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PREFACE.

In Barth's "Religions of India" we find the following notice of Rāmānuja:—"In the twelfth century this qualified idealism (viz. that of the Pāncarātras or Bhāgavatas) was successfully revived by Rāmānuja, a Brāhmaṇ, and a native of the neighbourhood of Madras, who gave a systematic exposition of it in his commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras*. He argued against the absolute *Advaita* of Śāṅkara, maintained the separate but finite reality of individual beings, and rejected the theory of the *Mūyī*. His followers, called Rāmānujas, after his name, worship Rāma as the representative of the Supreme Being, they are divided into several branches, and are very numerous, particularly in the South." And Sir Monier Williams in his "Brāhmanism and Hindūism" writes:—"Rāmānuja, or as he is called by his followers Rāmānujācārya, was born about the twelfth century at Strī (Śrī) Parambattūr, a town about twenty-six miles west of Madras. He is known to have studied and taught at Kāñcīpuram, and to have resided towards the end of his life at Śrīrangam on the river Kāverī, near Trichinopoly, where for many years he worshipped Viṣṇu in his character of Śrīranganaṭh. The distinctive point of his teaching, according to the *Saiva-darśana-saṅgraha*, was the assertion of the existence of a triad of principles (*padārthatritayam*),—namely, 1. The Supreme Being (*Īvara*), 2. Soul (*cit*), and 3. non-Soul (*a-cit*). Viṣṇu
supreme Being; individual spirits are souls; the visible
n) is non-Soul. All three principles have an eternal
existence distinct from each other.

This doctrine was clearly antagonistic to that of the great Brāhmanical revivalist Śāṅkara, who lived three or four centuries before. According to Śāṅkara, the separate existence of the spirit of man, as distinct from the one Universal Spirit, was only

illusory. Illusion (*Māyā*), too—existing from all eternity—was the only material or substantial cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of the external world, though this eternally creative Illusion was powerless to create the world except in union with the one Spirit Rāmānuja, on the other hand, contended that the souls of men are truly, essentially, and eternally distinct and different from the one Universal Spirit. With regard to the external world his views appear to have been less dualistic than those of the Śāṅkhya, and even than those of the Vedānta viz of Śāṅkara), for in the former we have *Prakṛiti* and in the latter *Māyā*, as the material cause (*upādāna*) out of which the universe was created, whereas Rāmānuja held that God is himself both the creator (*kartā*) of the world and the substantial cause or material out of which it is formed.* He appears, too, to have asserted that the world and God stand towards each other in the relation of body and soul, and that body and soul are virtually one. It will be found, in fact, that the doctrine "*ex nihilo nihil fit*" in some form or other holds good in every religious system which India has produced independently of Christian influences."

The *Vedāntatattvasāra* may be briefly described as consisting of a series of refutations of the leading Śāṅkara doctrines, and vindications of those of Rāmānuja, and as therefore giving a good idea of the views held by this teacher, and the mode of argumentation adopted by him and his followers in their controversies with the Śāṅkaras. The work is, as stated on the title-page, usually ascribed to Rāmānuja himself, and I commenced the following translation with this impression; but as I proceeded I found several reasons for doubting the truth of this opinion. In the first place, the *Vedāntatattvasāra* can hardly be considered as worthy in style and execution of the author of the *Śrībhāṣya* and other works that are undoubtedly his, and, secondly, it

* That is, when Nature (*Māyā*, *Prakṛiti*) is regarded as in close union with Him, as the body of which He is the Soul—not when each is considered as to essence. Comp. pages 17—32 of this work.

appears to be full of quotations * from the *Śrībhāṣya*, *Gītābhāṣya*, and other writings of Rāmānuja, not always very closely connected or combined into one whole. Hence I conclude that it is for the most part a compilation by some *śiṣya* or other follower of this famous teacher. But it may be taken as a trustworthy compendium of the principal tenets of the Rāmānuja system for the very reason that it is such a compilation.

It is very difficult, in this part of India, to ascertain the real facts as to the works of Rāmānuja, and inquiries made of learned pandits have not been productive of any very satisfactory results. But I find in the *Prapannāmrita*, a poetical account of Rāmānuja and some of his contemporaries of allied views, the following statement at the beginning of the 69th chapter —

आश्रिताखिलमन्दारो भाष्यकारो महायथाः ।
 अस्यां भूम्यां शेषितव्यानर्थान् साधनरूपकान् ॥ १ ॥
 तेषां विरोधिभागांश्च लोकोन्जीवनहेतुना ।
 सम्यङ्निर्णय्य सुस्पष्टं तदर्थप्रतिपादकान् ॥ २ ॥
 अधिकारानुगुण्येन जीवन्त्यान् व्याजहार सः ।
 वेदान्तसारवेदान्तदीपवेदार्थसङ्ग्रहान् ॥ ३ ॥
 तेषां विवरणञ्चक्रे श्रीभाष्यं यतिपुङ्गवः ।
 श्रीशाङ्खिभक्तिस्तोत्रात् तदुल्लभतरन्त्विति ॥ ४ ॥
 ततो गद्यत्रयञ्चक्रे प्रपञ्चप्रतिपादकम् ।
 तेषामनधिकाराणां प्रपञ्चा स्वाङ्घ्रिपङ्कजम् ॥ ५ ॥
 हितं सम्यक् प्रदर्शयाम कृतकृत्यो यतीश्वरः ।
 लीलाविभूतिं सन्त्यज्य नित्यां सम्प्राप सत्वरम् ॥ ६ ॥

“That greatly renowned Commentator, (Rāmānuja) who is (as it were) the *mandāra* (one of the five trees of paradise ;

* See, for instance, on pages 23, 59, 68, clear examples of extensive quotation, besides which many others might be noted.

hence *mandāra* = fulfiller of desires) to all * those who betake themselves to him, having, for the giving of new life to men, deeply reflected on the matters to be discriminated (?) (or observed ?) † in this world, as forming the means (of true knowledge and emancipation) and those portions (in the *siddhāntas* of other teachers?) in opposition thereto, promulgated three treatises which very clearly expound these matters in accordance with the qualifications (of different classes of his followers), viz, the *Vedāntasāra*, the *Vedāntadīpa*, and the *Vedārthasangraha*. As an explication of these, that eminent ascetic also composed the *Śrībhāṣya*; in it is taught devotion to the feet (person) of Viṣṇu. That (viz., *Śrībhāṣya*) being hard to understand, he then composed the *Gadyatraya*, which inculcates *prapatti* (taking refuge in the mercy, etc., of Viṣṇu). Then having fully shown that the weal of those not qualified (for the study) of the above-mentioned works is to be attained by repairing for refuge to his (the teacher's) lotus-feet, and having accomplished all his aims, the lord of ascetics forsaking the sport-manifestation (or glory) of the world straightway gained the eternal glory of heaven."

And in a small work entitled "A Catechism of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Philosophy" by Pandit N. Bhāṣyāchārya, who describes himself as a Vaiṣṇava Brāhman, and a descendant of the 74 Vaiṣṇava priests (Āchārya-Purushas) appointed by Śrī Rāmānujāchārya, and as having had opportunities of studying systematically this philosophy under his own learned *guru*, this answer is given to question 46:—"He (Rāmānuja) left behind him altogether seven works:—(1) *Śrībhāṣya*, a large commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa, according to the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy. In this work he criticises the other philosophical systems, especially that of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya. (2) *Vedāntadīpa*, a smaller commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras*. (3) *Vedāntasāra*, a gloss on the *Brahma Sūtras*. (4) *Vedārtha-sangraha*, a discourse on the *Upanishads*. (5) *Gītā-*

* I take *akṣulāiritamandāra* to be the correct reading.

† The text seems to be corrupt, but I have no emendation to suggest.

bhāṣyā * a commentary on *Bhagavadgītā*. (6) *Gadyatraya*, (in prose) a treatise in praise of Nārāyaṇa, written for the use of his disciples (7) *Nityagrantha*, or ordinances relating to the daily worship of Nārāyaṇa. Of these he presented *Śrībhāṣya*, *Vedārtha-saṅgraha*, and *Gītābhāṣya* to the library (at Srīnagar)."

In neither of these quotations is any mention made of the *Vedāntatattvasāra*, but of the *Vedāntasāra* only. Through the kindness of Bābū Govindadās, Durgākund, I have been enabled to look over a copy of the latter work, and I find the description given of it in the second quotation an accurate one, viz., that it is a very brief gloss on the *Brahma Sūtras*, and quite distinct from the *Vedāntatattvasāra*. From the cursory inspection I have been able to make, I should say that it, too, is not by Rāmānuja himself, though ascribed to him in both the above-cited passages.

* This, though not mentioned in the preceding quotation from the *Prapaṇā-mṛita*, is undoubtedly by Rāmānuja.

BENARES,
3rd September, 1891.

॥ श्रीः ॥

श्रीमद्रामानुजाचार्यप्रणीत इति प्रसिद्धो

वेदान्ततत्त्वसारः ॥

श्रीमते रामानुजाय नमः ॥

“सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्मे”त्येवाद्वितीय-
यशब्देन सजातीयादिभेदशून्याङ्गीकारे कथं तादृशस्य जगद्वापारः ।
मायाङ्गीकारेणेति चेत् किं तदानो निर्विशेषज्ञानमात्रस्वरूपं ब्रह्म
माया तिष्ठतीति जानाति न वा, जानाति चेत् ज्ञानमात्रस्य कथं
ज्ञातृत्वम् । न जानाति चेत् अज्ञत्वात्कथमङ्गीकरोति । अपि च
यत्किञ्चिच्छक्तियोगेन मायाङ्गीकारानन्तरमभ्युपेयते भवद्विः तत्पूर्वे

In the text “Truly (1) existent, my dear child, was this in the beginning, one only without a second, Brahma”, since you hold that by the words “without a second” that (2) is affirmed which is devoid of difference belonging to the same class, etc., how is such a being capable of mundane activity ? (How can it engage in the creation, sustentation, and retraction of the universe ? If you say that this takes place by the appropriation of *Māyā*, then, we ask, does Brahma, whose essence is undifferentiated (3)

1 Chhāndogya Upanishad VI. 2. 1.

2 Brahma is said by the Śāṅkara Vedāntins to be devoid of difference inherent in the same class of things, in a different class, and in an individual of a class. These differences are, respectively, what distinguishes one piece of cloth from another, a piece of cloth from a water pot, and the top of a tree from its root. See also *Pañchadāsī*, *Pañjālī* Vol. V. p. 667.

3 The idea is that before the (illusory, creation of the universe Brahma is not differentiated, i. e. is pure knowledge, or intelligence, without any distinction in itself, or in relation to objects; and that in order to this creation he admits (angīkaroti) *Māyā* to association and union with himself, and, thus associated and united with *Māyā*, becomes

मायाङ्गीकारानुगुण्यन्यभ्युपगमे निर्विशेषत्वहानिः । किञ्च तदानीं किं मायाविलक्षणं ब्रह्म उताविलक्षणेन मायात्मकम् । यदि विलक्षणं वस्तुतः परिच्छेदादनन्तत्वं ब्रह्मणो न स्यात् । अथ मायात्मकम् तर्ह्यङ्गीकारवचनं निरर्थकं, “सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्मे” तिलक्षणावाक्यमप्यपादै स्यात्, सजातीयविजातीयव्यावृत्त्यर्थे हि लक्षणम्,

knowledge only, (4) then know that Māyā exists, or does it not ? If you say that it knows, how can that which is pure knowledge only be a knower ? If you say that it does not know, then since it is without knowledge (is not a knower,) how can it appropriate Māyā ? (5) Moreover, as regards what you acknowledge after the appropriation of Māyā by means of a certain capacity possessed by Brahma, there must be prior to this a loss of undifferentencedness, seeing that you acknowledge a capacity conducive to the appropriation of Māyā.

Again, Is Brahma at that time different from Māyā in qualities and nature, or is it, as not so differing, identical with

differentenced and capable of creation etc. According to the Śāṅkaras Brahma is impersonal, while the Rāmānujyas hold that he is a personal and conscious being. The pronoun he used in the translation seems necessary in English, but it is not intended to imply personality, for it is the Śāṅkara doctrine that is under discussion.

4. At the time of the appropriation of Māyā, and before the (illusory) creation of the universe.

5. Even prior to the creation, etc, acknowledged after the appropriation Māyā, Brahma cannot be wholly undifferentenced, from the very fact that you must admit that it is capable of appropriating Māyā. Two other readings of the first clause do not seem of much value. They are “Apīcha Yatkiñchichehkhaktiyogam Māyāṅgikārartham abhyupeyate bhavadbhīḥ” and “Apīcha Yatkiñchichehkhaktiyogam Māyāṅgikāntantaram abhyupeyate bhavadbhīḥ” They may be translated thus,—“Moreover, as, in order to establish this appropriation of Māyā, you acknowledge that (Brahma) is possessed of a certain capacity (for that appropriation)” and “Moreover, as you acknowledge that (Brahma) is possessed of a certain capacity (for creation, etc,) after the appropriation of Māyā.”

तदन्यानिष्ठतन्निष्ठमर्थोऽपि हि नान्यथा । ननु शिष्योपदेशार्थमध्यारो-
पापवादस्यायेनेहमुच्यते, “असर्वभूतायां रक्षौसर्पारोपवद् वस्तुन्य-
वस्तुचारोऽध्यारोपः, वस्तु सन्निदानन्ताद्वयं ब्रह्म, अज्ञानादिसकल-
जडसमूहोऽवस्तु, अज्ञानन्तु सदसदभ्यामनिर्वचनीयं विगुणात्मकं
ज्ञानविरोधि भावरूपं यत्किञ्चिदिति वदन्ति, अहमश्च इत्यनुभवात्”,
अन्यथा निर्विशेषस्य कथं जगत्कारकत्वमिति चेत् । तद्वैवं जग-
न्मिथ्यात्ववादे शिष्याचार्ययोस्तदुपदिष्टज्ञानस्यापि तदन्तर्गतत्वा-
Māyā? If (6) Brahma does so differ, then by reason of limitation
by substance it is no longer infinite. And if it is identical
with Māyā, then the declaration that Brahma appropriates Māyā
would be meaningless and absurd. The defining sentence (7)
“Brahma is real, knowledge, infinite” would also be (8) inapplicable,
for a definition is intended to exclude what belongs to the same
class and to other classes, for knowledge of a property which
inheres in some particular thing, and does not inhere in what is
other than that thing, is not otherwise conveyed than by such a
defining sentence.

6 If Brahma does differ in nature and qualities from Māyā, then
Brahma and Māyā form two distinct substances, and Brahma must be
limited by Māyā as a separate substance, and so is not the great whole.
This objection is urged in accordance with the doctrine of the Śāṅkaraas,
who hold that *kālate deśato vastutaścha parichehbedo nāsti* (Brahma is
not limited by time, space, and substance) On the other hand, the
Rāmānujiyas hold that though Brahma is thus limited by the existence
of another substance, viz, *achit* (matter) he is still infinite (that is,
all pervasive). Vide Taittiriya Upanishad II. 1. Bhāshya, in loco, and
Panchadaśī, Pañḍit, Vol. VI. p. 104.

7. Taittiriya Upanishad II. 1

8. If Brahma is identical with Māyā, then, according to the
Śāṅkara's view of Māyā, it ought to be described as,—“Unreal,
ignorance, and finite” Hence this special lakṣhaṇa would not apply,
and lakṣhaṇa in general would also have no place; for difference
inherent in the same class of things, and in a different class, would
not exist in such a case, there being only one substance—Brahma.

क्लिष्टोपदेशार्थे कल्पितमित्यपि न शक्यते वक्तुम्, कल्पिताचार्या-
पदिष्टेन कल्पितज्ञानेन कल्पितस्य शिष्यस्य का वार्थेऽभिहितः । नि-
र्विशेषचिन्मात्रातिरेकि सर्वे मिथ्येतिवदतो मोक्षार्थशक्यादिप्रयत्नो
नष्कलोऽविद्याकार्यत्वात्, शुक्तिकारणत्वमिदं रजताद्युपादानादिप्र-
यत्नवत् । मोक्षार्थप्रयत्नोऽपि व्यर्थः कल्पिताचार्यायतनज्ञानकार्यत्वात्,
शुक्लह्लादवामदेवादिप्रयत्नवत् । “तत्त्वमस्या”द्विवाक्यजन्यज्ञानं न
बन्धनिवर्तकमविद्याकल्पितवाक्यजन्यत्वात्, स्वयमविद्यात्मकत्वा-
त्, अविद्याकल्पितज्ञानाश्रयत्वात्, कल्पिताचार्यायतनश्रवणजन्य-

But you will say that this (9) is asserted for the instruction of the student according to the rule of (10) ascription and negation—“(11) Ascription is the imagining of the unreal in the real, like that of the snake in the rope which is not really a snake (but a rope only)—The real is Brahma, the existent, intelligence, joy, and secondless, the unreal is the whole assemblage of insentient objects, viz., (12) ignorance, etc. As for

9. The appropriation of *Māyā*, and the consequent creation, etc., of the world, omniscience as *Īśvara*, etc

10 The Śāṅkara will say that all this is ascribed to Brahma, (i. e. Brahma is imagined as the subject of the appropriation of *Māyā*, and the illusory generation, etc. of the universe) by the teacher in order not to shock the student's prepossessions about the reality of the universe, etc. But the teacher only ascribes this, in order, step by step in his teaching, to advance to a complete negation of the reality of the world, the bondage of the individual soul, and the difference between that and Brahma.

11. Śāṅkara Vedāntasāra, p. 5 Calcutta printed edition This quotation gives in a nutshell the Śāṅkara's notion of the world as an unreal substance erroneously superposed on, or imagined to exist in, Brahma as its substratum, and the only real substance, just as when on a dark night a rope mistaken for a snake is the real substance, and the substratum, so to say, of the imaginary snake.

12. i. e. the conditioning adjunct of *jīva*, original ignorance, and its effects *jagadjanmādi*.

त्वाद्वा, स्वप्नबन्धनिवर्तकशक्त्यजन्यज्ञानवत् । नन्वाचार्यतज्ज्ञानयोः
कल्पितत्वेऽपि स्वप्नदृष्टसिंहभयेन प्रबोधवज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिः सम्भवतीति
चेत्तेषां दृष्टान्ते परमार्थेदोषस्य स्वप्नस्य सिंहरूपासदर्थोपलब्धिं ज्ञानं
प्रति कारणत्वं ज्ञानस्य भयं प्रति भयस्य प्रबोधं प्रति, प्रभुद्वेषि देव-
दत्तः परमार्थः । दृष्टान्ते तु सर्वस्य मिथ्यात्वेन दृष्टान्तानुपपत्तिः ।
अपिचास्मिन् सिद्धान्ते “नारायणः परं ब्रह्म आत्मा नारायणः पर”

ignorance, they declare it to be something that cannot be described either as existent or non-existent, constituted of the three qualities, adverse to knowledge, having (13) the form of an entity, as attested by the cognition I am ignorant,”—and you will ask how (14) in any other way could the undifferentenced be the cause of the world? We reply, Then if you thus affirm the falsity of the universe, you cannot also affirm that it (the universe) is feigned by the teacher to assist in the instruction of the student, because the student, the teacher and the knowledge imparted by him would be included (as false)—what benefit would be obtained by a feigned student by means of feigned knowledge taught by a feigned teacher? And in the case of one who alleges that everything except pure undifferentenced knowledge is false, the effort of (15) reading, etc., in order to attain liberation is futile, because it (the effort) is an effect of ignorance; like the effort to acquire nacreine silver, etc. The effort to attain liberation is also nugatory, because it is the effect of knowledge resting (for its impartation) on the agency

13. The Śāṅkaras suppose that such cognitions denote that ignorance is a real entity (or, a something positive).

14. How can we suppose the undifferentenced Brahman to engage in real creation, etc.? It is only by the aforementioned attribution of ignorance, or illusion, to Brahman that he can be regarded as the cause of the illusory universe.

15. Reading and study of the Vedānta with the teacher in order to obtain true knowledge of the self.

इत्यादिश्रुतिप्रतिपादितो नारायणः प्रथमगुरुर्ब्रह्मण कल्पितः पूर्वे ब्रह्म
सनातनः पुरुषोत्तमोऽर्जुनेन कल्पितः कल्पिता च तदुपविष्टा सर्व-
थास्त्रमयी गीतेत्येवं दुःषिद्धान्तापत्तिदोषः प्रज्ञामानसिः कथं न
विचारणीयः । अथ चेत्सिद्धान्तनिष्ठैरपि स्वस्वगुरुविषये माया-
कल्पित इत्येवंवक्तव्यत्वे “गुरुरेव परं ब्रह्म गुरुरेव परागतिः” “सहि
षिद्यातस्त जनयति तच्छ्रेष्ठं जन्म तस्मै न दुह्येत कदाचन” “आ-

of a feigned teacher, like (16) the effort of Śuka, Pāhlāda, Vāmadeva, etc. The knowledge derived from texts like “That (17) thou art” does not put an end to bondage, because (18) it originates from a sentence feigned by nescience, because it is itself of the nature of nescience, because it rests on knowledge feigned by nescience, or because it originates from hearing (the teaching of the Vedānta) which is dependent on a feigned teacher, just as in sleep knowledge (19) derived from a sentence (heard therein) does [not] put an end to bondage (experienced in the waking state).

But it may be asserted that although the teacher and the knowledge inculcated by him are both feigned, yet it is possible that knowledge may be produced in the student, like the waking

16. For according to the system of the Śaukaras everything but Brahman is unreal, hence the endeavours of the unreal Śuka, etc., were unreal and nugatory

17. Chhāndogya Upaniṣad VI. 8 7.

18. As the world and all its conditions are illusory, so the Veda, also, as belonging to the mundane state, is feigned and unreal, the knowledge derived from it is of like character, and also the intelligence which in the form of teacher and student is its recipient.

19. The knowledge derived from such texts is according to you purely illusory, i. e. has no real existence, being itself part of this illusory world, and its effect, therefore, is just as unreal as that of knowledge derived from a sentence heard in sleep would be, which knowledge only seems to put an end to bondage, but does not do so in reality, for the unreal knowledge attained in sleep cannot have a real effect.

चायमे मां विजानीयादि"त्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिविरोधः कश्च न परामर्श-
नीयः । नन्वतत्त्वज्ञानदशायामुपदेशादयः सत्य एव जाते तु ज्ञाने
“यत्तत्त्वस्य सर्वमात्मेवाभूतत्वेन कं पश्येद्वि"त्यादिश्रुतेर्न द्वैतदर्शन-
मिति चेत् तद्विद्वितीयमात्मसाक्षात्काराद्विनष्टमूलाज्ञानतत्त्वायस्य कथं
द्वैतदर्शनपूर्वकोपदेशादिव्यवहाराः । बाधितानुकुन्येति चेत् सम्य-

consciousness produced by fear of a lion seen in a dream. To this we reply, not so—in the illustration the dream, although a (20) defect, is a real thing, and is the cause in relation to the knowledge which is dependent on the non-existent object, viz., the lion—knowledge is the cause in relation to fear—fear in relation to waking, and moreover the awakened Devadatta has a real existence. On the other hand, in the subject of the illustration, (viz., the manifested universe) everything is unreal, and therefore the illustration is inapposite. Besides, according to this doctrine (of the falsity of the universe), the Nārāyaṇa (Viṣṇu) described in,—“Nārāyaṇa (21) is the supreme Brahma, the supreme spirit is Nārāyaṇa,”—and other passages of the Śruti, is feigned as the first teacher by Brahmā, and is feigned as the perfect Brahma, the Eternal, the Best of Beings, by Arjuna (22); and the song which he (Krishna) taught, containing the essence of all the Śāstras, is also feigned. That such an evil conclusion should follow is surely a fault which ought to be well considered by those who pride themselves on their wisdom. Besides, as those who hold this doctrine must also say in the case of their own teachers, that they are feigned by Māyā, they ought to take into account how this opposed to the following passages of the Śruti and

20. Avidyā is the supreme original defect, and all others proceed from it. A defect is defined as that by what a thing appears as other than it really is. For instance, by the power of Māyā the world appears real, but Brahma its substratum is alone real, and the world false.

21. Probably a quotation from the Nārāyaṇa Upanishad.

22. In the Bhagavadgītā.

ज्ञानप्रवृत्तिवैलायां बाधिनानुवृत्तिलिप्तिरिति न वा, तिष्ठति चेत्
 "ज्ञानेन तु तदज्ञानं येषां नाशितमात्मन" इत्यादिप्रमाणाविरोधा-
 नुभवविरोधश्च, रज्जुनासात्कारदृशायां सर्वधमानुषलम्भात् । न
 तिष्ठति चेदुपदेशसमये सम्यग्ज्ञानप्रवृत्तत्वेन बाधिनानुवृत्त्यसम्भ-
 वात्कथं द्वैतदर्शनं तत्कृतोपदेशश्च । अथ च "विद्राक्षितो मोहम-
 हान्यकारोऽय आश्रितो मे तत्र सन्निधानात्, विभावसोः किन्तु समीप-
 Smṛiti,—“The teacher is verily the supreme Brahma, the teacher
 is the highest refuge” “For he begets him (the student) by
 means of knowledge, that is the best birth, let him (the student)
 never bear ill-will against him (the teacher)” “Let him know
 the teacher to be me (Brahma)”

Again, if it be said that in the absence of true knowledge
 instruction and other usages are indeed (23) real, but when know-
 ledge is gained, there remains no perception of duality, according
 to the Śruti,—“But (24) when to him (the wise) all has become
 spirit only, then what should he perceive by means of what,”—
 we ask, How can there exist the practice of instruction etc., ac-
 companied by the perception of duality, in the case of one (25)
 whose (26) original ignorance and its effects have been destroy-
 ed by the intuition of the secondless spirit? If you say
 that this is owing to the persistence of the negated, (27)

23. i. e., seems to be real

24. Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad II 4. 14.

25. Viz. the teacher, who must have attained to true knowledge
 in order to teach others.

26. Original ignorance is that by which the whole world seems
 to him to exist.

27. Viz. ignorance and its effects The world, transmigration etc.,
 have been shown to be false, and exploded, but ignorance and its
 influence still remain, like the odour which remains in a pot of garlic
 after it has been washed, or like the ashes of a piece of cloth consumed
 by fire (Siddhāntīśa, Parichebheda 4)

गस्य शीतं तमो मीः प्रभवन्त्यजाद्य” इति वादिन उद्धवस्य स्वत-
त्त्वज्ञानस्फूर्तिप्रकाशनखेलायां बाधितानुवृत्त्यसम्भवे “नमोस्तु ते महा-
योगिन् प्रपन्नमनुशाधि मां यथा त्वत्पुत्राभ्योक्ते रतिः स्यादनुपायि-
नी”तिमेव दर्शनमूलविज्ञापनं कथं सम्भवति । रज्जुबाधात्कारदशायां
सर्पेष्टमानुषपत्तिवद्, पदिष्यमानतत्त्वज्ञानानुसन्धानेनाद्वितीयात्मसा-
क्षात्कारे सति बाधितानुवृत्त्यनुपपत्त्या उपदेशानुपपत्तिस्तदवस्था ।

then, we ask, does this persistence of the negated exist at the time when right knowledge obtains, or does it not? If it does, then this would be opposed to “But (28) in the case of those whose ignorance has been destroyed by knowledge of the self” and similar authorities, and also opposed to the evidence of consciousness, seeing that the mistake of there being a snake (imagined as existing in the rope) is not to be found when there is immediate perception of the rope (as a rope). If it does not exist, then we reply that as right knowledge obtains at the time of instruction, and the persistence of the negated is therefore impossible, how can there remain a perception of duality, and the teachings resulting (29) therefrom? Moreover, the persistence of the negated being impossible at the time when Uddhava thus declared the revelation to him of true knowledge,—“By (30) thy approach the delusion and great darkness which abode in me have been dispelled. How, indeed, can cold, darkness and fear prevail over one who has drawn nigh the sun, O first of the unborn (gods),”—how could he make the following request founded on the perception of difference—“Salutation to thee, O great Yogī. Instruct me who have taken refuge in thee, so that my devotion to thy lotus feet may be unfailing” Just as when there is

28. Bhagavadgītā V. 16.

29. i. e., as before stated, in the case of the teacher.

30. Bhāgavata Purāṇa

तथा भगवदुपदिष्टतत्त्वज्ञानवधारणानन्तरं “नष्टो मोहः स्मृतिर्ल-
ब्धा स्वप्नसादान्मयाऽच्युत” इत्यादिना तत्त्वसाक्षात्काराविष्कार-
दशायां बाधितानुवृत्त्यसम्भवात्, तव प्रसादात् “स्थितोऽस्मि-
तसन्देहः” दुर्योधनादीन् प्रति युद्धविषयं “तव वचनं करिष्य”
इति द्वेन दर्शनमूलमज्जुनवाक्यं कथं सङ्गच्छेत । किञ्च परमार्थदोषमूल-
कैरज्जुवर्षादिदृष्टान्तेरपरमार्थदोषमूलेयं बाधितानुवृत्तिर्दुःसाध्यापि
यत्कथञ्चिदुच्यते तत्क्षेत्रज्ञस्यैवाच्यताम् । आदावज्ञत्वं पश्चा-

direct apprehension of the rope the erroneous notion of there being a snake can no longer hold, so on the immediate intuition of the secondless spirit by means of reflection on the true knowledge which is being taught (by the teacher,) the persistent influence of the negated becomes impossible; and hence the impossibility of instruction remains the same as (31) before. In like manner, after (Arjuna's) full apprehension of the true knowledge taught by the Blessed One (Krishna,) inasmuch as the persistent influence of the negated was impossible when he manifested his intuition of the truth in the words,—“Delusion (32) is destroyed, and I have attained (33) recollection by thy favour undecaying One,”—how does Arjuna's (further) declaration founded on a perception of duality harmonize therewith, viz, “By thy favour I stand freed from doubts, I will do thy bidding with reference to fighting against Duryodhana and the others?”

Moreover, although you will find it hard to establish the persistent influence of the negated, which is produced by the unreal, by means of such illustrations as that of the rope and the snake, which (illustrations) have as their foundation really

31. In the case of the student.

32. Bhagavadgita XVIII. 73.

33. Recollection is the uninterrupted abiding knowledge of the truth of things.

द्रुहपदेशादिभिरधिगतज्ञानत्वं तेषामेव सम्भवति । ईश्वरस्य तु
 “यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्” “परा इत्य शक्तिर्विविधेव श्रूयते स्वाभा-
 विकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च” “यो वेति युगपत्सर्वे प्रत्यक्षेण सदा स्वतः”
 इत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधात्कथञ्चिदपि ब्रूतुं न शक्यते । कथं तर्हि तस्य
 द्वैतदर्शनमुपदेशादिव्यवहाराश्चेति निरूपणीयम् ।

ननु मिथ्याभूतस्य मिथ्यात्वेन दर्शनं न सम्यग्ज्ञानविरोधीति

existing defects, (of error etc.) still if it (34) be affirmed at all, it should be affirmed of the embodied soul only—in the case of such souls alone is it possible that they should at first be ignorant and afterwards experience accession of knowledge by means of the teacher's instruction, etc But this (persistence of the negated) can nowise be asserted of the Divine Ruler, for it would be opposed to the following, and like passages of the Śruti—“He (35) who knows all things (in general) and knows every thing (in particular)”, “Transcendent (36) is his power, it is revealed as truly manifold and essential, and also the operation of his knowledge and might”; “Who of himself, always at one and the same time, knows all things by immediate perception” Therefore (37) it is to be considered how the perception of duality and usages of instruction can possibly pertain to him.

But if it be said that the perception (by Īśvara) of that which is unreal as unreal is not opposed to (the existence

34. Viz. persistence of the negated.

35. Mūṇḍaka Upaniṣad I 1 9.

36. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad VI 8

37. Īśvara is described as being a teacher; for example in the Mahābhārata as Viṣṇu he teaches Brāhṇā, and in the Bhagavad-gītā as Kṛiṣṇa he teaches Arjuna, hence persistence of the negated must pertain to him also, but this is opposed to all sacred authority. If perception of duality etc., are all products of nescience, then how can they pertain to the infinitely wise?

चेत्, यदीश्वरो मिथ्यात्वेनैव स्वयतिरिक्तं जानाति न तर्हि तन्न-
यहानुग्रहादिषु प्रवर्तेत, न ह्यनुन्मत्तः कोपि मिथ्यात्वेन ज्ञातानुद्दिश्य
किमपि करोति । किञ्चेश्वरस्य यावद्विशेषविरोधिब्रह्मस्वरूपाव-
भासे ब्रह्मविघर्नेभूतं द्वैतदर्शनं मिथ्यात्वेनापि न सम्भवति न हि
शुक्तितया शुक्तौ भासमानायां तत्र रजतावभासेषण्णिः । तद्यानभ्यु-

of) right knowledge (38), we reply, if Īśvara (39) knows what is distinct from himself to be unreal, then he cannot engage in the acts of favouring (the good), repressing (the wicked), etc.; for nobody who is not crazy performs any action with reference to (persons) known (by him) to be unreal. Moreover, seeing that in the case of Īśvara there is a manifestation of the essence of Brahma, which is the opposite of all variety, the perception of duality (40), which is an illusory modification of Brahma, (41) cannot exist even as unreal, (42) for when the

38. If Īśvara perceives what is unreal as real, then he cannot be omniscient; but if he perceives what is unreal as *unreal*, then his being Īśvara is not invalidated. Just as a traveller in a sandy desert while seeing the water of the mirage, feels assured of the non-existence of water (i. e. that his perception is false), in the same way Īśvara, also, cognising the whole world as false is not involved in ignorance.

39. As we have seen, the Śāṅkaras hold that the supreme Brahma is not differenced in any way. The word Īśvara is applied by them to the Māyā—modified, differenced Brahma who engages in the creation, etc., of the world. The Rāmānujas, on the other hand, regard Brahma as always differenced by qualities, etc., and with them Īśvara is but another name for Brahma.

40. i. e. the perception of difference of substance—the cognition that the world exists apart from Brahma.

41. Another reading is “Brahmavivartabhūten-driyadvaitadarśanam”—“perception of duality by means of an organ which is an illusory modification of Brahma.”

42. Īśvara, says the Śāṅkara, perceives duality, but perceives it as false.

यगमे “स विश्वकृद्विश्वविदात्मघोनिर्द्धः कालकालो गुणी सर्वविद्
यः” “तेषामेवानुकम्पार्थ”मित्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिविरोधः । किञ्च यथा
चन्द्रेकत्वे ज्ञायमानेषु द्विवन्दर्शनमविदोऽव दोषमन्तरेश न स्यात्,
तथेश्वरस्य मिथ्यात्वेनापि द्वैतदर्शनमविदोऽव दोषं विना च न सम्भ-
वति । दोषाभ्युपगमे तु “शुद्धे महाविभूत्याख्ये परे ब्रह्मणि वर्तते
मेवम भगवच्छब्दः सर्वकारणकारणे”, “समस्तहेयरहितं विष्णवाख्यं

mother-of-pearl shell appears as a mother-of-pearl shell, there is no possibility of the manifestation of silver therein. If you do not admit this to be so (viz, that there cannot be a perception of duality as false in the case of *Īśvara*), then your position contradicts the following texts of the *Śruti* and *Smṛiti*—“He is (43) omniscient, omniscient, self-caused (self-existent), who knows, is the author of time, endowed with good qualities, all-wise,” “To (44) show compassion on them only (I, abiding in the essence of the self, destroy, with the bright lamp of knowledge, the darkness sprung from ignorance).” Moreover, as the perception of two suns, though it is known that there is only one sun, is pure nescience (error), not without fault (as its

43 *Śvetāśvatara Upanishad* vi. 16. Instead of *kālakāla* (which seems to be the reading everywhere in *Rāmānuja* works), the printed *Upanishad* reading is *kālakāra*, which agrees with *Śāṅkara*’s explanation—*kālasya kartā*. According to the translation adopted in the text, *kālakāla* has practically the same meaning, the second *kāla* being equivalent to *pierayitā*, *pravartaka*, from *kālayati*, to instigate. Or according to another meaning of the same root *kālakāla* may mean the ‘Calculator of time.’ Or perhaps the sense simply is, ‘the time of time,’ that is, the Lord of time. The *Vedānta Syamantaka*, in expounding this passage says “Time is not the Lord of the Supreme Spirit, as it is of other things, but the Supreme Spirit is the Lord of time.”

44. *Bhagavadgītā* X. II. The recipients of compassion are those only who are devoted to *Kṛishṇa*.

परमं पदम्”, “परः पराणां सकला न यत्र क्लेशादयः सन्ति पराव-
रेश” इत्यादिनित्यनिर्दोषप्रतिपादकशास्त्रविरोधः । तस्माद्यथा
तिमिरादिदोषरहितस्य द्विचन्द्रदर्शनं मिथ्यात्वेनापि न सम्भवति
तथा समस्तहेयप्रत्यनीकस्येश्वरस्यापि मिथ्यात्वेनापि द्वैतदर्शनं न
सम्भवति । किञ्च नीलपृष्ठाद्याकारेणानुभूयमानायां शुक्तौ मिथ्यात्वे-
नापि न रजतप्रतीतिः । तदुपादानाद्यर्थे प्रवृत्तिश्चानुन्मत्तानां यदि

cause), so Īśvara's perception of duality even as false would be nothing but nescience, and could not arise without fault. But if you should allow the existence of fault (in the case of Īśvara), then such an admission would be in conflict with the following sacred authorities, which describe an eternally faultless being— (45) “The word Bhagavat, O Maitreya, is applied to the pure supreme Brahman, who is called Mahāvibhūti, the cause of all causes,” (46) “(He who is) called Vishnu is the highest refuge, devoid of all imperfection,” “The (47) highest of the high ones (gods), who is free from all distress, etc., the Lord of the higher (gods) and the lower (men)” Therefore as the perception of two moons even as unreal, is not possible in the case of one who is free from the defect of tinna, etc., so the perception of duality even as unreal is not possible in the case of Īśvara likewise, seeing that He is the opposite of all imperfection (48)

45. Vishnu Purāṇa VI 5 59.

46. Vishnu Purāṇa

47. Vishnu Purāṇa VI 5 70.

48 The word heya, ‘what is to be abandoned,’ denotes here and elsewhere in the Rāmānjan darśana whatever is defective and the opposite of good, and specially the faults and imperfections that attend the jivātmā in the state of bondage, and from which it is dissociated when emancipated. From these Īśvara is ever free. It is to be borne in mind that heya resides in Prakṛiti, and not in the jivātmā, and is only connected with the latter through the antahkarana, which is really connected with the jivātmā, not illusorily as in the Sāṅkara system.

दृश्येत तदेवस्वरस्यापि सर्वदाऽपरोक्षेणाद्वयानन्तात्मसाक्षात्कारे मि-
थ्यात्वेन द्वैतदर्शनं तन्मूलोपदेशादिव्यवहाराश्चापपद्येरन् । किं व-
रुणो सर्पवर्त्तिविशेषज्ञानमात्रे ब्रह्मण्यारोपितस्य प्रपञ्चस्य को दृष्टा ।
“नाऽन्त्रोऽतोऽस्ति दृष्टे”ति श्रुतिर्ब्रह्मेव दृष्टेति चेत्, ज्ञानमात्रस्व-
रूपस्य कथं दृष्टृत्वं कथं वा ज्ञानमन्तरेण भ्रमभूतस्य प्रपञ्चस्य

Moreover, (49) when the pearl-oyster shell is perceived under the aspect of a dark-coloured exterior, etc., there exists no cognition of silver even as unreal. And if it were observed that men in their sober senses exerted themselves for the purpose of acquiring such (silver) etc., then in the case of Īśvara, also, the perception of duality even as unreal, and the usages of instruction, etc., based on that perception, would be fitting, notwithstanding his (50) immediate cognition of the secondless bliss-spirit, Brahma, which (immediate cognition) exists always and by intuition.

Moreover, who is the percipient of the manifested universe, which is imagined in Brahma, who is undifferentenced knowledge only, as the snake (is imagined) in the rope? If you say that Brahma alone is the percipient, according to the passage of the Śruti (51) “There is no other percipient than this,” How can that whose essence is knowledge only be a percipient, or how can there be a percipient of the universe, which is constituted of error (illusion), without knowledge (as a quality of the percipient)? If you say that (Brahma is the percipient) by means of union

49. That is when the shell is closed, or seen so lying that the outer part only is exposed to view, and not the internal, iridescent, silvery layer called mother-of-pearl, or nacre.

50. The Śāṅkaras hold that Īśvara, although engaging in the work of the universe, is not bound, and is omniscient, etc. Hence, as omniscient, he must have an ‘immediate cognition of Brahma,’ or a ‘manifestation of the essence of Brahma.’

51. Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad III. 8. 11. Though the Śāṅkaras usually quote the passage as given in the text, the Upaniṣad reading is ‘Nāyadato’sti draṣṭṛḥ.’

दृष्टा । मायायोगेनेति चेत्, किमयं योग [अथवा सम्बन्ध] आग-
न्तुक उत स्वाभाविकः । आगन्तुके तु विभुत्वं ब्रह्मणो न स्यात् ।
स्वाभाविकश्चेत्, अयेऽपि मायाशबलमेव ब्रह्म, अतश्च सर्वदा
विशिष्टमेवेति सिद्धम्, एवं च सति कथं विजातीयभेदशून्यम् ।
किंच मायाशबलत्वेऽप्यये प्रपञ्चाप्रतीतिः किं कारणम् । ईदृशाभावा-
दप्रतीतिरिति चेत्, तदभावे किं कारणम् । इच्छेवेति चेत्, किमये-

with Māyā, then, we ask, is this union [or (52) connection] adventitious or essential? If you hold it to be adventitious, then Brahma cannot be (53) all-pervasive, and if it is essential, then it is established that even in the beginning Brahma is truly modified by Māyā, and hence that it is always differenced, and this being the case, how is it devoid of the difference inherent in another (54) class? Moreover (55) what is the cause of the non-cognition of the universe notwithstanding that Brahma is modified by Māyā? If you say that non-cognition is owing to the absence of (56) vision, we ask what is the cause of the absence of that? If you say the will (of Brahma) alone, we ask, was Brahma even in the beginning endowed with will? If so,

52. This seems to have crept in from the margin

53. If the connection with Māyā is adventitious, then Brahma is not all-pervasive, otherwise why should he not, diffused everywhere, be always in union with Māyā?

54. See note 2, p. 1.

55. If the connection between Brahma and Māyā is essential, then there must be a cognition of the manifested universe at the very beginning, (i. e. even before each creation, and during each pralaya) i. e. you hold that before the creation Brahma is undifferenced, which cannot be the connection with Māyā is essential.

56. The act of seeing referred to in such passages as Chhāndogya Upanishad VI. 2. 3. 4. as being the first step in the work of creation. This ikshāpa is interpreted to import sankalpa (the resolve to create) in the darśanas generally.

ऽपीच्छावद्ब्रह्म तर्हि सर्वदा सविशेषमेवेति सिद्धम् । किञ्चाङ्गीकरणा-
त्पूर्वकमाश्रिता माया । ब्रह्माश्रितेति चेत्, सर्वदा वैशिष्ट्यप्रसङ्गेऽद्वे-
तहानिश्च । ननु मायाया अपरमार्थत्वात्तदोषप्रसङ्ग इति चेत्,
अपरमार्थशब्देन किं विवक्षितम्, रज्जुसर्पवन्मिथ्यात्वम्, अथ-
वा त्रिकारावच्छिन्नत्वेन ब्रह्मसमानसत्ताभाववत्त्वम् । न चाद्यः,
“अज्ञानन्तु त्रिगुणात्मकं ज्ञानविरोधि भावकूपमि”ति स्वसम्प्रदायवा-
चनविरोधः । अथ “मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सूयते सचराचरमि”त्युक्त्या

then it is established that he was always differenced. Moreover, prior to the appropriation (by Brahma), who was the substratum of Māyā? If you say that Brahma was the substratum, then it follows that he is always differenced, and there is an end to non-duality.

But if it be said that Māyā being unreal the fault just referred to does not attach (to Brahma), we ask what is intended by the word 'unreal'? Falsity like that of the snake (imagined) in the rope? Or, as (Māyā) (57) is characterised by modification, the not being possessed of an existence like that of Brahma (58)?

The first alternative is not (admissible), for it is in conflict with the declaration of your own system,—“(59) Now ignorance —is constituted of the three qualities, adverse to knowledge, having the form of an entity”

57. The Śāṅkaras agree with the Rīmānujas in holding that Māyā, constituted of the three qualities, is modified in the form of the ether, etc.; &c in practical life they acknowledge modification (*pari-nāma*); but they further affirm that according to the real condition of things this is only illusory modification (*vivarta*).

58. Literally “the being that which is possessed of the negation of an existence like that of Brahma.” Another reading is ‘Brahma-samānasattākābhāvatvam.’ Perhaps the original reading was ‘Brahma-samānasattākātvābhāvaḥ,’ or ‘Brahmasamānasattābhāvaḥ.’

59. Śāṅkara Vedāntasāra, page 5, Calcutta printed edition.

कार्योत्पत्तिः कारकाभावे न स्यात्, असतः परोत्पन्नानुकूलशक्तिमत्त्व-
रूपकारणत्वावम्भवात् । ननु कार्यस्याप्यसत्त्वे नैव दोषः स्वप्नशिर-
श्छेदनकार्ये प्रति स्वाप्नचौरस्य कारणत्वं दृश्यते इति चेन्न “वेधर्म्या-
सु न स्वप्नादिवदि”ति सूत्रे स्वप्नजायतेवेधर्म्याज्जायतस्तत्त्वयानं स्वप्न-
त्ययसादृश्यप्रतिषेधात्, तथा “सत्त्वाच्चापरस्ये”तिसूत्रे यथा च कारणं
ब्रह्म त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति तथा कार्यमपि जगत्त्रिषु
कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरतीति कार्यस्य सत्यत्वप्रतिपादनात्,
अन्यथा “ऽसत्यमप्रतिष्ठन्ते जगदाहुरनीश्वरमि”त्यासुरसिद्धान्तप्रस-

Moreover, the production of effects (which is sanctioned) by the words—“Through (60) me, the supervisor, Nature gives birth to the animate and inanimate (world)”—would not take place, there (61) being a non-existence of cause, (62) for it is impossible that what is non-existent should be a cause in the form of that which is endowed with a capacity conducive to the production of something else

But if you say that since the effect is purely non-existent this is not a fault—a thief seen in a dream is perceived to be the cause in relation to the effect consisting of the cutting—off of a

60. Bhagavadgītā IX. 10:

61. In both systems Māyā is the material cause of the universe ; but while to the Śāṅkara she is only illusorily a material cause, to the Rāmānuja she is, as identified with Prakṛti, a real material cause, and her effects are also real. It may be said that there is no difference as to the identity of Māyā with Prakṛti in the two systems ; only the Rāmānujas hold that Māyā, or Prakṛti, is real, and the Śāṅkaras that she and her product, the unmanifested and manifested universe, are false.

62. Literally “It is impossible that the non-existent should possess causality in the form of the being endowed with a capacity conducive to the production of something distinct (from itself).”

ज्ञात्, “गौरनाद्यन्तवती सा जनयिषी भूतभाविनी”, “विकारजननी-
मन्नामगुरुपामजां ध्रुवात्”, “अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत्”,
“अजामेकौ”, “मायां तु प्रकृतिं श्रियन्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम्, यस्या-
वयवभूतेस्तु व्याप्तं सर्वमिदं जगत्”, “अक्षरात्परतः पर”, “मम
योनिर्महद्ब्रह्म”, “मम माया दुरत्यया”, “प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव विद्व-
नादौ उभावपी”त्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिविरोधाच्च, न हि मिथ्याभूतं वस्तु-
त्वरत्त्वध्रुवत्वादिभिः परवाक्यैरुपदिश्यते । द्वितीयस्तु पक्षः प्रकृते-

head seen in a (63) dream—we say no, since in the Sūtra—(64)
“Because of difference of characteristics, (the waking state is) not
like sleep, etc”—because of the different nature of waking and
sleeping—it is denied that the cognitions of the waking state are
like the cognitions of the state of sleep, and also since in the
Sūtra—“And (65) because of the existence of what is posterior”—
the (66) effect is affirmed to be real, according to the dictum—
“and (67) as the cause, Brahma, does not forego (is inseparably
connected with) existence during the three times (past, present,
and future), so the effect, the world, also does not forego existence
during the three times”—for otherwise the doctrine of demon—like
men would accrue,—“They (68) declare the world to be without

63. In the dream all appears real, though false, so this illusory
world appears real, but is purely fictitious, and since it is fictitious, it
cannot be said that the non-existence of the cause *Māyā* is a fault.

64. *Brahma Sūtras* II. 2 29.

65. Do. do 1 16 Instead of ‘*aparasya*’ ‘*avarasya*’ is the
reading found in the printed text of the Sūtras, but the former seems to
be the only reading in Rāmānuja works.

66. The Rāmānuja here argues if the effect—the manifested
universe—is real, then the cause *Māyā* (i. e. *Prakṛiti*) must be real also.

67. A quotation from Śankara’s commentary on this Sūtra, and
a shaft drawn from the enemy’s quiver.

68. *Bhagavad-gītā* XVI. 8.

ब्रह्मसमानसताकाभावाभ्युपगमात्, “विकारजननीमज्ञात्”, “नित्य-
सततविक्रियामि”त्यादिभिरस्याः सविकारत्वेन सततपरिणामत्वेन
चेकरूपाभावान्न ब्रह्मसमानसताकत्वम् । अत एवेयमनृतादिपदैरुप-
चर्यते तत्कार्याण्यप्यनित्यत्वेनाविर्भावतिरोभावधर्मकत्वसाम्यात्स्व-
प्रपञ्चमृगतृष्णातोयादिषट्सन्मिथ्यादिपदैरुपचरतो व्यपदिश्यन्ते

reality, without basis, without a divine ruler” ; and the following passages of the Śruti and Smṛiti would be contradicted (by the theory of the falsity of mundane effects),—“Nature is without beginning and without end, she is the genetrix, who causes beings to be,” “The genetrix of change, the unconscious, the eightfold, (69) the unborn, the enduring,” “Out (70) of this the Māyā-associated One creates all this universe,” “(Māyā (71) who is) unborn, and one,” “(72) Let him know Māyā to be Nature, but the Māyā—associated One to be the great Lord, by whose parts all this world is pervaded” “(The (73) Supreme Spirit is) higher than the imperishable, high One,” “My (74) great Brahma is the source (whence proceeds the birth of all things),” “My (75) Māyā is hard to over pass,” “Know (76) Nature and Spirit to be both of them beginningless”, for it is not an unreal thing which (these) higher (77) texts describe as being ‘imperishable,’ ‘enduring’ etc’

69. See Bhagavadgītā VII. 4

70. Śvetāśvatara Upanishad IV. 9.

71. Do. IV. 5.

72. Do. do 10.

73. Muṇḍaka Upanishad II. 1. 2.

74. Bhagavadgītā XIV. 3.

75. Do VII. 14. Quoted in proof of the reality of Nature.

76. Do. XIII. 19.

77. So called because, in contrast to those texts which set forth things in a secondary sense, these higher texts declare the higher transcendental truth of things.

वेदायवननार्थम् । यच्चेऽपलभ्यमानत्वविनाशित्वाभ्यां सदसदनिर्वचनीयत्वेन कार्यस्य मृषात्वमिति तदसत्, उपलब्धिविनाशयोगो हि न मिथ्यात्वं साधयति किंत्वनित्यत्वम् । यद्वेशकालसम्बन्धितयोपलभ्यते नोपलभ्यते च तदनित्यत्वं प्रकलवाक्यैः, “अनाशी परमार्थश्च प्राञ्चैरभ्युपगम्यते तत् नानाश न सन्देहो नाशिद्रव्योपपादितम्”, “यत्तु कालान्तरेणापि नान्यसंज्ञामुपैति वे परिणामादिसम्भूतां तद्वस्तु

But the second alternative (is not opposed to our view) for (we) acknowledge that Nature is not possessed of an existence like that of Brahma—because she is not uniform, as shown by her changefulness and continual modification, she is not possessed of an existence like that of Brahma, according to the words “(Nature) the genetrix of change, the unconscious,” “The eternally subject to continual change.” Hence for the purpose of generating (78) dispassion, ‘false’ and other like terms are metaphorically applied to her, and her effects are also, like the world of sleep, the water of the mirage, etc, metaphorically described by the words ‘non-existent,’ ‘unreal,’ etc, inasmuch as they resemble (these illusory objects) in being endowed with the properties of appearance and disappearance (79) That which (you assert) viz, that an effect is false since, on account of its being (first) perceived and (afterwards) destroyed (as to form), it cannot be described either as existent or non-existent, is untrue, for (the effect’s) connection with perception, and destruction (of form) does not

78. i. e. Nature is so described by the Śruti in order that those whose knowledge is imperfect may attain dispassion and freedom from worldly desires and appetites, for if they entertained the notion that the world was real, they would give their minds to worldly things only.

79. Because the effect is perceived, it cannot be said to be non-existent; and because it is destroyed as to form, it cannot be said to be existent

नृप ! तच्च किम्", "अन्तवन्त इमे देहा" "अविनाशि तु तद्विद्धि"
 "आद्यन्तवन्तः कौन्तेय न तेषु रमते बुधः", "आममायाग्निनाऽ-
 नित्याः", "अनित्यमसुखं लोकात्", एकादशे च "प्रत्यक्षेणानुमानेन
 निगमेनात्मसंविदा, आद्यन्तवदसज्ज्ञात्वा निस्सङ्गे विशरेदिह", "त-

prove that it is false, but rather that it is impermanent. What is (first) perceived and (afterwards) not perceived in relation with time and space, that is impermanent according to the cogent (80) texts "The (81) wise hold (the soul to be) imperishable and real, but that (the effect of works) is perishable, without doubt, being effected by means of the perishable substance," "But (82) what never at any other time obtains another name resulting from transformation, etc., that is real, and what is that O king?", "These bodies (83) (are said to) pass away," "But (84) know that (spiritual substance) to be imperishable." "(Enjoyments (85) produced by external objects) have beginning and end, the enlightened does not take pleasure in them, O Son of Kunti", "(The (86) contacts of the senses with the outer world) come and go, being impermanent," "(This) transient (87) joyless world", and in the eleventh Skandha of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa—"By sense-perception, by inference, by revelation, by cognition of the self, knowing (this world) to have beginning and end, to be non-existent, let him live here without attachment (to worldly things)" "This universe

80. Cogent—setting forth in a clear and conclusive manner, as contrasted with other texts, the reality of things.

81. Viṣṇu Purāṇa II 14 15.

82. Do. " 13. 74.

83. Bhagavadgītā II 18.

84. Do. " 17.

85. Do. V. 22.

86. Do. II. 14.

87. Do. IX 33.

देतदस्य नित्यं जगत्” । ते एव नित्यानित्ये “नासतीवद्यतं भाव” इत्यत्र सत्त्वासत्त्वव्यपदेशहेतुः, अन्यथा पूर्वोपरविरोधः प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधश्च । प्रत्यक्षं प्रपञ्चसद्भावमाहकमिति सूत्रकारोप्याह “नाभाव उपलब्धेः” ।

न“न्येकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्मे”ति श्रुतिः स्फुटतयाऽद्वितीयत्वं ब्रह्मणो वदति कथं तर्हि वस्तुन्तरसद्भावे तत्सिद्धिः । उच्यते वस्तु-

is undecaying, eternal.” It is the same permanence and impermanence (of Spirit and Nature respectively) which cause them to be described as existent and non-existent in the śloka. “ There (88) is no being of the non-existent (there is no non-being of the existent),” (89) otherwise there would be a contradiction to the context, and also contradiction to perception by the senses. That (90) perception causes apprehension of the true being of the universe the author of the Sūtras has also declared “Because (91) of its perception (the world) is not non-existent”.

But it may be said that the Śruti clearly affirms that Brahma is without a second in the words “(Truly existent was this in the

88. Bhagavadgītā II 16 See Rāmānuja's Commentary on the Bhagavadgītā, *in loco*, on which this paragraph is largely based.

89. In the above Commentary Rāmānuja shows that the indestructibility and destructibility of spirit and body respectively, (not the reality of the one and the falsity of the other), are referred to in the passage immediately preceding the last quoted śloka, beginning with “Learned men do not grieve for the living or the dead,” and in the subsequent ślokas “Know that to be imperishable,” etc., “These bodies are said to pass away,” etc.

90. There is perception by the senses of the external world of matter, which would also be contradicted, for the senses do not perceive what is wholly false in itself.

91. Brahma Sūtras II. 2 28.

न्तरविशिष्टस्यैवाद्वितीयत्वं श्रुत्यभिप्रायः । तथाहि, इदं विभक्तनाम-
रूपबहुत्वावस्थं जगदये सृष्टेः प्रागेकमेवाऽविभक्तनामरूपकतये-
कत्वावस्थापन्नमेवाऽद्वितीयमधिष्ठानान्तरशून्यञ्च सदेवासीदित्यर्थः,
“मूलमनाधारमि”त्यादिभिरैकार्थ्यात् । सच्चिदेो विशेष्यभूतपरमा-
त्मवाचकोपि कारणविषयत्वसामर्थ्यात्कारणत्वोपधिकगुणविशिष्टप्रकृ-
तिकालशरीरकं परमात्मानमुपस्थापयति । तथाच सदेवेत्येवकारेण
नेयायिकाभिमतमुत्पत्तेः प्राजगतोऽसत्त्व व्यावर्त्यते । एकमेवेत्ये-
वकारेण “बहुस्यामि”ति सत्त्वमाशकार्यबहुत्वावस्था व्युदस्यते ।

beginning), one only without a second, Brahman” How then can that possibly be the case if there is true existence of substance additional to, and distinct from (Brahman)? We reply that the meaning of the Śruti is that Brahman as differenced by substance (92) additional and distinct is without a second. Thus the meaning of the above passage is as follows, “This universe whose state is (now) that of a multiplicity of discrete name and form, in the beginning, before the creation, was truly existent as one only, and without a second, (i. e.) had (then) passed into a state of unity because of its having indiscrete name and form, and was devoid of another basis,” for it thus agrees in meaning with

92. Viz The two substances *chit* and *achit*, i. e. soul and not-soul (non-soul, *Prakṛiti*, *Kāla*). The three real and distinct substances or existences acknowledged by the Rāmānujas are indicated in the formula *chidachidāśvaāḥ*. *Chaitra* is spoken of as one, though a differenced being composed of soul, body, etc. The Supreme Spirit is differenced, qualified, conditioned by the aggregate of soul and not-soul as co-existing substances composing as it were his body, and controlled by him as man's body is by his spirit, and the title of the Rāmānuja system, *Vaiśiṣṭādvaita*, means the doctrine of the secondlessness (complex oneness, wholeness) of Brahman so differenced.

सर्वासाङ्कारवादिनीनां श्रुतीनामेकवाक्यावश्यम्भावात् । तत्र “विष्णुस्तदासीद्वृत्तिरेव निष्कलः”, “एको ह वै नारायण आसीन्न ब्रह्मा नेशानो नेमे द्यावापृथिवी न नक्षत्राणि नापो नाग्निर्न सोमो न सूर्यः” “स एकाकी न रमते तस्य ध्यानान्तःस्थस्येका कन्या दशेन्द्रियाणी”-
त्यारभ्य सुबालोपनिषदि “किं तदासीन्नेवेह किंचनाय आसीन्मूल-
मनाधारमिमाः प्रजाः प्रजायन्ते दिव्यो देव एको नारायण” इत्या-
द्यनुसारात्, “तद्वेदं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत्तन्नामरूपाभ्यां व्याक्रियते”ति
नामरूपव्याकरणमात्रश्रवणाद्वायमेव श्रुत्यर्थः, अन्यथापरस्परव्या-
घातप्रसङ्गात् । उपदिष्टं चेत्तच्छ्रुत्यभिप्रायं भगवतेकादशे,

‘A baseless root,’ and similar texts. The word ‘existent’ besides denoting (93) the Supreme Spirit as characterized by difference, by virtue of its relating to the cause (of the world) indicates the Supreme Spirit as one whose body is Nature and Time differenced (94) by (possessed of) properties conducive to causality. So here, by the word ‘truly’ in ‘Truly existent,’ the non-existence of the world before its production (as an effect), as held by the Naiyāyikas, is excluded. By the word ‘only’ in ‘one only’ the state of multiplicity of the effects about to be created, which is described

93 As for instance in Chhāndogya Upanishad VI 8 4, 6. ‘sat’ denotes the Supreme Spirit in his own nature as spirit only. He is *viśeshya*, susceptible of, and characterized by difference, as contradistinguished from differencing Nature and soul, which are his *viśeshana*.

94. The word ‘sat’ relating to the cause of the genesis, etc., of the world, describes that which is capable of being a cause, and such causality is possible only to the differenced Brahma, i. e. the Supreme Spirit in conjunction with soul and not-soul, not the Supreme Spirit alone. Here the Supreme Spirit and soul are the *nimittakāraṇa*, and not-soul (*Prakṛiti*) is the *upādānakāraṇa*.

“एको नारायणो देवः पूर्वसृष्टं स्वमायया ।

संहृत्य कालकलया कल्पान्त इदमीश्वरः ॥

एक एवाद्वितीयो ऽमूदात्माधारो ऽखिलाश्रयः ।

कालेनात्मानुभावेन साम्यं नीतासु शक्तिषु ॥

सत्त्वादिष्वदिपुरुषः प्रधानपुरुषेश्वरः ।

परावराणां परम आस्ते कैवल्यसंज्ञित” ॥

in the words “Let me become many,” is (95) negatived. For all passages of the Śruti that are declarative of the cause must necessarily agree in meaning.

This is clearly the meaning of the Śruti in the above quotation (tatra), because in accordance with the passages commencing with “Then Viṣṇu existed—Hari alone, without parts,” “Verily one only, Nārāyaṇa, existed, Brahman was not, nor Śiva, nor this heaven and earth, nor the stars, nor the waters, nor fire, nor the moon, nor the sun,” “He delights not in being alone—one daughter (buddhi) and the ten organs (were born) of him while absorbed in meditation,” in the Subāla Upanishad, (and subsequently proceeding thus) “What then existed? Nothing indeed existed here (in the world) in the beginning, there was a baseless root—these creatures are produced—there was one heavenly

95. The state characterized by multiplicity of effects is negatived, but not the real independent existence of soul and not soul. The idea is, If these did not previously exist as distinct realities, then Brahman would have said ‘Let me become differenced,’ ‘Let me become soul and not-soul,’ but not ‘Let me become many’; which indicates that soul, not-soul, and Īvara existed in a state of unity, as one differenced whole—‘Let me become many’ implies difference of substance existing in an indeterminate state.

इत्यत्राखिलाभये सत्येवादितीयत्वनिर्देशेन विशिष्टस्येवादि-
तीयत्वं स्फुटतया विदुम् । वाराहे च “मय्येव सकलं जातं मयि सर्वं
प्रतिष्ठितं मयि सर्वं लयं याति तद्ब्रह्माद्वयमस्यहम्” । श्वेताश्व-
तरोपनिषदि च मन्त्राभिमानिभिर्देवैरपि सूक्ष्मचिदविद्विशिष्टस्येव पर-
मात्मनः परमकारणत्वं निर्णीतम्, “ओ ब्रह्मवादिनो वदन्ति

किं कारणं ब्रह्म कुतः स्म जाता जीवाम केन क्व च सम्प्रतिष्ठाः ।

अधिष्ठिताः केन तु खेनरेषु वर्तमानहे, ब्रह्मविदां व्यवस्था ॥

कालः स्वभावो नियतिर्यदृच्छा भूतानि योनिः पुरुषेति चिन्त्यम् ।

संयोग एषा न त्वात्मात्मभावादात्माप्यनीशः सुखदुःखहेतोः ॥

deity, Nārāyaṇa,” and because there is a revelation of the (96) de-
velopment of name and form alone in “This (World) was then un-
developed, it was (afterwards, at the creation) developed by name
and form ” for otherwise it would follow that (these texts and
(97) “Truly existent” etc.) are mutually conflicting.

And this, intended (as shown above) by the Śruti, is
taught by Bhagavat (Krishna) in the eleventh (Skandha of the
Bhāgavata Purāṇa), “The one divine being, Nārāyaṇa, the Lord,
at the end of the kalpa, at the (fitting) period of time, by his
wonder—working power having retracted this formerly—created
universe into himself, existed as one only without a second, the
self—based, the substrate of all—at the (right) time by his own
inherent energy goodness and the other forces (qualities) having
been brought into a state of equipoise, the Primal Soul, the Lord
of Nature and Soul, supreme over the superior (gods), and the

96. The world previously existed in the state of undeveloped
name and form, and the origin of previously non-existent things is not
here described.

97. ‘Truly existent,’ etc., teaches the secondlessness of Brahma
only as differenced.

ते ध्यानयोगानुगता अपश्यन्देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणेर्निगूढाम् ।

यः कारयानि निखिलानि तानि कालात्मयुक्तान्यधितिष्ठत्येकः” ॥

वेदान्तसूत्रकारोपि स्वयोगमहिम्नेदमेव निश्चितमित्याह श्रीभागवते,

“भक्तियोगेन मनसि सम्यक्प्रणिहिते ऽमले ।

अपश्यत्पुरुषं पूर्णं मायां च तदुपाश्रयाम् ॥

inferior (men), abides under the designation of pure unity” In this passage by the enunciation of the secondlessness (of Brahma), while he is at the same time the (98) substrate of all, it is clearly proved that this secondlessness is that of a differenced being only Also in the Varāha Purāṇa “In me all originated, in me all is subsistent, in me all is (ultimately) absorbed, therefore I am the secondless Brahma.”

And in the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad the supreme causality of the Supreme Spirit only as differenced by subtle Soul and not-Soul, (and not as undifferenced, according to the Śāṅkaras) is definitely declared by (99) the deities who identify themselves with the Mantras (of this Upanishad—(100) “Om! Those who inquire about Brahma ask, (101) What is the cause Brahma? Whence

98 The substrate of all things (soul, not-soul) existing in the subtle, undeveloped state.

99. The deities are here distinguished from Bhagavat, mentioned in the preceding passage. They identify themselves with, or regard themselves as the patron deities of, the Veda, i. e. preside over its preservation, revelation, transmission by accredited teachers, application to the different holy rites, and the teaching of the recondite meaning of the Angas and Upāṅgas.

100. Śvetāśvatara Upanishad I, 1—3. This is a very difficult passage, but I have tried to render it in conformity with Rāmānuja doctrines, and also as far as possible in accordance with the meaning of the original as I understand it. There are several readings different from those of the printed text which have influenced the rendering. I have found the passage elsewhere with

यया संमोहितो जीव आत्मानं त्रिगुणात्मकम् ।

परोपि मनुतेऽनर्थं तत्कृतं चाभिपद्यते ॥

अनर्थोपशमं साक्षाद्वक्तियोगमथोक्षजे ।

लोकस्यावानतो व्यासश्चक्रे सात्वतसंहिताम्” ॥

किञ्चाय इत्यनेन यदि प्रलयकाले विवक्षितः तदा तु “अ-
क्षरं तमसि लीयते तमः परे देवे एक्यीभवति”,

are we born? Whereby do we live, and wherein do we ‘ultimately’) abide? By whom ruled do we live in pleasure and pain? The dictum of those who know Brahman—It (the cause Brahman) is to be regarded as time, the inherent character (of things), necessity, (102) spontaneity, the elements, (103) Nature, and Soul—as the union of these,

the same readings. *Brahmavidām vyavasthā*, instead of *Brahmavidā vyavasthām* in the printed text as annotated by Śāṅkara, is alluded to and explained by the word *unipita*. In two manuscripts the word *saṅkhyā* occurs between *kāla* and *avasthā*. This, if not a clerical error or something crept in from the margin, indicates that the doctrine of the Pythagoreans was not altogether unthought of in India. Chintyam for *chintyā* probably agrees with *kūṭanam*. In some manuscripts the reading is *natvātmā bhāvat* instead of *natvātmātmabhāvat*. This would still give the sense that ‘soul is not (alone) the cause by its nature (as soul).’

101. Here we have the three notions of genesis, continuance, and absorption in Brahman, which latter according to this system is simply a return to the subtle state of soul and not-soul, and not identification with Brahman, as the Śāṅkaras teach.

102. The word *yadūchchhā* presents a difficulty of which I have not been able to get a satisfactory explanation. How can ‘spontaneity’ be enumerated among the causes?

103. The original word ‘yonī’ is clearly a name of one of the causes, and not a mere predicate the rest of the sentence, as it has been understood in previous versions of this passage. The sense ‘Nature’ seems the only suitable one.

“प्रकृतिर्यो मयाख्याता व्यक्ताव्यक्तस्वकृषिणी ।

पुरुषश्चाप्युभावेतौ लीयते परमात्मनि ॥

परमात्मा च सर्वेषामाधारः पुरुषोत्तमः ।

स विष्णुनामा वेदेषु वेदान्तेषु च गीयते” ॥

भारते च,

but spirit (alone) is not (the cause) by its nature as spirit—spirit also (as *jīvātmā*) is not the Lord, because of (the existence of) pleasure and pain They the *Brahmavidah*), devoted to the practice of meditation, beheld (104) the power of the Divine Spirit concealed by its own qualities He who, being one, (105) superintends all those causes associated with time and spirit, (in the preceding passage)—

The author of the *Vedānta Sūtras* also declares that he has ascertained the same (106) truth by the greatness (power) of his concentration —“By the practice of devotion defilement being destroyed, his mind being wholly fixed and purified he saw the Perfect Soul and *Māyā* whose substrate he is, (that *Māyā*) (107) by whom the soul being deluded, though superior, regards itself as consisting of the three qualities, and obtains (suffers) the evil resulting therefrom. For the sake of the people who do not know that direct devotion to *Kṛiṣṇa* is the annulment of evil *Vyāsa* has composed the (108) *Sātvatasamlittā*”

104. *Devātmaśakti* is perhaps more correctly ‘the power inherent in God,’ though the *Rāmānuja* doctrine seems to require the rendering given in the text

105. Or ‘superintends all those causes combined with time and spirit, (in the work of causation).’

106. *Viz.* the supreme causality of the differenced *Brahma*.

107. In this system the connection of Soul with body and works produces identification with the body, and *Miyā* (*Avidyā*) is Nature, works, and the ignorance resulting from connection with these.

108. *Scil.* *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*

“ब्रह्मादिषु प्रलीनेषु नष्टे लोके चराचरे ।

आभूतसंप्रपञ्चे प्राप्ते प्रलीने प्रकृते महान् ॥

एकस्तिष्ठति सर्वात्मा स तु नारायणः प्रभुः” ।

इत्याद्यनेकप्रमाणैस्तदानीं सूक्ष्मविद्विद्विशिष्टस्य ब्रह्मणः
सिद्धत्वादिशिष्टस्यैवादितीयत्वं सिद्धम् । यदा तु यत्पूर्वं कदाचिदपि
न सृष्टिसद्भावस्तत्कालोऽयमर्थः तदा तु “सूर्याचन्द्रमसो धाता

Again, if by the expression ‘in the beginning’ the time of the world’s absorption is intended then by “The imperishable one (jīvātmā, Soul) is merged in darkness (Prakṛiti, Nature) darkness becomes one with the Supreme Deity,” (109) “Nature whom I have described as of manifested and unmanifested essence, and Soul also, both these are merged in the Supreme Spirit, and the Supreme Spirit is the basis of all (beings), the Highest Soul, he is celebrated under the name Viṣṇu in the (110) Veda and in the Vedānta,” and in the Mahābhārata “When Brahmā and the other deities are absorbed, and when, the reflux (dissolution) of all beings having arrived, the animate and inanimate world vanishes and is absorbed in Nature, the Great (Being) abides as one, (111) the essence of all, and he is Nārāyaṇa the Lord,” and many other proofs it being established then that Brahma is differentiated by subtle Soul and not-Soul, it is established that he is secondless as differentiated only.

Again, if the words, ‘in the beginning’ signify (112) that time before which the creation had never really taken place, what is the meaning of this passage of the Śruti (113) “The Creator formed the sun and moon as before ?”

109. Viṣṇu Purāṇa.

110. The Veda here is the Karmakāṇḍa.

111. Not ‘the soul of all, but ‘he of whom all consists, he who comprises all in himself as his body and modes’

112. The Śāṅkara is supposed to say that this refers to a time when the creation had not occurred, and Brahma was undifferentiated.

113. R̥g Veda X. 190 3.

यथापूर्वमकल्पयति"ति श्रुत्यभिप्रायः कः । अथ च तदानीं जीवानां तत्कर्मप्रवाहाणाञ्चाभावाद्वैवादिष्विषमसृष्टेः किं कारणमिति निरूपणीयम् । ईश्वरेच्छेति चेन्न "साधुकारी साधुर्भवती"त्यादिश्रुतिविरोधाद्वैषम्यनेर्घृण्यदोषप्रसङ्गाच्च । ननु प्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वेन न वैषम्यादिदोषप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्न प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्ववादे "यथोक्तनामिः सृजते गृह्णते चे"त्यादि श्रुतिविरोधः, दोषपरिहारार्थं "वैषम्यनेर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात्"इति सूचनिर्माणवैयर्थ्यं च स्याद्विवर्तवादे ।

Moreover, seeing that souls, and the streams of their works, had at that time no existence it ought to be shown what is the cause of the unequal creation of gods, etc. If you say it is the will of Īśvara alone that is the cause, we say no, for that would be opposed to this and other passages of the Śruti—(114) "He that does good becomes good" and the faults of injustice and cruelty would attach to (Īśvara).

Again, if you say that the universe being false injustice and other faults do not thus attach, we reject this position—by the doctrine of the falsity of the universe (115) "As the spider sends forth and withdraws (its thread)" and other passages of the Śruti are contradicted, and according to the doctrine of illusory modification (116) the composition of the Sūtra (117) "Injustice and cruelty do not exist for (the world) is dependent (on works)" in order to disprove these faults would be purposeless (118).

114. Brihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad IV. 4. 5 He who performs good works obtains good recompense in the future life. Hence works are the cause of injustice (inequality of condition).

115. Muṇḍaka Upanishad I. 1. 7.

116. The differentiated Supreme Spirit is the real material cause of the world by modification of that portion of himself which is called not-Soul in the Rīmānuja System.

117. Brahma Sūtras II. 1. 34.

118. If the world is mere illusory appearance, then these are not real faults to be disproved.

ननु सन्मासाध्यस्तत्प्रपञ्चस्य को द्रष्टा, ब्रह्मेशानाद्यविद्याति-
रोहितस्वरूपं स्वगतनानात्वं पश्यतीति चेन्न नित्यमुक्ताऽख्येकर-
सप्रकाशज्ञानमात्रस्वरूपस्य निरंशस्य तिरोधानासम्भवात् । प्रकाशप-
र्यायस्य ज्ञानस्य तिरोधाने स्वरूपनाशप्रसङ्गः । तिरोधानं नाम वस्तु-
स्वरूपे विद्यमाने तत्प्रकाशनिवृत्तिः । प्रकाश एव वस्तुस्वरूपमित्य-
ङ्गीकारे तिरोधानाभावः स्वरूपनाशो वा स्यात् । न च वाच्यं स्वरूप-

If in reply to our question, (119) who is the percipient of the universe imagined in pure existence (Brahma) only, you say that it is Brahma alone (120) whose essence is concealed (121) by beginningless nescience that beholds multiplicity (the universe) existent in himself, we deny this, for it is impossible that (such) concealment should exist in the case of the (122) impartite (Brahma), whose essence is ever free, undivided, uniform light (or) knowledge only (123). On the (124) concealment of this know-
ledge, synonymous with light, there would ensue a destruction of essence. Concealment is the departure (cessation) of its light while the essence of the thing continues to exist. As you hold that the light itself is the essence of the thing, (*i e.* Brahma) then either concealment cannot occur, or, (if it does), there will

119. If the world is fictitiously imagined, then who is the percipient imaginer, for there must be such ?

120. There is no percipient distinct from Brahma, such as Chaitra, Maitra, etc.

121. Concealed in the form of jīva, etc.

122. Nānūjānāya, another reading for nānūśāya, would lay stress on Brahma's being ever free (from faults of nescience), as nānūśāya does on his being of undivided essence.

123. Brahma, you say, in the form of the different jīvas of Chaitra, Maitra, etc., is in the power of illusion but this cannot be, for Brahma is, according to your system, impartite, and in essence ever free, etc.

124. In the state of transmigration.

प्रकाशस्य नित्यत्वेऽपि तद्वैयर्थ्यमात्रमविद्यातिरोहितमिति वैशद्यस्य
स्वरूपानतिरिक्तत्वे प्रागुक्तदोषस्य तदवस्थत्वात्, अतिरिक्तत्वे च
सविशेषत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न च निर्विशेषप्रकाशमात्रस्याज्ञानसाक्षित्वम-
ङ्कारादिकगदूषमश्चेपयत्येते साक्षित्वभ्रमादयोऽपि हि ज्ञातृविशेष-
गता दृष्टा न ज्ञप्रमात्रगताः । किञ्च यदि ब्रह्मेशानाद्यविद्यावशात्स्व-
गतनानात्वं यथ्यति तर्हि प्रलयकाले विद्यमानेऽप्यज्ञाने प्रपञ्चाद-
र्थेने किं कारणम् । किञ्च ब्रह्माज्ञानपक्षे स्वाज्ञाननिवृत्त्या तस्यैव-

occur a destruction of essence. And it cannot be asserted that although the light (or knowledge which constitutes the essence (of Brahma) is imperishable, only its clearness (125) (or brightness) is concealed by illusion, for if the clearness is not distinct from the essence, then the afore-mentioned fault remains the same (126), and if it is distinct, then (Brahma) becomes differenced (127) Nor is it admissible that that which is undifferenced light (or knowledge alone should be a witness of ignorance, and the subject of the erroneous notion (of the existence) of the universe (consisting of) the organ of self-consciousness, etc., for the character of a witness, erroneous notion, etc., are observed to reside in a particular (concrete, personal) knower, and are not found in mere (abstract, impersonal) knowledge only. Moreover if it is Brahma only that under the influence of beginningless illusion beholds multiplicity existent in himself, then what is the cause of the non-perception of the universe during the time of its absorption, notwithstanding that ignorance (then) continues to exist (128)?

125. One MS. reads *varāśūṭya* for *varāṇḍya* in both places, which seems a clear mistake.

126. Viz that there takes place a destruction of essence.

127. The brightness then being a mere non-essential attribute, of the light, Brahma.

128. Ignorance continues to exist, and also the percipient Brahma, why then is the world not perceived? Why does it not exist?

मोक्षमाहत्वात्तद्विद्याकल्पितानां जीवानां मोक्षार्थप्रयत्नादिप्रयत्नो निष्कलोऽविद्याकार्यत्वात्स्वाप्नुमुच्छृणां प्रयत्नवत्, शुक्तिकारवतादिषु रजताद्युपादानादिप्रयत्नवत् । मोक्षार्थप्रयत्नोऽपि व्यर्थः कल्पिताचार्यायत्तज्ञानकार्यत्वात्, शुकप्रह्लादवामदेवादिप्रयत्नवत् । किञ्चेकमेव ब्रह्म सर्वशरीरेषु जीवभावमनुभवति चेत्, 'पादे मे वेदना शिरसि मे सुखमिति' वत्, सर्वशरीरेषु सुखदुःखप्रतिसन्धानं स्याज्जीवेश्वरबहु-मुक्तशिष्याचार्यज्ञत्वाच्चत्वादिव्यवस्था च न स्यात् । सौमरिप्रभृतिषु

Again, if you hold that ignorance appertains to Brahma (alone) then as Brahma alone is liberated by the departure of the ignorance attaching to himself, the effort of reading, etc., in order to attain liberation on the part of the souls fictitiously produced by his nescience is futile, because it is an effect of nescience like the effort of aspirants after liberation seen in a dream, and like the effort to acquire native silver, etc. The effort to attain liberation is also nugatory, because it is the effect of knowledge resting for its impartation on the agency of a feigned teacher, like the effort of Śuka, Prahlāda, Vāmadeva, etc

Again, if you assert that Brahma as one only experiences the condition of soul in all bodies, then there must be the (129) consciousness of pleasure and pain in all bodies,—such as 'I have a pain in my foot,' 'My head is easy,' (free from pain)—, and the established order of soul, Lord, bound, free, disciple, teacher, learned and unlearned would not exist. For oneness of soul existing in the case of Saubhan and others, the consciousness of pleasure, etc., occasioned by (union with) many bodies is seen to belong to one (soul)

129. Brahma alone must be possessed of universal all-pervading consciousness, just as Chartra being one only cognises simultaneously the sensations of pleasure and pain existing in various parts of his body.

ह्यात्मेकत्वेऽनेकशरीरप्रयुक्तं सुखादिप्रतिसन्धानमेकस्य दृश्यते । न चाहमर्थस्य चातृत्वात्तद्वेदात्प्रतिसन्धानाभावे । नात्मवेदादिति कर्तुं शक्यम् । आत्मा चातेव स चाहमर्थ एव अन्तःकरणभूतस्त्वहंकारो जडत्वात्करवत्त्वाच्च शरीरेन्द्रियादिवन्न ज्ञाना “विकारजननीमहाम्”, “एतदो वेति”, “नहि विज्ञातुर्विज्ञातेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते”, “नान्योऽतो ऽस्ति द्रष्टे”ति, “जानात्येवायं पुरुष.”, “विज्ञातारमरे केन विज्ञानीयात्”, मोक्षधर्मे च “अबुध्यमानां प्रकृतिं बुध्यते पञ्चविंशकः, न तु बुध्यति गन्धर्व प्रकृतिः पञ्चविंशकं” । किञ्चान्यत्र सप्त एवान्यचारोप-

Nor can it be said that the ahamartha (130) being the knower, it is because of its difference (in different bodies), not because of difference of souls, that there is an absence of consciousness (131) It is the soul that is the knower, and that (knower) is really the ahamartha (132) but the principle of egoism, constituted of the internal organ, is not the knower, seeing that it is insentient and an instrument, like the body and its organs (according to the following passages) “(Nature) the genetrix of change, the unconscious,” “He who knows this,” “(133) For the knowledge of the knower is indefeasible,” “There is no other percipient than this Soul alone knows,” “(134) Behold by what means should one know the knower! ” and in the Mokshadharmā (135) “The

130 Ahamartha, that which is expressed by the word I, or the object of the consciousness I, is here, with the Śāṅkara, synonymous with ahaṁkāra, as appears from the following sentence.

131. i. e. of universal consciousness on the part of Brahma. The pleasure and pain experienced in the body of Chaitra is not cognised by Maṁtra, but this would be the case if all souls were parts of Brahma.

132. Here the ahamartha is held to be jivātmā, the self, the Ego.

133. Brihad Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV. 3 30

134. Do. do II. 4. 13. IV. 5. 15.

135. Name of a section of the twelfth book (Śāntiparva) of the Mahābhārata, 6156 to the end.

नियमान्नरविवाणादेरिव स्वहृदयेणाऽसतः प्रपञ्चस्य न ब्रह्मण्यारोपस-
म्भवः, दृश्यते हि रज्ज्वादिषु सत एव सर्पादेरारोपः । 'नीलं नभः'
इत्यादिषु पूर्वमनुभूतस्य सत एव नीलस्य प्रतीतिः । स्वप्नेऽप्यद्य-
क्षन्मनि जन्मान्तरे वा दृष्टस्य श्रुतस्य वा विषयस्यानुभवः, "अदृ-
ष्टादश्रुताद्वावान्न भाव उपजायत" इत्येकादशे भवद्वचनात् । नन्वा-
रोपः स्वविषयस्य क्वाचित्प्रतीतिमात्रमपेक्षते न सत्यत्वमपीति चेन्न
प्रतीतिरप्यसतः शशशृङ्गादेरिव असम्भवात् । ननु रज्जुसर्पप्रतीतिरिव

Twenty-fifth is conscious of unconscious Nature, but Nature, O
Gandharva, is not conscious of the Twenty-fifth."

Moreover according to the rule that only that which is (really)
existent somewhere, can be imagined to exist elsewhere, it is im-
possible that the universe, essentially non-existent like the horn
of a man, etc., should be imagined to exist in Brahma, for it is ob-
served that only what is (really) existent, such as a snake, etc., is
imagined to exist in a rope and like objects. In 'the sky is blue'
also, there is a (136) cognition only of a (really) existent blue
(137), previously—perceived. In a dream, too, we perceive only
those objects which we have seen or heard of in the present or
some other (previous) birth, according to the declaration of Bha-
gavat in the eleventh Skandha (of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa) "No-
thing originates from a thing unseen or unheard of" (138).

136. Cognition is perceptual in the several cases mentioned.

137. Not of a blue in the sky (or ether), for this, according to
Hindu doctrine, being devoid of colour, the blue which presents itself in
the sky is simply an āropa of the real blue previously perceived in cloth
and other terrestrial things.

138. The argument is that even the imagination of the unreal is
a result of the perceived real. Only the real can be imagined elsewhere
than where it really is. If the world is false, then all that takes
place in it is unreal, and therefore unimaginable.

प्रपञ्चप्रतीतेरपि दोषमात्रमेवकारणमपेक्षितमिति विषयसद्भावो नापेक्षित इति चेन्न दोषरूपकारणस्यापि मिथ्यात्वेन परपक्षे विषयप्रतीतिरूपकार्योत्पत्तेरसम्भवात्कार्यस्य कारणसत्तापेक्षत्वनियमात् । नन्वसतोऽप्यारोपितसर्पस्य भयादिकार्यं प्रति कारणत्वदर्शनात्कार्यस्य कारणसत्तापेक्षत्वनियमो नास्तीति चेन्न, असतः परोऽप्यनुकूलशक्तिमत्त्वरूपकारणत्वासम्भवात्, भ्रमस्थलेऽप्यारोपितादिविषयज्ञानस्यैव भयादिकार्यहेतुत्वेन विषयस्य तद्वेतुत्वाभावात्, कारणमात्रमिथ्यात्वपक्षे कार्योत्पत्तिवर्णनानुपपत्तेः । नन्वसतोऽपि सर्पादेर्ज्ञानकारणत्वा-

But it may be said that only the cognition of its object in some substrate is necessary to erroneous surmised (āropa), not the reality (of that object). This we deny, for there cannot be even a cognition of what (139) is non-existent, as for instance the horn of a hare.

You may say that as in the case of the cognition of the snake (imagined) in the rope, mere fault (nescience) is all that is required as the cause of the cognition of the universe likewise, hence it is not necessary that the object (the universe) should really exist. We deny this, for, according to the view of our opponents, the cause consisting of fault being false, the effect consisting of the cognition of the object cannot be produced, conformably to the rule that an effect is dependent on the existence of its cause. But, you will reply, it being observed that an imagined snake, though unreal, is the cause in relation to fear and other effects, there is no rule that the effect is dependent on the existence of its cause. This we deny, because it is impossible that the non-existent should be a cause, whose character is the being possessed of a capacity conducive to the production of something else, because

139 The presentation of what is real alone takes place, otherwise what should prevent the presentation of such chimeras as sky—flowers, etc. 1

वपतिश्च द्रव्यकारणत्वोपपत्तिरपि किं न स्यादिति चेन्न देवस्यैवासदर्थवत्त्वमनञ्चानकारणत्वेन भ्रमस्थले विषयस्य ज्ञानकारणत्वानुपपत्तेः । ननु घटपटादीनां व्यावहारिकसत्यत्वमङ्गीकृतमेवेति चेन्न स्वरूपतो मिथ्याभूतस्य शुक्तिरजतस्येव व्यवहारार्हत्वासम्भवात् । नन्वसतोऽपि स्वाप्रपदार्थस्य स्वकालावच्छिन्नव्यवहारोपयोगित्वं दृश्यत इति चेत्, तर्हि प्रातिभासिकव्यावहारिकसांकर्यप्रसङ्गः । किञ्च रज्जावध्यस्तानां सर्पभूदलनाम्बुधारादीनामसत्यत्वे यदि भेदो वक्तुं शक्यते तदा सन्मात्रेऽप्यस्तानामप्ययं व्यावहारिकसत्ताकोऽयं च प्रातिभा-

in the case of (140) mistake, too, the cognition whose object is the snake imagined (in the rope) being alone the cause of fear and other effects the object (the snake) is not the cause of these, (and) (141) because on (your) theory of the falsity of causes in general a description of the production of effects is inadmissible.

But, you will ask, in like manner as (in our view) the snake, though unreal, is the cause of the knowledge (of itself), why should it not be a cause of fear as well? To this we reply, It cannot be, for in the case of (mere) mistake fault alone being the cause of knowledge relating to a non-existent object, it is impossible that the object should be the cause of that knowledge.

But, you will say, (we Śāṅkaras) do in fact admit the practical reality (142) of waterpots, pieces of cloth, and other (mundane) objects. This we deny, for that which is essentially false like machine silver is not susceptible of use in practical life.

140. Mere, ordinary, and universally admitted mistake, such as the supposing a rope to be a snake.

141. 'You say the imagined snake is a cause and so forth, but it is not for you to talk of causes and their effects, who deny the reality of them all from Brahma downwards.' For Brahma, though really existent, is not according to the Śāṅkara doctrine a real cause.

142. Vyāvahārikaśatyatvam is vyavahāropayogitvam—'reality subservient to practical life.'

सिक्तसत्ताक इत्येवं भेद उच्यताम् । अत्रच्छेदत्रादे,—“यथा वृषाहर्षं समष्ट्यभिप्रायेण वनमित्येकत्वव्यपदेशस्तथा नानात्वेन प्रतिभासमानानां जीवगतानामज्ञानानां समष्ट्यभिप्रायेण तदेकत्वव्यपदेशः । इयं समष्टिस्तृष्णोपाधितया विशुद्धसत्त्वप्रधाना, एतदुपहितं चेतन्यं [सर्वज्ञत्व] सर्वेश्वरत्वसर्वनियन्तृत्वादिगुणकमन्तर्यामी सगत्कारण-मौलेश्वर इति व्यपदिश्यते । सकलाज्ञानावभासकत्वात् [अस्य सर्वज्ञ-

If you say that an object seen in a dream though false is observed to be subservient to the practical life appertaining to the time of that (object), then you (143) confound what is illusory with what is practical. Moreover, if, in spite of their unreality, (144) difference can be asserted in the case of snakes, cracks in the ground, rills of water, etc., erroneously imagined in a rope, then may such a difference, as ‘This is possessed of a practical existence’ and ‘This is possessed of a (merely) illusory existence’ be said to exist in the case of those things, also, which are imagined in more existence (Brahma) (145)

‘We do not hold the absolute non-reality of things. In the condition of practical life—during the period of transmigratory bondage—waterpots, etc., are real, but in the condition of real existence—when true knowledge has been attained—they are falsified.’

143. ‘By acknowledging that objects dreamt of are subservient to the practical life (imaginary transactions) pertaining to the time in which they are perceived, you confound your own division of illusory and practical, for your doctrine is that dream—objects have only an illusory existence.’

144. i. e. such difference cannot be asserted in the case of snakes, etc.

145. “If the snake imagined in the rope were described as practically existent, and the similarly—imagined crack in the ground as illusorily existent, then you might talk of such a difference as ‘the world and all its contents are practical and nacrine silver, etc., illusory.’ If all things are alike imaginary and unreal, then there can be no such differences as ‘this is practical,’ ‘this is illusory,’ etc.

त्वम्] “यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्” [इति श्रुतेः] । अस्येयं समष्टिरक्षि-
लकारवत्त्वात्कारवशरीर,मानन्दप्रचुरत्वात्कोशवदाच्छादकत्वाद्या-
नन्दमयकोशः, सर्वोपरमत्वात्सुषुप्तिः, अत एव स्थूलसूक्ष्मप्रपञ्चस्य-
स्थानमिति बोध्यते । यथा वनस्य व्यष्ट्यभिप्रायेण वृक्षा इत्यनेकत्व-
व्यवदेशस्तथाज्ञानस्य व्यष्ट्यभिप्रायेण तदनेकत्वव्यवदेशं “इन्द्रो
मायामिः पुरुषश्चेत्येते” [इत्यादि श्रुतेः] । इयं व्यष्टिर्निर्गुणोपाधितया
मलिनसत्त्वप्रधाना, एतदुपहितं चेतन्यमल्पज्ञत्वादिगुणकं प्राज्ञ

(146) What is declared in the exposition (147) of circum-
scription is false, viz — “As, when regard is had to a collective
aggregate of trees, they are described as one, namely, a wood, so
when regard is had to the collective aggregate of the ignorances
existing in souls, (and) appearing as manifold they are described
as one (Māyā) This collective aggregate (of ignorances), as
forming the conditioning adjunct of the Superior (intelligence), viz.
Īśvara. He (Īśvara) is omniscient because the illuminator of all
ignorances, according to the Śruti passage “He who knows all
(in general), and knows everything (in particular).” The afore-
mentioned collective aggregate is called his, viz, Īśvara's causal
body because it is the cause of all, the sheath of bliss because it is
fraught with bliss, and because it encases the soul like a sheath,
dreamless sleep because there is (then) a cessation of all things,
and hence also the place of the absorption of the gross and sub-

146. The long quotation that follows is from the exposition of
adhyāropa in the Śāṅkara Vedāntasāra. Several sentences are here omit-
ted that occur in the original, but I have supplied those words in brackets
that appeared necessary to make good sense.

147. That is the exposition of Brahma's becoming Īśvara and jīva
by being circumscribed by Māyā and the antaḥkarana.

वत्युच्यते । एकाज्ञानावभासकत्वात् [अस्य प्राज्ञत्वम्] । अनयोः
समष्टिअष्ट्योर्वनवृक्षयोरिवाभेदः । तदुपहितयोरीश्वरप्राज्ञयोरपि
वनवृक्षावच्छिन्नाकाशयोरिवाभेदः । वनवृक्षतदवच्छिन्नाकाशयोराधा-
रानुपहिताकाशवदनयोरज्ञानतदुपहितचेतन्ययोराधारभूतं यदनुप-
हितं चेतन्यं तत्तुरीयमिति चोच्यते, “शिवमद्वैतं चतुर्थे मन्यन्त”-
इति श्रुतेः । इदमेव तुरीयं शुद्धचेतन्यमज्ञानादितदुपहितचेतन्या-
भ्यामविविक्तं सन्महावाक्यस्य वाच्यं विविक्तं सल्लक्ष्यमिति चोच्यते,—

tile universe. As, when regard is had to the distributive aggregate of a wood, it is described as many, viz trees, so, when regard is had to the distributive aggregate of ignorance, it is described as many, according to the Śruti passage (148) “Indra (Ātmā) appears multi-form by reason of illusions” This distributive aggregate, as forming the conditioning adjunct of the inferior intelligence, viz Soul. He (Prājña) is cognitive, because the illuminator of one (individual) ignorance. These two, the collective aggregate and distributive aggregate (of ignorance), are identical, like the wood and the tree. Īvara and the cognitive one conditioned by these are also identical, like the (two) ethers circumscribed by the wood and the trees. The unconditioned intelligence which is the substrate of ignorance and the (two) intelligences conditioned by that, just as the unconditioned ether is the substrate of the wood, the trees, and the (two) ethers circumscribed by these, is called the fourth, according to the Śruti passage (149) “They consider him blessed, secondless, fourth” This same fourth, viz, pure intelligence, when undiscriminated from ignorance and the intelligence conditioned by that is said to expressed by the great (150) text, and when discriminated to be implied (only) —

148. Rig Veda VI. 47. 18.

149. Māṇḍūkya Upanishad 7.

इति यदुक्तं तदयुक्तम् । ईश्वरस्याधारभूतमनुपहितं चेन्नन्यमिति वचनं “मूलमनाधारम्”, “दिव्यो देव एको नारायण” “आत्माकारोऽखिलामय” इत्यादिभिर्विरुद्धते । वृक्षाणां समूहरूपस्य वनस्य वृक्ष-सत्तानन्तरसत्ताकत्वेन वनस्थानीयस्येश्वरस्यापि जीवसत्तानन्तरसत्ता-कत्वादादावेकत्वेनावस्थानम्, पश्चादे-“कोहं बहुस्यम्”. “अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाही”ति संकल्पपूर्वकबहु-त्वमवर्गं जीवभाषणतिरश्च न सम्भवति ।

The declaration that unconditioned intelligence is the sub-
strate of *Īśvara* is (151) opposed to ‘a baseless root,’ “There
was one heavenly deity, *Nārāyaṇa*,” “The self based, the substrate
of all,’ and other passages. Because the existence of a wood
composed of an assemblage of trees is posterior to the existence of
trees, the existence of *Īśvara*, also, who is represented by the wood,
is (152) posterior to the existence of Soul, hence it is impossible
that he should at first subsist as one, (and) afterwards, on
resolving “(153) I am one, let me become many” (154) “Having
entered in along with this Soul, (my) self, let me develop name
and form” become many, and assume the condition of soul.

150. *Tat tvam asi*, *Chhândogya Upanishad* VI. 8. 7.

151. For the *Rāmānuja* view is that *Īśvara*, *Nārāyaṇa*, *Paramāt-
mā*, *Brahma*, etc., are all names of one being and there is no uncondition-
ed *Brahma*.

152. The *Rāmānuja* argues that a collective aggregate supposes
a previous distributive aggregate.

153. *Chhândogya Upanishad* VI. 2. 3.

154. Ditto VI. 3. 2.

अनु समष्टिपूर्वत्वाद्वाप्येवमभव इति चेन्न, जगदीनां समूहा-
वस्थौ समष्टिरिति व्यपष्ट्रियते, चेनावयवाश्चादियु तद्यादृष्टेः । किञ्च,
समूहवस्थया जीवास्तिष्ठन्ति न वा । तिष्ठन्ति चेज्जीवभावावति-
संकल्पवेद्यं तदवस्थम् । न तिष्ठन्तीति वक्ष्येऽपि न कश्चिदुपपद्यते
“न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चिद्वि”त्यादिनाऽऽत्मादिभ्युत्पत्तिर्जीवानां
प्राचीनकर्मफलभोगाय जगत्सृष्ट्याभ्युपगमाच्चा, न्यथा विषमसृष्ट्यानुपपत्ते-
रपि । तथा च सूत्रम्—“वेद्यम्यनेर्धृष्टे न सापेक्षत्वात्, (तथा हि दर्श-
यति) ” । सृज्यमानदेवादिचेष्टकर्मसापेक्षत्वाद्विषमसृष्टेर्देवादीनाम् ।
देवादियोगं तत्तत्कर्मसापेक्षं दर्शयति श्रुतिः “साधुकारी साधुर्भ-
वति, साधुकारी पापो भवति, पुण्य, पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति, पापः

. It may be objected that this is not impossible, on the ground that collective aggregation is anterior to existence in separate parts. This we deny, for it is a state wherein separately—existing parts are brought together that is called collective aggregation, for such we see to be the case as regards an army, a wood, a heap (of anything, as grain, etc.).

Again, Do souls exist or not during the state of collective aggregation (155)? If they do exist, the resolve to assume the condition of Soul would be futile, as before shown. Nor is the alternative that they do not exist at all a possible one, seeing that there is a scriptural declaration of Soul's being unborn, etc., in the words—“The wise is not born, nor dies” (156), that, moreover, it is an accepted doctrine that the creation of the world is in order to the reaping of the fruits of the former works of souls, and that an unequal creation cannot otherwise be accounted for.

Such, too, is the import of the Sūtra:—“Inequality and cruelty do not exist, the world being dependent on works” (157), i. e.

155. The state of *pralaya*.

156. *Kaṭha Upanishad* I. 2. 18.

157. *Brahma Sūtras* II. 1. 34.

यमेव" । "न कर्मोऽविभक्त्यादिति चेन्नाऽन्यदित्या, कुश्चद्यते चाप्युपल-
भ्यते च" । प्राम्नुहोः चेष्टा न सन्ति, कुतः, अविभाज्यवशात्,
"सदेव बोध्योदमय आसीदिति । यतस्तदानीं तदभावात्कर्म न
विद्यते, कथं तदपेक्षं सृष्टिवैषम्यमित्युच्यत इति चेन्नाऽ"न्यदित्या"-
त्चेष्टानां तत्कर्मप्रवाहानाञ्च । तदनादित्वेऽप्यविभाग उपपद्यते,
यतस्तत्त्वेष्टवस्तु तदानीं परित्यक्तनामरूपं ब्रह्मशरीरतयापि पृथ-
ग्यपदेशानर्हमसिद्धम् । तथानभ्युपगमेऽकुताभ्यागमः कृतविप्रवा-
शप्रसङ्गश्च । "उपलभ्यते च" तेषामनादित्वम्, "न जायते म्रियते
वा विपरिवर्ति"ति । सृष्टिप्रवाहानादित्वञ्च "सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता

the unequal creation of the gods, etc., being dependent on the (past) works of embodied souls, gods and the like who are created (at each creation) The union (of souls) with (the nature of) gods, etc., the Śruti shows to be dependent on their various works:—"He that does good becomes good, he that does evil becomes evil; he becomes virtuous by virtuous deeds, evil by evil deeds (158)."

There is also the Sūtra:—"There were no works, because of non-diremption—we deny this, for they are beginningless, and this is both congruous (is accordant with reason), and is fountid (is revealed in the Veda)" (159) *i. e.*, "Before the creation embodied souls do not exist. Why? Because there is a declaration of the non-diremption of name and form in the passage—"Truly existent, my dear child, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second, Brahman." Hence souls not then existing, their works likewise, do not exist; how then can it be said that the inequality of creation is dependent on their works? We deny this, 'because' souls and the streams of their works 'are beginningless' Although they are beginningless, non-diremption is congruous (is

158. Brihad Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV. 4. 5.

159. Brahman Sūtras II. 1. 35. Sūtras 35 and 36 in Śaṅkara-
chārya's Bṛāhmya are here regarded as one only.

यथापूर्वमकल्पयति"त्यादौ, "अद्वेदं तर्ह्यव्याकृमनाचीतनामरू-
पाभ्यां व्याप्नियते"ति नामरूपव्याकरयमात्रवशात् । क्षेत्रज्ञानं
स्वरूपानादित्वं सिद्धं सृतावपि "प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव विदुषनादौ
सभावणी"ति "सर्वभूतानि कोन्तेय प्रकृतिं यान्ति मामिकामि"ति ।
ननु "घटे भित्ते यथाकाश आकाशः स्यादथा पुरा । एवं देहे मृते
जीवे ब्रह्म सम्पद्यते पुनरि"त्यादिना घटाकाशदृष्टान्तेन ब्रह्मणो
जीवमावापतिर्गम्यत इति चेत्, आकाशदृष्टान्तेनोपहितांशभेदप-
क्षस्तु घटाकाशन्यायेन पूर्वपूर्वोपहितांशपरित्यागे तत्तदंशरूपस्य
भोक्तुरभावादुत्तरोत्तरोपहिताशानां पूर्वपूर्वोपहितांशानुभूयभोगप्रतिबन्धाना-

accordant with reason), because Soul having then rejected name and form, and being exceedingly subtle, does not admit of separate designation even as the body of Brahma. For if this be not allowed, (viz. that souls and their works are beginningless, etc), there will follow the 'accession of what is not done, and the destruction of what is done' (160). That they are beginningless 'is found' (is revealed in the Veda) in the words "The wise is not born, nor dies'. And that the flow of creations is beginningless in 'The Creator formed the sun and moon as before,' for there is a revelation of the development of name and form alone in 'This world was then undeveloped, it was (afterwards, at the creation) developed by name and form'. That the essence of souls is beginningless is evinced in the Smṛiti also. — 'Know Nature and Spirit to be both of them beginningless,' 'All beings O son of Kuṇṭi, pass to my Nature' (161)."

160 That would occur in the present creation which is not the result of works, and the recompense of works done in the past creation would not take place.

161 Bhagavadgītā IX 7. During the state of dissolution all beings are as it were merged in Nature (Prakṛiti) becoming devoid of name and form. They still however exist, and thus there is no new beginning at each creation, every thing is continuous and eternal.

नुपपत्तेरुपलभ्यमानेष्वप्यपूर्वानुभूतभोगप्रतिसन्धानविबुद्धः । भोक्तृस-
न्तत्येकतानमात्रेण प्रतिसन्धाने सौगतमतोन्मज्जनेन स्थिरात्मपरि-
त्यागप्रसङ्गाच्चात्यन्तानुपपत्तोऽकृताभ्यागमकृतविप्रणाशप्रसङ्गश्च, मो-
क्षानुपपत्तिश्च । तथा हि स्थिरात्मन्युपाधीनां सर्वदा सर्वत्र गम-
नागमनेन विनष्टोपाधिप्रदेशेष्वुपाध्यन्तरसञ्चारस्याऽवर्जनीयत्वादुपा-
धेरैव मोक्षो नत्वात्मनः । श्लोकार्थस्तु यथा शब्दगुणको महाव-
काशप्रद आकाशो घटाकाशावस्थायामल्पावकाशप्रदत्वेन वर्तमानो
घटदोषासंस्पृष्टोऽवनिष्ठते, घटे भित्ते तु यथापुराऽऽकाशः स्यान्म-
हावकाशप्रदः स्यात्, तथा स्वभावतः सत्यसंकल्पादिगुणकोऽसंसारी

Should it be said that in the passage "As, when the jar is broken, the jar-ether becomes the infinite ether as it was before ; so, when the body is dead, the soul re-attains to Brahma" etc., it is meant by the illustration of the jar-ether that Brahma assumes the nature of Soul, we reply, that the theory (162) of a plurality of conditioned portions (of Brahma), which is based on the illustration of the jar-ether, is opposed to the fact that Soul is conscious of the remembrance of what has been formerly experienced, since it is impossible that each succeeding conditioned portion should possess a remembrance of what has been experienced by each preceding portion, there being an absence of an experiencer consisting of each several portion owing to the abandonment of each preceding conditioned portion, after the analogy of the jar-ether (163). And (this theory) becomes utterly inadmissible if (in order to

162. The theory is that Brahma, one only like the infinite ether, is conditioned by the various bodies and internal organs of transmigrating beings. The body, etc., of Chaitra passes to and fro, and so conditions at different times different portions of Brahma.

163. How can the portions subsequently conditioned possess a knowledge of what has been experienced by those previously conditioned, seeing that these latter are now abandoned by, and unconnected with, that which conditioned them ?

जीवः संसारदशयामल्पजोऽनीकस्तथापि जन्ममरणदिदेहादिधर्म
वर्धितोऽवतिष्ठते, देहे मृते स्थूलसूक्ष्मोपाधिनिवृत्तौ पुनर्ब्रह्म सम्पद्यते
“सम्पद्याऽऽविर्भावः स्वेन कष्टादि”त्यनुसारादाविर्भूतनवको बृह-
त्वादियुगविशिष्टो भवति “ब्रह्मस्यो महिमानमवप्नोति” “स चान-
न्याय कल्पते” । नन्व“नेन जीवेनात्मनानुबिष्य मामरूपे व्याक-
रवादी”त्यादिभिर्ब्रह्मण एव जीवभावावतिः भूयते । तत्रेदं विमर्श-
नीयम्, संकल्पपूर्वकजीवभावावतिः किं निर्विशेषस्यो, त मायोपाधि-
कस्येश्वरस्य । न चाद्यः, निर्विशेषस्य संकल्पशून्यत्वात् । न द्वि-
तीयः, विशुद्धसत्त्वप्रधानोपाधिकस्य मलिनसत्त्वोपाधिकः स्यामिति

obviate the foregoing objection) you say that there is remem-
brance merely as a result of a continuous series of experiencing
portions, for this would involve rejection of a permanent spirit
through emergence (necessary acceptance) of the doctrine of the
Bandhas, there would also occur the ‘accession of what is not
done and the destruction of what is done,’ and liberation would
become impossible That is to say, there would be liberation of the
condition (164) only, not of the spirit, seeing that, as (in the case of
the various souls) their conditions are always and every where
passing into and passing away from the permanent spirit, it is
inevitable that another condition should (at some time or other)
occupy the place of the condition which has perished (when libera-
tion has taken place).

But in our view the sense of the śloka is that “As the
(infinite) ether (naturally) endowed with the quality of sound,
and affording infinite space, in the state of the jar-ether exists as
that which affords finite space, and yet remains unaffected by the
defects of the jar, but when the jar is broken, becomes the (in-

164. Here the word ‘condition’ is used as a translation of
‘upādhi’; which in the Śāṅkara Vedānta denotes the fictitious acces-
sories (body and internal organ) conditioning Soul.

सम्भवति, विद्याविद्ययोः साङ्ख्यप्रसङ्गात् । किञ्च, “अन्तःप्रविष्टः
शास्ता जनानां सर्वोत्प्रे”त्यनेन स्वस्य स्वयमेवात्मा शास्ता
चा“ग्निरात्मानं दहती”तिवदत्यन्तानुपपन्नः । अथ च, “एष एवा-
साधु कर्म कारयति तं यमधो निनीवती”ति सर्वत्रोऽपि जीवभूतस्य

finite) ether as it was before, *i e*, again affords infinite space; so Soul naturally endowed with real resolve (165) and other like quali-
ties, and non-transmigratory (166), in the state of transmigration
is parviescent and powerless (167), and yet remains exempt from
birth, death, and other properties of the body, etc., but when the
body is dead, *i e*, when the gross and subtle conditions (168) have
passed away, reattains to Brahma;” according to the Sūtra “Hav-
ing attained (to Brahma, Soul) is manifested (in its own form), for

165. The following quotation from Rāmānuja's Vedārthasa-
graha is explanatory of the word 'satyasankalpa' as used of Īśvara in
Chhāndogya Upanishad VIII 7 1. "The words 'endowed with real
resolve' declare that although there exist innumerable objects of enjoy-
ment and aids thereto which are eternal and superexcellent, the Lord
by mere resolve brings into existence a vast number of objects pre-
viously non-existent. And 'endowed with real resolve' declares that
the essential existence, subsistence, activity, and all other distinguish-
ing features of these objects of enjoyment and aids thereto, sentient
and insentient, permanent and impermanent, depend on the mere re-
solve (volition) of the Lord" Real resolve in the case of the Lord
and liberated souls is resolve (volition) that cannot be frustrated, but
is necessarily realized.

166. Transmigratoriness is not an essential characteristic of Soul.

167. Destitute of dominion and authority such as naturally
belong to it.

168. Body, internal organ, etc.

स्वस्य नरकानुभवहेतुभूताऽसाधुकर्मकारयिता, वायकर्मसु निवर्तन-
यत्कोऽपि नियन्तेति सर्वमसमञ्जसमेव स्यात् । किञ्च, “मुक्तिर्हित्वा-
ऽन्यथाकूपं स्वकूपेण व्यवस्थितिर्”¹⁶⁹त्यनुसारेण यदवस्थावस्थस्य
सङ्कल्पपूर्वकबीजभावापत्तिः पुनः तदवस्थावस्थितिरेव तस्य मोक्ष
स्तर्ह्येश्वरस्य बीजभावापत्तेः पुनरीश्वरत्वापत्तिरेव मोक्षः, तथा
सति निर्गुणमोक्षवादे न संगच्छते । तथा च सूत्रम्, “इतरव्यप-
there is the expression ‘in its own (form)’ (169),” i e, it has its
qualities manifested, (170), is then characterized by the quality of
immensity, etc, according to the words, “He obtains the greatness
of Brahma,” “(171) And he becomes infinite (172).”

But it may be said that in “Having entered in along with
this Soul, myself, let me develop name and form” it is declared
that it is Brahma that assumes the nature of Soul. Here it
should be reflected, Is it the undifferented Brahma or the *Māyā*—
conditioned *Īśvara* that having first resolved (“Let me become
many”) assumes the nature of Soul. The first alternative is not
admissible, for the undifferented Brahma is devoid of resolve,
nor the second, for the mere resolve ‘Let me possess the condition
of impure goodness’ is incongruous in the case of one whose con-
dition chiefly consists of the quality of pure goodness, for no

169. Brahma Sūtras IV. 4. 1. See Chhāndogya Upanishad VIII 12 3.

170. The following is a quotation from the *Pancharātrarahasya*
in the *Sarvadarśanasangraha*.—“Then the natural and excellent
qualities of souls, omniscience and the rest, concealed in the transmi-
gratory state, are manifested. These qualities are common to liberat-
ed souls and the Lord. Universal creativeness alone distinguishes the
Deity from these souls. Liberated souls being subsidiary parts of
Brahma, who possesses them as subsidiaries, and is himself non-subsi-
diary, realize all joys together with that wise” (Supreme Spirit).

171. Śvetāśvatara Upanishad V. 9.

172. Not infinitely pervasive, but infinite in knowledge, which
is not then limited as in the state of bondage.

देवादिनाऽकारवादिदोषप्रवृत्तिः", जगतो ब्रह्मानन्दत्वं प्रति-
पादयन्नि"स्तत्त्वमस्य"ऽ"यमात्मा ब्रह्मे"त्यादिभिर्बोधस्यापि ब्रह्मा-
नन्दत्वं व्यपदिश्यत इत्युक्तम् । तत्रेदं चोद्यते यदीतरस्य जीवस्य
ब्रह्मभावो ऽमीभिर्बोध्यैर्व्यपदिश्यते तदा ब्रह्मणः सर्वज्ञस्यसङ्कल्प-
त्वादियुक्तस्यात्मनो हितरूपजगदकरणमहितरूपजगत्करणमित्या-
दयो दोषाः प्रसज्येरन् । अध्यात्मिकाधिभौतिकाधिदेविकाऽनन्त-

person who is not crazy makes resolve to procure his own dis-
advantage. Granted, however, the possibility of such resolve, if
Īśvara by the rejection of his condition has the power of altering
his state, then why should he not become undifferentiated (173)? Nor
is it possible that nescience should become the condition of one who
is characterized by the condition of science (true knowledge),
for there would thus ensue a commingling of science and nescience
(174)

Moreover, that according to the words "Having entered in
He is the ruler of beings, the self of all" He is His own self
and His own ruler is wholly unreasonable, just as if one were
to say 'fire burns itself.' Likewise that by the words "It is He
alone that causes him whom He desires to degrade to do wrong
deeds" it is meant that He, though omniscient, causes wrong
deeds which are the occasion of His own experiencing of hell, in
the form of Soul, and that He, though able to cause to cease from
evil deeds, is the regulator (actuator) therein is altogether in-
congruous.

Again, (if) according to the words "Settlement in (realiza-
tion of) one's own form, on the abandonment of an alien form,
is liberation" (175) liberation were the return to that state in which
he was on the part of one who on resolving "I am one, let me

173. Undifferentiatedness being in your view the highest aim.

174. Īśvara would be omniscient and parviscent, would know
all things and yet be involved in ignorance.

175. Bhāgavata Purāṇa, Skandha II.

दुःखाकरं जगत्, न चेदृचे स्वानर्थं स्वाधीनो कृत्तुमान्मर्ते ।
 जीवद्वन्द्वमेव मेद्वद्विन्द्यः कुतयो जगद्वन्द्वद्वोरनन्तरत्वं वदन्ता
 त्वमेव परित्याक्तः, मेदे हत्यनन्तरत्वाऽसिद्धिः । जीवादि-
 कमेद्विषया मेद्वयुतयः, स्वाभाविकाऽमेद्विषयाश्चाऽमेद्वयुतय इति

become many" has assumed the nature of Soul, then liberation would be *Īśvara's* resumption of the nature of *Īśvara* after having assumed the nature of Soul, and, such being the case, the doctrine of a quality-less (176) liberation would not agree therewith.

And such is the import of the *Sūtra* (177) "Through the declaration of the other, (Soul), to be *Brahma*, there would attach the fault of the not-making of what is beneficial, etc," i. e. it is said by those who maintain the identity of the world with *Brahma* that the identity of Soul also with *Brahma* is declared by the texts "That thou art," and (178) "This self is *Brahma*," etc. (179). In reply thereto it is urged (in the *Sūtra*) "If by these sentences it is declared that another, viz., Soul, is *Brahma*, then the not-making of a world taking the form of what is beneficial to himself, and the making of a world taking the form of what is injurious to himself, and other faults will attach to *Brahma* as one endowed with the attributes of omniscience, real resolve, etc. The world is a cause of infinite pain, originating from self (in one's own person, body and internal organ), from elemental beings (wild beasts, etc), and from superhuman powers (demons, etc), and one who is self-dependent and wise does not engage in such

176. Allusion to the *Śāṅkara* doctrine that liberation is the passing of Soul from a state in which it is seemingly possessed of qualities to that in which it becomes one with the quality-less *Brahma*.

177. *Brahma Sūtras* II 1. 21.

178. *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* II.

179. Or this might be otherwise rendered :—It is said (by the *Pūrva-pakṣi*) that (among) those texts which make known the identity of the world with *Brahma* the identity of Soul with *Brahma* is also declared by such as 'That thou art,' 'This soul is *Brahma*, etc.'

चेत्, न चेदं वक्तव्यम्, स्वभावतः स्वस्मादभिन्नं जीवं किं जगत्कार-
णं ब्रह्म जानाति, न वा । न जानाति चेत्, सर्वव्यवहानिः ।
जानाति चेत्, स्वस्मादभिन्नस्य जीवस्य दुःखं स्वदुःखमिति जानते
ब्रह्मणो हितोऽकरणाऽहितकरणादिदोषप्रवृत्तिरनिवार्या ॥

ननु “मायाभासेन जीवेशो करोती”ति जीवेश्वरयोर्ब्रह्मप्रति-
विम्बत्वं श्रूयते, अतो बुद्धिप्रतिविम्बितो जीवो मायाभासे ईश्वर इति
चेन्नविशेषोऽपलब्ध्यमात्रस्य ब्रह्मणः प्रतिविम्ब इति न शक्यते वक्तुम् ।
a work (*viz* as the making of the world) resulting in his own
disadvantage.

The Śruti passages declaring that Brahma is distinct from
Soul are rejected by you when you assert the identity of the
world and Brahma, (for) if there is distinction, identity cannot
be established. If you say that the Śruti passages that speak of
distinction relate to adventitious distinction, and the Śruti pas-
sages that speak of identity relate to essential identity, then, in
this regard, it ought to be stated whether Brahma, the cause of the
world, knows Soul to be essentially identical with himself or
not. If he does not know, there is an end to omniscience. If he
does know, then there inevitably attach to Brahma, as one knowing
the pain of Soul, identical with himself, to be his own pain, the
faults of the not-making (of a world) beneficial to himself, and
the making (of a world) injurious to himself (180).

If it be said that in the words *Māyā* produces Soul and
Lord in appearance only (*ābhāsenā*), it is declared that Soul and
Lord are mere reflections of Brahma, (and not real in themselves);
accordingly Soul is that which is reflected in the intellect, and
Lord is mere appearance (reflected in) *Māyā*; we reply that
Brahma being (181) undifferentiated intelligence only, a reflection
thereof cannot be affirmed, and is, moreover, opposed to the Śruti

180. Brahma as omnipotent ‘can make, or not make, or make
otherwise (i. e. after what is wrong in the making), and yet he, accord-
ing to your view, makes a world injurious to himself.

181. According to the Śāṅkara view.

श्रुतिविरुद्धश्च, “स कारणं करखाधिपाधियो न चास्य कश्चित्त्वन्निता न चाधिषः” “न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चित्” । नित्यानां जीवानां करणकलेवरप्रदानप्रषण्णविरोधोऽपि, तथा च वेदस्तुते। “बुद्धी-न्द्रियमनःप्राणाश्चनानामसृज्यभुः । माषाद्यै च भवाद्यै चात्मने कल्पनाय च” । श्रुत्यर्थस्तु माया आभासेन, अयाशात्म्येन, जीवेशो करोति, उभयोस्तत्त्वे वेपरीत्यञ्जनयति, दृश्यते ह्युक्तार्थ आभास-प्रयोगः, हेत्वाभासो धर्मोभासः । किं तद्वेपरीत्यम्, उच्यते “अजो नित्यः शाश्वतोऽयम्”, “आत्माप्यनीशः”, “अनीयया शोचति

passages (182) “He is the cause, the Lord of the lord of the organs, of Him there is neither parent nor lord,” (183) “The wise is not born nor dies” It is also opposed to the declaration of the bestowal of organs and bodies on eternal souls (184). As, for example, in the Vedastuti (a section of the latter half of the tenth Skandha of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa) “The Lord created the intellect, the organs of sense, the mind, and the vital breath of living beings, for the enjoyment of material objects, for worldly existence, and for ministering to Soul” In our view the meaning of the above quoted statement of the Veda is that Māyā produces (causes to appear) Soul and Lord falsely (*ābhāsenā*), in a manner contrary to their true nature, i. e. generates wrong notion in regard to the nature of both, for the word *ābhāsa* is found to be used in the aforesaid sense—e. g. *hetuābhāsa* (false reason), *dharmaābhāsa* (false devotion) What is that wrong notion? We reply in regard to the nature of Soul, described in the words (185) “on-

182. Śvetāśvatara Upanishad VI. 9. The Lord is uncaused.

183. Kaṭha Upanishad I. 2. 18. Soul, too, is uncaused and eternal.

184. Soul is eternally existent, but at each new creation of the universe, God creates the body etc., by means of which it passes through its transmigratory existence.

185. Kaṭha Upanishad I, 2. 18.

मुह्यमान" इत्याद्युक्ते जीवतन्वे देहात्मभ्रमं स्वतन्त्रात्मभ्रमञ्ज्ञात्वा-
दयति, तेन "देहोऽहमीश्वरो ऽहमहं भोगी" निवक्तारो भवन्ति ।
तथा "पतिं विश्वस्यात्मेश्वरम्", "शाश्वतं शिवमच्युतम्", "यो
मामवमनादिं च", "आत्माधारोऽखिलाश्रय", इत्युक्त ईश्वरतन्वे
कार्यत्वान्याधारत्वमायोपाधिकत्वबुद्धिं जनयति, तथा च गीयते,
"अव्यक्तं व्यक्तिमापन्नम्", "अवजानन्ति मां मूढाः", "परं भावमजा-
नन्तः" । नन्वाभावः प्रविशिव्यर्थे प्रसिद्धः, स एवाभाहीकार्यः, हन्त

born, eternal, everlasting," (186) "Soul also is powerless (because of pleasure and pain)", (187) "Soul mourns because of its powerlessness, being deluded," Māyā produces the error that body is Soul, and the error that Soul is self-dependent (188) In consequence of this, men use such locutions as, 'I am body,' 'I am Lord,' 'I am experiencer (189).' Similarly in regard to the nature of the Lord, described in the words "Lord of all, the Ruler of Soul," "Everlasting, blessed, imperishable," (190) "He who knows me to be unborn and beginningless," "The self-based, the substrate of all," Māyā produces the notions (191) that he is an effect, has another as basis, and is conditioned by Māyā, and so it is sung (in the Bhagavadgītā), "The unwise think me the in-

186. Śvetāśvatara Upanishad I 2.

187. Śvetāśvatara Upanishad IV. 7.

188. But the quoted passages show that soul is not the perishable body, nor the Omnipotent Lord, but is dependent, and subject to pleasure and pain, viz., is in a state of bondage

189. Men mistakenly talk of their bodies as if they were their real selves, as if they were not subordinate to the supreme Lord, and as if they were the sole experiencers of worldly existence uninfluenced by the power of desert, and unactuated by divine agency in accordance with their past deeds. 'Swata evāham bhogī nādṛṣṭā-dibhiḥ'—Rāmānuja's Commentary on Bhagavadgītā XVI. 14.

190. Bhagavadgītā X 3.

191. Notions contradicted by the text just referred to.

तहि, “सद्यदेवेदमय आसीत्”, “धीरहा विषमः शून्य” इत्याद्यच्छून्यव्यवस्थायां प्रसिद्धार्थेन शून्यमेव तत्त्वमिति विज्ञायते कुतो अनाङ्गीक्रियते, तदनङ्गीकारे यत्कारणं तदपि समानम् । नन्वयं जीवो यदि भिन्नस्तर्हि कथं “तत्त्वमस्या” दिवाक्येरेकत्वव्यपदेश इत्यथ “अज्ञेनानाव्यपदेशादन्यथाचापि दासकितवादित्वमधीयत एके”, ब्रह्मांशो जीवः, कुतः ‘नानाव्यपदेशाद्’, ‘न्यथाचे’ कत्वेन व्यपदेशात्, उभयथा हि व्यपदेशो दृश्यते । नानाव्यपदेशत्वात्, सद्रूपसुख्यत्वनिश्चिन्तृत्वनिग्राम्यत्वसर्वज्ञत्वाच्चत्वत्वाधीनत्वपराधीनत्वसुदुस्वा-
visible to have become visible (192)”, “Fools despise me,” “Not knowing my higher nature (193)”

It may be objected that the word *ābhāsa* is commonly used in the sense of a reflection, and that meaning alone is to be admitted in the passage under consideration. Well then, in these sentences (194) “Truly non-existent was this in the beginning,” “A slayer of heroes, cruel, naught (is Viṣṇu),” the words ‘non-existent’ and ‘naught’ according to their usual meaning affirm that nihility is the only reality, and why is that doctrine not accepted by you? The same reason for that not being accepted exists here also (195).

Again, it may be asked, If Soul is distinct from Brahman, how is it that “That thou art” and the like sentences make a

192. Bhagavadgītā VII 24.

193. Ibid IX. 11. These passages, relating to the incarnation of Kṛṣṇa, are adduced as proofs of the erroneous conceptions of Īśvara entertained by those who are under the influence of illusion.

194. Tattvīya Upaniṣad II. 7.

195. The words ‘non-existent’ and ‘naught’ are not taken literally by the Śāṅkaras, since they believe that Brahman is absolute reality, and that Īśvara has a practical existence, in accordance with their views of Vedic doctrine. “In the same way,” argues the Rāmānuja, “we hold that *ābhāsa* cannot signify a mere reflection, for that would contradict the Veda, as is shown in the texts previously quoted.”

शुद्धत्वकल्याणगुणाकरस्वविपरीतत्वपतित्वशेषत्वादिभिर्दृश्यते । “अ-
न्यथा चा’भेदेन व्यपदेशोऽपि, “तत्त्वमस्य” “यमात्मा ब्रह्मे”त्या-
दिभिर्दृश्यते । “अपि दासकितवादित्वमधीयत एके” “ब्रह्मदास
ब्रह्मदासा ब्रह्मेमे कितवा” इत्याथर्वणिका ब्रह्मणो दासकितवादित्व-
मधीयते, ततश्च जीवव्यापित्वेनाभेदो व्यपदिश्यत इत्यर्थः ।
एवमुभयव्यपदेशमुच्यत्वसिद्धये जीवोऽयं ब्रह्मणोऽयं इत्यभ्युपग-
न्तव्यः । न च भेदव्यपदेशानां प्रत्यक्षादिप्रसिद्धार्थत्वेनान्यथासिद्ध-
त्वम्, ब्रह्मसृष्ट्यत्वतन्निगम्यत्वतच्छरीरत्वतच्छेषत्वतदाधारत्वत-
त्पान्यत्वतत्संहार्यत्वतदुपासकत्वतत्प्रसादलभ्यधर्मार्थकाममोक्षरूप-

representation of unity ? Here applies the Sūtra (196) “A portion because of the representation of plurality, and otherwise. Moreover some read that there is the condition of fishermen and gamblers, etc.” i.e. Soul is a portion of Brahma. Whence ? Because there is representation of plurality—‘And otherwise,’ because there is representation according to unity, for both kinds of representation are found (in the Veda) There is found representation of plurality, as that (Brahma and Soul are) respectively the Creator and the (197) created, the Actuator and the actuated, the Omniscient and the nescient, the Self-dependent and that which is dependent (198) on another, the (199) Pure and the (200) impure, the Repository of good qualities and the (201) opposite, the Master and that which is supplementary (or substi-

196. Brahma Sūtras II. 3 43.

197. Jīva is ‘created’ (sent forth), that is, receives, at the crea-
tion, body and organs conducive to the experiencing of the fruit of deeds,
and the attainment of emancipation. During the period of *pralaya*
there is an absorption of body, etc., in *Prakṛiti*.

198. viz., Brahma.

199. Free from illusion or nescience.

200. Involved in illusion.

201. Associated with *heya*, *prākṛita*, *gunas*.

पुरुषार्थभोक्तृत्वादयः, तत्कृतश्च जीवब्रह्मणोर्भेदः प्रत्यक्षाद्यगोचर-
त्वेनानन्यथासिद्धः । अतो जगत्सृष्ट्यादिवादिनीनां प्रमाणान्तरसिद्ध-
भेदानुवादेन न मिथ्यायौपदेशपरत्वम् । “अपि स्मर्यते” “ममेवांशो
जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः”, मद्भिभूतिभूतो मदंश एव स्वभा-
वतः सत्यसङ्कल्पादिगुणकः सन्कश्चिदनादिकर्मरूपाविद्यावेष्टनति-
रोहितस्वरूपो जीवभूतो ऽतिसङ्कुचितज्ञानैश्वर्यो जीवलोके संसारे
वर्तमानः । तथा च श्रुतिः “त इमे सत्याः कामा अनृतापि-
धानाः” । जीवानां कर्मप्रवाहानादित्वं तु “न कर्मविभागादिति

diary) (202) to him ‘And otherwise’—representation according to identity is also found in “That thou art,” (203) “this soul is Brahma” and like sentences ‘Moreover some read that there is the condition of slaves, gamblers, etc,’ i e, in the words (204) ‘Fishermen are Brahma, slaves are Brahma, these gamblers are Brahma’, the Atharvavedins read that there also pertains to Brahma the condition of slaves, gamblers, etc Hence, because Brahma pervades (205) all souls, there is representation of identity Such is the meaning After the manner thus stated, Soul is to be acknowledged as a portion of Brahma, so as to secure to both kinds of representation a literal application. Nor should it be said that such representations of difference are established by other means of proof because they relate to matters known through sense—perception, etc, (for) that Soul is created by Brahma, is actuated by him, is his body, is supplementary (or subsidiary) to him, has him as its basis, is preserved by him, is retracted into him, is his worshipper, and is an experiencer of the

202. In the Śrutaprakāśikā (Tikā on Śrībhāṣya) śeṣhitvam is explained by tadavattā, the possessing jīva, etc., as subsidiary.

203. Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad II.

204. Said in Śāṅkara’s Commentary *in loco* to be a quotation from the Brahma Sūtra.

205. As the Internal Ruler.

चेन्नानादित्यादुपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यते चे'भिसूत्रादवसेयम् । स्मृतिश्च,
 "अनादिबालसंशुभ्रः संसारपदवीं गतः" । नन्वेकवस्त्वेकदेशवाची
 ह्यंशशब्दः, जीवस्य ब्रह्मेकदेशत्वे ननु ता दोषा ब्रह्मणि भवेयुः ।
 न च ब्रह्मखण्डो जीव इत्यंशत्वोपपत्तिः, खण्डानर्हत्वाद्ब्रह्मश-
 इत्यथ "प्रकाशादिवत् नैवं परः" । तु शब्दस्त्वोद्यं व्यावर्तयति ।
 "प्रकाशादिव"जीवः परमात्मनोऽंशः, यथाऽभ्यादित्यादेर्मास्वतो
 भादुपप्रकाशोऽंशो भवति यथा गवां शुक्रकृष्णादीनां गोत्वादिविशि-
 ष्टानां गोत्वादीनि विशेषणान्यंशः, यथा वा देहिने देवमनुष्यादे-

four objects of life consisting of virtue, wealth, pleasure, and liberation, obtainable by his favour, and the difference thereby made between Soul and Brahma, are matters not established by other means of proof (than the Veda), because incognisable by sense—perception, etc. Hence the Śruti passages which declare the creation of the world, etc., are not concerned with the (206) teaching of what is false by mere re-statement of difference already established by some other means of proof. There is also the Sūtra (207) 'Moreover it is said in the Śruti', 'An (208) eternal portion of me having become Soul in the world of Soul,' i. e., a certain portion of me, a divine emanation of me, being naturally possessed of real resolve, and other like qualities, having become Soul whose true essence is concealed by a wrapping of nescience consisting of beginningless deeds, whose knowledge and power are exceedingly limited when dwelling in the world of Soul, in the transmigratory state (209). And in accordance there-

206. 'Re-statement of difference already established by some other means of proof' is, according to Śāṅkara ideas, the teaching of what is false, and not intended as true by the Veda; for all knowledge of the external world is purely fictitious, as is the external world itself.

207. Brahma Sūtras II 3. 45.

208. Bhagavadgītā XV. 7.

209. Partly quoted from Rāmānuja's Commentary *in loco*.

देहोऽशस्तद्वत् । एकवत्त्वेकदेशत्वं क्षणशतं विशिष्टस्यैकवस्तुनो विशेषणमंश एव । तथा च विवेचकाः, विशिष्टे वस्तुनि विशेषणांशोऽयं विशेष्यांशोऽयमिति व्यपदिशन्ति । विशेषणविशेष्ययोरंशशित्वेऽपि स्वभाववैलक्षण्यं दृश्यते । एवं जीवपरयोर्विशेषणविशेष्ययोरंशशित्वं स्वभावभेदश्चापपद्यते ।

तदिदमुच्यते 'नेवं पर' इति यथाभूतो जीवस्तथाभूतो न परः, यथैव हि प्रमायाः प्रमायानन्यथाभूतस्तथा प्रमास्थानीयतदंशाव्जीवातंशी परोऽप्यर्थान्तरभूत इत्यर्थः । एवं जीवपरयोर्विशेषण-
with is the Śruti (210) "These true desires are covered by what is false" That the works of souls have a beginningless course is determined by the Sūtra "There were no works because of non-diremption—we deny this, for they are beginningless, and this is both congruous (is accordant with reason), and is found (is revealed in the Veda)." And the Smṛiti also declares "Sunk in sleep from beginningless time Soul has trodden the path of trans-migratory life"

It may be said that the word portion designates an integral part of a single thing; but if Soul were an integral part of Brahman, the faults pertaining to it (Soul) would belong to him. Nor can the being a portion be upheld by the assumption that Soul is a *separate* portion of Brahman, for Brahman is insusceptible of division into separate portions. Here applies the Sūtra (211) 'But (it is a portion) after the manner of light, not such is the Supreme.' The word 'but' debars the objection urged. Soul is 'a portion of the Supreme after the manner of light,' after the same manner as light consisting of brightness is a portion of the bright fire, the sun, etc., as the bovine nature, and other differencing parts are portions of white, black, and other cows differenced by that nature, or as the body is a portion of the embodied soul,

210 Chhândogya Upanishad VIII 3. 1.

211 Brahman Sūtras II 3 46.

विशेष्यत्वकृतं स्वभाववैलक्षण्यमाश्रित्य भेदनिर्देशः प्रवर्तते ।
अभेदनिर्देशास्तु पृथक्सिद्धान्तविशेषणानां विशेषपर्यन्तत्वमाश्रित्य
मुख्यत्वेनोपपद्यन्ते 'आत्मसस्य' 'इयमात्मा ब्रह्मे' त्यादिषु तत्त्व-
ब्रह्मशब्दकत्वमयमात्मेति शब्दोऽपि जीवशरीरकक्ष्मवाचकत्वेनैका-
द्यभिधायित्वात् । अयमर्थः प्रत्यक्षमङ्गितः । ननु 'अना सोम्य
तदा सम्पन्ने भवति स्वमपीति भवती'ति जीवपरयोः स्वरूपेण
श्रूयत इति चेत्, 'प्राज्ञेनात्मना सम्परिषत्को न बाह्यं किञ्चन
वेद नान्तरमि'ति स्वापदशायां जीवस्य सर्वज्ञेन परमात्मना निर-

viz god, man, etc. For the being a portion is the being an integral part of a single thing, and the differencing part of a single thing (thereby) differenced is a portion of it. Accordingly the discerning affirm that in a differenced thing one part is that which differs, and the other part is that which is differenced thereby. Moreover, although the differencing part and that which is thereby differenced constitute a portion and that of which it is a portion, a distinction of nature is observed. Thus it is admissible that Soul and the Supreme as differencing part and what is differenced thereby, should form a portion and that of which it (Soul) is a portion, and should at the same time possess a distinction of nature. This is declared in 'not such is the Supreme,' i.e., the Supreme is not such as Soul, for just as (a lamp or other luminous body) possessed of brightness is other than the brightness proceeding from it, so the Supreme also, of whom Soul is a portion, is a being distinct from Soul; which is a portion of him, as exemplified by brightness (in the foregoing example). Such is the meaning. After the manner thus stated, there occur (in the Śruti and Smṛiti) declarations of distinction, being based on the diversity of the nature of Soul and the Supreme resulting from the fact that the one, Soul, is the differencing part, and the other the Supreme, he who is differenced thereby. Again, declarations of the identity (of Soul and Brahma) are admissible in their

स्तसमस्तश्रमस्य बाह्याभ्यन्तरज्ञानलोपः श्रूयते, नह्यकिञ्चिद्विशेषस्य तदानीमेव सर्वज्ञेन सता स्वेन परिष्वङ्गः सम्भवति । 'सता सोम्ये'त्यत्रापि न जीवपरयोः स्वरूपेक्यमुच्यते । अपि तु सुषुप्ति-काले नामरूपानुसन्धानाभावात्प्रलयकाल इव ब्रह्मणि लयः प्रति-पाद्यते स्वमपीतो भवति स्वात्मनि ब्रह्मणि लीनो भवति न तु स्वस्मिन्नेव स्वस्य लयः सम्भवति । अत्रापि सता सोम्य तदा सम्प-

literal sense, being based on the fact that the differencing parts, incapable of separate existence, ultimately extend to (involve and expres-) that which is differenced by them, and in "That thou art," "This soul is Brahma," and other sentences the words 'Thou' and 'This soul' (are admissible) equally with the words 'That' and 'Brahma, because they express the same object in that they designate Brahma having Soul as his body' This matter has been explicated before.

Should it be said that in (212) "when a man sleeps here, then, my dear child, he is united with the existent, he is gone to his own (self)," there is a scriptural declaration of a unity of essence (being) possessed by Soul and the Supreme, we would reply that in the words (213) "This person, embraced by the omniscient self, knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within," it is declared that in the state of deep sleep there is a sublation of all knowledge pertaining to Soul of what is without and within, because it has been freed from all weariness when embraced) by the all-knowing Supreme Spirit, for one who is devoid of knowledge cannot at the same time be embraced by his own self being all-knowing and truly existent. And in "He becomes united with the existent, my dear child" also, it is not declared that there exists a unity of essence in the case of Soul and the Supreme Spirit, but rather it is imported that because of the non-existence of consciousness as to name and form in the time of

212. Chhândogya Upanishad VI. 8. 1.

213. Brihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad IV. 3. 21.

ज्ञो भवतीति तृतीयास्वारस्यात्सम्पत्तिशब्दस्य परिष्कृष्टशब्देकार्थ्यान्न
स्वरूपेभ्यसम्भवः । तथा च सूत्रकारः, “सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेने”ति ।

अथ प्रतिबिम्बवादे लिख्यते ।

नन्वृ“तं पिबन्तो सुकृतस्य लोके गुहां प्रविष्टौ परमे पराद्धे ।
छायातपो ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ती”तिश्रुत्या जीवस्य ब्रह्मप्रतिबिम्बत्वं
प्रतिपाद्यत इति चेन्न एकदेहावस्थितत्वेऽपि जीवात्मपरमात्मनोर-
भास्वरभास्वरयोः स्थायातपयोरिवाप्रकाशत्वप्रकाशत्वरूपस्वभावश्रव-
स्यामात्रप्रतिपादनपरत्वात्, “द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं
profound sleep there is absorption in Brahma as in the time of
the dissolution of the universe. ‘He is gone to his own self,’ i. e.
he is then absorbed in Brahma as his own self, but absorption
of his own self in his own self is impossible. Also in, ‘then, my
dear child, he is united with the truly existent’ the words ‘united
with’ agreeing in meaning with the word ‘embraced,’ according to
the proper force of the third (instrumental) case, (viz *satā*), it is
impossible that Soul and Brahma should be one in essence Hence
it is said by the author of the Sūtras (214) “Because there is
representation of difference in sound sleep, and in the going forth
(of Soul at death)”

The doctrine of reflection is next considered

It may be said that the Śruti passage “There (215) are two
drinking their reward in the world of their own works, having
entered into the cave (of the heart), into the highest region
Those who know Brahma call them shadow and sunshine” de-
clares that Soul is a (216) reflection of Brahma We deny this, its
purport being merely to declare that though Soul and the Su-
preme Spirit dwell in the same body, there exists between them a
fixed distinction of nature (viz, that the former is non-luminous

214. Brahma Sūtras I. 3. 42.

215. Kātha Upanishad I 3. 1.

216. The word ‘chhāyā’ being here understood by the Śāṅkaras
to mean ‘reflection.’

वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते । तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वन्त्यमश्नन्नन्यो ऽमिवाक-
शीति”अत्यन्तरेकार्थ्यात् । अत्रापि ब्रह्मण आतपत्वाभावादातपव-
द्भास्वरत्वमेवातपशब्दार्थ इति, जीवस्य छायात्वाभावेऽपि छाया-
षट्बद्धदशायामभास्वरत्वमेव छायाशब्दार्थो भवितुमर्हति । “अ-
सूलमनश्च ह्रस्वमदीर्घमलोहितमक्वायमि”ति छायाप्रतिषेधश्च यथापु-
ना च छायाशब्दो ब्रह्मप्रतिविम्बपरः ।

नन्वे“क एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः ।

एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ।

and the latter luminous) like that existing between a dark shadow and bright sunshine For it thus agrees in meaning with another Śruti, “Two (217) birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweets fruit, the other looks on without eating.” Here too, (in the first-quoted passage,) Brahma not being actually sunshine, the term ‘sunshine’ signifies that he is luminous like sunshine. Soul also not being actually a shadow (reflection), the term ‘shadow’ must indicate that in the state of bondage it is non-luminous (dark) like a shadow And in “It is neither gross nor subtle, neither short nor long, nor red, without shadow (218)” there being a revealed denial of the being a shadow,—in the passage under discussion the word shadow does not signify a reflection of Brahma.

But it may be said that according to “The Soul of beings abiding in all beings, though one appears manifold, like the moon in the water,” “As the one ether becomes diverse in waterpots, etc, so the one Soul (or Self) dwells in many beings, like the sun (reflected) in lakes of water,” and other authoritative texts, as in the case of the reflections of the moon shewn in the water of tanks, canals, and irrigated fields, there is only an adscititious

217 Mundaka Upanishad III 1 1.

Svetāśvatara Upanishad IV 6

218 Brihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad III. 8 8.

आकाशमेकं हि यथा घटादिषु पृथग्भवेत् ।

तथात्मैको ह्यनेकस्थो जलधारेष्विवांशुमान्” ।

इत्यादिशास्त्रानुसारेण तद्भाषकुल्यावेदारजलप्रसिध्यन्तीनां चन्द्रप्रतिबिम्बानामिव मायाहङ्कारतद्विकारप्रसिध्यन्तद्वाच्यानामीश्वरजीववृत्तिज्ञानानामेवाधिकमेदकत्वेन तन्निबन्धनेऽयं “चाक्षो द्वाधवावीशानीशा” इति चेन्न परिच्छिन्नव्योमादिविलक्षणवस्तुनश्चायासम्पत्त्यसम्भवात्त्रोहिताच्छायप्रवणाच्च । काल्पनिकच्छायाङ्गीकारे जीवेश्वरयोरपि मिथ्यात्वप्रसङ्गात् । तदभ्युपगम “आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः”, “य एतद्विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ती” त्यादिविधीनामा-

(219) difference of the cognitions residing in (constituting) Lord and Soul, which cognitions are reflections of Brahma shewn in Māyā, the organ of egoism, and its modifications, hence the distinction indicated in “There (220) are two, one knowing (Lord), the other not-knowing (Soul), both unborn, one strong, the other weak,” (and like passages), rests on that false difference alone, (and does not prove real duality). We reject this view for the following reasons — It is impossible that a substance (entity) whose nature is diverse from that of ether (221) and other finite things, should assume the form of a shadow (reflection), and there is a Vedic statement that it (Brahma) is “not red, without shadow.” If fictitious reflection is affirmed, it follows that Soul and the Lord are unreal. If this, too, is maintained, “Behold the (222) Self (or Soul) is verily to be seen, to be heard,” “They (223) who know it become immortal,” and other like injunctions become meaningless. If,

219 A difference resulting from the conditioning (unreal) *antahkaṇḍāḍi* alone, just as the numerous and variously-shaped reflections of the moon in the water of lakes, etc., are due to the presence of that water, the action of its waves, etc.

220. Śvetāśvartara Upanishad I 9

221. Diverse from these as being infinite, while ether is an effect, according to the Vedānta, and therefore finite.

222. Bṛhad Āraṇyaka II 4 5.

223. Śvetāśvartara Upanishad III 10.

नर्थस्य प्रसङ्गात् । तस्याप्यभ्युपगमे ब्रह्मणो मानान्तराविषयत्वात्स्वानुभवस्यापि मिथ्याभूतजीवानतिगितावभासकत्वाच्च यावत्प्रमाणप्रमेयमिथ्यात्ववादिनः कथायामधिकारानुपपत्तेः । जलचन्द्रदृष्टान्तोपदेशानां ब्रह्मणः शरीरभूतचित्चिद्व्रतदोषास्पृशेप्रतिपादनपरत्वोपपत्तेर्वाक्यान्तरोपदिष्टजीवेश्वरस्वरूपत्वभावयाथाव्यबाधकत्वाभावात् । श्रूयते चान्तर्य्यामिणो निर्दोषत्वम्, “एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः”, “अग्निर्यथेको भुवनं प्रविष्टो रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव । एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बह्विधश्च, सूर्यो यथा सर्वलोकास्य चक्षुर्न लिप्यते चाक्षुषैर्ब्राह्मदेवैः । एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्-

further, this also should be maintained, then Brahma being an object not ascertained by any other means of proof (than the Veda), and personal experience not declaring anything ulterior to Soul (which is held by the Śāṅkaras) to be unreal, one who thus asserts the falsity of all means of proof and things proved thereby cannot be regarded as competent to engage in discussion. Lastly, since (224) the teachings conveyed in the illustration of the reflection of the moon in the water admit of explanation as intended to make known that (Brahma) is unaffected by the faults attaching to Soul and not-Soul, which constitute his body, they do not deny the reality of the essence and nature of the Lord taught in other texts. And the faultlessness of the Internal Ruler is declared in the Śruti, “There (225) is one god hidden in all beings,” “As (226) one fire, when it has entered, the world, assumes forms corresponding to the different forms of the fuel it burns, so the one Inner Soul of all beings assumes forms corresponding to the different forms it enters, and exists also without,” “As (227) the sun, the eye of the whole world,

224. Since a perfectly appropriate meaning is thus established.

225. Śvetāśvatara Upanishad VI. 11.

226. Katha Upanishad II. 5. 9.

227. Ibid II. 5. 11.

रात्मा न लिप्यते लोकदुःखेन बाह्यः” । अन्यथा “ऽऽकाशमेकं हि यथा घटादिषु पृथग्भवेति”तिदृष्टान्तान्तरोपादानवेयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात् । ननु

“सितनीलादिभेदेन यथेकं दृश्यते नमः ।

भ्रान्तिदृष्टिभिरात्मापि तथैवेकः पृथक् पृथक्” ।

इत्याद्यात्मेकत्ववादाः कथम्, अवेलस्ययादिति ब्रूमः, भेदशब्दे हि वेलस्यवचनो लोके प्रसिद्धः सुसदृशेषु नास्य कश्चिद्भेदो ऽस्तीति वक्तारो भवन्ति । तथा ऽऽत्मनामपि नरपशुतिर्गम्भेदमिन्नशरीरवर्तिनां शरीरसम्बन्धमपोह्य केवलतत्त्वरूपेण निरूप्यमा-

is not sullied by the external faults (impurities) pertaining to the eye (as disease) so the one Inner Soul of all beings is not sullied by the misery of the world, being himself without” Otherwise it (228) would be idle to adduce the other illustration “As one ether becomes diverse in waterpots,” etc

But it may be asked, How is it that we find the following and other declarations of the unity of spirit, “As (229) one ether is viewed as possessing the differences of white, blue etc, so one spirit also is regarded as manifold by those whose minds are deluded by error” ? We reply, Because of non-diversity of nature, for the word ‘difference’ is currently accepted as signifying diversity of nature, as in the case of things very much alike

228. If the illustrations given of the reflection of the sun and moon in the water do not convey the meaning already set forth, viz, that the Supreme as Antaryāmi is not affected by the faults of his body, Soul and not-Soul, which are pervaded by him, but teach the Śāṅkara doctrine of reflection, then the further illustration “For as one ether” etc, must, according to the same system, teach the doctrine of circumscription, and so be discordant and irrelevant.

229 That is, ether (or sky) is imagined by the ignorant to possess those differences of colour, etc, which really belong to sunlight, clouds, vapour, etc.

ज्ञानां पद्वारः परमाणूनामिव न किञ्चिदपि बेलक्ष्यमस्तीत्यनेनाभि-
 प्रायेणैकत्ववादा नानात्वनिवेद्यारम्भः । तदभिप्रायमेवेदं भगवद्वचनं
 “विद्याविनयसम्पन्न” इत्यादि “निर्दोषं हि समं ब्रह्म” प्रकृतिसंज्ञ-
 दोषविमुक्ततया सममात्मवस्तु हि ब्रह्म । “सर्वभूतेशः सो
 ऽसौ ब्रह्मचारिणो यो ऽयं विष्णुः”, वाराहे “यत्सत्त्वं स हरिर्देवो यो
 हरिस्तत्परं एहं सत्त्वेन मुच्यते जन्तुः सत्त्वं नारायणात्मकम्”, लेङ्गे
 “सत्त्वस्वरूपश्च स्वयं स विष्णुः पुरुषोत्तमः नहि पालनसामर्थ्यमृते
 सर्वेश्वरं हरिमि”त्यादिभिः ग्रामाणिकानां चेतनान्तरशङ्का नापप-
 द्यते । “ब्रह्माणमिन्द्रं रुद्रं च यमं बहूणमेव च निगृह्य हरते
 यस्मात्तस्माद्भूरिहोच्यते” । नारायणस्य तु, “अथ यको ह वे

people are accustomed to say 'there is no difference between this (and that)' So, also, there is no diversity of nature (230) inherent in souls dwelling in bodies possessing the differences (different conditions) of man, beast, and bird, when, excluding their connection with these bodies, they are considered in their pure essence, just as no diversity of nature pertains to the atomic particles of the lotus pollen Such is the meaning of such affirmations of unity and denials of duality. Such, too, is the meaning of the saying of Bhagavat “(The learned look upon a Brāhman) endowed with knowledge and refinement, (a cow, an elephant, a dog, and a Svapāka), as all (231) alike, (Even here worldly existence is vanquished by those whose mind is fixed on uniformity (of Spirit), because Brahma is without fault and of uniform (232) nature.” Because Brahma, viz, spiritual essence, is uniform when freed from the faults resulting from connection with Nature.

230 Soul is the same in essence, though there is a real distinction of individuals.

231. Bhagavadgītā V. 18

232 Ibid. V 19 See Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya on the passage.

नारायण आसीत्”, “अथ नित्यो ह वै नारायणः”, “एव सर्वभूता-
न्तरात्मा अपहृतशम्भा दिव्यो देव एको नारायणः”, “नारा-
यणः परं ब्रह्म, आत्मा नारायणः परः”, सुबालोपनिषदि “किं त-
दासीन्नेवेह किञ्चनान्न आसीन्मूलमनाधारमिमाः प्रजाः प्रजायन्ते
दिव्यो देव एको नारायणः”, स्वेंनाश्वतरे “स विश्वकृद्विश्वविदा-
त्मयोनिर्ज्ञः कालकालो गुणो सर्वविद्यः । प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः
संसारमोक्षस्थितिबन्धहेतुः” “देशतः कालतो व्याप्तिर्मातृदत्त्वं तथैव
च । हरेर्विभूतिमायन्तु केवलं सम्प्रभाषितम्”, स्कान्दे “बन्धको

In view of the passages “This Vishṇu is the lord of all beings, O students of Brahma, (in the Varāha Purāṇa) “The god Hari is the highest object, by goodness Soul is liberated, goodness is one with Nārāyaṇa,” (and in the Linga Purāṇa) “Vishṇu himself is essentially goodness, there is no possibility of protection apart from Hari the lord of all” those who accept the authority of sacred institutes cannot entertain the supposition that (233) any other intelligence (spiritual being) (than Nārāyaṇa is the Supreme Spirit). And there is also the following “He is here called Hari because he subdues and takes away Biahmā, Indra, Rudra, Yama, and Varuna”

And that Nārāyaṇa is the opposite of all imperfection, and the repository of the whole assemblage of excellent qualities is known from such texts as “Verily one only, Nārāyaṇa, existed,” “Verily eternal is Nārāyaṇa,” “This Nārāyaṇa is the Inner Soul of all beings, devoid of sin, the one heavenly deity,” “Nārāyaṇa is the Supreme Brahma, Nārāyaṇa is the Supreme Spirit,” (in the Subāla Upanishad) “What then existed? Nothing indeed existed here (in the world) “in the beginning, there was a baseless root—these creatures are produced—there was one heavenly deity, Nārāyaṇa”

233 The sense seems to be that though, as just shown, all spirit is the same in essence, still there a fixed distinction of nature between the Supreme Spirit (Nārāyaṇa) and Soul

भवपाशेन भवपाशाच्च मोचकः केवल्यदः परं ब्रह्म विष्णुरेव सना-
तन" इत्यादिभिर्निखिलहेयप्रस्थनीकत्वं कल्याणगुणगणाकरत्वमवग-
म्यते । सद्ब्रह्मात्मशिवादिशब्दा हि तुल्यप्रकरवस्थेन नारायणश-
ब्देन विशेषितास्तमेवावगमयन्ति । न "न्यात्मा वा इदमय आसी",
दिति प्राक्चतुष्टयेकत्वावधारणात्कथं सूक्ष्मविद्विद्विशिष्टस्य नारायणस्य
कारणत्वम् । उच्यते "यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते येन जातानि
जीवन्ति यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ती"ति परित्यक्तस्थूलाकाराणां सूक्ष्मा-
कारापत्या ब्रह्मणि वृत्तिः प्रतिपाद्यते नतु स्वरूपनिवृत्तिः, "अक्षर-

(in the Svetāśvatara Upanishad) "He is omnific, omniscient, self-caused (self-existent), who knows, is the author of time, endowed with qualities, who knows everything, is the master of nature and the embodied soul, the lord of the three qualities, the cause of the bondage, existence, and liberation of the world," "Universal existence in space and time, and likewise the bestowing of liberation, pertain to Hari, but only a little of his divine greatness has been declared," (in the Skanda Purāṇa) "He who takes captive in the snare of existence, and he who liberates from the snare of existence, the giver of absolute emancipation, the Supreme Brahman, is the eternal Vishnu alone" For the words 'Existent,' 'Brahma,' 'the Self,' 'the Blessed,' etc, having their meaning defined by the word Nārāyaṇa occurring in like passages (of the Veda), denote the same deity (Nārāyaṇa)

But you will say, Since the words "Spirit alone was this in the (234) beginning" affirm the existence of unity prior to creation, how can Nārāyaṇa differentiated by subtle Soul and not-Soul be the cause of the world? We reply that in "That from which these beings are born, by which when born they live, into which departing they (235) enter," it is set forth that beings having rejected

234. Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad I. 4. 1.

235. Taittīriya Upanishad III. 1.

न्तमसि लीयते तमः परे देवे एकीभवती"ति तमः शब्दवाच्यायाः प्रकृतेः परमात्मन्येकीभावश्चक्ष्यते । पृथग्ग्रहणरहितत्वेन धृतिरेकीभावः स एव लयशब्दार्थः, यथा "वृक्षे लीनाः पतङ्गाः, वने लीनाः चारङ्गाः" । अथ एव "तमसा गूढमयेऽप्रकेतमासीत्", "आत्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतन्स्मिंश्चान्यो मायया सन्निरुद्ध" इति । सूक्ष्मरूपेण चेश्वरस्या "न्तःप्रविष्टः शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मे"त्यनेन स्वस्य स्वयमेवात्मा शास्ता चाग्निरात्मानं दहती"ति वदत्यन्तानुपपत्तेः । अथ च "एष एवासाधु कर्म कारयति तं यमघो निनीषती"ति सर्व-

their gross form exist in Brahman (236) by the assumption of a subtle form, but destruction of essence is not intended; for in "The Imperishable One (Soul) is merged in darkness (Nature) darkness becomes one with the Supreme Deity,"—it is declared that Nature, here designated by the term darkness, becomes one with the Supreme Spirit. The becoming one with the Supreme Spirit is existing as that which cannot be cognised as (237) distinct. This is the meaning of the word 'laya,' as seen for instance in "The birds are merged (concealed) in the tree," "the deer are merged (concealed) in the forest." Hence, too, it is said "In the beginning this was hidden by darkness and unperceived," "From this the Māyā-associated One creates all this, and in it another, (Soul), is enclosed by (238) Māyā" (239) For that "Having entered in, He is the ruler of beings, the self, (or soul), of all," means that, the Lord existing in subtle form becomes his own ruler, and his own self, is wholly unreasonable, just as it would be to say 'fire

236. During the period of *pralaya* they continue to exist one with Brahman, and thus the Supreme, differentiated by subtle soul and not-Soul, becomes the cause of the world.

237. Not the becoming identical with.

238. Śvetāśvatara Upanishad IV. 9.

239. Here begins a long repetition of paragraphs occurring at pp 51—53.

चोऽपि जीवभूतस्य स्वस्य नरकानुभवहेतुभूतासाधुकर्मकारयिता पाप-
कर्मसु निवर्तनशक्तोऽपि नियन्तेत्यादिकं सर्वमसमञ्जसमेव स्यात् ।
आह च सूत्रकारः “इतरव्यपदेशाद्विताकरखादिदोषप्रसक्तिः” अगतो
ब्रह्मानन्यत्वं प्रतिपादयद्विस्तृत्यमस्ययमात्मा ब्रह्मेत्यादिभिर्जीव-
स्याप्यनन्यत्वं व्यपदिश्यत इत्युक्तम् । तथेदं चेद्यत्ने यदीतरस्य
जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावो ऽमीभिर्वाक्येर्व्यपदिश्यते तदा ब्रह्मणः सार्वज्ञ्य-
सत्यसङ्कल्पत्वादियुक्तस्यात्मनो हितरूपजगदकरणमहितरूपजग-
त्करवमित्यादयो दोषाः प्रसज्यरेन् । आध्यात्मिकाधिभौतिकाधि-

burns itself.’ Likewise that by the words “It is He alone that causes him whom He desires to degrade to do wrong deeds,” it is meant that He, though omniscient, causes wrong deeds which are the occasion of His own experiencing of hell, in the form of Soul, and that He though able to cease from evil deeds, is the regulator (actuator) therein, is altogether incongruous.

And the author of the Sūtras has said “Through the declaration of the other, (Soul), to be Brahma, there would attach the fault of the not-making of what is beneficial,” etc, i e, it is said by those who maintain the identity of the world with Brahma, that the identity of Soul also with Brahma is declared by the texts “That thou art” and “this Self is Brahma,” etc. In reply thereto, it is urged (in the Sūtra), ‘If by these sentences it is declared that another, viz, Soul, is Brahma then the not-making of a world taking the form of what is beneficial to himself, and the making of a world injurious to himself, and other faults will attach to Brahma as one endowed with the attributes of omniscience, real resolve, etc. This world is a cause of infinite pain, originating from self (body, etc), from elemental beings (wild beasts, etc), and from superhuman powers (demons, etc), and one who is self-dependent and wise does not engage in such a work, (viz, as the making of the world), resulting in his own disadvantage

दैविकाऽनन्तदुःखाकरं चेदं जगत्, न चेदृशे स्वानर्थे स्वाधीने
बुद्धिमान्बर्त्तते । जीवाद्ब्रह्मणो भेदवादिन्यः श्रुतयो जगद्ब्रह्मणोर-
नन्यत्वं वदता त्वयैव परित्यक्ताः, भेदे सत्यनन्यत्वासिद्धिः ।
ओपाधिकभेदविषया भेदश्रुतयः स्वाभाविकभेदविषयाश्चाभेदश्रुतय
इति चेत्, तच्चेदं वक्तव्यं स्वभावतः स्वस्मादभिन्नं जीवं किमनुप-
हितं जगत्कारणं ब्रह्म जानाति, न वा । न जानाति चेत्सर्वज्ञत्व-
हानिः । जानाति चेत् स्वस्मादभिन्नस्य जीवस्य दुःखं स्वदुःखमिति
जानतो ब्रह्मणो हिताकरणाहितकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिरनिवार्या ।

जीवब्रह्मणोरज्ञानकृतो भेद, सत्प्रविषया भेदश्रुतिरिति चेत्तथापि
जीवाज्ञानपक्षे पूर्वोक्तो विकल्पस्तत्फलं च तदवस्थम् । ब्रह्माज्ञान-

The Śruti passages declaring that Brahma is distinct from Soul, are rejected by you when you assert the identity of the world and Brahma, for if there is distinction, identity cannot be established. If you say that the Śruti passages that speak of distinction, relate to adventitious distinction, and the Śruti passages that speak of identity relate to essential identity, then in this regard it ought to be stated whether the unconditioned Brahma, the cause of the world, knows Soul to be essentially identical with himself or not. If he does not know, there is an end to omniscience. If he does know, then there inevitably attach to Brahma, as one knowing the pain of Soul, identical with himself, to be his own pain, the faults of the not-making (of a world) beneficial to himself, and the making (of a world) injurious to himself.

It may be said that the difference between Soul and Brahma is the product of ignorance, and that the Śruti passages which speak of difference relate to this ignorance—imagined difference, (and not to any real distinction). Here, also, on the view that ignorance resides in Soul, the afore-mentioned dilemma (240) would present itself, and the same consequence would follow. If

एते स्वप्रकाशस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणो ऽज्ञानसाक्षित्वं तत्कृतजगत्सृष्टिश्च न संभवति । अज्ञानेन प्रकाशस्तिरोहितश्चेत्, तिरोधानस्य प्रकाशनिवृत्तिकरत्वेन प्रकाशस्यैव स्वरूपत्वात्स्वरूपनिवृत्तिरेवेति स्वरूपनाशादिदोषसहस्रं प्रागेवोदीरितम् । “अधिक्रान्तु भेदनिर्देशात्” । तु शब्दः एवं व्यावर्तयति । आध्यात्मिकादिदुःखयोगार्हात्प्रत्यगात्मनो ऽधिकमर्थान्तरभूतं ब्रह्म, कुतः, भेदनिर्देशात्, प्रत्यगात्मनो हि भेदेन निर्दिश्यते परं ब्रह्म, “य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनो ऽन्तरो यमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा शरीरं य आत्मनो ऽन्तरो यमयति स त आत्मान्तर्गम्यमृतः”, “पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारब्धु मत्वा जुष्टस्त-

you maintain that ignorance resides in Brahman, we reply that Brahman being of self-luminous essence cannot be a witness of ignorance, nor can (241) the creation of the world be a result of such witnessing. If you say that the light (luminous nature or essence of Brahman) is concealed by ignorance, we reply that concealment causes failure of light, hence as light (luminousness, self-manifestation) is the essence (of Brahman), there would occur a failure (destruction) of essence. The destruction of essence thus involved, and innumerable other faults have already been spoken of.

Again, there is the Sūtra, ‘But (242) (Brahman) is ulterior to Soul (or Self), because of there being a declaration of difference.’ The word ‘but’ sets aside the (opposite) view. Brahman is ulterior, is a different being from the Internal Soul or Self, which is susceptible of connection with pain originating in the (corporeal self etc. Whence? ‘Because of there being a declaration of difference’—because the Supreme Brahman is declared to be distinct from the Internal Soul in such Śruti passages as

241. The creation of the world (duality) is held by the Śāṅkaras to be the result of Brahman's being a witness (perceiver) of Nescience.

242. Brahman Sūtras II 1. 22.

स्तेनामृतत्वमेति”, “स कारणं करणाधिपतिः”, “तयोरन्यः
पिपलं स्वादृत्यनश्नन्नन्यो ऽभिवाकशीति”, “ज्ञात्वा द्वावजावीशा-
नीशो”, “अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत्तस्मिंश्चान्यो मायया सन्नि-
रुद्धः”, “प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः”, “नित्यो नित्यानाम्”, “यो-
ऽक्षरमन्तरे सञ्चरन्त्यस्याक्षरं शरीरं यमक्षरो न वेद एष सर्वभूतान्त-
रात्मा ऽणूतपाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायण” इत्याद्याः । तथा
सुषुप्तावपि जीवपरयोर्मेदः “प्राज्ञेनात्मना सम्परिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किञ्च-
न वेद नान्तर” इति स्थापदशायां जीवस्य सर्वज्ञेन परमात्मना
निरस्तसमस्तश्रमस्य बाह्याभ्यन्तरज्ञानलोपः श्रूयते, न ह्यकिञ्चि-

“He (243) who dwelling in Soul is within Soul, whom Soul does not know, whose body Soul is, who rules Soul within, he is thy Soul (Self), the ruler within, the immortal,” “But (244) when he regards Soul and the Actuator as distinct, then delighted thereby (or together with him, the Actuator, the Supreme Spirit) he attains immortality” “He (245) is the cause, the lord of the lord of the organs,” “One (246) of them eats the sweet fruit the other looks on without eating,” “There (247) are two, one knowing, the other not knowing, both unborn, one strong, the other weak,” “From (248) this the Māyā—associated one creates all this, and in it another (Soul) is imprisoned by Māyā,” “The (249) Master of Nature and of Soul, the lord of the qualities,” “He (250) is the eternal among the eternal (the supremely eternal)”,

243. Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Upanishad III. 7. 22. *ātmā* instead of *vijñāna*, according to the Mādhyandina text.

244. Śvetāsvatara Upanishad I. 6.

245. Ibid. VI. 9.

246. Ibid. IV. 6.

247. Ibid. I. 9.

248. Ibid. IV. 9.

249. Ibid. VI. 16.

250. Ibid. Śloka 13.

जज्ञस्य तदानीमेव सर्वज्ञेन सता स्वेन परिष्वङ्गः सम्भवति । “सता सोम्य तदा सम्पन्नो भवति स्वमपीतो भवती” त्यत्रापि न जीवपरयोः स्वरूपैक्यमुच्यते, अपि तु सुषुप्तिकाले नामरूपानुसन्धानाभावात्प्रलय-काल इव ब्रह्मणि लयः प्रतिपाद्यते, स्वमपीतो भवति स्वात्मनि ब्रह्मणि लीनो भवति न तु स्वस्मिन्नेव स्वस्य लयः सम्भवति । अत्रापि सता सोम्य तदा सम्पन्नो भवतीति तृतीयास्वारस्यात्सम्पत्तिशब्दस्य परिष्वङ्गशब्देकार्थान्न स्वरूपैक्यसम्भवः । तथा च सूत्रकारः “सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेने”ति । तथा च “विवक्षितगुणोपपत्तेश्च”, “अनुपपत्तेश्च न शरीर” इति । वक्ष्यमाणाश्च गुणाः परमात्मन्येवोपपद्यन्ते

“He who pervades the imperishable (Soul), whose body the imperishable is, whom the imperishable does not know, is the inner Soul of all beings, devoid of sin, the one heavenly deity Nārāyaṇa ”

(251) Moreover, in deep sleep also there is difference between Soul and the Supreme Spirit, for in the words “This person embraced by the omniscient Soul knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within,” it is declared that in the state of deep sleep there is a sublation of all knowledge pertaining to Soul of what is without and within, because it has been freed from all weariness (when embraced) by the all-knowing Supreme Spirit, for one who is devoid of knowledge cannot at the same time be embraced by his own self being all-knowing and truly existent. And in “He then becomes united with the existent, my dear child, he is gone to his own self,” it is not declared that there exists a unity of essence in the case of Soul and the Supreme Spirit, but rather it is taught that because of the non-existence of consciousness as to name and form in the time of deep sleep there is absorption in Brahma as in the time of the dissolution of the universe. “He is gone to his own self,” i. e.

“मनोमयः प्राणशरीरो भाहूयः सत्यसङ्कल्प आकाशात्मा सर्वकर्मो सर्वकामः सर्वगन्धः सर्वरसः सर्वमिदमभ्यातो ऽवाक्यऽनादर” इति । ननु “स कृतं कुर्वीति” ति विहितमुपासनम्, तथायं गुणविधिः, असत्ता च गुणेनोपासनं विहितार्थं स्यात्, “मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीति”-तिवत्, अन्यथा, “अशब्दमस्पर्शमि” त्यादिनिर्गुणवाक्यविरोधः, अतो मनोमयत्वादयो न पारमार्थिका इति चेन्नैवं “सर्वेषु प्रसिद्धोपदेशादि,” ति सूचविरोधात् । सर्वेषु वेदान्तेषु प्रसिद्धं ब्रह्म, इह च “सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जनानि” ति शान्त उपासीते ति वाक्योपक्रमे श्रुतं

he is then absorbed in Brahma as his own self, but his own absorption in his own self is impossible. Also in “He then becomes united with the existent, my dear child,” the words ‘united with’ agreeing in meaning with the word ‘embraced,’ in accordance with the proper force of the third (instrumental) case, it is impossible that Soul and Brahma should be one in essence. Hence the author of the Sūtras has said, “Because there is representation of difference in deep sleep, and in the going forth (of Soul at death).”

Of like import are the Sūtras “Because (252) the qualities that are to be described find place in (are possible, belong to) Brahma alone,” “Because (253) they do not find place in the embodied one, Soul, (that is not referred to as intelligent, etc)” The qualities about to be described find place in the Supreme Spirit alone—“He (254) who is intelligent, whose body is vital spirit, whose form is light, whose resolves are real, whose essence is like ether, whose are all works, all desires, all smells, and all tastes, who embraces all this, who is without speech, and without regard (for any object, as one with no desire unsatisfied).”

252. Brahma Sūtras I. 2. 2.

253. Ibid. Sūtra 3.

254. Chhāndogya Upanishad III. 14. 2.

तदेव मनोमयत्वादिभिर्धर्मैर्विशिष्टमुपदिश्यत इत्यर्थः । न हि सर्वेषु वेदान्तेषुकल्पितगुणोपदेशादितिहेतुर्वक्तुं शक्यते साध्यासिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । न च “सर्वे खल्विदं ब्रह्मे” इति वचनमेवाभावज्ञापनार्थमिति वाच्यम्, ‘तज्जलानि’ तिहेतुविरोधात् । किञ्च, यदि “सर्वे खल्विदं ब्रह्मे”-तिवचनमेवाऽऽभासनान्मिथ्यात्वविधिस्तर्हि पुनः “स क्रतुं कुर्वीतेति” सगुणोपासनविधिरनर्थकः स्यात्, नहि निर्विशेषज्ञानवतः स-गुणोपासनविधिरिति सङ्गतं भवति । “अशब्दमस्पर्शमि” त्यादि श्रुतिस्तु भूतभौतिकवैलक्षण्यं ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपादयतीति न विरोधः, “सत्त्वादयो न सन्तीति यच्च प्राकृता गुणा” इति स्मृतेः । ननु तच्च

But it may be said that the preceding words (255) “Let him thus meditate” contain the meditation (upāsana) enjoined, the foregoing ‘He who is intelligent,’ etc, is an injunction of qualities by the ascription of which the meditation is to be performed, and, furthermore, meditation by means of unreal qualities may be the matter enjoined (256), as in the text “Let (257) him meditate on mind as Brahma,” (where mind is only an assumed quality of Brahma), for otherwise such sentences as “without (258) voice, without touch,” teaching that Brahma is without qualities, would be contradicted. Hence intelligence and the other qualities mentioned are not real.

We reject this view, for the reason that it would contradict the Sūtra “Because (259) of the setting forth of one certified in all” Its meaning is that in all the Vedānta texts Brahma is certified,

255. Namely, in the passage just quoted.

256. Or, as this translation seems to require *vihitārthah*, perhaps the more correct translation would be ‘and this meditation may have its object (viz. Brahma) enjoined (declared) through the medium of unreal qualities’

257. Chhāndogya Upanishad III. 18. 1.

258. Kāṭha Upanishad I. 3. 15.

“तथा ऽऽसन्नित्यमगन्धवच्चे” ति गन्धरसादेर्निषेधः इह तु “सर्व-
गन्धः सर्वरस” इति यावद्गन्धरसविधिः, न चेकस्मिन्वस्तुनि गुण-
तदभावावुपपन्नाविति तस्माद्विषयभेदवर्णेनेन हि विरोधपरिहारः
कार्यः । स च कार्यब्रह्मणि मनेमयत्वादितः, शुद्धे त्वशब्दत्वादिरिति
चेन्न “विश्वमेवेदं पुरुषस्तद्विश्वमुपजीवति”, “पतिं विश्वस्यात्मे-
श्वरं शाश्वतं शिवमच्युतं”, “यमन्तःसमुद्रे कथयो वयन्ति”, “न
तस्येशे कश्चन”, “तस्य नाम महद्यशः”, “परात्परं यन्महतो
महान्तम्”, “न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते”, “न त्वत्समः”,
“परं हि पुण्डरीकाक्षान्न भूतो न भविष्यति”, चाराहे “नारायणा-

and here (in the Chhândogya Upanishad) the very same being that is mentioned in the beginning of the passage—“One should thus calmly meditate, ‘All this is Brahma, for it is produced, absorbed, and breathes in that’”—is (in III 14 2) set forth as differenced by intelligence and other qualities. For it cannot be alleged that the argument contained in the Sūtra is ‘Because of the setting forth of fictionously—ascribed (unreal) qualities in all the Vedānta texts,’ seeing that that would involve the disproof of what both the Vedānta and your system seek to prove (viz, the true nature of Brahma)

Nor can it be said that the words ‘all this is Brahma’ are really intended to make known the non-existence (of all but Brahma), for that would be opposed to the argument which follows—‘for it is produced, absorbed, and breathes in that.’ Moreover, if the words ‘all this is Brahma’ are really an injunction (declaration) of the falsity (of all but Brahma) by declaring the world to be a mere appearance (or by making manifest its real nature), then the following injunction of meditation on Brahma as possessed of qualities, viz ‘Let him thus meditate,’ would be meaningless, for it would be irrational to

“ स विश्वकृद्विश्वविदात्मयोनिर्यः कालकालो गुणी सर्वविद् यः ।

प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः संसारमोक्षस्थितिवन्धहेतुः ” ॥

“ एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ।

कर्माध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधिवासः साक्षी चेत्ता केवलो निर्गुणश्च ” ॥

hold that one who has received the knowledge that Brahma is undifferentenced (devoid of qualities) should afterwards be enjoined to meditate on Brahma as possessed of qualities. As for ‘without voice, without touch’ and other Śruti passages, they teach that the nature of Brahma is different from that of the elements and the products of the elements, hence they do not contradict those passages which describe the possession of qualities (as ‘He who is intelligent,’ etc). For as the Smṛiti says, “The qualities of Nature, viz, *sattvādi*, pertain not to the Lord”

But it may be said that in the passage just quoted (‘without voice, without touch,’ etc.) the words ‘Likewise without taste, eternal, without smell,” are a denial of smell, taste, etc., but here (in the passage ‘He who is intelligent’ etc), the words ‘whose are all smells and all tastes’ are an affirmation of all smell and taste (as qualities of Brahma), and there cannot be in the same entity both qualities and the absence of qualities. Hence the (apparent) contradiction is to be repelled by describing (setting forth) a distinction of subjects (in the Vedic texts), namely thus, that intelligence and other qualities (therein mentioned) pertain to Brahma viewed as an effect, and voicelessness, etc, to the pure (absolute) Brahma.

This, too, we reject, for the following and other passages of the Śruti and Smṛiti prove that to Nārāyaṇa alone pertains the highest nature, and that he is endowed with qualities as possess-

“सगुणो निर्गुणो विष्णुश्चानगम्यो ह्यसौ स्मृतः, न हि तस्य गुणाः सर्वे सर्वैर्मुनिमणोरपि कर्तुं शक्या वियुक्तस्य सत्त्वादेरखिले-
र्गुणैः”, “एष आत्मा उपहृतपाप्मा”, “परा ऽस्य शक्तिर्विविधेषु भूय-
ते”, “तत्त्वं नारायणः पर” इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभिर्नारायणस्यैव पर-
तत्त्वं दिव्यकल्याणगुणयोगेन सगुणत्वं प्राकृतहेयगुणरहितत्वेन निर्गु-
णं divine and excellent qualities, and devoid of qualities as free from natural (pertaining to Prakṛti) and evil qualities—“All this is the (Supreme) Spirit, all lives through him,” “The master of all, the lord of soul, the eternal, blessed, imperishable,” “Whom (260) sages weave (as weavers a piece of cloth) in the midst of the world-ocean, (that is, whom sages know to pervade all things),” “There is none who rules over him,” “His (261) name is Great Glory,” “One who is higher than the high, and greater than the great,” “There is none seen equal to him, or superior,” “There (262) is none equal to thee,” “There never has been, nor will be, one greater than the lotus-eyed Vishnu,” (in the Varāha Purāṇa) “There has not been, nor will be, a greater deity than Nārāyaṇa,” (in the Brahma Purāṇa) “There is declared no other refuge like unto him, so, without doubt, the Vedas steadfastly proclaim,” (in the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad) “He is omniscient, self-caused, who knows, is the author (or destroyer) of time, endowed with qualities, all-knowing, master of Nature and Soul, lord of the qualities, the cause of the bondage, the existence, and the liberation of the world,” “One God hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the inner soul of all beings, the supervisor of works, the dweller in all beings, the witness, the observer, absolute, and without qualities,” “Endowed with qualities, devoid of qualities, attainable by knowledge, is Vishnu, all the companies of holy sages cannot declare all his qualities though he is separate from the qualities of Nature (*sattvārūḍi*),” Thus Spirit is devoid of sin,”

260 Mahānārāyaṇa Upanishad 3

261. Śvetāśvatara Upanishad IV 19.

262. Bhagavadgītā XI 4 3

शत्वमिति विषयभेदवर्णेनेनेकस्यैवावगमाद्ब्रह्मद्वैविध्यं दुर्वचनमिति
दिक् ॥

इति श्रीमद्रामानुजाचार्य्यप्रणीत इतिप्रसिद्धो

वेदान्ततत्त्वसारः सम्पूर्णः ॥

“His supreme power is declared to be manifold,” “Nārāyaṇa is the (highest) being, the supreme”

By thus describing (setting forth) a distinction of subjects since it appears that Brahma is one only, a two-fold nature is wrongly asserted

Thus far a brief indication (of the system of Rāmānuja, and his refutation of Śāṅkara doctrines)



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