

THE
PREFACES

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THE PREFACES



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(Author of A History of Hindi Literature, and Smiles & Tears)

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
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At the feet of the Masters



FOREWORD

Pythagoras called 'three' the perfect number—expressive of beginning, middle and end. The concept of Trinity is common to most religions. The Christians have the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. The Hindus have the Brahmā, Vishṇu and Maheś. The Buddhists have Buddha, His Order, and the Law. The Jains' Holy Trinity consists of Right Belief, Right Knowledge and the Right Conduct. If we have to anthropomorphize abstract virtues, we have had in modern times the three Ascended Masters—Barrister Jugmander Lal, Brahmchari Sital Pershad and Pandit Ajit Prasada. Between them, they exhausted all possibilities of translation and interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures. It is not possible for a layman to go through all that *copia verborum* in a lifetime. This volume is an attempt to put the wisdom of the Ancients in a nutshell.

I am grateful to Shri Gyan Chand Jain of Lucknow Kirana Company for financing the printing of this work. But for his assistance, it would not have been possible to publish these *Prefaces* to the Sacred Books of the Jains.

Lake Terrace,
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July 1, 1958

K. B. JINDAL



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The Prefaces

1. DRAVYA SAMGRAHA

AMONG the ancient royal dynasties of India, the Gangas of the West were devoted followers of Jainism. There is a tradition that a Jaina Âchârya, named Simhanandi, belonging to the Nandigaṇa, helped Śivamâra, the first king of the Ganga dynasty, to rise to the throne. In one inscription we find a mention of the fact that Śivamâra Konguṇivarmâ was the disciple of Simhanandi, and in another that the race of the Gangas prospered through the sage Simhanandi. It is therefore no wonder that we shall find in Jaina works verses to the effect that the Ganga kings worship the feet of Simhanandi or that a dynasty which owed its origin to the help of a Jaina Âchârya should be staunch to the Jaina religion. There are records which establish beyond doubt that the kings of the Ganga dynasty were the promoters and protectors of Jainism. Numerous inscriptions, dating from the fourth to the twelfth century A. D., testify to the building of Jaina temples, consecration of Jaina images of worship, hollowing out caves for Jaina ascetics and grants to Jaina Âchâryas by the rulers of the Ganga dynasty.

In this dynasty there was a king, named Mârasimha II, mentioned in the inscriptions as Dharma-Mahârâjâdhirâja Satyavâkyâ Konguṇivarmâ Parmânadi Mârasimha. The reign of this king was conspicuous by great and decisive victories over the Cheras, the Cholas, the Pândyas and the Pallavas of the Nolambâdi country. The most notable success of Mârasimha II against his enemies was that against Vajjaladeva, and his most terrible fights were fought at Gonûr and Uchchangi. Faithful to the doctrines of Jainism, this great king, after a glorious reign, abdicated his throne and gave up his life by a three days' fast, in the presence of his spiritual preceptor, the great Ajitasena, at Bânkâpur, in the Dhârwar district. The epitaph of Mârasimha II is contained in the inscription engraved on the four sides of the base of the pillar known as Kûge Brahmadeva Khambha, near the entrance to the temples on Chandragiri hill, at Śravaṇa Belgola (Mysore). Though this inscription is without date, the year of the death of Mârasimha II is inferred from another inscription to be 975 A. D.

Châmuṇḍa Râya or Châmuṇḍa Râja was the worthy minister of this great king. It is the heroism of this minister that enabled Mârasimha II to win his great battles against Vajjala and those fought at Gonur and Uchchangi. In an inscription at Śravaṇa Belgola, we have an eulogy of Châmuṇḍa Râya in the following terms :

Châmuṇḍa Râja, the sun adorning like a jewel the head of the eastern mountain of the Brahma-kṣatra race, the moon increasing by the rays of fame

the waters of the Brahma-kṣatra race, a jewel in the garland sprung from the mountain containing the mine of the Brahma-kṣatra race, and a fierce wind to raise the fire of the Brahma-kṣatra race, was born.

Where the array of the enemy was broken like that of a herd of deer before a pursuing elephant, when at the order of king Indra he raised his arm to conquer Vajjaladeva, of terrible power, like the ocean disturbed at the end of age.

He who was thus praised by his lord in the fight with the king of Nolambas : "Which king among my foes will not fall as food to the black snake of my arrow, when you sitting always in the front of the bravest heroes—an elephant by whose tusks, resembling a thunderbolt, the rock of the temples of the elephants of the enemy are split,—are present ?"

Who fiercely roared thus in the fight with king Raṇa-siṃha, "O king Jagadekavira ! By our prowess I can conquer in a moment (an enemy), even if he be Râvaṇa, his city Lankâ, the citadel Trikûta, and the moat the briny ocean."

To whom the celestial damsels bestowed the blessing—"We were thirsted in many battles of this hero by our eagerness to embrace his neck, but now we have been satiated with the water of the edge of his sword. O victor of Raṇa-ranga-siṃha ! Live to the end of age."

Who, formerly frustrated the desire of king Chaladanka-ganga, who wished to snatch by power of arms the fortune of the empire of the Gangas, and who satisfied the desire of the Râkṣasas, who were eager to drink blood, by holding the blood of his brave enemies in skulls of heroes resembling cups made of jewels.

The above inscription is Châmuṇḍa Râja's own information about himself. But the greater part of this inscription seems to have been lost. "Heggade Kanna, in order to have only two-and-a-half lines inscribed regarding himself, appears to have caused three sides of Châmuṇḍa Râya's original inscription to be entirely effaced, leaving only the one side,"* a translation of which we have given above.

"Châmuṇḍa Râya composed a work called *Châmuṇḍa Râya Purâṇa*, containing an epitome of the history of the 24 Tirthankaras, and at the end its date is given as Saka 900, the year 978. A. D."† The statements found in the verses of the inscription quoted above "accord with those given in the *Châmuṇḍa Râya Purâṇa*. It is there said, in the opening chapter, that his lord was the Ganga-kula-chuḍâmaṇi Jagadekavira Nolambakulântaka-deva; and that he was born in the Brahma-kṣatra vaṃśa. In the concluding chapter it is said that he was the disciple of Ajita-sena; also that in the Krita Yuga he was Saṃmukha, in the Treta Yuga Râma, in the Dvâpara Yuga Gândîvi, and in the Kali Yuga Vira-mârtaṇḍa. The origin of his various titles is then related. From this defeat of Vajjaladeva, in the Khedaga war, he obtained the title *Samara-Dhurandhara*; from the valour he displayed on the plains of Gonur in the Nolamba war, the title *Vira-mârtaṇḍa*; from his fight in the fort of Uchchangi, the title *Raṇa-ranga-siṃha*; from his killing Tribhuvana Vira and others, in the fort of Bâgalûr and enabling Govinda to enter it, the title of *Vairikula-kâladaṇḍa*; from his defeat of Râja and others in the fort of king Kâma, the title of

* Lewis Rice—'Inscriptions at Śravaṇa Belgola.' Introduction, page 33.

† *Ibid* page 22.

Bhuja-vikrama; from his killing his younger brother, *Nāga-varmma*, on account of his hatred, the title of *Chhaladanka Ganga*; from his killing the Ganga warrior (bhata) *Mudu Rāchayya*, the titles of *Samara-paraśurāma* and *Pratipakṣa-rākṣasa*; from his destroying the fort of the warrior (bhata) *Vīra*, the title of *Bhata-māri*; from upholding the brave qualities of himself and others, the title of *Guṇavaṇ Kāva*; from his virtue, liberality etc., the title of *Samyaktva-ratnākara*; from his not coveting the wealth or wives of others, the title of *Śauchābharaṇa*; from his never telling an untruth even in jest, the title of *Satya-yudhiṣṭhira*; from his being the head of the bravest, the title of *Subhata-chūḍāmaṇi*. Finally, in his composition, he calls himself *Kavijana-śekhara*, the head of the poets.

Of most of these allusions we have no other information; but it is remarkable that among so many distinguished actions no mention is made of a single work of religious merit. . . . On the contrary, there is little more than a record of warfare and bloodshed from beginning to end.”*

But there are authentic records to show that with the advance of his age, *Chāmuṇḍa Rāja* devoted himself mostly to religion, under his spiritual teacher *Ajitasena*, and became immortal as one of the greatest promoters of Jaina religion, by erecting the colossal images of *Gomateśvara* and *Neminātha* in *Vindhyagiri* and *Chandragiri* at *Śravaṇa Belgola* (Mysore) and devoting the greater part of his wealth to the maintenance of worship of these images.

After the death of *Mārasimha II* of the Ganga dynasty, *Panchaladeva*, fully known as *Dharma-mahārājādhirāja Satyavākya Konguṇivarmā* *Panchaladeva*, ascended the throne. He was succeeded by king *Rāchamalla* or *Rājamalla II*, fully known as *Dharma-mahārājādhirāja Satyavākya Konguṇivarma Parmanadi Rāchamalla*. *Chāmuṇḍa Rāja* was also the minister of *Rāchamalla* or *Rājamalla II*. In one inscription we read “*Rāya* (i e., *Chāmuṇḍa Rāya*), the excellent minister of the king *Rāchamalla*” and in another “*Chāmuṇḍa Rāya*, second in glory to king *Rāchamalla*.” In a Jaina work, named *Vāhuvali-Charitra*, we find that there was a king named *Rājamalla*, the worshipper at the feet of the sage *Simhanandi*. *Chāmuṇḍa Bhupa* (or *Rāja*) was his minister. In a manuscript we read “*Chāmuṇḍa Rāya*, having the titles of *Ranaranga-malla*, *Asahya-parākrama*, *Guṇa-ratna-bhūṣana*, *Samyaktva-ratna-nilaya* etc., the *Mahāmātya* (highest minister) of *Rājamalla* of the Ganga dynasty, graced by the great sage *Simhanandi*”

Before we proceed to describe the images and buildings established by *Chāmuṇḍa Rāya*, it will be better to give a brief description of the places which bear these monuments of piety and which have now become some of the holiest places of pilgrimage resorted to by the Jains.

Śravaṇa Belgola or *Belgola* of the *Sramaṇas* (Jainas) is a village in the

* Lewis Rice—‘Inscriptions at Śravaṇa Belgola.’ Introduction, page 34.

Channarayapatna Taluq of the Hassan district in Mysore. The word 'Śravaṇa' is used before Belgola to distinguish it from two other Belgolas which are known as Hale Belgola and Kodi Belgola. Belgola in Canarese indicates "white lake;" and in many inscriptions we have references to "Dhavala-sarovara," "Dhavala-sarasa" and "Śveta-sarovara," all signifying the "white lake;" and the place must have derived this name from the beautiful lake situated on the spot. There are two hills, one on the north and the other on the south of the village, which are respectively known as Chandragiri and Vindhyagiri, on which there are temples and images established by the Jainas and numerous inscriptions throwing a flood of light on the ancient history of this faith. Chandragiri according to a tradition derives its name from Chandragupta, who followed his spiritual teacher Bhadrabâhu, when the latter with twelve thousand disciples, at the approach of a terrible famine, left Pâtaliputra and moved towards the south. It was on Chandragiri that Bhadrabâhu left his mortal body, and in his last moments there was only one disciple, the above mentioned Chandragupta, who was present. If we accept the tradition of the Jainas we shall have to come to the conclusion that this Chandragupta, the disciple of the sage Bhadrabâhu, was none other than the celebrated Maurya emperor of the same name.

It was on Chandragiri that Châmuṇḍa Râya erected a magnificent temple containing the image of the twenty-second Jaina Tirthankara, Neminâtha. Subsequently, the upper storey of the building was added by the son of Châmuṇḍa Râya and an image of the twenty-third Tirthankara, Pârśvanâtha, was placed in it. Both these storeys were built in the tenth century A.D. and give a fine idea of the beautiful architecture of that age.

On Vindhyagiri, Châmuṇḍa Râya erected a colossal image of Vâhuvali or Bhujabali, more commonly known as Gommat Svâmi or Gommatesvara. Later on, imitating Châmuṇḍa Râya, the chief Vîra-Pândya erected another statue of Gommatesvara at Karkala (South Canara) in 1432 A.D.; and afterwards a similar figure of Gommatesvara was established by the chief Timmarâja at Yenur (South Canara) in 1604 A.D.

These "colossal monolithic nude Jain statues.....are among the wonders of the world."* These are "undoubtedly the most remarkable of the Jain statues and the largest free-standing statues in Asia.....All three being set on the top of eminences, are visible for miles around, and, in spite of their formalism, command respectful attention by their enormous mass and expression of dignified serenity. The biggest, that at Śravaṇa Belgola, stands about 56 feet in height, with a width of 13 feet across the hips, and is cut out of a solid block of gneiss, apparently wrought *in situ*. That at Karkala, of the same material, but some 15 feet less in height, is estimated to weigh 80 tons. The smallest of the giants, that at Yenur, is 35 feet high. The three

* Imperial Gazetteer of India, page 121.

images are almost identical, but the one at Yenur has the 'special peculiarity of the cheeks being dimpled, with a deep grave smile,' which is considered to detract from the impressive effect. The extreme conventionalism of Jain art is well-illustrated by the fact that, whereas all the three colossi are substantially identical, save for the smile at Yenur, the dates vary widely."*

The image erected by Châmuṇḍa Râya "is not only the most ancient in date and considerably the highest of the three, but from its striking position on the top of the very steep hill and the consequently greater difficulty involved in its execution, is by far the most interesting. The image is made and stands erect facing the north.....The figure has no support above the thighs. Up to that point it is represented as surrounded by ant-hills, from which emerge serpents: a climbing plant twines itself round both legs and both arms, terminating at the upper part of the arm in a cluster of fruit or berries. The pedestal on which the feet stand is carved to represent an open lotus."†

There are inscriptions on the slabs near the right and left foot of the image of Gommatesvara at Śravaṇa Belgola. The inscription on the right-hand slab is as follows:

Śrī-Châmuṇḍarâjam mâḍisidaṃ;
Śrī-Châmuṇḍarâjan °śe° Yv °v° ittân;
Śrī-Gaṃgarâja suttâlayavaṃ mâḍisida;

"The alphabet and language of the first and third lines are Canarese. The second line is a Tamil translation of line 1, and consists of two words, of which the first is written in the Grantha and the second in the Vatteluttu alphabet. The first two lines record that Châmuṇḍa Râja caused to be made the image, at the foot of which the inscription is engraved, and the third line that Gaṃgarâja caused to be made the buildings which surround the image."‡

The inscription on the slab on the left-hand is as follows:

Śrī-Châmuṇḍarâjeṃ karaviyaḷeṃ
Śrī-Gaṃgarâje suttâle karaviyale;

"The alphabet is Nâgarī, and the language is Marâthi.....The Marâthi language was perhaps adopted for the benefit of Jain pilgrims from the Marâthâ country."‡

From the identical type used in both the lines, the inscription on the left hand slab is supposed to be engraved during the reign of Ganga Râja, when he erected the building round the image of Gommatesvara established by Châmuṇḍa Râya. It is all the more probable, as the inscription on the left is nothing but a repetition of that on the right in a different language.

* Vincent Smith—'A History of Fine Art in India & Ceylon', page 268.

† Epigraphia Carnatica, Vol. II, Introduction, page 29.

‡ E. Hultzsch—'Inscriptions on the Three Jain Colossi of Southern India' (Epigraphia Indica, Vol. VII, pages 108-109).



Ganga Râja was the minister of Viṣṇuvardhana, a king of the Hoysala dynasty, who ruled in the 12th century A.D. In an inscription dated about 1160 A.D., we find the praise of Ganga Râja and Châmuṇḍa Râya, together with that of Hulla, as follows :

"If it be asked who in the beginning were firm promoters of the Jina doctrine (i.e. in Śravaṇa Belgola)—(they were) Râya, the minister of king Râchamalla; after him, Ganga, the minister of king Viṣṇu, and after him, Hulla, the minister of king Nṛsiṃhadeva: if any others could claim as much, would they not be mentioned ?"*

Besides the inscription at the foot of the image announcing that Châmuṇḍa Râya established the same, we find reference to this in another inscription, dated about 1180 A.D., in the following manner :

"Combining in himself wisdom, religion, glory, high character and valour, the moon of the Ganga race was Râchamalla, famed in all the world. That king's second in glory (his minister Châmuṇḍa Râya), equal to Manu, was it not he that had this Gommata made by his own effort ?"†

The three statues represent Vâhuvali or Bhujavali, also known as Gommateśvara, who was the son of Âdijina Rīṣabhanâtha, the first Tīrthankara of the Jains. Rīṣabhadeva, according to tradition, was a king, and had two wives, Nandâ (some say Sumangalâ) and Sunandâ. Nandâ or Sumangalâ gave birth to the twins, Bharata and Brâhmî, a boy and a girl, the former of whom was placed on the throne by Rīṣabhadeva, when he retired to seek absolute knowledge. Vâhuvali and his sister Sundarî, were born of Sunandâ, and the former ascended the throne of Takṣa-śilâ (modern Taxila), when his father distributed his kingdom among his sons. Bharata had possession of a wonderful Chakra (discus), which could not be withstood by any warrior in fight. With the help of this Chakra, Bharata conquered the earth and returned to his capital. But the discus would not enter the capital (or, according to another account, the armoury). Bharata then took this as a sign that there was still another territory on earth which had not been conquered by him, and, after reflection, came to the conclusion that there was only the kingdom of Takṣa-śilâ, ruled by his brother Bhujavali, which had not been subdued by him. Bharata then declared war on his brother Bhujavali, and in the terrible fight that followed, Bhujavali was victorious. Even the discus of Bharata could do no harm to Bhujavali. But Bhujavali, though victorious, suddenly became lost in meditation, thinking of the vanity of this world. Bharata made obeisance to Bhujavali and returned to his place; but Bhujavali went to the summit of Kailâśa mountain, remained standing there (or, according to another account, stood on the very field

* Epigraphia Carnatica, Vol. II, Introduction, page 34. Hulla was the minister of Narasimha I, of the Hoysala dynasty, who ruled in the 12th century A.D.

† Epigraphia Carnatica, Vol. II, page 154. The line speaking of the construction of the image is—"चामुण्डरायं मनुप्रतिमं गोम्मटं अल्ले माडिसिदन् इन्ती देवनं यत्नदिम्"

of battle) in a statuesque posture for one year and "the creepers, wreathing round the boughs of the trees on the bank clung to his neck and crowned his head with their canopy and the blades of kuśa-grass grew between his feet, and he became in appearance like an ant-hill."* Subsequently, Bhuja-
vali obtained absolute knowledge and became one of the Kevalis.

In an inscription, however, we read that Puru was the father of Vāhuvali or Bhuja-
vali and Bharata. Then the inscription goes on to say that "Bharata, the son of Puru Deva, surrounded by all the kings conquered by him, erected in glee an image, representing the victorious Vāhuvali Kevali, which was 525 bows in height, near Podanapura. After a long time, in-
numberable Kukkuta-sarpa (dragons having the body of a fowl and the head and neck of a snake), terrifying the world, grew up in the place surrounding (the image of) that Jina, for which the image became known as Kukkuteśvara."†

In the light of these traditions, we shall be able to understand the signi-
ficance of the sculptured anthills, from which serpents are issuing, and the climbing plant which twines round the legs and arms of the images of Gommateśvara at Śravaṇa Belgola, Karkala and Yenur. "These details are identical in all three, and supposed to represent so rigid and complete an absorption in penance that ant-hills had been raised around his feet and plants had grown over his body, without disturbing the profoundness of the ascetic's abstraction from mundane affairs."‡

The story of the establishing of the image of Gommateśvara by Chāmuṇḍa Rāya is thus described in a work, composed in Sanskrit verses, named *Vāhuvali Charitra* :

In the city of Madhurā (now known as Madura) in the Drāviḍa country there was a king, named Rājamalla, who encouraged the spread of Jaina tenets, and was the worshipper of Siṃhanandi, belonging to the Deśīya Gaṇa. His minister was called Chāmuṇḍa Rāja. One day, when the king sat with his minister in the royal court, a travelling merchant came there and told them that in the north there is a town called Paudanapurī, where there is an image of Vāhuvali, also called Gommata, established by Bharata. Hearing this, the devout Chāmuṇḍa Rāja resolved to visit the shrine of the image, and going home narrated the tale to his mother, Kālikā Devī whereupon she also wished to go with him to that sacred spot. Chāmuṇḍa Rāja then went to his spiritual preceptor, Ajitasena, who revered Siṃhanandi and made a vow before the latter that he will not drink milk till he sees the image of Vahuvali. Accompanied by Nemi-
chandra, his mother and numerous soldiers and attendants, Chāmuṇḍa Rāja started on his pilgrimage and reached the Vindhya-giri (in Śravaṇa Belgola). In the night, the Jaina Goddess Kuśmāṇḍī (the Yakṣiṇī attendant on Neminātha, the twenty-second Tīrthankara) appeared in a dream to Chāmuṇḍa Rāja, Nemichandra and Kālikā, and told them that it was very difficult to go to Paudanapurī but on that very hill there is an image of Vāhuvali, formerly established by Rāvaṇa, which will be visible if the hill

* The Kathā-koṣa or Treasury of Stories, translated by C. H. Tawney, pages 192-195.

† Epigraphia Carnatica, Vol. II, page 67, Inscription No. 85.

‡ Lewis Rice—"Inscriptions at Śravaṇa Belgola". Introduction, page 33,

he cleft by a golden arrow. According to the dream, on the next morning, Châmuṇḍa Râja stood on the hill with his face towards the south and let loose a golden arrow from his bow. Immediately the mountain was cleft in twain, and an image of Vâhuvali became visible. Châmuṇḍa Râja then established and consecrated the image and granted lands for the worship of this image. When king Râjamalla heard of this affair, he conferred the title of "Râya" on Châmuṇḍa Râja and granted further lands for the regular worship of the image.

In a very recent work, named *Râjâvali-kathe* written by Deva Chandra in the Kannâḍa language, the same story is repeated, with variations in details. It is there written that Châmuṇḍa Râya was a feudatory chief of king Râjamalla. His mother learnt from Adi-purâṇa, when this work was being read to her, that in Podanpura there was an image of Vâhuvali. Thereupon she set out with her son to see this image, but on her way on the hill where Bhadrabâhu Svâmi died, she dreamt one night that Padmâvatî appeared to her and said that there is an image of Vâhuvali on that very hill, covered by stones, which was formerly worshipped by Râma, Râvaṇa and Mandodarî. On the next morning an arrow was shot and the image of Vâhuvali became visible.

Thus, in the legendary accounts of the Jains, we find that Châmuṇḍa Râja was not the person who caused the image to be made, but that there was already an image on the hill which he established and consecrated in the proper way. The high priest at Śravaṇa Belgola had also stated, according to these traditions, that "in ancient times, an image was at this place, self-formed from earth, under the shape of Gomat Îśvara Svâmi which Râvaṇa, the monarch of the Râkṣasas, worshipped to obtain happiness."

Châmuṇḍa Râja discovered it and "made the workmen cut it into a regular shape, with the utmost accuracy of proportion in all its parts; the several proportions of the body resembling the original likeness of Gomat Îśvara Svâmi in profound contemplation to obtain Mokṣa.. He also caused several buildings to be constructed as temples and other edifices round the God (?). On their completion, he established the worship of the image.....with great ceremony and devotion."* In an extract taken from *Sthala-purâṇa*, we find the following passage which agrees with the above story :

Châmuṇḍa Râja.....set out with his family.....with a view to visiting the God Gommateśvara.....at Padanapura and the 1,254 other gods scattered throughout the surrounding country. En route he came to Śravaṇa Belgola Kṣetra, having heard a good deal about the God Gommateśvara.....He repaired the ruined temples and, among other ceremonies, had that of sprinkling the god performed. He appointed Siddhântâchârya as Guru of the Math to conduct the daily, monthly, annual and other processions. He established in the Math a Chattraṃ where food, medicine and education were provided for pilgrims. He appointed men of his caste to receive with due respect the devotees and pilgrims of all three castes who should resort to the place from Delhi, Kanakâdri, Svîtpura, Sudhâpura, Pâpâpuri, Champâpuri, Sammida-giri, Ujjayanta-giri,

* Historical and Legendary Account of Belliagola (Asiatic Researches, Vol. IX, page 263).

Jayanagara, etc. For this purpose, certain villages.....were made over to the temple. He fixed Śilā-anas in the four directions.....This endowment was maintained by his descendants for 109 years.*

Now let us attempt to find out how far these statements to the effect that Châmuṇḍa Râya was merely the discoverer of the image of Gommatesvara at Śravaṇa Belgola are true. The work, *Bhujabali Charitra* or *Vâhuvali Charitra*, is composed in Sanskrit verses, and in it we find only a collection of traditions handed down from mouth to mouth, with variations arising from such a course. The date of the work cannot be definitely ascertained, but, from its style, it can be inferred that it was composed long after the establishment of the image of Gommatesvara. *Râjâvalikathe* is "a compendium of Jaina history, legends and chronology, drawn up early in the present century for Devîramma, a lady of the Mysore royal family, by Devachandra of the Jaina establishment at Maleyur".† This work also cannot, therefore, be called to be an authority for determining the question in hand. In *Râjâvali-kathe* and in *Sthala-purâṇa*, the authors made no attempt to be accurate on historical points, for the subject-matter in their hands was merely a collection of legends and fables. It is true that there are historical materials underlying these stories, but these should not be taken on trust as they are, but we should test the accuracy of the same by comparing these with other and more trustworthy records before we could accept them as matters of history. To mention one among many inaccuracies in *Sthala-purâṇa*, we may quote the line "Châmuṇḍa Râya, king of Dakṣina Madura and the descendant of Jaina Kṣatri Pându,"‡ from which we shall understand how in the legendary accounts Châmuṇḍa Râya, the minister came to be described as the king of Madura.

Further, if there had not been any contemporary and authentic records to prove who caused the image to be constructed, we might have doubted, on the basis of these traditionary accounts, that Châmuṇḍa Râya erected this statue. But, fortunately for us, there are records to prove that it was Châmuṇḍa Râya and no other who had the image of Gommatesvara constructed.

First, there is the inscription which we have already quoted under the feet of the image in which it is distinctly stated that Châmuṇḍa Râya made the image. Next, in an inscription dated about 1180 A. D. we have seen that Châmuṇḍa Râya had this image made by his own effort. These are supported by a work named *Gommata-sâra*, composed by Nemichandra, the preceptor and therefore contemporary of Châmuṇḍa Râja, in which we have the following verses :

* Extract taken by Capt. I. S. F. Mackenzie (Indian Antiquary, Vol. II, page 130).

† Lewis Rice—"Inscriptions at Śravaṇa Belgola". Introduction, page 3 (1889).

‡ Extract taken by Capt. Mackenzie (Indian Antiquary, Vol. II, page 130). It may also be mentioned that in the *Pattâvali* of Sena-gaṇa, we have "Châmuṇḍa Râya, the king of the Southern Tailanga and Karnâṭaka, the crest jewel of the Kṣatriya race, a resident of the city of Dakṣina Madhurâ, for whose awakening (of soul) the image of Vâhuvali Gommata Svâmi (was efficacious) and consecrated by Ajita-sena Bhattâraka,"

Let the aphorisms consisting of the Gommata compendium, the Gommata Jina, on the summit of Gommata Hill and the Dakṣiṇa (Southern) Kukkuṭa Jina constructed by Gommata Rāya, be victorious.

Let that Gommata by whom the face of the image was constructed which was seen.....by the gods.....and sages, be victorious.*

The image of Gommateśvara caused the hill on which it was situated to be called Gommata hill, and Nemichandra uses the words "constructed (विनिर्मित) by Châmuṇḍa Rāya". We have already mentioned that the (Southern) image of Gommateśvara, which was established by Bharata in Paudanapura, came to be known as Kukkuṭeśvara, when dragons sprung up around it. The image established by Châmuṇḍa Rāya came to be called the Southern Kukkuṭa Jina to distinguish it from the other one which was in the north. Châmuṇḍa Rāya, by having this image constructed came to be called Gommata Rāya.

From these facts we have not the least doubt that it was Châmuṇḍa Rāya who had this image constructed. For such a great act he himself came to be known as Gommata Rāya, which would have been hardly possible, had it been the fact that he merely discovered the image. Nemichandra, the preceptor of Châmuṇḍa Rāya, must have been present at the time of the establishment of this image (for even in *Vāhuvali Charitra* we find that Nemichandra was present on this occasion), and consequently the words of Nemichandra, supported as they are by the inscription, must be accepted to be conclusive on this point.

The reason why in the works like *Vāhuvali Charitra*, *Rājāvalīkathe* etc., we find that Châmuṇḍa Rāya was merely the discoverer of the image, may probably be that the writers of these works desired to ascribe to the image a greater antiquity, causing the image to be considered an object of deeper veneration.

There is one more legend connected with the image of Gommateśvara which describes how the pride of Châmuṇḍa Rāya for establishing such a figure was humbled. The story is as follows :

Châmuṇḍa Rāya, after having established the worship of this image, became proud and elated, at placing this God by his own authority at so vast an expense of money and labour. Soon after this, when he performed in honour of the God the ceremony of *Pañchāmṛita snāna* (or washing the image with five liquids—milk, curd, butter, honey and sugar), vast quantities of these things were expended in many hundred pots; but, through the wonderful power of the God, the liquor descended not lower than the navel, to check the pride and vanity of the worshipper. Châmuṇḍa Rāya, not knowing the cause, was filled with grief that his intention was frustrated of cleaning the image completely with this ablution. While he was in this situation, the celestial nymph, Padmāvatī, by order of the God, having transformed herself into the likeness of an aged poor woman, appeared, holding in her hand the five *amritas* in a *Beliya Gola* (or small silver pot) for washing the statue; and signified her intention to Châmuṇḍa Rāya, who laughed at the absurdity of this proposal, of accomplishing what it had not been in his power to effect. Out of curiosity, however,

* Gommata-sāra, Karma-Kāṇḍa, verses 968 and 969.

he permitted her to attempt it; when, to the great surprise of the beholders, she washed the image with the liquor brought in the little silver vase. Châmuṇḍa Râya, repenting his sinful arrogance, performed a second time, with profound respect, his ablution, on which they formerly wasted so much valuable liquids, and washed completely the body of the image. From that time this place is named after the silver vase (or *Beliya Gola*) which was held in Padmâvatî's hand.*

We shall now try to ascertain the probable date on which the image of Gommateśvara was erected by Châmuṇḍa Râya. We have already seen that Châmuṇḍa Râya was the minister of Mârasimha II and Râchamalla or Râjamalla II. It was during the reign of Râjamalla that the tradition ascribes the establishment of the image of Gommateśvara. We have found that during the reign of Mârasimha II, Châmuṇḍa Râya distinguished himself as a valiant warrior, and in an inscription in which he gives an account of himself he only makes mention of the victories which he had won. There is no mention of any religious work done by him, and had it been the fact that he erected the colossal image during the reign of Mârasimha II, he must have mentioned the same, it being a monumental work which has immortalised his name. Mârasimha II died in 975 A. D. Châmuṇḍa Râya, in his work, named *Châmuṇḍa Râya Purâṇa*, gives a detailed account of all his exploits and mentions all his titles and how he derived the same, but there is not the slightest mention of the erection of the image of Gommateśvara by him. At the end of this work the date of its completion is mentioned to be Śaka 900 (978 A.D.). It must have been, therefore, after 978 A.D. and before the last year of the reign of Râchamalla or Râjamalla II that the image of Gommateśvara was erected. The reign of Râjamalla II ended in 984 A.D. We therefore come to limited period, viz., 978—984 A. D. within which the statue must have been established.

There is a verse in *Vâhuvali Charitra* which purports to give the exact date of the establishment of the image. That verse is as follows :

कल्क्यब्दे षट्शताख्ये विनुतविभवसंवत्सरे मासि चैत्रे,
पञ्चम्यां शुक्लपक्षे दिनमणिदिवसे कुम्भलग्ने सुयोगे ।
सौभाग्ये मस्तनाम्नि प्रकटितभगणे सुप्रशस्तां चकार
श्रीमच्चामुण्डराजो वेल्गुलनगरे गोमटेश-प्रतिष्ठां ॥

i. e., Śrī Châmuṇḍa Râya established the image of Gomateśa in the city of Belgula, in Kumbha Lagna, on a Sunday, the fifth day of the bright lunar fortnight, in the month of Chaitra, in the praised year Vibbhava, in the Kalki age, known as 600, when the auspicious Mrigaśirâ star was visible.

If we accept that the date mentioned above is the true one, as it indicates an auspicious day on which such a great work might have been performed, we shall have to find out on what date in the years between 978 and 984 A. D.

(for we cannot go beyond this period, as has been already shown) was such a combination possible. We have carefully tested all the possible dates according to the methods adopted in astronomy and found out that on Sunday, the 2nd of April 980 A. D., there was Mrigaśirâ Nakṣatra, and that from the previous day (the 20th Chaitra) there was Pañchami Tithi (Śukla Pakṣa) and that there was also Kumbha Lagna on Sunday. This, therefore, may be accepted to be the date on which Châmuṇḍa Râya established the image.

But there is one point in the above verse which at first sight is in discrepancy with the accepted period derived from history. In the above verse, it is stated that in the Kalki age 600, in the praised year Vibhava, the statue of Gommateśvara was established. The Śaka Saṃvat begins after 605 years and five months elapse from the Nirvâṇa of Mahāvîra and the Kalki era begins 394 years and seven months after the Śaka era, or, in other words, 1000 years after the Vîranirvâṇa. The Kalki era therefore begins from 472 A. D. The year 600 of the Kalki would therefore be $472 + 600 = 1072$ A. D., which does not accord at all with history, for Râchamalla II's reign ended in 984 A. D. Further, even by astronomical calculation we find that the Pañchamî Tithi in Śukla Pakṣa in Chaitra of the Kalki year 600 falls on Friday, the 23rd Chaitra, a fact which is opposed to that laid down in the verse itself, viz., that the Śukla Pañchamî in Chaitra was a Sunday in that year.

It is, therefore, necessary to interpret "the Kalki era 600" as the sixth century of the Kalki. The Vibhava year should be the eighth in order, so that it may accord with historical facts. By "the Kalki era 600 in the praised year Vibhava," therefore, we should mean the eighth year in the sixth century of the Kalki, viz., the year 508 of the Kalki era; and, if we accept this, it exactly accords with the year 980 A. D. and corresponds in every astronomical detail with the facts mentioned in the verse.

There are, therefore, two courses open for us to adopt; first, to reject the verse contained in the *Vâhuvali Charitra* as opposed to historical records, or to interpret it in the way we have done, so that it may accord with the data obtained from the inscriptions; and we think that the latter course would be the best to adopt.

II

We shall now try to collect all available information about the author of *Davva-saṃgaha* (*Dravya-saṃgraha*) or compendium of the substances. From the last verse of this work, it appears that it was composed by Muni Nemichandra. In *Vâhuvali Charitra* we read that Nemichandra, belonging to the Deśiya Gaṇa, accompanied Châmuṇḍa Râya and his mother, when they started to see the image of Gommateśvara at Paudanapura. Further, that Nemichandra also dreamt that there was an image of Gommateśvara

on the Vindhya-giri, and that Châmuṇḍa Râya, after establishing the image, offered villages yielding a revenue of ninety-six thousand coins at the feet of Nemichandra for the daily worship and festivals of Gommateśvara.

That Nemichandra was revered by Châmuṇḍa Râya appears from a verse in an inscription dated about 1530 A. D., engraved in the enclosure of Padmâvatî temple in Nagar Taluq, Shimoga District, Mysore :

त्रिलोकसार-प्रमुख.....
.....भुवि नेमिचन्द्रः ।
विभाति सैद्धान्तिक-सार्वभौमः
चामुण्डराजार्चित-पादपद्मः ॥

i. e., “(The author of) *Trilokasâra* and other (works)....Nemichandra, the Saiddhântika Sârvabhauma (the Paramount Lord of those versed in the Siddhântas) shines in this world, his lotus-feet worshipped by Châmuṇḍa Râja.” Though a fragment of this verse is effaced, the meaning is quite clear. The Saiddhântika Sârvabhauma is a synonym of the epithet “Siddhânta-chakravartî,” generally applied to Nemichandra.

Nemichandra himself, in his work entitled *Gommatasâra*, has praised Gommatas Râya or simply Râya which, as we have seen before, is but another name of Châmuṇḍa Râya. In the eulogistic verses, Nemichandra has mentioned that Ajitasena was the spiritual preceptor of Châmuṇḍa Râya, who erected the image of Gommateśvara.

In the introduction to the commentary on *Gommatasâra* by Abhaya-chandra, we find that this work was composed according to the desire of Châmuṇḍa Râya, who wished to learn the exposition of substances as enumerated in the canonical works of the Jainas. In a very old illuminating manuscript of *Trilokasâra*, composed by Nemichandra, we have a picture representing Châmuṇḍa Râya, with several courtiers hearing the tenets of Jainism as expounded by Nemichandra.

Nemichandra Siddhânta-chakravartî is the author of (1) *Dravya-saṃgraha*, (2) *Gommatasâra*, (3) *Labdhisâra*, (4) *Kṣapaṇasâra* and (5) *Trilokasâra*. In *Vâhuvalî Charitra* we have “Nemichandra, the author of *Gommatasâra*, *Labdhisâra* and *Trilokasâra*.” In the last verse of *Dravya-saṃgraha*, Nemichandra has mentioned his name. Similarly, from a verse in *Gommatasâra* we know that it was composed by Nemichandra. It may be well to give a brief account of the works of Nemichandra at this place.

III

Gommatasâra is so named, as it was composed for the reading of Châmuṇḍa Râya who, as we have already shown, was also known as Gommatas Râya. This work is also known as *Pañcha-saṃgraha* (the compendium of five things), the significance of which will be understood when we mention that in it the following five subjects have been thoroughly treated: (1) *Bandha*

(bondage), (2) Badhyamâna (that which is bound), (3) Bandhasvâmi (that which binds), (4) Bandha-hetu (the cause of bondage) and (5) Bandha-bheda (the varieties of bondage).

The work consists of 1705 verses in Prâkrit, and is divided into two parts Jîvakâṇḍa and Karmakâṇḍa, containing 733 and 972 verses respectively. In Jîvakâṇḍa, there is an enumeration of Mârgaṇâs, Guṇasthânas, Jîva, Paryâpti, Prâṇa, Saṅga and Upayôga. In Karmakâṇḍa, there are nine sections, called Prakritisamutkîrtana, Bandhodayasatva, Sattvasthânabhaṅga Trichûlikâ, Sthânasamutkîrtana, Pratyaya, Bhavachûlikâ, Trikaṇa-chûlikâ and Karma-sthiti-rachanâ. The eight varieties of Karma and the bondage of Karma, with respect to its Prakriti, Sthiti, Anubhâga and Pradeśa, are also treated in detail. There are also various other subject connected with Karma which are elaborated in this part. To be brief, the first part of *Gommatasâra* gives an idea of the natural characteristics of Jîvas and the means and stages of their development, while the second part describes the obstacles producing bondage of Karma which must be removed, in order that Jîvas might attain liberation. The advancement of the soul is the end which the author always keeps in view; and it is in this light that he has summarised the precepts of Jaina Âchâryas on this point in *Gommatasâra*. The work, in very brief limits, comprises most of the important tenets of Jaina philosophy, and proceeds to lay down the ways and means to liberation, warning us against the hindrances and obstacles to the same.

Châmuṇḍa Râya himself wrote a commentary on *Gommatasâra* in Canarese language. In the last verse of *Gommatasâra* there is a reference to the fact that Châmuṇḍa Râya wrote in the popular language a commentary, named *Vîra-mârttaṇḍî*. (*Gommatasâra*, Karmakâṇḍa, verse 972). One of the titles of Châmuṇḍa Râya being *Vîramârttaṇḍa*, he named his commentary "*Vîra-mârttaṇḍî*," meaning "composed by *Vîra-mârttaṇḍa*." This commentary of Châmuṇḍa Râya seems to have been lost, and we only have a reference to it in another commentary, named *Keśavavarṇîyâ Vṛitti* by Keśavavarṇî, in the opening verse of which the author says: "I write the *Vṛitti* on *Gommatasâra* from the Karnâṭaka *Vṛitti*." There is another commentary on *Gommatasâra*, named *Mandaprabodhikâ* written by Abhayachandra. Following these commentaries, Todarmalla has written a commentary in the Hindi language which is widely read by the Jaina Pandits of the present day.

Labdhisâra is a treatise on Labdhi, which literally means "attainment." The sense in which it is used in Jaina philosophy is "the attainment of those things which will lead to perfect conduct." Labdhi is said to be of five kinds: Kṣâyopaśamika, Viśuddhi, Deśanâ, Prâyôgya and Karaṇa. The first four kinds of Labdhi appear without distinction to Bhavya and Abhavya individuals, but the fifth one appears only to a Bhavya individual who is advanced towards perfect conduct.

Kṣapaṇasāra by Nemichandra should not be confounded with another work of the same name written by Mādhavachandra, the latter being composed in Sanskrit prose and the former in Prākṛit verse. The subject-matter of both these works is the same, for each of them treats of Bandha, Kaṣāya, Leśyā, etc., and lays down the means by which Kaṣāyas may be removed. *Kṣapaṇa* literally means 'destruction' and *Kṣapaṇasāra* deals with the destruction of Kaṣāyas.

This work may be considered to be a continuation of *Labdhisāra*, and both *Labdhisāra* and *Kṣapaṇasāra* are so related to *Gommatasāra* that these may be said to be a sequel to it. The number of verses in *Jīvakāṇḍa* of *Gommatasāra* is 733, that in *Karmakāṇḍa* 972, that in *Labdhisāra* 380 and that in *Kṣapaṇasāra* 270.

Trilokasāra contains a description of the three Lokas (regions of the universe). In it is found a description of the countries of the earth, with oceans, mountains etc., together with a description of the abodes of heavenly beings and the inmates of hell. The stars and planets, with their orbits, are described, and there is a mention how night and day are caused by the motion of the earth. Besides these, there are other subjects, such as the various kinds of measurements, methods of reckoning etc.

There is a commentary on *Trilokasāra*, written by Mādhavachandra Traividya, in the introduction of which we find that the work was obviously written by Nemichandra for imparting knowledge to Chāmuṇḍa Rāya. It is curious to note, however, that at the end of the commentary, Mādhavachandra says that he himself wrote some verses which have been incorporated in this work, according to the instructions of his preceptor Nemichandra.

We further hear that there is a work named *Pratiṣṭhāpāṭha* by Nemichandra, which was written in imitation of another work of the same name written by Indranandi, to whom Nemichandra makes obeisance in *Gommatasāra*. This work is said to consist of directions for the establishment and consecration of images. Pandit Javāharlal Śāstrī has written that he has seen an incomplete manuscript of this work. We are at present unable to give any further information about the same.

In *Gommatasāra*, we have a mention of several sages to whom Nemichandra makes obeisance as his preceptors. These sages are Abhayanandi, Indranandi, Vīranandi and Kanakanandi. There is an epic named *Chandra-prabha Charitaṃ* composed by Vīranandi, at the end of which it is written that Vīranandi was the disciple of Abhayanandi and that Abhayanandi was the disciple of Guṇanandi. In *Gommatasāra* itself we find that Kanakanandi was the disciple of Indranandi.

IV

Davva-saṃgraha or *Dravya-Saṃgraha*, may be conveniently divided into three parts. The first part deals with the six Dravyas (substances) including the five Asti-Kāyas existing in and comprising this universe. This part

extends from verse 1 to verse 27. The second part, comprising verses 28-29, deals with the seven Tattvas and nine Padârthas. The third part, consisting of verses 40-57, describes the way to attain liberation.

In the opening verse, along with the usual Mangalâcharaṇa, it is mentioned that Dravya consists of Jîva and Ajîva. In the second verse, Jîva is defined; and the several characteristics of Jîva mentioned in this definition are taken up one by one in verses 3-14, and a detailed consideration of the same is embodied therein. After this detailed description of Jîva, the author proceeds to describe Ajîva in verse 15 which consists of Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma, Âkâśa and Kâla, each of which is defined in verses 16-22. These five classes of Ajîva with Jîva make up the six Dravyas existing in this universe.

Among these, Jîva, Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma and Âkâśa are called Astikâyas (verse 23), the definition of which is given in the next verse. The first part ends after two more verses.

The second part deals with the seven Tattvas, viz., Âsrava, Bandhana, Saṃvara, Nirjarâ, Mokṣa, Puṇya and Pâpa. These seven, together with Jîva and Ajîva, are known as the nine Padârthas. Some again regard all these nine as Tattvas. The different varieties of Âsrava, Saṃvara etc. are treated in detail in verses 29-38.

The third part begins with verse 39, in which and the next verse the means to attain liberation are stated, according to the ordinary and realistic points of view. Perfect faith, perfect knowledge and perfect conduct which are essential to obtain liberation are then defined, and in this connection the importance of Dhyâna (meditation) is emphasised. In verse 49 we are introduced to the prayers of the Jainas by which one should attempt to concentrate the mind upon the Arhats, Siddhas, Âchâryas, Upâdhyâyas and Sâdhus. These five classes of beings are known as the five Parameṣṭhis, and their characteristics are described in verses 50-54. The work ends with a mention of the efficacy of Dhyâna (meditation).



2. TATTVARTHA SUTRA

THE AUTHOR of *Tattvārtha Sūtra* is the most famous disciple of the universally worshipped saint Kundakunda. The relationship between Kundakunda and Umāsvāmi is established by inscription No. 108, written in 1365 Śāka and found at Śrāvaṇa Belgola in Mysore. (Cf. *Siddhānta Bhāskara* Nos. 2 and 3, pp 117 and 122; also No. 4, p. 51. Also the Gurvāvali in *Pāṇḍavapurāṇa*, by Śrī Śubha Chandra about 1600 Vikrama Samvat.)

As Kundakunda was a Griddhapichcha, so his disciple Umāsvāmi also was called one. For in some MSS. of *Tattvārtha Sūtra* a śloka is found appended in the end:

तत्त्वार्थ सूत्रकर्तारं गृद्धपिच्छोपलक्षितम् ।
वंदे गरीन्द्र संयातम् उमास्वामि मुनीश्वरम् ॥

The age of Kundakunda and Umāsvāmi is well-established. The tradition is universal and is adverted to in all Jaina books found in Jaina Libraries all over. Old written MSS. in the bhaṇḍāras of Jaipur and Idar also bear it out. (See also *Indian Antiquary* Vol. XXI, mentioned in Bhāskara No. 4., pp. 78 and 204).

The age is so correct according to the tradition of Jainism that the works of these two Great Saints command universal acceptance and reverence, both from the Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras.

Our revered author Śrī Umāsvāmi flourished A. V. 714—798. If Lord Mahāvīra attained Nirvāṇa in 527 B. C., then Umāsvāmi lived 135—219 A. D. This is roughly the tradition. Anyhow, *Tattvārtha Sūtra* is a very old book, more than 1700 years old. It falls at the very opening of the period when the great omniscient successors of Vīra disappeared, and the later Pontiffs began to rise. Thus, as to date, its place is in the second half of the first millennium after Vīra.

As to the 4 Divisions of Jaina Literature : Cosmology, History, Philosophy and Ritual, *Tattvārtha Sūtra* has its place in Philosophy (Dravyānuyoga).

As to the old non-extant Literature, *Tattvārtha Sūtra* has descended from the sixth Aṅga, Jñātridharmakathā, and the second Pūrva, Agrāyini.

As to extant Literature, it is nearly at the end of the submerged tradition of Vīra and Gautama's Word (about 600 B. C.), of the wisdom of the two Bhadrabāhus (400 B. C.), and then forms the first glorious successor of the great works of Kundakundāchārya (100 A. D.), and then looks forward about the same distance of time ahead to the learned and lucid Prākṛit Gāthās of Śrī Nemichandra Siddhānta Chakravarti. (1000 A. D.).

The book contains only 10 short chapters, but its value is in inverse proportion to its size. It is revered both by the Digambara and Śvetāmbara sections of the Jaina community. The whole of Jaina philosophy is taught in it.

There is no Jaina doctrine or dogma, which is not expressed or implied in these aphorisms. Verily *Tattvārtha Sūtra* is a sacred epitome of Jainism.

It is recited by millions of mouths every day, in temples and in private houses. Indeed, it is held that one recitation of this book brings as much pious merit as a fast of one day. So it is said :

दशाध्याये परिच्छिन्ने तत्त्वार्थे पठिते सति ।
फलं स्यादुपवासस्य भाषितं मुनिपुङ्गवैः ॥

It is deservedly the text-book of the religion of Tirthaṃkaras *par excellence*. How great and authoritative it is recognised to be, will be further evident from the fact that it is perhaps the most commented upon book in Jaina Literature. No less than 31 commentaries of it are known to be extant now.

Very little is known at present of the life of the Author. His name was Umāsvāmi, or, according to the Śvetāmbara version, Umāsvāti. His spiritual descent is given below :

Serial No. of Saint	Name	Number of years that he was head of Jainism	From and to the year of Lord Vira, i.e., after Mahavira's Liberation 527 B.C.
I—3 Kevali (for 62 years)			A.V.
1	1. Gautama Svāmi	12	1—12
2	2. Sudharmāchārya	12	13—24
3	3. Jambu Svāmi	38	25—62
II—5 Sruta-Kevali (100 years)			
4	1. Viṣṇudhara	14	63—76
5	2. Nandimitra	16	77—92
6	3. Aparājita	22	93—114
7	4. Gauvardhana	19	115—133
8	5. Bhadrabāhu I	29	134—162
III—11 Ten Pūrvi (181 years)			
9	1. Viśākhāchārya	10	163—172
10	2. Prostīlachārya	19	173—191
11	3. Kṣatriyāchārya	17	192—208
12	4. Jayasenāchārya	21	209—229
13	5. Nāgasenāchārya	18	230—247
14	6. Siddhārthāchārya	17	248—264
15	7. Dhṛtisenāchārya	18	265—282
16	8. Vijaya (sena) āchārya	13	283—295
17	9. Buddhilingāchārya	20	296—316
18	10. Devāchārya	14	316—229
19	11. Dharamasenāchārya	14	330—343

Serial No. of Saint	Name	Number of years that he was head of Jainism	From and to the year of Lord Vira, i.e., after Mahavira's Liberation 527 B.C.
IV—5 Eleven Angins (123 years)			A. V.
20	1. Nakṣatrâchârya	18	344—361
21	2. Jayapalakâchârya	20	362—381
22	3. Pâṇḍavachârya	39	382—420
23	4. Dhruvasenâchârya	14	421—434
24	5. Kâṃsâchârya	32	435—466
V—4 Minor Angins (99 years)			
25	1. Subhadrâchârya	6	467—472
26	2. Yaśobhadrâchârya	18	473—490
27	3. Bhadrabâhu II	23	491—513
28	4. Lohâchârya	52	514—565
VI—5 One Angins (118 years)			
29	1. Ashadbali	28	566—593
30	2. Mâghanandi	21	594—614
31	3. Dharasena	19	615—633
32	4. Puṣpadanta	30	634—663
33	5. Bhûtabali	20	664—683

After Bhûtabali, there was no one who had a perfect knowledge of even one Anga. But the Pontiff's chair was never vacant and to that came the following saints.

Name	Became Pontiff on	Remained Pontiff for	A. V. From and to
Guptigupti	Phâguna Sudi 14, Saka 26	10 years	683—603
Mâghnandi	Aśvina „ 14, 36	4 „	694—697
Jina Chandra	Phâguna „ 14, 40	9 „	798—708
Kundakunda	Pausa Badi „ 8, 49	52 „	707—758
Umâsvâmi	Kârtika Badi 8, 101	40 years 8 days	759—799

It is known that Umâsvâmi renounced the world at the early age of 19 years. He remained an ascetic for 25 years. Then he became the head of ascetics (Achârya). From these we get the following brief sketch of dates in his life.

Event	Year A. V.	Saka era	A. D.
Birth	714	57	135
Renunciation	733	76	154
Became Pontiff	758	101	179
Death	798	141	219

We must emphasise one point here. These dates are not to be relied upon as absolutely correct. For according to different Paṭṭāvalis there are different dates, and a discrepancy of a few years is inevitable. Therefore the dates must be taken to be rough and provisional. The sequence of the tradition, however, is acknowledged and may be relied upon thoroughly.

According to Śvetāmbara tradition, Umāsvāti was a pupil of Śrī Ghoṣanandi Kṣamana, who was a pupil of Vāchaka-mukhya Śiva Śrī. In the *Sarva Darśana Saṃgraha* of Mādhavāchārya he is called Umāsvāti Vāchakāchārya.

The name of his father was Svāti, that of his mother Vātsī or Umā. He was born in the town named Nyagrodhika. He composed his great work in Kusumapur or Pātaliputra, modern Patna in Bihar.

It is also related that once he made a stone-image of Sarasvatī, the goddess of learning, speak.

A very interesting story is told of how this Great Gem of a Jaina sacred book came to be written.

In Gujarāt (Saurāstra) there lived a Jaina layman, Dvaipāyaka. He was a very pious man and withal learned in Jaina religious lore. He was anxious to write some really great Jainā book. But worldly cares forbade the execution of such an unworldly undertaking. To conquer this obstacle, he made a vow not to take his food unless he had made at least one aphorism every day. Thus if he missed adding one aphorism to his book any day, he had to go fasting for that day. For the theme of his book he took *Liberation*. And put his resolve that very day in practice. He thought out and made the first aphorism as: दर्शन ज्ञान चारित्राणि मोक्ष मार्गः. Belief-knowledge-conduct (united constitute) the path to Liberation. Fearing lest he should forget it, he transcribed it upon a side of a pillar in his house.

Next day Dvaipāyaka chanced to go away from his home on some business. In his absence his house was visited by a Saint.

The wife of Dvaipāyaka, herself a pious woman, received the Saint and entertained him. The Saint's eyes fell upon the aphorism on the pillar. He thought over it for a moment and then added the word सम्यक् before it; and departed.

When Dvaipāyaka returned and saw the correction in his aphorism, he questioned his wife. She had not seen the Saint do it, and said so, but suggested to the husband that it must have been made by the Saint.

The layman-author on this ran at once to find out the noble Saint to whom he was indebted for such an invaluable and radical correction. He came upon an order of monks at the outskirts of the town and saw the head of the order sitting in his radiant peace. He at once concluded that this must be the Saint. He fell at the feet of the Saint and made a most humble and heart-felt entreaty that the work was beyond his poor layman's wits and that the saint should oblige him and the world by completing the book, the first aphorism of which had been corrected by the Saint in such a pro-

vidential manner. The Saint was moved by compassion and finished the book.

This Saint was none other than our Umâsvâmi, and the completed book is *Tattvârtha Sûtra*.

The book is an exposition of Seven Principles of Jainism, i.e., the 7 *Tattvas*.

The opening *Sûtra* serves the purpose of an Introduction, Justification and Recapitulation of the whole book. It was necessary to indicate the position of the principles (*tattva*) in the whole range of Jaina knowledge. They are the subject-matter of right belief, and the relation of the two cannot be appreciated fully, unless we consider the position of right belief in the scheme of Jaina philosophy. This position is indicated by the first *Sûtra*. This brings us to the justification also. The first purpose of everything living is happiness. Happiness to be worth anything must be eternal, faultless and independent. Such happiness is identical with the Jaina conception of liberation. Right belief in and right knowledge of the seven principles, along with a life led in the light of the knowledge, and firmly established on the basis of the belief is the sole threefold path of final and everlasting deliverance. Thus the first *Sûtra* is a justification of the book which deals with these basic principles of belief and action. It is also a recapitulation, because the whole book can easily be seen to be merely an expansion of the various aspects, details and developments of this mighty and all comprehensive *Sûtra* of Jainism.

The whole book consists of 357 *Sûtras*, divided into 10 chapters with 33, 53, 39, 42, 42, 27, 27, 39, 26, 47, and 9 *Sûtras* respectively.



3. PANCHASTIKAYASARA

WHEN THE European scholars first began to study Indian philosophy and Indian literature they were peculiarly sympathetic towards the idealistic systems of India. These scholars were brought up in the tradition of Kant and Hegel. Kant in constructing his critical philosophy emphasised the phenomenality of our experience in general. The external world including "the starry heavens above" was merely a fictitious creation of the human mind according to its own forms and categories.

Roused from his dogmatic slumber by Hume, Kant began to inquire as to the possibility of a true metaphysics. Hume's analysis of experience ended in throwing overboard the fundamental conceptions of experience. The reality of the Self, the objective world and even the certain law of causation were all said to be fictitious concepts based upon psychological habits but having no rational foundation. From such a sceptical shipwreck Kant attempted to save metaphysics. Waiving the earlier methods as dogmatic, he introduced his own critical philosophy. The main characteristic of this system is the activity of the mind as opposed to the passive *tabula rasa* of the *Lockean* system. Nature is due to the co-operation of sense materials and the activity of mind. Forms of space and time and the categories of the understanding form the *a priori* constitutive elements of experience. Knowledge is confined to such an experience which is phenomenal. This phenomenal world or the world of appearance is but an island surrounded by the unknown ocean of noumenal reality. This may be taken to be the foundation of modern idealism.

No doubt Kant strongly repudiated the suggestion that his system was idealistic. It is true that he posited the existence of the thing-in-itself. But this realm of noumenal reality remained unknown and unknowable. It was preserved only because of Kant's personal predilection; hence it was the very first thing to be rejected by his successors.

Through the influence of Hegel, the German idealism secured an inordinate potency. Peculiarly gifted with genius for system-building, Hegel wrought out his system of idealism based on *Kantian* traditions. The *thing-in-itself* was got rid of as an empty abstraction. Reality was identified with concrete experience. Thus the metaphysical dualism of Kant was converted into an idealistic monism. According to this *Hegelian* conception reality is equal to the Absolute consciousness. All finite things and persons are reduced to merely adjectives or qualities of this Absolute which is of the nature of the spirit. It is this spirit that is the reality of which all other things of our ordinary experience are mere appearances.

Besides this idealistic monism of Germany there was another important aspect of thought that determined the trend of modern ideas. Herbert Spencer worked out a scheme of cosmic evolution in his synthetic system. This

Spencerian philosophy also in its own way contributed to metaphysical monism and phenomenality experience; hence the philosophy of the 19th century, especially towards the last quarter, had a predominant note of monism. This general proneness towards a monistic interpretation in western thought must have determined the attitude of the West towards Indian thought. Naturally were European scholars like Max Muller and Deussen sympathetically attracted by the metaphysical flights of Śankara and Rāmānuja. The uncompromising monism of Vedānta was admired as the fruit of oriental culture.

The philosophical attitude is never constant. It has always been undulating between idealism and realism. In the West there is observed a distinct set-back to idealism. The English philosophers like Bradley and Bosanquet who inherited the traditions of Hegel and who practically ruled the philosophical world are now openly challenged. This revolt against idealistic influence has manifested through different channels. Pragmatism championed by James and Dewey has exposed the hollowness of a barren intellectualism.

The *Hegelian* doctrine of the identity between thought and reality and the consequent criterion of truth in the form of self-coherence and self-consistency are openly condemned as pernicious metaphysics. "The will to believe" is recognised as an important factor in knowledge. Experimental verification of thought which is the method followed in science is hailed as the true model for philosophy. Thought is studied in its true concrete setting. Inasmuch as it is merely an instrument to secure greater efficiency of life, its value is entirely determined by its utility. Even scientists like Mach and Poincare acknowledge this instrumentality of thought. Concepts are only convenient fictions to comprehend Nature.

From within Oxford University itself there has sprung up a philosophical schism which boldly questions the pretensions of the Absolute. Schiller and Rashdall, Strutt and others attack the *Hegelian* stronghold. The Absolute is condemned because it neither satisfies the philosophical curiosity nor appeals to religious consciousness.

From France and Italy we hear a similar protest from Bergson and Croce. The former repudiating the *Hegelian* Absolute, builds up a theory of the universe based upon evolutionism. He too condemns intellect as inadequate to apprehend the inner nature of reality. His antagonism to intellectualism is carried to an uncompromising revolt against even scientific and philosophical constructions in general. He appeals to intuition as the only means of getting at reality. Similarly, Croce tries to separate what is living from what is dead in Hegel. Thus on all sides this German idealism is being assaulted. But the most dangerous opponent of idealism has come in the form of New Realism.

From an unexpected source there has come opposition. The science of mathematics whose alleged weakness was the strength of *Kantian* idealism has asserted its own right to challenge metaphysics. The mathematical

discoveries of Cantor, Peano, and Frege have once for all reclaimed certain fundamental mathematical notions such as the concepts of infinity and continuity from the unwarranted criticisms of metaphysicians. As Bertrand Russel clearly points out, modern idealism must once for all relinquish its *Kantian* basis. It can no more depend upon the so-called demonstration offered by Kant as to the impossibility of real space and time.

This wave of realism is further intensified by the fact that it is intimately associated with modern science. The traditional *Hegelian* idealism of the West has been peculiarly adverse to the interest of science. It may be safely asserted that a system of metaphysics which does not take into consideration the method and achievement of modern science is so far self-condemned. Nobody can be blind to the claim of science to be a safe means for revealing truth. Its claim is so wonderfully substantiated by its achievements that we may say that modern life and modern thought are mainly the result of modern science. So much so that any system of metaphysics which aspires to secure the open-sesame to unlock the secrets of reality must not openly conflict with modern science. The new realism therefore is in noble company.

When we are aware of this changed attitude in modern thought we are naturally stimulated to examine similar philosophical attitudes in the past.

What is placed before the students of philosophy herein is due to such a sympathetic scrutiny of the past. The Jaina system of thought is so peculiarly consistent with modern realism and modern science, that one may be tempted to question its antiquity. Still it is a fact, that such a system flourished in India several centuries before the Christian era.

The author of the work which is analysed here lived in the first century B. C. Hence it is one of the earliest treatises on Jaina thought. But the author was not the originator of this system. The *anekāntavāda* of the Jains must be certainly older than Mahāvīra who is believed to have revived Jainism.

The realistic tendency in oriental philosophy is not peculiar to Jainism. From the very early days we find this principle of interpreting life and the universe, running side by side with the idealistic one. During the Vedic period we find nothing but gross form of realism. The Vedic Gods were but magnified human beings sharing all the weaknesses and foibles peculiar to mankind. When sacrifices were offered to *Indra* or *Agni* or *Vāyu* or *Varuṇa* with chanting of hymns, there could be no trace of any suspicion as to the reality of the world around. Not only the world of Nature was taken to be real but many of its elements were imaged after man. No doubt, we find a unifying tendency as an undercurrent of the Vedic thought. No doubt, the Vedic Devas were subordinated to the one creative principle of the universe—*Prajāpati*.

But this wonderful period of primitive culture is followed by a barren age of sheer ceremonialism. The period of the Brāhmanas is marked by sacrificial technique. Elaborate formulae were invented for the conduct of sacrifices. Ceremonialism took the place of poetic effusions. This led to the

ascendency of the priestly class. The sacrificial master or *Tajaman* has to engage his priests, paying heavy fees or *dakṣiṇās*. Religious devotion during this period degenerated into petty commercialism. But this state of things did not last long. While the priests were further elaborating the ceremonial formulae, the work of investigating the true nature of reality was taken up by another band of thinkers. By this time the homogeneous Aryan tribe split up into different castes. Of these sects, the *Kshatriyas* or the warrior class have learned the secrets of Reality. They have introduced a new philosophical cult known as *Brahmavidyā*. The *Brahmavidyā* must have originally referred to certain spiritual intuitions obtained through introspection. Man discovered himself for the first time. The inner spiritual principle, the *Ātman* is taken to be the Reality. It is neither the body nor the senses. It is something behind and beyond the corporeal frame. It is that which hears but is not heard. It is that which sees but is not seen. It is that which makes the operation of the senses possible while itself is beyond sense-apprehension. This spiritual principle was indifferently called *Ātman* or *Brahman*. Like the Pythagorians of Greece, the Indian thinkers kept their metaphysical cult as a secret. The *Kshatriyas* who were the discoverers and custodians of the New Thought, imparted it only to the deserving few. This *Upanishadic* cult, for so was it named, soon replaced the earlier ceremonialism. The *Jñāna-kānda* superseded the *Karma-kānda* as the path to self-realisation. Even the priests, discounting their ceremonial technique, flocked to the royal courts to be initiated into the new mysteries. Thus the age was one of intense discussion, research and self-introspection. During this period again, we have the seeds of the different philosophical systems constructed in the succeeding period. No doubt Yājñavalkya is a towering personality of the Upanishadic age. No doubt, he attempted reconciliation between the old and the new. In his hands the new wisdom appeared as distinctly monistic. But that current which is evidently the source of the later Vedantic stream was only one of the many currents of the Upanishadic wisdom. This is very well substantiated by the different systems constructed subsequent to the age. The philosophical systems in India are mainly of two classes, the orthodox and the heretic. The six *Darśanas*—Pūrvamīmāṃsā, Uttara mīmāṃsā or Vedānta, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Viśeṣhika—constitute the orthodox systems. The heretical systems are Buddhism, Jainism, the philosophy of the Chārvākas and Brihaspatyās. Of course this classification does not mean anything but that it was made by Brahminical scholars. 'Orthox' and 'heretical' are terms mainly based upon the attitude towards the Vedas. Kapila's Sāṅkhya is *nirṭvara* and is allied to Jainism and Buddhism in its opposition to Vedic sacrifices. Pūrvamīmāṃsā or Vedānta rejects the creator and creation as Vyāvahāric and hence the result of *māyā*. There is a good deal of truth in the statement that it is merely Buddhism in disguise. Hence the traditional classification is justified neither by philosophical nor religious criterion.

Of these different systems which represent the post-upanishadic thought,



the Vedânta alone has become prominent. But students who study impartially the other systems, will realise the importance of their contributions to Indian thought and culture.

The supremacy of Vedânta over the systems, which are to a very great extent realistic, is not a thing to congratulate ourselves. For, realism is generally allied to science and many of the scientific theories pertaining to the constitution of the physical world are associated with these realistic schools, e. g., the atomic theory of the *Nyāya* and *Viśeshika* schools. Idealism even in the West either openly or covertly has been antagonistic to the interests of science. Hence any attempt to escape from the hypnotic illusion of a powerful idealism is to be welcomed by impartial students of science and philosophy.

It is not possible for us to examine in detail the several realistic schools of Indian thought. Hence we shall confine ourselves to Jaina philosophy which is generally neglected by many and misunderstood by the few who attempt to speak on it.

JAINA PHYSICS

We have referred to the contribution to Indian wisdom by the warriors. By their plain living and high thinking they led to the emancipation of human intellect from the thralldom of barren ritualism. While the priest-craft was engaged in devising sacrifice after sacrifice, their minds were dominated by a passionate desire for solving the riddle of the universe and for understanding the nature of the Eternal One behind the world of appearance. This dominant phase of monism centres round the court of Janaka. But there must have been other schools of new *Kshatriya* thought. This group of thinkers could not compromise with the traditional thought of the Vedic period. They show a strong bias towards Dualism and Pluralism. They represent the liberal tendency in the new thought itself. Whenever they encountered a conflict between their ideals and the Vedas, they did not hesitate to repudiate the authority of the latter. To this left wing of the pioneers of thought we owe the systems of philosophy such as the *Sāṅkhya*, the *Jaina* and the *Buddhistic* schools. It is worthy of notice here "that the greatest intellectual performances or rather almost all the performances of significance for mankind in India have been achieved by men of the warrior caste."*

The *Sāṅkhya* system presupposes two kinds of existences—physical and spiritual, *prakṛiti* and *puruṣa*—rather an infinite number of *puruṣas*. Salvation according to *Sāṅkhya* consists in the differentiation between the two, matter and spirit. The individual *puruṣa* secures emancipation by recognising its own intrinsic qualities as being distinct from the *prakṛitic*

* "Philosophy of Ancient India" by Richard Garbe.

transformations which go to constitute the cosmic evolution. Not only the genuine physical changes but also the psychological facts such as will, desire and intellect are credited to *prakriti* while the *purushas* remain passive spectators of the whole drama, having nothing to do with moral responsibility.

Evidently, following the same dualistic tendencies but differing in the last point of moral responsibility, the Jainas and the Buddhists worked out their respective systems with a deep religious colour. The Buddhists seem to have overshot their mark. Equipped with the logic of *Kshanikavāda*, they reduced the whole world of reality, physical and spiritual, to mere concatenation of sense-qualities having only a momentary existence—a result independently reached after several centuries by Hume. Neither this sensational nihilism of Śākya Muni nor the monistic interpretation is favoured by the Jainas. They steer clear of the two extremes. They accept the *purushas* of the *Sāṅkhyas* but in their hands these *purushas* cease to be passive spectators. They are active architects of their own destiny and through their own effort obtain final freedom, bearing all the while full moral responsibility for conduct. The *Prakriti* is also similarly elaborately reconstructed. It is made more definite. It is denied many of its psychological implications. It is identified with matter in modern scientific sense and it is also given an atomic constitution. It appears under a new name—*pudgala*. The term *pudgala* means matter. The physical object which has the several sense qualities and which occupies space is also called *mūrta* and *rūpa* object. In speaking about *pudgala* or matter, the Jaina thinkers clearly analyse the qualities apprehended by sense perception. The qualities of touch, taste, smell, colour, and sound are generally associated with *pudgala*.

But the physical bodies that are apprehended by sense perception are constituted by atoms or *paramāṇus*. It is this atomic structure of the universe that is the interesting part of Jaina physics.* The *paramāṇu* or atom is defined quite in terms of modern physics. Though modern physics revolutionised the concept of atom still it has not completely annihilated it. No doubt an atom is a cluster of electrons as complex perhaps as the solar system itself. But the discovery of *radio-activity* has not interfered with the laws of physics and chemistry based upon atomic conception. The only change that modern physics has introduced is that atom is no more simple and basic but complex and perhaps secondary. In spite of this complex nature it does maintain its individuality. No modern physicist will deny that it is the fundamental foundation of the structure of the physical universe. It is such an atom or *paramāṇu* that is the basis of physical structure.

The *Paramāṇu* is neither created nor can be destroyed. It is the permanent basis of the physical universe. The several kinds of physical objects are all constituted by the same class of primordial atom. The *paramāṇu* cannot be an object of sense perception. It is in itself transcending the sense experience

* This doctrine of atomic structure is also prominent in the *Nyāya* and *Viśeṣika Schools*.

and as such it is practically *amūrta* though it is the basic constituent of all *mūrta* objects.

This primary atom or the material point has an intrinsic attraction to similar atoms. Thus molecular aggregates are formed by the combination of atoms. These molecular aggregates are called *skandhas*.* These *skandhas* are again of infinite variety; you may have a molecule constituted by two atoms or three and so on up to infinite number of atoms. Thus every perceivable object is a *skandha* and even the whole physical universe is sometimes spoken of as *mahāskandha* or the Great aggregate. The physical objects being aggregates of atoms or *skandhas*, their changes are entirely due to atomic disintegration or aggregation.

Having accepted the reality of physical object, the Jainas naturally accepted the possibility of real motion.

Motion has always been an unintelligible perplexity to the idealist. Both in the East and the West, idealistic thinkers have fought shy of this by taking refuge in the conception of *māyā* or appearance. It is in the western system of thought that the conception figures prominent. Zeno trying to defend the unchangeable, adamant Absolute of Parmenides, introduced four invincible arguments against the reality of motion. These arguments were accepted as invincible for several centuries. They figure in some form or other in Kantian antinomies and Hegelian dialectic. Even Bradley draws upon Zeno's wisdom in his attempt to condemn the realities of concrete world to the limbo of appearances. As Bertrand Russell points out, the arguments are no more irrefutable in the light of modern mathematics. Hence Realism need not approach the problem with any misgivings. Reality of motion has thus obtained a standing ground in the field of modern philosophy.

What is more important than this, is the part played by this concept in science. For science the world of reality is a system of energies. This dynamic conception of science has given a new dignity to the concept of motion. In spite of the unwarranted caution exhibited by physicists like E. Mach and Karl Pearson, modern physics has once again emphasised the importance and the reality of motion in understanding the mystery of Nature. Always looked upon with suspicion by idealistic metaphysics, the doctrine of reality of motion has been welcomed by realistic and scientific systems of thought.

But in order to accept the reality of motion of physical objects the reality of space must be postulated. Thus motion in Jaina doctrine is intimately associated with space and two other categories with peculiar nomenclature, of *dharma* and *adharma*. We shall examine the Jaina account of these three categories.

Reality of space is also a crucial doctrine to determine whether metaphysics is idealistic or realistic. Curiously the non-Jaina Indian systems of thought do not pay any prominent attention to the problem of space. In fact, the

* This term also occurs in Buddhistic philosophy but with a different meaning.

more influential Indian system of philosophy, the Vedānta uses the term *ākāśa* indifferently to denote space and ether. It is the latter meaning that is more prominent. It is to the credit of the ancient Jaina thinkers that they took a bold attempt to attack the problem and that with very great success. This fact is perhaps due to their special interest in mathematics. An adequate solution of the problem of space and time is intimately connected with mathematical philosophy. It is modern mathematics that has successfully reclaimed once again space and time from the destructive dialectic of the idealistic metaphysics. Space is indispensable to science and realistic metaphysics. The wonders of modern science are all associated with the reality of space and what is contained therein. Hence to "the Indian Realism" space cannot but be real. *Ākāśa* is infinite extension. It accommodates all other real existences. On account of this accommodating function it has a portion which is filled with the other real objects. This portion is called *lokākāśa*, the world-space because it is co-extensive with the world or *Loka*. Beyond that, there is the infinite empty space which is *śuddha ananta ākāśa*.

The interesting fact about this conception of space is the doctrine that space also is constituted by simple elements known as *ākāśāṇu* or spacial point. This *ākāśāṇu* is to space what *puḍgala paramāṇu* is to matter. And each *ākāśāṇu* is related to each *puḍgalaṇu*. To borrow a convenient modern expression, the class of space points and the class of material points are "similar, having one to one relation."

The Jaina thinkers elaborately describe the nature of space, carefully distinguishing it from matter. It is devoid of the several physical qualities and as such it is mere extension. It should not be confounded with extended objects.

Matter and space do not exhaust the physical conception. The Jaina thinker pertinently asks the question why the atoms should be kept together constituting the world of *mahā skandha*? Why should they not get dissipated throughout *anantākāśa* or infinite space? Then there would be no world. The very fact that the structure of the world is permanent, that the world is a cosmos and not a chaos implies the existence of another principle which guarantees the permanency of the world's structure and the world form. This principle has the function of binding the flying atoms to the world's centre. Its function then is distinctly inhibitive to arrest the flying atom. This physical principle is called *adharma* or rest. But if *adharma* alone were to function in the universe, there would be absolute rest and universal cosmic paralysis; hence the necessity of a counteracting force called *dharma*. The function of this is to guarantee free movement for the objects that move of their own accord or otherwise. This principle of *dharma* or motion then is merely to relieve the universal inhibition that would otherwise result.

These two principles, *dharma* and *adharma*, of motion and rest are described in terms that are applicable to the modern conception of *ether*. Both *dharma* and *adharma* pervade through space up to the world limit. They are

absolutely non-physical in nature and non-atomic and non-discrete in structure. The qualities of *pudgala* are not found therein. Nor have they the structure of space which is constituted by space points. These two physical principles are perfectly simple. Therefore they may be spoken of as one or as many. They are spacial, and yet are non-spacial. They are *amūrta* and *arūpa*. They are neither light nor heavy. They are not objects of sense perception. Their existence is inferred only through their function. Such are the characteristics of these two principles which are distinctly peculiar to Jaina physics.

The movement of physical objects and of organic beings is due entirely to other causal agency. Organic beings are capable of spontaneous movement and physical objects move because of impact received from other physical moving objects. Movement of these things should not be causally traced to the agency of *dharma*. Similarly when the moving objects come to rest, rest should not be interpreted as the result of the agency of *adharma*. *Dharma* and *adharma* are devoid of any kind of direct causal potency. Their function is purely external and indirect. Their neutrality is so much emphasised by the Jaina thinkers that there could be no mistake about their meaning. These are in short the necessary physical postulates without which the structure and form of physical universe will be quite unintelligible.

JAINA METAPHYSICS

There are two important concepts in Jaina metaphysics which are preplexing to students of Jainism, the *astikāyas* and the *dravyas*. The term *astikāya* is a compound name made up of *asti* and *kāya* which respectively mean existing and extensive magnitude. *Astikāya* therefore means a real that has extensive magnitude. The other term *dravya* means the real that is fluent or changing. We shall try to explain these two concepts in detail.

The *astikāya* are five in number—*Jīva* (soul), *pudgala* (matter), *dharma* (principle of motion), *adharma* (principle of rest) and *ākāśa* (space). These five build up the cosmos. Space and matter are distinctly extended reals. *Dharma* and *adharma* are indirectly related to space. Their operation is in space and is limited by *lokākāśa*. Thus they may also be considered as related to space. Lastly, life is generally associated with body, the organic body constituted by *pudgala* or matter. *Jīva* is operative in and conditioned by such a physical medium. In a way therefore *Jīva* also is related to space. These five existences which have spatiality either directly or indirectly are the five *astikāyas*. These are the constituent elements of the universe or the world.

Kāla or time, though not an element of the physical universe, may be mentioned here. Since change and motion are admitted to be real, time also must be considered real. The real or absolute time as contrasted with the relative time, is constituted by simple elements known as *kālānus* or

instants. Instants, points and atoms are the characteristic conceptions of Jaina thought and in this respect it has a wonderful corroboration from the field of modern mathematics.

The Jaina thinkers in distinguishing time from the five *astikāyas* made use of an important idea. *Astikāya* is spatiality or extensive magnitude. This extensive magnitude is denoted by a technical name—*Tiryak prachaya* or horizontal extension.

When the simple elements, say, the points are so arranged in a series where each term is an item also in another series, we must have the two dimensional series which will correspond to surface or extension. Wherever there is such a *tiryak prachaya* we have *astikāya*. But time or *kāla* has only *ūrdha prachaya*. The elements are in a forward direction. The series is *mono-dimensional* or linear order. Therefore *kāla* has no extension either directly or indirectly. Hence it is not an *astikāya*. Though it is not an *astikāya*, it is distinctly a real entity which accounts for changes in other things.

Such are the characteristics of real time. This should not be confounded with *vyavahāra kāla* or relative time which is measured by some conventional units of either long or short duration. These conventional distinctions would have no meaning if they are not co-ordinated in a single real time series.

The term *Dravya* denotes any existence which has the important characteristic of persistence through change. Jaina conception of reality excludes both a permanent and unchanging real of the *Permenidion* type and also the mere eternal flux of Heraclites. An unchanging permanent and mere change without substratum are unreal and impossible abstractions. Jaina system admits only the dynamic reality or *dravya*. *Dravya* then is that which has a permanent substantiality, which manifests through change of appearing and disappearing. *Utpāta* (origin), *vyaya* (decay) and *dhrouvya* (permanency) form the triple nature of the Real. To emphasise the underlying identity alone, would end Vedāntic conception of the Real as *Brahman*. To emphasise the change alone, would result in the *Kṣanika Vāda* of the Buddhist. The reality is a stream of discrete and momentary elements. The concept of *dravya* reconciles both these aspects and combines them into an organic unity. It is an identity expressing through difference a permanency continuing through change. It corresponds to the modern conception of organic development, rather in its Hegelian aspect. It has duration; it is movement; it is the *Elan Vital*. The five *astikāyas* and *kāla* (or time) are the six *dravyas* or the real existences.

Inducted to the Jaina conception of the real, let us examine the distinctions in the realm of the reals. The dynamic substance or *dravya* is always associated with certain intrinsic and inalienable qualities called *guṇas*. Thus the yellow colour, malleability etc. will be the qualities or *guṇa* of the *dravya* gold. The *dravya* with its inalienable qualities must exist in some state or form. This is its mode of existence or *pariyāya*. This mode or *pariyāya* is subject to change. It may be destroyed and a new mode

may appear. But this creation and destruction are relevant only to *paryāyas* or modes, and not to *dravya*, the constitutive substance. That can neither be destroyed nor created. That is eternal.

The approximate parallel conceptions in the western thought will be Spinoza's substance, qualities and modes. Of course for Spinoza there was only one substance, whereas here we have six distinct substances or *dravyas*. The term 'attribute' is used in a technical sense by Spinoza, whereas it means merely the qualities in Jaina metaphysics. Each *dravya* or the real has its own appropriate attributes. Matter has the sense qualities of touch, taste, etc., soul has *chetanā* (consciousness), and so with the other *dravyas*.

What is the relation between *dravya* and *guṇa*—the reals and their qualities? This is an important problem even in modern metaphysics. There have been two distinct answers proposed by philosophers. One answer always emphasises the permanent basis as the real, and the other the changing qualities. The former condemns change as mere appearance or *māyā*, whereas the latter condemns the permanent substance as a mere figment of imagination. The former school generally ends in agnosticism and maintains that the real is unknown and unknowable. The latter generally ends in scepticism, and sweeps away in a flood of doubt the fundamental concepts of life and world, of morality and religion. In India we have *Advaita Vād* as an example of the former and Bhuddism of the latter. In the West, philosophers like Locke and Kant may be mentioned as representatives of the former school, and Hume may be taken as a type of the latter.

The problem is once again taken by Bradley, who after an acute analysis codemns it to be insoluble. Hence according to his own dialectic, the thing with its qualities is self-contradictory and therefore an appearance. This is a conclusion which goes clean against science and common sense. Thinghood is not after all a self-contradictory notion. For the Jains it is a fundamental concept. The thing or *dravya* as a dynamic entity is always flowing. It has no existence apart from its qualities which in their turn are not really distinct from the *dravya*. The thing-in-itself, apart from all the qualities, is merely an empty abstraction. The qualities themselves are not merely momentary fleeting sensations. The thing exists in and through its qualities, and the qualities related and organised constitute the thing. The difference between the two is only a difference of reference and not difference of existence; in the technical language of Jaina metaphysics, the *anyatva* between *dravya* and *guṇa* is only *vyāpadeśamātra*. They do not have *pradeśaprāduktva*. Hence they are one in reality, though having distinct nomenclature and reference.

Paryāya is another technical term demanding careful understanding. *Paryāya* means mode of existence. This again is viewed from two different aspects, *arthaparyāya* and *vyanjanāparyāya*. We have already mentioned that *dravya* is but an entity that is continually changing. This triple nature of reality that is permanency through births and deaths, through creation

and destruction, gives to *dravya* a characteristic mode of existence every moment. This continuous flow of the real is parallel to the continuous flow of the duration of time. This intrinsic change of *dravya* is known as *arthaparyāya*. All the six *dravyas* have this *arthaparyāya*. What is *vyājanāparyāya*? It is not merely the cross-section in the continuous flow of *dravya*. *Vyājanāparyāya* has a pretty fixed duration of existence. Besides the molecular aggregation and disintegration that take place every moment in a physical object, the object may have a particular mode of existence; as a pot, for example, for a certain duration of time. This *paryāya* of pot is *vyājanāparyāya* of *pudgala*. Similarly for *Jīva*. The continuous change that takes place in consciousness is *Jīva's arthaparyāya*. Its existence as a particular organism, as a man or a *deva* with determinate age, is the *vyājanāparyāya* of *Jīva*. Thus *Jīva* and *pudgala* have both the kinds of *paryāyas* whereas the other four *dravyas* have got only *arthaparyāya* alone. The reals are thus exhausted by the six *dravyas* with their respective *guṇas* and *paryāyas*.

Since these *dravyas* are reals, they have *satta* or *astitva* or existence as their common characteristic. From this point of view of *satta*, all the *Dravyas* may be brought under one class. Though from the class point of view all the *dravyas* are one, still the *satta*, their common characteristic should not be abstracted and postulated as the unitary substance of which the other *dravyas* may be taken as *paryāyas*. This *ekānta* view is condemned as unwarranted and erroneous. The six *dravyas* in spite of their common characteristic of *satta* are fundamental and irreducible, one to another.

One more point and we may leave this topic. A thing in concrete world is therefore a *paryāya* of anyone of the *dravyas*. It is also otherwise called *artha*. An *artha* or a thing is a corporate unity of an infinite number of qualities, just as the cosmos is a system of infinite number of *arthas*. The one is extensive and the other is intensive; but both are infinite wholes. According to Jaina philosophy, therefore, we require an infinite thought to apprehend them completely. He who cannot know a thing completely cannot know the world completely, and conversely he who cannot know the world completely cannot know even a single thing really and completely. This particular attitude of the Jaina thinkers reminds us of Tennyson's apostrophe to a *Flower in the Crannied Wall*:

Little flower—but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.

JAINA BIOLOGY

Perhaps it is inaccurate to speak of biology in the system before us. The science of biology as such is peculiar to modern age; hence we are not quite justified in expecting such a scientific conception in a work of pre-Christian era and which is perhaps of the same age as of Plato and Aristotle. Naturally therefore, the ideas about the organic world are curiously intermixed with

various mythic and fantastic conceptions relating to beings of Hell and Heaven. Eliminating all these as irrelevant, we still have considerable material to enable us to have an insight into the ancient ideas about life and living beings.

One important conception that would strike the reader in the very beginning, is the organic unity of the plant and animal world. Vegetable kingdom is distinctly organic. Its nature was accurately observed and carefully described. The whole plant world is included in the class of organisms having one sense, i. e., the sense of contact. Then the world of animals and insects is classified according to the same principle of sense organs. The animal world beginning with such insects as earthworm and ending with man is brought under four main groups—organisms with two, three, four, and five senses.

Associated with organisms, there is the conception of *prāṇas* or the essential characteristics of living beings. These are mainly four. *Balaprāṇa*, *indriyaprāṇa*, *āyuh-prāṇa* and *uchhṛvāsa-niśvāsa prāṇa*. Every organism implies certain capacity of spontaneous activity. This capacity for action is *balaprāṇa* or life potency. Every organism must possess some kind of sense awareness. This implies the possession of a sense organ and the capacity to apprehend the environment through that sense. The number of sense organs is different according to stages of organic development. Next is *āyuh prāṇa* or duration of life. Every living organism has a limited duration of life. This organic capacity to persist through a certain duration is *āyuh prāṇa*. And lastly respiration. There is no organism without this *prāṇa* of *uchhṛvāsa-niśvāsa*. These four main *prāṇas* are the essential attributes of organic beings.

One other interesting point is the enumeration of the different means of birth of organisms. Young ones may be produced from *garbha*. These are *garbhajas* young ones, produced from the womb. Then the *andajas*, the young ones produced from eggs. Thirdly, *sammūrchhana* or spontaneous generation. This refers to minute organisms. And lastly they speak of *upapādikas* in the case of *devas* and *narakas*. The last one of course we may treat as beyond scientific pale. The recognition of spontaneous generation is a point deserving special emphasis.

Another fact deserving notice is the early recognition of the existence of microscopic organisms. These are called *sūkshma ekendriya jīvas* or microscopic organisms having only one sense. These are said to fill the earth, air, water and fire. The possibility of microscopic organisms in fire seems a little too fantastic.* But in the case of the other three, we need have no hesitation as they are fully established by modern science.

In this connection it is necessary to point out that Hermann Jacobi's conjecture that Jainism is very ancient, though historically true, rests on an unwarranted assumption as to these *jīvanikāyas*. He interprets (vide his tran-

* For the verification of this, one must look to the result of further scientific investigation.

slation of *Tattvārthadhigama*) these *jīvas* in earth, air, water and fire in such a way as to suggest that Jainism is, or was once at least, a mind of Indian fetishism which believed in the souls of earth, air, etc. Then what is the purpose of calling these *sūkshma ekendriya jīvas*? What is the meaning of this distinction between *jīva* and *ajīva*, *chetan* and *achetan*?

The different organisms mentioned above are *jīvas* or souls in association with matter or *pudgala*. If you look at the system of metaphysics as a whole, you have the picture of an infinite number of *jīvas* caught in the vortex of matter—souls surrounded by a soulless environment. This picture is extremely analogous to the cosmic picture of the *Sāṅkhyas*—an infinite number of *purushas* submerged in an ocean of *prakṛiti* and drifting along the current of *prakṛitic* evolution. But there instead of one homogeneous *prakṛiti* constituting the environment of the *purushas*, we have the five *ajīva-dravyas* forming the appropriate stage for the enactment of the spiritual drama of the souls. The primary characters are *jīva* and *pudgala*. The others make the things go. The whole cosmic evolution is due to the interaction between soul and matter. According to Jain thought this entanglement of *jīva* in the vortex of matter is *saṃsāra*. How could an *achetan pudgala* bring about such a calamitous result? *Pudgala* or matter in a very subtle and fine form, fills the cosmic space. This form of *pudgala* is spoken of as *karma prayogya pudgala*—matter fit to manifest as *karma*. In this cosmic space are also the *jīvas*. *Jīvas* by their impurity of heart lead to formation of subtle material cocoon or Karmic bodies which retard and obstruct the intrinsic spiritual radiance of the soul. When once this subtle deposit of matter is begun, the grosser encrustation of matter and the formation of organic bodies is inevitable according to psycho-physical laws. Here we have to notice one important point. Even such a great oriental scholar like Hermann Jacobi makes the ambiguous and misleading statement that *karma* according to Jains is purely material and he further suggests that since they speak of a combination between *jīva* and *karma*, Jains assume that soul is of some subtle matter, thus making the combination between the two possible. This is extremely misleading and far from the truth. There is neither combination nor direct causal relation between soul and matter. Jains speak of *bhāva-karmas* as distinct from *dravya-karmas*. The former psychological *karma* is immediate to *jīva*. The latter, material is mainly concerned with the building up of the bodies. No doubt the two are associated together; yet the two are distinct and separate. *Jīva* is *chetana* and *śarīra* is *achetan*.

This conjoint existence or *saṃsāra* is *anādi*, without beginning. Through its congenital impurity of the heart, soul is thrown into impure environments from time immemorial, though there can be an end to this state of existence. This end consists in securing spiritual freedom and perfection through obtaining the purity of the heart which in its turn leads to the destruction of the material encasement. Thus the life of the soul in *saṃsāra* is an infinite series without beginning but with an end which is *mokṣa*.

JAINA PSYCHOLOGY

Jīva is the central conception of Jaina system. Its nature is *chetanā* or consciousness. *Jīva* and *chetanā*, life and consciousness, are co-extensive. Wherever there is life there is consciousness. Even in the lowest class of organisms we have to posit existence of consciousness. But this does not imply that in every living organism there is explicit consciousness. In very many cases consciousness may be latent and implicit. In the lower organisms it is mainly implicit and latent, in man generally explicit, and in certain exceptional cases of men having higher spiritual development consciousness may be supernormal.

Jīva with its characteristic of *chetanā* is entirely distinct from *pudgala* or matter. It cannot be apprehended by sense perception; hence it is *Amūrta*. The qualities which are generally associated with matter such as colour, taste, etc., have no relevancy in the case of *Chetanā*.

Jaina psychology is thus based upon the metaphysical assumption of *jīva* which is of the nature of *chetanā*. It is not a "psychology without a soul." This general nature of *chetanā* or consciousness manifests in two ways, *darśana* and *jñāna*, perception and understanding. These two modes of consciousness are mainly cognitive or thought elements. Consciousness includes also emotion and will. The effective and conative elements are also recognised by Jaina system. Effective states or emotions are the general characteristics of *saṃsāri jīva* or living beings in our ordinary sense. Conduct or behaviour is also assumed to be the natural manifestation of life. *Charitra* or conduct is also associated with all *saṃsāri jīvas*. Thus from the point of view of modern psychology consciousness has a threefold function and this is also assumed in Jaina system.

This tripartite division of consciousness is expressed in another way also. In describing the characteristics of *jīva*, its *chetanā* character is said to manifest not only in *jñāna-darśana*, understanding and perception, but also in *karma chetanā* and *karmaphala chetanā*, awareness of action and awareness of pleasure-pain. The recognition of the threefold aspect of consciousness may be illustrated even from the conception of a perfect being. The characteristics of a perfect being are *anantajñāna*, *anantadarśana*, *anantavīrya* and *ananta sukha*—infinite Knowledge, infinite Perception, infinite Power and infinite Bliss. The other characteristics are irrelevant to our purpose. The first two of the enumerated qualities, infinite knowledge and infinite perception, are distinctly cognitive. Infinite power implies activity or conation and infinite bliss the hedonic experience. Thus throughout the Jaina account of life, the three aspects of consciousness are assumed.

Every organism or a *saṃsāri jīva* is an organic unity of two distinct entities—*jīva* and *pudgala*, soul and body. Naturally therefore there crops up the problem of the relation between the two. Soul is *chetanā* (consciousness), *amūrta* (non-corporeal), *arūpa* (non-sentient) whereas body has the

opposite qualities in each case. One may be said to be the contradiction of other. The Dualism is so emphatically expressed here as in *Cartesianism*.

The term body implies two different things. The gross body that we actually perceive through our senses, is constituted and nourished by matter taken in the form of food, etc. This body is every moment changing and will be given up by the soul after a certain period. Besides this gross body, there is for every *jīva* a subtle body known as *karmana śarīra*. This body is constituted by subtle material molecules known as *Karma Pudgala*. This subtle body may also be changing. But still it is a necessary and inalienable appendage of *samsāri jīva*. This is transcended only in the perfect state. In discussing the relation between the states of this *karma śarīra* and the states of *jīva*, Jainism makes an important distinction between *upādāna kartā* and *nimitta kartā*, substantial cause and external cause. Mental states are the modifications of the mind and Physical states are the modifications of matter. Mind is the *upādāna kartā* of psychical states and matter is the *upādāna kartā* of physical changes, and yet physical states and psychical states may be mutually external conditions. The causal activity contemplated here is a bit obscure. One psychical state is due to the immediately antecedent psychical state and similarly one physical state is the result of its own antecedent. Thus mental series in a way is independent of physical series. But still a mental change may be externally determined by a physical change, and the physical conversely by the mental change. The relation between the physical and the mental is purely external. In the technical language of the system, one is the *nimitta kartā* of the other. So far as we are able to make out, the meaning seems to be this: a mental change is due to two conditions—one an *upādāna kartā*, a mental antecedent and another *nimitta kartā*, a physical antecedent. The mental change is the result of both these antecedent conditions, physical and mental. Similarly a change in the body is to be traced to two conditions: an *upādāna* condition, a physical antecedent in this case, and a *nimitta* condition, a mental antecedent. The system emphasises the causal interrelation between mind and matter, even though the interrelation is one of external condition. The reason given for accepting this interrelation is the reality of moral responsibility. If there is no causal interrelation between mind and matter, why should a person be taken responsible for his conduct? If moral responsibility is real, if moral evaluation of conduct is genuine, then conduct must be the intimate expression of the personality.

Though the discussion is about *jīva* and its *karmana śarīra*, the discussion and its conclusion may very well be taken as relevant to our problem of the relation between soul and body. The whole discussion may be taken as expressing the views in regard to the wider problem. Soul and body are capable of causal interrelation and a change in one always involves two antecedents, one physical and the other psychical. If causal interrelation is not admitted, certainly ethical values will remain unexplained and unintelligible,

The sense organs recognised in the system are the usual five. But sometimes *manas* or mind is also spoken of as an *indriya*. *Indriyas* in general are of two kinds: *dravya indriya* or the physical sense organ and *bhāva indriya*, the psychical counterpart. Sensory awareness is the result of the contact between *dravya indriya* and the physical object sensed. It is assumed of course that only physical objects or *puḍgala* can be apprehended by sensation. This contact may be direct or indirect. In the case of sight the contact is indirect. The object perceived by vision is not brought in contact with the eyes. The objects in space are revealed to us by light or *jyoti*. It is through being illuminated that they are apprehended by vision. The exact operation of light on the eyes is not further explained. In the case of the other senses, we have direct contact. But the direct contact may be *sthūla* or *sūkshma*, gross or subtle. In the case of touch and taste we have the direct contact with the gross object. But in the case of smell we have contact with minute particles of the object smelt. In the case of sound also we have *sūkshma* contact. But in this case what the ears come in contact with, is merely a kind of motion. Unlike the other Indian systems of thought which associate sound with *ākāśa*, Jaina system explains the sound as due to the violent contact of one physical object with the other. It is said to be generated by one *skandha* knocking against another *skandha*. Sound is the agitation set up by this knock. It is on account of this theory of sound that the system speaks of an atom or *paramāṇu* as unsounding by itself. Thus in all these cases, the environmental stimulus is either directly or indirectly a physical object. Sense perception is the result of the contact between two physical things—*dravyendriya* on the one hand and the stimulus from the object on the other hand.

The next interesting point is the analysis of the different sensations obtained through different sense organs. Through the eyes we have the apprehension of five colours. Visual sensations consist of the five elements or *pancha varṇa*. But we have to note here that sensation of white is also included as one of the colours. In this respect the term *varṇa* or colour is used in its popular sense and not in the scientific sense. Similarly taste is of five kinds—pungent, bitter, sweet, sour and saline. These five tastes are obtained through the tongue which is *rasanendriya*. Skin is *sparsanendriya* and through it the following eight kinds of cutaneous sensations are obtained: light and heavy, soft and hard, rough and smooth, cold and hot sensations—four pairs of opposite senses. These cutaneous sensations include sensations of temperature contract, pressure and muscular or kinaesthetic sensations. Sensation of smell is only of two kinds, *sugandha* and *durgandha*. Sound sensations are of infinite variety. The different kinds of sounds natural and artificial, purposive and non-purposive, articulate and inarticulate, musical and non-musical are spoken of.

What we directly apprehend through a sense organ is not merely particular sensation but the object. Sense perception is known as *darśana*. *Darśana* is

the perception of a physical object. *Darśana* may be *chakṣu darśana* and *achakṣu darśana*. *Chakṣu darśana* means perception of an object through visual sensation. *Achakṣu darśana* means perception through the other senses. *Darśana* or sense perception not only implies the passive receptivity of the mind but also the active interpretation of the received stimulus, i. e. *Darśana* means the complication between the datum and mental construction. This is implied in the description given of "knowledge by acquaintance". *Mati*, *avagraha*, *ihā*, *avaya* are different stages of sense perception. *Avagraha* refers to roughly the datum. But the datum does not mean anything. It is merely the ununderstood patch of colour, e. g. in the case of visual sensation. At the presentation of this visual patch there is the questioning attitude of mind which is represented by the term *ihā*. As a result of this examination we may interpret the object. This interpretation is *avaya*. In the case of visual perception these three different stages may not be clearly distinguishable. But in the case of auditory perception we may clearly recognise the different stages. *Darśana* then includes all these three stages, then only is the thing known to us.

These three stages together with *darśana* or recollection constitute the different forms of *mati jñāna*. But recollection is connected with memory and need not be brought under sense perception.

In this connection we have to notice one important point. The term *darśana* is not confined to sense perception. It is a general term including the sense perception as well as the supernormal perception of other kinds. Two kinds of supernormal perception are generally mentioned by Jaina thinkers—*avadhi darśana* and *kevala darśana*. *Avadhi darśana* refers to the peculiar kind of clairvoyant capacity which is able to perceive things and events in distant places and also in distant times, either past or future. Objects and events not evident to the normal sense perception are obvious to *avadhi darśana*. But the objects of *avadhi* perception appear as if they are perceived normally close at hand. It is said that *avadhi darśana* is concerned with only *rupa dravyas* or perceptual objects. The other *darśana* known as *kevala darśana* is perception *par excellence*. It is associated with perfect consciousness. This faculty is acquired only after complete emancipation from *karmic* bondage. To this perfect perception the whole reality is obvious. In short it refers to the all-perceiving faculty of *paramātmā*. What we are justified in speaking of in connection with Jaina psychology are the normal sense perceptions, *chakṣu darśana* and *achakṣu darśana*, and the supernormal clairvoyant perception or *avadhi darśana*.

Jaina account of cognition is also interesting. *Jñāna* or understanding is said to be of different kinds according to means employed in cognition. (1) *Mati jñāna* is knowledge obtained through the normal means of sense perception and memory based upon the same. This is the common inheritance of all persons. (2) *Śruta jñāna* is knowledge obtained through testimony of books. This corresponds to knowledge by description. It is

acquired by study. Therefore it is possessed by only the learned men. Besides these two means of knowledge there are three other supernormal means of understanding. These are *avadhi jñāna*, *mana paryāya jñāna* and *kevala jñāna*. *Avadhi jñāna* is the understanding of the nature of the objects obvious to *avadhi darśana*. *Mana paryāya jñāna* refers to a peculiar kind of telepathic knowledge acquired by persons of certain stage of spiritual development. It is a means by which knowledge of alien minds is obtained. The last one of course refers to the perfect understanding or the omniscience of the Perfect Being or *Purushottama*. Treating this as the metaphysical ideal, we have to recognise the other four kinds of cognition as relevant to our psychological interest.

Affective consciousness plays a very important part in Jaina metaphysics. The whole religious discipline is directly secured by a stoic freedom from the affective influence of environmental objects. Experience of pleasure, pain, is assumed to be the specific characteristic of organised beings or *samsāri jīvas*. In one of the descriptions given of *jīva*, it is mentioned that *jīva* has the tendency to continue beneficial activity from which pleasure results and to discontinue the harmful activity from which pain results. This is so very analogous to biological description of the instinct of self-preservation. *Jīva* equipped with this quality naturally desires pleasant things and avoids unpleasant things.

Since the psychological analysis is subordinate to the metaphysical system, several facts of psychological interest are thrown into the background of the philosophical scheme. Nevertheless there is no mistake about the striking psychological analysis exhibited by Jaina thinkers. Experience of pleasure and pain, is generally referred to as *karmaphala chetanā* or consciousness of the fruits of action. Pleasure and pain are always viewed in relation to action.

Bhāva or affective consciousness is of three kinds,—*śubha bhāva*, *aśubha bhāva* and *śuddha bhāva*—feeling of pleasant nature, feeling of an unpleasant nature, and feeling of pure nature. The last one refers to the enjoyment of Self by Self. As such it may be taken to mean the spiritual experience of the pure Self. The other two kinds of the feeling are relevant to the point. These are corresponding to the normal feelings generally recognised by students of psychology. These feelings are generally related to certain objects in the environment to which there may be attraction or aversion in the *jīva*. Thus on the one hand feelings manifest as the result of *karma* or action, and on the other hand they are determined by objects in the environment.

A very interesting classification of emotions is given in connection with the conditions of *karmic* bondage. These emotions are generally divided into two main classes *sakāshaya* and *akāshāya*, those that have the tendency to colour or stain the purity of the soul and those that have not that tendency. The *sakāshāya* ones are *krodha* or anger, *māna* or pride, *māyā* or deceitfulness or dissembling and *lobha* or greed. The *akāshāya* emotions are

Hāsyā—laughter.

Rati—feeling of attraction.

Arati—feeling of repulsion.

Śoka—sorrow.

Bhaya—fear.

Jugupsā—feeling of disgust which may manifest in hiding ones own weaknesses.

Striveda—peculiar sex feeling of women.

Puṃsaveda—peculiar sex feeling of men.

Napuṃsaka Veda—The corrupt sex feeling of eunuchs.

Again certain instinctive tendencies are also referred to as *saṃjñās*. These are *āhāra*, *bhaya*, *maithuna* and *parigraha*—hunger, fear, sexual appetite and acquisitive instincts. There are corresponding feelings to these instinctive appetites which may colour the consciousness of a *jīva*.

The feeling aspect of sensations is implied in the very classification of the sense elements. The feeling aspect is predominant in the case of smell and taste whereas it is indirectly associated with auditory and visual sensations. The rest of the references to feeling of pleasure and pain are purely metaphysical and therefore they are more of religious interest than of scientific interest.

Ātmā is not only *jñānī* and *bhoktā*, the knower and the enjoyer but is also a *kartā* or the agent. This may be considered as the central idea of Jaina system. Soul by its own activity is able to make or mar its own destiny. The theory of *karma* is intimately associated with the causal agency of *ātmā*. As a result of this metaphysical assumption, we have several facts of psychological importance mentioned in the system. Even in the lowest organism there is the tendency to continue pleasurable activity and to discontinue painful activity. This primitive tendency of life or *jīva* is just the conative activity which develops into conscious choice of an end or purpose which is the characteristic of volitional activity. In human beings this conative tendency is naturally associated with *rāga* and *dvesha*, desire and aversion.

Conative activity in general is denoted by the term *karmachetanā*. This *karmachetanā* or consciousness of activity is to be associated with the zoological kingdom—*trasa jīvas*. The plant world or the world of *ekendriya sthāvāra jīvas* is devoid of this *karma chetanā*. They have *karma phala chetanā* alone whereas the other *jīvas* have both and also *jñāna chetanā* to boot. The importance of volitional activity is clearly testified by the part it plays in the Jaina system of ethics. The psychology of *will* is also connected with another doctrine of psychological importance. *Mohaniya karma* which is considered to be the root of all evil has two aspects, cognitive and conative. What is known as *darśana mohaniya* interferes with the faculty of perception and belief. *Charitra mohaniya* is a sort of corruption of the will; it misleads the will and thus leads the *jīva* towards evil. We shall consider the relation

between *karma* and *âtma* when we go to consider the ethical aspect of Jaina system. In the meanwhile let us see what Jaina logic is.

JAINA LOGIC.

1. Pramana

Under this head we have to consider the following three points :

1. *Pramâna*
2. *Naya*
3. *Saptabhangi*

Pramâna and *naya* refer to understanding. (*Pramânanayai-radhigamaha*). Knowledge is through *pramâna* and *naya*. *Pramâna* refers to the apprehension of reality or valid knowledge. *Naya* refers to the different aspects of considering things. These are the two means of enriching knowledge. *Saptabhangi* refers to the theory of predication which is peculiar to Jaina system.

Pramâna is of two kinds—*pratyakṣa pramâna* and *parokṣa pramâna*, Immediate Apprehension of reality and Mediate Apprehension of reality. Ordinarily the term *pratyakṣa* refers to sense perception. This ordinary meaning of the word is considered secondary and subordinate by Jaina thinkers. They call it *vyavahârîka pratyakṣa*. The real *pratyakṣa* is known as *paramârthika pratyakṣa* or that which is apprehended by *âtma* immediately and directly. According to this view, sense perception is indirect and mediate ; for the sensory object is apprehended by *âtma* only through the medium of sense organs.

Pramânas in general are five—*mati*, *śruti*, *avadhi*, *manahparyaya* and *kevala*. These five are already explained in connection with cognition. Of these *mati* and *śruti* are considered *parokṣa pramânas*. The other three are considered to be *pratyakṣa pramânas*. There is one interesting fact about these *Pramânas*. The standard or reality is distinctly experienced in its normal and super-normal aspects. The normal experience would be *mati jñāna*, the supernormal experience would include *avadhi*, *manahparyaya* and *kevala*. These four would constitute direct knowledge by the self, but our experience is also enriched by the testimony of others. Therefore the testimony of others transmitted through literature is also considered as one of the *pramânas*. This is *śruta jñāna*. This is not given the supereminent place which it has in the other Hindu systems of thought. The Vedas form the ultimate *pramâna* for the Brahmanical systems. Every other principle of knowledge is subordinated to the Vedic revelation which itself must be implicitly accepted. But the Jainas recognise *śruta jñāna* as only one of the *pramânas* and even then it is only subordinate. Direct and Immediate Apprehension is the ultimate standard of truth. The *pramânas* are all distinctly human and they are not considered to be eternal. It is this humanistic element in the system that is specially interesting. Three of these five *pramânas* have the possibility of being corrupted by adverse psychological conditions. Thus they will

become misleading or corrupt *pramāṇas* or *pramāṇābhāṣas*. Thus *mati jñāna* may become *kumati*. This evidently refers to illusory and hallucinatory perceptions and erroneous inferences. *Śruti* may become *kuśruti*. This would be feeding one's intellect with fictitious philosophy and unreliable literature. False and misleading clairvoyance is the corrupt form of *avadhi* which is technically called *vibhanga jñāna*; hence right *pramāṇas* would exclude these three corrupt forms of *kumati*, *kuśruti* and *vibhanga*. But in the case of the other two *pramāṇas* there is no such possibility of falsification. *Manah-paryaya* is the supernormal faculty acquired after great spiritual development and *kevala* is the Ideal reached after complete emancipation. Hence in these two cases there is no chance of extraneous interference. The right forms of the former together with the latter two constitute the *pramāṇas*.

From the short enumeration of the *pramāṇas* given above, it is clear that the Jaina doctrine of *pramāṇas* is slightly different from that of the Hindu systems in general. The *pramāṇas* such as *pratyaksha*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* etc., which are variously stated by the various systems of Hindu philosophy are all comprehended by *mati jñāna* and *śruta jñāna*. Even in these two cases, objective corroboration seems to be the most important criterion of the true *Pramāṇas*. In addition to these two normal sources of knowledge, they recognise the other three supernormal sources. Thus they recognise not merely the intellect but also the higher intuition which Bergson emphasises. Bergson is no doubt right in placing intuition over intellect. Intellect is the analytic process of understanding things. Hence it shares the artificial nature of the process of analysis. It is no doubt incapable of accounting for the vision of artist or the poet. The *Dæmon* of Socrates and the *Christ* of St. Paul are quite beyond the pale of intellectual analysis. The Reality like the *Proteus* of ancient myth slips out from the grip of intellect but is quite evident to the supernormal intuition. We have an inkling of the existence of such a supernormal faculty in man through the lifting of the veil by recent psychic research. The normal personality is but a fraction of the total personality which is more of the subconscious nature. It is the subconscious self that seems to be the storehouse of spiritual power and wisdom. One who has learnt to tap the resources of this hidden self, becomes a genius in the field of art or morality. To him is given the open *sesame* to unlock the secrets of the universe. A philosophy of knowledge, therefore, must necessarily take cognisance of such a supernormal intuition.

But to recognise this is not to deprecate the intellect altogether. According to Bergson what is revealed by the intellect is quite untrustworthy. Such a summary condemnation of the intellect would be an unwarranted impeachment of modern science. Intuition apotheosised at such a cost would be no more than a philosophical fetish. A more reasonable attitude would be to recognise both the intellect and intuition as adequate means of apprehending the nature of reality so long as they have corroboration by objective evidence. Rationalism which could not accommodate any supernormal faculty and

mysticism which could not stand the glare of reason, both are inadequate representation of the full nature of human personality whose powers are inexhaustible and whose depths are unfathomable. The Jaina doctrine of *pramāṇas* is able to accommodate both, from the lowest to the highest in the order of gradation.

The recognition of the distinction between the *pramāṇas* and *pramāṇabhāṣas* implies an important philosophical principle—the existence of an objective reality which is beyond and beside knowledge. Knowledge is not the only form of reality. If that be the case, Jaina philosophy would not be different from *Advaita*. Its whole philosophical claim as an independent system of thought rests on the admission of the independent existence of the objective universe besides consciousness. The world of objective reality is apprehended by perception or *darśana* and understood by intellect or *jñāna*, which two are but the manifestations of *chetanā*, the intrinsic nature of the soul. Nowhere in the Jaina system is it even casually implied that the object of knowledge is in any way modified or interfered with by the process of knowing. In order that *darśana* may reveal the form and *jñāna* may discover the nature, there must be an object postulated, an object which is logically prior to the intellectual process. This postulating of an independent object of knowledge should not be interpreted to imply the passivity of the intellect. The continuous activity of the *jīva* or soul is the central doctrine of Jaina thought. Hence the intellect is an active manifestation of consciousness but this activity has the power of revealing its own nature as well as *non-chetana* objects beyond. Thus the term *jñeya* or the object of knowledge includes both the self and the non-self, mental facts as well as physical facts. The example of a light is very often brought in to illustrate the nature of knowledge. Just as light reveals itself as well as other objects which are illuminated, so also *jñāna* reveals the *tattvas*—both *jīva* and *ajīva*. Hence it would be quite inconsistent to interpret the relation between *jñāna* and *jñeya*, knowledge and its object, in any other way that would make both inseparable elements of any higher unity. No doubt as far as *jīva* or soul is concerned the relation between *jñāna* and *jñeya* is very intimate. The soul is *jñāni*, the possessor of *jñāna* or knowledge. There can be no *jīva* without *jñāna*, for without it he would be *achetana* and indistinguishable from other *ajīva dravyas*; and there could be no knowledge without *jīva*, for being foundationless and off its moorings from life it will cease to have connection even with consciousness. Thus *jñāna* and *jñāni*, knowledge and self, are absolutely inseparable though distinguishable by name. But this very name *jñāni* may also become *jñeya-padārtha*, the object of knowledge to his own *jñāna*. The *jñāni*, *jñāna* and *jñeya*—the self, knowledge, and the self as object of knowledge all become different aspects of a single concrete unity.

But knowledge or *jñāna* is also related to *ajīva padārthas*, that is physical objects can also be *jñeya padārthas*. When physical objects are the objects of knowledge, the relation of knowledge to its object is not the same as in

the previous case that between knowledge and self as object of knowledge. *Jñāna* is distinctly alien to *ajīva padārthas* though these become as *jñeya* related to *jñāna* or knowledge. The function of *jñāna* or knowledge here is to reveal the *ajīva padārthas* in their true nature as *achetana* or physical. How could *chetana* reveal the nature of *achetana* things? This question is rejected as unreasonable for the simple reason that it is unanswerable. The question means why *jñāna* should have its *jñāna* nature? That *jñāna* though alien to the nature of physical objects—these latter being *achetana*—can still be related to them and reveal their nature to *jñāni* or the knowing self, is taken as the fundamental postulate of Jaina Epistemology.

Thus the close study of the philosophical foundation of Jaina Epistemology reveals the following two facts:

(1) The relation between knowledge and its objects, *jñāna* and *jñeya* as far as *ajīva padārthas* are concerned, is purely one of external relation.

(2) As a corollary of the first, we have the independent existence of *jñeya padārthas* or objects of knowledge, of course with the exception of self which has an internal relation to *jñāna* or knowledge.

The distinction between internal relation and external relation requires explanation. The Russell-Bradley controversy as to the nature of relations is an interesting, though an intricate, topic of modern philosophy. But here we cannot deal with it in detail. It is enough to indicate what the terms mean. Bradley-Bosanquet school of modern idealism following the traditions of Hegel assumes that all relations are grounded in the nature of the terms related. That is, the terms apart from the relations and the relation apart from the terms will not be the same. A and B having a relation R cannot be the same A and B if they cease to have that relation R. Change or cessation of a particular relation will lead to change, or the nullification of the terms so related. A blind faith in this metaphysical doctrine has constrained the Hegelian idealist to subscribe to many an absurd doctrine. The terms related to one another, since their nature is tyrannically controlled by this relation, are to be interpreted as members or elements of a higher organic unity. The members of a family therefore are the elements of the unity of family. Society itself is an organic unity, like plant or an animal body, having as its elements the different human personalities who constitute the society. Nay, even the whole universe is conceived as an organic unity or system having as its members both things and persons. The logical result of this doctrine is the complete subordination of human personality to this fetish of a higher unity beside which there is nothing real. Every thing is degraded to the level of appearance and unreality. The political and moral consequences of such a metaphysical doctrine need not be portrayed in detail. It is enough to say that the catastrophe which destroyed the European civilisation is the necessary consequence of the culture and social organisation inspired by the philosophy of the Absolute.

But we have a healthy change introduced into modern thought by the

invaluable contributions from Bertrand Russell. He, as upholder of the opposite doctrine of external relations, sufficiently exposed the inadequacy and the falsity of the rival doctrine. According to him two terms A and B may have a relation R and yet the nature of the terms may not be affected by the change of the relations. To exhibit the truth of the controversy we may cite the following illustration which is very useful to the reader, though crude. You may have for example a chair by the side of a table. The two are in a certain spatial relation, say the chair is to the south of the table. If the relation is changed, i.e. if the chair is placed to the north of the table then according to the doctrine of internal relations both the terms, the chair and the table, must undergo change in their nature because of a change in the relations. This seems absurd to the unsophisticated observer. In this case he knows fully well that there is no change in the things themselves except the change of position. To persist in the belief that the things do change in consequence of the change of position is merely to surrender one's own reason to the false gods of philosophy. Russell holding the doctrine of external relations maintains that the things do not change their nature in spite of the change of position. This has an important and refreshing consequence. You may have a society of human beings without degrading the personalities to fractions of a unity or to appearance of a reality. And the one consequence that is relevant to us in this connection is that the relation of knowledge to its object need not amount to the postulating of a higher unity of which these two are aspects. If that were the case, this alleged higher unity must have as its members both persons and things, *chetana* and *achetana dravyas*. The fundamental doctrine of Jainism, like that of the *Sāṅkhya*, is the distinction and the alienability between *jīva* and *ajīva*.

This short digression into modern European thought we had for the following reason. The authors of an "Epitome of Jainism", in trying to expound the doctrine of *syādvāda*, attempt to make out that Jainism is a bold idealistic interpretation of the universe as a set-off against the realistic method. We are not going to quarrel about a name. Jainism may be characterised idealistic or realistic according to one's own tastes, so long as the terms are clearly defined. But what we are concerned with is just the exposition of the doctrine of *syādvāda*. Speaking of the ordinary way of thinking of *ajīvas* the authors say :

"They are continually betraying the phenomenal changes when brought into relation with other existences around them. How, then, can we think of them as individual things in spite of the changes ? The answer often unhesitatingly forwarded by philosophers is that we can combine diversity with unity in our conception of things by thinking them as individual entities each endowed with manifold qualities. They are substances according to philosophers, which possess various properties such as extension, solidity, weight, colour etc. Or they are substances or subjects to whom belong the capacities of sensation, feeling and perception etc. But a careful observation

will show that such a device obviously fails to give us any real apprehension of existence—even though it may be the simplest individual existence; because in trying to give unity to a member of unconnected determinations by ascribing them to a common substance what we really do is to add to these determinations another determination, equally isolated and unconnected with the rest. Take away the other determinations, what will be left of your substance? It is impossible to explain the known by the unknown. So to apprehend the real unity of different qualities, to think them as one, what mind demands is that we should think or have a rational notion of the relation of each to each and that we should discern how the existence of any one involves the existence of all the rest and how all are so connected with this particular quality that they would not exist except in and through the whole to which they belong. To catch hold of such substance and not *substratum* as Locke had meant, we must discern the principle from which this manifoldness of parts and properties necessarily arises and which has its very existence and being in them, and linking together in thought differences which spring out of it. Such unity of substance is really a *unity in difference* which manifests itself and realises in these differences.

"In the realm of mind or in the spiritual life of conscious beings also, there are undoubtedly infinite multiplicity and diversity, but we must not overlook the fact that it is a multiplicity or diversity which is no longer of parts divided from each other but each of which exists and can be conceived of by itself in isolation or segregation from the rest or in purely external relations to them. Here on the contrary, the multiplicity or diversity is that of parts or elements each of which exists in and through the rest and has its individual being and significance only in its relation to the rest or each of which can be known only when it is seen in a sense to be the rest. We cannot, for example, take the combination of two external independent things in space and employ it as a representation of the relation of mind and its objects, for though thought be distinguishable from the object, it is not divisible from it. *The thinker and the object thought of are nothing apart from each other. They are twain and yet one. The object is only object for the subject, the subject for the object. They have no meaning or existence taken individually and in their union they are not two separate things stuck together but two that have lost or dissolved their duality in a higher unity.*"*

The subject and the object merging into a higher unity sounds more like idealistic rhetoric than philosophical logic. Here we have an echo of Bradley and Bosanquet. The authors have drunk deep of Hegel but they have not discerned what is living and which is dead in Hegel. No doubt the Jaina conception of *Dravya* is closely allied to the *Hegelian* dialectic but the Jaina metaphysics does not contemplate the *Hegelian* absolute. The authors who do not spare the Indian Absolutist Śāṅkara, for his misunderstanding of *Syādvāda*, do

* An Epitome of Jainism, pages 106-109.

not hesitate to make obeisance to his western counterpart. This inconsistency is quite glaring and the misrepresentation of Jaina doctrine is all the more surprising as it apparently proceeds from Jaina writers. A more careful study of their own system and a little less of that hypnotic illusion by and the blind adoration to German idealism, would have enabled our authors to see that the system they expound is a bold and masterly refutation of the philosophical Absolutism of ancient India.

2. Naya

The next topic relating to Jaina logic is about *naya*. This is the second means of understanding things, the first being *pramāṇa*. All concrete things are extremely complex; they have innumerable qualities and relations. The reals being such complex entities, they may be examined from different aspects. This apprehension of a thing from a particular point of view is known as *naya*—an opinion or an assertion from some one aspect. Every aspect of a thing in its own way reveals the nature of that thing. Hence *naya* is a means of insight into the nature of reality. Theoretically the possible *nayas* are infinite in number since the reals have infinite qualities and relations. But writers on Jaina logic generally speak of seven different *nayas*. These are *Naigama*, *Samgraha*, *Vyavahāra*, *Rijusūtra*, *Śabda*, *Samabhirudha* and *Evambhūta*. Let us try to explain these in order.

(i) Naigama Naya

This *naya* seems to be somewhat obscure and is therefore differently interpreted by the scholars. Puṣya-pāda in his commentary on Sūtra 33 of *Tattvārtha Sūtra* explains the *naya* thus, “*Naigama* is that which relates to the purpose or end of a course of activity.” The illustrations given are :

(1) You see a person carrying water, firewood and other necessities for cooking meals and ask him “what are you doing ?” “I am cooking meals” he replies. This answer refers to the purpose or end of a series of activity. The person is not actually in the act of cooking at the time of the answer.

(2) The second illustration refers to a person who goes with an axe. When he is asked what he is about, he replies “I am to bring a wooden measure (*prastha*).” He is to cut a piece of bamboo perhaps and make a *prastha* out of it. Here again this measure is only the purpose or end to be realised.

(3) In each of the two examples “*odana*” and “*prastha*”, “food” and “measure”, there is a central purpose which gives meaning to a course of some duration. The course of conduct is represented by different modes of activity at different stages. In spite of this difference, the whole series and also every individual item tend towards the ideal aimed at. So far therefore the general purpose or aim may be said to be present in all the different stages of the course of conduct. It is the general purpose that gives meaning to the

different items of the series and connects them into a whole. This emphasis on the teleological element which is imminent in a course of purposive activity seems to be *Naigama Naya* point of view.

The same interpretation, with the same two illustrations of 'cooking' and making a 'measure' is adopted by Sruta Sâgara, the author of a *Vṛtti* on *Tattvârtha* called after him *Srutasâgareyam*. The same illustrations are again found in *Prameya Kamala Mârtaṇḍa*, a treatise on Logic.

This *Naigama Naya* is further sub-divided into three according to the true relations of the teleological and interpreting idea. The two illustrations refer to some present course; hence they come under (1) *Vartamâna Naigâma* (Present *Naigama*).

But there may be looking back to a past event. On the morning of *Deepâvali* day, you may say "To-day is the *Parinirvâṇa Kâla* of Lord Mahavira." But Lord Mahavira does not attain *nirvâṇa* on that day which you are actually speaking about. The event took place several centuries ago. Yet it was on a corresponding day of that year. Because of this correspondence, an event true of the day centuries ago is also associated with all such corresponding days of the subsequent years. Thus we speak of the king's birthday, the *Darbâr* day every year. The assertion has meaning only because of a past event. This characteristic attribute of the present—the genuinely belonging to the past, yet transferred to the present, because of an identical relation between the two, is pertaining to (2) *Bhûta Naigama* (past *Naigama*).

Instead of looking back to the past you may look forward to a remote future. Instead of detecting in the concrete present some element which was once associated with it, you may discover in it something which is *yet to be*. At the sight of a prince you may hail "Here comes His Royal Highness." The prince is but scion of the royal family. He is not yet king, but is going to be one. Similarly you may speak of every *bhavya jîva*, a good soul, as *siddha jîva*, a perfect soul. For somehow in the far off future perfection will be the goal of all; for every one is God in the germ. Such an assertion is true according to (3) *Bhâva Naigama* (future *Naigama*).

The other way of interpreting this *Naigama Naya* is associated with Siddhasena who is quoted by Hermann Jacobi under his translation of Sutra 33 of Umâsvatî's *Tattvârtha*. Sri Deva Suri who is quoted by Mallisena in his *Syâdvâda Manjari* also adopts this second view. But curiously, this is not so very prominent in Umâsvatî's own *Bhâshya*. Any how this method of interpreting the *Naya*, starts with the examination of the relation between the universal and the particular, *sâmânya* and *viśeṣa*. For this, *Naya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems are referred to as adopting *Naigama Naya* in an *ekânta* manner, i.e. these two systems adopt this *Naya* so far as they go, but push it to an unwarranted length. *Sāṅkhya* and *Vedânta* deny altogether *viśeṣas*—particulars. Buddhism denies *sâmânya*, universal outright. Against these two extremes the above systems recognise the importance of both. The universal by itself or the particular by self, will

not be able to account for a concrete thing. These will be empty abstractions. Again one cannot be derivative from and secondary to the other. The thing is an organic unity of both *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*—universal and particular. There can be no universal (*sāmānya*) apart from the particular and no particular (*viśeṣa*) apart from the universal; and there can be no real thing apart from either. This seems to be the fundamental Jaina view of the Real.

The very same view is said to be adopted by the *Naiyāyikas* and the *Vaiśeṣikas*. Therefore both the Jainas and the others adopt the *Naigama* point of view. But wherein the Jainas differ from the others? It is here. No doubt *Naiyāyikas* and *Vaiśeṣikas* adopt the *Naigama* view by maintaining that the concrete thing is the complex made up of the universal and the particular (*sāmānyas* and *viśeṣas*). No doubt they maintain that these two are different and therefore distinguishable. No doubt they believe each is in itself primary and not derivative. So far, they agree with the Jainas. But while the Jainas believe that the distinction between *sāmānya* (universal) and *viśeṣa* (particular) is true only in a relative way, the *Naiyāyikas* and the *Vaiśeṣikas* maintain that it is absolutely true. *Sāmānya* is quite different and distinct from *viśeṣa*. It is because of this absolute difference between the two that in their hands this *Naya* becomes *Naigamabhāsa*. They are *kathanchit bhinnah* and not *atyanta bhinnah*.

After explaining thus the *Naigama Naya*, Sri Deva Suri enumerates three species of this *Naigama* distinction.

1. Differentiating two qualities one from the other, e.g. existence and thought are in soul *sat chaitanyaṃ ātmani*. Here, thought is differentiated from existence.

2. Differentiating two substances, e.g. *Dravya* is that which manifests through things and their modes. *Vastu paryāyaya dravyaṃ*.

3. Differentiating a thing from its attribute, e.g. a sensual person has only a momentary pleasure. *Kṣaṇamekaṃ sukhi viśayāsaktajīva*.

Thus (1) existence is spoken to be separate from thought, (2) a thing from its mode and (3) a person as different from his pleasure. Contrast in all these cases is true only in a relative way. As we saw above, the very same illustrations are reproduced by H. Jacobi in his translation.

But when we attend to Mallisena, we find evidently both the interpretations given in his *Syādvāda Manjari*. He begins by explaining *Naigama Naya* in the same way as Deva Suri or Siddhasena do. He refers the readers to an earlier portion of his book, where there is a discussion of the relation between *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*. Hence he does not want to add anything further under this *Naya* and ends the passage by mentioning two well-known examples given in *pravachana* the Divine word. What are the two examples? He just mentions two names; and they appear to be cryptic. But this need not be altogether helpless. His words are *pravachana prasiddha nilayana prastha dīrghāntadvya*. *Nilayana* and *prastha*—are the words here. In *Pūjyapāda* we have *odana* and *prastha*. Instead of food and a measure

we have a *house* and a *measure*. The rest is quite clear. The illustrations leave us in doubt as to the meaning of the *Naya*. House-building or making a measure refers to the purpose or the ideal. It relates to "*saṃkalpa mātra*" as Puṣṭyapāda says.

The next question we have to face is "How does Mallisena manage to give one explanation and to bring in the illustrations pertaining to the other interpretation?" Here we must confess we are driven to conjecture. We do not know wherefrom he is quoting the examples. It may refer to another, from whom both Puṣṭyapāda and Mallisena draw their inspiration. What justification is there for Mallisena's attempt to bring the two views together? The teleological element or purpose may be taken to be the common basis for both the views. In the case of house-building or measure-constructing the thing which is to be the goal is indicated by the purpose of the individual. This purpose embodies the ideal nature of the thing which is the concrete realisation of the same. Similarly the distinction between the universal and particular is purely teleological. What is particular from one point of view may be universal from another. In fact, the particular is drawn out of the universal. It is through the medium of the particular that the universal expresses its nature. If we remember this point, then it is clear to us that the distinction entirely depends upon the purpose in view. It is this purposive nature that brings the two views together. What are apparently divergent, have this common foundation. Perhaps Mallisena had this in his mind when he interpreted the *Naigama* in one way and illustrated it in another. This compromise is offered as a provisional suggestion.

(ii) *Samgraha Naya*

The next *naya* is the class point of view. The nature of things as understood by the Jaina system is such that there is a similarity and identity among a number of individuals.

These individuals naturally fall into appropriate classes. When we consider them as individuals belonging to a class, our attention is directed to the underlying similarity to the exclusion of their individual and proper characteristics. From this underlying principle of classification we may consider the individuals as a whole and a unity. Here again the unity is only relatively true. The unity here rests on the underlying similarity among the number of individuals brought under the same class. But there is a great danger in forgetting the elementary fact of this class point of view. The individuals forming the class, though spoken of as a whole and unitary class, are really distinct from one another and may be really differentiated by not only their intrinsic natures but also by intervals of space and time. To emphasise the unity at the cost of the plurality and difference would be a distinct metaphysical error. It is this erroneous application of *Samgraha Naya* that accounts for the system of *Advaita Vedānta*. Too much emphasis on the unity and the complete ignoring of the diversity

is the characteristic of this system. A similar mistake is found in its western counterpart of *Hegelian* idealism. Both agree in condemning the differences as appearances and in accepting the ultimate absolute as the one reality.

But Jaina thinkers noticed very early both the utility as well as the danger of this *Samgraha Naya*. This class point of view is quite useful and rational in its own way. It contributes to economy of thought by enabling us to deal with a number of things as one.

This is not merely justified by practical convenience but also by the philosophical principle of the common nature. The common nature by itself is but an abstraction. Hence to set it up as the reality and the only reality is doubly erroneous. So long as its relative nature is remembered, the *naya* has its own uses. But in the hands of the *Sāṅkhyas* and *Mimāṃsikas*, it becomes absolute and thus a *nayabhāsa*.

This *Samgraha Naya* is of two kinds—*Para Samgraha* or the ultimate class view and *Apara Samgraha* or the inferior class-view. Every existing thing partakes of the nature of Reality. Hence we may speak of all things as one in the ultimate Reality or Existence. But the different classes of things living and non-living included in this ultimate Reality may themselves be spoken of as different classes. This is *Apara Samgraha* or the inferior class view.

(iii) *Vyavahāra Naya*

Vyavahāra Naya means the popular and conventional point of view, which rests on sense-perception of the concrete present. This is the basis of the ancient materialistic systems of the *Chārvākas* and *Brahaspatyas*. The whole criterion of Reality is the concrete present. The forgotten past and the far off future are unwarranted myths not justified by the only *pramāṇa* of sense-perception. Looking back into the past through memory and peeping into the future through ideal forecast are philosophical uncertainties. The same applies to the categories obtained by intellectual analysis such as *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*—universal and particular.

Sense-perception reveals to us a tree or a stone or a pot or a cloth. These are the real things supported by the *pramāṇas* and sanctioned by *vyavahāra* or convention. Whoever has perceived at any time either *sāmānya* or *viśeṣa*? Why should philosophers trouble themselves about these metaphysical abstractions. The concrete reality of things is sufficient for our practical life and what is justified by this pragmatic criterion is so far theoretically true.

Here again the Jaina thinker recognises the partial truth of the principle. The tree in the compound, the stone on the path-way, the pot with water and the cloth you wear are all real things. They are not appearances or illusions of *naya*. Their reality is corroborated by our concrete experience. To say this much is certainly acceptable and true. But to go beyond, to condemn everything that is not included in the concrete present, to deny the past and the future and to reject the philosophical categories in toto, to surrender reason to sense-perception, is the apotheosis of convention. Hence

Jaina thought rightly rejects the unwarranted exaggeration of this *Vyavahāra Naya*, though it recognises in it the soul of goodness and an element of partial truth.

(iv) *Riju Sūtra*

This *Riju Sūtra* is the extreme opposite of *Samgraha Naya*. The latter denies all difference whereas *Riju Sūtra* denies all continuity and identity. Reality is concentrated to mathematical present. It is purely momentary. In this respect it is still narrower than the *vyavahāric* present. At least for *vyavahāra* view there is a tolerable duration; for, the present and the conventional things are real so far. But according to this *Riju Sūtra Naya*, a thing is what it is in the present mathematical moment. To speak of duration of a thing is rejected by this view as an unwarranted assumption. What we are absolutely sure of is just the present moment. The past moment is no more and the next moment is not yet. Hence a thing, as being in the "no-more" or in the "not-yet", is sheer contradiction. If it is real at all, it must be in the present moment. We at once recognise the identity between this *Riju Sūtra* view and *Buddhistic* metaphysics. Its aim is, as that of Buddhism, to expose the pretensions of an unchanging metaphysical substratum of things. As a corrective to such a conception of changeless substratum, Buddhist metaphysics adopts *Riju Sūtra* view and brings the centre of gravity to the present moment. Thus it enables to secure the balance between change and permanence. Change partakes of the nature of time duration. It shares with it the ephemerality. There is some truth in maintaining the reality of change and in concentrating it to one moment. To over-emphasise the neglected element of change, as a set off against *Vedānta* and to secure a habitation for it in the camp of Reality, is certainly a commendable metaphysical venture. But to identify reality with mathematical moment, to emphasise change as the only real and to make it live in a metaphysical void, is to overshoot one's mark. This erroneous and uncalled for accent on change is to the detriment of the relating and the unifying principle of Reality, without which change will have no meaning. It is this *Riju Sūtrabhāsa* that the Jaina system asks us to beware of. If this principle is the sole criterion of Reality, then reality would end itself by committing suicide, to employ a suggestive phrase of Bradley.

(v) *Śabda-Naya*

The implication of terms or names. The name has the function of calling to our mind the particular object which is referred to or implied by the name. Of course the implication need not necessarily be an individual object. An attribute, a relation and action may be referred to by appropriate words in the language. Thus the grammatical distinction of terms into parts of speech has an underlying logical foundation. The particular kind of meaning is associated with a particular part of speech. Thus the difference

in meaning corresponds to the difference among the terms. Thus a sort of intimate relation exists between a term and its meaning. Variation in the term may introduce a corresponding variation in the meaning. Thus not only the difference of the parts of speech implies a broad difference among the meanings but also the inflexional variations in the same part of speech may be said to have corresponding variations, however slight they be. This principle of correspondence between the terms and their meanings, is the foundation of the science of grammar. We have already mentioned that there is a relation to logic implicitly present in this grammatical principle. Indian grammarians in their discussion of verbal implications very often pass beyond their legitimate sphere and enter into logical and quasi-metaphysical discussions. Such an exaggerated notion about the verbal implications would be not only illogical but also conflicting with common sense and convention. Jaina logicians therefore raise a note of warning against such an unwarranted application of this principle and point out the logical danger in that one-sided emphasis of the relation between *śabda* and *artha*.

Their contention is this. No doubt generally speaking the grammatical principle or *Śabda Naya* adopted by the *vayākaraṇīs* is sanctioned by usage. But to assume it to be a universal principle without an exception, would be neglecting the difference between the relative and the absolute and identifying the partial truth with the whole and the complete one. Ordinarily each name has its own meaning. The term 'cow' is different from 'king' not merely in word but also in meaning. But this is also true : words which are different in nature and origin may nevertheless refer to the same identical object. Exaggerated and universal application of the *Śabda Naya* of the grammarians cannot conveniently accommodate synonyms in the vocabulary. That there are synonyms and that they are distinct from one another literally, no grammarian can afford to deny. Yet unswerving loyalty to his principle of *Śabda Naya* would constrain him to accept such an absurdity. The only way out of the difficulty is to accept the Jaina interpretation of *Śabda Naya*, according to which the relation between terms and meanings is a relative principle. The illustrations generally offered are the synonyms *Indra*, *Śakra*, and *Purandhara*, names referring to the one and the same individual, the Lord of the Devās. Similarly terms differing not merely in origin as the above but also in number, gender, person, case, etc. may still refer to the same individual fact. Thus *Puṣyaha* (masculine), *Tārā* (feminine) *Nakṣatram* (neuter), in spite of difference of gender do refer to the same object, Star. Again in a sentence, terms referring to the same individual object may appear in different cases; and if a verb, in different sense and person may refer to the same activity. This subordination of grammatical differences of inflexion to the logical implication of terms seems to be the essential principle of *Śabda Naya*, as understood by the Jainas. It is not necessary to repeat that the *naya* in the hands of the grammarians because of *ekānta* application degenerates into a false *naya*, *Śabdabhāsa*.

(vi) *Samabhirudh Naya*

The derivative difference of names. This *Samabhirudh Naya* is the differentiation of terms according to their roots. Thus it is only a special application of *Śabda Naya*. In becoming specialised it becomes narrower and more exaggerated than the above *naya*. As a general rule the terms in a language have their own special radical signification. This radical signification is the reason for the particular nomenclature. The first appearance of the word was evidently suggested by such an implication of the root. Of course this does not mean the connotation of the name. Connotation is the ground of the application of the name whereas the significance of the root accounts for the origin of the name. The former is logical and universal whereas the latter may be purely subjective and even accidental. The science of history of language may discover various principles subserving the origin of names in a vocabulary. To the historian of language this is certainly an important principle. To detect radical difference in the vocabulary and to trace the history of different terms from this original seed-difference is certainly a commendable pursuit. But this nuclear difference interesting to the historian of language is not so very important as to swallow up all the other grammatical and logical principles of implication. Here again the *naya* is discovered to be a relative one by Jaina Logic which enjoins a necessary circumscription to the above claims put forward by the historian of language. For example, it is true that the term 'gau' (cow) is different from 'Indra.' This difference can be traced to their respective roots. Hence the difference in the roots must mean a corresponding difference in the terms and therefore in their meanings. Accurately speaking says this *naya*, the terms 'Indra', 'Śakra' and 'Purandhara' respectively imply 'the all prosperous,' 'the all powerful' and 'the destroyer of enemies.' These are the direct and legitimate significations sanctioned by their origin. To emphasise the original and the radical implication of a term is one thing, and to suggest that the term in its ordinary application must necessarily and always mean the same original radical sense, is quite a different thing. The passage from the radical and immediate difference to the current application and the general accepted sense, is an unwarranted jump taken by this *naya*.

(vii) *Evambhūta Naya*—

The last of the *nayas* is a further specialisation of the previous ones. This is merely the historical principle run mad. According to this principle the radical sense in general is not the appropriate implication of a term. Even the root signification must have different gradations and aspects. Of these various aspects and gradations in the manifestation of the thing, only particular aspect is contemplated by the root of a term and it is this contemplated aspect that is the legitimate meaning of the term in its current usage. The very same thing in a different attitude must be designated by a different term altogether. Thus, for example, the term 'gau' implies an animal in motion.

That which moves is a 'gau' or 'cow'. The same term, therefore, should not be applied when the animal is at rest or lying down. Movement is fundamentally different from lying down and therefore the same term 'cow' should not be applied to an animal at two such fundamentally different attitudes. Fundamental difference in the logical implication must necessarily be indicated by literal difference in the terms. This is the contention of *Evambhūta Naya*. The term must just designate the particular aspect or attitude in the object referred to. If the term goes beyond that, it will be a source of confusion and ambiguity. Language instead of revealing things as they are, would only conceal them.

This grammatico-logical contention may be conceded partially. In a perfect vocabulary this ought to be the principle, but the language that we use is not so evolved under the guidance of such a rigorous logical principle. Hence it would be an egregious blunder to identify what actually exists, with what ought to be logically. Therefore this *Evambhūta Naya* interpreted without reference to concrete usage and conventional meaning would only end in meaningless verbiage.

These are the seven *nayas* referred to in Jaina logic. The first four are called *Artha Nayas* inasmuch as they deal with objects of knowledge, whereas the other three are called *Śabda Nayas* inasmuch as they pertain to terms and their meanings. The same seven are sometimes otherwise grouped. The first three come under *Dravya Naya* whereas the other four come under *Paryāya Naya*. The former means the substantive aspect whereas the latter means the aspect of change or manifestation.

These *nayas* have an important place in the *anekānta vāda* of the Jaina system. All human descriptions and predications are relative and circumscribed inasmuch as they issue forth from the limited and partial nature of the intellect. Not only in our every-day speech but also in the language of the metaphysical statements to have their own context and relation universalising their meaning apart from their setting in the background, would result in practical inconvenience and philosophical confusion. Jaina thinkers, recognising the extreme complexity of reality, are never wearied of emphasising the *anekānta* aspect. Multifaced reality may lead to "multitude of descriptions". Every one of them may be partially true but not one of them is really true. Philosophy is but the fable of the seven blind men and the elephant. Each one perceives a certain aspect of the real and congratulates himself that that is the only reality. When reality would not fit in with his own petty framework, then there is the ruthless pruning and chopping to make it convenient. Then there is the denial of certain inconvenient things as appearance and illusion. System, building in philosophy, has always been the process of providing reality with a procrustean bed. But one who knows, smiles at the simplicity of human philosophising. The critical caution, that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy, was sounded several centuries before the Christian era by the *Anekāntavādins*,

Our account of the *nayas* will be incomplete without a mention of the six *nayas* which are generally employed in the examination of the nature of souls. According to Jaina metaphysics, *jīva* or soul has the nature of consciousness or *chetanā*. When it is viewed in its pure state, unlimited by extraneous conditions, it has its thought characteristics fully and perfectly developed. This state of its existence represents the ideal of perfection or *siddhahood*. But even in this ideal state, the nature of the self does not lose its complexity. Even in its infinite radiance, the self does not lose its *dravya* nature or dynamic constitution. It is not distinct and separable from its own infinite qualities. It is the richness of content that marks the Jaina conception of perfection as against the nihilistic attitude of *Vedānta* which speaks of quality-less existence as the ultimate Reality. Existence apart from qualities would be an empty abstraction and is therefore all the more unfit to stand for the ultimate Reality. It is this inalienable unity that exists between the Real and its qualities that may be said to be the central doctrine of Jaina metaphysics.

This pure and perfect state of the self is a thing to be achieved. Ordinarily the existence of the self is somewhat different. Its infinitude is limited, its glory abated and radiance dimmed by alien conditions and limitations. By its own general weakness and disposition, it weaves round itself material sheaths, some subtle and some gross. These material sheaths form the encumbrances and limitations which make the cycle of births and deaths possible for the *jīvas*. In this state, *jīva* is generally an embodied consciousness or an organism. In its normal state it may be evident to the senses through its gross organic body. In its subtle state of interval from death to another birth, even though it casts off its grosser sheath, it is still endowed with a subtle *karmic* body which serves as the nucleus for building up its appropriate body of the next generation. *Jīva* in these states is said to be the conditional one (*sopādhi jīva*) as differentiated from the unconditioned perfect self (*nirupādhi jīva*).

Jīva in its *saṃsārik* state is not only associated with a body of its own but with several other things living and non-living. The environment in which it lives, moves and has its being is generally wider than its own corporeal frame. Even in the case of animals and birds there is such a wider interest than the mere instinct of self-preservation. The parental instinct of helping and preserving the young ones and filial instinct of falling back upon the support of the parents form the prehuman biological foundation of the institution of family among human beings. When we come to human society, this widening of the environmental horizon of the self becomes all the more marked. Several economical and social institutions such as owning property or belonging to a particular social order or a nation, all these contribute to extending the personality so as to coincide with its environments. There is a personal pride and pleasure in extending one's own property. There is a sympathetic feeling of joy or sorrow with the prosperity or adversity of the

family or the nation to which the individual belongs. The nature of the personality therefore is determined by the extent and diversity of interest. We feel offended when any injury is done to our possessions. We feel it a personal insult if any one who is near and dear to us is unfairly treated. The self which is by its own intrinsic nature a complex entity becomes all the more complex by identifying itself through its interest with its environment of things and persons. Under such circumstances it is an extremely difficult problem to define the exact nature of the soul and to point out its own appropriate boundary. Hence the necessity of the application of *nayas* or points of view. These *nayas*, as already mentioned, are specially designed for the purpose of explaining the nature and defining the limits of the self.

To start with, there are two main aspects or *naya nīśchaya* and *vyavahāra*. The former represents the true and complete point of view. There is no distinction between *dravya* and its *guṇas*. The self is looked at as a whole with all the wealth of its attributes. The latter represents the partial point of view. The complex nature of the self is analysed into its diverse qualities and our attention may be directed to any particular attribute with which the self may be identified at the moment. Further, the former *Nīśchaya Naya* is divided into *Śuddha Nīśchaya* and *Asuddha Nīśchaya Naya*. *Śuddha Nīśchaya Naya* holds the self in its pure and unconditioned *nirupādhi* state. Disentangled from all its material environment and limitation, the self radiates in its pristine glory through all its wealth of infinite qualities. This aspect where the self is in its qualities and its qualities are pure and unalloyed expression of the nature of this self, is the topic of *Śuddha Nīśchaya Naya*. The second *Asuddha Nīśchaya Naya* contemplates the self as caught in the meshes of the material environment, the *sopādhi* state. The presence of *upādhi* makes it impure or *asuddha*. Its intrinsic glory is dimmed but still it is viewed as a whole with its complete nature as expressed in its attributes, though somewhat warped by alien influences. This is the self according to *Asuddha Nīśchaya Naya*.

Similarly the *vyavahāra* point of view is divided into two main heads—*satbhūta vyavahāra* and *asatbhūta vyavahāra*. The term *satbhūta* implies the intrinsic nature of the thing. Here the question is not about the purity or the impurity of the thing. The term *vyavahāra*, as already explained, implies the analysis and differentiation of attributes from the underlying *dravya*. *Jñāna* or thought is certainly an attribute of the self. To speak of *jñāna* as identical with self is to adopt *Satbhūta Vyavahāra Naya*. The term *asatbhūta* implies the importation of alien qualities into the self. Some of the organic instincts and emotions are distinctly due to the physical constitution. Nevertheless such instincts and emotions are associated with the self from the point of view of *Asatbhūta Vyavahāra Naya*. Similarly the *kārmic* constituents which are intrinsically physical may be said to belong to the self and modify its manifestations.

Each of these two again is divided into two other minor kinds—*upachārīta* and *anupachārīta*. *Upachārīta* is usage sanctified by convention but having

no other intrinsic justification. It is a sort of metaphorical application; whereas *anupachârîta* is just the opposite of the above. It stands on its own intrinsic merit and has no metaphorical and transferred import. Thus finally we have four kinds of *Vyavahâra Naya*—1. *Anupachârîta Satbhûta Vyavahâra Naya*, 2. *Upachârîta Satbhûta Vyavahâra Naya*, 3. *Anupachârîta Asatbhûta Vyavahâra Naya* and 4. *Upachârîta Asatbhûta Vyavahâra Naya*.

Now the first is mainly *vyavahâra* inasmuch as it analyses the attributes from the things; is *satbhûta* inasmuch as it emphasises the genuine and intrinsic attributes; and is *anupachârîta* inasmuch as it is free from figurative and transferred implication. The illustration of this is the self of the nature of *jñâna* or knowledge. The second *naya* is *vyavahâra* for the reason stated above and *satbhûta* for the same and *upachârîta* because the epithet is figurative and transferred. When we speak of *jñâna* or knowledge as *pramâna* or the criterion of truth we are thinking of the objects of knowledge or *artha*. *Artha* itself may be spoken of as a manifestation of knowledge or *jñâna vikalpa*. To speak of *artha* or the object as a modification of knowledge is only figuratively true in the case of external objects. These being physical in nature are *achetana* and yet, as object of knowledge, may be spoken of as modification of *jñâna*. What intrinsically belongs to the self is transferred to its object because of the relation brought about by the process of knowledge. The third *naya* is *Anupachârîta Asatbhûta Vyavahâra*. The only term that demands explanation is *asatbhûta* here. It refers to the identification of the self with some alien properties. For example to consider one's own body as oneself which is generally done in ordinary life is *asatbhûta vyavahâra*. This is not merely figurative as the statement is sanctioned by the intimate interrelation that exists between the soul and the body. Hence pointing to the body as 'this body is mine,' or 'I am this,' is a statement which is justified according to *Anupachârîta Asatbhûta Vyavahâra Naya*. The last *naya* is the *Upachârîta* form of the same. Here the alien quality or the thing with which the self is identified lacks that intimate relation that exists between the soul and its own body. To call the ornaments as one's own, to claim certain individuals as one's relatives, to possess certain things as one's own property, in short to identify one's personality with alien things and persons is possible only in a figurative sense. Each personality is distinct from and alien to the others, though all by co-existing together may partake of common environment and enter into definite relations. Still from the metaphysical point of view one's destiny is in one's own hands. Therefore the popular identification of the self with the other things said to be owned by it, is a figurative and transferred predication or *Upachârîta Asatbhûta Vyavahâra Naya*. These four kinds of *Vyavahâra Naya* together with the two *Nischaya Nayas* constitute the six *nayas* which are specially employed to fathom the depth of human personality.

The object of these *nayas*, generally of the former seven and specially of the latter six, is to reveal the intrinsic nature of personality in its cosmic

environment. It is not merely a matter of theoretical interest that underlies these *nayas*. Apprehension and understanding of the nature of reality must be a useful means in the hands of the self to reach the safe haven of Beatitude from which there is no return. But besides this practical aspect, there is another aspect to the question. The truth that is apprehended by the *pramāṇas* and the *nayas* must be available for the general public, ever growing under the weight of sorrow and yearning, to have that Bliss which they know only by faith and hope. Hence is the necessity for expressing the truth through scripture. This revelation of the truth through language is the WORD or *syādvāda*. This pertains to the principle of conditional predication which is sevenfold. This sevenfold predication is known as *saptabhangi*.

3. Saptabhangi

The dialectic of *syādvāda* is no less puzzling to Indian students of philosophy both old and new, than the *Hegelian* dialectic is to the European philosophers. *Syādvāda* and its counterpart appear at first sight self-conflicting and unwarranted. But they have an important principle,—nay the fundamental principle of reality as their substratum and justification. Closer examination reveals in them a clear grasp of truth. Every other theory of knowledge is fading into insignificance before the principle of conditional predication.

Everything existing from the bespangled heavens above to the inmost core of human personality is in a process of change and modification. If we trust ourselves to the imagination of the astronomer which enables him to look back through eons of the past cosmic history or to have a glimpse of the far off future, we see the universe as a motion picture on the screen of existence. What is a twinkling star at present was once upon a time gigantic nebulous mass of several million miles diameter. Then by process of aggregation and condensing there is the formation of a denser nucleus which becomes larger and larger by the same process which in its turn leads to the evolution of an enormous quantity of heat. This leads to the formation of the fiery orb which by the same laws of motion gives birth to a number of incandescent masses. These held to the parent by the laws of gravitation form the planetary system. Thus our sun itself is but a star among the starry systems.

Side by side with this evolution of a sun with its planetary system we have the converse drama enacted. Either due to a mysterious explosion or due to a clash of star with star there bursts into existence a new mass of nebula. The telescope reveals to human view not only the nursery of distant solar systems, but also the decay and dissolution of the decrepit and defunct starry systems. The starry heavens are but the cosmic alphabet which spell the three sublime words birth, growth and decay.

Turn now to our own earth which is but a tiny speck in space when compared to the sun and the stars. Here also the same process. The

formation of the crust of the earth is after terrible volcanic convulsions which had taken place in the early history of the earth. The geological changes are followed by the appearance of life on the surface; then the wonderful evolution of the plant and animal kingdoms are all indelibly written on the different strata of the earth. This also repeats the same story. Then life itself is a mysterious though subtle process of combined building up and breaking up. Turn where you will, you see the same thing. Reality is a complex process of change and everything in it is partaking of the same process.

Nothing is merely permanent; nothing is merely changing. The acorn grows to the oak; the seed is in the plant and the tree and yet it is not there as the seed. Everything lives by the process of death. The very loss leads to gain. This message of the organic reality is an important contribution to philosophy.

Hegel founded his metaphysics on logic—nay identified both. But his logic is not the mere scholastic logic on which his predecessor Kant built his system. Hegel's logic came as a disturber of peace to the then philosophic thought; but it ultimately led to the emancipation of thought from scholastic thralldom. He proclaimed boldly to the world that affirmation and negation are ultimately reconciled by a higher unity. 'Is' and 'Is not' are really identical and same, for they are but the aspects of the same reality. To one who is familiar with this dialectical process of thesis and antithesis reconciling in a higher synthesis, the following presentation of *saptabhangi* will lose its paradoxical nature and unveil the underlying truth.

Long ago the Jainas recognised this complexity of existence. Any particular object as the topic of assertion, can very well take in two assertions—affirmative and negative. How can there be two apparently contradictory statements both true of a single fact? The nature of the fact is such, is the answer. Every concrete assertion presupposes a question as to the exact nature of the object. This interrogation again rests on the desire to determine the thing from a particular point of view. Since the thing has several aspects and relations there may be several determinations. Hence is the possibility of apparently conflicting attributes inhering in the same and exhibited by the process of predication. Is that statue of marble or of plaster of Paris? If it is one, it is not the other. Is that the same gold bangle which you had last year? No, it is newly made though the same gold is used. Was Socrates a Greek or Roman? He was Greek and not Roman. These are familiar questions and answers. All these exhibit the possibility of predicating affirmation and negation of the same thing. *Is* and *is not* can significantly refer to the same subject. The only thing we have to remember is that the point of view is different in each case. There is nothing mysterious, nothing incredible. When the same subject can have two such predicates, no one predicate can monopolise the subject to itself. There will always be some aspect of the subject left out by this predicate; and this left out aspect can very well be expressed by the rival predicate. This implies that under no circumstance can we have a predication which is the only true predication about the subject.

There can be no judgment absolutely true and excluding every other judgment about the same topic. Hence we have recourse to qualified assertions as the only available ones under the circumstances. These qualified or conditional assertions are primarily two—affirmation and negation.

(1) Perhaps X is.

(2) Perhaps X is not.

These two aspects are inherent in the same thing; hence we can say :

(3) Perhaps X *is* and *is not*. Here we are contemplating the whole thing in its two aspects which are kept apart and attended to severally. But these two aspects are inherent in and expressive of one single identity. Hence they may be considered together jointly as expressing the single identity. In that case there is no chance of asserting two conjointly by a single predicate, for the simple reason that there can be no such predicate. Therefore we have to confess our inability to and proclaim the bankruptcy of vocabulary for having such an assertion. This fact becomes the fourth mode of predication.

(4) Perhaps X is indescribable.

Remembering this helpless nature of our tongue, we may still qualify this by each of the first three predicates. Thus we have the last three modes of predications, which are :

(5) Perhaps X is, though indescribable.

(6) Perhaps X *is not*, though indescribable.

(7) Perhaps X *is* and *is not*, though indescribable.

In their traditional form these are :—

(1) *Syâdasti*

(2) *Syânnâsti*

(3) *Syâdastinâsti cha*

(4) *Syâdavaktavyaḥ*

(5) *Syâdasti avaktavyaḥ*

(6) *Syâdnâsti avaktavyaḥ*

(7) *Syâdasti nâsti avaktavyaḥ*.

These seven modes of predication are usually illustrated with reference to some object such as a jar or *ghata*. Whether it is to have an affirmative predicate or negative one, depends respectively on four aspects: its own form, matter, place and time leading to affirmation and alien form, matter, place and time bringing in negation to the jar. A jar is real or is affirmed with reference to *svarûpa*, *svadravya*, *svakṣetra*, *svakâla* and is unreal or is denied from the point of view of *pararûpa*, *paradravya*, *parakṣetra* and *parakâla*. When we have affirmation and negation for their reasons, the subsidiary modes are derived from these two.

1. Then what is the *svarûpa* or intrinsic form of a jar? And what is its *pararûpa*? When we hear the word *jar* uttered, the term invariably implies a certain definite group of attributes through which a particular object is designated by the term. These essential attributes connoted by the term *jar* will be its *svarûpa*. The attributes of any other object implied by any

other term will be its *pararûpa*—will be alien to the jar. Existence rests on *svarûpa* and non-existence on *pararûpa*. If existence is predicated of the jar both from its own form as well as that of an alien thing like cloth (*pata*), then the jar will lose its distinctive character and become one with cloth. If on the other hand non-existence is predicated from its own form as from alien nature, then there will be no jar at all. Neither of these results stand to reason.

Again confining ourselves to the class of vessels we still find that a jar is different from a kettle. Is that vessel a jar or kettle? The jar-form is its *svarûpa* and the kettle-form is its *pararûpa*. From the former the jar is, from the latter it is not.

Again we may be concerned with jars alone. One individual jar has its individuality as *svarûpa* and every other jar will be *pararûpa*. Jar A exists on account of *svarûpa*, and does not on account of *pararûpa*. If non-existence is associated with *svarûpa* then there will be no jar at all; if existence follows from *pararûpa* then all jars will become one without distinction and there will be no separate individual ones.

Then *ghata*, jar is made by the potter. The mass of clay on the potter's wheel is not yet a jar. It is only the finished product that is a jar. This finished form is its *svarûpa*; any other stage in its formation is its *pararûpa*. The former leads to affirmation, the latter leads to negation.

2. What is its own matter? Clay is *svadraya* and gold is *paradravya*. The jar is of clay and is not of gold. *Svadrayena asti paradravyena nâsti*.

3. What is its own place or *svaksetra*? The ground where the jar is, is its *svaksetra* and every other place is its *paraksetra*. The Taj is in Agra (*svaksetra*) and is not in Delhi (*paraksetra*). If the jar exists in *paraksetra* also, then there will be no place without a jar. In the case of the Taj, every place will have a *Taj Mahal*. If the thing is not even in its own place then there will be no jar anywhere in the world. Either result will be unsatisfactory.

4. What is its own time or *svakâla*? The jar's *svakâla* is the duration of the present in which it is intact. Its past when it was a mass of clay on the potter's wheel and its future when it will be a heap of broken shells will be its *parakâla*. Its existence in its own time and non-existence in other times, will be quite evident. So also with every other object. Socrates existed at a particular age of Athenian history and is not existing now. If a thing exists in *parakâla* also as in *svakâla* then it will be eternal; if it does not exist in *svakâla* as in *parakâla* then it will be nothing; for existence implies a relation to its time or duration.

Thus a thing is affirmed in its fourfold self-relation—form, matter, place and time; and is denied in its fourfold alien relation.

Now the *svarûpa* etc., are determined with reference to the fourfold other-relation of *pararûpa* etc. The self-relation apart from the other relation has no meaning. But how are we to determine the four kinds of relation—*pararûpa*, *paradravya* etc? These must depend on their environmental

relations and these latter again on others. Thus we pass on from our environment to others still wider, without having any clear grasp of the self-relation. The distinction between a thing and its other rests on the sandy foundation of a vicious indefinite regress. Hence the affirmation and negation also fall to the ground.

This objection rests on misapprehension. The distinction between the fourfold self-relation and other-relation does not rest on an indefinite regress. The essential nature of a thing not only implies its *svarûpa* but differentiates itself from *pararûpa*. In experience we not only perceive a thing, but perceive it as distinct from other things. A jar is seen not merely as a jar but as a thing distinct from cloth by its side. Without this distinction there can be no perception of the jar at all. The very process of self-assertion implies differentiation from non-self. Hence the change of indefinite regress is quite unwarranted.

Now according to this theory, *asti* and *nāsti* (*is* and *is not*) may be predicated of *prameya* the objective aspect of knowledge or the process of apprehending an object. This dual predication must rest on *svarûpa* and *pararûpa* of *prameya*. What is its *svarûpa* and what is its *pararûpa*? *Pararûpa* of *prameya* means non-*prameya*. Anything other than *prameya* we have no means of knowing. Hence the theory must fail in this case.

No, says the logician. The state of being apprehended by knowledge—*prameyatva* is the *svarûpa* of *prameya*. This implies in general the relation of object to the knower; anything besides this relation, even the object, will be distinct from *prameyatva* and hence will be the *pararûpa* in this context. Now this theory must be applicable to the ultimate existence or *Mahāsattā*. If *is* and *is not* are to be predicated of this *Summum Genus*, what are its *svarûpa* and *pararûpa*? For the latter cannot be, as there can be no other form or matter or place or time not included in this. The *pararûpa* of *Mahāsattā* need not imply the existence of other things besides itself; that would be self-contradictory. But still we can speak of its *pararûpa* when we contemplate something which falls short of the all-comprehensive universal. Any of its parts will be so far the negation of whole—its *pararûpa*.

Now *asti*, affirmation depends on self; *nāsti*, negation on other things. *Asti* which is conditioned by self can very well belong to a thing. But if *nāsti*, which is conditioned by other than the jar for example, is also predicated of the jar then it would imply that the jar participates in the nature of its other—say cloth. This will lead to mere confusion.

This objection also is based on a misapprehension. Affirmation no doubt rests on the nature of the self, the jar. The negation, resting on another thing—*pata* (cloth), does not mean that the jar also has the nature of a cloth. That would be absurd. The clear cut boundary between things will vanish and with it all knowledge. *Asti* implies self-assertion, *nāsti* implies alien-exclusion. A thing not only asserts its own individuality, but also repulses anything alien to it. It is this element of repulsion that everything

must have in order to be real, that entitles it to have the negative predicate. Instead of leading to a confusion, this element of differentiation is the only basis for self-assertion of a thing. *Asti* and *nāsti*, assertion or exclusion, are inalienably present in the same thing. Wherever there is *asti* there is *nāsti* and wherever there is *nāsti* there is *asti* also.

Now this association of the two, *asti* and *nāsti* in the same thing, appears quite unwarranted. For on the one hand when we perceive a jar we see mere *asti* without *nāsti*, and on the other hand in the case of certain impossible and unreal concepts such as ass's horns, sky-flower there is mere *nāsti* without *asti*.

This is not quite correct. In the case of any perceived object, *nāsti* does not mean that the thing should not exist as such and yet be perceived. That would be meaningless. *Nāsti* means nothing more than that element of repulsion and differentiation which isolates a thing from its background and gives it a determinate and positive nature. In this sense, *nāsti* is inseparable from *asti* and it is the sense in which it is used. As to the other case of impossible and unreal concepts, where is the positive foundation? If sky-flower is quite real, nay if it has a slight positive basis, it will cease to mean an unreal and an impossible thing. Its nature seems to be pure negation and nothing less than that. This cannot be, answers our logician. How can there be any negation without any significance? A significant negation must have some positive basis; otherwise it will be mere nonsense. The elements constituting the concept are by themselves real and are justified by the canons of experience. We have seen horns in a cow; we have seen an ass or a horse. These are existing and real. But the fanciful combination of an ass with horns or a flower with sky is unreal. But for the experience of horns on the head of a cow or flower in a tree there can be no talk of an ass with horns or a flower in the sky. Without this positive basis of experience there will be no elements to make up even a fanciful complex. Thus even the fanciful ideas of unicorn and centaur must have some foundation in our experience. Again in the proposition "*Syādasti jīva*," the terms *asti* and *jīva* (life) must mean identically the same thing or different things. If the meanings are of the same nature, then one cannot be predicated of the other as a pot cannot be the predicate of a jar, both being co-ordinate. Further *asti* or existence is predicable of everything real. If *asti* is identical with *jīva*, then *jīva* also must be predicated of everything. But if *jīva* is different from *asti* then there is no chance of predicating *asti* of *jīva* for they are entirely different from each other. Further *jīva* being different from *asti* and *asti* being the predicate of everything, *jīva* cannot be related to anything real, i. e. *jīva* would become unreal. You cannot maintain that *jīva* though different from *asti* can be said to have the predicate by a process of combination with it; for combination is impossible in the case of repelling elements.

The horns of this dilemma are blunted by *syādvāda*. These results need not frighten the logician to whom *asti* and *jīva* are identical from the

dravyārtha view and different from *pariyārtha* view. They are different and yet identical. But for this dual nature there can be no predication at all.*

The primary modes of predication are three—*Syādaṣṭi*, *syānnāsti* and *syādvaktavyaḥ*. The other four are obtained by combining these three. Now according to *Sāṅkhya* philosophy everything is real and therefore exists. According to Buddhism everything is momentary and unreal. Both these views are rejected by the Jainas as extremes. The former is true according to *dravyārthika* point of view; the latter is true according to *pariyārthika* point of view. Hence each is true in its own way and is not true absolutely. Again reality is indescribable according to the *Vedāntins* who emphasise the *nirvachanīya* aspect of reality. Even this is only partially true, for otherwise even this predication “that Reality is indescribable” will be impossible.

The same seven modes of predication may be obtained in the case of following pairs of attributes : eternal and changing, one and many, universal and particular, etc. These pairs of opposites can very well be predicated of reality and these may yield the other derivative modes of predication. Thus practically every attribute, by being affirmed and denied according to different aspects, may bring about seven fundamental propositions true of real subject.

It may be said that after all; this principle of *Saptabhaṅgi* is a wanton indulgence in meaningless self-contradiction. This objection has been sufficiently answered above. This is not a case of wanton paradox or purposeless pun. If the words are wantonly misinterpreted or understood in an unwarranted sense, then it may be charged with wanton quibbling; for example in the statement that this person has a new woollen shawl (*nava kambala*) the term *nava* may be taken to mean also *nine*. Though the word is capable of such an interpretation, still in this statement it does not mean that. In spite of the context, if a person retorts that assertion by saying “this person cannot have nine shawls as he is very poor”, it would be wanton quibbling. There is no such wanton quibbling underlying *Saptabhaṅgi*.

If it is not wanton quibbling, it must merely be an expression of doubt. To say, a thing may be as well as may not be, is to exhibit one's own doubt and ignorance. At the best, therefore, the doctrine is a mode of scepticism. This charge of scepticism is certainly unfounded. Doubt expresses absence of determinate knowledge. If the *prima facie* appearance of a thing leads you to two different interpretations, of which alternatives we cannot choose the right one, then there is doubt as to its nature. Since its exact nature is unknown, scepticism may be the result. But in the case of the contradictory propositions forming the basis of *Saptabhaṅgi* we have two different aspects each serving as the basis of one of the propositions. Hence there is neither doubt nor confusion in this case. Each assertion is definite and clear.

Two passages are quoted from the two great Hindu commentators of

* This discussion from *Saptabhaṅgitarangini* reminds us of Bralley's discussion of the theory of predication—in appearance and reality.

Vedānta Sūtra, Śankara and Rāmānuja. The *Sūtra* that is commented on is “नैकरमीशसंभवात्” (CH. I, PADA 2, SU. 33).

“This doctrine we meet as follows : Your reasoning, we say, is inadmissible ‘on account of the impossibility in one thing’. That is to say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing; just as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold the same moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either be so many and such, or not be so many and such; the third alternative expressed in the words ‘they either are such, or not such’ results in a cognition of indefinite nature which is no more a source of true knowledge, than doubt is. If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than one nature is definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny this. For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive nature is itself something, falls as such under the alternative predications ‘somehow it is’ ‘somehow it is not’ and so ceases to be a definite assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion and to the result of the assertion; partly they are, partly they are not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite, how can the *Tīrthaṅkara* (*Jina*) teach with any claim to authority and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether indeterminate ? Observation shows that only when a course of action is known to have a definite result, people set about it without hesitation. Hence a man who proclaims a doctrine of altogether indefinite contents does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a mad man. Again, if we apply the Jaina reasoning to their doctrine of the five categories, we have to say that on one view of the matter they are five and on another view they are not five; from which latter point of view it follows that they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it logical to declare the categories to be indescribable. For if they are so, they cannot be described; but, as a matter of fact they are described so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction. And if you go on to say that the categories on being described are ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not ascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being ascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that imperfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the opposite; you certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man than like a sober, trustworthy person. If you further maintain that the heavenly world and final release exist or do not exist and are eternal or non-eternal, the absence of all determinate knowledge which is employed in such statement will result in nobody’s acting for the purpose of gaining the heavenly world and final release. And moreover it follows from your doctrine that soul, non-soul and so on, whose nature you claim to have ascertained, and which you describe as having existed from all eternity, relapse all at once into the condition of absolute indetermination. As

therefore the two contradictory attributes of being and non-being cannot belong to any of the categories—being excluding non-being and *vice versa* non-being excluding being—the doctrine of the *Arhat* must be rejected”—Śāṅkara.*

“With the help of this, they prove that all things—which they declare to consist of substance (*dravya*) and *pariyāya*—to be existing one and permanent in so far as they are substances, and the opposite in so far as they are *pariyāyas*. By *pariyāya* they understand the particular states of substances, and as those are of the nature of being as well as non-being, they manage to prove existence, non-existence and so on. With regard to this, the *sūtra* remarks that no such proof is possible. ‘Not so’, on account of the impossibility in one, i. e. because contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing, not any more than light and darkness. As a substance and particular states qualifying it—and (by the Jains) called *pariyāya*—are different things (*padārtha*), one substance cannot be connected with opposite attributes. It is thus not possible that a substance qualified by the particular state such as existence, should at the same time be qualified by the opposite state, i. e. non-existence. The non-permanency, further of a substance consists in its being the abode of those particular states which are called origination and destruction; how then should permanency, which is of an opposite nature reside in the substance at the same time? Difference (*bhinnatva*) again consists in things being the abodes of contradictory attributes; non-difference, which is the opposite of this, cannot hence possibly reside in the same things which are the abode of difference; not any more than the generic character of a horse and that of a buffalo can belong to one animal. But (the *Jaina* may here be supposed to ask the *vedāntin*) how can you maintain that *Brahman* although one only, yet at the same time is the self of all? Because we reply, the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of the supreme person, omniscient, omnipotent and so on. And that the body and the person embodied and their respective attributes are of totally different nature (so that *Brahman* is not touched by the defects of this body). We have explained likewise. Moreover, as your six substances, soul and so on, are not one substance and one *pariyāya*, their being one substance and so on, cannot be used to prove their being one and also not-one and so on. And if it should be said that those six substances are such (viz. one and several, and so on) each owing to its own *pariyāya* and its own nature, we remark that then you cannot avoid contradicting your own theory of everything, being an ambiguous nature. Things which stand to each other in the relation of mutual non-existence, cannot after all be identical. Hence the theory of the Jāinas is not reasonable.”—Rāmānuja.*

The authors of the *Vedānta Sūtras* as well as the commentators reject the

* Thibaut's translation of the *Bhāṣya*.

Saptabhangi naya on the ground of the impossibility of contradictory attributes inhering in the same thing.

All that is said above by way of exposition and discussion would vindicate the claim of *Saptabhangi* against the charges brought against it by these scholars. Our account would be incomplete if these charges are not examined in this connection.

Now the author of the *Sûtras* does not give any detailed reasons besides the one contained in the *Sûtra* itself—that a thing cannot have self-contradictory attributes. *Asti* and *nâsti*, being and non-being or affirmation and negation, being contradictory epithets cannot be referred to the same thing. Hence the doctrine of such a predication is futile. This reasoning, though short, is interesting and suggestive. We have already pointed out the philosophical attitude adopted by the Jainas. A thing being of complex nature, having *dravya* and *pariyâya* must be an identity in difference. Instead of rejecting the doctrine of reality for the reason given, they seem to claim that the real is real only because of such a capacity to comprehend and reconcile the differences in itself. Here we are reminded of Bradley's polemic against "the nature of things". Though he admits the *Hegelian* doctrine of identity in difference, he cannot forget the scholastic traditions about identity and difference. Every concrete thing or person is according to Bradley a unity in diversity, and identity in difference a constant which is varying also. Now Bradley argues that such a nature implies self-contradiction and internal conflict. This is so because it is not possible for us to know how the difference could be derived from and related to an identity. Hence he condemns such things to the limbo of appearances.

We have been suggesting the similarity between the *Hegelian* doctrine of identity and the Jaina doctrine of *asti-nâsti*. But we must raise a note of warning that the Jaina doctrine does not accept wholesale *Hegelian* metaphysics. Unlike Bradley, the greatest living representative of *Hegelian* absolutism, the Jainas emphasize this important aspect of reality. The reason which is employed by Bradley to condemn a thing to be appearance, is the very reason which serves the Jain thinkers to proclaim the reality of the same.

The commentators deserve special attention. Hence we shall examine their criticism in detail. Śankara's criticism is of three main stages. First, he tries to point out the intrinsic impossibility of this doctrine. Secondly, its practical futility. Thirdly, its conflict with many other Jaina doctrines. Being and non-being cannot be predicated of the same thing just as it is impossible to predicate hot and cold of the same. Mutually contradictory and conflicting attributes cannot exist together of the same thing at the same time. This objection appears to be unanswerable, but if we remember the two different aspects of self-relation and other relation we can very easily see that the objection does not hold good. Very often even in ordinary experience we have examples of co-existing attributes which are in the

abstract self-contradictory. The branches of a tree may be in motion, but the tree as a whole may not budge an inch. Here the tree is moving and yet is not moving. The same individual person may be father in relation to X and son in relation to Y. In this case we cannot reasonably ask how can the same individual be both father and son. The two conflicting attributes of fatherhood and sonhood are quite intelligible in the same individual. Similarly a class which is a genus with reference to its own species may itself be a species in relation to its own higher genus. We need not multiply instances. It would be quite idle to maintain the impossibility of incompatible attributes in one and the same thing. It is a matter of surprise to us modern readers how such an acute thinker like Śāṅkara should go without observing the particular aspect from which the rival presents his case.

After appealing to experience to substantiate his point, Śāṅkara brings in the charge of indefiniteness against the doctrine of *Saptabhaṅgi*. On a previous occasion we replied to this charge of indefiniteness. It is enough here to show that if by definiteness Śāṅkara means unconditional and absolute assertion, indefiniteness instead of being a defect would be certainly a meritorious point to the credit of *syādvāda*. In the course of the discussion, the critic indulges in certain epithets which we should now call "unparliamentary". We may pass it without notice partly because of its irrelevancy to the main argument and partly because of the fact that in his days such an intermixture of Logic and Rhetoric was perhaps accepted as a justifiable weapon of debate.

As to his second point, the practical futility of the doctrine, we have to say a word. His argument comes to this. Every theoretical doctrine has a practical bearing. This is all the more so in the case of Indian thinkers. All Indian philosophers, in spite of their doctrinal differences, accept this as the fundamental truth of philosophy that metaphysical research is the handmaid of ethico-religious ideal of securing the *summum bonum* of life. Hence any doctrine that is indefinite and ambiguous in its message is condemned by this pragmatic test. Since we have not accepted the theoretical charge of ambiguity, we need not tarry long at this practical consequence.

Next, let us go to the application of *Saptabhaṅgi* to the other Jaina doctrines, such as the five categories and the final release with the consequent heavenly bliss. Śāṅkara points out that according to this logic, the five *astikāyas* may be five and may not be five. This result will not certainly non-pluss the Jaina logician. If they are severally referred to, they are five. If they are referred to as an aggregate and a class, they are one. If they are classified according to a different principle they may be two, living and non-living. Hence there is no fixed numerical characterisation of these categories. Variation in the number that may be used to designate these categories, instead of implying self-contradiction, indicates only a variation in the point of view from which they are examined. As the climax of his criticism, Śāṅkara asks his rival to say what would become of the heavenly world if it both

exists and does not, both eternal and non-eternal. His rival will only answer, as the author of *Saptabhangi Tarangini* does, in the following manner. If you say it must be one of those and not both, you have the following difficulty. If the final release and heavenly bliss is eternal and existing, where is the chance for *samsāra* and the attempt to obtain *mokṣa*? If the other alternative is the only truth, what is the purpose of preaching such an ideal which is altogether impossible? "Man partly is and wholly hopes to be" is not mere poetry. It is genuine philosophy. Inasmuch as the final release is the goal towards which the whole creation moves, it is true and real; and inasmuch as it is the goal and is not yet an actualised fact, it is not real and true. Why should this doctrine be so vehemently attacked, passes our understanding.

When we go to Rāmānuja, we have got a different method of argument altogether. He seems to accept the rival doctrine, all the while protesting. He clearly sees the distinction between *dravya* and *ṣaṛyāya*, substance and mode. He also perceives that *ṣaṛyāya* means change and *dravya* permanency. He also correctly points out that the doctrine of *syādvāda* is based upon these two different aspects, *dravya* and *ṣaṛyāya*. The proper course for the critic having gone so far, would be to accept the doctrine. Or if he wants to reject, he must show that things do not have both these aspects—*dravya* and *ṣaṛyāya*. Instead of doing either, Rāmānuja attempts to defend the *Sūtra* on a principle which is quite indefensible and unwarranted. What he proves is that *asti* and *nāsti* cannot be predicated of a thing from the *dravya* point alone. According to him the same substance cannot have both predicates. Certainly, it cannot have. Jaina Logic too proclaims the same thing. But if you take the thing in both its aspects—and it must be so taken to avoid empty abstractions—then it can and must have both the predicates.

Attempting to reject this doctrine of identity in difference, Rāmānuja has the insight to perceive how his own doctrine of *Vedānta* is affected. In one sense the *vedāntic* metaphysics is the doctrine of the one and the many. If reality could be one and many at the same time, *Vedāntism* would be sufficient argument in favour of *syādvāda*. But unlike Śankara who dismisses the Many as *Māyā*, Rāmānuja, as constrained by his metaphysical attitude, accepts the reality of the many also. Then what becomes of the one in the many? He proposes the *pūṛva pakṣa* for the Jaina. "But how can you maintain that *Brahma* although one only, yet at the same time is the self of all?" He answers the *pūṛva pakṣa* thus—"The whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of the Supreme Person and that the body and the person are of totally different nature." This is extremely dubious victory. If the body constituted by finite things and persons is really the manifestation or *pariṇāma* of the *Brahmana* and this what Rāmānuja believes, then his refuge is quite unsafe. For, his rival would be justified in asking whether the *pariṇāma* or the body is real or illusory. If the latter, his commentary becomes an unnecessary reduplication of Śankara's and if the former he is bound to

admit the *syâdvâda* point of view that the real is one from the point of view of the person and many from the point of view of *pariṇāma* or his body.

For a fuller discussion of the same, we refer the reader to the excellent work *Saptabhangi Tarangini* from which we have freely drawn in this essay.

One other point and we may take leave of this topic. Bertrand Russell in his American lectures "On Logical Atomism", develops Menrong's theory of objective fact in a very suggestive way. According to Menrong, every proposition either true or false has an objective fact as the basis. For, in order that there may be an intelligent assertion apart from its true value, there must be some objective basis. This doctrine implies two sets of objective facts, one for true propositions and other for false ones. Both being objective, what is the destined mark of each, so that one stands for truth and the other for error? Thus the question of truth is pushed further without being answered and we have to admit objective facts which are false and erroneous. In order to avoid this result, Russell proposes a modification in the doctrine.

He distinguishes between the meaning of a name and the fact implied by a proposition. Any individual object may be designated by a name. The name is a symbol referring to some particular object. This is a bare fact. There is no meaning in calling this true or false. It simply is. Truth or falsity refers to a proposition, a proposition becomes true or false because of an *objective fact*. The term *objective fact* is used in the sense of that which is other than the proposition that makes for its truth or falsity. Every objective fact may have two propositions of which one is true because it corresponds to the fact and the other is false because it has no corresponding fact. This theory of correspondence works well in the case of a true affirmative proposition, i. e. of the pair of propositions based on each fact. If the true one is affirmative, it is so because there is a corresponding fact. The negative proposition which is not corresponding to that fact is so far falsified by the fact. But take the following pair. Socrates is living and Socrates is not living. Here it is the negative proposition that is true, and affirmative one is false. According to Russell's theory, the negative proposition which is true must have a corresponding fact; otherwise it cannot be true. But what is the objective fact that is corresponding to this proposition—'*Socrates is not living*'. There seems to be none and yet there must be one. Therefore Russell brings in the theory of "*negative fact*". This suggestion raised a lot of discussion among the audience. But Russell himself leaves it undeveloped. He emphasises the fact that negative facts must be accepted as a fundamental postulate if the correspondence theory is to work.

Now what have we in the above doctrine of *Saptabhangi*? Each thing is capable of having seven modes of predication, and primarily two affirmative and negative. The affirmative proposition is determined by self-form, matter, place and time. The negative proposition rests on non-self relation of the same four—form, matter, place and time. In this case both the propositions are true. A negative proposition in the case of self-relation and

affirmative proposition in the case of non-self-relation would both be false. The proposition relating Socrates to his own time is true, the one relating him to any other time is false. To say that he is living now is such a false proposition. We are entitled to say only this, that he is not living now.

Thus we have something like this. A thing in its *Svarûpa* (self-form), *svadavya* (matter), *svakṣetra* (place), *svakâla* (time) is the positive fact enabling the truth of an affirmative proposition. The thing in its *pararûpa* (non-self-form), *paradravya*, *parakṣetra*, *parakâla* will constitute the negative fact. This will justify the negative proposition. This is offered only by way of suggestion for a possible explanation of what Russel calls "negative fact". Neither do we propose to develop Russell's theory nor do we want to imply that he was anticipated by Indian logicians of old. Any how the comparison is interesting and suggestive.

This *Saptabhāgi* is a powerful organ in the hands of *Syādvādins* who avoided the nihilism of the Buddhists as well as the absolute monism of the *Vedāntists*, who steered clear of the shallow realism of the *Chārvākas* and the ludicrous idealism of the *Nyāyavādins*.



4. PURUSHARTHA SIDDHYUPAYA

THE DOCTRINE of Ahimsâ has been universally accepted as a basic principle of all religions.

Gautam Buddha has been called the Lord of Compassion. The Allâh of the Muslims is called Al-Rahmân and Al-Rahîm, the Benificent and the Merciful. Dayâlu, Kripâlu are the names given to God by the Hindus. "Thou shalt not kill" is one of the ten commandments in the Holy Bible. Sage Tulsî Dâs, the immortal author of the *Mânas* says :

दया धर्म का मूल है, पाप मूल अभिमान ।
तुलसी दया न छॉड़िये, जब लग घट में प्रान ॥

"Compassion is the root of religion, pride the root of sin. Do not give up compassion, O Tulsî, as long as breath is within you."

The great Rishi Veda Vyâs exclaims :

अष्टादशपुराणानां व्यासस्य वचनद्वयम् ।
परोपकारं हि पुण्याय पापाय परपीडनम् ॥

"All the 18 Purâṇas have been condensed by Vyâs in two phrases. The good of others leads to religious merit, causing pain to others is sin."


Mahâtmâ Gândhi in *Young India* dated the 6th August 1931, says that "in trying to enforce in one's life the central teaching of the Gîtâ, one is bound to follow Truth and Ahimsâ. Perfect renunciation is impossible without perfect observance of Ahimsâ in every shape and form."

Through the successful efforts of Mahâtmâ Gândhi in making non-violence in word, thought, and deed, the basis of all struggle for political liberty, freedom, and self-government, the word Ahimsâ has acquired a world-wide recognition. An Ahimsâ League has been established in London with branches elsewhere. The apostle of Ahimsâ was the first recipient of the Bronze Medal of the Community Church of New York for the most outstanding religious service in the world in the year 1931.

In queer contrast to all this, however, we find that every religion, except Jainism, has permitted, approved of, and encouraged Himsâ, the antithesis of Ahimsâ in various forms, and many have expressly sanctioned it and given it the name of sacrifice from the Latin *Sacrificium* to sanctify, to make sacred ; and called it Yajña यज्ञ from the Sanskrit root यज् to worship, consecrate, give, make an oblation, sacrifice.

The fundamental reason assigned for animal sacrifices by the Hebrews was that no one should appear before Jehova empty-handed,* just as it would be indecent to approach a king or a great man without some present,

* Exodus xxxiii-15,



however trifling. Homer teaches that gods and kings alike are persuaded by gifts. Not only in Canaan, but among the Greeks, there is evidence that cereal oblations had a great place in early ritual, though afterwards they became second in importance to animal sacrifices, which yielded a more luxurious sacrificial banquet. With some people the idea of sacrifice is that God has need of the worshipper and his gifts, just as the worshipper has need of God and His help; and thus with a matter-of-fact business-like people like the Romans, religion became very much a sort of bargain struck with the gods. In general, however, we find an extraordinary persistence of the notion that sacrifices do in some way afford a physical satisfaction to the deity.

The notion that the more ethereal elements of the sacrifice rise to heaven, the seat of the gods, in the savoury smoke that ascends from the sacrificial flame, was of later development. Among the Semites, sacrifices were not originally burned. God was not seated aloft, but was present at the place of sacrifice, inhabiting a sacred stone. A refinement of the original usage was that the food spread on the tables of the gods is eaten by his ministers, the priests to whom he is supposed to make over the enjoyment of the banquet. In olden times the gods themselves were held to partake of these gifts of food, just as the venerable dead were fed by meat and drink, placed or poured out upon their tombs. In the religion of savages, both gods and the dead have very material needs among which the need of nourishment has the first place.* Among Greeks of the seventh century B.C., sacrifices to water-gods were simply flung into the river or sea; and sacrifices to underground gods were buried, indicating the idea that the gods were too ethereal to enjoy a sacrifice through any other sense than that of smell. Primarily, a sacrifice is a feast of which the gods and the worshippers partake together. The tendency was to give to all feasts, nay to all meals, a sacrificial character by inviting the gods to partake of them. The Arabian invocation of the name of Allāh over every beast killed for food is a relic of sacrificial formula. Among old Aryans, the sacrificial feast has had as its chief feature the Somaras, wine which "cheereth gods and men".† The sacrificial meal was common to all the nature religions of the civilized races of antiquity. With the breakdown of this type of religion, the sacrificial ritual went under corresponding modification. Human sacrifices are associated with cannibalism, which means eating the flesh of men of alien nation or of hostile kin.‡

The idea that God is the Lord of Creation; and hence the best, the most innocent and the purest of his creatures should be offered to Him, accounts for the sacrifice of a son, of infants, of young boys, of human beings (नरमेघ), of cows (गोमेघ), of horses (अश्वमेघ), of buffaloes, goats (अजमेघ), sheep, cocks, etc.

* Herodotus V-92.

† Judges IX-13.

‡ Encyclopaedia Britannica.



Even in the present refined and civilized times, we find some rulers of Indian States and principalities celebrating the brightest day in the annals of Hindu tradition, the Vijaya Dashmî, the day of the conquest of Râma over Râvaṇa, by a wholesale massacre of buffaloes and goats in the name of religion, and a feast on the flesh thus obtained is believed to be an act of religious piety.

The Muslim festival of Baqar-Îd or Îd-ul-Zuhâ commemorates the sacrifice of his son by Abraham; and in India where the cow is held sacred as a mother by the Hindus, the cruel cow-slaughter has during the last half century led to serious riots, resulting in considerable loss of human life and injury to person and property.

Before many an altar of Hindu goddesses, thousands of animals and fowls are slaughtered by the priests, and their flesh distributed to the congregation as a sacrament. Such slaughter has hardened the hearts of the Hindus also, and they do not hesitate to meet their Muslim brothers in mortal combat on religious pretext.

Most heinous Himsâ is thus committed in the name of religion and God and goddesses.


The notion that the victim of a religious sacrifice is a fortunate being who suffers no pain and attains bliss ever-lasting in the heavens on high, is obviously ill-founded. The moans and sufferings, the writhings and wringings of the victim are tangible, and the loud noises created by the beating of drums and cymbals, and the chanting of hymns and psalms only serve to deaden sensibility of the insufferable sight. The sacrificial post, the *stupa* is an outstanding feature of the Âshrams of Hindu sages. Why should there be need of a post to tie the victim if the sacrificial slaughter were not forcible killing of one who was unwilling to die ?

Writing about the Durgâ Pûja sacrifices, Mr. Bipin Chandra Pal says :

“Goats only were sacrificed in our house, as a rule. I had then no sense of the cruelty of the thing. No tender feelings for the poor dumb animal that, when forced down into the artificial halter, used to look up to his tormentors with such pitiful gaze, with tears trickling down from the corners of its eyes, touched me then.”*

Although human sacrifices before grim goddesses by the Thugs, and the self-immolation of deluded devotees at the sharp revolving wheel at Kashi and beneath the chariot of Jagannath at Puri, and of widows on the funeral pyre of their husbands, and the offering of human babies and tongues before goddesses are events of old history, we do occasionally hear of human sacrifices made in moments of religious frenzy. And animal sacrifices are daily offered in millions. Many a Hindu and many a Muslim sanctify all meat, obtained by killing, by reciting sacred words.

It is a happy sign of the times that a world League of Ahimsâ has been

* “Memories of my Life and Times” by Bipin Chandra Pal, 1932, page 125.  Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts

established at London at Ahimsâ House, 137 Elgin Crescent. Their motto is "Kill not for food, ornament or sport." The founders expect from a reformed diet the growth of a humane and glorious civilization where "they shall not hurt nor destroy.....for the earth shall be full of knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea."* The President says that "never can man progress spiritually until he is willing to abandon cruelty. We cannot connect the word righteousness with the murder of the weak, and helpless. For lack of teaching of 'Not-Hurting', the Christian religion has been and is sadly impoverished. There is reason to think that Christ himself expressly insisted on abstinence from flesh. Those who accept the idea of re-incarnation would not find it difficult to believe that existence did not begin with the first birth in human form, but that life throughout all kingdoms was for ever one and divine in essence. A later generation would look back with horror and disgust at a practice which was now so general as hardly to excite comment or question. The benevolent intentions of many societies, seeking to relieve suffering of all kinds, were sadly hampered by the prevailing hardness of heart towards animals which hardened us even to our fellow men. It is no doubt an incredibly hard task to place before an indifferent and pre-occupied world the message that all life is one, human, sub-human, and super-human, one in essence and destiny, moving slowly but steadily, however unconsciously, towards a glorious destiny. There is one great ladder for all living beings, whether they walk the earth on two legs or on four, whether they thread the waters with fins or stretch their wings to the air. The world is not deliberately cruel. It is but custom and thoughtlessness that support a cruel practice."†

While the principle of Ahimsâ is gaining ground in the West and vegetarianism is flourishing, we find that the evil habit of taking animal food is on the increase, spreading far and fast in India. There is at present a craze for moving in high society, and eating and drinking form the chief attractions of the upper social circles. The days of Epicurus seem to have returned. It looks as if we live to eat, and not that we eat to live. Wherever one meets a friend, some dish or drink is as a rule offered, insisted upon, and a refusal is considered rude. And further the eatables must be of a non-vegetarian character, for fashion so dictates. No body ever thinks, reasons out, considers, or decides, what he should eat or drink, how many times, and at what hours in the day or at night. Precious hours of life are frittered away in eating, drinking, smoking, talking and thus keeping the mouth ever engaged. The trade of the butcher, the confectioner, the keeper of hotels, restaurants, cafés and refreshment-rooms is flourishing. Millions of living beings are daily killed to provide food and pleasure for the upper classes. The consequence is distress, discontent, disease, death. It is idle to argue that meat diet is necessary for human strength. Medical opinion is clearly and definitely

* Isaiah xi-9.

† Revd. E. F. Udny, in the *Ahimsâ Journal*.

against it. Chemical analysis has proved to demonstration that there is more vitality in vegetarian than in animal food.

It is said by some people that the abolition by statute of the taking of animal life would be detrimental to the progress of civilised society. India was at a high pitch of power and glory when cow-slaughter was prohibited by Akbar, the Great Moghul Monarch of India. In the vast territories of Bikaner State, covering an area of about 25,000 square miles, and in some other Indian States, the killing of a bull, cow or calf is a very serious offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to 7 years, and the sale or even the import of beef, and the killing of pigeons and peacocks are criminal offences. In the face of these facts it does not stand to reason that human progress would suffer if meat, fish, and fowl were abolished by statute as food, at least in countries where non-flesh diet is available.

A Scientist writes :

"Little animals feast on microscopically small organisms. As is usual, where life is carried on in millions, the coral polyps go to fill the larder of fishes that thrive in their midst, the polyps being eaten when they thrust out their bodies with waving tentacles to gather in their own food supplies.

"Swallows, swifts, small bats, and dragon-flies prey on insects. The trout is also responsible for keeping down insect life, his particular fancy being mayflies. As a result of a test made over four hours, it was found that a trout 2 lbs. in weight ate 960 mayflies. And that was only one trout.

"The lions and tigers and other members of the cat family enjoy their meal of raw flesh, as also do crocodiles, centipedes, dogs, weasels, sea-lions, walruses, seals, and birds of prey like the golden eagle.

"Although it is disturbing to hear of the slaughter and spilling of blood that goes on all day and every day in Nature's kingdom, so that appetites may be satisfied, still it must be remembered that under the present order of things, the flesh-eaters are playing a big and useful part in keeping down numbers and in balancing the scales of prolific life."

The argument that there are countries like the polar regions where no other food except flesh is available, is as irrelevant as the argument that life lives upon life, that wolves and tigers, cats and dogs, eagles and crows, fish and fowl, snakes and lizards etc., are all purely carnivorous; and hence Himsâ is inevitable in the world. It may be inevitable in some circumstances; but those circumstances do not apply to us. We must look to our immediate surroundings. Irrelevant speculation, suppositious arguments, and discussions as to what happens elsewhere, what happened in the past, and as to what may possibly happen in the future, lead not only to a sheer waste of time and energy, are not only an abuse of intellect, but are positively injurious and harmful. Again, in a similar strain exclaims a carping critic, that the present cities have been turned into safe and secure, sanitary and sacred habitations as a consequence of the killing of wild and ferocious beasts, the destruction of death-dealing poisonous reptiles and the clearing away of

thick forests and vegetable undergrowth, which involved gross Himsâ on an extensive scale; and that if man would cease to kill the ferocious beasts, the venomous reptiles, and the vermin which destroy human life, domesticated animals, agriculture, and horticulture, would become impossible. Such speculations are advanced, not only by men of science, but by men of religion, as well. They may or may not be excusable for the purpose of advancing honest scientific research, but they are quite out of place when indulged in by persons discussing religious principles. The essential truths, the universal principles, the basic axioms, do not admit of changing circumstances. They are eternal, everlasting, true in all circumstances, at all times, under all conditions. Himsâ would not cease to be Himsâ by force of circumstances. Its resulting reaction, its Karmic effect, as regards duration, kind, intensity and mass may vary with circumstances but its nature is unchanging. Even if it be excusable, or slightly harmful, in certain circumstances, it is never commendable.

What would happen if every living being in the world turned a Jaina, and ceased to commit Himsâ? This is again an idle question. It leads to nothing. It helps us in no way. It is no justification for the commission of Himsâ. Please do not bother about the world. The world will take care of itself. You would do well to take care of yourself. Do what you think best in the circumstances in which you are placed; and do not worry about the others, how your action affects them. Do not cause injury to any living being by a voluntary act, or through thoughtlessness. When you have adopted the care and caution necessary under the circumstances, do not worry about the result of your action. But consider well, think carefully, act cautiously in right earnest, and do not delude yourself into a false belief that you are doing so. Do not shut your eyes to what is obvious and plain. Do your duty, but do it humanely, considerately, honestly, without the least malice, and without the slightest intention of causing injury to another. This is the gospel of Ahimsâ. And remember that men who indulge in Himsâ and justify their actions on the ostensible plea of doing good to humanity in general, are really and actually moved by selfish desire of obtaining money, power, influence, popularity, name, fame, applause, advertisement, or some other personal benefit.

To call the most cruel form of killing by the name of "sport" is an abuse of the word, a gross lie, and a despicable deception. What is fun to the boys is death to the frogs. Angling is fun indulged in on sacred Sundays. It is rather a desecration of the Sabbath, when creatures of water are baited out of their element and die an agonising death on dry land. The bringing down of hirping birds from their perches in trees by wounding them with stones thrown from a catapult, or with shots from a gun is cowardly cruelty, and no sport. The hunting of fox, deer, rabbit, etc., is equally cruel and cowardly. Big-game shooting is occasionally defended on the ground that the killing of ferocious animals saves men and beasts from their ravages.

The pretext is false in fact. It is rarely that one goes with the sole object for shooting a man-eating or a sheep-carrying wolf or a poisonous snake. Even when the avowed object of the hunter is protection of society from the ferocious wild animal, the real motives which impel him to such action are not humanitarian, but the desire of reward, the expectation of being called a brave man, or the excitement of the hunt.

A person may have a justification for causing the death of a wolf, or a tiger when he is compelled to do so in order to save the life of a man, or a beast. But a lion-hunt, or tiger-shooting as such, is a sin, though it may not be a crime under man-made law. A hunting expedition is an expensive pastime indulged in by persons in high position, who are not only personally secure from all possible harm, but have all comforts and luxuries provided for them, and for their sport the poor beast is beaten out of his retreat, goaded into a temper, and is fired at from a safe distance and it is then that the killers find a pleasure in watching the death agonies of the unfortunate animal, and exhibit its stuffed skin as a trophy or memento of their bravery.

Shooting of thousands of birds by parties of pleasure-seekers, even during the Christmas week, and on a Sabbath, is also called sport; and records are made and preserved of the thousands bagged by members of the party. This can hardly be differentiated from the sinful pleasure experienced by boys who stone to death a crawling serpent or a scorpion seeking for a hole to creep in, who enjoy the tearing up of a mouse by a cat, or who steal the eggs or young ones of a bird.

If there be any pleasure experienced in such killing, it can only be likened to the morbid feeling of satisfaction which Nâdir Shâh is said to have enjoyed when hordes of persons used to be brought in his presence bound all over and beheaded one after another. When asked who he was that he should enjoy such a general massacre of the innocent—for if he was a god he should protect his creatures, if he was a god's messenger or a founder of religion he should protect his followers, and if he was a king he should protect his subjects—, he said he was "God's Wrath" which had visited the people.

The shooting of elephants for the sake of their tusks has assumed so serious proportions that it is predicted that the elephant will be extinct in Africa within 50 years. Ivory is so valuable that people who have nothing else to do turn to the game of elephant-shooting and amass a fortune in a short time. Carried by greed, a group of aviators dropped several bombs from the sky on a herd of elephants. A number of them were killed outright, and many lay wounded. But most of the ivory was blown to bits by bombs, and the greedy aviators got much disappointment as a result of the cruel killing.

Plucking feathers of live birds and the skinning of living animals, for the sake of their feathers and skins, are facts which cannot be denied. These are some of the worst forms of cruelty which can be imagined.

The doctrine *قتل المرفى قبل الايذا* "Kill the harmful before harm is caused" is very often relied upon as a justification for killing. If a serpent, a

tiger, a scorpion, or a wolf suddenly appears, the first impulse with those who believe in the doctrine of "Killing the injurer before he injures" or with the vast majority of people who are swayed by vague fear, is to kill. Fear stupefies the intellect and drowns all thinking faculty. It is a false idea, a baseless notion, which has, like many others, become too common indeed, that such an animal or reptile is the enemy of man; and that it is its nature to attack. In truth it never intends harm by nature or instinct. The fang of the serpent, the claws of a tiger, the jaws of a wolf or the sting of a scorpion are its protective weapons, designed for self-protection when attacked. They are undoubtedly carnivorous and kill smaller beings for food. Like man they have not the means of obtaining food without causing injury. This is their bad Karma, but it is not irremediable. Man-eating tigers and man-attacking serpents have been mentioned by naturalists and others; but they have acquired these habits as the result of man's aggression against them. They will go their own way and will not harm any person, if such person has no intention of, and takes no step towards, causing them injury. They have been known to pass peacefully by the side or even over the body of a saint absorbed in concentration. The physical reaction, ordinarily caused by the touch of a serpent, scorpion, mosquito, wasp, or bee makes it apprehend harm to itself and it strikes in self-defence. Such a physical reaction does not happen in the case of a saint.

A snake would not bite even if it crosses a man's body, if man would lie motionless and not convey to the snake an idea that he would cause it harm. And if man has the courage to look on steadily at a snake, it would be speedily hypnotised and would instead of causing harm obey the dictates of man. If man entertains no ill-will towards other beings, none else is likely to cause him any harm whatsoever.

Shri Kuladânanda Brahmachâri in the book *Sri Sri Sadgurusanga*, Part III, pages 125-126 writes as follows:

"Mr. Anderson, a European gentleman, saw a sage in the forest of Jayadebpur, where he went out for a hunt. The elephant, on which Mr. Anderson was riding, got frightened seeing a tiger and threw him down. Mr. Anderson fired twice or thrice at the tiger, but missed his aim. He then began to run followed by the tiger. He saw a naked sage in a copse and ran to him. The sage asked him to sit and waving his hand forbade the tiger to advance. The tiger sat at a distance, wagged its tail and growled for some time and then went away. Mr. Anderson was astonished to see the wonderful phenomenon and asked the sage how he was able to pacify the tiger. The sage replied: 'One who has no *Himsâ*, is never injured by tigers or snakes. Because you have a feeling of *Himsâ* in your mind, you are attacked by wild animals.' Mr. Anderson from that day became a vegetarian and gave up shooting. He was seen by many people in Dacca and Chittagong when this change had come over him."

In the same book, pages 151-152 Brahmachâri Kuladânanda writes

about one Nangâ Bâbâ who occupied a mud hill in Fyzabad. During the course of a target practice by soldiers a notice was served on him announcing the time when the practice would be held and he was told that no one would be responsible for his death if he did not go elsewhere. The practice began and bullets whistled past his body on all sides, but he merely lifted his hand in front of his face, and no harm came to him. Colonel Crawley who was in charge of the operation, and who was witnessing everything from a distance through binoculars, was astonished at the indifferent and calm attitude of the sage; and when everything was over he went to Nangâ Bâbâ and saluted him with reverence.

Another form of Himsâ is that which arises from religious or superstitious persecution. Socrates was compelled to drink the cup of hemlock poison. Joan of Arc was burnt to death as a witch. The terrors of the Inquisition are matters of history. The crucifixion of Christ and the terrible persecution of the early Christian Apostles are also matters of record. So is the tragedy enacted at Karbalâ on the bank of the Euphrates, where Yazid cut off all supplies and prevented the 72 followers of Hassan and Hussain from even taking water from the river. All of them were killed and their women folk taken as prisoners. The imprisonment of Vâsudeva and Devaki, and killing of their 8 babies one after another by Kansa, their uncle; the attempt of Hiraṇya Kashyap to murder Bhakta Prahlâd, the innocent boy-devotee; the cruel murder of Hakikat Rai; the tortures inflicted on Sikh Gurus, Arjun Deo and others, are matters of Hindu tradition and history. The poisoning of Swâmi Dayânand Saraswati, the murders of Pandit Lekh Râm, Swâmi Shradhânand, and Râjpâl are recent happenings of the present times. The murderers have, after a sentence of death by a Court of Law and execution at the gallows, been applauded as martyrs.

Political Himsâ, the killing of armies in battle, murder in mass, is justified as a necessity for national existence. On a declaration of war, each and every one of the countries engaged in war, consider that theirs is a just cause, and the hostile party is in the wrong. All the combatants pray to the same one God, to help them in destroying the homes and hearths of the hostile people, and pray for victory, which spells destruction of the opposing armies. Such is the excitement created by the priests, the clergy, the followers of the Princei of Peace, that even churches and hospitals, schools and colleges, libraries and museums, factories and workshops, shops and granaries, are not spared, nor are freinds and relations. The crime committed at Kurukshetra ruined India that was. Mahâbhârata devastated Bhârata Varsha, the land of Bharat. The battles of the Crusades, the wars of the Roses, the French Revolution, the war of American Independence, the Havoc of 1857, the Revolution in Russia, the Great War in which India and the leading great Powers of the world were engaged for six long years have very largely contributed to Himsâ on a large scale, which though justified as political necessity is Himsâ unpardonable.

A very cruel slaughter and on a very extensive scale, is committed in the name of municipal and nationaleconomy, for the preservation of health and property from pests. The wholesale destruction of stray dogs and of rats is horribly cruel. Widespread campaigns for the extermination of locusts were organised by Provincial Governments and Indian States, in which high salaried officers with high-sounding academic degrees obtained from Foreign Universities were engaged, and heavy allowances and retinues and expensive corps of subordinate officials were placed at their disposal, with costly appliances and apparatus. A local cess was imposed by Provincial Governments for this special purpose, and thus indirectly every person was made to contribute to and share in the commission of this horrible Himsâ. And it is not certain whether the value of the crops saved was less or greater than the amount of expenditure incurred in these big schemes. Again it is possible that statistics carefully made may prove to demonstration, that taking into consideration the vast extent of India as a whole, a flight of locusts which is an occasional visitation, is not such a dire distress as it is imagined to be. The locusts are ephemeral insects, they do not live long, the period during which they cause damage of crops is limited, and the extent of damage occasioned would not produce a famine of grain, or some such calamity in the country; and it may also be possible that the excrement and dead bodies of locusts dying may prove fertilising agents and the next crops may more than compensate the damage. If man is careful and industrious enough, no pests will cause any such damage as is insufferable or very significant.

Himsâ, again, is committed on an extensive scale in the name of science for the avowed benefit of mankind. Vivisection is extolled as a virtue because it is pursued by eminent scientists and under the patronage of the Government of many countries. But if truth had its way, it should be declared to be a crime. The preparation of vaccination lymphs causes such amount of pain and agony to a young and healthy calf that a person, whose heart retains its natural tenderness and has not been hardened by the continued callous practice, can hardly endure its sight.

The *Abolitionist* of London says: "Let us leave no stone unturned during 1932 to abolish this horrible practice of torturing sentient creatures for our *supposed* benefit. In Austria, vivisection institutions have been permitted only in Vienna, Graz, Styrea, Innsbruck and Tyrol. And even there, vivisection merely for the purpose of illustrating physiological processes is absolutely forbidden. And in cases where it is allowed, the lowest species of animals must be used, and only under anæsthetics. In a *Vivisection Laboratory* is a book which gives 30 instances of the horrible experiments done in the name of science, by persons held in high esteem, who have received honours and rewards. Dr. Carrel and Dr. Banting, Nobel Prize recipients, cut out the organs of the body and kept the animals alive as long as possible. Sir John Rose Bradford cut out the kidney of fox terriers piece-

meal, resulting in various symptoms—diarrhoea, vomiting, emaciation, etc., and the animals lived for varying periods, days, weeks or months. Sir Victor Horsley and Dr. Blair Bell of Liverpool have cut out the parathyroids or pituitary glands of dogs, producing horrible deformities. Banting in Canada in 1922 discovered Insulin (which appears to have increased the death-rate from Diabetes) by cutting out the pancreas of dogs. Mantegazza, an Italian who died in 1910, performed the experiment of piercing the feet with many nails for preparing material for his book *The Physiology of Pain*. Squirted poison in the brain, inoculation in the eyes, injections in the ears, inducing abscesses, and blows on the skull to create epilepsy, are experiments which have been performed by eminent scientists.”

There is a note, on page 5 of *The Abolitionist* dated January 1, 1932, of the serious fact that during the last 25 years no fewer than 243 children under five years died from vaccination, and yet only 94 of the same age from small-pox. The statistics given there prove to demonstration that inoculations by vaccines for diphtheria, scarlet-fever, measles, whooping-cough, typhoid, cancer, diabetes, thyroid, tetanus, for phthisis by tuberculin, and for syphilis by salvarsan, have increased the death-rate, and the discontinuance of inoculation has decreased it. The unanimous decision of the Royal Commission on Vivisection was that the tuberculin discovery of Professor Koch was a “*Vast Failure*.” They added that an access of increased air and light, the avoidance of overcrowding, and the provision of proper food will serve to diminish the incidence and the mortality of the disease.

Medical opinion is gaining ground that the inoculated and thus “protected” animals are serious carriers of disease because of the quantities of poison put into them. So are human beings who are inoculated. We run grave risk in transferring their blood to our veins. Infinitely more serious is the risk of transferring dormant diseases from cattle to humans by vaccinating with bovine lymph. This accounts for the enormous amount of bovine ‘consumption’ in humans. And consumption and cancer are intimately related.

Inoculations and injection-treatment for every sort of disease have come into fashion, and have become widespread because they inflate the bills of the surgeon and his clinical laboratory assistants, and the rich people take a pride in undergoing an expensive course of treatment. In many cases the doctors imagine and thus create disease. Their earnings increase with the complications in treatment of diseases, and they exploit the rich who have more money than commonsense. Diseases have increased in their variety and in their extent, with the increase of the medical profession; just as litigation, false and dilatory pleas in law, have flourished with the increase of the number of law courts and lawyers, and criminal returns have swollen up with the strengthening and encouragement of the police, and the improvement of prospects in that department.

It is a matter of every day occurrence that frogs, rabbits etc. are killed

in college laboratories to educate young men in the science of Biology. How very strange and paradoxical it is that by causing death, people wish to learn the science of life.

Costly organizations called Research Institutes for Scientific Investigation, established with the ostensible object of preventing diseases like malaria, leprosy, goitre, cholera, plague, tuberculosis, are rather expensive experiments of doubtful utility, when the cost incurred in maintaining them is taken into consideration. Removing the economic distress of people is a surer method of prevention of disease. The Himsâ committed in the intentional, pre-arranged, determined killing of millions of living beings is certainly gross and serious.

The social and convivial custom of eating from the same dish, biting off from the same fruit, biscuit or cake, and drinking from the same cup is responsible for the spread of many contagious and infectious diseases. Kissing has by medical experts been pronounced to be a dangerous medium of dissemination of disease. The use of tinned provisions, preserved fruits, condensed milk, aerated and bottled waters, ice creams, teas and coffees, and the habit of smoking and drinking contribute in no small measure to bad health and disease.

In European countries, and in Australia the newspapers are full of accounts of ravages to agriculture by birds, beasts and insects, and of discussions of scientific methods for killing these birds, beasts, and insects. One paper says that damage by mice to wheat crops in Melbourne has been worse than what happened in 1917, 15 years ago. Another suggests a poisoning scheme for the eradication of the dingo and the fox.

The extent of damage, and the possible risk is more the creation of an active imagination, than a dangerous reality. Protect your property certainly; and peaceful means will suggest themselves to you, if you do not permit yourself to be misled by pre-conceived notions of killing, which result from habitual meat-eating, shooting and hunting, and to which all schemes of wilful destruction are attributable. India has been an agricultural country. Its people have been leading a pastoral life. Every household had its cultivated land, and herd of cattle. And India never suffered from such imaginary fears as disturb the western scientist. Mice, rabbits, locusts, monkeys, crows, pigeons, and pests of sorts, have been causing damage to crops and grain-stores, and yet the produce and stocks have been plentiful. This reminds one of the remarks made by a European lady when she noticed an Indian cooking, and observed that an open fire entailed much loss of firewood energy, and as every household cooked for itself there was much loss of time and human energy which could be saved by establishing bakeries and restaurants, eating houses, and confectionaries. The remedy suggested is worse than the disease, even if the diagnosis be correct. Mass production of cooked food is really an evil which is responsible for many of the diseases and ill-health, so prevalent in the present age of expensive living and feverish

activity. Simplicity of diet, simplicity in games, simplicity of amusements, simplicity of life in general were the special features of happy old India proverbially the land of Peace and Plenty, Strength and Longevity.

Notwithstanding the so-called progress in surgery, bacteriology, and vaccines, the fact remains that human longevity, human happiness, human health, human strength, and physical development has been going down from generation to generation. The description of the statures of our ancestors as given in ancient books may be called myths and fictions by the learned men of the present day, but it is a fact which must be admitted that the mummified bodies of the kings of Egypt and the fossils of ancient people are no dwarfish structures of the modern times. The descriptions given in the *Illiad* and the *Odyssey*, in the *Shāhnāmā* of Firdousi, in the ballads of *Ālhā* and *Udal*, and in the pages of Tod's *Rājasthān* prove to demonstration that our ancestors were certainly far superior to us in physical stature and prowess, in courage and endurance, in mental and spiritual power. In the *Shāhnāmā*, Rustam is called bronze-body; and the warriors of olden times used to wear an armour the mere weight of which would be difficult for us to carry. The heavy swords some of which are exhibited in museums and armouries would not be easily lifted up by our strong men, not to say of their being wielded with such effect as to cut the warrior and the horse in twain. The wars, battles, and fights of our times are mere butcheries and wholesale destruction, without any element of personal courage and valour. Can one imagine a worse form of killing than the bombing from aeroplanes of hospitals, churches, prisons, colleges, and cities, or the cannonading from long distance of miles.

Kill, kill, kill, is the cry of the day. Millions of lives are killed every day in the name of religion as sacrifices, in the name of health for food, in fun or sport, in the name of science for experiments, for rejuvenation to supply glands to man and woman, in the name of sanitation and prevention of diseases, or with the ostensible object of protection and prosperity of agriculture, horticulture, arboriculture, and fruitculture. And the result is that the world is deteriorating day by day in physical prowess, intellectual strength, and spiritual development.

There is yet another form of Himsâ, which is commonly considered to be an act of mercy, and applauded as such. It is a prevalent practice these days to shoot a horse, a cow, or a dog, which has been seriously injured or which has contracted a "dangerous or incurable" disease; and such killing is acclaimed an act of mercy. Is not the unfortunate animal killed because it is not profitable from a mercenary or economic point of view to spend money and attention over it, and the sight of its sufferings is too painful to be tolerated? If killing under such circumstances be an act of mercy, why should not charity begin at home, and why should it not be extended to one's own relations, friends and mankind in general. We hear of suicides under such conditions, which means moral weakness. We have heard that soldiers hopelessly wound-

ed in battle, and passengers mortally injured in railway accidents have been thrown in a hollow and buried, or hurled in a river or sea to be washed away; but barring such exceptional cases, every possible effort is made to preserve human life as long as possible. One can understand the practical difficulty in bestowing the same care, attention, and expense on animals as in the case of human beings, and it may be pleaded in extenuation; but to call such killing an act of mercy is to cheat one's own inner conscience. It is Himsâ, pure and simple. We have of course left out of consideration the other reason based on philosophy, the reality of things, that every soul is the maker, and the master of its destiny, its own tempter and seducer, and its own redeemer; and it must suffer and work out the resulting effects of its own previous acts, committed whether in the present or prior births, or conditions of its existence. No other soul can suffer for it vicariously, and no other can act as its redeemer or saviour. And further the destruction of the present body, diseased or injured, does not sever the connection between the soul and the body for ever hereafter, and the next body which the soul on leaving the present one must immediately inhabit is not likely, in the circumstances, to be better, healthier, or stronger. Man's duty clearly is to help a soul in distress, to alleviate and mitigate its suffering by attention, service and assistance, but not to destroy the body under the false notion that such a destruction would terminate the sufferings which the embodied soul has to endure as a matter of pre-ordained certainty. The agony is, thereby really and truly speaking, intensified and prolonged. There is always the possibility of life surviving the worst attacks of disease and the severest forms of injury in accidents; and the possible opportunity to the soul of redemption, reformation, regeneration, or at least improvement in that condition of life is rendered impossible by killing the body.

Another argument in support of Himsâ commonly advanced, believed in, and acted upon is that 'life lives upon life,' and 'the fittest must survive'; and that the lower forms of life were created by God for the use and benefit of the higher forms and for Man, the Lord of Creation, to be used for food and otherwise. It is further said that even the most rigid vegetarian and the strictest follower of Jainism cannot live without causing injury to some sort of life. The Jains, it is said, believe that water, air, fire, earth and vegetables have life, and it is not possible for them, however much they may profess a concern for saving life, to abstain from causing injury to such forms of life, and to other life organisms such as ants, flies, worms and vermin in the ordinary affairs of life.

II

Persons who argue in this strain, have no idea of the full significance of Ahimsâ, and the manner in which it is to be practised. Before meeting the argument, it is therefore necessary to explain the full significance of Ahimsâ,

and the course of discipline which would enable one to progress by gradual steps in the observance of its practice.

Himsâ is defined as injury to the vitalities, caused through want of care and caution. The vitalities in a living body are enumerated as ten—the three forces of thought, speech, and body; the five senses of touch, taste, smell, hearing, and sight; respiration, and age or duration of life. Every embodied living being possesses at least four of these ten vitalities—the body, the sense of touch, respiration and age. An embodied soul which possesses this minimum number of vitalities is called irrational one-sensed, such as vegetable-bodied beings. The irrational two-sensed soul possesses six vitalities, viz., the power of speech and the sense of taste also, such as a worm. The three-sensed soul has seven, the sense of smell being added to these, e. g. an ant. A four-sensed soul possess eight, viz., the sense of sight as well, like a fly. The five-sensed soul has nine, the sense of hearing being added to these, e. g., irrational animals. All rational human beings have all the 10 vitalities.

Existing separately by itself, neither the soul nor the body is susceptible to any injury at all. Injury is caused to the vitalities in an embodied soul, which feels pained at such injury. The amount of injury caused and the pain thereby occasioned, would depend upon the number of vitalities and the scope and capacity of the vitalities to which injury is caused.

The above-numerated ten are material vitalities—*dravya prâṇa*. As distinguished from these, a soul has conscious vitalities—*bhâva prâṇa*, which are the very attributes of Jîva, such as consciousness, peacefulness, happiness, power. And with reference to the conscious vitalities, the Himsâ caused is called Bhâva Himsâ, as distinguished from Dravya Himsâ which arises from causing injury to the material vitalities.

Every evil thought, every evil word, and every evil act causes Himsâ. "Do to others as you expect others to do unto you. Don't do to others, what you do not approve for yourself," should be the guiding principles in all affairs of life.

Bhâva Himsâ is caused by entertaining impure thought-activities such as anger, pride, deceit, greed, sorrow, fear, disdain, sex-desires. Such thought activities injure the real nature of the soul—purity, perfection, direct knowledge of all substances, in all their varying conditions, at one and the same moment, infinite power, unruffled peacefulness, and bliss everlasting and unmixed. Dravya Himsâ proceeds from Bhâva Himsâ, which precedes it. The thought is father to the act. An evil thought vitiates the purity of the soul, and is followed by a sinful act, varying in its degree of evil, with the vicious intensity of the thought. Equanimity, non-attachment, self-absorption, self-realization would make the commission of Dravya Himsâ an impossibility.

So far as a householder is concerned, Himsâ is divided into various kinds. It is either Ârambhaja, viz., that which arises from engagements in

occupations, in spite of all care and caution; or Anârambhaja otherwise called Saṃkalpî, viz., that which is committed intentionally or knowingly, e. g., hunting, offering sacrifices, killing for food, amusement, or decoration, or out of mischief, enmity, malice, or jealousy.

Saṃkalpî Himsâ is entirely renounced by a householder and may well be avoided by every thinking person, without any injury, harm, or serious inconvenience to himself. If he is placed in circumstances, where he cannot avoid the commission of Himsâ, his act would be Himsâ all the same but the degree of culpability would vary with the varying circumstances. Let us take a few cases by way of illustration, and leave the inquisitive disciple or the thinking scholar to discuss the rest with persons who are his superiors in knowledge and conduct.

There is a festering wound in the body, full of maggots. One would remove the maggots as carefully as he can, wash the wound and dress it up.

While going on an urgent business, one finds a swarm of ants or earth-worms on the ground in front. He would try to avoid crushing them by deviating from the path, and if that be impracticable, he would tread gently and carefully, and avoid hurting the living beings as far as is possible.

A fly is caught in a spider's web, and he runs to sting it to death. A Jain householder would do what he can to extricate the fly by breaking the web. This act is Ahimsâ, protection of life, though some little injury has been caused to the spider in the damage to its web and in the loss of its food.

A person is suffering from a disease caused by bacilli. A Jain Doctor would not mind giving such medicine as he knows would kill the germs. His act would certainly be Himsâ, but Himsâ of two-sensed beings and thus of a trifling degree when compared to the Ahimsâ, the good resulting from protecting a five-sensed person. Again his motive in giving the medicine is not to kill the germs but to save the patient, and that determines the resultant Kârmic effect.

Innumerable germs exist in the human body and they die in consequence of a fast, for want of nourishment. Observance of a fast would thus be Himsâ in a way, but the avoidance of Himsâ in ways innumerable, because fasting more than outweighs the technical Himsâ.

Ârambhaja or Ârambhi Himsâ may again be sub-divided as Udyamî, Grahârambhî, and Virodhî. Udyamî is Himsâ unavoidably committed in the exercise of one's profession. Permissible professions according to Jaina writers are (1) the profession of a soldier *असि*, (2) of a scribe *मसी*, (3) of agriculture *कृषि*, (4) trade *वाणिज्य*, (5) of an artisan *शिल्प*, (6) intellectual *विद्या*. Grahârambhî Himsâ is that which is unavoidably committed in the performance of necessary domestic purposes, such as preparation of food, general, bodily and household cleanliness, construction of buildings, wells, gardens, and keeping cattle. Virodhî Himsâ is unavoidably committed in defence of person and property against thieves, robbers, dacoits, assassins, assailants, and enemies, in meeting their aggression and in causing the

least possible injury necessary in the circumstances in which one may find himself.

Complete Ahimsâ in its highest aspect is practised by one who has renounced all worldly pursuits, and has adopted the discipline of a saint's life. A true believer in the householder's stage abstains from Samkalpî Himsâ, but is not able to completely avoid Ârambhî and Virodhî Himsâ, although he tries his best to avoid it as far as possible, and makes a steady progress in such endeavour.

It would thus be clear that the dictates of Jainism and the practice of Ahimsâ is not only quite consistent with, but is helpful in material progress and prosperity, social, economic and national advancement. It is an entirely mistaken notion that Ahimsâ makes cowards of men, or that Jain Ahimsâ has led to the weakening of the Indian nation, and to the fall of the Indian empire.

III

Jainism is a practical religion. It is a religion which can be practised while one is engaged in the daily transactions of life in this world. It helps in everyday affairs of mundane life. It adds to the success of a businessman, of a man in power and responsible position, of an artisan, and an artist, and of a labourer in the street, and of a man who is placed in the lowest, the dirtiest, and the worst position in life. It is a religion which cannot only be professed but lived. A Jain, while professing and practising Jainism, may well be a victorious king, a successful statesman, administrator, executive or judicial officer, a successful factory manager, an inventor, a scientist, a doctor, a soldier, an engineer, a tradesman, a lawyer, a farmer, a labourer, an artisan, or an artist.

Apostles of Ahimsâ have been rulers of vast territories, have fought battles, have vanquished armies, and have founded empires. They have awarded merited punishment to murderers, robbers, ravishers, thieves, swindlers, and criminals of sorts. The land in their charge used to be proverbially fertile, and the people happy and prosperous.

According to the Jaina scripture known as *Padma Purâṇa*, Shri Râm Chandra, the hero of the Râmâyana, attained Mokṣa or Nirvâṇa, became a worshipful Arhat and is a worshipable Siddha, because of having followed the discipline of a saint, and having thereby got rid of all Karmic contact, although he killed many men in his encounter with Râvaṇa, the king of Ceylon, and in other skirmishes. Such killing was Himsâ, but the Karmic contamination was not deep because of absence of malice, and such as there was, was neutralised by austerities, control of speech and action, meditation and concentration of mind.

Hanumân, the great General and Commander-in-Chief of Shri Râm Chandra's army also attained emancipation. So did millions of others.

The five Pândava brothers who were the victorious heroes of the greatest

war of epic India, a war which caused the destruction of the flower of Indian chivalry counted in millions, were also good Jaina rulers of territories. They adopted the vows of sainthood, and after severe austerities and deep meditation attained the highest and purest point of soul purity—the Divinity.

Emperor Chandra Gupta Maurya was a good Jain monarch of historical times. He sat on the Magadha throne in 322 B. C. and conquered the North-west country up to the Hindukush. His territories extended up to Kathiawar in the west, and included the Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Behâr. He also adopted the vows of a Jain saint at the feet of Bhadrâ Bâhu Swâmi and performed austerities of the order. This is proved to demonstration by the rock inscriptions at Śravaṇa Belgola in Mysore.

Châmuṇḍa Râya was a brave general and a great minister of the Jaina king, Râyamalla, who reigned in the tenth century and belonged to the Ganga dynasty. He took the vows of a layman from the Great Saint Ajitsena. The beautiful temple at Chandragiri, Śravaṇa Belgola, district Hasan, Mysore, was constructed by him. (*Supra* BK. I, pp. 1-12.)

King Kharvel of the dynasty of Mahâ-Megha-Vâhan was also a good Jain monarch, who ascended the throne in his 16th year. His victories and his charities are recorded in the rock inscription of Hathi Guphâ near Bhuvaneshwar, in Orissa.

The Parmâr and Solanki Rajputs of Osia, near Jodhpur were converted to Jainism some 2,300 years ago.

Maharaj Kumârpâla of Anhilpur, Patan-Gujrat, was also a Jain monarch, a devout disciple of Shri Hem Chandra Âchârya. His territories extended up to Kolhapur in the south, Kashmir in the north, Magadha in the east and Sindh in the west. In Pâtan, the capital of his kingdom, there were 1800 multi-millionaires. He was not only learned and bountiful, but led a controlled and regulated life. After the queen's death, he did not marry again and observed the vows of sexual purity. The Jain temples at Târanga Hill were built by him. He ruled from 1143 to 1174 A.D., having ascended the throne at the age of 50. He gave one crore of rupees annually to alleviate the distress of poverty-stricken people. In recognition of his exemplary personal merit of character he was given many titles by his subjects, such as परनारी सहोदर "Brother to the wives of others," जीवदाता "the Giver of life," विचार चतुर्मुख "All-round thinker," दीनोद्धारक "Uplifter of the fallen", राजर्क्षि "Saint-king."

The Bhandâris of Jodhpur who trace their descent from the Chouhân Rajputs of Ajmere were converted to Jainism in 992 by Yashobhadra Sûri. They were learned scholars, wise administrators and brave soldiers, loyal to the Jodhpur Raj.

Raja Amogh Varsha, of Malkhed, in the territory of Hyderabad, Deccan, ruled from 815 to 877, and then adopted the vows of a Jaina saint.

Bachhrâj, the founder of the Bucchâwat clan, who came with Rao Bikâji and helped in establishing the kingdom of Bikaner in 1488, was a Jain Rajput,

Ahiṃsâ in its full significance has been realized, preached, and practised only by and in the Jaina religion. Jainism is synonymous with Ahiṃsâ. It is Ahiṃsâ Dharma, the religion of Ahiṃsâ. "Ahiṃsâ Paramo Dharmah"—Ahiṃsâ is the highest religion—is emblazoned on the banner of Jainism. Its philosophy and conduct are broad-based on the solid foundation of Ahiṃsâ, which has throughout and consistently been followed to its logical conclusion.

It is the first and foremost of the five vows, which a Right Believer on the path of Right Conduct follows. The other four are abstention from falsehood, intercourse, and from possession of temporalities.

The five vows are followed in the completest form, and to their fullest extent, by saints, viz., persons who have cut off all connection with temporal objects, have adopted asceticism, and are ever engaged in austerities, study, discourse, contemplation, meditation, and self-realisation.

They are followed in a lesser degree, and to an extent varying with his spiritual advancement, by every Right Believer who has entered upon the path of liberation.

IV

The great saint Amrita Chandra Sûrî no doubt recommends the highest full vows of a saint to a Right Believer because as a rule one should always aim at the highest. If however one's capacity does not permit him to scale so high, he may proceed on the path of progress by a graduated course of self-discipline, the layman's path, which is also divided into eleven degrees, graduated according to the increasing capacities of the disciple, the Shrâvaka. There are six daily duties prescribed for a Shrâvaka, the performance of which is of considerable help in spiritual advancement towards the higher discipline of a saint. The six duties are,—the worship of the perfect ones, the Arhats; attendance upon spiritual leaders; study of the sacred scriptures; meditation once, twice or three times a day in a calm, quiet place; temperance in eating, drinking, bodily covering, and daily engagements; and charity. Charity according to Jaina teachings comprises in giving food and medicine to those who need them, imparting knowledge to the ignorant, and affording protection to all living beings. This book *Purushârtha Siddhyupâya* is not only a discourse on the importance of Ahiṃsâ as a basic rule of conduct to be universally adopted by all, but is sufficient to solve all problems which agitate man's mind, viz. what substance the universe is composed of, what are the natural qualities and functions of each of these substances, what is life, why does it transmigrate, how can it attain the highest purity and perfection?

After the usual preliminary salutation, the author lays down the basic rule of universal application, which helps in the complete understanding of things, namely that everything has to be looked at from two points of view,

the real and the practical standpoint. Then soul or life is defined, and thereafter the mutual action and re-action between life and non-life, Jīva and Ajīva, Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, Ātmā and Karma.

The three Jewels of Jaina Philosophy—Right Belief, Right Knowledge, and Right Conduct are then lectured upon. Himsā is described in great detail, and its various implications and effects discussed at length. The Real and Practical Right Conduct is then discussed, and it is shown that the principle of Ahimsā underlies all meritorious actions, and all efforts for the acquisition of the goal of life—Divinity.

This treatise treats of Ahimsā in all its varying aspects. It proves to demonstration that all evil thoughts, all evil acts, every immorality, and every sin and crime is covered by the term Himsā. Even where no harm is caused to another by such thought, intention, word or act, the purity of the soul of the persons who entertain such thought, utter such word, or commit such act is certainly injured, and that in itself is Himsā. As such it must be avoided, just like the crime of suicide. Causing harm to another may possibly be justified or extenuated in particular circumstances, but voluntarily causing injury to the self has no justification or extenuation.

The book lays down a clear method, a royal road, a practical path. The path is simple, easy, straight, and not winding, mazy, steep, narrow or strait. It would be a pleasure to follow it. A person who has not taken to a course of physical exercise, is staggered at the mention of a Sandow's performances and feels sceptic on hearing what a Rām Mūrti can achieve. He would not believe unless he saw, that a four-cylinder car in full action can be stopped from moving by the unaided physical resistance of a mere man. It is difficult to fix limits to the development of bodily strength, and the expansion of spiritual power is only limited by space and substance. The process of expansion may seem difficult, arduous, hard, impracticable to one from a distance, but when one has entered upon the practice of discipline, there is for him an ever-increasing joy in the consciousness of ever-increasing power and knowledge, and every effort makes the succeeding attempt more pleasant and joyful.

A Jain ascetic is not an idle fanatic who mortifies his body and soils his soul. He lives a life of extreme activity and joy. His asceticism has a fascinating charm, and what seems a torture of the body to the ignorant is a delicious enjoyment of constantly increasing power and knowledge.

The joys of Yoga, of communion with the Highest, are only known to those who have experienced them. They are above all earthly pleasures. They lead to heavenly happiness, and ultimately to the realisation, the attainment of Godhood, where the soul is identified with limitless, perfect, direct, complete knowledge of all that is, that was and that shall be, where it is supremely self-satisfied, omniscient and omnipotent, for ever and ever, in the unending eternity of time and space.

5. GOMMATASARA, JIVA-KAND

IF TATTIVARTHA SUTRA* is the Jaina Bible, the *Gommaṭasāra* is a brief expansion of a part of that Bible, giving the Path to Perfection or Liberation.

The Path is clear and conclusive. If followed, it leads to the Goal, Liberation.

The Goal cannot be attained without following it.

The Soul-Classes, Quests and Stages, given in this book, may be verified by anyone easily with the necessary time, trouble, inclination and sympathetic realisation of the Word of the Omniscient, any day, in any condition of life, in any part of the world.

To follow the Path, it is not necessary to be born a Jaina or to profess or to embrace Jainism. Call yourself by whatever name you like, live your life as you have lived it hitherto, but if it is in accord with Jainism, if it conforms to the type and measure of faith, knowledge and conduct leading to the Goal, the soul may be sure that he or she is a Liberable being, and on the Path to Truth and Freedom from the miseries and limitations of embodied existence.

You build yourself. The Soul is the sole architect of its life and condition, here and hereafter. As such, believers in Jainism and those who come to consider and weigh Jainism in their search after Truth will find this work a valuable guide.

The probable reasons for the name *Gommaṭasāra* having been assigned to this authoritative work on Jain Philosophy may be summed up as below.

In the *Karma Kāṇḍa* Gāthā 965, the author says that this treatise is based on the discourses of Śrī Vardhamāna, the 24th and the last Jain Tīrthaṃkara of the present era in Bharata Kṣetra, and the teachings are also well established by the rules of logic, Pramāṇa and Naya. The author has called Śrī Vardhamāna or Mahāvīra by the name of Gommaṭadeva.

The word Gommaṭa is probably derived from “go” speech, and “maṭa” or “maṭha” abode, meaning “the Abode of Speech”, the Lord from whom flows the letterless voice, the wonderful music, *Divya-Dhwani*. *Sāra* means the essence, the condensed purport. The word *Gommaṭasāra* would thus mean the “Essence of the Discourses of Lord Mahāvīra”.

Again, we learn from the Sanskrit commentary, that the treatise is a compilation of the answers given by the author Śrī Nemī Chandra Siddhānta Chakravartī, to the questions put to him by Rājā Chāmunda, asking him to enumerate the sub-classes of body-making Karma, and to explain their existence, bondage, non-bondage, and cessation of bondage, with regard to the spiritual stages of souls in various conditions of life from the completely undevelopable vegetable-bodied soul, to the fully developed rational five-sensed beings. The answers are based on the ancient manuscripts, *Dhavaḷa*, *Jaya Dhavaḷa* and *Mahā Dhavaḷa*, still preserved in

needle-pricked characters on palm-leaves in the Jain temple at Mūḍbidri, South Canara. The major part of *Gommaṭasara* is based on *Dhavalā*, which was composed by Āchārya Bhutabali about 7th century after Lord Mahāvira.

Chāmunda Rāya was also called Rājā Gommaṭa most probably on account of his great devotion to Shri Gommaṭa Deva or Lord Mahāvira. As a compliment to the Great questioner, the compilation has been called *Gommaṭasāra* after his name.

Chāmunda Rāya was a brave general and a great minister of the Jain King Rājamalla who reigned from 974 to 984 A. C. (after Christ), and belonged to the Ganga dynasty.*

The ancestors of this Jaina dynasty ruled at Ayodhyā, and were descended from the ancient Ikṣvāku family, founded by Rīṣabhadeva, the first Tirthaṅkara. Once it so happened, that Vijaya Mahā Devī, wife of Rājā Bharata, a descendant of the family, while pregnant, went to take a bath in the Ganges. A son was born to her there, and was on account of this circumstance, named Ganga Datta. He became a renowned King and the Dynasty was called Ganga-Vaṃśa after his name. In this dynasty Mahārāja Viṣṇu Gopa flourished at Ahichhetrapore (near Bareilly, U. P.). He had two sons from his wife Prithvīmātī, named Bhāgadatta and Śrī Datta. Bhāga Datta went to the Kalinga country (near Orissa), ruled there and established the Kalinga Ganga dynasty. Shrī Datta continued to rule at Ahichhetra. Rājā Padma Nābha was a descendent of his. He had two sons named Rāma and Lakṣman. In consequence of some dispute with Rājā Mahipāl of Ujjain (Mālvā), he had to leave Ahichhetra for Deccan with his sons, whose names he changed to Didiga and Mādhava. They went to Perur in District Codappa in the Madras Presidency and offered respects to the learned and spiritually advanced Āchārya Siṃhanandī, who bestowed spiritual blessings on them. They established their power near Mysore in the second century after Christ. The 21st king in descent from Mādhava who commenced to rule in 103 A. C. was Rājā Malla II.

Chāmunda Rāya belonged to the clan of Brahma Kṣatriya. He won many battles and received many titles, like Samara-Dhurandhara "the leader in battle", Vīra Mārtanda, "the sun among the brave", Raṇa Rāja Siṃha, "a great Lion in battle", Vairī Kula Kāla Danda, "the sceptre of death for the hosts of enemies", Bhuja Mārtanda, "the sun among the powerfull-armed," Samara Parśurāma, "Paraśurāma in battle", Satya Yudhiṣṭhira, "Yudhiṣṭhira in speaking truth". He was a great scholar also. He wrote a commentary† on *Gommaṭasāra*, in Canarese language in presence of the author Nemi Chandra Siddhānta Chakravartī. He also composed *Chāmunda Rāya Purāṇa* in Canarese and *Charitrasāra*, a treatise on the practices of ascetics in Saṃskṛit.

Appreciative mention of Rājā Chāmunda Rāya has been made by the

*Supra Bk. I, pp. 1-12

†Keśava Varṇi has based his Commentary on *Gommaṭasara* on this work.

author in *Karma Kāṇḍa* Gāthā 966 to 972. Rājā Chāmunda Rāya took vows of a layman from the Great Saint Ajitasena, who was a disciple of the order of Āchārya Āryasena, as stated in Gāthā 734 of *Jīva Kāṇḍa*. Rājā Chāmunda Rāya constructed a beautiful Jaina Temple now called Chāmunda Rāyā Basti at Chandragiri in front of Vindhyagiri at Shravaṇa Belgola, district Hasan, Mysore, containing a beautiful image of Śrī Nemi Nāth to whom our author has offered obeisance on several occasions in *Gommaṭasāra*.

He constructed in 983 A. C. the great and wonderful image of Śrī Bāhubali, called Gommaṭa Swāmī, Gommaṭeśvara, "the Lord of Gommaṭa", after his name.

Bāhubali was one of the sons of the first Tīrthaṅkara Rīṣabha Deva and ruled at Podnāpore. He had a contest with his elder brother Bharata and defeated him. But he felt so distressed on this account that he renounced all temporal power and adopted an ascetic life. He practised the severest austerities. He stood unmoved for a whole year, in standing posture, in meditation, so deep and concentrated that creepers spread and entwined themselves round his legs and arms. He was the first who obtained omniscience in this Avasarpiṇī cycle in Bharata Kṣetra even before Lord Rīṣabha. His unsurpassed severe austerities have been very often extolled in Jaina Shāstras. The wonderful image at Vindhyagiri represents this exemplary attitude of meditation.

The grandeur of the image, as also its serene-looking and peace-inspiring presence, are well-known to all Jainas and non-Jainas who have had the good fortune of visiting it. When I visited the sacred place, I met some English men and women missionaries, who out of respect for the Holy Image took off their shoes and visited it bare feet. They also held the opinion which I have given above. The Image is about 57 feet high and still every limb and minor limb thereof is in exquisite proportion. It is impossible to convey its glory and artistic excellence by words. Any one who has the chance of seeing it personally, will easily agree with the hitherto general opinion.

This gives an answer to some critics also, who call the Jainas idolatrous. The Jainas do not worship the stone, silver, gold or diamond of which the images are made. They worship the qualities of total Renunciation of the world, the Acquisition of undisturbable harmony with the Infinite, and the Identity of the Liberated Soul with peace-everlasting, which these images represent.

Also to quote Shakespeare with traduction :

"Ah me ! how sweet is Jina itself possess'd,

When but Jina's shadows are so rich in joy !"*

It is clear how irresistible and experientially axiomatic must have been the Peace and Guidance given by the Arhats and Omniscients, when their mere images are so potent of grace, peace and inspiration.

**Romeo & Juliet*, Act V, Scene 1.

So much for the origin of the name Gommatasāra.

A noticeable feature about *Gommatasāra* is that the author has always followed the earliest known beacon-lights of Jainism, after Lord Mahavīra's Mokṣa. The most known of these lights is Bhadrabāhu (the 5th śruta-kevali, 162 A. v.). He was the preceptor of the Mauryan Emperor Chandragupta, who became a saint and was called Prabhā Chandra and who renounced the body at Chandragiri Hill, Śravanabelgol, just in front of the feet of the great Bāhubali.

Śrī Nemi Chandra also follows the tradition of Śrī Kunda-Kundāchārya, who flourished in the first century B. C. As an authority on the learned Jain scriptures, he is next to Śrī Gautama Gaṇadhara, the chief of all saints, who directly received the discourses of Lord Mahavīra, delivered from his unquivering lips in letterless voice. Śrī Kunda-Kundāchārya has composed among others, the wonderful works on Jaina Metaphysics called *Samayasāra*, *Niyamasāra*, *Panchāstikāyasāra* and *Pravachanasāra*. He also followed the tradition of Umā Swāmī, who occupied the pontifical seat after Śrī Kunda-Kundāchārya and gave to the world the Jain Bible, *Tattvārtha Sūtra*.

The age and the date etc. of the author Śrī Nemi Chandra Siddhānta Chakravartī need not be repeated here, as they are dealt with at length in Book I, entitled *Dravya Saṃgraha**. He flourished about 1000 A. D.

According to Jaina Geography, a Karma Bhūmi (or region where human beings depend for their livelihood upon work, such as agriculture, etc.) has six parts: one Ārya Khaṇḍa or the part peopled by noble, religious and meritorious good people, and five Mleṣcha Khaṇḍas, peopled by the rest of the inhabitants of the Karma Bhūmi. The extreme northern and southern countries, Airāvata and Bhārata and 32 countries of Videha in the middle of Jambū Dvīpa are such Karma Bhūmis. A Chakravartī is the king of the capital of Ārya Khaṇḍa of Bhārata or Airāvata. He advances, and conquers all his neighbours, and by his prowess and piety brings all the five Mleṣcha Khaṇḍas under him and becomes the sole Emperor of all the six parts of Bhārata Kṣetra.

Similarly the Jaina scriptures are only a finite expressed part of the inexpressible all-grasping omniscience, which comprehends all the attributes and all modifications of all substances in all ages, past, present and future, from beginningless time to endless eternity.

Śrī Nemi Chandra was Siddhānta Chakravartī, because he had conquered all the realms of the known knowledge of the Sacred Books. He was called the Emperor because he had, like a Chakravartī conquering the six parts of Bhārata, mastered the famous authoritative works *Dhavalā* etc., composed by Bhūtabali and Puṣpadanta, the disciples of Arahātali some seven centuries after Lord Mahavīra. *Dhavalā* consists of six parts called "Jīva

**Supra* p. 12

Sthâna", "Kṣullaka Bandha", "Bandha Swâmî", "Vedanâkhaṇḍa", "Vargaṇâ-Khaṇḍa" and "Mahâbandha". Gâthâ 397 of *Karma Kâṇḍa* may be quoted here :

जह चक्केण य चक्की छक्खंडं साहियं अविग्गेण ।

तह मइचक्केण मया छक्खंडं साहियं सम्मं ॥

"Just as a Chakravartî monarch conquers six parts of the country by his Chakra weapon, so I have mastered the six parts of *Dhavalâ* etc., by my weapon of intellect."

His title is justified by his well-known books *Dravya Saṃgraha*, *Gommaṣasâra*, *Jîva Kâṇḍa* and *Karma Kâṇḍa*, *Labdhisâra*, *Kṣapaṇasâra* and the wonderful *Trilokasâra*, a book on Jaina Cosmology, without a study of which it is impossible to understand Jainism in its minute details and classifications or its artistic and perfect solidarity. His works deal mainly with Karṇânuyoga, one of the four Vedas or Anuyogas of the Jaina Siddhânta, the other three being Prathamânuyoga, Charaṇânuyoga and Dravyânuyoga.

1. *Prathamânuyoga* is History, the part dealing with the ages and lives of the great personages of the World, specially with those of the 63 Great Persons (Śalâkâ-Puruṣas), i.e. the 24 Tîrthaṃkaras, the 12 Chakravartîs, the 9 Nârâyaṇas, the 9 Prati-Nârâyaṇas and the 9 Balabhadras.

2. *Karṇânuyoga* is Cosmology, the part dealing with Space, the Universe, the Non-Universe, the three worlds, their description, dimensions and denizens and different calculations as regards spiritual stages and soul-quests.

3. *Charaṇânuyoga* is Ritual, the part dealing with rules of conduct for laymen and for ascetics. Of these, the former are detailed in the eleven Pratimâs or stages of restraint and renunciation of householders; the latter are the stricter and harder rules of greater and fuller restraint and renunciation for ascetics.

4. *Dravyânuyoga* is Philosophy, the part dealing with the substances. Primarily the substances are two: Soul and Non-soul. But they are enumerated as six, because the non-soul obviously consists of five independent and distinctly individual substances: Matter, Time, Space and the Media of Motion and Rest. Thus, there are six substances: Soul (Jîva), Matter (Pudgala), Time (Kâla), Space (Âkāṣa), Motion (Dharma), and Rest (Adharma).

Matter is of many kinds. But the most mighty kind is Karmic matter, which the mundane soul wears and which is the self-wound motor to keep the soul moving in "Saṃsâra".

This connection of Soul and the Non-Soul matter necessitates a consideration of the inflow of Karma into soul, the bondage of soul by Karma, the stoppage of the inflow, the shedding of the bondage, and perfect freedom of the soul from Karma. These seven are called the Tattvas or principles of Jainism. They are Jîva (Soul), Ajîva (Non-Soul), Âśrava (Inflow), Bandha

(Bondage), Saṃvara (Stoppage), Nirjarā (Shedding), and Mokṣa (Liberation).

There is another way of glancing at the subject. As the six Khandas of one Karma Bhūmi, huge as they are (the mere width of our Bharata Kṣetra is about 21 lacs of miles with a length of about 5 crores and 81 lacs of miles), are nothing compared with Space or the universe, even so the works and knowledge of Śrī Nemichandra, tremendous though they are, are really nothing in comparison with the whole knowledge, possessed by the Kevali Jina, the Omniscient Conqueror of Karmas.

Yet *Gommaṣasāra*, *Jīva Kāṇḍa* is a good introduction to the great Tattva, Soul (Jīva). "Know Thyself" has been the precept and practice of all serious searchers after the truth about Soul. Jainism is an uncompromising apotheosis of knowledge. And in a way, in Jainism even Omniscience also is experiential, almost empirical. The Soul in Omniscient Overflow (Kevala Samudghāta) touches the universe.

This Omniscience again is a negation of Noetics. There is no Science or progression in Omniscience. It is just the seeing of the Whole Truth. It is a full and direct manifestation of the Soul. Knowledge is the essence of soul. There is no soul without knowledge. There is no knowledge or knowability without soul. Non-omniscience is merely a result of the soul being obscured by the conation-obscuring, and knowledge-obscuring (Darshanā-varṇīya and Jñānāvarṇīya) Karmas. These being destroyed, Omniscience, the real natural characteristic of the Soul, manifests itself.

There are infinite souls. Each one has infinite attributes and modifications in Space and Time. It is not easy to classify and analyse and describe them. Less than an Omniscient cannot do it. Less than an Omniscient can follow it, only by faith and fragmentarily. Our puny measures of Logic, Science and popular Philosophy are as capable of measuring Omniscience, as our yards and inches are of measuring Space.

There are two ways known to us of having a very rough and remote idea of Omniscience. One is by considering the extent of early Jaina Sacred Literature which is mostly lost today; and the other and even a better one is by considering the Jaina theory of numbers. Both subjects are of high value, and immense use, and it is best to consider them here.

EARLY JAINA SACRED LITERATURE

The knowledge of Śruti, Śruta-Jñāna, may be of things which are contained in the Angas (Limbs or sacred books of the Jainas) or of things outside the Angas. There are 64 simple letters of the alphabet. Of these 33 are consonants, 27 vowels, and 4 auxiliary (which help in the formation of compound letters). The total number of possible combinations of these 64 simple letters into compounds of 2, 3, 4, or more up to 64 letters is :

$$2^{64} - 1 = 1,84,46,74,40,73,70,95,51,615.$$

These are the letters (simple and compound) of Śruta in its entirety. This number being divided by 16,348,307,888, which is the number of letters in a central foot (madhyama-pada) of the Paramâgama (Sacred Jaina Literature), gives us the number of padas of the Angas as 11,283,58,005. The remainder 80,108,175, gives us the letters of that part of Śruta which is not contained in the Angas. This part is divided into 14 Prakîrṇakas.

I. THE TWELVE ANGAS

The Angas are twelve, as follows :

1. The *Āchāra-anga* comprises a full exposition of the rules of conduct for ascetics. It contains 18,000 Madhyama Padas.

2. The *Sūtrakṛita-anga* comprises a detailed exposition of knowledge, humility etc., of religious rites, and difference between the rites of one's own religion and those of the other one-sided views. It contains 36,000 Madhyama Padas.

3. The *Sthāna-anga* comprises an exposition of one or more sthānas, or numerical points of view in considering Jīva (Soul), Pudgala (Matter) and other Dravyas. While the Jīva-dravya or soul is from the point of view of consciousness one and the same everywhere, from the point of view of being liberated (siddha) or mundane (saṃsārin) it is of two kinds. Similarly the saṃsārin, or mundane Jīva, that is the soul not yet perfectly freed from the bondage of karmas which keep it moving in the cycle of existences, is of three kinds—one-sensed immobile (sthāvara), not full-sensed (vikalendriya), and in possession of all the organs of the senses or full-sensed (sakalendriya). The liberated souls too, are of many kinds from the point of view of place, time etc. This anga contains 42,000 Madhyama Padas.

4. The *Samavāya-anga* gives an account of the similarities that arise from the point of view of Dravya (elements of the universe), Kṣetra (place), Kāla (time), and Bhāva (character). From the point of view of dravya, Dharma and Adharma are alike (that is, both are constituent elements of the universe). From the point of view of place, the breadth of human region, and of the first central hole of the first hell (indrakabila), and the first central car or abode of the first heaven (indrakavimāna), and the abode of siddhas are alike. From the point of view of time, the Utsarpiṇi and Avasarpiṇi, the ascending and descending arcs or eras are alike. From the point of view of bhāva, right-belief and right-knowledge are the same. This Anga has 164,000 Madhyama Padas.

5. The *Vyākhyā-prajñapti-anga* gives an account of the 60,000 questions which the chief disciples put to the Omniscient Lord, the Tīrthaṃkara, with their answers. It has 228,000 Madhyama Padas.

6. The *Jñātṛidharma-kathā-anga* is also called Dharma-Kathā-anga. It gives an exposition in detail of the nature etc., of the nine padārthas—

Jiva etc., as well as the answers to questions which the Gaṇadharas put to the Lord. It has 556,000 Madhyama Padas.

7. The *Upāsakādhyayna-anga* gives details of the eleven stages of a householder's life, the vows of chastity etc., and other rules of conduct for the householder, as well as aphorisms and lectures on the same. It has 1,170,000 Madhyama Padas.

8. The *Antakṛit-daśa-anga* gives an account in detail of the ten ascetics who, in the period of each of the twenty-four Tirthaṃkaras, undergo very strict sufferings in asceticism and finally set themselves free from the bondage of karma. It has 2,328,000 Madhyama Padas.

9. The *Anuttaropapādaka-daśa-anga* gives an account of the ten great ascetics who, in the period of each Tirthaṃkara, practise asceticism of a very high type and in virtue of that take birth in the five Anuttaravimānas, or heavens, such as Vijaya etc. It has 9,244,000 Madhyama Padas.

10. The *Praśna-vyākaraṇa-anga* gives instructions as to how to reply to questions relating to past and future time, gain and loss, happiness and misery, life and death, good and evil, etc. It also furnishes an account of the four kinds of narration, viz., Ākṣepanī (substantiation), Vikṣepanī (refutation), Samvedanī (devotion), Nirvedanī (renunciation). It has 9,316,000 Madhyama Padas.

11. The *Vipāka-sūtra-anga* contains an exposition of the bondage, operation, and existence of Karmas, and of their intensity or mildness from the point of view of dravya, kṣetra, kāla and bhāva. It has 18,400,000 Madhyama Padas.

12. The *Dṛiṣṭi-pravāda-anga* has 1,086,856,005 Madhyama Padas. It is divided into five parts: five Parikarmas, Sūtra, Prathamānuyoga, fourteen Pūrva-gatas, and five Chūlikās. These five parts will be considered one by one.

A. Five Parikarmas

1. The *Chandra-prajñapti* Parikarma contains accounts of the motion, period, satellites of the moon; the variations of lunar days and months; and the celestial influence of the moon; its eclipses, etc. This has 3,605,000 Madhyama Padas.

2. The *Sūrya-prajñapti* deals with the greatness, influences, satellites, etc. of the sun. It has 503,000 Madhyama Padas.

3. The *Jambū-Dvīpa-prajñapti* contains an account of Jambūdvīpa with its Meru Mount, mountain ranges, lakes, rivers etc. It has 325,000 Madhyama Padas.

4. The *Dvīpa-Sāgar-prajñapti* contains an account of all the continents and oceans and the residences of the Bhavana-Vāsi (residential), Vyantara (peripatetic), Jyotiṣa (stellar) celestials, and the sites of Jaina temples. It has 5,236,000 Madhyama Padas.

5. The *Vyākhyā-prajñāpti* contains a numerical account of Jīva, Ajīva, the nine padārthas etc. It has 8,436,000 Madhyama Padas.

B. Sutra

This contains an account of 363 false creeds, or heretic faiths. Some of their doctrines are viewed in their application to the soul. Some say : Soul cannot be bound by Karmas. Others say : It does nothing; has no attributes; does not bear the fruit of action; is self-manifesting or self-evident; can be manifested only by non-self; is real, is unreal etc.—one-sided views of soul. These views are refuted and the true description of soul given. This text has 8,800,000 Madhyama Padas.

C. Prathamamanuyoga

This contains an account of the 63 great personages—24 Tīrthaṃkaras, 12 Chakravartīs, 9 Nārāyaṇas, 9 Pratinārāyaṇas, and 9 Bala-bhadras. This has 5,000 Madhyama Padas.

D. Fourteen Purvagatas

1. The *Utpāda-pūrvā* contains an exposition of the nature of Jīva (soul), Pudgala (matter), Kāla (time) etc., from the point of view of their rise, decay and continuity in different places and at different times. It has 10,000,000 Madhyama Padas.

2. The *Agrāyaṇīya-pūrvā* contains an account of the seven tattvas, nine padārthas, six dravyas, and different right and wrong standpoints of view. It has 9,600,000 Madhyama Padas.

3. The *Vīryānuvāda-pūrvā* gives us account of the powers of the soul, of the non-soul, of both, of place, of time, of nature or character (bhāva-vīrya), of austerity (tapo-vīrya), and of the powers of the Narendras, Chakra-dharas, Bala-devas etc. It has 7,000,000 Madhyama Padas.

4. The *Astināsti-pravāda-pūrvā* gives an account of Jīva and other dravyas, as they may be considered to be existent or non-existent from the point of view of place, time, nature, etc. Account is also given of the Saptā-bhaṅgī, or seven ways of considering things, and their use in taking a comprehensive view of things. It has 6,000,000 Madhyama Padas.

5. The *Jñāna-pravāda-pūrvā* contains a detailed account, analysis, and subject-matter of the mati, śruta, avadhi, manahparyaya, and kevala-jñāna and of ku-mati, ku-śruta, and ku-avadhi jñāna, i.e. of the five kinds of right, and three kinds of wrong knowledge. It has 9,999,999 Madhyama Padas.

6. The *Satya-pravāda-pūrvā* deals with silence and speech, with the twelve kinds of speech, kinds of speakers, and with many kinds of false speeches and ten kinds of true speeches. It has 10,000,006 Madhyama Padas.

7. The *Ātma-pravāda-pūrvā* deals with the soul as the doer of and enjoyer from the niśchaya (real) and vyavahāra (practical) point of view. From the

Vyavahāra point of view, Jīva has four or ten vitalities (prāṇas); and from the Nīśchaya point of view or ultimate reality, only one, namely consciousness; and is such as has been, is, and will be imbued with prāṇa. From the practical point of view it does good or bad deeds; from the real standpoint it has pure modifications in its own nature. From practical point of view it is said to speak falsely or truly; from the real standpoint it has no speech. It is called prāṇin, because the prāṇas are found in it both internally and externally, from both points of view. From the real point of view, it enjoys its own true bliss, but from a practical standpoint it enjoys the fruits of its Karmas, good or bad. From a practical point, it absorbs the material Karmas and is material; in reality it is immaterial. From both points of view it exists at all times and knows all the things of the past, present and future. From a practical view-point it pervades the body, but in reality it has innumerable spatial units of universe, equal in dimensions to Lokākāśa. By knowledge it may be said to pervade all space and is therefore called Viṣṇu. Although from practical view-point it is mundane, yet in reality it is itself, *i.e.* identical with its own knowledge and conation and therefore is called Svayambhū, self-existent. Although it is corporeal because it has audārika (physical) and other bodies, yet in reality it is incorporeal. From practical point of view it is called man (mānava) because of its present incarnation in a human body; but in reality it should be called *mānava* because of its possession of the faculty of knowing. And many other things concerning the soul are given in this pūrva. It has 260,000,000 Madhyama Padas.

8. The *Karma-pravāda* gives the various conditions, such as bandha (bondage), sattā (existence or presence), udaya (mature appearance or operation), udiraṇā (pre-mature operation), utkarṣaṇa (prolongation), apakarṣaṇa (diminution or retardation), saṃkramaṇa (transformation), upaśama (subsidence), nidhatti and niṣkāñchita (forms of existence), etc. of the eight kinds of Karmas, from the points of view of primary (prakṛiti), secondary (uttara prakṛiti) and tertiary nature (uttarottara-prakṛiti). It also deals with the various conditions of minds and also such actions as īryāpatha etc. It has 18,000,000 Madhyama Padas.

9. The *Pratyākhyāna-pūrva* deals with the things which should be renounced by man for all time, or for a fixed period of time in accordance with the condition of his body, strength etc., from the points of view of nāma (name), sthāpanā (representation), dravya (substance), kṣetra (place), kāla (time), and bhāva (condition); also with fasts, with the five samitis (carefulness) and the three guptis (restraints) and also with the renunciation of absolutely bad things. It has 8,400,000 Madhyama Padas.

10. The *Vidyānuvāda-pūrva* contains the 700 minor sciences, and the 500 kinds of higher learning. It gives the nature of the learning, the qualities requisite to attain it, the ways of pursuing it, its formulæ, instruments, and diagrams, and the advantages that accrue to one who has mastered it. It also

deals with the eight kinds of knowledge. It has 11,000,000 Madhyama Padas.

11. The *Kalyāṇa-vāda-pūrva* gives an account of the grand celebration of the great points (kalyāṇaka) in the lives of Tirthaṅkaras, Chakra-dharas, Vāsudevas etc., and of the sixteen causes, and austerities that lead to a soul becoming a Tirthaṅkara, or that make it deserving of the high positions in life; and also an account of the influence of the motions of the planets, sun, moon, and Nakṣatras (constellations), and that of their eclipses and of the auguries. It has 260,000,000 Madhyama Padas.

12. The *Prāṇa-vāda-pūrva* contains an account of eight kinds of medical science, of removal of pains caused by spirits and ghosts, by means of chanted formulae, or offering made under certain conditions, of antidotes to venoms of serpents etc., and of how to ascertain the auspiciousness of occasions by examining the respiration of men; of the ten currents of vitality in man's body; and of things which are agreeable or disagreeable to these currents in various forms of existence (such as that of men, animals etc.). It has 130,000,000 Madhyama Padas.

13. The *Kriyā-viśāla-pūrva* treats of music, prosody, figures of speech; of the 72 arts; of the technical arts; of dexterity; of 64 arts of women; of their 84 rites such as pregnancy etc., of 108 rites such as right-belief, right-knowledge etc., and of 25 rites such as bowing to the gods etc., and also of necessary and occasional rites. It has 90,000,000 Madhyama Padas.

14. The *Triloka-bindu-sāra-pūrva* gives an account of the three worlds, the 26 parikramās (preparatory rites), 8 vyavahāras (kinds of occupation), 4 bījagaṇitas (4 branches of mathematics, algebra etc.) and the way of attaining mokṣa and the glory and happiness of having attained it. It has 125,000,000 Madhyama Padas.

E. The Five Chulikas

1. The *Ālagatā Chūlikā* gives the methods of staying water, of walking through water, of stopping fire, of passing through fire, of eating fire, by means of incantations or offerings.

2. The *Sthalagatā Chūlikā* gives an account of the methods of incantations and offerings, by which to go to Meru mountain and other countries, to travel swiftly etc.

3. The *Māyagatā Chūlikā* contains the incantations and offerings for performing miracles and tricks or sleights of hand.

4. The *Rūpagatā Chūlikā* contains the methods of transformation into the shape of a lion, elephant, horse, ox, deer etc., by means of incantations, offerings, and austerities etc. It also contains an account of the processes of artificial transformation in the vegetable world, as well as that of combination or alteration of the metals and elements under chemical processes.

5. The *Ākāsagatā Chūlikā* deals with the incantations, offerings, and austerities, by which man is enabled to travel in space etc.

Each of the five Chūlikās has 20,989,200 Madhyama Padas.

The Anga Scriptures and their 1,12,83,58,005 Madhyama Padas are tabulated as below :

The Anga Scripts.			
1. Āchāra-anga	..	..	18,000
2. Sūtra-kṛita-anga	..	..	36,000
3. Sthāna-aga	..	..	42,000
4. Saṁvaya-anga	..	..	164,000
5. Vyākhyā-prajñapti	..	..	228,000
6. Jñātri-dharma-kathā-anga	..	..	556,000
7. Upāsaka-adhyayana-anga	..	..	1,170,000
8. Anta-kṛiḍa-daśa-anga	..	..	2,328,000
9. Anuttara-upapādaka-daśa-anga	..	..	9,244,000
10. Praśna-vyākaraṇa-anga	..	..	9,316,000
11. Vipāka-sūtra-anga	..	..	18,400,000
12. Dṛiṣṭi-pravāda-anga	..	..	1,086,856,005
5 Parikarmas.			
1. Chandra-prajñapti	3,605,000		
2. Sūrya-prajñapti	503,000		
3. Jambū-dvīpa-prajñapti	325,000		
4. Dvīpa-prajñapti	5,236,000		
5. Vyākhyā-prajñapti	8,436,000		
Total	18,105,000	18,105,000	
Sūtra	8,800,000	8,800,000	
Prathamānuyoga	5,000	5,000	
14 Pūrvagatā			
1. Utpāda-pūrvā	10,000,000		
2. Agrāyaṇīya-pūrvā	9,600,000		
3. Viryānuvāda-pūrvā	7,000,000		
4. Astināsti-pravāda-pūrvā	6,000,000		
5. Jñāna-pravāda-pūrvā	9,999,999		
6. Satya-pravāda-pūrvā	10,000,006		
7. Ātma-pravāda-pūrvā	260,000,000		
8. Karma-pravāda-pūrvā	18,000,000		
9. Pratyākhyāna-pūrvā	8,400,000		
10. Vidyānuvāda-pūrvā	11,000,000		
11. Kalyāṇa-vāda-pūrvā	260,000,000		
12. Praṇa-vāda-pūrvā	130,000,000		
13. Kriyā-viśāla-pūrvā	90,000,000		
14. Triloka-bindusāra-pūrvā	125,000,000		
Total	955,000,005	955,000,005	
5 Chūlikās			
1. Jalagatā Chūlikā	20,989,200		
2. Sthālagatā Chūlikā	20,989,200		
3. Māyāgatā Chūlikā	20,989,200		
4. Rupāgatā Chūlikā	20,989,200		
5. Akāśāgatā Chūlikā	20,989,200		
Total	104,946,000	104,946,000	
		1,086,856,005	1,128,358,005

II—THE ANGA-BÂHYA ŚRUTA, OR SCRIPTURES OTHER THAN THE TWELVE ANGAS

These contain 80,108,175 letters divided into fourteen Prakîrṇakas.

1. The *Sāmāyika-prakîrṇaka* contains an account of the six kinds of Samāyika : nāma (name), sthâpanâ (representation), dravya (substance), kṣetra (place), kâla (time) and bhâva (nature or condition).

2. The *Samstava-prakîrṇaka* gives an account of the five stages in the lives of Tirthaṃkaras, their thirty-four powers, eight Pratihâryas (miracles), most refined body, Samavasaraṇa (Divine Hall of Audience), and preaching of dharma or religious doctrine.

3. The *Vandanâ-prakîrṇaka* deals with the temples and other places of worship.

4. The *Pratikramaṇa-prakîrṇaka* gives an account of those methods that are necessary for the removal of those defects that are related to the day, to the night, to the fortnight, to the four months, and to the year; relating to the îryâpatha (careful walking), and those defects which arise in the perfect condition of the death of a pious man.

5. The *Vinaya-prakîrṇaka* gives an account of five kinds of vinaya (humility and becoming modesty of behaviour) relating to belief, knowledge, conduct, austerity, and behaviour.

6. The *Kṛiti-karma-prakîrṇaka* gives detailed accounts of the modes of worship etc. of the Jinas (Tirthaṃkars); and of the significance of obeisance and reverence paid to Arhats, Siddhas, Achâryas, Upâdhyâyas, Sâdhus, images of Jaina Tirthaṃkaras, the word of Jinas, and the Jaina temples, by making three bows to them and by going round them three times, from the right to left, by making twelve obeisances and by bending the head in the four directions.

7. The *Daśa-vaikâlîka-prakîrṇaka* contains rules of conduct and of purity of food for the ascetics.

8. The *Uttarâdhyayana-prakîrṇaka* gives details and effects of four kinds of disturbances and twenty-two kinds of troubles or sufferings (pariṣaha) that an ascetic may have to undergo.

9. The *Kalpa-vyavahâra-prakîrṇaka* gives the right practices of the ascetics and also details of purificatory methods on lapses from right practices.

10. The *Kalpâkalpa-prakîrṇaka* considers the things, places, or thoughts that may be allowable for use by a monk, from the points of view of substance, place, time and nature.

11. The *Makâkalpa-sanjñaka-prakîrṇaka* gives an account of the rules of ascetic practices (Yoga) in the three ages (past, present, and future) that are suitable to Jina-kalpin (independent monks), with reference to body etc., and in accordance with the substance, place, time, and nature or condition; and also an account of the rules of conduct of Sthavira kalpin (members of orders), relating to initiation, teaching, maintaining ascetics,

self-purification, and sal-lekhanâ (pious death) and high forms of worship performed in sacred places.

12. The *Pundarîka-prakîrṇaka* gives details of charity, worship, austerity, belief, self-control etc., that lead the soul to incarnation in one of the four classes of celestials; also an account of the birthplaces of the celestials.

13. The *Mahâ-pundarîka-prakîrṇaka* gives details of the causes, austerity etc. that lead to a soul being reborn as Indra, Pratindra etc.

14. The *Niṣidhikâ-prakîrṇaka* gives many methods of purifying oneself from the faults arising from carelessness.

THE JAINA THEORY OF NUMBERS

The other way of gaining some slight and distant idea of Omniscience is to consider the Jaina Theory of Numbers.

BRIEF STATEMENT OF 21 KINDS OF NUMBERS

Names of the numbers	Their Algebraical expressions		Remarks
I. SAMKHYÂTA. (=S.)			
1. Jaghanya S. ..	A=2	A=2	
2. Madhyama S. ..	B=3, 4 &c., upto C-1.	B=3, 4, 5 to D-2.	
3. Utkriṣṭa S. ..	C=D-1	C=D-1	
II. ASAMKHYÂTA (=A).			
4. Jaghanya Parita A. ..	D=(See below)	D=(See below)	
5. Madhyama Parita A. ..	E=D+1 to F-1.	E=D+1 to D ^d -2.	
6. Utkriṣṭa Parita A. ..	F=G-1	F=D ^d -1	
7. Jaghanya Yukta A. ..	G=D ^d	G=D ^d	E.g. number of instants in an Avali or wink.
8. Madhyama Yukta A. ..	H=D ^d +1 to I-1.	H=D ^d +1 to D ^{2d} -2	Number of spatial units in Lokâ which can be the possible subject matter of visual knowledge (Avadhî Jñâna) of the highest kind.
9. Utkriṣṭa Yukta A. ..	I=J-1	I=D ^{2d} -1	
10. Jaghanya Asamkhyâta A.	J=G ²	J=D ^{2d}	
11. Madhyama Asamkhyâta A.	K=G ² +1 to L-1.	K=D ^{2d} +1 to M-2.	
12. Utkriṣṭa Asamkhyâta A. ..	L=M-1	L=M-1	

Names of the numbers		Their Algebraical expressions		Remarks
III. ANANTA (=A).				
13. Jaghanya Parita A.	..	M=(See below).	M=(See below).	E.g. number of souls incapable of liberation.
14. Madhyama Parita A.	..	N=M+1 to 0-1.	N=M+1 to M ^m -2	
15. Utkṛiṣṭa Parita A.	..	O=P-1	O=M ^m -1	
16. Jaghanya Yukta A.	..	P=M ^m	P=M ^m	
17. Madhyama Yukta A.	..	Q=P+1 to R-1.	Q=M ^m +1 to M ^{2m} -2	Number of Siddhas.
18. Utkṛiṣṭa Yukta A.	..	R=S-1	R=M ^{2m} -1	
19. Jaghanya Ananta A.	..	S=P ²	S=M ^{2m}	
20. Madhyama Ananta A.	..	T=S+1 to U-1.	T=M ^{2m} +1 to U-1.	
21. Utkṛiṣṭa Ananta A.	..	U=Perfect knowledge.	U=Perfect knowledge.	

Jaghanya = Minimum.

Madhyama = Medium.

Utkriṣṭa = Maximum.

All Minimums are :—A, D, G, J, M, P, S.=2, D, D^d, D^{2d}, M, M^m, M^{2m}.

So, really there are only two unknowns, i.e. D and M.

Parita = Preliminary

Yukta = Advanced.

Ananta = Infinite.


Saṃkhyāta. = Numerable.

Asaṃkhyāta = Innumerable.

Ananta = Infinite.



TABLE OF NAMES OF NUMERATION



Note—Jaghanya and Utkriṣṭa everywhere represent only one number.

In the above Table

A=2
B=3, 4 &c. to C—1
C=(D—1)
D=as given below
E=D+1, D+2 &c. to F—1
F=(G—1)
G=D^d

H=G+1, G+2 &c. to I—1
I=(J—1)
J=G^g
K=J+1, J+2&c., to L—1
L=(M—1)
M=as given below
N=M+1, M+2&c. to O—1

U=Number of units of perfect knowledge.

O=(P—1)
P=M^m (This is the number of souls incapable of Liberation)
Q=P+1, P+2&c. to R—1
R=(S—1)
S=P^p
T=S+1, S+2&c. to U—1



In the footnote to table on page 108, it has been demonstrated that really there are only two unknowns—D. and M. Let us see what they are.

D. or Jaghanya Parita Asamkhyata

To find D., *i.e.* Jaghanya Parita Asamkhyâta.

Let there be four pits each of 1 lac Yojanas in diameter,
and 1000 Yojanas deep and called : Anavasthâ (d¹)
Śalākā (B¹)
Pratiśalākā (Y¹)
Mahāśalākā (X)

Fill d¹ with round rape-seeds; overfill it from its mouth surface in a regular conical form, the apex of which is one rape-seed; as 

The number of seeds in the pit is $\left. \begin{array}{r} 197912092999 \\ 680000000000000000 \\ 0000000000000000 \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} 45 \text{ figs.} \\ (31 \text{ zeroes}). \end{array}$

The number in the cone above $\left. \begin{array}{r} 17992008454516 \\ 3636363636363636 \\ 3636363636363636 \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} 46 \text{ figs.} \\ (16 \text{ thirty sixes}). \end{array}$

The total seeds are $\left. \begin{array}{r} 19971129384513163636363636 \\ 36363636363636363636^{4/11} \end{array} \right\} 46 \text{ figs.}$
Say Z

From this filling of d¹, drop one seed in B¹.

Then take up the seeds from d¹, and drop one seed on each of the Continents and Oceans beginning with Jambûdvîpa. Where the last seed is dropped, it would be an Ocean. (Disregard the $\frac{4}{11}$ seed, which will not be in the Cone). Now dig a pit of the diameter of this Ocean, of the same depth, *i.e.* 1000 Yojanas. Call it d²; and fill it in with rape-seeds like a topping Cone, as d¹ was filled in. Then drop another rape-seed in B¹ from the filling of d².

Then take up the seeds from d² and drop one each on the Continents and Oceans beginning with the Continent next to the Ocean where the last seed from d¹ was dropped. Wherever in a Continent or Ocean the last seed of d² is dropped, take the diameter of that as the diameter of the next pit d³ which is also 1000 Yojanas deep. Fill it up conically like d¹ and d². From the filling of d³, drop a third rape-seed into B¹.

Repeat till B¹ is filled in the usual top Conical form. The number of seeds in B¹ is Z; and much greater in each of the pits d¹ to d² successively, because their diameters are much larger at each step.

From the filling of B^1 drop a seed in Y^1 . Repeat the same process of dropping one seed on each Continent and Ocean, beginning from the one next to where the last seed from the last Z pit was dropped. The next pit $Lz+1$ will be 1000 Yojanas deep and with a diameter of the Continent or Ocean where the last seed from the Lz pit was dropped. Go on till there are Z^2 pits of the L class with ever-increasing diameter. When the last pit, *i.e.* Lz^2 is exhausted, drop one seed in Y^1 .

Now Y^1 is also conically filled. Then drop the first seed in X. Repeat till X is also filled. Then the number of L pits will be Z^3 . The number of seeds in the last of these Z^3 pits is the number D or Jaghanya Parīta Asaṃkhyāta. In other words, $D = \text{number of rape-seeds in the } Z^3\text{-th pit}$, where $Z = 46$ figures and where each Continent and Ocean in the width of its ring is double of its immediate predecessor, and never more than only one seed is dropped on each. In other words to find D., *i.e.* Jaghanya Parīta Asaṃkhyāta, take a pit of the diameter of Jambūdvīpa, *i.e.* of 1 lac Yojanas and of 1000 Yojana depth. Fill it with round rape-seeds; overfill it from its mouth surface

in a regular conical form, the apex of which is one rape-seed; as 

The number of seeds in the pit is	..	..	.. 45 figs.
” ” ” ” in the cone is	..	..	.. 46 figs.
			—
The total seeds are	..	..	.. 46 figs.
			Say Z.

Now there are innumerable Continents and Oceans in the Middle World (Madhya Loka). Each Continent is surrounded by a ring of an Ocean, which in its turn is ringed round by a Continent. Also the width of the ring of each Continent and Ocean is double the width of the ring of its immediately preceding Ocean and Continent.

Now we take the Z seeds out of our first pit, and drop one seed, on each of the Continents and Oceans beginning with Jambūdvīpa. Where the last seed is dropped, it would be an Ocean. Now dig a pit of the diameter of this Ocean. Fill it with rape-seeds in the form of a topping Cone as before.

Take the seeds out of it and proceed to drop one each, beginning from the Continent next to the Ocean which gave us the diameter of this 2nd pit. Then wherever you drop the last seed of this 2nd pit, take the diameter of that Continent or Ocean for a fresh pit, which is to be filled conically as before and the seeds from which are also to be disposed of as before.

Go on doing this for Z^3 times. The number of seeds in the last, *i.e.* Z^3 -th pit is D.

The imaginary dropping of rape-seeds on the Continents and Oceans serves the purpose of showing

(1) the tremendous extent of the area of the Middle World;



- (2) the real character of the Jaina Mathematical ideal of an innumerable number, which although innumerable is still not infinite; and
- (3) the tremendous, soul-staggering extent of Omniscience.

G. or Jaghanya Yukta Asamkhyata.

Take D and *virlana* it, or spread it into its units, *i.e.* write down as many ones as there are units in D. On the top of each one, place a D (called Deya). Multiply all together. The product is D^d . This is equal to G. This is the number of instants (*samayas*) in an *Avalî* or wink.

In other words $G = D^d$.

M. or Jaghanya Parita-Ananta

Now we come to the other great unknown M.

To find $M = \text{Jaghanya Parita Ananta}$.

Take Jaghanya Asamkhyâta Asamkhyâta, J. which is $= G^2 = D^{2d}$

Treat it to the third degree of Śalâkâ-Virlana-Deya, as below. In Śalâkâ-Virlana-Deya, there are always three dispositions of the number treated. The first is called Śalâkâ. The number kept in this is reduced by one at each completion of process in the next two dispositions. The second disposition is called Virlana. In this, one is placed in as many places as there are units in the number. The third disposition is Deya. It is the number which is given to be placed on the top of every unit in the Virlana. The first Deya is always the number itself.

Let us treat 3 by this method. We place 3 as Śalâkâ. We place 3 ones under Virlana; and the Deya is 3.

In the Virlana, on the top of each one we place 3. We multiply all these threes and get $3 \times 3 \times 3 = 27$. This is the next Deya. Now we reduce the Śalâkâ by one. So at the second step we have 2 as Śalâkâ; 27 ones as Virlana; and 27 as Deya. The next Deya would be 27^{27} . Now we reduce the Śalâkâ by another one. So at the third step we have 1 as Śalâkâ; 27^{27} ones as Virlana, and 27^{27} as Deya. The next Deya or the result of Virlana is

$$\left[\left\{ (27)^{27} \right\}^{27} \right]^{27}$$

Let us express it symbolically thus: $27 \left[\begin{smallmatrix} 4 \end{smallmatrix} \right]$, which means that 27 is to be written four times, once as a base, then as a power of that base, then as a power of that power and so on.

If we take the last result, *i.e.* $27 \left[\begin{smallmatrix} 4 \end{smallmatrix} \right]$, and treat it by the Śalâkâ method as we treated the three above, it would be a two-fold treatment. Thus: take $27 \left[\begin{smallmatrix} 4 \end{smallmatrix} \right]$ and treat it as Śalâkâ, Virlana, Deya. Virlana $27 \left[\begin{smallmatrix} 4 \end{smallmatrix} \right]$ and place on the top of each unit of the Virlana process the number $27 \left[\begin{smallmatrix} 4 \end{smallmatrix} \right]$.

multiply all these 27 [4] together and now reduce one out of the Śalākā number 27 [4]. The product of this multiplication should be considered as the next Virlana and Deya. Virlana this virlana into separate units and place on the top of each unit, the Deya thus obtained. Multiply together all these Deya. Then reduce one more from our Śalākā 27 [4]. Consider the product of this second multiplication to be the next Virlana and Deya; Virlana it as before and place on the top of each Virlana unit this product and multiply all these Deya together and then again subtract one from our Śalākā 27 [4]; proceed serially in the same way considering the ever-and ever-increasing new and new product of each multiplication as Virlana and Deya; and go on virlaning and multiplying together the new ever-increasing product of the multiplication, at each step reducing one at a time from 27 [4], until the whole Śalākā 27 [4] is totally exhausted; thus we reach the end of the two-fold treatment. The result of this second treatment also being treated in the Śalākā way will give us the third degree Śalākā treatment of 3, i.e. the huge product of the multiplication at the end of the second Śalākā treatment should be treated and considered as the new and fresh Śalākā, Virlana and Deya; and it should be exhausted exactly as above by successive Virlana and Deya, placing Deya on each unit and then multiplying all Deya together and then reducing one from this Śalākā on each multiplication of all the Deya. This is technically called Śalākā-Traya-Niṣṭhāpana. The result of treating J. like this is a kind of K. To this result add the following six :

1. The innumerable spatial units of the substance of motion (Dharma Dravya).
2. The innumerable spatial units of the substance of rest (Adharma Dravya).
3. The innumerable spatial units of one soul (Ek Jīva Dravya).
4. The innumerable spatial units of the universe-space (Lokākāśa).
5. Innumerable $\times$ innumerable spatial units of the Universe, i.e. the number of non-host individual souls (Apratiṣṭhita Pratyeka).
6. Innumerable $\times$ innumerable spatial units, i.e. the number of host individual souls (Sapratīṣṭhita Pratyeka).

Take the total of theses even and treat it to Śalākā-Traya-Niṣṭhāpana as above. The result is again a kind of K. To this add the following four :

1. Instants of one Kalpa or a cycle of Avasarpinī and Utsarpinī (the instants of 20 crore $\times$ crore sāgaras of years).
2. Innumerable $\times$ innumerable spatial units of the Universe, i.e. the number of thought-activities of the soul which determine the duration of bondage of Karmas (Sthiti-bandha Adhyavasāya Sthāna).
3. Innumerable $\times$ innumerable spatial units of the Universe, i.e. the number of degrees of passion which determine the intensity, or the mild or strong fruition, of bondage of Karmas (Anubhāgabandha-Adhyavasāya Sthāna).

4. Innumerable $\times$ innumerable spatial units of the Universe, *i.e.* the number of the units of soul's vibratory activities (Avibhāga pratiṣṭheda of Yoga).

Take the total of these five and treat it to Śalākā-Traya-Niṣṭhāpana as above. The result is equal to M.

U. or Utkrista Ananta-Ananta.

Take S. Treat it to Śalākā-Traya-Niṣṭhāpana. The result is a kind of T. To this add the following six :

1. Infinite part of all souls, *i.e.*, the number of liberated souls (Siddhas).
2. Infinite $\times$ above, *i.e.* the number of common or group-souled vegetable (sādhāraṇa vanaspati nigoda) souls (*i.e.* all the mundane souls, except the earth, water, fire, air, and individual or one-souled vegetable, and mobile souls).
3. Infinite $\times$ above, *i.e.* the number of all vegetable souls (Vanaspati).
4. Infinite $\times$ all souls, *i.e.* the number of atoms of matter (Pudgala).
5. Infinite $\times$ infinite matter-atoms, *i.e.* number of instants in Practical Time (Vyavahāra Kāla).
6. Infinite $\times$ infinite instants in Practical Time, *i.e.* the number of spatial units in the non-universe space (Alokākāśa).

Take the total of these seven and treat it to Śalākā-Traya-Niṣṭhāpana. The result is again a kind of T. To this add the infinite $\times$ the infinite which is the number of units (Avibhāga Pratiṣṭheda) of the individuality attribute (Aguru-laghu-guṇa) in the substances of Motion and Rest (Dharma and Adharma Dravya).

Take the total of these two, and treat it to Śalākā-Traya-Niṣṭhāpana. The result is a kind of T.

Subtract this from the number of units (Avibhāga Pratiṣṭheda) of perfect knowledge (Kevala Jñāna); and then add it to the remainder.

Thus the number of units of perfect knowledge is U.

This last subtraction and addition of the same, is to show that even this last kind of T, soul-straining though it is, is nothing compared with U, Omniscience, which is the goal and glory of Jainism, being the highest and the most Ideal condition of the Purest possible soul.

Note that the expression "innumerable $\times$ innumerable," and "infinite $\times$ infinite" is employed above, because the innumerable and the infinites are not the same. By this time it will be clear that there are a huge number of these innumerable and infinites in the Middle kinds, included in E. H. K. and in N. Q. and T.

THE CONTENTS OF GOMMATASĀRA

This book is really a very brief and hasty glance at the Great Theme, a feeble human effort to give a rough idea of the soul-astounding extent

of Divine Ominiscience. It confines itself to a short account of Spritual Stages and Soul-quests which are the well-known Jaina ways of considering the soul.

Jīva Kāṇḍa is only the first Part of the great work *Gommaṭasāra*; the second Part being the Karma Kāṇḍa. The two Parts together are a brief expansion and explanation of the beautiful little *Dravya Saṃgraha*, by the same author. "Jīvamajīvaṃ Davvaṃ" (जीवमजीवं दब्बं), the living and the non-living substances are the opening words of *Dravya Saṃgraha*. *Gommaṭasāra* simply deals with these two mighty categories with the living soul in the Jīva Kāṇḍa, and with the non-living Karmic matter in the Karma Kāṇḍa.

Dravya Saṃgraha is the barest enumeration of the topics of Jainism with their main divisions and sub-divisions. It consists of 58 Gāthās in 5 Parts.

Jīva Kāṇḍa consists of 734 Gāthās in 22 Parts or 20 Chapters and 2 Appendices.

The topics in the 20 Chapters are introduced in Gāthā 2, viz. 14 spiritual stages (Guṇa-Sthāna); 14 soul-classes (Jīva Samāsa); 6 kinds of capacity to develop (Paryāpti); 10 vitalities (Prāṇa); 4 kinds of animate feelings or impulse (Saṃjñā); and 14 Soul-quests (Mārganā); also 12 kinds of conscious attentiveness (Upayoga).

In the 20 chapters, the 14 soul-quests alone form 14 chapters, the others take one chapter each. Gāthā 4 tells us how Soul-classes, Developableness, Vitalities, Rationality and Attention are included in the 14 Quests, and therefore the chief considerations in treating of the soul are :

14 Spiritual stages, the degree to which the mundane soul has advanced in its freedom from wrong-belief, vowlessness, negligence, passions and vibratory activity; and

14 Soul-quests, the conditions, circumstances, and equipments which help us to identify the soul when we are seeking to mark it in the infinity of mundane existences.

These two are also interconnected. The stages classify the soul briefly the quests take them up in greater detail

The stages are named in Gāthās 9-10.

मिच्छो सासरा मिस्सो अविरदसम्मो य देसविरदो य ।
विरदा पमत्त इदरो अपुव्व अणियट्ठि सुहमो य ॥९॥
उवसंत खीणमोहो सजोगकेवलजिणो अजोगी य ।
चउदस जीवसमासा कमेण सिद्धा य एादव्वा ॥१०॥

The English translation is :

"Delusion (Mithyātva), downfall (Sāsādana), mixed (Mīśra), vowless right-belief (Avirata Saṃyaktva), partial-vow (Deśa-Virata); imperfect vow (Pramatta-Virata), the other perfect vow (Apramatta-Virata), new thought-activity (Apūrvā Karaṇa), advanced thought-activity

(Anivṛitti Karaṇa), slightest delusion (Sûkṣma Sâmparâya), subsided-delusion (Upaśânta Moha), delusionless (Kṣîṇa Moha), vibratory omniscient conqueror (Sayoga Kevali Jina), and non-vibratory omniscient (Ayoga-Kevali)—these 14 should be known to be the spiritual stages (Guṇasthâna), one after another. After the last, the soul becomes liberated (Siddha).”

The Quests are given in Gâthâ 142 :

गइइंदियेसु काये जोगे वेदे कसायणारणे य ।
संजमदंसणलेस्सा भवियासम्मत्तसरिणआहारे ॥१४२॥

The English translation is :

The fourteen soul-quests are—1. Conditions of existence (Gati), 2. Sense (Indriya), 3. Embodiment (Kâya), 4. Vibratory activity (Yoga), 5. Sex-inclination (Veda), 6. Passion (Kaṣâya), 7. Knowledge (Jñâna), 8. Control (Samyama), 9. Conation (Darśana), 10. Thought-paint (Leśyâ), 11. Capacity of Liberation (Bhavyatva), 12. Right-belief (Samyaktva), 13. Rationality (Samjñitva), and 14. Assimilation of matter (Âhara).

The stages and quests, with their many divisions and sub-divisions, and inter-connections really exhaust the point of view from which souls in the world may be viewed. Our matter-mad, mammon-mad world may blind us to Truth. But the signposts on the path to it, though deserted and neglected still shine with their eternal splendour and are unerring guides to the soul who understands itself and cares to tread the hard and lonely but sure path to freedom unending, and bliss everlasting. Śrî Nemichandra has not erected these signposts. He is eager and careful to tell us at each step “The Conqueror has said so” “the All-knowing has described it” etc. The passions and the ceaseless vibrations are the primary and essential cause of stages; and these and the operation of other Karmas that of quests. The soul who wants to know itself will soon see its thralldom to the passion of Anger, Pride, Deceit and Greed, and Sleep and Attachment and their innumerable combinations. Here as everywhere else in Jainism, there is no room for unreasoned faith. If anyone claims this and frightens away the earnest inquirers, it is not the fault of Jainism. It is a gross misunderstanding, and misrepresentation of Jainism. It is fouling one's own nest. True Jainism does not want blind faith. It wants knowledge of universal principle. Nay, more. It wants realisation and application of this knowledge to the tears and smiles of our neighbours, to the dew and sun on the red rose, to the rainbow on the sky, to the roaring torrents of the Niagara, to the fury of the floods and famines in our Motherland, and to the solution of the soul-racking problems of Economics and Politics in Europe and America. No corner of the universe, no condition of life, no modification in our finest tremor of the mind or soul, no change of form in lifeless matter anywhere—nothing is hidden from Jainism. Nothing is exempt from the

Soverign Law of Causation, from the unconquerable Rigour of Karma. The Stages and Quests of the soul here below are entirely due to this. The omniscients of old, the saints, with souls which were purer than the purest ideals conceivable by men, and stronger than adamant in their body and more lustrous in the Light of their souls than the sun or many suns,—these saints saw these Eternal Principles of Life and embodied them in their teachings. These teachings are for all souls high or low, in all ages and in all climes. There is no barrier of castes, creed or colour to their investigation and adoption. The greater part of Jaina literature is still unpublished. Therefore its lustre is not shed all over the world. Therefore the whole of humanity is in the iron-grip of war, of trade-jealousy and trade-deceit, of pain and selfishness, of dejection, disappointment and fear.

Evidently in Religion and Philosophy there is no greater concept than Soul; and in the whole world there is no greater phenomenon than life.

This book throws a flood of light on the question of Living beings as we know them and how they may reach their ideal—Nirvāṇa.

Living man as we see him is obviously a combination of two distinct substances; Living and Non-living. Let us consider these.

At the outset one marvellous thing is noticeable. We do see purely non-living things, as the pen with which I am writing or the paper which you are reading. But pure life is never met with in the world. So the position really is that we have :

- (1) Living substance mixed with non-living substance; and
- (2) Non-living substance.

There is non-living matter in both. But in one there is life also; in the other, not.

Another important and useful fact is the fact of death.

It is not annihilation of anything, soul or matter. It is only a separation of the outer body from the soul, which is still combined with two material but fine bodies. It is only when soul obtains liberation, that it becomes permanently pure and completely rid of all combination with matter. By careful comparison we can find a trace to the characteristic features of life and its differences from lifelessness.

The first thing we notice in one, who was living but is dead now, is that his senses do not act. He cannot touch, taste, smell, see or hear. He has no vitality of the senses. Also he is powerless. He cannot act, speak or think. He has no force, no vitality of body, speech or mind. But many of these things may be absent also in a living man who is asleep, in a trance or otherwise unconcious. Therefore all over the world we examine the man's respiration. If it is there, we say, "he still lives." If not, we say "he has breathed his last." So Spenser speaks of Death as "nought but parting of the breath."* This respiration is a sure sign of life. It is also popular speech to say of a dead

* *Faerie Queene*, Book VII, canto 7, stanza 46,

man, "he has numbered his days", "his time has come" etc. Without going into the insoluble mysteries of metaphysics, in the above common observations, which may be made anywhere and at any time and by anyone, we have the surest and most self-evident distinction between living and lifeless objects. If we can believe in the testimony of our own immediate observation, confirmed by the fact that the experience of every other thinking being is exactly the same, we must sum up the distinction between living and non-living substances thus. A non-living substance does not have,

- (1) The Vitality of the five senses;
- (2) The Power of body, speech and mind;
- (3) Respiration; and
- (4) Age.

These four may be called the four (or with their sub-divisions ten) vitalities of living beings.

But it is noticeable that all these four or ten are also a manifestation of one underlying real fact; *viz.* that of consciousness. In a dead body the sense-organs are there and the eye may be impressed with colour and form as before, but there is no consciousness behind it which in life received, and recorded, and responded to the ocular stimulus. The four or ten vitalities are sure signs to distinguish the living from the non-living; but in reality it is consciousness which distinguishes life from lifelessness.

Too much and too careful thought cannot be given to this consciousness. If we do not understand it, we shall wander from the truth. Let us, therefore, try to gain further insight into this consciousness.

We often pass through a street without seeing or hearing things which are present before the eye and the ear. A man spoke; but we say, "I am sorry, I did not hear him." The speech was there; the sound waves impinged on the ear and yet we did not hear. Why? Simply because we were absorbed otherwise. We were not, *i.e.* our consciousness was not, attentive to it. This attentiveness of consciousness is another great distinction between the living and the lifeless. This attentiveness, of course, will be of as many different sorts as there are activities of the senses, mind and the soul, of which we can be conscious. We can be conscious of an object of sight, or of the other four senses; or of the soul itself directed to a material object or to its own Omniscience. Thus our attention also may be directed towards an ocular, or non-ocular object, or towards the soul directly knowing a material object or full of its own Omniscience.

Notice also, that of necessity, this attention is essential to any kind of knowledge. As a matter of fact, if we subject any piece of our knowledge to deep analysis we can note the following stages:

1. To begin with there is consciousness itself. This is the centre of life. It is life itself. It is the first and unmistakeable characteristic of what is called soul.
2. It must be attentive to conate an object, to be inclined towards an object, *i.e.* to be merely turned towards it,

3. It must conate the object, *i.e.* it must be aware that some object is present there, without determining anything more about it in the least.

4. Then it must attend to know that object in however slight a detail. This is the attentiveness which must precede knowledge.

5. Then detail is grasped and knowledge begins. When we know a thing, we are not conscious of these five steps. But since our birth we are so much habituated to gain knowledge by means of our senses and mind, that these five steps are a sort of reflex or automatic, unconscious action of our busy consciousness. When we walk even for miles, or see with our eyes, or wink or breathe, or our blood courses in the body—we are seldom conscious of any of these things. They are familiar, habituated, and reflex or unconscious actions, and therefore unobserved. But their stages are all the same there. The alternate balancing of the whole body on one foot, then bending forward, then balancing on the other and so on; the closing of the eyelid to protect the eye; the inhalation of air to supply the lungs with oxygen, the exhalation to put forth foul carbonic acid gas etc., each little action with its minute process and delicate machinery is going on without our attending to it, consciously. Infinitely more delicate and unobserved are the myriad throbs in our mind, which we call our channel of knowledge. Only an Omniscient can see the millions of regular, natural processes by which the smallest particle of knowledge is called into being. Familiarity has bred indifference amounting to ignorance in us. This psychic factory is within our own bodies.

Take an example

1. You are reading these words before your eyes. If you are dead and unconscious you can never read the words although they are before your eyes. There is no consciousness there. To be able to read you must have consciousness.

2. If your thoughts are away, *e.g.* a siren-song from your neighbour fascinates you and you are all ear to it, you cannot read these words, for your consciousness is not attentive to the words. So attention is needed.

3. When your attention is drawn to the words in the first instance, there is merely a conation of them. You are merely conscious that something, not words, but merely something is there. This is conation (*Darśana*). This precedes knowledge. But it is most difficult to detect it or to describe it. It is itself an indescribable stage of consciousness touching a knowable object. It is merely a sort of is-ness of something of which your attentive consciousness is aware. It is not knowledge; nor even the beginning of knowledge. It is merely a preliminary, but a necessary preliminary, to knowledge.

4. After this conation by attentive consciousness, the consciousness is directed to know the thing. The first instant witnesses the attention of the consciousness, shifted from conation to knowledge. This attentiveness is the beginning of knowledge. After this, knowledge begins. These stages are

exceedingly difficult to analyse. Very profound, patient and long practised self-analysis is needed to perfectly verify them. But they are there. They may be sensed satisfactorily by any one who gives sober, serious and staid thought to the grasping of them.

5. From being aware of the mere is-ness of something in the paper before you, you instantly are conscious that there are some sort of letters there. Your mind questions: what kind of letters? The next instant answers: letters of the English Alphabet. You impress this on your mind and record and retain it there for future use. This is useful to you on future occasions. You may remember it, you may recognise it by seeing these very words again or by seeing some others, similar or dissimilar to them. You may collect together many records like this and build up an induction on the basis of them. From your induction you may deduce inferences.

From all the above knowledge about the words you are reading, you may lead yourself on to a knowledge of something else which is not in the words themselves. So from the mere sense of having seen the words, *i.e.* from a merely sensitive knowledge about them you may go on to think that they are philosophical symbols and exclaim with Milton:

How charming is divine philosophy,
Nor harsh and crabbed, as dull fools suppose,
But musical as is Apollo's lute,
And a perpetual feast of nectared sweets,
Where no crude surfeit reigns.*

If you analyse your experience about these words you will easily perceive no less than thirteen distinct stages in it. 1. Consciousness (Chetanâ). 2. Attention (Upa-yoga) of this consciousness towards the conating (Darśana) of these words. 3. Conation (Darśna) itself, *i.e.* the awareness that something is there. 4. Attention (Upa-yoga) of consciousness to know (Jñâna) and to see. 5. Acutal sight (Avagraha), the preception that there is something like words there. 6. The desire (Îhâ) to know further the question what letters are these. They seem to be English. It is the process through which mere preception is transmuted into judgment; it is the conception and comparison or pre-judgment or ratiocination. 7. The judgment (Avâya), the answer: they are English letters. 8. The retention (Dhâraṇâ), the fixing of the judgment in the mind. 9. The memory (Smriti) of the words. 10. Their recognition (Sanjñâ). 11. The induction (Chintâ) from them. 12. The deduction (Abhinibodha) and 13. The scriptural knowledge (Śruta), *i.e.* the extra knowledge of other things derived through the sight of the script of the letters.

It is easy to see that the first four are pre-knowledge stages; and the next eight are stages of degrees of sensitive knowledge, and the last is inferential knowledge which may be termed scriptural knowledge.

Consciousness may further know things directly without the intermediation of the senses or the mind. The soul itself may visualise matter directly

* Comus, lines 476-480.

or may visualise the impressions about it in the mind of another. This kind of knowledge is very rare and can be understood only after great profound study and longlived life of controlled discipline and purity. Still more difficult to understand is Omniscience. I shall try to take the reader up to it gradually, provided he is patient and dispassionately in search of Truth, and not in the hurry to criticise, or dogmatise, to say "What is Truth," and then Pilate-like go away.

One thing I may here say, although it is obvious, that sensitive and scriptural knowledge may go wrong. Even visual knowledge (direct vision of matter by the soul) may go wrong but direct mental knowledge of the mind of others and Perfect knowledge or Omniscience cannot go wrong. Thus we may be said to have come to eight kinds of knowledge—five right and the first three wrong also.

These are the first batch of considerations of the great fact of consciousness in living matter. And we must remember that each kind of conscious activity has its preliminary attentiveness.

Thus we may sum up. Consciousness is attentiveness of Conation or of Knowledge, or Conation or Knowledge itself. Conation is for Ocular (Chakṣu), Non-ocular (Achakṣu), Visual (Avadhi), or Perfect (Kevala) Knowledge.

Knowledge is Sensitive (Mati), Scriptural (Śruta), Visual (Avadhi), Mental (Manah Paryaya), or Perfect (Kevala); also wrong Sensitive (Ku-Mati), wrong Scriptural (Ku-Śruta), and wrong Visual (Ku-Avadhi).

Let us illustrate again. Consciousness which is the mighty, real characteristic of life is the starting point. You must be alive to read these words. You must be attentive to feel that something is there. You must conate these words. Then again you must be attentive to perceive, then alone you begin to know them, *i.e.* have perception, conception, judgment, retention, memory, recognition, induction, or deduction from them.

Roughly it may be said that attentiveness for conation or knowledge of any kind is the first instant of conation or knowledge. As the name implies, it is the instant in which consciousness attends to conate or know an object. Also obviously conation is a necessary preliminary to knowledge.

Consciousness is the most essential difference between the Living and Non-Living. It deservedly detained us for a moment. But we must attend once more to a distinction between the two mighty categories, the Living and the Non-living substances.

We have seen that the first distinction is that the Living has and the Non-living does not have the four or ten vitalities—the five senses; the power of mind, speech and body; respiration; and age. We found the second distinction, to be attentiveness of consciousness to four kinds of conation—Ocular, Non-ocular, Visual and Perfect; and to eight kinds of knowledge—Sensitive, Scriptural, and Visual of the right as well as wrong kind; Mental and Perfect of the right kind only.

We also saw that although Non-living substance is found in fair abundance around us, living substance always seems to be mixed up with non-living matter in the world. Popular phraseology teaches us to call this non-living sheath of the living consciousness, its "body". "One body, one soul" seems to be the general motto of the universe. There are exceptions, but they need not detain us here. Botanical and other scientific researches have taught us about parasites and their hosts; so one body becomes the lodging of many souls. But to stick to popular parlance, one unified, individual consciousness forms the *ego* or soul or "I" and it fills one body. The crudest observation shows that this consciousness has the capacity of completely filling the size of its particular body. The elephant has a conscious individual soul; so has an ant. So we may note as the third distinction between life and lifeless matter, that life has the capacity of completely filling its lifeless sheath with consciousness, or in other words, of being co-extensive with its body.

Notice also that the same grows fat on high living, or grows thin by disease. Indeed the little new-born baby becomes a big boy, then a bigger powerful man, and then a weak, emaciated old man; yet all through, the same one individual consciousness completely fills the body in its different sizes. The soul is capable of contraction and expansion.

Look at the living-non-living mixture from another point of view. We attribute activity and enjoyment to it. We say of a man's act: What a good or bad thing he has done. When a man acts without restraint or rashly and comes to grief, we say: "This is the fruit of his folly." If a man is good, and prosperous, we say: "Oh, he does deserve it all and more." These popular phrases really have a philosophical significance. They attribute responsibility and reward to our consciousness. They imply that this consciousness is an active, responsible agent; is the Doer of all actions; and is the Enjoyer of the fruits of those actions, good or bad.

It is necessary to remember these, lest we should fall into the error of exempting the soul, *ego* or individual consciousness from all responsibility for his actions, good or bad, and thus at one stroke uproot all ethical distinctions and stop to discriminate actions.

We must also draw a distinction between the actions and the inner activity, to which these external actions are due. From the practical point of view we must emphasise the external actions, and from the real point of view their causes in the inner activity of our consciousness. But the responsible agent of both these is the individual consciousness itself.

Consciousness is as such purely itself, *i.e.* quite separate from matter which is unconscious, lifeless. From this pure or real point of view, we may say that all action and enjoyment of the soul is within its own consciousness.

Once more let us compare our categories, the Living and Non-living. The most obvious form of non-living substance is matter; as iron, dry wood, sapphire, stone wall, key of our lock, our table, chair and innumerable other objects conveniently handy for this investigation to anyone at all times and

at all palces. That is the chief characteristic of this mass of matter of so many kinds ? It is obviously this : It can be known by the senses. It has colour; we can see that coal is black, sapphire is blue, gold is yellow, ruby is red, and snow is white.

Again if we taste various kinds of matter we find that pepper is pungent, that aloe is bitter, that salt is saline, that the juice of an unripe mango is acid, and that sugar is sweet. Again rose essence smells sweet, sulphur does not smell nice. Also, iron is hot, ice is cold; silk is smooth, sand is rough; cotton is soft, stone is hard; a feather is light and lead is heavy. We can sum up these five colours, five tastes, two smells and eight touches as the more obvious characteristics of lifeless matter. None of these twenty is found to characterise Consciousness, or pure life. Of course when life is mixed with non-living matter, it assumes all these distinctions of colour, taste, smell, and touch. Thus embodied consciousness does have colour, taste, etc. Soul is not matter. Byron rightly said that is the matter; never mind him, what is the mind, no matter. By "mind" we must mean the taking *Ego*, the soul.

This point is radical and deserves a little more consideration. Above we have seen vitalities, attention, conation, knowledge, doing and enjoying, and co-extension with the body as the observed characteristics of the living substance. Here we may pause for a moment to consider these characteristics also. They were all derived from our observation of a dead corpse and a living reader of these words. In the corpse, we simply noted the absence of the living and thus indirectly inferred that what was absent, belonged to and was taken away by the living substance when it left the corpse lifeless. The living reader gave us mostly the psychic stages of conation and knowledge. But in all these we are not able to study or observe pure life. Indeed it must be confessed frankly that there is absolutely no means at present of our studying life or soul directly and fully in its pure condition, without any admixture of matter in it. We are in the world. There is no pure soul in this world of ours. All are embodied or mundane souls. In studying them, except in abstract thought, we cannot separate the living soul from its sheath of non-living matter, *i.e.* the body. But the living embodied soul also can exhibit in the world such a high degree of manifestation of pure life and independence of non-living matter, that we can form a very near idea, of a pure perfect soul. As we approach that idea we find that vitalities, and responsibility for doing and enjoying shrink more and more; and that conation and knowledge correspondingly increase in purity, extent, depth and fineness. From this it is justifiable to conclude that the ultimate idea of a perfect soul, *i.e.* the ideal soul will be identical with an individual consciousness which has perfect conation and perfect knowledge, with their attendant perfect power and perfect bliss. Also that this stage must mean total separation or liberation from matter. Thus alone from a consideration of the obvious categories of the living substance and non-living substance, gradually and after very deep, persistent, patient, difficult, and long study

and contemplation, we can arrive at a conception of a Pure Soul, the Highest Self, the Ideal, God, or whatever other name you like.

Living substance rises higher and higher towards the condition of matterless living, and ultimately, when perfectly rid of matter, it attains an eternal condition of Pure Light in Self-Absorption and by nature ascends upwards to the top of universe.

There is no turning back, and no further bondage with matter, and no transmigrations. Its modifications there consist of its own perpetual self-modification. It has perfect conation and perfect knowledge. It is itself. It is liberated. It is Pure Soul.

But excepting this condition of absolute purity, the soul's own pure qualities are effected by those of matter. So we find that attention, conation and knowledge, which are pure consciousness or its modifications, are observed in a mundane or embodied soul, to exist along with vitalities, and the size of the body, and are responsible for sowing and reaping the fruit of action, which are the characteristics of the living being united with the non-living matter and with touch, taste, smell and colour, the pure characteristics of non-living matter.

The whole picturesque and endless variety of life,—physical, mental and emotional life in the universe, is the effect and summation of infinite ways in which the Living unites with the Non-living.

Let us try to consider this glorious wealth of variegated life of souls in the universe; The whole universe is packed full of living creatures. Indeed in such out-of-the-way and unexpected places, does our knowing intelligence light upon life, that some Great Intellects have gone to the length of saying that all is Life and there is no lifeless matter at all. This of course is easily refuted by common everyday universal observation. In comprehending the almost incomprehensible vastnesses of space and time and their contents, let us keep a cool and dispassionate head lest in our admiration of one or other of the several constituents of the universe, we should deny one or more and thus cripple our further and full knowledge of the whole truth of things. Indeed the checking of our premises and first conclusions again and again is absolutely essential if we, imperfect human beings, want to gain right knowledge. The search after Truth is not a child's play: the path to it is more narrow to traverse than the passage of the camel through the eye of the needle in the Bible.

The universe, then, teems with infinite living forms. How to observe, analyse, and classify them, so that we can advance on the path of our tremendous, trackless inquiry?

I propose to take this matter up in three different ways.

1. Soul-classes (Jīva Samāsa). There are obvious differences of body, sense and mind in different classes of souls. The body is primarily the basis of this classification. This in Jainism is technically called soul-classes. (Jīva Samāsa).

2. Soul-quest (Mārganā). It comprises other inner differences in species, sex, passion, knowledge, conation etc. In soul-quest, the embodied condition of the soul, *i.e.* the mixed living and non-living condition is primarily the basis.

3. Spiritual Stages (Gupasthāna). They concern the purely-inner progress of the soul. In these spiritual stages, the progress of the soul from ignorance and delusion to perfect self-absorption is traced.

I. SOUL-CLASSES

From the protoplasm of the germ-cell to a full-blown human being, there is an infinite number of mundane souls or living beings in the universe. The protoplasm so far as is known at present, has no ears to hear, no eyes to see, no nose to smell, no tongue to taste; it has only the sense of touch. The human being has all the five senses fully developed and distinct, and a mind also which is also a sort of additional and higher sense (a quasi-sense), the organ of which sense is invisible to us. In Jainism, it is an organ which is made up of subtle matter called *Manovarganā* or mental matter. Its form is like a lotus with eight petals near the heart. Dr. Robert Bell has long held the theory that the solar plexus is the real centre of mental activity. Professor Troude and eminent war-surgeons dispute the brain as the seat of mental activity. In war time operations, brains were removed without impairing the mental faculties.

Thus we can divide mundane souls into six classes :

- | | | |
|---------------------------------|---------|--------|
| 1. With the sense of touch only | | fine. |
| 2. " " " & taste | | gross. |
| 3. " " " " & smell | | " |
| 4. " " " " " & sight | | " |
| 5. " " " " " & hearing | | " |
| 6. " " " " " " & mind | | " |

7. Fine one-sensed souls cannot be known by our senses. They can penetrate all matter. They are everywhere in the universe. They are not obstructed by, and they do not obstruct others. They die their own death.

Some of the above seven kinds are born with the capacity to develop, others die before acquiring the capacity to develop. Each one of the seven may therefore be developable or non-developable. Thus there may be said to be 14 soul-classes in all.

Here another distinction may be considered. Some mundane souls when attacked or in fear of something or some-one, can voluntarily change their place in space. A man attacked with a sword or by a lion can run away from the lion or his assailant. So a dog, cat, pigeon, butterfly, maggot, or the finest animalculæ which we can see, runs away from the vicinity of danger and death. It is merely a paraphrase of the universal instinct of self-preservation.

But it is evident that a blade of grass, a huge oak, or banyan or a stone

growing in a quarry cannot run away before the scythe, axe, or spade which threatens to put an end to its life. This capacity to be able to take one's body from one place to another divides souls in the universe into Immobiles like stones in quarry, vegetables, trees, etc., and Mobiles like men, animals, birds, etc.

Observation will show that all one-sensed souls are immobile, incapable of voluntary change of place; and that all the other souls are mobile, who can at will run away from danger or death.

The classes are said to be 14 in Gáthá 72; 57 in Gáthá 73; 98 in Gáthá 79 and 80; and 570 in Gáthá 78. But we can classify them into 406 soul-classes, also, as below :

Sub-human

One-sensed, having the sense of Touch only.

Earth-bodied—Soft	..	.. 1	Each one of the 7 is Fine or Gross, ∴ 7×2=14	Each one of the 27 is deve- lopable, poten- tially develop- able, or totally undeve- lopable; therefore 27×3=81	
„ Hard	..	.. 2			
Water-bodied	..	.. 3			
Fire-bodied	..	.. 4			
Air-bodied	..	.. 5			
Vegetable	..	..			
Non-one-souled	..	..			
Ever-one-body-many-souled (Nitya-Nigoda)	..	.. 6			
Other One-body-many-souled (Itara-Nigoda)	..	.. 7			
One souled	..	..			
Host-one-souled—Trunk	..	.. 15			
Creeper	..	.. 16			
Plant	..	.. 17			
Tree	..	.. 18			
Root	..	.. 19			
Non-host-one-souled —Trunk	..	.. 20			
Creeper	..	.. 21			
Plant	..	.. 22			
Tree	..	.. 23			
Root	..	.. 24			
Two-sensed, having Touch and Taste	..	.. 25			
Three-sensed, having Touch, Taste and Smell	..	.. 26			
Four-sensed, having Touch, Taste, Smell & Sight	..	.. 27			
Five-sensed (42), as per detail below :					

Five-sensed (42), as per detail below :

In Work Region, Five-sensed Irrational.

Aquatic	..	1
Terrestrial	..	2
Aerial	..	3



In Work Region, Five-sensed Rational.

Acquatic	..	4
Terrestrial	..	5
Aerial	..	6

Each one of the 6 may be born by (1) uterine birth and may be developable or potentially developable, thus giving 12 classes; or (2) spontaneous generation and may be developable, potentially developable or totally undevelopable thus giving 18 classes. And thus $12+18=$ 30

In the Highest Enjoyment Region

Terrestrial, Developable	..	..	31
„ Potentially developable		..	32
Aerial, Developable	..	..	33
„ Potentially developable		..	34

In Middle Enjoyment Region

Terrestrial, Developable	..	..	35
„ Potentially developable		..	36
Aerial, Developable	..	..	37
„ Potentially developable		..	38

In Lowest Enjoyment Region

Terrestrial, Developable	..	..	39
„ Potentially developable		..	40
Aerial, Developable	..	..	41
„ Potentially developable		..	42

42

Human (13) as detailed below :

In Work-Region Ārya Khanda

Of Uterine Birth, Developable	..	..	1
„ Potentially developable		..	2

Of Spontaneous generation, Absolutely undevelopable.. 3

In Work-Region, Mleccha Khanda

Developable	..	..	4
Potentially developable		..	5

In Highest Enjoyment Region

Developable	..	..	6
Potentially developable		..	7

In Middle Enjoyment Region


Developable	..	..	8
Potentially developable		..	9

In Lowest Enjoyment Region

Developable	..	..	10
Potentially developable		..	11

In Distorted Enjoyment Region

Developable	..	..	12
Undevelopable	..	..	13



Celestials (172), as per detail below :

Residential	..	..	..	10
Peripatetic	..	..	..	8
Stellar	..	..	..	5
Heavenly, in 31 layers in 1st and 2nd Heavens				31
in 7 layers in 3rd and 4th Heavens.				7
in 4 layers in 5th and 6th Heavens.				4
in 2 layers in 7th and 8th Heavens.				2
in 1 layer in 9th and 10th Heavens.				1
in 1 layer in 11th and 12th Heavens.				1
in 3 layers in 13th and 14th Heavens.				3
in 3 layers in 15th and 16th Heavens.				3
in 9 layers in 9 Graiveyaka	..			9
in 1 layer in 9 Anudisā	..			1
in 1 layer in 6 Anuttara	..			1
				—
				86

Each one of the 86 may be developable or potentially developable, giving in all 172 Classes 172

Hellish (98), as per detail below :

in 13 layers of 1st Hell	..	13
in 11 layers of 2nd Hell	..	11
in 9 layers of 3rd Hell	..	9
in 7 layers of 4th Hell	..	7
in 5 layers of 5th Hell	..	5
in 3 layers of 6th Hell	..	3
in 1 layer of 7th Hell	..	1
		—
		49

Each one of the 49 may be developable or potentially developable, thus in all 98 Classes 98

The total of all the above is 406 :

Sub-human	..	..	..	123
(i) One to Four-Sensed	..			81
(ii) Five-Sensed	..			42
Human Five-Sensed	..			13
Celestial	..	..	..	172
Hellish	..	..	..	98
				—

Total Soul-Classes .. 406

The following points as to the soul-classes may be explained for the reader who is familiar with the technicalities of Jainism.

The Universe is 14 Rajus high, 7 Rajus at the base, with a thickness which at the base is 7 Rajus, then gradually decreases to one Raju at a height of 7 Rajus, *i.e.* at the Middle of the Universe, where the Middle World, *i.e.* the region of the human and subhuman beings, is situated. Then it gradually grows to a thickness of 5 Rajus at the point where the sixth Heaven ends, and which marks the Middle of the Upper World, or the region of heavenly beings; finally it gradually decreases to a thickness of one Raju at the top of the Universe, *i.e.* 14 Rajus high above the base, 7 Rajus high above the Middle World, and $3\frac{1}{2}$ Rajus high above the sixth Heaven. It is here, that the Siddha Kṣetra, or the Region of the eternally liberated souls is situated. This is at the top of the Universe. (See diagram at the end of this Book, p. 139).

“Nigoda” beings are of two kinds, fine and gross. Fine Nigoda living beings exist everywhere in the Universe, from the nethermost hell to the highest region of the eternally liberated souls. They are one-sensed, both developable and undevelopable, take birth and die 18 times in the short interval of time taken by one pulse-beat of an average human being. Of course, being souls, they have knowledge, but this knowledge, preceded by its conation, is limited to the sense of touch. These Nigoda souls are neither earth-bodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied, nor air-bodied. They belong to the vegetable sub-classes of the immobile class of souls. They have one body, occupied by many souls which are born, which live, and which die together.

These group-souls are of two kinds :

(1) Those who have never left Nigoda. These are called *Nitya Nigoda*, ever-one-body-many-souled.

(2) Those who left Nigoda and became embodied in higher forms of soul-classes, but have come down to Nigoda once more. These are called *Itara Nigoda*, or *Chaturgati Nigoda*, one-body many-souled.

These two are also called *Sādhārana*, or “Common” or group-soul-classes of vegetables.

Other vegetables have one body and one soul only. They are called individual-souled or individual (*Pratyeka*) vegetables. These are always gross, and never fine. But these again may or may not have parasites or hosts. Thus there are two kinds :

(1) *Sapraṭiṣṭhita*, or Host-one-souled vegetables.

(2) *Apraṭiṣṭhita*, or Non-host-one-souled vegetables.

Each one of these two being either a Trunk, Creeper, Plant, Tree, or Root, there are 10 calsses of these individual-souled-vegetables, so-called in contrast to common or group-souled vegetables.

The Jaina conception of the Middle World is that it is entirely confined to the one Raju square of the layer of the Mobile Channel (*Trasa Nadi*), at a height of 7 Rajus from the base of the Universe.

This Middle World consists of concentric rings of successive Continents and Oceans. Each succeeding ring has a width double of the ring-width of its predecessor. In the centre of the Middle World there is the first Continent Jambûdvîpa, of a diameter of one lac (1,00,000) Yojanas. It has in its centre the Sumeru mountain, which has a height of 1,00,040 Yojanas, 40 Yojanas of which form the top, and 1,000 Yojanas of which are embedded in the earth as the sub-terranean foundation of the Mountain, and which has a circular base with a diameter of 10,000 Yojanas.

The Ocean, Lavaṇa, next to Jambûdvîpa and encircling it all round is a ring with a width of 2 lac Yojanas. The next Dhâtukī Khanda, is a continent, a ring with a width of 4 lac Yojanas. The next Kâlodadhi is the Second Ocean with a ring-width of 8 lac Yojanas. The next Puṣkaravara Dvîpa, is the third Continent with a ring-width of 16 lac Yojanas. And so on, till through innumerable Continents and Oceans we reach the last pair of rings, the Svyambhû Ramaṇa Ocean. This is the last ring of water holding our Middle World in its embrace.

It is to be noted that the third Continent Puṣkara-Vara-Dvîpa has a circular mountain bisecting it equally throughout the width of its ring. This mountain is called Mānuṣottara, Cis-human, as there are no human beings beyond its limits nor can any human being go beyond its limit. Thus the human regions are a circle of 45 lacs of Yojanas, and comprise the first two oceans and the first two and a half Continents.

It is noticeable that in Jainism there are 5 regions, each with a diameter of 45 lacs of Yojanas.

- (1) The above human region is called the 2½ Dvîpas.
- (2) As Nirvāṇa is attained only from the human regions, the Siddha Kṣetra at the top of the Universe also is a region with a diameter of 45 lac Yojanas.
- (3) So is Siddha Śilā, the earth below the Siddha Kṣetra.
- (4) The first Indraka-Vimāna or central celestial Car or residence, is just one hair's breadth above the apex of Sumeru.
- (5) The first Indraka Bila or central hellish hole or residence of the denizens of hell in the first layer of hell is one lac Yojanas below our earth.

It is also interesting to note that there are three regions with a diameter of one lac Yojanas, and two regions with a height and thickness of the same extent, viz :—

- (1) Jambûdvîpa, the first Continent in the centre of the middle World.
- (2) The last Indraka Vimāna or central celestial Car or residence in Sarvārtha Siddhi in the last or 3rd layer of the Upper World.
- (3) The last Indraka Bila, or central hellish hole, or residence of the denizens of hell in the last or 49th layer of hell in the seventh earth in the Lower World.
- (4) The height of Mount Summeru minus its top of 40 Yojanas.

- (5) The thickness of the first earth from its crust at the Middle World down to the end of the second part; Panka Bhâga, *i.e.* just before the beginning of the first layer of the first hell.

Now the central or first continent, Jambûdvîpa, has a diameter of one lac Yojanas. This is divided into seven countries (Kṣetra) each separated from the other by a mountain (Kulâchala). Thus we have seven countries and six mountains. The first is a country, the second a mountain and so on. Each succeeding division has double the width of its predecessor, till we reach Videha, the central region round Sumeru, from where the width begins to be half of its predecessor. Thus arithmetically the divisions are 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 32, 16, 8, 4, 2, 1, a total of 190 units. The countries in the extreme north and south being each of one unit have a width of one lac Yojanas divided by 190, *i.e.* $526 \frac{6}{19}$ Yojanas.

The second, third and fourth countries, next to the extreme north and south, have respectively 4, 16, and 64, units of width.

In these three pairs of countries there are the three Bhoga Bhûmis or Enjoyment-Lands, being the lowest (Jaghanya), middle (Madhyama), and the highest (Uttama) Bhoga-Bhûmis, respectively.

In Videha, however, the eastern and western countries, beyond the eastern and western limits of the Bhadra Śâla forest, are Karma Bhûmis. The rest alone, *i.e.* the region immediately round Sumeru is the highest Bhoga Bhûmi. The region in the north is called Uttara Kuru, that in the south Deva Kuru Bhoga Bhûmi.

In 32 countries of Videha, and in the rest of the continent there is Karma Bhûmi or Work-Region, where people have to depend on agriculture etc. for their living. In Enjoyment Region, they have no work to do, they get all that they want from Kalpa Vṛikṣas, wishing-trees, never have disease or accidents, and live the full span of their lives. The least happiness of a man in Bhoga Bhûmi is infinite times the happiness of a Chakravarti.

It is very significant that the islanders of Java have a word in their language denoting an Enjoyment-Land. Is it that the Jaina missionaries and colonists penetrated into these islands, centuries and centuries ago, and left the tradition of their Bhoga-Bhûmi there ?

In the Lavaṇa Ocean round Jambûdvîpa, and in Kâlodadhi round Dhâtukî Khanda, there are 96 islands; 48 in each, 24 on each shore of the Ocean. They are inhabited by ill formed persons (kumanuṣya) with disproportionate (hundaka) bodies. All of them have an age of one Palya. These people also do not have any agriculture etc. and live, some on mud and some on fruits. They have no wishing-trees. As they have no arts of agriculture etc., they are called people of Bhoga Bhûmi, but as their life is low and savage-like and their forms improper and distorted, the land is called Ku-Bhoga Bhûmi or wrong, distorted or improper Enjoyment-Land.

The Chapter on *Paryāpti* (Developableness) in Jainism is interesting, but not free from intricacy. It is dealt with in *Jīva Kānda*, Chapter III, Gathas 118-128; and is followed by an account of *Prāṇa* (Vitality) in Chapter IV, Gathas 129-133. Biologists and zoologists alone can say if it is capable of being subjected to experiments. But the briefest Jaina account is this. The newly born soul is incomplete, but has the capacity to become complete in assimilation, body, senses, respiration, speech, and mind. The completion of the capacity to develop these six assimilation etc., makes the six *Paryāptis*. When a soul goes from one condition of existence to another, it assimilates the molecules of *dhāraka*-matter, and also of speech matter in the case of more than one-sensed, and of mind-matter in the case of rational beings. The *dhāraka* molecules form the physical body of human and sub-human beings, the fluid (*vaikriyaka*, transformable) body of celestial and hellish beings, and the assimilative body in case of saints. These molecules must be reduced to a primary solid and liquid form. The completion of the capacity to do it, is the Assimilative (*Āhāraka*) Development. The solid portions develop into bone etc., the hard substances, and the liquid into blood, bile etc., the fluid substances of the body. The completion of the capacity to do it, is the Body (*Śarīra*) Development. The molecular matter assimilated by the soul is further formed into sense-organs. The completion of the capacity to do it, is the Sense (*Indriya*) Development. The wear and tear of the body is made up by ceaseless Respiration. The completion of the capacity for respiration is the *Āna-pāna*-Development. The completion of the capacity to form speech-molecules and mind-molecules into speech and mind, is respectively the Speech and Mind Development.

The beginning of the acquiring of 4, 5 or 6 capacities is simultaneous; but their completion is in the order in which they are named above. And from the first kind, each successive development takes more time to complete itself than its predecessor. But each one individually, and all the six collectively never take more than one Antara muhūrta (the minimum of which is one wink (*Avalī*) and one instant (*Samaya*), and maximum is 48 minutes minus one instant.)

But a completely undevelopable (*Labdhi-aparyāptaka*) soul does not complete its capacities to develop, and dies within one antar-muhūrta, which is one-eighteenth of one pulse-beat.

The *yoni* is the womb or other physical centre or nucleus where the incarnating soul finds its lodgment at conception. According to Jainism, such a nucleus may be cold or hot, covered or open, living or non-living, or a combination of these three pairs. Thus primarily *yonis* are of nine kinds.

But with their classes and sub-classes they are 84 lacs.

The 84 lacs of nuclei for birth of souls are as follows :

One-sensed beings :

Earth-bodied	..	..	..	7,00,000
Water-bodied	..	..	..	7,00,000

Fire-bodied	7,00,000
Air-bodied	7,00,000
Vegetables	
Non-one-souled :	
Ever-one-body-many-souled	7,00,000
Other One-body-many-souled	7,00,000
One-souled, including Host-one-souled, and Non-host-one-souled	10,00,000
Two-sensed beings	2,00,000
Three-sensed „	2,00,000
Four sensed „	2,00,000
Five-sensed „	
Sub-human	4,00,000
Hellish	4,00,000
Celestial	4,00,000
Human	14,00,000
Total	84,00,000

II. SOUL-QUEST

In what different ways we search for a mundane soul ? We can do so in no less than fourteen different ways.

1. Four conditions of existence (Gati)

We may see whether it is a human, or a sub-human soul on earth; or it is a non-human soul above or under the earth. These latter are the celestial and hellish beings. All ancient systems of thought posited their existence. We cannot see them today. But there is nothing inherently impossible in the conception of these forms of living beings, who live, think, and feel and can change their bodies at will, as described by Milton in his *Paradise Lost*.

This quest may be called Condition of Existence (Gati).

2. Five Senses (Indriya)

The five senses give us another kind of quest, called the sense-quest.

3. Six Embodiments (Kaya)

The different kinds of embodiments of immobile and mobile souls furnish another kind of quest. It is open to observation that the body of a vegetable and the body of a man are radically different. Ultimately as matter, they

may be and are the same. But their difference is equally marked. Their constitution and composition are different. Their chemical characteristics vary. They occupy obviously different places in the whole range of living beings. It is on this basis that people are split up into vegetarians and non-vegetarians. Vegetarians give up taking lives higher than vegetables, because animals are more evolved and their bodies approximate our own bodies more than the bodies of vegetables do.

I may be allowed to digress here. Live and let live is as simple a motto of life as it is profound. No one has a right to destroy any life. Every one has a right to live.

Now the curious thing is that life thrives on life. No living being can continue its life without another life being destroyed. How to reconcile these two facts: the duty of not-taking another's life, and the right of preserving one's own which necessitates destruction of other life? The reconciliation can be effected by interpreting these two sister precepts in a possible practical way, and not in an impossible antinomian fashion.

"The ideal practice of non-injury is possible only to the soul in its perfect condition, *i.e.* when it has freed itself from the last particle of matter (Karma Vargaṇās). On this side of that happy state, do whatever we will, some life must be transformed into our life in order to sustain it. Therefore what is meant and enjoined is simply this, 'Do not destroy life, unless it is absolutely necessary for the maintenance of a higher kind of life.' The purer souls will, of course, not like to sanction even this. But as formulated above, the rule does not sanction hurting or injury: it limits it to the lowest possible minimum. As a supplementary rule we have: 'And then begin with the least evolved kind of life, for example, with the *sthāvars* (immobiles).'*

Destruction of any one or more of the ten vitalities is injury. The extent of injury varies with the number of vitalities injured. Immobiles possess four, the least number of vitalities. Mobiles have from six to ten vitalities.

In the soul-classes above, we found souls to be mobile or immobile. The immobiles are one-sensed beings and have for their bodies vegetables, air, fire, water or earth. Science every day is making progress in discovering these tiny and ultra-microscopic fellow-beings of ours. Plants are credited with conscious life now. Much that was considered inorganic is found in the light of greater knowledge to be organic. Air and fire, water and earth, are the bodies of innumerable living beings. From this point of view we can search a soul in six kinds of embodiment—earth, water, fire, air, vegetable and mobile.

4. Fifteen Vibratory Activities (Yoga)

All activity of the body, speech, and mind is the cause of the inner modifications or vibrations of life or our vital consciousness. Thus our mundane

* *Outlines of Jainism*, p. 71.

life is continued. An angry thought, a noble impulse, the passion of patriotism, and infinity of movements of body, speech and mind produce almost visible changes in matter. There is a constant circulation, action, and reaction between these outward acts and the inner consciousness—vibrations of which the external vibrations are the cause.

Our speech, or thoughts may be true or false, a mixture of both or neither. This gives us eight kinds. Our body has several inter-penetrating sheaths of the outer body, electric and the karmic body. Their activity can be distinguished in no less than seven ways. Thus the vibration-quest gives us fifteen main kinds.

5. Three Sex-inclinations (Veda)

Every soul has the instinct of propagation. Life reproduces itself. This is due to sex-impulse. This takes three well-known forms—male, female, or common. We can search soul in these three sex distinctions.

6. Twenty-five Passions (Kashaya)

As soon as we take up any manifestation of the consciousness, volition of a soul, we can easily trace it to some passion or other in the consciousness. If we observe and analyse many of these manifestations, we find that they are due to the four passions of anger, pride, deceit, and greed, or their combinations. Again it is noticeable that there are innumerable degrees of each one of these passions. Take anger. It may be so intense as to blind one and to last a long, long time. It may possess one in an extreme and erroneous form. It may only mean a loss of all restraint. It may prevent only partial restraint. Or it may be a transient feeling, which may disturb the perfect equanimity of the soul for a moment. From these four broad degrees, we may say the four passions to be of sixteen kinds. Other minor passions are also noticeable, *e.g.* laughter (hásya), indulgence (rati), ennui (arati), sorrow (śoka), fear (bhaya), disgust (jugupsá) and the masculine, feminine and common sex inclinations. This quest may be called the passion-quest.

7. Eight Quests of knowledge (Jnana)

Knowledge has been considered above in its five right kinds of sensitive, scriptural, visual, mental, and perfect; and three wrong kinds of sensitive, scriptural and visual.

These eight kinds give the eight quests of knowledge.

8. Six Controls (Samyama)

Some souls have no control at all. Others have some sort of part control, part non-control. Some have more control than others. They have

equanimity; or have recovered it after losing it; or have a control which implies pure and absolute non-injury to other souls; they may be all but passionless; or they may be entirely ideal and passionless.

So Shakespeare says :

Give me that man,
That is not passion's slave, and I will wear him
In my heart's core, ay, in my heart of heart.*

The above six degrees of control give us the quest of souls with regard to their control.

9. Four Conation-Quests (Darsana)

The four kinds of conation—ocular, non-ocular, visual, and perfect—given before, form the conation-quest.

10. Six Thought-Paints (Lesya)

Everything which is matter, or mixed up with matter has some kind or other of touch, taste, smell and colour. Our mind and its activity are no exception. They are material and have colour, which they change with every change of their thought activity. A black-hearted man, red with rage, pale with fear, green with jealousy,—these are familiar phrases. Our thoughts and emotions have a very intimate connection with colours. We may be said to have thought-paints. There are innumerable intermediate characters of paints; but the primary ones are black, blue, grey, yellow, pink or red and white. These six form the soul quest as to thought-paint. The *Leśyās* are the soul's vibrations effected by mild and strong passions.

11. Liberability (Bhavyatva)

You may seek souls in two classes—those who are capable of liberation and those who are not capable of liberation.

The capacity of liberation is the basis of this quest.

12. Six Belifs (Samyaktva)

No living being is without some kind of creed, set of beliefs. He may or may not realise or analyse them. He may or may not express them to himself or any one else; but there they are in his inner being always.

Matter deludes the belief and conduct of the soul. But when matter subsides or entirely falls off, we have flashes of right faith and righteous conduct. This right belief may be due to the subsidence or destruction or part-destruction part-subsidence of the matter which keeps it submerged and deluded.

* *Hamlet* Act III, Sc. 2.

Three stages of this right belief are noticeable. To begin with, there is its absence, *i.e.* there is wrong belief. Then you may acquire right belief but lose it and slip from it to wrong belief, the condition of your belief during downfall. Thirdly, the condition of mixed right and wrong belief.

The above two triads give us six classes. These may be called subsidential, destructive, destructive-subsidential, wrong-belief, downfall-belief and mixed right-wrong belief. Here Right Belief is the basis of the quest.

13. Mind-Quest (Sanjna)

Souls have mind or not. They are rational or irrational. This is the rationality quest.

14. Assimilation-Quest (Ahara)

Souls are in an incarnation as celestial, human, sub-human, and hellish beings; there they are assimilating particles of matter for their physical bodies every instant.

But in transmigration from one condition of existence to another, there is no assimilation of matter of physical body. This distinction gives us the assimilation quest. That is, souls are :

- (1) those who are assimilating matter of their birth-bodies (Âhâraka Varganá); or
- (2) those who are not so assimilating it, *i.e.* in transmigration in the three instants of omniscient overflow in the 13th and the 14th stage.

III. SPIRITUAL STAGES

If we mark the freedom of pure soul from the impurifying bondage of matter we notice 14 stages.

1. The soul has delusion. It has wrong belief. (Mithyátva).
2. It has Right Belief, but it is falling from that to Wrong Belief. This is the Downfall Stage. (Sásádana).
3. It is in a stage of Mixed Right and Wrong Belief. (Mísra).
4. It has Right Belief; but does not act upon it; does not resolve or vow to follow it in actual life. It is Vowless Right Belief. (Avirata Samyaktva).
5. It may follow it by partial vows. We may call it the partial Vowstage. (Deśa-vrata).
6. It may be with all possible vows, but may keep them imperfectly, owing to negligence or illness (Pramáda). Call it the partial Vow-stage. (Pramatta-vrata).
7. If it has all vows and keeps them perfectly, we have the Perfect Vow-stage. (Apramatta-vrata).
8. When all vows are kept perfectly, then new inner progress begins.

The soul has a new inner thought-activity. Call it the New Thought-Activity (Apûrva-Karaṇa).

9. Further advance gives us the Advanced Thought-Activity stage (Nirvṛitti-Karaṇa).

10. Then we are near the Goal. Delusion is leaving us. When it has all but left us, call it the stage of Slightest Delusion (Sûkṣama-Sâmparyāya).

11. If all Delusion has entirely subsided, we call the stage one of Subsided Delusion (Upaśânta-moha).

12. If Delusion is destroyed, we are in the stage of Destroyed Delusion (Kṣîna moha).


13. Then the soul knows all, sees all. Still it has the body of its last incarnation and it vibrates, as every body does at every instant. We call this the stage of Vibratory Omniscience (Sayoga-kevalî).

14. When the body vibrations stop, the stage is of non-Vibratory Omniscience. It is of a short duration, and is called Ayoga-Kevali. Then the soul is at the end of its mundane existence and becomes liberated from all Karmic matter for ever; and rushes upward to enjoy its own eternal, supra-sensual, undisturbable, Infinite Bliss along with Infinite Knowledge, Conation, Perfect Right Belief, and Power. It is Siddha. It is itself. The goal is reached. The ideal is realised. It is the *acme* of Fineness. It has no high or low class, because all pure souls are the same. It is interpenetrable with them. There is no struggle for existence; because there is pure and full existence for all. It dropped its last body for ever and thus has a size slightly less than that. It has reached the end of the universe and is steady there. Its modifications are its own perpetual continuous self-modification.

In the fourteen stage, it is noticeable that our progress is from Wrong-Belief to Right-Belief, then to Vows, then to perfectly careful Vows, then to Passionlessness, and then to a cessation of the Vibratory Activity of body, speech, and mind, which induces the inflow of matter into the soul. In other words, we are beset by five kinds of innate evils or imperfections. These are Wrong-belief, Vowlessness, Carelessness, Passion and Vibratory Activity. We shed Wrong-Belief at the end of the first, Vowlessness at the end of the fourth, Carelessness at the end of the sixth and Passions at the end of the tenth, and Vibratory Activity at the end of the thirteenth stage.



JAINA UNIVERSE



(To face pp. 97, 100 and 129)



6. ATMANUSHASANA

ÂTMANUSHASANA is, as the very name indicates, a discourse on the Divinity in man. Each and every one of the 270 verses is an exhortation in language simple, persuasive, penetrating, forceful, and effective to the Atman, the I, the Ego, the Self, to separate its own Self from the non-Atman, the non-I, the non-Ego, the non-Self. This supreme separation is the complete victory of the Soul over Sin, Sorrow, and Death. It is Mokṣa, Freedom, or Liberation—absolute, perfect, eternal, and everlasting.



7. GOMMATSARA, KARMA-KAND


KARMA KANDA, in brief, is a scientific analysis of Evil, of Sin. Evil is material, as God or the Pure Soul is certainly immaterial. The Jīva Kāṇḍa deals primarily with the Soul; the Karma Kāṇḍa with the material and self-forged Karmic fetters of this soul. It describes the matter and manner of this bondage, so that true and accurate knowledge may help the imprisoned, embodied soul to live a life leading to freedom and Bliss.

Indeed the only use of true books—the “Bibles” of the world—is to teach people how to live. Otherwise they are a “dull and endless strife”, and the overproduction of books on all subjects and in all countries may well be called a prostitution of the Press, and distraction and dissipation of the human intellect. The Press is like the Frankenstein of old, which created by man, has mastered him to the strangling point. The fiction magazine with its teachings of crime and lasciviousness, the daily newspaper with its reports of divorces, dacoities, and all the dirty details of human defects and aberrations, are the greatest instruments of the Devil. Our costly and artificial systems of education and Government also seem to be open to the same objection mostly. We have the Conquerors of pain and ignorance (the Jinas) prohibited frivolous talk, jests, pranks, stories of sex, crime, political gossip etc., as Prāmāda (carelessness) leading to entanglement in Saṃsāra (mundane life), and obscuring the real qualities of the soul. Saint Umasvami's *Tattvārtha Sūtra* * gives the eternal, patent remedies and procedure for lessening and removing human ills.

It is a very long process to show the application of these remedies to our many and complex needs of every-day life; and it is obviously impossible to indicate their application to individual needs. But the remedies are there, and every man and woman, knowing his or her own faults and frailties, needs and desires, can easily find guidance after studying those general rules of right human conduct. The test of the pudding is in the eating thereof; and the test of the value of these teachings is when a man follows them and finds that they cure his weakness and sorrow and give him peace, power, calmness, a noble delight in his own work and life, and joyous co-operation and brotherly service in his relations with his neighbours and living beings generally. In one word, these teachings instil into one an insight of his being a chip of the eternal Omniscience and Omnipotence which we call GOD, and at the same time excite him into an easy, almost instinctive, realisation of his being a happy member of the Universal Fraternity of all Living Beings.

Gommaṭa Sāra, Karma-Kāṇḍa is really a complement of Jīva Kāṇḍa of

* *Supra* Book 2, pp. 17 to 21.



Gommaṭa Sâra. For general remarks on the whole book, reference may be made to the Jîva Kâṇḍa *. Here only Karma Kâṇḍa will be dealt with.

The Six Substances

Space and time are co-extensive and infinite. Space consists of the Universe (Loka), and the Non-Universe (Aloka). The Universe consists of two substances : Living (Jîva) and non-Living (Ajîva). The Living alone has consciousness, power to attend and to know. The non-Living has neither Consciousness, nor Attention, nor Knowledge. This is of five kinds : (1) Matter (Pudgala), e.g. table, chair, brick, stone, etc. (2) Principle of Motion (Dharma) which is an essential auxiliary of the motion of souls and matter. (3) Principle of Rest (Adharma), which is a similar auxiliary of the cessation of the movements of souls and matter. (4) Time (Kâla), in virtue of which things become old, new, or continue in their existence. (5) Space (Âkâśa), which gives their place or location to all substances. These six, Jîva, Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma, Kâla, and Akâśa, are called the six substances or Dravyas.

Dravya literally means flowing or continuing. It is so-called, because it flows or continues the same through all its modifications. It is called "Sat" or Existence also. Existence or substance is a collective name for a trinity-unity of Birth (Utpâda), Decay (Vyaya) and Continuance (Dhruvyā).

Attributes (Guna)

A substance further is a group of attributes and modifications. As there are six substances, some attributes are general or common; others are special. *Sâmānya-guṇa* or common attributes are found in all substances; these are the attributes which are necessary for the existence of the group, as a group or substance.

These are infinite but six are principal :

1. *Astîva*, Is-ness : indestructibility, permanence, the capacity by which a substance cannot be destroyed.
2. *Vastutva*, Functionality : capacity by which a substance has a function.
3. *Dravyatva*, Change-ability : capacity by which it is always changing in modifications.
4. *Prameyatva*, Know-ability : capacity of being known by someone, or of being the subject-matter of knowledge.
5. *Agurulaghutva*, Individuality : capacity by which one attribute or substance does not become another and the substance does not lose the attributes whose grouping forms the substance itself.
6. *Pradeśatva*, Spatiality : capacity of having some kind of location in space.

<i>Chetanatva</i> , Consciousness	..	} are common attributes of the class of substance, or group of attributes, called Soul.
<i>Amūrtatva</i> , Immateriality	..	
<i>Achetanatva</i> , Unconsciousness	..	} are common to Space, Motion, Rest and Time.
<i>Amūrtatva</i> , Immateriality	..	
<i>Achetanatva</i> , Unconsciousness	..	} are common to Matter.
<i>Mūrtatva</i> , Materiality	..	

Viśeṣa guṇa are special attributes of a particular substance. These are the attributes which distinguish one group from the others.

Viśeṣa-guṇa or special attributes of each substance are :

1. *Jīva*—Soul

1. Knowledge. In its full form it arises only in the absence of knowledge-obscuring karma.
 2. Conation. In its full form it arises only in the absence of conation-obscuring karma.
 3. Bliss. In its full form it arises only in the absence of all the four destructive karmas
 4. Power. In its full form it arises only in the absence of obstructive karmas
 5. Right Belief
 6. Right Conduct.
- } In its full form it arises only in the absence of deluding karma.
7. *Avyāvādha*, Undisturbable. Neither pleasure nor pain, due to the absence of *vedanīya* or feeling karma.
 8. *Avagāha*, Penetrability, due to the absence of age-karma.
 9. *Agurulaghutva*, due to the absence of family-determining karma.
 10. *Sūkṣmatva*, Fineness due to the absence of body-making karma.

The first six are *anuṣṭhāna* attributes, which co-exist in and constitute the substance.

They arise fully only on the destruction (*kṣaya*) of the four destructive (*Ghātīya*) karmas—Conation-and-Knowledge-obscuring, Deluding, and Obstructive.

The last four are *pratijīvi* attributes, which merely indicate the absence of their opposites. They arise fully on the destruction (*kṣaya*) of the four non-destructive (*Aghātīya*) karmas—Feeling, Age, Family-determining and Body-making.

2. *Pudgala*, Matter has for its special attributes :

1. Touch,
2. Taste,
3. Smell and
4. Colour.

3. *Dharma*, has for its special attribute the quality of being the medium of motion.

4. *Adharma*, medium of rest.

5. *Akāśa*, Space; its special attribute is to give place to all substances.
6. *Kāla*, Time; its special attribute is to bring about modifications.

Modifications (Paryaya)

Modifications occur only with reference to attributes. This alone is what is meant by Birth and Decay. Modifications or conditions change; a new condition is born, *i.e.*, comes into existence (Utpāda), and the old one decays, *i.e.*, goes out of existence (Vyaya). The essential attributes of the substance always persist through all these modifications. It must be clearly understood and constantly remembered that substance is one: the birth and decay in its modification, and the continuance of the substance itself are only three aspects of viewing one and the same thing. Also Substance (*Dravya*), Attribute (*Guṇa*) and Modification (*Paryāya*) are three mutually interpervasive aspects of the one trinity-unity. Attribute is nothig different from Substance and Modification. So for all the three. When we talk or think of one, we necessarily talk or think of the remaining two. The threefold distinction is merely for the purpose of exposition and explanation by our limited knowledge to others of limited knowledge. The soul with Omniscience sees the whole trinity-unity in its entirety at one and the same time.

The Seven Tattvas

In the Universe, the *Jīva Dravya* or Soul is found mixed with non-living matter. Even the most ordinary and the least civilised men, even animals, exhibit the recognition of the fact. For Death is a most universal and eternal phenomenon. The living body is living; when death intervenes, the body becomes lifeless, or dies. Life has left the body. This Life is the Soul; the body represents the grossest and most visible form of matter, with which the Life was clothed, and which was "Living" only so long as Life or Soul was united with it.

The Soul (*Jīva*) and the Non-Soul (*Ajīva*) are the first two *Tattvas*. The most important non-Soul is the *Pudgala Dravya* or Matter-Substance. The most important combination of soul and matter is our body.

It is also manifest that this body is constantly changing, in virtue of our activity of mind, speech and body. A feeling of modesty in the mind of the maiden paints her cheeks with blush. A sad thought gives one a long face. Criminal broodings breed a criminal look in a man or woman. The pious chanting of a hymn or prayer gilds one with the calm detachment and glory of the halo of a priest or devotee. Our food, dress, play and work, all bring about constant changes in the body.

Matter attracts matter. Generally the law of nature is "like to like". The matter of bad thoughts attracts matter of bad thought, and ultimately becomes the father of a bad habit. This attraction of good or bad matter by the soul in virtue of its mental, vocal, or bodily activity, is called Inflow (*Āśrava*).

When the attracted matter has actually become a part of our body, *i.e.*, when it has become bound to the soul as the body is already bound to it, it is called Bondage (Bandha). The Persian word *bandāh*, "bound" for man, is literally true in this sense of Jainism. The Christian "Fall of Man" by the absorption of Sin by man, is a parallel doctrine.

If by pious attention and right conduct, the Inflow is stopped; it is Stoppage (Samvara).

The gradual shedding of the matter already bound is Shedding (Nirjarā).

The total separation of Soul from the bondage of all matter is Liberation (Mokṣa).

In brief, Jīva or Soul plus Karma or Matter is what it is now in its embodied, mundane condition; and the embodied soul minus all matter is what the Soul will be in its Pure and Liberated condition in Mokṣa.

Matter

Matter (Pudgala) is of six kinds :

1. Gross-gross, or very gross matter (solid), *e.g.*, a mountain, a pillar of iron, etc. This class of matter when divided, cannot be united without the use of a third something ;

2. Gross-liquid, *e.g.*, water, oil, etc. On division this can be united without the intervention of a third thing ;

3. Gross-fine, *e.g.*, shade, sunshine. It is interesting to compare this with the corpuscular theory of light in Western physics, before it was replaced by the modern wave-theory of Huygens. It is matter which looks gross or tangible, but cannot be grasped;


4. Fine-gross, *e.g.*, fragrance, sound, sweetness etc. The distinction between this and gross-fine lies in that gross-fine is more gross than fine because it can be seen as light, shade, etc.; whereas fine-gross cannot be seen, although its origin may be gross. The gases of science would be fine-gross. Fine-gross includes all things that may be perceived by the senses of touch, taste, smell or sound;

5. Fine, matter capable of becoming karmic matter. It cannot be perceived by the senses;

6. Fine-fine, matter which has for its atoms the combination of two or more ultimate atoms (paramāṇu). According to some saints it is the ultimate atom itself.

From the molecular point of view, Matter is of 23 kinds :

1. Atom, *Aṇu vargaṇā*.
2. Numerable-atoms molecule, *Samkhyâtāṇu-Vargaṇā*.
3. Innumerable-atoms molecule, *Asamkhyâtāṇu-Vargaṇā*.
4. Infinite-atoms molecule, *Anantāṇu-Vargaṇā*.
5. Assimilation-molecule, *Āhāra-Vargaṇā*.
6. Assimilation-unreceivable molecule, *Āhāra Agrāhya-Vargaṇā*.
7. Electric molecule, *Taijasa-Vargaṇā*.



8. Electric-unreceivable molecule, *Taijasa Agrâhya-Vargaṇâ*.
9. Speech-molecule, *Bhâṣâ-Vargaṇâ*.
10. Speech-unreceivable molecule, *Bhâṣâ Agrâhya-Vargaṇâ*.
11. Mind-molecule, *Mano-Vargaṇâ*.
12. Mind-unreceivable molecule, *Mano Agrâhya-Vargaṇâ*.
13. Karmic-molecule, *Kârmaṇa-Vargaṇâ*.
14. Fixed-molecule, *Dhruva-Vargaṇâ*.
15. Inter-non-inter molecule, *Sântara-Vargaṇâ*.
16. Inter-indifferent molecule, *Sântara Śûnya-Vargaṇâ*.
17. Individual-body molecule, *Pratyeka Śarira-Vargaṇâ*.
18. Fixed-indifferent molecule, *Dhruva Śûnya-Vargaṇâ*.
19. Gross-common-body molecule, *Vâdara Nigoda-Vargaṇâ*.
20. Gross-indifferent molecule, *Vâdara Nigoda-Śûnya-Vargaṇâ*.
21. Fine-common-body molecule, *Sûkṣma Nigoda-Vargaṇâ*.
22. Sphere-molecule, *Nabho-Vargaṇâ*; and
23. Great-molecule molecule, *Mahâ-Skandha-Vargaṇâ*.

Of these the most important are Nos. 5, 7, 9, 11, and 13.

Of all mundane souls there are five bodies only :

1. *Audârîka*, the physical body of all men and animals.
2. *Vaikriyika*, the body of hellish and celestial beings, which they can change at will.
3. *Âhâraka*, the spiritual man-like emanation from the head of a saint in doubt, in the sixth spiritual stage.
4. *Taijasa*, electric body of mundane souls which always accompanies them.
5. Karmic body found in all mundane souls.

The first three bodies are made of Âhâi aka Vargaṇâ molecules of assimilative matter, No. 5.

The electric body is made of *Taijasa Vargaṇâ*, No. 7.

Our speech is made of *Bhâṣâ Vargaṇâ*, No. 9; our mind, of *Mano Vargaṇâ*, No. 11; and our karmic body of *Kârmaṇa Vargaṇâ*, No. 13.

Karmic Matter

Now it is with the last that we deal here.

Inflow of Karmic matter towards the soul is caused by the vibratory activity of mind, speech and body.

If the vibratory activity is with passion, the inflow leads to bondage of soul by karmic matter. It is called *Sâmparâyika* or Mundane Inflow.

If it is without passion, i. e., purely vibration in the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth spiritual stages and does not lead to bondage, it is called *Îryâpatha* or transient or fleeting Inflow.

The Mundane Inflow is of 39 kinds, according to its causes :

5 Caused by the activity of the 5 Senses.

4 " " " " " 4 Passions.



5 Caused by the activity of the 5 Sins of Injury, Lie, Theft, Unchastity and Worldly Attachment.

25 Caused by 25 kinds of activities as follows :

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1. *Samyaktva-kriyā*, that which strengthens right belief; e.g., worship, etc.
 2. *Mithyātva-kriyā*, that which strengthens wrong belief, e.g., superstition, etc.
 3. *Prayoga-kriyā*, bodily movement.
 4. *Samādāna-kriyā*, tendency to neglect vows, after having taken them.
 5. *Īryāpatha-kriyā*, walking carefully, i.e., looking on the ground for protecting living beings which may be trod upon and thus injured.
 6. *Prādoṣikī-kriyā*, tendency to accuse others in anger.
 7. *Kāyikī-kriyā*, a wicked man's readiness to hurt others.
 8. *Adhikaraṇikī-kriyā*, having weapons of hurtfulness.
 9. *Paritāpikī-kriyā*, anything which may cause mental pain to oneself or others.
 10. *Prāṇātīpātikī-kriyā*, depriving another of vitalities of age, sense-organs, power or respiration.
 11. *Darśana-kriyā*, infatuated desire to see a pleasing form.
 12. *Sparśana-kriyā*, frivolous indulgence in touching.
 13. *Pratyāyikī-kriyā*, inventing new sense-enjoyments.
 14. *Samantānupātana-kriyā*, answering call of nature in a place frequented by men, women or animals.
 15. *Anābhoga-kriyā*, indifference in dropping things or throwing oneself down upon the earth, i. e., without seeing whether it is swept or not.
 16. *Svabhasta-kriyā*, undertaking to do by one's own hand, what should be done by others.
 17. *Nisarga-kriyā*, admiration of hurtful or unrighteous things.
 18. *Vidāraṇa-kriyā*, proclaiming other's sins.
 19. *Ājñā-vyāpādikī-kriyā*, misinterpreting the scriptural injunctions, which we do not want to follow.
 20. *Anākāṅkṣā-kriyā*, disrespect to scriptural injunctions out of vice or laziness.
 21. *Prārambha-kriyā*, engaging in harmful activities or expressing delight in other's misdeeds.
 22. *Pārigrāhikī-kriyā*, trying to persevere in one's attachment to worldly belongings.
 23. *Māyā-kriyā*, deceitful disturbance of some one's right knowledge and faith.
 24. *Mithyā-darśana-kriyā*, praising actions due to wrong belief.
 25. *Apratyākhyāna-kriyā*, not renouncing what ought to be renounced.
- The Senses, Passions and Vowlessness are the causes and the 25 kinds of activity are their effects.

The differences in inflow in different souls caused by the same activity arise from differences in the following :

1. Intensity of desire or thought-activity.
2. Mildness „ „ „ „
3. Intentional character of the act.
4. Unintentional character of the act.
5. Dependence of the act upon living and non-living substances or activities.
6. One's own position and power to do the act.

The Dependence (Adhikaraṇa) is of two kinds, relating to the souls and the non-souls.

The first, *i.e.*, dependence on the souls is of 108 kinds due to differences in the following :

1. *Samarambha*. Determination to do a thing. Compare intention for an offence in Criminal Law.
2. *Samārambha*. Preparation for it, *i.e.*, collecting materials for it. Compare in Criminal Law the conduct of the criminal before committing the offence.
3. *Ārambha*. Commencement of it. Compare Attempt in Criminal Law.

These three can be done by three yogas, *i.e.*, activity of mind, body and speech, thus there are $3 \times 3 = 9$ kinds. Each one of the 9 kinds can be done in three ways, *i.e.*, by doing oneself, or having it done by others, or by approval or acquiescence. Thus we get 27 kinds. Each one of the 27 may be due to the 4 passions. That gives us $27 \times 4 = 108$ kinds. Thus the Jaina rosary has 108 beads, one for each of these 108 *Jivādhikaraṇas*.

These 108 kinds can become 432 kinds, if we consider each passion in its 4 aspects of error-feeding or right-belief-preventing, partial-vow-preventing, total-vow-preventing and perfect-conduct-preventing.

The second kind of dependence relating to the non-soul is of the following 11 kinds.

2 kinds of production : (1) *Mūla guṇa*, *i.e.*, of the body, speech, mind and respiration, (2) *Uttara guṇa*, *i.e.*, production of books, pictures, statues, etc.

4 kinds of putting down a thing : (1) *Apratyā Vekṣita*, without seeing, (2) *Duh-pramriṣṭa*, petulantly, peevishly, (3) *Sahasā*, hurriedly and (4) *Anābhoga*, where it ought not to be put.

2 kinds of mixing up : (1) *Bhukta-pāna*, food and drink, (2) *Upakaraṇa* mixing up of things necessary for doing any act.


3 kinds of movement by (1) *Kāya*, body, (2) *Vāṅ*, speech and (3) *Mana*, mind.

Inflow of the Eight Karmas

I—II.—Knowledge and Conation-obscuring.

The inflow of knowledge and conation-obscuring karmic matter, is caused by the following :

1. Depreciation of those who are learned in the scriptures.
2. Concealment of knowledge.



3. Envy; jealousy. Refusal to impart knowledge out of envy.
4. Obstruction. Hindering the progress of knowledge.
5. Denying the truth proclaimed by another, by body and speech.
6. Refuting the truth, although it is known to be such.

III.—Feeling.

The inflow of pain-bringing-feeling (Asâtâ-vedanîya) karmic matter is due to the following feelings and acts :

1. *Dukha*, pain. 2. *Śoka*, sorrow. 3. *Tāpa*, repentance, remorse. 4. *Ākrandana*, weeping. 5. *Badha*, depriving of vitality. 6. *Parivedana*, piteous or pathetic moaning to attract compassion.

These six can be produced in one's own self, in another, or both in one's and another. Thus there are 18 forms of this inflow.

There are ten causes of inflow of pleasure-bearing-feeling (Sâtâ-vendanîya) karmic matter :

1. *Bhûta-anukampâ*, compassion for all living beings, 2 *Vrati-anukampâ*, compassion for the vowers, 3. *Dâna*, charity, 4. *Sarâga-samyama*, self-control with slight attachment etc., 5. *Samyam-asamyama*, restraint by vows of some but not of others, 6. *Akâma-nirjarâ*, equanimous submission to the fruition of karma, 7. *Bâla tapa*, austerities not based upon right knowledge, 8. *Yoga*, contemplation, 9. *Kṣânti*, forgiveness, and 10. *Śauca*, contentment.

IV.—Deluding.

The inflow of right-belief-deluding (Darśana mohaniya) karmic matter is caused by *Avarṇavâda*—defaming the Omniscient Lord, *Arhat Kevali*; the Scriptures, *Śrûta*; the Saints' brotherhood, *Sangha*; the true Religion, *Dharma*; and the Celestial beings, *Deva*, e.g., saying that the celestial beings take meat or wine etc. and to offer these as sacrifices to them.

The inflow of right-conduct-deluding karmic matter is caused by the intense thought-activity produced by the rise of the passions and the quasi-passions, *no-kaṣâya*, e.g. joking about truth etc., disinclination to take vows etc., moving in evil society etc.

V.—Age.

The inflow of *Narakâyu* karma, hellish-age karma is caused by too much wordly activity and by attachment to too many worldly objects or by too much attachment, e. g., committing breaches of the first five vows of non-killing, truth, non-stealing, chastity, non-attachment to worldly possessions. The point to be noted is that it is not the possession or ownership of worldly wealth which is sinful but it is the attachment to it which is a sin. A man may be in the world; but he must not be of it.

The inflow of *Tiryancha-âyu*, sub-human-age karma is caused by *Mâyâ*, deceit, e. g., cheating others, preaching the false doctrines, etc.

The inflow of *Manusya-âyu*, human-age karma is caused by slight wordly activity and by attachment to a few worldly objects or by slight attachment. Natural humble disposition is also the cause of human-age-karma.

Vowlessness and sub-vowlessness with slight worldly activity and slight attachment, are causes of the inflow of all kinds of age-karma.

Not taking the vows of laymen and not adopting the restrictions (*śīla*), but having slight attachment to the world and activity in it, can be the cause of the inflow of age-karmic matter of all four kinds.

The inflow of *Deva-Āyu*, celestial-age-karma is caused by :

1. *Sarāga-saṃyama*, self-control with slight attachment found in monks only.
2. *Saṃyamāsaṃyama*, restraint of some vows, but not of others, found in laymen only.
3. *Akāma-nirjarā*, equanimous submission to the fruition of karma.
4. *Bāla-tapa*, austerities not based upon right knowledge.

Right-belief is also the cause of celestial-age karma, but only of the heavenly order. It applies to human and sub-human beings only. A celestial or hellish right-believer binds the human-age karma. Note also that if a human or sub-human being has bound a particular age-karma before gaining right-belief, he must enjoy that.

VI.—Body-making.

The inflow of *Aśubha-nāma*, a bad-body-making karma is caused by a non-straightforward or deceitful working of the mind, body or speech or by *Viśamvāda*, wrangling etc., wrong-belief, envy, back-biting, self-praise, censuring others etc.

The inflow of good-body-making karma is caused by the causes which are opposite of the above, viz., by straightforward dealings with body, mind and speech; by avoiding disputes etc., right belief, humility, admiring praiseworthy people etc.

The inflow of *Tirthaṃkara*-body-making karma is caused by meditation (*Bhāvanā*) of the following 16 matters :

1. *Darśana-viśuddhi*, purity of right-belief. Pure right-belief is with 8 Angas or the following 8 qualities :

- (i) *Niḥśaṅkita*. Free from all doubt.
- (ii) *Niḥkāṅkṣita*. Free from wordly desire.
- (iii) *Nir-vichikitsita*. Free from repulsion from anything.
- (iv) *Amūḍhad ṛiṣṭitva*. Free from superstitious belief.
- (v) *Upa-gūhana*. Advancement in one's own attributes. Free from a tendency to proclaim the faults of others.
- (vi) *Sthiti-karaṇa*. To help oneself or others to remain steady in the path of truth.
- (vii) *Vātsalya*. Tender affection for one's brother on the path of Liberation.
- (viii) *Prabhāvanā*. Propagation of the path of Liberation.

2. *Vinaya-saṃpannatā*. Reverence for means of Liberation and for those who follow them.

3. *Śīla vrataṣṭānāṭichāra*. Faultless observance of the five vows, and faultless subdual of the passions.
4. *Abhikṣṇa jñānopayoga*. Ceaseless pursuit of right knowledge.
5. *Samvṛga*. Perpetual apprehension of mundane miseries.
6. *Śaktitas-tyāga*. Giving to others gift of knowledge, food, medicine etc., according to one's capacity.
7. *Śaktitas-tapa*. The practice of austerities, according to one's capacity.
8. *Sādhu-samādhi*. Protecting and reassuring to saints or removing their troubles.
9. *Vaiyāvṛittyā-karaṇa*. Serving the meritorious.
10. *Arhat-bhakti*. Devotion to Arhats or Omniscient Lords.
11. *Āchārya-bhakti*. Devotion to Āchāryas or Heads of the Orders of Saints.
12. *Bahu-śruta-bhakti*. Devotion to Upādhyāyas or teaching Saints.
13. *Pravachana-bhakti*. Devotion to Scriptures.
14. *Āśākyakā-parihāṇi*. Not neglecting one's six important daily duties.
15. *Mārga prabhāvanā*. Propagation of the path of Liberation.
16. *Pravachanavātsalatva*. Tender affection for one's brothers on the path of Liberation.

Even one of these, if properly contemplated and with right-belief, brings about the inflow of Tirthaṅkara-body-making karma.

VII.—Family-determining

The inflow of low-family-determining karma is caused by :

1. *Paranindā*, speaking ill of others;
2. *Ātma praśaṅsā*, praising oneself;
3. *Sad guṇoṣṭhādāna*, concealing the good qualities of others; and
4. *Asad guṇa udbhāvana*, proclaiming in oneself the good qualities which one does not possess.

The inflow of high-family-determining karma is caused by the opposites of the above, i.e.,

1. *Para praśaṅsā*, praising others;
2. *Ātma nindā*, denouncing one's self;
3. *Parsad-guṇodbhāvana*, proclaiming the good qualities of others;
4. *Ātmasad-guṇoṣṭhādāna*, not proclaiming one's own good qualities;
5. *Nichair-vṛitti*, an attitude of humility towards one's betters; and
6. *Anutseka*, not being proud of one's own achievement or attainments.

VIII.—Obstructive

The inflow of obstructive (Antarāya) karma is caused by disturbing others in charity, gain, enjoyment of consumable things, enjoyment of non-consumable things and making use of their powers.

The inflow of the seven karmas, i.e., of all except the age-karma, is going on always, in souls influenced by the Passions, and of the

age-karma also on special occasions ; but the predominance of the above causes will determine the intensity of fruition (anubhāga) of their particular inflow.

The special occasions of age-karma are eight in one man's life, as follows :— Supposing a man's life is to be 81 years. The first occasion for binding the age-karma will be on his passing $\frac{2}{3}$ of it, *i.e.*, when he is 54. The second on his passing $\frac{2}{3}$ of the remainder, *i.e.*, when he is 72. The third on his passing $\frac{2}{3}$ of the remainder, *i.e.*, when he is 78. The fourth on his passing $\frac{2}{3}$ of the remainder again, *i.e.*, when he is 80. Similarly the fifth when he is 80 years, 8 months. The sixth at 80 years, 10 months and 20 days. The seventh at 80 years, 11 months, 16 days and 16 hours. The eighth at 80 years, 11 months, 25 days, 13 hours, and 20 minutes. If no age-karma is bound yet, the ninth is the last *antar-muhūrta* of his life. The point is that the man is born with his particular age-karma already bound. Therefore he must bind the age-karma of his next incarnation at the latest at the last moment.

Bondage

The causes of Bandha or bondage are :

1. Wrong-Belief

Mithyādarśana, wrong-belief, is of five kinds.

1. *Ekānta*. Taking only one aspect of a many-sided thing, *e.g.*, man is mortal and immortal, regarded from the point of view of body and soul respectively. Taking only one view is *Ekānta*.

2. *Viparīta*. Perverse belief, *e.g.*, animal sacrifices lead to heaven. Injury to anyone cannot be a cause of merit.

3. *Samśaya*. Doubt, scepticism, hesitation, *e.g.*, as to path of Liberation.

4. *Vinaya*. Veneration. Taking all religions and gods, even the so-called religions which enjoin cruel or immoral practices, to be equally worthy of pursuit.

5. *Ajñāna*. Wrong belief caused by ignorance, *eg.*, indiscrimination of good and bad.

Wrong belief is caused by *Nisarga*, inborn error; or by *Adhigama*, preaching of another. *Nisargaja* is also called *Agrahīta* and *Adhigamaja* is called *Grahīta*.

The last is of four kinds :

(i) *Kriyāvādi*. Belief in time, soul, etc. as causing everything in the world. All the substances perform their functions and become causes of different effects. To uphold otherwise is wrong belief.

(ii) *Akriyāvādi*. Opposite of the above, *e.g.*, the soul does nothing. This undermines all truth. If the soul does nothing, who is responsible for the doing and fruition of our good and bad actions ?

(iii) *Ajñānika*. Agnostic. Everything is not knowable. This is one of the

general attributes of all substances. How then can it be said that nothing is knowable? It may be unknowable from some point of view; but that is all.

(iv) *Vaineyika*. Religion is identical with veneration of parents, king etc., e.g., Confucianism. Obviously veneration and eternal truth are not identical.

2. Vowlessness

Avirata, vowlessness, non-renunciation is of 12 kinds—

Lack of compassion for six classes of embodied souls; and lack of restraint of five senses and one mind.

3. Carelessness

Pramâda, carelessness is of 15 kinds—

4 kinds of *Kathâ*, talk about

1. Food (*Bhojana-Kathâ*).

2. Women (*Stri-Kathâ*).

3. Politics (*Râjya-Kathâ*).

4. Scandal (*Deśa-Kathâ*).

5 Senses.

4 Passions.

1 Affection (*Sneh*).

1 Sleep (*Nidrâ*).

—
15

1 *Kathâ* × 1 Sense × 1 Passion × 1 *Sneha* × 1 *Nidrâ* make one combination or one kind of *Pramâda*.

So 4 kinds of talk × 5 senses × 4 passions × 1 affection × 1 sleep make 80 kinds.

4. Passions

Kaṣâya, passions are 4, i.e., anger, pride, deceit and greed.

5. Vibrations

Yoga, vibrations in the soul through mind, body and speech are of 15 kinds—

4 of mind :

1. *Satya mana*, true mind.

2. *Asatya mana*, false mind.

3. *Ubhaya mana*, mixed true and false mind.

4. *Anubhaya mana*, neither true nor false.

4 of speech :

1. *Satya-vachana*, True.

2. *Asatya-vachana*, False.

3. *Ubhaya-vachana*, Both.

4. *Anubhaya-vachana*, None.



7 of body :

1. *Audārika*, Physical.
2. *Audārika miśra*, Physical with karmic.
3. *Vaikriyaka*, Fluid.
4. *Vaikriyaka-miśra*. Fluid with karmic.
5. *Āhāraka*, Assimilative.
6. *Āhāraka-miśra*, Assimilative with physical.
7. *Kārmaṇa*, karmic.

15

The *taijasa*, electric body is always found with the karmic body. It never has an independent *yoga*. The electric molecules are drawn like the karmic molecules by the vibrations set in the soul by yoga of any kind.

Karmic matter is bound to the soul by the Vibrations (Yoga) of mind, speech and body, coloured by Passions (Kaṣāya) of anger, pride, deceit, and greed mainly. The vibrations determine the kind (Prakṛiti) and the quantity (Pradeśa) of the karmic matter to be drawn towards and bound to the soul. The Passions determine the duration (Sthiti) of the bondage, and the mild or intense fruition (Anubhāga) of the karma at its maturity.

148 Sub-classes of Karma

There are 8 kinds of Prakṛitis of Karmic matter :

1. *Jñānāvaraṇa*. Knowledge-obscuring.
2. *Darśanāvaraṇa*. Conation-obscuring.
3. *Vedaniya*. Feeling karma.
4. *Mohaniya*. Deluding.
5. *Āyu*. Age.
6. *Nāma*. Body-making.
7. *Gotra*. Family-determining.
8. *Antarāya*. Obstructive.

The eight karmas have respectively 5, 9, 2, 28, 4, 93, 2 and 5 subclasses, i.e., 148 subclasses in all, as detailed below :

5 Knowledge-obscuring, *Jñānāvaraṇa* (=j.).

- | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. <i>Mati-j.</i> | Sensitive-knowledge-obscuring. |
| 2. <i>Śruti-j.</i> | Scriptural " " |
| 3. <i>Avadhi-j.</i> | Visual " " |
| 4. <i>Manahparyaya-j.</i> | Mental " " |
| 5. <i>Kevala-j.</i> | Perfect " " |

9 Conation-obscuring, *Darśanāvaraṇa* (=d.).

- | | |
|----------------------|----------------------------|
| 6. <i>Chakṣu-d.</i> | Ocular-Conation-obscuring. |
| 7. <i>Achakṣu-d.</i> | Non-Ocular " " |
| 8. <i>Avadhi-d.</i> | Visual " " |
| 9. <i>Kevala-d.</i> | Perfect " " |
| 10. <i>Nidrā</i> | Sleep |



- | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------|
| 11. <i>Nidrā-Nidrā</i> | Deep sleep. |
| 12. <i>Prachalā</i> | Drowsiness. |
| 13. <i>Prachalā-prachalā</i> | Heavy drowsiness. |
| 14. <i>Styānagridhi</i> | Somnambulism. |

2 Feeling, Vedanīya (=v.)

15. *Sātā-v.* Pleasure-feeling; that which brings pleasure.
 16. *Asātā-v.* Pain-feeling; that which brings pain.

28 Deluding, Mohanīya.

I. 3 *Darśana-mohanīya*. Right-belief-deluding.

17. *Mithyātva*, Wrong belief.
 18. *Samyag mithyātva*, Right-wrong belief, mixed wrong and right belief.
 19. *Samyaktva Prakṛiti*, Clouded-right belief, right belief clouded by slight wrong belief. Full right belief of the subsidential or destructive kind, being a characteristic primary attribute of the soul, manifests itself at the subsidence or destruction of this sub-class.

II. 25 *Chāritra-mohanīya*, Right-conduct-deluding.(i) 16 *Kaṣāya*, Passions.

- (a) 4 *Anantānubandhi*, Error-feeding or Wrong-belief-breeding or right-belief-preventing passions, viz.

20. *Krodha*, Anger.
 21. *Māna*, Pride.
 22. *Māyā*, Deceit.
 23. *Lobha*, Greed.

(b) 4 *Apratayākhyānavaraṇīya*, Partial-vow-preventing passions.

24. Anger.
 25. Pride.
 26. Deceit.
 27. Greed.

(c) 4 *Pratyākhyānavaraṇīya*, Total-vow-preventing passions.


28. Anger.
 29. Pride.
 30. Deceit.
 31. Greed.

(d) 4 *Samjvalana*, Perfect-conduct-preventing. This is the slightest degree of passion and co-exists with self-restraint of a high order. It relates to the four passions of

32. Anger.
 33. Pride.
 34. Deceit.
 35. Greed.

(ii) 9 *Nokaṣāya* or *Akaṣāya*, Quasi-passions, slight or minor passions.

36. *Hāsyā*, Laughter; Risible or Laughter-producing.
 37. *Rati*, Indulgence.



38. *Arati*, Ennui, dissatisfaction.
39. *Śoka*, Sorrow.
40. *Bhaya*, Fear.
41. *Jugupsâ*, Disgust, aversion. Hiding one's own, and publishing other people's shortcomings.
42. *Strīveda*, Feminine inclination.
43. *Puṃveda*, Masculine inclination.
44. *Napuṃsaka veda*, Common sex inclination.
- 4 *Āyu*, Age-Karma.
 45. *Narakāyu*, Hellish age.
 46. *Tiryanchāyu*, Sub-human age.
 47. *Manuṣyāyu*, Human age.
 48. *Devāyu*, Celestial age.
- 93 *Nāma*, Body-making Karma.
 - 4 *Gati*, Condition; condition of existence.
 49. *Naraka*, Hellish.
 50. *Tiryancha*, Sub-human.
 51. *Manuṣya*, Human.
 52. *Deva*, Celestial.
 - 5 *Jāti*, Genus of beings.
 53. *Ekendriya*, One-sensed.
 54. *Dvīndriya*, Two-sensed.
 55. *Trīndriya*, Three-sensed.
 56. *Chaturendriya*, Four-sensed.
 57. *Panchendriya*, Five-sensed.
 - 5 *Śarīra*, Bodies.
 58. *Audārika*, Physical.
 59. *Vaikriyika*, Fluid.
 60. *Āhāraka*, Assimilative.
 61. *Taijasa*, Electirc.
 62. *Kārmaṇa*, Karmic.
 - 3 *Angopāṅga*, Limbs; limbs and minor limbs.
 63. *Audārika*, Physical.
 64. *Vaikriyika*, Fluid.
 65. *Āhāraka*, Assimilative.
 66. *Nirmāṇa*, Formation; proper formation of limbs and minor limbs in relation to their situation (*sthāna*) and dimensions (*pramāṇa*).
 - 5 *Bandhana*, Bondage; molecular bondage.
 67. *Audārika*, Physical.
 68. *Vaikriyika*, Fluid.
 69. *Āhāraka*, Assimilative.
 70. *Taijasa*, Electric.
 71. *Kārmaṇa*, Karmic.



- 5 Samghâta, Interfusion; molecular interfusion.
72. *Auâdrika*, Physical.
73. *Vaikriyika*, Fluid.
74. *Âhâraka*, Assimilative.
75. *Taijasa*, Electric.
76. *Kârmaṇa*, Karmic.
- 6 Saṃsthâna, Figure; figure of the body.
77. *Samachaturasra*, Symmetrical; perfect symmetry all round.
78. *Nyagrodha parimaṇḍala*, Banyan-like; short in lower but large in upper extremities like a banyan-tree.
79. *Svâti*, Tapering; like a snake-hole, broad in lower but short in the upper extremities, reverse of the above.
80. *Kubjaka*, Hunchback.
81. *Vâmana*, Dwarf.
82. *Hunḍaka* Unsymmetrical; disproportionate, deformed.
- 6 Samhanana (=s), Bones, muscles etc.
83. *Vajra-ṛiṣabha-ârâcha-s*, Adamantine nerves, joints and bones.
84. *Vajra-nârâcha-s*, Adamantine joints and bones.
85. *Nârâcha-s*, Unbreakable joints and bones.
86. *Ardha-nârâcha-s*, Semi-unbreakable joints and bones.
87. *Kîlita-s*, Riveted bones.
88. *Asamprâpta sripâṭikâ-s*, Loosely-jointed bones.
- 8 Sparśa, Touch.
89. *Kaṭhara*, Hard.
90. *Komala*, Soft.
91. *Guru*, Heavy.
92. *Laghu*, Light.
93. *Rūkṣa*, Rough.
94. *Snigdha*, Smooth.
95. *Śîta*, Cold.
96. *Ūṣṇa*, Hot.
- 5 Rasa, Tastes.
97. *Tikta*, Pungent.
98. *Kaṭuka*, Bitter.
99. *Kaṣâya*, Astringent, saline.
100. *Âmla*, Acid.
101. *Madhura*, Sweet.
- 2 Gandha, Smell.
102. *Sugandha*, Sweet-smelling, fragrant.
103. *Durgandha*, Evil-smelling; mal-odorous.
- 5 Varna, Colour.
104. *Kriṣṇa*, Black.
105. *Nîla*, Blue.
106. *Rakta*, Red.



107. *Pīta*, Yellow.

108. *Śukla*, White.

4 Anupûrvī, Migratory forms; the power of retaining the form of the last incarnation during transmigration, *i.e.*, in the passage from one to another condition of existence. The names are according to the four conditions of existence, *e.g.* *Devānupûrvī* means the power of retaining the last form whatever it was, in going to the celestial condition of existence. (4).

109. *Naraka* Anupûrvī, Hellish—migratory form.

110. *Tiryancha* „ Sub-human „ „

111. *Manusya* „ Human „ „

112. *Deva* „ Celestial „ „

113. *Agurulaghu*, Not heavy-light; neither too heavy to move, nor too light to lack stability.

114. *Upaghâta*, Self-destructive; having a self-destructive limb or organ, as a stag's horns.

115. *Paraghâta*, Destructive; possessing a limb or organ fatal to others, as a lion's claws, etc.

116. *Ātāpa*, Hot light; radiant heat; possessed of a brilliant body, which is hot to others but not to the possessor, as the gross radiant earth-bodied beings in the sun.

117. *Udyota*, Cold light, phosphorescence; cold light like moonshine.

118. *Uçhkvāsa*, Respiration.

2 Vihâyogati, Movement; capacity of moving in space.

119. *Śubha*, Graceful.

120. *Aśubha*, Awkward.

121. *Pratyeka śarīra*, Individual body; a body enjoyable by one soul only.

122. *Sādhāraṇa*, Common body; possessed and enjoyable by many souls, as a potato.

123. *Trasa*, Mobile with bodies having 2, 3, or 5 senses.

124. *Sthāvara*, Immobile with bodies having one sense only, *i.e.* the sense of touch.

125. *Subhaga*, Amiable; amiable personality, even though not beautiful.

126. *Durbhaga*, Unprepossessing; even though beautiful.

127. *Susvara*, Sweet-voiced, musical.

128. *Duḥsvara*, Harsh-voiced, noisy.

129. *Śubha*, Beautiful (body).

130. *Aśubha*, Ugly (body).

131. *Sūkṣma*, Fine (body), uncuttable and all-pervasive.

132. *Bādara*, Gross (body).

133. *Paryāpti*, Developable; capable of developing the body fully.

134. *Āparyāpti*, Undevelopable; incapable of developing the body fully.

135. *Sthira*, Steady (circulation of blood, bile etc).

136. *Asthira*, Unsteady (circulation of blood etc).
137. *Ādeya*, Impressive; appearance such as may affect others.
138. *Anādeya*, Non-impressive; dull appearance.
139. *Yasaḥ Kīrti*, Fame; bringing good fame even if one does not do good actions.
140. *Ayasaḥ Kīrti*, Notoriety; bringing bad name, even if one does good actions.
141. *Tirthaṃkara*, A Tirthaṃkara's career with all its grandeur when He preaches and completes His Ministry.

2 Gotra, Family-determining.

142. *Uchcha* Gotra, High Family.

143. *Nīcha* „ Low „

5 Antarāya, Obstructive.

144. *Dāna Antarāya*, Charity-Obstructive..

145. *Lābha Antarāya*, Gain „

146. *Bhoga Antarāya*, Obstructive of enjoyment of non-consumable things.

147. *Upabhogha Antarāya*, obstructive of re-enjoyment of non-consumable things.

148. *Virya Antarāya*, Obstructive of power of exercise of one's capacities.

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The Quantity of Bondage

In consonance with their nature according to their names, and due to the differences in the vibrations (yoga) in the soul-activity, not perceptible by the senses, the karmic molecules enter, become one, and stay with every Pradeśa of the soul. They come in infinite numbers, every moment, to each soul.

The particular number of the molecules actually absorbed is called *pradeśa-bandha*.

Duration of Bondage

The maximum duration of Knowledge-obscuring, Conation-obscuring, Feeling and Obstructive karmas is 30 crore × crore Sāgaras.

This is possible in a rational five-sensed, fully developable (paryāpta) soul, who has wrong-belief (Mithyātva).

The maximum duration of Deluding-karma is 70 crore × crore Sāgaras.

The maximum duration of Body-making and Family-determining karmas is 20 crore × crore Sāgaras each.

The maximum duration of Age-karma is 33 Sāgaras.

The minimum duration of Feeling karma is 12 Muhūrtas = 12×48 minutes = 9 hours 36 minutes. That of Body-making and Family-determining is 8 Muhūrtas.

Of all the rest, the minimum is one Antar-muhūrta, which ranges from 1 Samaya and 1 Avali at the lowest to 48 minutes minus one Samaya.

Fruition of Karma

Fruition is according to the name of the karma, e.g., knowledgeobscuring karma prevents the acquisition of knowledge and so on.

Stopping of Inflow

The causes of Inflow and Bondage are given above.

Samvara is the stoppage of inflow of karmic matter into the soul.

Wrong belief (*Mithyâ darśana*) is stopped in the 4th spiritual stage *

Vowlessness (*Avirata*) in the 5th and 6th;

Carelessness (*Pramâda*) in the 7th;

Passion (*Kaṣâya*) in the 8th, 9th and 10th; and

Vibration (*Yoga*) in the 14th stage.

Samvara or Stoppage of Inflow is produced by :

3 kinds of *Gupti*, Preservation.

5 „ „ *Samiti*, Carefulness.

10 „ „ *Dharma*, Observances;

12 „ „ *Anuprekṣâ*, Meditation.

22 „ „ *Parisaha-jaya*, Sub-dual of sufferings; and

5 „ „ *Châritra*, Conduct.

By austerities is caused the shedding of karmic matter, and also stoppage of inflow.

(i) Preservations.

Gupti, Preservation is proper control (*nigraha*) over mind, speech and body.

(ii) Carefulness.

The 5 *Samitis* are :

Samyaka iryâ samiti, Proper care in walking.

Samyaka bhâṣâ samiti „ „ „ speaking.

Samyaka eśanâ samiti „ „ „ eating.

Samyaka âdâna nikṣepa samiti, Proper care in lifting and laying.

Samyaka utsarga samiti, Proper care in excreting.

(iii) Observances.

The 10 observances are :

Uttama-kṣamâ Supreme Forgiveness.

Uttama mârdava „ Humility.

Uttama-ârjava „ Straight-forwardness (Honesty).

* For Spiritual Stages, *Infra* p. 172



<i>Uttama-śaucha</i>	„	Contentment.
<i>Uttama-satya</i>	„	Truth.
<i>Uttama-samya</i>	„	Restraint.
<i>Uttama-tapa</i>	„	Austerities.
<i>Uttama-tyāga</i>	„	Renunciation.
<i>Uttama-ākīnchanya</i> ,		Supreme Non-attachment. Not taking the non-self for one's own self; and
<i>Uttama-brahmacharya</i> ,		Supreme Chasity.

(iv) *Meditations.*

The 12 Meditations are :

1. *Anitya anuprekṣā*. Everything is subject to change or is transitory.
2. *Āśaraṇa anuprekṣā*, Unprotectiveness, Helplessness. The soul is unprotected from the fruition of karmas. Death, pain, pleasure, success, failure are the necessary results of our acts in this or past lives.
3. *Samśāra anuprekṣā*, Mundaneness. Soul moves in the cycle of existences and cannot attain true happiness till it is out of the cycle.
4. *Ekatva anuprekṣā*, Loneliness. I am alone the doer of my actions and the enjoyer of the fruits of them.
5. *Anayatva anuprekṣā*, Separateness, Otherness. The world, my relations and friends, my body, and mind, they are all distinct and separate from my real self.
6. *Aśuchi anuprekṣā*, Impurity. The body is impure and dirty. Purity is of two kinds—of the soul itself, and of the body and other things. This last is of eight kinds.
7. *Āśrava anuprekṣā*, Inflow. The inflow of karma is the cause of my mundane existence and it is the product of passions etc.
8. *Samvara anuprekṣā*, Stoppage. The inflow must be stopped.
9. *Nirjarā anuprekṣā*, Shedding. Karmic matter must be shed from or shaken out of the soul.
10. *Loka anuprekṣā*, Universe. The nature of the Universe and its constituent elements in all their vast variety proving the insignificance and miserable nothingness of man in time and space.
11. *Bodhi durlabha anuprekṣā*, Rarity of Right Path. It is difficult to attain right-belief, knowledge and conduct.
12. *Dharma svākhyā tattvānuprekṣā*, Nature of Right-Path as said by the conquerors. The true nature of Truth, *i. e.*, the three-fold path to real Liberation.

These must be meditated upon again and again. As to the first kind of meditation, *viz.*, transitoriness, *anitya anuprekṣā* it must be noted that as substance, everything is permanent. Only condition is transitory. Of the matter assimilated as karma and non-karma by the soul, that which is accepted by the soul is called *Upātta*. The rest is *Anupātta* matter which is not taken in by the soul.

(v) *Sufferings.*

For the sake of non-falling-off from the path of Liberation, and for the shedding of Karmic matter, whatever sufferings are undergone calmly and with religious renunciation are called the Sufferings (Parisaha).

The 22 Sufferings are :

1. Hunger.
2. Thirst.
3. Cold.
4. Heat.
5. Troubles from insect-bites, mosquitoes, etc.
6. Nudity. To bear calmly the troubles of climate, unpopularity etc., due to the vow of absolute possessionlessness, *i. e.*, nakedness.
7. Ennui, dissatisfaction, languor.
8. Women. Resisting temptations from and desire for women.
9. Walking too much; not to feel the fatigue, but to bear it calmly.
10. Continuous sitting in one posture. Not to disturb the posture of meditation, even if there is danger from lion, snake etc.
11. Sleeping. Resting on the hard earth.
12. Abuse.
13. Beating.
14. Begging. To resist the temptation of begging even when there is great need of protection of body, mind etc.
15. Failure to get alms;
16. Disease.
17. Contact with thorny shrubs, etc.
18. Dirt, Discomfort from dust, etc.
19. Respect or disrespect by admirers or enemies.
20. To resist conceit of knowledge; and to be full of humility.
21. Lack of knowledge. Not to be pained, even though it is felt that one does not know much.
22. Slack belief, *e.g.*, on failure to attain supernatural powers even after great piety and austerities to begin to doubt the truth of Jainism and its teachings.

(vi) *Charitras.*

The 5 kinds of Right-conduct are :

1. Equanimity.
2. Recovery of equanimity after a fall from it.
3. Pure and absolute non-injury.
4. All but entire freedom from passion.
5. Ideal and passionless conduct (Parihâra-viśuddhi). It is found only in a man of 38 years, who has served the Tirthamkara for 8 years, *i.e.*, from the age of 30 to that of 38. He must have read the *Pratyākhyānapūrvā*.*

* Cf. Bk. 5, p. 103

Shedding of Karmic Matter

Nirjarā means the falling away of karmic matter from the soul. The fetters may by themselves gradually wear out and leave the soul free; but it is a long process. Therefore a shorter method is adopted; deliberate activity may hasten the ripening of a karma and the shedding of its matter. To illustrate: we wish evil to our neighbour A; the thought-activity invites the karmic matter into the soul (*âśrava*), the matter comes and binds the soul (*bandha*). This karma may take two months to bear its full fruits; in the meantime it is an evil load for the soul. To gain lightness and to get rid of the karma, the soul may deliberately feel an opposite kind of feeling towards other neighbours B, C, and D, or towards A himself. A still surer way is to practise austerity. By removing the mind from the demands and impulses of the body, and by mortifying the physical man through not listening to its greed and temptations, matter may be overcome and soul freed from the bondage.

The natural maturing of a karma and its separation from the soul is called *savipāka-nirjarā*. Inducing a karma to leave the soul by means of a contrary karma, or by means of ascetic practices, is called *avipāka nirjarā* (riddance without fruition).

The terminology of the distinction is derived from botany. A seed grows into a fruit. It may ripen by itself (*savipāka*); or it may be plucked half-ripe, or even unripe, and then ripened by artificial means.

The causes of stopping of inflow of Karmic matter given above* are also causes of the shedding of the karmas already bound to the soul.

In addition to these, austerities (*tapa*) also cause the shedding before its time. *Tapa*, austerities are external and internal.

External austerities are :

1. *Anaśana*, Fasting.
2. *Alamodarya*, Eating less than one's fill, or less than one has appetite for.
3. *Vṛtti-parisankhyāna*, Taking a mental vow to accept food from a householder, only if a certain condition is fulfilled, without letting any one know about the vow.

4. *Rasa parityāga*, Daily renunciation of one or more of six kinds of delicacies, viz :

1. Ghee (clarified butter).
2. Milk.
3. Curd.
4. Sugar.
5. Salt.
6. Oil.

5. *Vivikta śayyāsana*, Sitting and sleeping in a lonely place, devoid of animate beings.

* *Supra* pp. 160—162



6. *Kāya kleśa*, Mortification of the body, so long as the mind is not disturbed.

Internal austerities are also six, viz :

1. *Prāyaścitta*, Expiation.
2. *Vinaya*, Reverence.
3. *Vaiyāvṛitya*, Service of the saints or worthy people.
4. *Svādhyāya*, Study.
5. *Vyutsarga*, Giving up attachment to the body, etc.
6. *Dhyāna*, Concentration.

Liberation

When all the karmic matter has left the soul, it becomes the Pure Soul, the Realised (Siddha) or the Liberated (Mukta) Soul.

Now in Jainism, the soul is immaterial and has none of the special attributes of Matter. Matter is devoid of consciousness and has none of the special attributes of Soul.

Mind is matter. Karmas are matter. Pleasure and pain are matter. Prosperity and adversity are matter, as being the pleasure-and pain-feeling karma, due to the presence or absence of some kind of matter.

The Saint Kunda Kunda says in *Panchástikāya* * :

“Things enjoyable by the senses, the five senses themselves, the bodies (including the five kinds of bodies), the mind, the Karmas, and other material objects—all this is known as matter (*puḍgala*)”.

All matter is visible, even karmic matter, though not to our physical eye. Certainly mental matter is visible directly to mental knowledge.

The inflow and bondage of Karmic matter being the essential causes of all pain and pleasure, it is possible in the light of Jainism to try to find out, what kind of Karma is the cause of a particular kind of pain or failure, and how the inflow of the karma is stopped and how, if it is already bound, it can be shed. If this is done even roughly and approximately, the study of Karmas becomes of immense and intense practical value. Also with caution and patience, it can be tested by and made a subject of, experiments. Perhaps some day in the hands of some lucky scientist, its results may be proved by science, like the life in plants, which given as an axiom in Jaina books, was later proved by Sir Jagdish Chandra Bose scientifically.

Soul moulds matter. Every pain and adversity can be treated scientifically and surely in accordance with the Karma Philosophy of Jainism.

Hence the necessity of studying the Jaina Karma Philosophy. It is not merely interesting as being of a curious character and great antiquity. It is not important only for the study of the history and evolution of some most important aspects of philosophy and religion generally, and particularly of Hindu and Jaina origin. It becomes essential (if it is found to be true)

* Supra Book 3, pp. 22—73

for the diagnosis and cure of, and prescription for our individual, social, moral, economic, political, and religious doubts, difficulties, deficiencies, disputes, troubles, and ailments.

The causes and processes of mundane ailments are adumbrated above. Their remedies, as suggested by Jainism for the last 3,000 years at least, must be of interest and guidance. They are the eleven stages (Pratimās) of the Householder's Life; and the vows, common to the Householder and the Monk, but followed in a more extended and intensive way by the latter.

(i) **Pratimas :**

1. *Darśana* (faith).—A true Jaina must have a perfect and intelligent, well-reasoned faith in Jainism, *i.e.* he must have a sound knowledge of its doctrines and their applications in life.

2. *Vrata* (vow).—He must observe the five minor vows (*aṇuvratas*), the three *guṇa-vratas*, and the four *śikṣā-vratas*. To give details : he must not destroy any kind of life, must not tell a lie, must not make use of another person's property without the owner's consent, must be chaste, must limit his necessities of life, and avoid the use of food which involves unnecessary killing of living beings. The three *guṇa-vratas* are special vows relating to the limitation and determination of his daily work, food, and enjoyment. The remaining four vows relate to his meditation in the morning, noon, and evening, to his keeping fast on certain days, and to his duty of daily giving charity in the form of knowledge, medicine, comfort, and food.

3. *Sāmāyika* (worship). He must worship regularly for forty-eight minutes, three times daily. Worship means self-contemplation and purifying one's ideas and emotions.

4. *Prośadhopavāsa* (fortnightly fast). He fasts regularly, as a rule, twice a fortnight each lunar month.

5. *Sachitta-tyāga* (abstinence from the flesh of conscious creatures). He refrains from taking fresh vegetables, because they are living.

6. *Rātri-bhukta-tyāga* (abstinence from eating at night). He must not take food at night. There are minute living beings which no amount of light can reveal or disperse, and which must be consumed with meals after sunset.

7. *Brahmacharya* (celibacy).

8. *Ārambha-tyāga*. Abandonment of merely worldly engagements and occupations.

9-11. The remaining three stages are preparatory to the monk's life. Their names are *parigraha-tyāga*, *anumati-tyāga* and *uddiṣṭa-tyāga* and they enjoin a gradual giving up of the world and retiring into some very quiet place to acquire the knowledge of truth and ultimately to become fit to be a teacher of the path to Liberation.

(ii) **Vows.**

The vows (vratas) are five, *i.e.* to be free from :

- Injury (Himsâ),
- Falsehood (Anṛita),
- Theft (Steṇa),
- Unchastity (Abrahma), and
- Worldly attachment (Parigraha).

For the fixing of these five vows in the mind, there are five kinds of meditation (bhâvanâ), for each of the vows.

The five meditations for the vow against injury are :

1. *Vâggupti*, Preservation of speech;
2. *Manogupti*, Preservation of mind;
3. *Îryâ*, Care in walking;
4. *Ādâna-nikṣepaṇa-samiti*, Care in lifting and laying down things; and
5. *Ālokitapâna-bhojana*, Thoroughly seeing to one's food and drink.

The five meditations for the vow against falsehood are

1. *Krodha-pratyâkhyâna*, Giving up anger;
2. *Lobha* „ „ „ greed;
3. *Bhîrutva* „ „ „ cowardice or fear;
4. *Hâsya* „ „ „ frivolity; and
5. *Anuvichi-bhâṣaṇa*, Speaking in accordance with scriptural injunctions.

For the vow against theft, the five meditations are

1. *Śūnyâgâra*, Residence in a solitary place, like a mountain, cave, etc.,
2. *Vimochitâvâsa*, Residence in a deserted place;
3. *Paroparodhâkaraṇa*, Residence in a place where one is not likely to be prohibited by others, nor where one should be likely to prohibit others;
4. *Bhaikṣya-śuddhi*, Purity of alms according to the scriptures;
5. *Sadharma aviṣamvâda*, Not disputing with one's co-religionists, as to "mine" and "thine".

For the vow against unchastity, the five meditations are :

1. *Strirâga-kathâ-śravaṇa tyâga*, Renouncing of (reading or hearing) stories exciting attachment for women;
2. *Tan-manohara-anga-nirikṣaṇa tyâga*, Renouncing of seeing their beautiful bodies;
3. *Pârva-ratânu-smaraṇa tyâga*, Renouncing of thinking over, remembrance of past enjoyment of women;
4. *Vṛiṣyeṣṭa-rasa tyâga*, Renouncing of exciting and aphrodisiac food or drinks; and
5. *Sva-śarîra-saṃskâra tyâga*, Renouncing of beautifying one's own body; self-adornment.

For the vow against worldly attachment, the five meditations are : giving

up infatuation (Râga) and hatred (Dveṣa) in the pleasing and displeasing worldly objects of the five senses.

The destructive or dangerous and censurable character of the five faults, injury etc. in this as also in the next world, ought to be meditated upon. One must also meditate, that the five faults, injury etc. are pain personified, as they themselves are the veritable wombs of pain.

And we must meditate upon the following four :—

1. *Maitri*, Benevolence for all living beings (Sattveṣu).
2. *Pramoda*, Delight at the sight of beings, better qualified or more advanced than ourselves on the path of liberation (Guṇa-adhikeṣu).
3. *Kârūṇya*, Pity, Compassion for the afflicted (kliṣyamaneṣu).
4. *Mâdhyasthya*, Tolerance or indifference to those who are uncivil or ill-behaved (Avinayeṣu).

For Saṃvega (the apprehension of the miseries of the world) and Vairâgya (non-attachment to sense pleasures), we should meditate upon the nature of the world and of our physical body. The world is transitory and not fit for love; and the body is impure and hampering in spiritual progress and therefore should be sub-ordinated to the soul.

The Five Sins

1. By passional vibrations, the hurting of the vitalities is injury (Himsâ).
2. Injury or Himsâ is to hurt the Prâṇas or vitalities, through *Pramattayoga*, i.e. vibration due to the passions, which agitate the mind, body or speech.
3. Falsehood is to speak hurtful words through *Pramattayoga*, passional vibrations (Avirati).
4. Theft is to take anything which is not given through *Pramattayoga* (Steya).
5. Unchastity is coition or sexual contact, through *Pramattayoga* (Abrahmacharya).

Worldly attachment is mûrchhâ, infatuation or intoxication, through *Pramattayoga*, in the living or non-living objects of the world (Parigraha).

Worldly objects are said to be Parigraha, because they are the external causes of internal attachment.

A Vratî or a vower should be without blemish which is like a thorn (śalya) which makes the whole body restless.

This Śalya or blemish is of three kinds :

1. *Mâyâ-śalya*, the thorn of deceit.
2. *Mithyâ-śalya* the thorn of wrong-belief.
3. *Nidâna*, the thorn of desire for future sense-pleasures.

Vowers are of two kinds : *Agârî*, householders (laymen) and *Anagâra*, houseless (ascetics).

One whose five vows are partial is a householder. The householder's life has 11 Pratimâs or stages given above*.

* *Supra* p. 165



The householder must be with the following seven supplementary vows also :

1. *Digvrata*, Taking a life-long vow to limit his worldly activity to fixed points in all the ten directions, *i.e.* East, West, North, South, South-east, East-north, North-west, and West-south, and Up and Down.

2. *Deśavvrata*, Taking a vow to limit the above also for a shorter period of time, *e.g.* for one's weekly or daily wordly activity.

3. *Anartha dandā-vrata*, Taking a vow not to commit purposeless sin. It has five kinds :

(i) *Apadhyāna*, Thinking ill of others;

(ii) *Pāpōpadeśa*, Preaching of sin to others.

(iii) *Pramāda-chāritra*, Thoughtless or inconsiderate conduct as breaking the boughs of trees, plucking flowers, etc. without any purpose.

(iv) *Himsādāna*, Giving objects of offence to others.

(v) *Duḥśruti*, Reading or hearing bad books.

The above three, *Digvrata*, *Deśavvrata* and *Anartha-dandā-vrata* are called *Guṇa* vratās, multiplicative vows, because they raise the value of the five vows of Ahimsā, etc.

4. *Sāmāyika*, Taking a vow to devote so much time everyday, once, twice or three times, at sunrise, sunset and noon to contemplation of the self for spiritual advancement.

5. *Prośadhōpavāsa*, Taking a vow to fast on four days of the month, *viz.* the two 8th and the two 14th days of every lunar fortnight. Fast means abstention from food and drink, and devoting one's time to religious study and contemplation, etc.

6. *Upabhoga paribhoga parimāṇa*. Taking a vow every day limiting one's enjoyment of consumable and non-consumable things.

7. *Atiḥi-Samvibhāga*. Taking a vow to take one's food only after feeding the ascetics with a part of it.

If ascetics are scarce another person may be fed in their place, if he is observing the vows of a householder or is possessed of right belief, or is an afflicted or poor person.

The last four, *Sāmāyika*, *Prośadhōpavāsa*, *Upabhoga parimāṇa* and *Atiḥi samvibhāga* are called *Śikṣāvratas*, disciplinary vows, so-called because they are preparatory for the discipline of an ascetic's life.


The householder is also the observer in the last moments of his life of the process of *Sallekhanā*, peaceful death which is characterised by non-attachment to the world and by a suppression of the passions.

Thus the householder's vows are twelve, with the last or peaceful death as their supplement.

There are five defects or partial transgressions which should not be found in a man of right-belief.

1. *Śankā*. Doubt, Scepticism;

2. *Kāṅkṣā*. Desire of sense-pleasures;



3. *Vichikitsā*. Disgust at any thing, e.g. with a sick or deformed person;
4. *Anyadṛiṣṭi praśaṁsā*. Thinking admiringly of wrong-believers;
5. *Anyadṛiṣṭi-saṁstavan*. Praising wrong-believers.

There are five defects respectively in each of the five vratas (vows) and seven śīla (supplementary vows) which should be avoided.

The partial transgressions of the first vow, *Ahimsā* are :

1. Angrily or carelessly tying up an animal or human being.
2. " " " beating " " " "
3. " " " mutilating " " " "
4. " " " overloading " " " "
5. " " " withholding food or drink from an animal or human being.

The partial transgressions of the second vow, *Satya* are :

1. *Mithyopadeśa*. Preaching false doctrines.
2. *Rahasyākhyaṇa*. Divulging the secret (actions of man and woman)
3. *Kūṭa-lekha-kriyā*. Forgery and perjury.
4. *Nyāsāpahāra*. Unconscientious dealing by means of speech, e.g. A deposits Rs. 1,000 with B. and then thinking that he has deposited only Rs. 900, demands Rs. 900. B. says : Yes, take whatever you deposited and gives him Rs. 900. This is *Nyāsāpahāra*.
5. *Sākāra-mantra-bheda*. Divulging what one guesses by seeing the behaviour or gestures of others, who are consulting in private.

The partial transgressions of the third vow, *Acharya* are :

1. *Stena prayoga*. Abetment of theft.
2. *Tadāhṛitādāna*. Receiving stolen property.
3. *Viruddha-rājyātikrama*. Illegal traffic, e.g. by selling things at inordinate prices in time of war, or to alien enemies etc.
4. *Hinādhika-mānonmāna*. False weights and measures.
5. *Pratirūpaka-vyavahāra*. Adulteration.

The partial transgression of the fourth vow, *Brahmacharya* are :

1. *Para vivāha-karaṇa*. Bringing about the marriage of people who are not of one's own family.
2. *Itvarikā-pari-grahitā gamana*. Intercourse with a married immoral woman.
3. *Itvarikā-apari-grahitā gamana*. Intercourse with an unmarried immoral woman.
4. *Ananga-kriḍā*. Unnatural sexual intercourse.
5. *Kāmā-tivrāhabhiniveśa*. Intense sexual desire.

The partial transgressions of the fifth vow, *Parigraha-parimāṇa* arise when a man limits the quantity of say two kinds of things, but then changes the proportion of those things, although the quantity remains the same, e.g., he limits his land-possession to 4 fields and 2 houses. Then wanting a house more, he acquires three houses and reduces the fields by one. Thus though the number and possibly the value of his possessions may remain the same,

still the limit of his vow is partially transgressed. This sort of transgression may be between five pairs of possessions as follows :

1. Fields and Houses.
2. Silver and Gold.
3. Cattle and Corn.
4. Female-servant and Male-servant.
5. Clothes and Utensils.

The partial transgressions of the first *Guṇavrata*, i.e. *Dig-vrata* are :

1. *Ūrdhva-vyatikrama*. In passion or negligence to go up higher than your limit in the vow.
2. *Adhah-vyatikrama*. In passion or negligence to go down lower than your limit in the vow.
3. *Tiryag-vyatikrama*. In passion or negligence to go in the other eight directions, beyond your limit in the vow.
4. *Kṣetra-vridhhi*. In passion or negligence to increase in one and decrease in the other direction the boundaries of the distance which is the limit in the vow.
5. *Smṛiti-antarādhāna*. Forgetting the limit in the vow but still to go on recklessly. This transgression will arise even if the limit of the vow is not exceeded.

The partial transgressions of the second *Guṇavrata*, i.e. *Deśa-vrata* are :

1. *Ānayana*, sending for something from beyond the limit.
2. *Preśya-prayoga*, sending some one out beyond the limit.
3. *Śabda anupāta*, sending one's voice out beyond limit, e.g., by telephone.
4. *Rûpānupāta*, making signs for persons beyond the limit; as the morse code with flags, etc.
5. *Pudgala-kṣepa*, throwing something material beyond the limit.

The partial transgression of the third *Guṇavrata*, i.e. *Anartha-dandavrata* are :

1. *Kandarpa*. Poking fun at another.
2. *Kaut-kuchya*. Gesticulating and mischievous practical joking.
3. *Maukharya*. Gossip, garrulity.
4. *Asamikṣyādhikarana*. Overdoing a thing.
5. *Upabhoga paribhoga-anarthakya*. Keeping too many consumable and non-consumable objects.

The partial transgressions of the *Sāmāyika Śikṣāvrata*, are :

1. *Mano-duṣprañidhānam*. Misdirection of mind during meditation.
2. *Kāya-duṣprañidhānam*. Misdirection of body during meditation.
3. *Vāka-duṣprañidhānam*. Misdirection of speech during meditation.
4. *Anādara*. Lack of interest in meditation.
5. *Smṛityanupasthāna*. Forgetting of due formalities.

The partial transgression of the second *Śikṣāvrata*, i.e. *Prośadhōpavāsa* are :

1. *Apratyavekṣita-apramāñjita-utsarga*. To excrete in a place without inspecting and without sweeping it.

2. *Apratyavekṣita-apramāṛjita ādanā*. To take up or lay down things in a place, without inspecting and without sweeping it.
3. *Apratyavekṣita-apramāṛjita-Sanstaropakramaṇa*. To spread a mat or seat in a place, without inspecting and without sweeping it.
4. *Anāḍara*. Lack of interest.
5. *Smṛitya anupasthāna*. Forgetting of due formalities.

The partial transgression of the third *Śikṣāvṛata*, i.e. *Upbhoga paribhoga-parimāṇa vrata*, are :

1. *Sachittāhāra*. Taking living things, e.g., green vegetables (which were given up).
2. *Sachitta-sambandha-āhāra*. Taking anything connected with a living thing, e.g. using a green leaf as a plate.
3. *Sachitta-sammiśra-āhāra*. Taking a mixture of living and non-living thing, e.g. food with unripe seeds.
4. *Abhiśava-Āhāra*. Taking aphrodisiacs, or strengthening or exciting food.
5. *Duḥ-pakva-āhāra*. Taking badly cooked food.

The partial transgression of the fourth *Śikṣāvṛata*, i.e. *Atithi samvibhāga vrata*, are :

1. *Sachitta nikṣepa*. Placing the food on a living thing, e.g. on a green plantain leaf.
2. *Sachitta-apidhāna*. Covering the food with living thing.
3. *Paravyapadeśa*. Delegation of hosts' duties to another.
4. *Mātsarya*. Lack of respect in giving, or envy of another donor.
5. *Kālātikrama*. Not giving at the proper time.

The partial transgression of *Sallekhanā*, peaceful death are :

1. *Jīvit āśansā*, desire to prolong one's life.
2. *Marṇāśansā*, desire to die soon.
3. *Mitrānūrāga*, attachment to friends.
4. *Sukhānubandha*, repeated remembrance of past enjoyment.
5. *Nidāna*, desire of enjoyments in the next world.

Charity


Charity is the giving of one's belongings for the good of one's self and of others.

The fruition of charity is different according to difference in :

1. *Vidhi*, manner of giving.
2. *Dravya*, thing given.
3. *Dātṛi*, person who gives; and
4. *Pātra*, person to whom it is given.

I. The manner of giving is of the following nine kinds :

1. *Samgraha*. Respectful reception of an ascetic. The usual formula is :
"Welcome ! welcome ! Food and drink are pure here."
2. *Uchcha sthāna*. Seating him on an exalted seat.
3. *Pad-odaka*. Washing his feet.



4. *Archanā*. Worshipping him.
5. *Praṇāma*. Bowing to him.
- 6-8. *Vāk-kāya-manah-śuddhi*. Being pure in speech, body and mind.
9. *Eśanā śuddhi*. Faultless way of giving food.

II. The thing given must be helpful in study and austerities.

III. The person who gives must have seven qualities.

1. *Aihika-phalānapekṣā*. Must not wish any gain in this world in its exchange.
2. *Ksānti*. Must give calmly without anger.
3. *Mudita*. Must be happy at giving.
4. *Niṣkapaṭatā*. Without deceit.
5. *Anasūyatva*. Without envy.
6. *Aviśādatva*. Without repentance; and
7. *Nirahaṃkāratva*. Without pride.

IV. The person to whom it is given must be one of the three kinds :

1. *Uttama pātra*. Ascetics;
2. *Madhyama pātra*. Laymen with vows;
3. *Jaghanya pātra*. Laymen with right belief, but not with vows.

These three with right belief are called *Supātrā*, good donees; and those who are with proper external conduct, but without real right belief are *Kupātrās*, improper donees. Unworthy donees *Apātrās* are those who have neither proper external conduct, nor real right belief. There is no merit in giving them anything.

There is also a *Karuṇā-dāna* or gift out of compassion for any Jaina or non-Jaina, human or sub-human being, who is in need of it. This Charity is of four kinds :

1. *Ahāra*. Food.
2. *Auśadhi*. Medicine.
3. *Abhaya*. Re-assuring the frightened, or removing their cause of fear.
4. *Vidyā*, Knowledge.

The 14 Stages

The 14 Spiritual Stages are :

1. *Mithyātva*. Wrong belief, Delusion, The thought-activity of the soul due to the operation of the right-belief-deluding karmas. In this, the soul does not believe in the right path to Liberation. From the first, *i.e.* this Guṇasthāna, the soul goes to the fourth Guṇasthāna always.

2. *Sāsādana*. Downfall. When there is operation in the fourth stage of one of the four Anantānubandhi kaṣāyas (error-feeding passions), the soul falls down to the first stage through the second, and the thought-activity in the passage through is called *Sāsādana*.

3. *Miśra*. Mixed, Operation of Samyak-mithyātva-mohanīya karmas or Miśra Mohanīya, Belief in right and wrong at one and the same time. This is reached always on falling down from the fourth stage.

4. *Avirata-samyaktva*. Vowless right-belief. Belief is produced by the Upaśama, subsidence of the four Anantānubandhi kaṣāyas (error-feeding passions) and one or three kinds of right-belief-deluding karmas respectively, i.e. one for a soul who has never been, or three for a soul who has been in possession of Samyaktva (right belief). The soul here has belief in the path of Liberation, but cannot observe the rules of conduct for attaining Liberation. Three kinds of thought activity may be noted in this stage :

- (i) *Upaśama-samyaktva* is attained by the Upaśama, Subsidence of five or seven kinds of deluding karmas.
- (ii) *Kṣayika samyaktva* is attained by the destruction of the seven prakrities.
- (iii) *Kṣayopāśama samyaktva* is attained by the destruction or subsidence of sixth and the continuous operation of the seventh, i.e. Samyak-prakṛti-mithyâtva, right-belief clouded occasionally by the slightest wrong-belief. This kind of thought-activity is characterised by three defects, viz :
 - (a) *Chala*, the defect of being shaken in his right-belief, e.g. thinking that worship of Śāntinātha will bring calmness or that of Pārśvanātha will remove obstacles, whereas all Arhats are the same.
 - (b) *Mata*, the defect of having the thought-activity soiled by one or more of the defects or transgressions, e.g. Shankā, doubt; Kāṅkṣā, desire of sense pleasures; Vichikitsā, hatred of the sick and deformed, etc.; Anya-dṛṣṭi-praśānsā, thinking admiringly of wrong believers; and Anya-dṛṣṭi-saṁstavan, praising wrong believers.
 - (c) *Agādha*, the defect of losing firm hold of right belief, e.g. dedicating a temple and still thinking it to be one's own property.

5. *Deśa virata*. Partial vows, i.e. taking the partial vows. All the 11 Pratimās or stages of a layman's life come in this stage. These are given *supra* page.

6. *Pramatta virata*. Imperfect vows, after renunciation of all wordly objects, still occasionally turning the mind to the service or needs of the body. This is pramattabhāva, careless slackness in concentration

Henceforth the stages are all in the life of a Muni, Saint.

7. *Apramatta virata*. Perfect vows. Renouncing the careless slackness of the 6th guṇasthāna, and being absorbed in spiritual contemplation (righteous concentration of the highest type).

From here, there are two Śreṇis, or ways of ascent :

- (i) *Upaśama śreṇi* in which the right-conduct-deluding karma subsides;
 - (ii) *Kṣapaka-śreṇi* in which it is being destroyed. This last is the necessary way to Mokṣa, Liberation.
8. *Apūrvā karaṇa*. New-thought-activity. Karaṇa or thought-activity which

the saint's soul had never yet acquired. This is the beginning of the first Śukladhyâna, pure concentration on the pure Âtma or Self.

9. *Anivṛitti-karaṇa*. Advanced thought-activity, special thought activity of a still greater purity, a stage of first Śukla-dhyâna.

10. *Sūkṣma-sâmparâya*. Slightest delusion. All passions are destroyed or have subsided, except very slight nominal greed. This is also first Śukladhyâna.

11. *Upaśânta-moha* or *Upaśânta-kaṣâya*. Subsided delusion. A thought-activity which is produced by the subsidence of the entire right-conduct-deluding karmas. This is also first Śukla-dhyâna. A saint must fall down from here, but if strong enough, he can resume his ascent from the Kṣapaka mode of ascent in the seventh stage.

12. *Kṣiṇa-moha*. Delusionless. The entire right-conduct-deluding karmas are destroyed in this stage, and the thought-activity produced belongs to the second Śukladhyâna. The saint attaining this, does so directly from the tenth stage without passing through the eleventh stage.

13. *Sayoga kevali*. Vibrating-perfect soul. Before commencing this, the soul must have destroyed the three remaining destructive karmas: knowledge-obscuring, conation-obscuring and obstructive karmas. Here the soul becomes Arhat or Perfect soul in human body with vibrations in it. Preaching and peregrinations belong to this stage.

14. *Ayoga-kevali*. Vibrationless perfect soul. This is attained when there is before the sayoga kevali's Liberation just enough time to speak out the five letters अ ई उ ऋ लृ. In this stage—a very brief one indeed—the vibrations of the holy body cease, and the soul attaining Peace and Bliss, becomes one with itself and leaving the body is called SIDDHA.

Now let us see from what particular kind of the 148 karmas the soul is freed in each stage. This can be caught at a glance from the following table :



Serial No.	Name of stage.	Sub-classes which are bindable.	Sub-classes which cease to be bindable at the end of the stage.	Operable sub-classes.	Sub-classes which cease to be operable at the end of this stage.	Sub-classes which are attendant.	Sub-classes which are now attendant at the end of the stage.
1	False belief ..	117 (1)	16 (5)	117 (15)	5 (21)	148 (35)	0 or 7 (38)
2	Back-sliding or Downfall ..	100	25 (6)	111 (16)	9 (20)	145 (36)	0
3	Mixed right-and-wrong-belief ..	74 (2)		100 (17)	1 (23)	147 (37)	0
4	Vowless right-belief ..	77 (3)	10 (7)	104 (18)	17 (24)	141 or (38) 148	1
5	Partial Vows ..	67	4 (8)	87	8 (25)	140 (38) or 147 (39)	1
6	Imperfect Vows ..	63	6 (9)	81 (19)	5 (26)	139 (38) or 146 (40)	
7	Perfect Vows ..	59 (4)	1 (10)	76	4 (27)	139 (38) or 146	1 or 4
8	New thought-activity ..	58	36 (11)	72	6 (28)	138 (41) or 142 (42)	0
9	Advanced thought-activity ..	22	5 (12)	66	6 (29)	138 or 142	36 or 0
10	All but passionless ..	17	16 (13)	60	1 (30)	102 (43) or 142	1 or 0
11	Subsided delusion ..	1	0	59	2 (31)	101 (44) or 142	0
12	Destroyed delusion ..	1	0	57	16 (32)	101	16
13	Vibratory Omniscience ..	1	1 (14)	42 (20)	30 (33)	85 (45)	0
14	Non-vibratory Omniscience ..	0	0	12	12 (34)	85 (46)	0

N. B. For explanation of figures in brackets (), see following pages.

Explanatory Note to the Table

The total number of sub-classes is 148. Of these there are 26 sub-classes which are included in some others of which they are a sort of inseparable accident, and therefore really only 122 distinct sub-classes can come into action at a time. The 26 are as follows :

The body (Śarīra) karma is of five kinds : Physical, Fluid, Assimilative, Electric, and Karmic. The molecular bondage (Bandhana) and interfusion (Saṃghāta) is of five kinds each. But the bondage and the fusion are entirely dependant on and associated with the five bodies. Therefore these ten may be considered as non-distinct (Avinâ-bhâvī).

The touch, taste, smell, and colour sub-classes are respectively 8, 5, 2, and 5 in number. But each class has a distinct activity, *i.e.* there are only four distinct sub-classes from this viewpoint. Thus 16 may be considered as non-distinct.

Deducting the above 10 and 16 *i. e.* 26 from 148, we get 122 sub-classes.

(1) Out of these 122 distinct sub-classes, two *i.e.* Clouded-Right-Belief and Mixed-Right-and-Wrong-Belief sub-classes cannot be bound in the first stage of wrong-belief, where the soul has and can have the bondage by the Wrong-Belief-Deluding Karma alone. Thus the number of bindable sub-classes becomes 120. But the soul in this stage cannot possibly have bondage of Śarīra or an Âhâraka Assimilative-body, Âhâraka-Ângopāṅga or Assimilative limbs and minor limbs, nor the Tīrthaṃkara-body-making-Karma. Deducting these three from the 120, we get 117 as the total number of bindable Karmas in this stage.

(2) The Hellish and Sub-human Age have had their bondage-separation (*Bandha Vyūchhitti*) at the end of the first and second stage respectively. But in this stage no age-karma is ever bound; therefore the Human- and Celestial-Age sub-classes also must be excluded. At the end of the second stage, we had $101 - 25 = 76$ bindable sub-classes. Deducting the 2 from this 76, we get 74.

(3) In this stage the Human- and Celestial-Age and the Tīrthaṃkara-body sub-classes can also be bound. Therefore to the above 74 these 3 must be added, making the bindable sub-classes 77.

(4) The Âhâraka Śarīra or Assimilative body and the Âhâraka Ângopāṅga or Assimilative limbs and minor limbs sub-classes are bound only here. Therefore $(63 - 6) = 57$ plus these 2 = 59 is the bindable total here.

(5) At the end of this stage, there is the bondage-separation of the following 16 sub-classes :

- (1) *Mithyâtva*. Wrong Belief.
- (2) *Napuṃsaka veda*. Common sex inclination.
- (3) *Narakāyu*. Hellish Age.



- (4) *Naraka Gati*. Hellish Condition of existence.
- (5) *Ekendriya Jāti*. One-sensed Genus.
- (6) *Dvīndriya Jāti*. Two „ „
- (7) *Tendriya Jāti*. Three „ „
- (8) *Chaturendriya Jāti*. Four „ „
- (9) *Hundaka Saṁsthāna*. Unsymmetrical Figure.
- (10) *Asamprāpta Śrīpātika Saṁhanana*. Loosely-jointed bones.
- (11) *Naraka-Anupūrvī*. Hellish Migratory form.
- (12) *Ātāpa*. Radiant Heat.
- (13) *Sādhāraṇa*. Group-Soul.
- (14) *Sthāvara*. Immobile.
- (15) *Sūkṣma*. Fine body.
- (16) *Aparyāpti*. Undevelopable.

The soul which passes from this stage onwards, leaves behind him the liability to be bound by these 16 sub-classes. In the next stage the total number of the bindable sub-classes is $117 - 16 = 101$.

(6) The following 25 sub-classes cease to be bindable after this stage.

- (1) *Nidrā-Nidrā*. Deep sleep.
- (2) *Prachalā-Prachalā*. Deep drowsiness.
- (3) *Styānagripphī*. Somnambulism.
- (4) *Anantānubandhi Krodha*. Error-feeding Anger.
- (5) „ *Māna* „ „ Pride.
- (6) „ *Māya* „ „ Deceit.
- (7) „ *Lobha* „ „ Greed.
- (8) *Strīveda*. Feminine Sexual inclination.
- (9) *Tiryancha Āyu*. Sub-human age.
- (10) *Tiryancha Gati*. Sub-human condition of existence.
- (11) *Nyagrodha Parimandala Saṁsthāna*. Banyan-tree like figure.
- (12) *Svāti Saṁsthāna*. Snake-hole-like tapering figure.
- (13) *Kubjaka Saṁsthāna*. Hunch-back.
- (14) *Vāmana* „ Dwarf.
- (15) *Bajra Nārācha Saṁhanana*. Adamantine joints and bones.
- (16) *Nārācha Saṁhanana*. Unbreakable joints and bones.
- (17) *Ardha Nārācha Saṁhanana*. Semi-unbreakable joints and bones.
- (18) *Kīlita Saṁhanana*. Jointed or Riveted bones.
- (19) *Tiryancha Ānupūrvī*. Sub-human migratory form.
- (20) *Udyota*. Gold light.
- (21) *Aśubha Vihāyogati*. Awkward movement.
- (22) *Durbhaga*. Unprepossessing.
- (23) *Dusvara*. Harsh-voiced.
- (24) *Anādeya*. Dull appearance.
- (25) *Niḥa Gotra*. Low family.



(7) The 10 sub-classes of bond-age-separation are :

- | | | | |
|------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------|
| (1) | <i>Apratyākhyāna Varnīya Krodha.</i> | Partial-vow-preventing | Anger. |
| (2) | „ „ <i>Māna.</i> | „ „ „ | Pride. |
| (3) | „ „ <i>Māya.</i> | „ „ „ | Deceit. |
| (4) | „ „ <i>Lobha.</i> | „ „ „ | Greed. |
| (5) | <i>Manuṣya Āyu.</i> | Human age. | |
| (6) | „ <i>Gati.</i> | Human condition. | |
| (7) | <i>Audārika Śarīra.</i> | Physical body. | |
| (8) | „ <i>Angopāṅga.</i> | Physical limbs and minor limbs. | |
| (9) | <i>Bajra Nārācha Samhanana.</i> | Adamantine joints and bones. | |
| (10) | <i>Manuṣya Anupūrvī.</i> | Human migratory form. | |

(8) The four sub-classes are perfect-vow-preventing-Anger, Pride, Deceit, and Greed.

(9) The six sub-classes are :

- (1) *Asātā Vedanīya.* Pain-feeling.
- (2) *Arati.* Dissatisfaction.
- (3) *Śoka.* Sorrow.
- (4) *Aśubha-nāma-karma.* Ugly body.
- (5) *Asthira* „ „ Unsteady circulation of blood.
- (6) *Ayaśaḥ-kīrti.* Bringing bad name.

(10) The Deva Āyu or Celestial-Age karma ceases to be bindable after the end of this seventh stage.

(11) The 36 sub-classes are :

- (1) *Nidrā.* Sleep.
- (2) *Prachalā.* Drowsiness.
- (3) *Hāsyā.* Laughter.
- (4) *Rati.* Indulgence.
- (5) *Bhaya.* Fear.
- (6) *Jugupsā.* Disgust.
- (7) *Deva Gati.* Celestial condition of existence.
- (8) *Panchendriya Jāti.* Five-sensed genus of beings.
- (9) *Vaikriyika Śarīra.* Fluid body.
- (10) *Āhāraka* „ Assimilative body.
- (11) *Taijasa* „ Electric body.
- (12) *Kārmaṇa* „ Karmic body.
- (13) *Vaikriyika angopāṅga.* Limbs and minor limbs in fluid body.
- (14) *Āhāraka angopāṅga.* Limbs and minor limbs in assimilative body.
- (15) *Nirmāṇa.* Formation.
- (16) *Sama-chaturasra-Saṁsthāna.* Figure with perfect proportion all round.
- (17) *Sparṣa.* Touch.
- (18) *Rasa.* Taste.
- (19) *Gandha.* Smell.



- (20) *Varṇa*. Colour.
- (21) *Devagatyānupūrvi*. Celestial migratory form.
- (22) *Agurulaghu*. Not heavy-light.
- (23) *Upaghāta*. Self destructive.
- (24) *Paraghāta*. Destructive.
- (25) *Uçchhvāsa*. Respiration.
- (26) *Śubhā Vihāyogati* Graceful movement.
- (27) *Pratyeka Śarīra*. Individual-body-plant.
- (28) *Trasa*. Mobile.
- (29) *Subhaga*. Amiable Personality.
- (30) *Susvara*. Sweet-voiced.
- (31) *Śubha*. Beautiful body.
- (32) *Bādara*. Gross (body).
- (33) *Paryāpti*. Developable.
- (34) *Sthira*. Steady (circulation of blood).
- (35) *Ādeya*. Radiant appearance.
- (36) *Tīrthaṃkara*. A Tīrthaṃkara's career with all its grandeur, when he preaches and completes His ministry.

(12) The five sub-classes are :

- (1) *Samjvalana-Krodha* Perfect-conduct-preventing Anger.
- (2) „ *Māna* „ „ „ Pride.
- (3) „ *Māya* „ „ „ Deceit.
- (4) „ *Lobha* „ „ „ Greed.
- (5) *Puṇveda*. Masculine-inclination.

(13) The sixteen sub-classes are :

- (1) *Mati-Jñānāvaraṇīya*. Sensitive-knowledge-obscuring.
- (2) *Śruta* „ Scriptural „ „
- (3) *Avadhi* „ Visual „ „
- (4) *Manahparyaya* „ Mental „ „
- (5) *Kevala* „ Perfect „ „
- (6) *Chakṣu darśanāvaraṇīya*. Ocular Conation-obscuring.
- (7) *Achakṣu* „ Non-ocular „ „
- (8) *Avadhi* „ Visual „ „
- (9) *Kevala* „ Perfect Conation-obscuring.
- (10) *Yasahkīrti*. Bringing good fame.
- (11) *Uchcha-gotra*. High-family.
- (12) *Dāna-antarāya*. Charity obstructive.
- (13) *Lābha* „ Gain „
- (14) *Bhoga* „ Enjoyment „
- (15) *Upabhoga* „ Re-enjoyment „
- (16) *Vīrya* „ Power „

(14) *Sātā-vedaniya* or Pleasure-feeling karma ceases to be bindable after the end of this stage.

(15) All the bindable sub-classes can become operable in this stage, therefore the number of operable sub-classes in this stage is 117.

(16) Out of the 117 operable, five cease to be operable at the end of the first stage, thus leaving 112. But in this stage the Naraka-Anupûrvi or Hellish Migratory form cannot operate. Therefore the total is 111.

(17) At the end of the second stage, the number of operable sub-classes was $111 - 9 = 102$. There is no transmigration in this stage; therefore the four migratory sub-classes must be deducted from it. But as the Hellish Migratory sub-class has already ceased at the end of the first stage, only three are to be deducted, leaving 99 ($102 - 3$). But as in this stage there is the operation of the Mixed Right-and-Wrong-Belief sub-classes, the total of operable sub-classes is 100.

(18) To the above 100, the following five have to be added, viz. the 4 migratory sub-classes and the slightly-clouded-Right-Belief sub-class; and mixed-belief is to be deleted. Thus there are 104.

(19) At the end of the fifth stage, the operable sub-classes were $87 - 8 = 79$. To these have to be added the Âhâraka Śarîra, Assimilative Body and the Âhâraka Angopânga, Assimilative Limbs and minor Limbs. Thus making the total 81.

(20) At the end of the twelfth stage, the operable sub-classes were $57 - 16 = 41$. To these the Tirthamkar sub-class being added, makes the total 42.

(21) At the end of this stage there is an operation-separation (Udaya Vyuchhitti) of the following five sub-classes, which cease to operate in the soul in any further stage:

- (1) Wrong Belief.
- (2) Âtâpa.
- (3) Group-souled.
- (4) Fine-body.
- (5) Undevelopable.

(22) The nine sub-classes are as follows:

- | | | | |
|-----|--------------------------------|---|---------|
| (1) | <i>Anantânubandhi-Krodha</i> . | Right-belief-preventing | Anger. |
| (2) | „ <i>Mâna</i> | „ „ „ | Pride. |
| (3) | „ <i>Mâyâ</i> | „ „ „ | Deceit. |
| (4) | „ <i>Lobha</i> | „ „ „ | Greed. |
| (5) | <i>Ekendriya-Jâti</i> . | One-sensed-genus of beings. | |
| (6) | <i>Dvîndriya</i> „ | Two „ „ „ | |
| (7) | <i>Tendriya</i> „ | Three „ „ „ | |
| (8) | <i>Chaturendriya</i> „ | Four „ „ „ | |
| (9) | <i>Sthâvara</i> | Immobile bodies, having one sense only. | |

(23) Samyaktva-Mithyâtva-Prakriti, Mixed-right-and-wrong-Belief ceases to operate.

(24) The 17 sub-classes are :

- (1) *Apratyākhyānāvaraṇiya-Krodha*. Partial-vow-preventing Anger.
- (2) " " *Māna* " " Pride.
- (3) " " *Māya* " " Deceit.
- (4) " " *Lobha* " " Greed.
- (5) *Narakāyu*. Hellish age.
- (6) *Devāyu*. Celestial age.
- (7) *Naraka Gati*. Hellish condition of existence.
- (8) *Deva Gati*. Celestial " " "
- (9) *Vaikriyika-Śarīra*. Fluid body.
- (10) *Vaikriyika-angopāṅga*. Limbs and minor-limbs in fluid bodies.
- (11) *Naraka Anupūrvī*. Hellish-migratory form.
- (12) *Tiryancha* " Sub-human " "
- (13) *Manusya* " Human " "
- (14) *Deva* " Celestial " "
- (15) *Durbhaga* Unprepossessing.
- (16) *Anādeya*. Non-impressive.
- (17) *Ayaśaḥkīrti*. Notoriety.

(25) The eight sub-classes are :

- (1) *Pratyākhyānāvaraṇiya-Krodha*. Total-vow-preventing Anger.
- (2) " *Māna*. " " " Pride.
- (3) " *Māya*. " " " Deceit.
- (4) " *Lobha*. " " " Greed.
- (5) *Tiryanchāyu*. Sub-human age.
- (6) *Tiryancha gati*. Sub-human condition of existence.
- (7) *Udyota*. Cold light.
- (8) *Nicha-gotra*. Low family.

(26) The five sub-classes are :

- (1) *Nidrā-nidrā*. Deep sleep.
- (2) *Prachalā-prachalā*. Heavy drowsiness.
- (3) *Styānagriddhi*. Somnambulism.
- (4) *Āhāraka-śarīra*. Limbs and minor limbs in assimilative body.
- (5) *Āhāraka-angopāṅga*. Limbs and minor limbs in assimilative body.

(27) The four sub-classes are :

- (1) *Samyaktva Prakṛiti*. Slightly clouded right-belief.
- (2) *Ardha nārācha samhanana*. Semi-unbreakable-joints and bones.
- (3) *Kīlita Samhanana*. Riveted jointed-bodies.
- (4) *Asamprāpta Śrīpātika-samhanana*. Loosely jointed bones.

(28) The six sub-classes are :

- (1) *Hāsyā*. Laughter.
- (2) *Rati*. Indulgence.
- (3) *Arati*. Dissatisfaction.



- (4) *Śoka*. Sorrow.
- (5) *Bhaya*. Fear.
- (6) *Jugupsā*. Disgust.

(29) The six sub-classes are :

- (1) *Samjvalan-Krodha*. Perfect-conduct-preventing Anger.
- (2) „ *Māna* „ „ „ Pride.
- (3) „ *Māyā* „ „ „ Deceit.
- (4) *Strīveda*. Feminine inclination.
- (5) *Puṇveda*. Masculine „
- (6) *Napuṃsaka veda*. Common sex inclination.

(30) The *Samjvalana Lobha*, Perfect-conduct-preventing-Greed sub-class ceases to be operable.

(31) The two sub-classes are :

- (1) *Vajra-Nārācha-Samhanana*. Adamantine joints and bones.
- (2) *Nārācha* „ Unbreakable „ „ „

(32) The sixteen sub-classes are :

- (1) *Mati-Jñānāvarṇīya*, Sensitive-knowledge-obscuring.
- (2) *Śruta* „ „ Scriptural „ „
- (3) *Avadhi* „ „ Visual „ „
- (4) *Manahparyaya* „ „ Mental „ „
- (5) *Kevala* „ „ Perfect „ „
- (6) *Chakṣu-Darśanāvarṇīya*. Ocular-conation-obscuring.
- (7) *Achakṣu* „ „ Non-ocular „ „
- (8) *Avadhi* „ „ Visual „ „
- (9) *Kevala* „ „ Perfect „ „
- (10) *Nidrā*. Sleep.
- (11) *Prachalā*. Drowsiness.
- (12) *Dāna-antarāya*. Obstructive of Charity.
- (13) *Lābha* „ „ „ Gain.
- (14) *Bhoga* „ „ „ Enjoyment.
- (15) *Upabhoga* „ „ „ Re-enjoyment.
- (16) *Vīrya* „ „ „ Power.

(33) The thirty sub-classes are as follows :

- (1) Either *Sātā-vedanīya*. Pleasure-feeling.
or *Asātā* „ Pain „
- (2) *Audārika śarīra*. Physical body.
- (3) *Taijasa śarīra*. Electric Physical body.
- (4) *Kārmaṇa-śarīra*. Karmic body.
- (5) *Audārika-angopāṅga*. Limbs and minor limbs in physical bodies.
- (6) *Nirmāṇa*. Formation.
- (7) *Samachaturasra Saṁsthāna*. Perfect symmetry all round.
- (8) *Nyagrodhaparimandala*. Banyan-tree-like Figure.

- (9) *Soâti Samsthâna*. Snake-hole-like Figure.
- (10) *Kubjaka* „ Hunch-back.
- (11) *Vâmana* „ Dwarf.
- (12) *Hundaka* „ Unsymmetrical or deformed.
- (13) *Vajrariṣabha-ârâcha-samhanana*. Adamantine nerves, joints and bones.
- (14) *Sparśa*. Touch.
- (15) *Rasa*. Taste.
- (16) *Gandha*. Smell.
- (17) *Varṇa*. Colour.
- (18) *Agurulaghu*. Not-heavy-light.
- (19) *Upaghâta*. Self-destructive.
- (20) *Paraghâta*. Destructive.
- (21) *Uçhvâsa*. Respiration.
- (22) *Śubha-vihâtyogati*. Graceful movement.
- (23) *Aśubha* „ Awkward „
- (24) *Pratyeka-śarîra*. Individual body.
- (25) *Susvara*. Sweet-voiced.
- (26) *Duḥsvara*. Harsh-voiced.
- (27) *Śubha*. Beautiful (body).
- (28) *Aśubha*. Ugly (bad).
- (29) *Sthira*. Steady circulation of blood.
- (30) *Asthira*. Unsteady circulation of blood.
- (34) The twelve sub-classes are :
 - (1) Either *Sâtâ-Vedanîya*. Pleasure-feeling.
or *Asâtâ* „ Pain-feeling.
 - (2) *Manusya-âyu*. Human-age.
 - (3) *Manusya-gati*. Human condition of existence.
 - (4) *Panchendriya-jâti*. Five-sensed beings.
 - (5) *Trasa*. Mobile.
 - (6) *Subhaga*. Amiable.
 - (7) *Bâdara*. Gross (body).
 - (8) *Paryâpta*. Developable.
 - (9) *Âdeya*. Radiant appearance.
 - (10) *Yaśaḥ-kirti*. Bringing good fame.
 - (11) *Tīrthaṃkara*. A Tīrthaṃkara's body.
 - (12) *Uchcha-gotra*. High-family.

(35) Although only 117 sub-classes are bindable and operabler in this stage, yet all the 148 exist for the soul who is in this stage, as at any time the 31 sub-classes which were unbindable here may become bindable in a subsequent stage.

(36) The following three are not possible in this :

- (1) *Âharaka śarîra*. Assimilative body.



(2) *Âhârak angopânga*. Limbs and minor limbs in Assimilative body.

(3) *Tîrthaṃkara*. A Tîrthaṃkar's body.

(37) The Tîrthaṃkara-body-making karma is not possible here.

(38) If the wrong-belief has been destroyed, then the Right-believer has the existence of 141, as he has already destroyed the following seven :

(1) *Mithyâtva*. Wrong-belief.

(2) *Śamyakmithyâtva*. Right-wrong-belief.

(3) *Samyaktva Prakṛiti*. Clouded right-belief.

(4) *Anantânubandhi Krodha*. Error-feeding or right-belief preventing Anger.

(5) „ *Mâna*. Error-feeding or right-belief preventing Pride.

(6) „ *Mâyâ*. Error-feeding or right-belief preventing Deceit.

(7) „ *Lobha*. Error-feeding or right-belief preventing Greed.

(39) The one less here is the Narakâyu or Hellish Age, separated at the end of the fourth stage.

(40) The one less here is the Tiryâñchâyu or Sub-Human age, separated at the end of the fifth stage.

(41) Devâyu or celestial age sub-class ceases to exist here.

(42) The four sub-classes are :

(1) *Anantânubandhi krodha*. Error-feeding or right-belief preventing Anger.

(2) „ *Mâna*. Error-feeding or right-belief preventing Pride.

(3) „ *Mâyâ*. Error-feeding or right-belief preventing Deceit.

(4) „ *Lobha*. Error-feeding or right-belief preventing Greed.

(43) For the soul on the subsidential ladder, whether his Right-Belief is acquired by the subsidence or by the destruction of the wrong-belief Karma, the numbers are 142 and 138 respectively in the ninth stage.

But on the destructive ladder, the following 36 also cease to exist, leaving $138 - 36 = 102$:

(1) *Nidrâ-nidrâ*. Deep sleep.

(2) *Prachalâ-prachalâ*. Heavy drowsiness.

(3) *Styânagridhi*. Somnambulism.

(4) *Apratyâkhyânâvaraṇīya Krodha*. Partial vow-preventing Anger.

(5) „ „ „ *Mâna*. Partial vow-preventing Pride.

(6) „ „ „ *Mâyâ*. Partial vow-preventing Deceit.

(7) „ „ „ *Lobha*. Partial vow-preventing Greed.

- (8) *Pratyâ khyânâvaranîya* *Krodha*. Total vow-preventing Anger.
 (9) " " " *Mâna*. Total vow-preventing Pride.
 (10) " " " *Mâyâ*. Total vow-preventing Deceit.
 (11) " " " *Lobha*. Total vow-preventing Greed.
 (12) *Samjvalana-Krodha* Perfect-conduct preventing Anger.
 (13) " *Mâna* " " " Pride.
 (14) " *Mâyâ* " " " Deceit.
 (15) *Hâsyâ*. Laughter.
 (16) *Rati*. Indulgence.
 (17) *Arati*. Dissatisfaction.
 (18) *Śoka*. Sorrow.
 (19) *Bhaya*. Fear.
 (20) *Jugupsâ*. Disgust.
 (21) *Striveda*. Feminine inclination
 (22) *Puṃveda*. Masculine. "
 (23) *Napuṃsakaveda*. Common sex inclination.
 (24) *Naraka Gati*. Hellish condition of existence.
 (25) *Tiryancha* " Sub-human " "
 (26) *Ekendriya Jâti*. One-sensed Genus of beings.
 (27) *Dvîndriya Jâti*. Two-sensed Genus of beings.
 (28) *Tendriya* " Three " " "
 (29) *Chaturendriya Jâti*. Four " " "
 (30) *Naraka-gati-anupûrvî*. Hellish migratory form.
 (31) *Tiryanch* " " Sub-human " "
 (32) *Âtâpa*. Hot light, radiant heat.
 (33) *Udyota*. Cold light.
 (34) *Sâdhâraṇa Śarîra*. Common body.
 (35) *Sthâvara*. Immobile.
 (36) *Sūkṣma*. Fine (body).
 (44) The *Samjvalana Lobha* or Slightest-Greed sub-class ceases to exist here.
 (45) There is existence-separation of the following 16 at the end of the twelfth stage :

- (1) *Mati-jnânâvaranîya*. Sensitive-knowledge-obscuring.
 (2) *Śruta* " Scriptural " "
 (3) *Avadhi* " Visual " "
 (4) *Manahparyaya* " Mental " "
 (5) *Kevala* " Perfect " "
 (6) *Chakṣu-darśanâvaranîya*. Ocular-conation obscuring
 (7) *Achakṣu* " Non-ocular " "
 (8) *Avadhi* " Visual " "
 (9) *Kevala* " Perfect " "
 (10) *Nidrâ* " Sleep " "
 (11) *Prachalâ* " Drowsiness " "



(12)	<i>Dāna-antarāya</i>	Obstructive of Charity
(13)	<i>Lābha</i> „ „	„ „ Gain.
(14)	<i>Bhoga</i> „ „	„ „ Enjoyment.
(15)	<i>Upabhoga-antarāya</i>	„ „ Re-enjoyment.
(16)	<i>Vīrya</i> „	„ „ Power.

(46) In this stage there is the existence of 85. But in the penultimate instant 72 cease to exist and in the last instant the remaining 13 also cease to exist, leaving the soul entirely free from Karmic matter in its pure condition of Siddhahood.



8. SAMAYASARA

IT IS NECESSARY to emphasise and clearly realise that there are two distinct categories: Perfect and Imperfect. The pure disembodied soul alone is perfect. The mundane, matter-clad soul is imperfect. By perfection here is meant a condition than which nothing is better *for ever*. One may want £ 100. For him nothing is better *at present* than to get £ 100. But there is no guarantee that he will want nothing, if he gets the £ 100. Perfection is where there is no want, no need, no desire, no room for further improvement or betterment. Perfect desirelessness, complete non-attachment, imperturbable *Vit-râg-tâ* are connotations of perfection. Thus it is that Jainism does not believe God, an Almighty, Perfect, Conscious Soul to be a Creator. Creation means bringing about something which was not before. The mundane soul when it becomes a Perfect Pure Soul, at the end of the 14th Spiritual Sage, certainly creates its own perfect *condition* of Infinite Perception, Knowledge, Power and Bliss. In this sense, and in this sense alone, God or Siddha may be said to be the Creator of all the universe, present, past and future, for the Siddha is Omniscient; and all the universe, with all its substances, with all their attributes and modifications, in all times and places, becomes subject to this All-Seeing Omniscience, and thus it may be said to *create* the universe. Here creation means the attainment of Perfection, of Omniscience, of Omnipotence, of Godhood, of Siddhahood. In no other sense, creation is possible in Jainism. If creation means the making or bringing into existence of something which was not before, (excepting that becoming perfect means bringing into existence the condition of Self-perfection and Omniscience, which was not before), it implies the conscious creation of something necessary and useful, or of something unnecessary and useless. If the former, why was a useful thing not made before; if the latter, the Creator is a frivolous wastrel, or simply puerile in making, and then breaking the universe.

If the Universe is created by God as an absolutely new thing, it must follow that before its creation God was not *Kṛita Kṛitya*, one so perfect that nothing remained to be done by him. If he only recreates a destroyed universe, then the Jaina explanation (that the universe is uncreated and passes through a sort of birth and death at the junction of Avasarpiṇī and Utsarpiṇī semi-cycles of time) is simple and sufficient. If it be said that there must be some creator (as distinct from some cause or co-existence or sequence) of everything, then there must be some Creator of God, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Further, like creates like. God as Pure Soul can create only Living Soul. How then can He create non-living unconscious matter out of Himself?

The Jaina doctrine is that the lifeless, non-living, unconscious Universe

is eternal and uncreated, and it evolves and revolves within its own countless attributes and modifications for ever, and that it undergoes even radical, catastrophic changes in Space and Time, which the history of all nations records as the Deluge, the Mahâbhârata, the Great War, the Pralaya, etc. etc. Is this doctrine not more soul-satisfying, simple and stamped with cogency and Truth than an attempt to explain things by the doctrine of Creation ? Creation thus being only the creation of its Perfect condition by the Pure Soul, it is easy to see that all else in the Universe, from the point of view of conscious, living, knowing Soul, is Imperfect.

Obviously Imperfection is only tolerated because and so long as we cannot get rid of it. Therefore all worldly endeavour, being the child of the living Soul's union with non-living matter, is to be merely tolerated, to be shunned, to be renounced. When renunciation is impossible or impracticable, it has to be merely tolerated and controlled and regulated so as to keep it within the limits of the most minimum harm to Perfection.

A clear intellectual perception and a persistent, practical pursuit of this in our daily life is essential to keep us true to the Centre of Truth. No verbal jugglery, no pious deception of self or others will save one from error and harm if this Central Truth is lost sight of. All Politics, Ethics, Laws and Economics will be engulfed in stygian, chaotic darkness, if once the human mind, the soul, loses or loosens grip of this First Fact of Life.

On the other hand, if this beacon-light is kept in view, nothing in the world can delude us long or deep. Our joys and sorrows, our successes and failures, our illness and health, births and deaths of relations and friends, victory and defeat, prosperity or adversity,—all these will be easily and instinctively referred to the Central Guide, and dealt with in their own proper perspective. All our wordly valuations depend upon our angle of vision. Ugliness is beauty in the wrong place, or seen from the wrong angle. High treason is patriotism from the wrong view-point. The State and Politics create chaos in an attempt to save the country and citizens from disorder and disruption. Marriage sanctifies apparent monogamy and not seldom becomes an effective cloak for mental and even physical polygamy. Trade and commerce meant for natural and equal distribution of things of necessity and use, often result in extravagant waste or stagnation of such things in the hands of the rich few, to the agonising misery of the poverty-stricken many. Even religion, the sign and mantle of God, has cloaked Satan more than the Light-ever-lasting against whom Satan rebelled for ever. Indeed there is nothing good or desirable in the world, which to some extent or other is not locked up in the arms of its contradictory. Verily, the extremes meet literally. Life means death. Death breeds life. The extremely rich are extremely poor. The possessionless are the richest. The crown of thorns is ever the real, ultimate adornment. The cup of misery is the only joy-giving nectar. Puruṣa and Prakṛiti are inextricably interlocked. Brahma and Mâyâ lie mingled together; none can say which is which. There is only

one way out of the den of this Duessa. It is to recognise the reality of this den and also of the flowerful glade of real roses outside. Till the rose glade is gained, the dark den must be tolerated and regulated.

In fine, there is no aspect or detail of practical life where the teachings of Śrī Kunda Kunda will not be of immense utility. Everywhere they will lay bare the deepest truth about the question in hand, and give the most lucid and calm guidance in the handling and solution thereof. Obviously the touchstone of the eternal Truth as laid down in the book is to be applied by every man or woman according to the point in hand and in the light of surrounding circumstances of substance, place, time, and the object in view. In this sense, Jainism may be said to be the apotheosis of relativity with which Eastern has made the Western world familiar.

Dravya, Kṣetra, Kāla and Bhāva form the eternal quaternary for our practical guidance. The same question can be and even must be answered differently according to the differences in substance, place, time and circumstances. This gives a knock-out blow to rigid consistency, and conservative orthodoxy, social or political, and perhaps indicates the wonderful essential sameness of religion and true conduct in different forms, in different countries and ages.

Great is the power of purity and truth. The ten aspects of religion—supreme forgiveness, humility, straightforwardness, truth, contentment, self-control, austerity, renunciation, possessionlessness and chastity or self-absorption are of eternal value, guidance and inspiration. They are God-given and God-giving. We reach God through them. They negate the sins and passions of anger, pride, deceit, greed etc. Sin and sorrow are also as eternal and infinite and indestructible as soul and salvation. You cross the ocean of Saṃsāra. You never destroy it.

The Bhavyas or Liberables only attempt to follow the path laid down by the Arhatas. But mundane misery must ever remain unkillable in its extent and length.

The motion and movements of matter are not necessarily the signs of life. Matter may be moved by soul. Then also it is moved by the non-soul partner of soul in its embodied condition. For pure soul has no desire or need to move matter of any kind. Thus in a way matter is moved by matter only. In other words, soul is not the cause of any motion, except when the soul is impure, soiled with its connection with matter and then it becomes the cause of motion. Even love and art, and the noblest and highest forms of endeavour in life are material and renounceable. A beautiful form is matter-born, a result of the physical body made of assimilative molecules (*Āhāraka Vargaṇā*). Love is only an effect upon the mind produced by this form of beauty. The soul may also be affected by deep, devoted love owing to this love reinforcing a pure kind of delusion which again is Kārmic matter. Similarly art. The artist's unity with his all-absorbing aim in painting, poetry, melody, sculpture or architecture is only a child of matter, which

is subtle, pure, non-harming, but all the same matter, which soils the soul and stands between it and its full realisation. Similarly, religious practices, worship, postures of ascetism etc., all the ladders to spirituality are material and matter-born. They fall into the category of non-soul. They are obviously not the soul in its entire fulness, in its perfect purity. They are helps for the soul to achieve self-realisation. But they are not the soul. As pneumatic belts or upturned floating pitchers are helps to a swimmer in water, but are not the swimmer, the practices of religion, even the highest of them, the sincerest and most earnest pursuit of right belief, right knowledge and right conduct are all mundane matters. They have no place in the region of pure souls. They are material, mundane, *cis-liberation*. As long as the soul is fascinated by or dependent upon or even in association with any of them, its connection with matter, with Karma, with Samsâra is not severed, and the mundane soul does not achieve the dignity and status of selfhood, of being its own pure self, of being a liberated soul, pure for ever.

Latest science has begun to perceive the existence of millions of atoms in a pin-head, revolving in a terribly continuous fashion. This is a great help to understand Jainism. Jainism posits the existence of an infinity of matter, *i.e.* of infinite atoms and molecules. If a pin-head has millions of atoms, how many atoms must a hut or a palace or a street or a city have? How many atoms must there be in a whole country or continent, in an ocean? How many in our earth, in the moon, in the sun? In our solar system? In all the solar systems in the starry sky? How many in the whole universe? Certainly, infinite.

Again, it is clear that a pin-head has no life, when by life we mean a manifestation of soul or consciousness or attention by means of the five senses—respiration etc. The presence of millions of atoms in a pin-head or in a speck of dirt, on the paper or the pen or the chair does not prove that the pin or paper or pen or chair are alive or have a soul. The multitudinous movements of matter and its uncountable variations and transfigurations do not demolish the eternal wall of distinction between soul and non-soul, between the living and the non-living. The Living now, as ever, has consciousness and attention. It alone has this. None else can be or is conscious (*chetana*) or capable of attention (*upayoga*). The non-living never possessed this soulness; never can and never shall possess consciousness. It shall never have the capacity of attending to anything; it shall never have knowledge of anything. It cannot *know*. *Jñâna* is not its *forte* and never can be.

This is the one primary distinction between living and non-living, the ignorance of which is the fertile mother of many pitfalls in Philosophy and Metaphysics. The great teachers of Jainism insist upon this distinction in very lucid, persistent and un-mistakeable language. They emphasise with ceaseless repetition that the pupil, the disciple, the earnest seeker after Truth must have a firm, un-faltering, un-loseable grasp of this basic

FACT of the universe, that the living and the non-living substances quite exhaust the universe, and make up a perfect division of it by dichotomy, and that the living is the living and never anything else, and the non-living is itself and never living.

This lesson was taught in the great, soul-purifying gâthâs of *Samayasâra* by Sri Kunda Kunda Âchârya in the first century B.C.

Samayasâra is full of the one idea of one concentrated divine unity. It is as persistent and emphatic about the Soul's identity with Itself, being the only living Conscious Reality, as pure Mahomedanism is about the *Vahdâniyata* of God, or Monistic Vedântism about *Para-Brahma*. This is the only One Idea which counts. All Truth, Goodness, Beauty, Reality, Morality, Freedom is in this. The Self and It alone is true, good, lovely, real, moral. The non-Self is error, myth, *mithyâtva*, ugly, deluding, detractor from and obscurer of reality, immoral, worthy of shunning and renunciation, as bondage and as anti-liberation. This Almighty, all-Comprehensive, claim of SELF-ABSORPTION must be perfectly and completely grasped for any measure of success in understanding Sri Kunda Kunda Âchârya's works, indeed for the true understanding of Jainism.

Few are the works, if any, extant of Jainism as digested of old by the Apostles and Omniscients after Lord Mahavira; and with the doubtful exception of Svâmi Kârîkeya's *Anuprekshâ*, none is older than Sri Kunda Kunda's. The tradition is much older. It is unbroken, continuous. Indeed it is claimed to be eternal. But in its written form, no work is older than the soul-analysing, soul-clarifying, soul-illuminating stanzas of Sri Kunda Kunda. They sparkle with one life and shed one white lustre, namely, the divine, limitless nature of Soul when absorbed in Itself. *Sva-Samaya* or self-absorption is the key-note, the purpose, the lesson, the object, the goal and the centre of Sri Kunda Kunda's all works and teachings. The Pure, All-Conscious, Self-absorbed Soul is God and never less or more. Any connection, causal or effectual, with the non-self is a delusion, limitation, imperfection, bondage. To obtain liberation or deification, this connection must be destroyed. Thus and then the "bound" soul, بندہ *bandâh*, becomes the Liberated Soul, خدا *Khudâ*, "Self come to Self, ذات پاک *Zât-e-pâka*, "Pure Entity". The man becomes Man. The Son of man returns to His Father in Heaven. Man becomes HIMSELF. Man becomes GOD.

To guard against any misunderstanding of Jainism, this central teaching, this clear golden goal must ever be kept in mind and in view.

It may well and legitimately be asked: what is the practical use of this Jaina idea of self-absorption?

The answer is: The mere insight into and knowledge of this Real Reality, is of everyday use in the conduct of our individual and collective lives. It is a true and the only panacea for all our ills. Its rigour may be hard. Its preliminary demand may occasion a wrench from our cherished habits, customs, and fashions of thought and action. But its result—which is imme-

diates, instantaneous and unmistakable,—justifies the hardship and the demand. The relief and service, the sure uplift of ourselves, the showering of calm balm, by the practice of self-realisation, upon the sore souls of our brethren and sisters, justify the price paid. Indeed it is merely the temporary yielding of a hollow, fleeting pleasure for the attainment of a real, permanent happiness and peace, which once gained, can never be lost. Once the soul has had its first dip into its own milk-white nectar Ocean of SELF; in Christian phrase, once the soul has seen the presence of God, it can never go away from it for ever. It must come back to the presence sooner or later, and oftener; till in the end it is always THERE and nowhere else.

To this an obvious criticism would be directed that this is making men angels or at least faultless supermen, whereas humanity consists at best of frail, feeble, faulty human mortals. This is quite true. Humanity can never become a community of angels. Our passion-tossed hearts must keep us generally deluded, weak, imperfect. But the practice of self-realisation makes us less deluded, less weak and less imperfect, and it brings us one or many steps nearer that condition of our purified and strengthened consciousness which is free from delusion, weakness and imperfection. Self-realisation deals with our inner warring impulses and feelings by suppressing some, eliminating others; and by self-control, self-discipline and self-respect, regulating the others into a self-guided harmony, which is a helpful reflection of God Himself.

Once you sit on the rock of self-realisation, the whole world goes round and round you like a crazy rushing something, which has lost its hold upon you and is mad to get you again in its grip, but cannot. The all-conquering smile of the Victor (Jina) is on your lips. The vanquished, deluding world lies dead and impotent at your feet.



9. NIYAMSARA

THE WORD *Niyama* literally means, "rule or law," and *Sāra* means "the right." *Niyamsara* thus signifies the Right Rule, *i.e.* the true and indispensable law for the attainment of liberation.

The sole object and the whole gist of this treatise is to show that the all-pure, all-conscious, all-blissful and self-absorbed soul alone is the Siddha, a perfect soul. If a soul is in bondage with karmic matter, *i.e.* if it has any connection, whatsoever, with the Non-Soul, it is imperfect, and under delusion. It is imperfection or delusion which is accountable for the continuance of transmigrations, and experiences of pain and pleasure. In order to obtain liberation, perfection, eternal beauty, a soul must get rid of all connection with the Non-self. When this connection with the Non-self is completely severed, Siddha-pada, Perfection, is attained.

Right Belief, Right Knowledge, and Right Conduct have been dealt with, from two points of view, the real and the practical.

The real is the only sure and direct path; while the practical is an auxiliary cause to the attainment of the real. Real path of liberation is absorption in the self.

Attachment and aversion, which include all passionate thought activities, are the main cause of karmic bondage, while non-attachment, or pure thought activity leads to freedom from bondage

RIGHT BELIEF

Practical Right Belief is a true and firm belief in *Āpta*, the all-accomplished, all-knowing source of all knowledge; in the *Āgama*, the Scripture, the written discourse, which first flowed from the omniscient; and in the *Tattvas*, the principles or categories.

The *Āpta* must have three special characteristics :

(a) Freedom from all defects such as hunger, fear, anger, delusion, (b) Omniscience and (c) Non-volitional propagation of truth. Such are the Arhats, the adorable Lords, of whom the most prominent are the twenty-four Tirthankaras.

Āgama is the scripture composed by the highly learned and spiritually advanced saints from discourses which flowed from the Arhats. These scriptures are faultless and free from the flaw of inconsistency.

Tattvas, the principle categories or substances are seven : (1) *Jīva*, soul, (2) *Ajīva*, non-soul, (3) *Āśrava*, inflow, (4) *Bandha*, bondage, (5) *Samvara*, the check of inflow, (6) *Nirjarā*, the shedding of previously bound-up Karmas, and (7) *Mokṣa*, liberation from all Karmic contact.

All that exists is included in one or other of the two principles, soul and non-soul. While a man is alive, it is the soul in his body which perceives

and knows all objects. A body without soul is incapable of perceiving or knowing anything. Material objects such as a pen, table or chair cannot feel or know anything. They are unconscious or inanimate substances.

I. The soul. It is the only conscious substance. Looked at from the real point of view even a mundane soul is pure, peaceful, all-knowing and all-blissful. It is potentially so. From the practical point of view such a soul experiences various kinds of pain and pleasure in different conditions of life.

II. The Non-soul. It comprises the other five real and independent substances, which, taken together with the soul, make up the six substances (Dravyas):

(1) Pudgala, "Matter" is the most prominent, and plays a very important part in the amphitheatre of the universe. The special attributes of matter-substance (pudgala) are touch, taste, smell, and colour. It exists either in the form of atoms or of molecules. Only gross molecules are cognizable by the senses; fine, electric and kârmic molecules which compose the electric and the kârmic bodies of all mundane souls are not cognizable by the senses.

(2) Dharma, "Medium of motion" is a single, immaterial substance, pervading throughout the whole of the universe. It is essentially an auxiliary cause of motion for soul and matter.

(3) Adharma, "Medium of rest" is also a single immaterial substance, pervading throughout the whole universe. It is also an essentially auxiliary cause of rest for soul and matter.

(4) Âkâśa, "Space" is a single infinite immaterial substance. Its function is to give place to all substances.

(5) Kâla, "Time" is an immaterial substance. It is an auxiliary cause of bringing about modifications in all substances.

III & IV. Inflow (Âśrava) and Bondage (Bandha).

Every mundane soul has a kârmic body, formed of kârmic molecules. The universe is full of kârmic molecules. Inflow of these molecules towards the soul, caused by its own vibratory activities, through mind, speech, and body, is called *Âśrava*. When these molecules are so attracted towards the soul, they are assimilated in the existing kârmic body. The causes of assimilation or bondage are the soul's vibratory activities and passions. This process is known as *Bandha* (bondage). The processes of Inflow and Bondage of kârmic matter go on simultaneously. The main auxiliary causes of both of them are:

(a) Wrong belief (Mithyâtva).

(b) Vowlessness (Avirati).

(c) Passions (Kaṣaya).

(d) Soul's vibratory activities (Yoga).

V. Saṃvara. Checking of Inflow and Bondage of Kârmic molecules, is called Saṃvara (Stoppage).

The main auxiliary causes of stopping the inflow and bondage of kârmic molecules are :

- (a) Right belief.
- (b) Observance of vows.
- (c) Passionlessness.
- (d) Restraint of soul's vibratory activities.

VI. Nirjarâ. The shedding of karmas already bound with a soul at maturity, or prematurely, is called *Nirjarâ*. The premature shedding of karmas is caused by pure thought-activities, brought about by the practice of right kind of austerities. The shedding on maturity is a natural and automatic process.

VII. Mokṣa. "Liberation" is freedom from all kârmic matter as a result of the non-existence of the cause of bondage and the shedding off of all karmas previously bound. It is the state of a Siddha, the condition of perfection.

Continuous devotion to *Āpta*, study of the scriptures, and meditation of the seven principles, cause the subsidence of wrong belief (*mithyâtva*) and of the four error-feeding passions (*anantânubandhi kaṣāya*) and as a consequence, the real right belief which is an attribute of the soul shines forth in its true splendour. At this stage the right believer is fully convinced of the true and pure nature of his own soul, and this is Real Right Belief.

RIGHT KNOWLEDGE

I. Practical Right Knowledge is the acquisition of the detailed knowledge of all the seven principles explained above, with the help of the Jaina scriptures. This Right Knowledge must be free from three main defects (a) Doubt (*Samśaya*), (b) Perversity (*Viparyaya*) and (c) Indefiniteness (*Anadhyavasāya*). It reveals the complete and precise nature of things.

II. Real Right Knowledge is to know the true and real nature of the soul as quite distinct from all other non-soul substances.

Constant contemplation of, and unflinching devotion to, the subject matter of practical right knowledge is an auxiliary cause to the attainment of Real Right Knowledge.

RIGHT CONDUCT

A right believer, who has fully realised the true and real nature of his own soul, and is bent upon getting rid of the kârmic filth which is in bondage with his soul tries to follow Right Conduct. His main object in doing so, is to be free from attachment and aversion, and from all impure thought-activities and to attain the condition of equanimity.

Practical right conduct consists in observing the following five vows :

- | | |
|------------|----------------------------------|
| (a) Ahimsâ | .. refraining from doing injury. |
| (b) Satya | .. refraining from falsehood. |
| (c) Asteya | .. refraining from theft. |



- (d) Brahmacharya .. chastity, purity.
 (e) Aparigraha .. non-attachment.

This practical right conduct can be observed either partially or fully. Laymen observe it partially, while those who observe it fully are saints. Partial observance is merely a stepping stone to the conduct of a saint, without following which it is not possible to advance spiritually and to ultimately liberate the soul from kârmic bondage.

A layman is required to follow the seven supplementary vows also, as they are helpful in the proper observance of the first five.

Out of these seven, the following three are called *Guṇavratas* (multiplicative vows) because they raise the value of the five vows manifold :

Dig-Vrata, a life-long vow to limit wordly activities to fixed points in all the ten directions, North, South, East, West, North-east, North-west, South-east, South-west, above and below.

Deśa-Vrata, a vow to limit wordly activity for a fixed period only.

Anartha-Danda Vrata. Taking a vow not to commit purposeless sin. It is of five kinds :

- (a) *Apa-Dhyāna*, Thinking ill of others.
- (b) *Pāpodeśa*. Preaching evil of others.
- (c) *Pramāda-charyā*. Inconsiderate conduct, such as uselessly breaking the boughs of trees.
- (d) *Himsā-dān*. Preparing or supplying instruments of attack.
- (e) *Duśruti*. Reading or listening to improper literature.

The remaining four are the following *Shikṣā Vratas* or disciplinary vows, so-called because they are preparatory to the discipline of an ascetic's life :

Sāmāyika. Taking a vow to devote a fixed period every day, once, twice, or three times, at sunrise, sunset and noon to the contemplation of the self for spiritual advancement.

Prośadhovāsa. Taking a vow to fast on four days of the month, i.e. the two *Aṣṭamīs* and the two *Chaturdaśīs*.

Bhogopohoga Parimāṇa. Taking a vow every day to limit one's enjoyment of consumable and non-consumable things.

Atithi-Saṃvibhāga. Taking a vow to take one's food only after feeding ascetics or others with a part of it.

Every Jaina house-holder is ordinarily required to perform the following six daily duties :

1. *Deva-Pūjā*. Worship of the Arhats, the adorables.
2. *Guru Bhakti*. Devotion to the gurus or preceptor-saints.
3. *Svādhyāya*. Study of the scriptures.
4. *Samyama*. Control of the five senses and the mind. In practising *Samyama*, it is necessary to renounce certain objects of enjoyments with the idea of self-control.
5. *Tapa*. Austerities such as meditating upon the nature of soul, every morning and evening, for a fixed time.

6. Dâna or Charity. Giving of (a) food, (b) knowledge, (c) medicine, or (d) protection.

The following eleven stages of spiritual progress have been laid down for a layman.

1. Darśana Pratimâ. A layman who entertains right belief, and follows the five main vows to a limited extent is classed in this stage.

2. Vrata-Pratimâ. In this stage he observes the five main vows to a limited extent (anuvratas), without transgression and follows the seven supplementary vows.

3. Sâmyâika Pratimâ. In this stage he practises faultless contemplation regularly, three times, in the morning, at midday and in the evening, at least for about 48 minutes every time.

4. Prośadhovavâsa Pratimâ. In this stage, he observes a fast faultlessly, on the 8th and 14th days of the fortnight.

5. Sachitta Tyâga. In this stage he does not take animate water and vegetable, etc.

6. Ratri-Bhukta Tyâga Pratimâ. He does not take or give food or drink at night.

7. Brahmacharya Pratimâ. He gives up sexual intercourse even with his wife.

8. Ârambha Tyâga Pratimâ. He gives up all profession and all means of earning money and all wordly occupations.

9. Parigraha-Tyâga Pratimâ. He gives up all desire for objects of the world and abandons all property except a very few limited number of clothes and utensils.

10. Anumati-Tyâga Pratimâ. He would not even offer advice on any worldly matter.

11. Uddiṣṭa-Tyâga Pratimâ. In this stage he would not accept food which is prepared particularly for him. He will only accept food which is respectfully offered by a house-holder at the time when he goes out for food. One following the discipline of this stage may be—

(a) *Kṣullaka*, who keeps a small sheet of cloth not sufficiently long to cover his whole body and a small loin cloth (langoti), and dines in a dish, or

(b) *Ailaka* who wears only a small loin-cloth (langoti) and dines off his hands.

They both carry a bowl of water for cleaning the body and peacock-feathers brush for harmlessly removing insects.

As soon as an *Ailaka* is able to subdue his passions and regards himself as above passion and emotion, he discards like an infant that small langoti also and becomes a *nirgrantha*, a naked saint, without any possession whatsoever, except the peacock feathers brush for carefully removing insects, and the bowl for carrying water, for cleaning, but not bathing the body. He may keep scriptures as well for daily study.

A saint while observing the five great vows fully and without any transgression, has to observe the following eight rules of conduct also :

I. Five kinds of caution (Samiti).

(a) *Îryâ Samiti*. Proper care in walking.(b) *Bhâṣâ Samiti*. Proper care in speaking.(c) *Eśnâ Samiti*. Proper care in eating.(d) *Âdâna-Nikṣepa Samiti*. Proper care in lifting and placing the bowl, etc.(e) *Utsarga Samiti*. Proper care while attending calls of nature.

II. Three kinds of Restraint (Gupti) (a) of mind, (b) word and (c) body.

These eight rules of conduct taken together with the five vows make the thirteen rules of practical right conduct laid down for a saint.

In dealing with the six essential duties from the real point of view, the author has used the word *Âvaśyaka* in its etymological sense. *Âvaśa* means independent; and *Âvaśyaka karma* means independent action. Independent action signifies the idea that the soul of a saint in meditation, is not dependent upon any other thought activity except its own pure and real nature. This is only possible in the condition of self-absorption, when a saint is free from all foreign thought activities.

From the practical point of view, they may be briefly described as follows :

1. *Pratikramaṇa*. Repentance means the statement of the sins and transgressions committed by a saint, during the performance of his daily routine; and making penance for them.

2. *Pratyakayana*. Renunciation means resolving to avoid particular thought-activities and actions in future, which tend to disturb the performance of essential duties.

3. *Stuti* or Praising.

4. *Vandanâ*. Prostration to the worshipful saints. *Stuti* and *Vandanâ* are both aspects of devotion which are practised with the object of getting rid of impure thought activities.

5. *Sâmâyika* or Equanimity. In practising *Sâmâyika* a saint resorts to some undisturbed solitude, and calmly and cheerfully withdraws all his thought-activities, and meditates upon his own soul and its various attributes and modifications.

6. *Kâyotsarga* is the relinquishment of attachment to the body and all other objects associated with it.

Nirvâṇa is the result brought about by the practice of self-absorption, which is the combination of Real Right Belief, Real Right Knowledge and Real Right Conduct.

In the condition of *Nirvâṇa*, the soul retains its own pure and real thought-activities only and enjoys its own natural and eternal bliss.



10. KARMA KANDA, PART II

KARMA is a word well-known not only in India, but beyond it, far and wide, in all countries of the world, where Oriental Philosophy is studied or talked of.

Every villager and every citizen in India uses the word Karma in daily parlance as signifying destiny, fate, happening, or event, for which he does not find or to which he fails to ascribe an immediate cause.

“My Karma is bad” is the cry of woe and despair, which is uttered when one is overtaken by a sudden calamity, or is the victim of a fraud, perfidy or swindle. With the majority of people Karma is the unknown factor in life, quantity X.

In all systems of Indian Philosophy the word has been used with profusion.

Srî Kṛiṣṇa is styled the Great Karma-Yogi, the superman of action. According to Hindu tradition it was on the battlefield of Kurukṣetra that Lord Kṛiṣṇa preached the Philosophy of Action, and raised the drooping spirits of Arjun, who hesitated to draw the bow against his respected elders and near and dear relations arrayed in battle against him.

The Great Warrior, the incomparable Archer, the bravest of the brave, had at that moment been overtaken by the weakness of inaction, indecision, incapacity to act, a sort of mental stupor; and to drag him out from that lethargic condition, the advice given was: “Do what is your duty in the circumstances in which you are placed, and be indifferent to the result.” Desire and expectation are sinful. No sin attaches to the mere commission of an act, which does not proceed from, or is not based on desire, or expectation, or any ill-will or good-will; but is merely a performance of duty, and is not a wanton or negligent act. This Discourse is called the *Bhāgwat Gītā*—the Song Celestial. It consists of 700 verses and is divided into 18 chapters.

In verse 3 of chapter VIII, it is said that Karma is the emanation (from the eternal) that gives rise to ideas, which taking shape or form, come to be.

अक्षरं ब्रह्म परमं स्वभावोऽध्यात्ममुच्यते ।

भूत भावोद्भवकरो विसर्गः कर्म संज्ञितः ॥

Stated in simple and clear language, Karma is said to be the resultant of the vibrations proceeding from Eternal Life; which vibrations take shape and have a duration, an existence for a definite period.

Some sages meant by Karma the acts enjoined by the sacred scriptures; and others considered it as synonymous with a submission to the duties and responsibilities of normal life.

In a modern sense, a Karma-Yogi is a purposeful man or woman who has settled views, a householder who calls himself unattached while actively engaged in the world's turmoil.



In Jaina Philosophy, however, the word Karma has quite a different and unique significance. The starting principle of Jainism is that there is an eternal beginningless union between soul and matter. This union though without a beginning is not without an end. When once the union is entirely broken, when once the soul is free from the slightest vestige of a contact with matter, nothing can bind it again. It is liberated.

The activity of the soul which invites and enables matter of an exceptionally subtle form to flow into it, as also the matter which actually does flow into the soul, is called Karma. The thought-activity is called Bhâva-Karma; and the actual matter flowing into the Soul and binding it is called Dravya-Karma. It is a substance. It is matter, in itself inert, lifeless, like a pebble, but in combination with Jîva, Life, its potency is immense, beyond calculation, beyond measure. It then keeps the Jîva itself bound and fettered, a prisoner, dancing constantly at Karma's beck and gesture. At each step, the momentum for a new movement is gained. At each embrace of matter, the delighted deluded soul throbs and vibrates for a fresh embrace. Wily matter is ever ready to attack the soul and to flow into it with its million insinuations, and to keep alive and vigorous the bondage of the living by the non-living. It is so very fine, so very subtle, that it cannot be perceived, recognised, discerned by any the most highly developed sense organ, or by the most perfected, the highest magnifying microscope. It eludes all efforts of the Chemist and the Physicist to calculate, measure, graph, photograph, utilise, harness or control it. It is millions of times finer and subtler than the waves of sound, light, or electricity, or the electrons, protons, conceived by man. And yet this matter is ever and anon surrounding us on all sides, and permeating through and through every particle of our body and soul. There is no space where it is not. And it is perceivable, appreciable, knowable by the Omniscients; and its workings, metamorphoses, make-ups and changes, are explained by Âchâryas, who have heard the letterless Voice of the Omniscient, and who have transmitted the knowledge thus directly acquired from the Omniscient to others through the past milleniums, by speech and in writings.

Karma is the Cause, the first, the ultimate, the original Cause which keeps the Universe going. All phenomena, all changes, all manifestations are due to Kârmic effects.

And Jaina saints, the Masters of wisdom, have analysed the workings of Karma in the most minutest details. And what would be a marvel and a miracle to the Modern Man is that they did so without the use of pen, pencil, or paper, without any of the modern resources and appliances. Mind and Memory were the only two instruments they used for researches into the workings and inter-actions of Soul and Matter, with an accuracy and a wealth of detail which would command the admiration of the modern scientist.

The Jaina Saints did all this wonderful research work without any selfish

motive, without expectation of praise or worship, or service in any shape or kind whatsoever from their admirers, worshippers or devotees. They thought deeply because it was a joy to think, they entered into intricate and far-reaching arithmetical and algebraical calculations because it was a pleasure to do so, because it was the natural, effortless exercise of their exalted, purified, refined intelligence and consciousness. They spoke, they uttered, not from desire but involuntarily, as an inherent, natural physical urge, being stimulated thereto by the intense desire of the seekers after truth.

In Book VII, the different kinds of substances which compose the Universe, their attributes, modifications, the conditions in which the embodied souls are found, the rules which regulate the combination of Soul and Matter, Jiva and Karma, the Bondage, Inflow, Stoppage, and Dissolution of Kârmic connection with Soul; and the ways and means of obtaining deliverance, Mokṣa, Liberation from Karmic contact have been described.*

This book deals with the same subject in details more minute, more exhaustive and more extensive. To give, however, a brief idea of the subject-matter by way of introduction, a little recapitulation would be pardonable.

It has already been stated that molecules having the capacity to adopt the Kârmic form, take shape in what have been termed 8 main classes, and 148 sub-classes of Karmas. The division into 8 main and 148 sub-classes has been made for the sake of facility of comprehension, and discussion of the subject. Speaking from an absolute point of view, the classes and the sub-classes are innumerable and even infinite. They vary, and no two are alike in every particular. The divisions into classes and sub-classes are based on points of preponderating similarity.

Kârmic matter never remains in an isolated condition. As soon as it takes form, it combines with the physical or fluid body, which stimulates it into activity. The stimulation into activity is called *Āśrava*, Inflow; and the combination *Bandha*, Bondage. The Kârmic molecules produce their effect after a certain period. This duration is called *Ābâdhâ*, quiescence. The action or effect is called *Udaya*, operation. The period for which it continues to operate is called *Sthiti* duration, and this varies with the mildness or intensity of passions. The natural riddance, falling, or shedding off of Kârmic molecules in due course during the period of duration is called *Nirjarâ*, shedding. This can also be effected earlier, and the operation and duration period can be shortened by austerities. As regards natural shedding of Karmas, it commences immediately at the moment operation begins and it is gradual, regular, and methodical by a fixed rule of arithmetical progression. The highest number of molecules shed off in the first instant of duration, and the lowest number in the last instant, while the number goes on decreasing by a common difference at every instant.

* *Supra* pp. 141-174



The operation may be tangible, the result may be apparent, appreciable, felt, or it may not be so. That would depend on circumstances ever varying in their nature. Every ordinary mundane soul, every one of us, so to say, binds Karmic matter of all the four passions—Anger, Pride, Deceit and Greed—at every instant, while it suffers from the action of only one of them, at an instant and the others shed off without producing any result, without being felt.

For example, take the case of a person engaged in pious meditation, or in deep study of the Sacred philosophy. The operation of evil and pain-producing Karmas will not affect him and they will continue to shed off in due course. He has a pious desire, and there will be the effect and bondage of good Karmas only.

Again Karmas of one sub-class can be transformed into those of another sub-class. Consider again the just-above-stated case of a person engaged in deep pious study. He will not mind, or feel or be affected by the inclemencies of the weather, by thirst, hunger, sleep, lassitude, etc., but will be enjoying the pleasure of acquisition of knowledge. The pain-producing Karma will thus be transformed into pleasure-producing one.

Duration and effect or fruition of Karmas can also be similarly increased or decreased. A person is thus the maker and master of his destiny, he can make himself happy or miserable, he can rise above circumstances, and can make a hell of heaven and a heaven of hell.

A Karma bound in one life may produce its effect in the same life, in the next, or in a life thereafter.

In this Book are found a rich detail of the various groups of sub-classes of each of the eight main classes, which are bound by a soul, which operate, and which simply remain in existence, at various spiritual stages. For example, a soul in the first stage—wrong belief—binds 22 out of the 28 sub-classes of Deluding Karma—wrong belief, 16 kinds of passion, one of the three sexes, fear, disgust, and one from each of the two pairs of indulgence and ennui, laughter and sorrow. Only 10 will be in operation—only one out of the four kinds of each of the four passions can operate at one time, and hence 12 kinds of passion fall out of calculation, and only 10 out of the 22 which are bound, can operate. Existence there is of all the 28.

The object of all this travail is to purify the Soul, to evolve it to its inherent perfection, to remove all the possible Karmic contaminations which obstruct the full and complete enjoyment and exercise of Omniscience, and Omnipotence. And how to attain this end is the subject discussed in *Karma Kānda*.

The knowledge and analysis of the various forms and workings of Karma is helpful in all stages of life, to the preceptor and the student, to the householder and the man of business, to the admiral and the general, to the warrior and the soldier, to the king and the politician, to the saint and the recluse. It is a general panacea.

11. PARIKSHAMUKHAM

THE REAL object of the Nyāya philosophy in the Hindu śāstras was propounded as attainment of liberation. In *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* the sage Yājñavalkya told his wife Maitreyī that we should learn about the soul, understand it and meditate on it. For proper understanding of the nature of a thing, help of the Nyāya philosophy is essential. It is said that we suffer misery because we have false knowledge regarding the soul, such as considering the body as soul. When we perceive the error of such a wrong belief, we get true knowledge. The Jain view also is that the Nyāya philosophy leads to right faith, right knowledge and right conduct which produce liberation.

Difference in philosophical views is based on different kinds and methods of appreciation of the one eternal truth. All Indian philosophies aim at the attainment of real happiness and destruction of misery. In *Yogavāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa* it is mentioned: "O Rāma ! the idea of creation consisting of Ahaṁkāra, Manas, Buddhi etc. which have been described by me as modification of one, are differently described by the authors of Nyāya philosophy. The Sāṅkhya and Chārvāka philosophies have described the same differently. The followers of Jaimini (Mīmāṃsā philosophy), Arhats (Jains), Bauddhas, Vaiśeṣikas and others of peculiar views like Pancharātras have described the same in different manner. All of them however will go to the same eternal goal as passengers from different places travelling at different times reach a particular city"*.

The great masters of philosophy knew this truth and in ancient times though each propounded his own theory and even criticised the views of others, intolerance was absolutely absent. All great teachers and writers were always eager to learn what others have thought and said on a particular question and an attempt was always made to discuss a particular point from different aspects. There is indisputable evidence that Buddha discussed the views of the Jains as well as of other sects in his time. There is evidence of

- * अहंकारमनोबुद्धिदृष्टयः सृष्टिकल्पनाः ।
 एकरूपतया प्रोक्ता या मया रघुनन्दन ॥
 नैयायिकैरितरथा तादृशैः परिकल्पिताः ।
 अन्यथा कल्पितैः सांख्यैश्चार्वाकैरपि चान्यथा ॥
 जैमिनीयैश्चार्हतैश्च बौद्धैर्वैशेषिकैस्तथा ।
 अन्यैरपि विचित्रैस्तैः पाञ्चरात्रादिभिस्तथा ॥
 सर्वैरपि च गन्तव्यं तैः पदं पारमार्थिकम् ।
 विचित्रं देशकालोत्थैः पुरमेकमिवाध्वगैः ॥

—Utpatti Prakaraṇa 96, 48-51.



such discussions by Śrī Mahāvira, the twenty fourth Tīrthaṅkara of the Jains.

The first attempt to give a concise view of the different systems of philosophy was made by Jain sage Haribhadra Sūri in his *Saddarśana-samuṣṣaya*. In this work he has described (1) Bauddha (2) Nyāya (3) Sāṅkhya (4) Jaina (5) Vaiśeṣika and (6) Mīmāṃsa systems of philosophy.* We find that within Sāṅkhya, he has also described Pātanjala philosophy and within Mīmāṃsa, he has dealt with Pūrva-mīmāṃsa as well as Uttaramīmāṃsa or Vedānta. Thus though Haribhadra's work is named "A compendium of six philosophies", in reality it treats of eight systems of philosophy. In *Vivekavilāsa* by Jinadatta Sūri (13th century) the same enumeration has been followed. Rajaśekhara Sūri (13th century) mentioning these six (really eight) systems of philosophy has stated that the Nāstika views cannot be accepted as philosophies.†

It is necessary to understand the difference of Āstika and Nāstika philosophies. Though Mādhavāchārya in his *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha* has described sixteen systems of philosophy viz. (1) Chārvāka (2) Bauddha (3) Arhata (4) Rāmānuja (5) Mādhava (6) Pāsupata (7) Śaiva (8) Pratyaviñña (9) Raseśvara (10) Pāṇīniya (11) Nyāya (12) Vaiśeṣika (13) Sāṅkhya (14) Yoga (15) Purva-mīmāṃsā (16) Uttaramīmāṃsā, it is on the basis of the distinction of the Āstika and Nāstika philosophies that the so-called Nāstika philosophies came to be excluded in the subsequent list of approved philosophies. By six systems of Indian philosophy, according to current acceptance, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Pātanjala (Yoga), Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta are understood. The Jaina and Bauddha philosophies were excluded from this list by later writers on the ground that these systems are Nāstika philosophies. Raghunandan has quoted a verse from *Hayaśirṣa-pancharātra* that the philosophies of Gautama, Kāṇada, Kapila, Patanjali, Vyāsa and Jaimini are the only six systems of philosophy‡.

The word Nāstika is differently interpreted. The derivative meaning from the Sūtra of Pāṇini is taken to be "he who does not accept Paraloka or existence after death". The second interpretation is that by Nāstika we mean the person who does not accept the existence of Īśvara and the third

* बौद्ध नैयायिकं सांख्यं जैनं वैशेषिकं तथा ।
जैमिनीयञ्च षड्विधानि दर्शनानाममून्यहो ॥

—*Saddarśana-samuṣṣaya* 3.

† जैनं सांख्यं जैमिनीयं योगं वैशेषिकं तथा ।
सौगतं दर्शनान्येवं नास्तिकं न तु दर्शनम् ॥

—*Ibid* Page 1.

‡ गौतमस्य कणादस्य कपिलस्य पतञ्जलेः ।
व्यासस्य जमिनेश्चापि दर्शनानि षडेव हि ॥

—*Devapratishṭhatattva*.



meaning is that Nāstika indicates the man who denies the authority of the Vedas*.

Now, if we accept the meaning of Nāstika as one who does not accept Paraloka (existence after death), Karma and the fruits of Karma, we cannot say that Jaina and Bauddha philosophies are Nāstika philosophies for both of these systems of philosophy accept these.

Again, if we interpret 'Nāstika' to mean 'denying the existence of Īśvara', the Sāṅkhya as well as Mīmāṃsā systems of philosophy should be taken as Nāstika philosophies as neither Kapila nor Jaimini has accepted the existence of a creator (Īśvara). But we have shown above that these two systems of philosophy have not been excluded from the list of six philosophies on such a ground.

The conclusion is therefore inevitable that to call Bauddha and Jaina philosophies "Nāstika", the third interpretation of the word "Nāstika" viz. denying the authority of the Vedas, must be accepted, for these philosophies do not accept the Vedas as eternal or as infallible. The Bauddhas accept two Pramāṇas, Pratyakṣa and Anumāna and do not accept the authority of the Vedas. In Jain philosophy Āgam (words, signs etc. of an Āpta or reliable person), has been accepted as a variety of Pramāṇa but the authority of the Vedas has not been accepted.

But this exclusion of Jain philosophy was effected at a very late stage. We find that its doctrines were attempted to be refuted in the *Vedānta-sūtras* and Kumārila and Śaṅkarāchārya levelled their arguments against certain Jain views such as existence of omniscient beings. There cannot be any doubt that all the different systems of philosophy whether the same were Āstika or Nāstika according to different interpretations were thoroughly studied and in conferences before saints, kings and scholars, discussions and refutations of various doctrines were of very frequent occurrence. We find in *Śaktisangama Tantra* (between 1555 to 1604 A.D.) that Jaina philosophy was taken as one of Kāli Darśanas. Even Jayanta Bhatta the celebrated Hindu author of *Nyāya-manjari* (9th century) accepted Jaina philosophy to be authoritative.

The name "Nyāya" came to be applied later to a system of philosophy which dealt with logic. The original name was "Ānvikṣiki" from Ānvikṣā (discussion). Fruitless Tarka Vidyā was always discouraged but that Ānvikṣikī which will lead to the attainment of a knowledge of self was always regarded as a subject to be learnt. In *Manu-saṃhitā* we find that a King should learn Ānvikṣikī. Rājaśekhara in his *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā* has mentioned that Ānvikṣikī knowledge is of two kinds, being of the nature of Pūrvapakṣa and Uttarapakṣa and that Jaina, Bauddha and Chārvāka systems are of the former and Sāṅkhya, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems are of the latter kind.



In *Chândogya Upaniṣad* (VII-1) and in *Mahābhāṣya* of Pātaṅjali, we find Nyāya philosophy named as “Vāko-vākya.” Vātsyāyana mentioned the five-limbed syllogism (for Parārthānumāna) as Nyāya. From analogy, the science propounding this has also been called Nyāya.*

The Hindu Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophies are mentioned as Yauga by Jain logicians. The Vaiśeṣika system is earlier than the Nyāya philosophy and its logical principles are accepted by the latter. “The Nyāya analyses the different ways in which our knowledge is acquired. They are said to be intuition (Pratyakṣa), inference (Anumāna), comparison (Upamāna), and verbal testimony (Śabda). Though *Pratyakṣa* originally meant sense-perception, it soon came to cover all immediate apprehension whether through the aid of senses or otherwise. It is knowledge whose instrumental cause is not knowledge (*Jñānakaraṇakam jñānam*). In inference, we require a knowledge of premises or of similarity, but such knowledge is not an antecedent condition of intuition. The word is used for the result or the apprehension of the truth as well as the process or the operation which leads to the result.

Sense-perception follows on the modification of the self, produced by the contact of the senses with their objects. Two kinds of perception are distinguished, determinate (Savikalpaka) and indeterminate (Nirvikalpaka), which correspond roughly to knowledge about and acquaintance with an object.

Inference operates neither with regard to things unknown nor with regard to that known definitely for certain; it functions only with regard to things that are doubtful. It derives a conclusion from the ascertained fact of the subject possessing a property which is constantly accompanied by another. We ascertain that the hill is on fire from the fact that the hill has smoke and smoke is universally accompanied by fire. Inferential reasoning is stated in the form of a syllogism of which the five members are: 1. Proposition (Prāṭijñā): the hill is on fire; 2. Reason (Hetu): because it smokes; 3. Example (Udāharaṇa): whatever shows smoke shows fire e.g. a kitchen; 4. Application (Upanaya): so is this hill; and 5. Conclusion (Nigamana): therefore, the hill is on fire. The first member states the thesis to be established. It is only a suggestion. It contains a subject of what is observed, which is generally an individual or a class, and a predicate, which is to be proved. The subject is the minor term (Pakṣa, Dharmin) and the predicate the major (Sādhya, Dharma). The second member of the syllogism states the presence in the minor of the middle term called ground (Hetu). The third takes us to the basis of inference, the major premise. Though Gautama and Vātsyāyana

*In *Subalopaniṣad* we find: “न्यायो मीमांसा धर्मशास्त्राणि ।”

In *Yājñavalkya Saṃhitā* we read: “पुराणन्यायमीमांसा ।”

In *Milinda-panha*, the word Nīti has been used to mean

— Nyāya: “सांख्ययोगा नीतिविसेसिका”

may not have regarded the example as the illustration of a general rule, later Nyāya looks upon it as the statement of an invariable concomitance between the mark and the character inferred (*Vyāpti-prati-pādakam Vākyaṃ*). The conclusion re-states the proposition as grounded. Nāgārjuna is given the credit for dispensing with the last two members of the syllogism as superfluous.

Universal propositions are reached through enumeration, intuition and indirect proof. Uninterrupted agreement (Niyata Sāhacharya) reinforced by absence of exceptions (Avinābhāva-rūpasambandha) leads to unconditional concomitances. Nature does not always supply us with positive and negative instances of the necessary type. In such cases indirect proof (Tarka) may be used. By pointing out the absurdities in which we are landed, if we deny a suggested hypothesis, we indirectly prove its validity. Even when we observe all possible cases and strengthen our conclusion by indirect proof we cannot reach absolute certainty. Experience of sensible particulars, however thorough and exhaustive, cannot give rise to universal relations. Gangeśa recognises the non-sensuous (Alaukika) activity involved in the apprehension of universals (Sāmānyalakṣaṇā).**

Pramāṇa is the main theme of all Nyāya philosophies. Different systems admit different number of Pramāṇas. In *Tārkika-rakṣā* (11th century) we find: "The Chārvākas accept only one Pramāṇa viz. Pratyakṣa; Kaṇāda and Buddha accept two Pramāṇas, Pratyakṣa and Anumāna; the Sāṅkhya system and some sects of Nyāya philosophy acknowledge three Pramāṇas viz. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda; some followers of the Nyāya philosophy accept four Pramāṇas—Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Śabda and Upamāna; Prabhākara (one school of Mīmāṃsā philosophy) accepts five Pramāṇas—Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda and Arthāpatti; the Bhāttas (followers of Kumārila Bhatta, another school of Mīmāṃsā philosophy) as well as the followers of the Vedānta philosophy accept six Pramāṇas viz. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda, Arthāpatti and Abhāva."†

The earliest detailed reference to the subject of Pramāṇa in Jain Nyāya is found in the *Tattvārthadhigama Sūtra* of Umāsvāmī. The twelve Angas of the Jains prevalent at the time of Śrī Mahāvīra only give a hint of Anekāntavāda but no specific reference of Pramāṇa, Naya or Sapta-bhangi is found in the same. Kundakunda in his *Pravachanasāra* has mentioned the two kinds of Pramāṇa viz Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa and the Sapta-bhangi. But these references give only the barest outlines without any definite details. For example, Kundakunda says:

* S. Radhakrishnan: *Indian Philosophy* in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 12. Page 250.

† प्रत्यक्षमेकं चार्वाकाः कणादसुगतौ पुनः ।

प्रत्यक्षमनुमानञ्च सांख्याः शब्दश्च ते अपि ॥

न्यायैकदेशिनोऽप्येवमुपमानं च केचन ।

अर्थापत्त्या सहैतानि चत्वार्याहि प्रभाकरः ॥

अभावषष्ठान्येतानि भाट्टा वेदान्तिनस्तथा ।

—*Tārkika-rakṣā* by Varadarāja.



"The knowledge of him who beholds the immaterial, the supra-sensorial in material objects (mûrtāni), and the hidden, complete (embracing) the self and the other, is called Pratyakṣa (immediate).

"The soul, in itself immaterial, goes into materiality (mûrti) and then apprehending with this material (body) the material (world), sometimes knows and sometimes does not know that—which-is-fit-for-knowledge (yogya).

"Touch, taste, smell, colour and sound are the material objects (pudgalas) for the sense-organs; the sense organs do not grasp them simultaneously.

"The sense-organs are called an exterior (para) substance, and not an innate nature of the self; how then could that which is reached by them be an immediate perception for the self ?

"Knowledge of objects from another is called indirect; but if knowledge is acquired by the soul alone (Kevala Jñāna) then it is direct."*

Kundakunda describes the sensorial joy; not supremely real of those who possess indirect knowledge (Parokṣa-Jñāna) thus :

"The lords of men, demons and Gods, oppressed by their natural (sahaja) organs of sense, unable to withstand that misery, find pleasure in satisfying objects".†

Kundakunda lays down that a soul in its perfect condition has omniscience knowing by direct intuition (pratyakṣa) substances, states etc. in all times and places without operation of senses. Parokṣa (indirect) knowledge is sense-knowledge, the senses being a material accretion to the soul.

Umāsvāmi in the *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra* made a more detailed reference to Pramāṇas and their subdivisions. Laying down the utility of Pramāṇas and Nayas as means of instruction for attaining right faith, Umāsvāmi has mentioned that "Mati, Śruta, Avadhi, Manaḥparyaya and Kevala are right knowledge"‡ and these also consist of two Pramāṇas. Mati and Śruta are taken to be Parokṣa and Avadhi, Manaḥparyaya and Kevala as Pratyakṣa. We find in Kundakunda's *Pravachana-sāra* the idea of Mati, Śruta, Avadhi and Manaḥparyaya in the following verse :

"The saint (Sādhu) has the scripture for eye; all creatures have their sense-organs for eyes; the Devas have eyes which see the remote (avadhi); but the liberated souls (siddhas) have eyes which see everywhere."§

Kundakunda's description of Kevala knowledge has already been quoted.

The oldest idea of Pramāṇa in Jainism as expounded by Umāsvāmi and as already described is that the knowledge which is derived without the help of the senses or mind is Pratyakṣa and the knowledge derived from the help of the senses or mind is Parokṣa. Among the three varieties of Pratyakṣa—Avadhi, Manaḥparyaya and Kevala, the first two cognise only objects

* *Pravachanasāra*. Śruta-skandha I. 54-58. Translation by Barrend Faddegon.

† *Ibid.* I. 63.

‡ *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra* I.9.

§ *Pravachana-sāra* III. 34. Translation by Barend Faddegon, p. 177.



having form. For this reason knowledge derived from these two kinds of Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa are called Vikala Pratyakṣa, but Kevala knowledge cognises all objects with or without form in the past, present or future and is therefore known as Sākala Pratyakṣa. Mati and Śruta are the two varieties of Parokṣa and Umāsvāmi has mentioned that Smṛiti, Sanjñā (Pratyabhijñāna), Chintā (Tarka), and Abhinibodha (Anumāna) are within Mati Jñāna (the first variety of Parokṣa).*

Samantabhadra first used the nomenclature “Nyāya” and in this respect he inaugurated a separate subject. He however did not compose any special work on Jain Nyāya. He mentions that Pramāṇa illuminates itself as well as other objects and states that the result of Pramāṇa is acceptance of desirable things, leaving undesirable things or indifference.† He has also mentioned Śruta Pramāṇa as Syādvāda and has stated Naya to be its part.‡

Siddhasena Divākara added the word “Bādhavivarjita” (without any obstruction) to the definition of Pramāṇa by Samanta-bhadra viz. that it illuminates itself as well as other objects. Though Samantabhadra used inference to establish an omniscient being in his *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* yet we find the definition of Anumāna with its subdivisions Svārtha and Parārtha for the first time in the *Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena. In this work also we get definitions of limbs of Parārthānumāna such as Pakṣa, Hetu and Dṛṣṭānta. The fallacies also have been described in the aforesaid treatise.

It is of the utmost importance to remember that except in the Jaina Nyāya, we nowhere find knowledge derived from the senses being called Parokṣa Pramāṇa. In Hindu Nyāya philosophy and in all other Hindu Śāstras, knowledge derived from the senses is known as Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa. Akalanka the greatest of Jain logicians attempted to reconcile this in the following way. He accepted Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa as two Pramāṇas but instead of dividing Pratyakṣa into Sākala and Vikala, he laid down two hitherto unknown divisions viz. Sāmvyavahārika and Mukhya Pratyakṣa.δ

* मतिः स्मृतिः संज्ञा चिन्ताभिनिबोध इत्यनर्थान्तरम् ।

—*Tattvārthadhigama Sūtra*.

† उपेक्षा फलमाद्यस्य शेषस्यादानहानघीः ।

—*Āpta-mīmāṃsā* Verse 102.

‡ स्याद्वाद-प्रविभक्तार्थे विशेषव्यञ्जको नयः ।

—*Ibid* Verse 106.

δ प्रत्यक्षं विशदं ज्ञानं मुख्यसांख्यवहारिकम् ।

परोक्षं शेषविज्ञानं प्रमाणमिति संग्रहः ॥

—*Laghiyastraya* Verse 93



He further laid down that Mati Jñāna derived through the senses and mind is not Parokṣa but Sāmvyavahārika Pratyakṣa.* As Mati came to be recognised as Sāmvyavahārika Pratyakṣa, its corelated Smṛiti, Sanjñā, Chintā and Abhinibodha as mentioned by Umāsvāmi also came under the same head. But a subtle distinction was made by Akalanka. He subdivided Sāmvyavahārika Pratyakṣa into two heads (a) Indriya-pratyakṣa (knowledge derived through the senses) under which came Mati and (b) Anendriya-pratyakṣa (knowledge derived through mind) under which came Smṛiti, Sanjñā, Chintā and Abhinibodha as mind is prevalent in these four. This change necessitated a change of definition of Pratyakṣa and Akalanka accordingly defined Pratyakṣa as "clear knowledge." (*Pratyaksam viśadam jñānam*).

Now, to meet the argument that if we take Mati as Pratyakṣa we must say that the traditional acceptance of the view that it is Parokṣa is denied, undermining the oldest authorities like Umāsvāmi. Akalanka has written that Mati, Smṛiti, Sanjñā, Chintā and Abhinibodha will be Pratyakṣa so long as these remain in the mental state. The moment these are connected with words, i.e. are expressed in words, they will become Parokṣa.† Thus, Akalanka has accepted Mati etc. as Pratyakṣa in one sense and Parokṣa in another sense. According to Akalanka, Śruta is what is heard and so the knowledge derived through words is Śruta and the knowledge having no connection with words is Sāmvyavahārika Pratyakṣa.

The peculiarity of Akalanka is that under Śruta in Parokṣa Pramāṇa he has two subdivisions—Akṣarātmaka and Anākṣarātmaka. Other Jain logicians have mentioned that Anumāna (inference) is of two kinds, Svārthānumāna (inference for one's own self) and Parārthānumāna (inference for the sake of others). Akalanka says that it is not inference alone that has these two subdivisions but other Pramāṇas also may be for Svārtha and Parārtha. Svārthānumāna is accepted by Akalanka to be included in Anākṣarātmaka Śruta Pramāṇa, as no help of words is necessary for its acceptance; and Parārthānumāna according to Akalanka comes within Akṣarātmaka Anumāna, as this cannot arise without help of words. The Pramāṇas Arthāpatti, Āgama etc are all recognised by Akalanka to be varieties of Śruta Pramāṇa.

The tables on the next page will illustrate the difference between the divisions of Pramāṇa by the oldest writers such as Umāsvāmi and Akalanka.

* आद्ये परोक्षमपरं प्रत्यक्षं प्राहुरंजसा ।
केवलं लोकबुद्धयेव मतेर्लक्षणसंग्रहः ॥


—Nyāya Viniścaya Verse 1

† ज्ञानमाद्यं मतिः संज्ञा चिन्ता चाभिनिवोधनम् ।
प्राङ्नामयोजनाचक्षेपं श्रुतं शब्दानुयोजनात् ॥


—Laghyastraya



1. Pramāṇa (according to Akalanka)



2. Pramāṇa (according to Umāsvāmi)



The writers who followed Akalanka (such as Ananta-vīrya, Vidyānanda etc.) did not accept Smṛiti etc. as Anendriya-pratyakṣa, though in one sense they were ready to accept knowledge derived through the senses to be Sāmvayavahārika Pratyakṣa.

Māṇikyanandi in his *Parikṣāmukham* has closely followed the views of Akalanka. Before the time of Māṇikyanandi, Pramāṇa was defined as "Svaparavyavasāyi jñāna" (valid knowledge of itself and others). Māṇikyanandi added the word "Apūrva" (not proved before) in the definition. Akalanka has mentioned the same thing by the word "Anadhi-gatārthagrahi".* A verse (the author of which has not been identified) in Mīmāṃsā philosophy shows that the element "Apūrva" was accepted as essential to Pramāṇa in that philosophy also.†

Māṇikyanandi has not followed Jaināgama by including Avagraha etc. within knowledge. He has mentioned Āgama in place of Śruta Pramāṇa and has placed it under Parokṣa Pramāṇa.

The use of 'Vyavasāya' or 'Nīśchaya' in the definition of Pramāṇa as used by Māṇikyanandi is to differentiate the Jain view from that of the Buddhists who do not accept this to be essential in Pramāṇa. Some Buddhist philosophers also deny the existence of external objects. To differentiate the Jain view the word "Artha" has been introduced in the definition of Pramāṇa by Māṇikyanandi.

There are four sects of Buddhist philosophers: 1. Mādhyamika 2. Yogācāra 3. Sautrāntika and 4. Vaibhāṣika. § Those who maintain that everything is void are Mādhyamikas or Śūnyavādins or Nihilists. Those who maintain the reality of everything are known as Sarvāstivādins or Realists divided into two groups (a) Sautrāntikas and (b) Vaibhāṣikas. Those who maintain that thought only is real are known as Vijñānavādins or Idealists.

Śāṅkarācārya in his Bhāṣya on *Vedānta Sūtra* II. 2-18 writes that the difference of views arose either from expounding different views at different times by Buddha or from the different views adopted by the disciples of Buddha. Śāṅkarācārya mentions that there are three kinds of disciples known as Sarvāstivādins, Vijñānavādins and Sarvaśūnyatāvādins. Bāhaspati Miśra in his commentary *Bhāmati* on the same Sūtra says "Disciples have great, medium or little intelligence. Those who have little intelligence descend into Nihilism following the existence of everything. Those who have medium intellect descend into Nihilism following the view that thought only is real. Those who have great intellectual capacity grasp

* प्रमाणमविसंवादि ज्ञानम् अनधिगतार्थाधिगमलक्षणत्वात् ।

—*Aṣṭa-śati*

† तत्रापूर्वार्थविज्ञानं निश्चितं बाधवर्जितम् ।

अदुष्टकारणारब्धं प्रमाणं लोकसम्मतम् ॥

§ बुद्धस्य हि मध्यमिक-योगाचार-सौत्रान्तिक-वैभाषिक-संज्ञकाश्चत्वारः शिष्याः ।

—*Brahma-Vidyābharāṇa*

Nihilism without any intermediate hold of anything". The following verse from *Bodhicharyāvatāra* is quoted in the *Bhāmati* :

देशना लोकनाथानां सत्वाशयवशानुगाः ।

भिद्यन्ते बहुधा लोक उपायैर्बहुभिः पुनः ॥

गंभीरोत्तानभेदेन क्वचिच्चोभयलक्षणा ।

भिन्नापि देशनाभिन्ना शून्यताद्वयलक्षणा ।*

The view of Sarvāstivādin (Realists) who maintain that everything whether external or internal is real is thus described by Śāṅkarācārya. "What is external is either element (Bhūta) or elementary (Bhautika); What is internal is either mind (Chitta) or mental (Chaitta). The elements are earth, water and so on; elementals are colour etc. on the one hand, and the eye and the other sense-organs on the other hand. Earth and the other three elements arise from the aggregation of the four different kinds of atoms; the atoms of earth being hard, those of water viscid, those of fire hot, those of air mobile.

The inward world consists of the five so-called 'groups' (skandha), the group of sensation (rūpaskandha), the group of knowledge (vijñānaskandha), the group of feeling (vedanā-skandha) the group of verbal knowledge (saṃjñāskandha) and the group of impressions (saṃskāra-skandha); which taken together constitute the basis of all personal existence"†.

The Skandhas are thus described in the following note of Dr. Thibaut to the above. This will explain the Ālayavijñāna and Pravṛttivijñāna :

"The rūpaskandha comprises the senses and their objects, colour etc.; the sense-organs were above called Bhautika, they here reappear as Chaittika on account of their connection with thought. Their objects likewise are classed as Chaittika in so far as they are perceived by the senses. The vijñāna-skandha comprises the series of self-cognitions (*ahamāhaṃ ityālayavijñāna-pravāḥ*) according to all commentators; and in addition according to *Brahmaśāstra*, the knowledge determinate and indeterminate of external things (*savikalpakaṃ nirvikalpakanca pravṛttivijñānasangitaṃ*). The vedanāskandha comprises pleasure, pain etc. The saṃjñāskandha comprises the cognition of things by their names (*Gaurāṣṭa ityādi-Śabda-saṅkalpita-pratyayaḥ*, *Ananda Giri*; *Gaurāṣṭa ityevaṃ nāmaśiṣṭa-savikalpāḥ pratyayaḥ*, *Go. Au*; *Sanjñā Yajñadattādīpāda-tadullekhi savikalpapratyayo vā dvitīyapakṣe vijñānapadena savikalpapratyayo na grāhyah*). The Saṃskāras-

* The instructions of the preceptors of people follow the inclination of their souls and so differ in many ways by various means. Sometimes the instructions are deep, and sometimes superficial. Sometimes these are of both the above kinds. Though these are different, really they are not different being characterised by Śūnyatā (Nihilism).

† The above is Dr. Thibaut's translation of *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* to *Vedānta Sūtra* II. 2. 18 :

सर्वास्तित्ववादिनो बाह्यमान्तरञ्च वस्त्वभ्युपगच्छन्ति, भूतं भौतिकं चित्तं चैतञ्च । तत्र भूतं पृथिवीधात्वादयः, भौतिकं रूपादयश्चक्षुरादयश्च । चतुष्टये च पृथिव्यादिपरमाणवः खरस्नेहोष्णरणस्वभावास्ते पृथिव्यादिभावेन संहन्यन्ते इति मन्यन्ते । तथा रूपविज्ञानवेदना-संस्कारसंज्ञकाः पञ्च स्कन्धाः तैज्याधातुं सर्वव्यवहारास्पदभावेन संहन्यन्ते इति मन्यन्ते ।

kandha comprises passion, aversion etc. dharma and adharma....The Vijñānaskandha is Chitta, the other skandhas Chaitta.”*

II

The title of the work *Parīkṣāmukham* is thus derived according to the author of *Nyāyamañidīpika*: “Parīkṣa or Tarka is the discussion used in finding out the strength or weakness of various arguments which are opposed to one another. ‘Pari’ means ‘full’ and ‘Ikṣaṇam’ means ‘discussion’ (of subjects). ‘Amukha’ means ‘the entrance’ to those who want to understand this subject. This work (*Parīkṣāmukham*) is like such a door.”†

Another derivation is also suggested by the same writer as follows: “As examination of all objects is made by Pramāṇa so Pramāṇa is the first thing (*Āmukha*) in Parīkṣa (discussion). Here the work itself describing Pramāṇa (which is *Parīkṣāmukham*) is also titled in the same name. As ascertainment is made by Pramāṇas leaving aside fallacies, discussion goes on with the help of Pramāṇas by those engaged in arguments. So the name *Parīkṣāmukham* of this work is justified.”‡

Nothing in detail is known about Māṇikyanandi, the author of *Parīkṣāmukham*. In the *Viśvaśa* (a Bengali encyclopaedia) it is mentioned “According to the Pattāvali of the Sarasvatī Gaṇḍha of the Digamvaras, Māṇikyanandi became Pattadhara in 585 Vikrama Samvat (523 A.D.). Before he became a Pattadhara that is to say, in the beginning of the 6th century, Māṇikyanandi wrote *Parīkṣāmukham*.”

This view is untenable. It is accepted by everyone that Māṇikyanandi was later than Akalanka and that he based his work on Akalanka’s writings. Anantavīrya, the author of *Prameya-ratna-mālā* a commentary on *Parīkṣāmukham* begins his work by saluting Māṇikyanandi in this manner:

Salutation to that Māṇikyanandi who has churned the nectar of the knowledge of Nyāya from the ocean of the words of Akalanka.§

In *Nyāyamañi-dīpika*, a commentary on *Prameya-ratna-mālā* we find:

* Sacred Books of the East. Vol. XXXIV, page 404.


† अन्योन्यविरुद्ध-नानाव्युक्तिप्रावल्यावधारणाय प्रवर्तमानो विचारः परीक्षा तर्क इति । ‘परि’ समन्तादशेष निःशेषतः ‘ईक्षणं’ विचारणं यत्र अर्थानाम् इति व्युत्पत्तेः । तस्य ‘आमुखं’ तद्व्युत्पत्तौ प्रवेशार्थिनां प्रवेशद्वारमिदं प्रकरणम् ।

‡ अथवा समस्तप्रमेयजालपरीक्षायाः प्रमाणपूर्वकत्वात् प्रमाणं परीक्षामुखम् । अत्र मुख-शब्दस्य प्रथमार्थवाचित्वात् प्रमाणप्रतिपादकं प्रकरणमपि परीक्षामुखमित्युच्यते । प्रमाण-निश्चयस्यापि एतत् प्रकरणपूर्वकत्वात् तदाभासव्यावृत्त्या निश्चितं हि प्रमाणं पुरस्कृत्य परीक्षा क्रियते प्रेक्षापूर्वकारिभिरिति प्रकरणस्य परीक्षामुखनामधेयमनुपचरितम् ।

—*Nyāyamañi-dīpikā*, a commentary on *Prameya-ratna-mālā*.

§ अकलंकवचोऽम्मोघेरुद्धे येन धीमता ।

न्यायविद्यामृतं तस्मै नमो माणिक्यनन्दिने ॥



Bhatta Akalanka Deva promulgated the influence of the true religion by the weapon of arguments delighting the hearts of all scholars of the world in the court of King Hima-śītala. . . . Afterwards the great sage Māṇikyanandi wrote the *Parikṣāmukham* culling the subject matter from the ocean of the śāstra written by him (Akalanka). This work (of Māṇikyanandi) is like a vessel to cross the ocean (of the work of Akalanka)*

Prabhāchandra the author of *Prameyakamalamārtanḍa* has written :

As the subject as laid down by Akalanka could be understood only by the wise, the Āchārya (Māṇikyanandi) composed the Prakaraṇa to explain that subject quoting the same with the object of laying down the same and wishing to explain the same (to all)†

There are differences of opinion as to the time during which Akalanka flourished. In *Ārādhana-kathā-koṣa* (15th or 16th century A.D.), Akalanka is described as the son of the minister of Śubhatunga, the King of Mānyakheta. It is also mentioned that there was a discussion in the court of King Himaśītala between him and the Buddhists. In the Malliṣeṇa Praśasti in Sravana Belgola the latter incident is supported. It is also mentioned therein that Akalanka visited the court of King Sāhasatunga. Dr. Satish Chandra Vidyābhuṣana has taken Śubhatunga or Sāhasatunga as Kṛṣṇarāja I of the Rāstrakūṭa dynasty.† Pandit Nathuram Premi following this view has mentioned that the time of Akalanka was from Vikram Samvat 810 to 832 (753 to 775 A.D.)§ Dr. K. B. Pathak holds the view that Akalanka was a contemporary of Sāhasatunga Dantidurga. B. Kamta Prasad Jain criticising the view of Mr. Premi, has accepted the view that Sāhasatunga was none other than Dantidurga who reigned from 744 to 759 A.D. and has suggested that the time of Akalanka was from 744 to 782 A.D. B. Kamata Prasad has given arguments to support his view in his article in Hindi entitled *Śrī Bhattākalanka Deva* published in *Jain Siddhānta Bhāskar* Vol. III Part 4. This view has however been ably refuted by Pandit Kailāsh Chandra Sāstrī in his article *Bhattākalanka kā Samaya* printed in the same journal (Vol. IV Part 3).

The first argument of B. Kamtaprasad is that Akalanka has been mentioned by Jinasena in his *Harivaṃśapurāṇa* and two verses have been

*सकलराजाधिराजापरमेश्वरस्य हिमशीतलस्य य महाराजस्य महास्थानमध्येभगवान् भट्टाकलंकदेवो विश्वविद्वन्मण्डलहृदयाह्लादियुक्तिशास्त्रेण जगत्सद्धर्मप्रभावमवबुधतमाम् । तदनु.....माणिक्यनंदिमुनिवृन्दारकस्तत्प्रकाशितशास्त्रमहोदधेरुद्धृत्य तदवगाहनाय पोतोपमं 'परीक्षामुखं' नामधेयमन्वर्थमुद्बुधत्प्रकरणमारचयन् मुदा ।

—*Nyāyamaṇḍīpikā*

†श्रीमदकलंकार्थोऽव्युत्पन्नप्रज्ञैरवगन्तुं न शक्यत इति तदव्युत्पादनाय करतलामलकवत् तदर्थमुद्धृत्य प्रतिपादयितुकामस्तत्परिज्ञानानुग्रहेच्छाप्रेरितस्तदर्थप्रतिपादनप्रवर्णं प्रकरणमिदमाचार्यः प्राह ।

—*Prameya-kamala-mārtanda*.

‡ Māṇikyanandi was a Digamvara author....As his work is based on that of Akalanka, he must have lived after 750 A.D..... Māṇikyanandi seems to have lived about 800 A.D."

—*History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic*, Page 28.

§ *Jain Hitaishi*, Part II, Page 428.

quoted in support of this view* and it is also mentioned that Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar is of the same view.† It has however been pointed out by Pandit Kailash Chandra Sāstrī that it is not correct to interpret the word 'Deva' in the first verse to mean Akalanka. It really refers to Devanandi alias Pujiyapāda the author of *Jainendra Vyākaraṇa*. In the second verse it is merely mentioned that the fame of Vīrasena is *akalanka* (free from any flaw). It has no connection with the author 'Akalanka'. Had Jināsena any desire to eulogise Akalanka, he would have done this in an unambiguous manner.

It is however not disputed by Pandit Sāstrī that Jināsena was a writer later than Akalanka. Vidyānanda in his *Aṣṭasahasri*, a commentary on Akalanka's *Aṣṭasati* has mentioned Kumārasena. This Kumārasena has also been mentioned in *Harivaṃśapurāṇa* of Jināsena. Prabhāchandra, a commentator on *Parikṣāmukham* is mentioned in the *Ādipurāṇa* of Jināsena. as undoubtedly later than Māṇikyanandi who followed Akalanka. The next argument of B. Kamtaprasad is that Akalanka was later than Dharmakīrti, the Buddhist philosopher who flourished in the beginning of the seventh century (635 to 650 A.D. approximately) Pandit Sāstrī admits this and gives examples showing that Akalanka has quoted and refuted the views of Dharma-kīrti. Pandit Sāstrī however is unable to accept the conclusion of B. Kamtaprasad from this fact that Akalanka was at least hundred years later than Dharmakīrti, for it is urged that even contemporary writers can quote and refute each other's views and many examples can be given of such refutations.

Dr. K. B. Pathak has mentioned that as Kumārila Bhatta has attacked some of the views of Samantabhadra and Akalanka, it must be supposed that he was a contemporary of those writers and lived even after the death of Akalanka. In his article discussing the date of Samanta-bhadra,‡ he has mentioned that the refutations of each other's views by Kumārila and Akalanka took place at the latter half of the eighth century A.D. B. Kamtaprasad has accepted this view and lays down that the time of Kumārila is 700 to 760 A.D. Pandit Sāstrī points out that how can it be possible that Kumārila lived even after the death of Akalanka as Kumārila according to B. Kamtaprasad (following Dr. K. B. Pathak) lived only up to 760 A.D. ? Further, Pandit Sāstrī is unable to accept this date of Kumārila without satisfactory proof, but is willing to accept that Kumārila existed during the later part of the seventh century, refuting the view of Dr. K. B. Pathak that Kumārila flourished in the 8th century§.

*इन्द्रचन्द्रार्कजैनेन्द्रव्याडिव्याकरणेक्षिणः ।

देवस्य देवसंघस्य न वन्द्यते गिरः कथम् ॥ Verse 31.

वीरसेनगुरोः कीर्तिरकलंकावभासते । Verse 39.

† *Principal Results of my last two years studies in Sanskrit Mss. Literature* by R. G. Bhandarkar (Wier, 1889) Page 31.

‡ *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol II. p. 141.

§ *Ibid* Vol. XIII, p. 157



In the work *Akalanka-charitra* it is mentioned that in 700 Vikrama Samvat (643 A.D.) there was a great discussion between Akalanka and the Buddhists. Pandit Sāstrī points out that B. Kamta Prasad has taken the date as saka 700 but it is clear from the Sanskrit verse that Vikram Samvat is referred therein*.

Pandit Sāstrī holds the view that Akalanka flourished in the middle of the 7th century. After criticising the views of B. Kamtaprasad, Dr. Pathak, Dr. Bhandarkar, and Dr. S. C. Vidyābhuṣaṇa as mentioned above, he mentions the following evidence regarding the time of Akalanka :

Siddhasena Gaṇi has written a commentary on the *Tattvārtha Bhāṣya*. Siddhasena has mentioned Dharmakīrti (7th century). Silāṅka (9th century) has mentioned Siddhasena as Gandhahasti. The date of Siddhasena therefore lies between these broad periods. Siddhasena has mentioned the work *Siddhi-viniścaya* of Akalanka in his *Tattvārtha Bhāṣya Tikā*.

Jinadāsa Gaṇi Mahottar composed a Churṇi on *Niśītha-sūtra*. In a Mss. of this work, the date of its composition is mentioned as Śāka Samvat 598 (676 A.D.). Jinadāsa has mentioned the work *Siddhi-viniścaya* of Akalanka. So Akalanka cannot have flourished later than 676 A.D.

Pandit Sāstrī quotes the following internal evidence from Akalanka's works which may be valuable to ascertain his date.

Dignāga the celebrated Buddhist philosopher in laying down the definition of Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa has mentioned that Pratyakṣa is 'Kalpanābodha.' Dharmakīrti who was later than Dignāga added 'Abhrānta' to it, in defining Pratyakṣa. Akalanka in his *Tattvārtha-rājavārtikā* has criticised the definition of Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa as laid down by Dignāga. A verse from Dignāga's *Pramāṇa-samuchchaya* has also been quoted by Akalanka.†

Pandit Sāstrī is of opinion that as Akalanka has not criticised Dharmakīrti's definition of Pramāṇa in his *Tattvārtha-rāja-vārtikā*, though he criticised views of Dharmakīrti in his other works, we may infer that Dharmakīrti's works *Pramāṇavārtikā*, *Pramāṇa-viniścaya* etc. were composed later than *Tattvārtha-rāja-vārtikā*. In *Tattvārtha-rāja-vārtikā* Akalanka has quoted a verse which is said to be the first verse of the Prakaraṇa entitled 'Santānantara-siddhi' of Dharmakīrti.‡ Pandit Sāstrī holds the view that as Dharmakīrti flourished from 635 to 650 A.D., Akalanka's date can be ascertained from this.

* विक्रमार्कशताब्दीयशतसप्तप्रमाजुषि ।

कालेऽकलंकपतिनो बौद्धैर्बादो महानभूत ॥

—*Epigraphia Carnatica* II. Introduction.

† प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढ नामजात्यादियोजना ।

असाधारणहेतुत्वादक्षैस्तद्व्यपदिश्यते ॥

—*Pramāṇa-samuchchaya* by Dignāga.

‡ बुद्धिपूर्वां क्रिया दृष्ट्वा स्वदेहेऽन्यत्र तदग्रहात् ।

मन्यते बुद्धिसद्भावं सा न येषु न तेषु धीः ॥

—*Tattvārtharāja-vārtikā*. p. 19.



Akalanka has also quoted from the work *Abhidharmakośa* of Vāsubandhu.*

Pandit Śāstrī concludes from the above that Dharmakīrti flourished from 635 to 650 A.D. and that Akalanka lived in the middle of the 7th century A.D.

In my opinion, no great help is derived from the internal evidence namely that Akalanka has mentioned Dharmakīrti, Vāsubandhu or Dignāga. There is a view that Vāsubandhu and Dignāga were contemporaries. Udyotakara in his *Nyāyavārtikā* refuted the views of Dignāga while discussing Prameya of *Anumāna-Pramāṇa*. Udyotakara has also mentioned Dharmakīrti and Vinīta-deva in *Nyāyavārtikā*. This Udyotakara has been mentioned by Subandhu the author of *Vāsavadattā*.† Subandhu was earlier than Bāṇabhatta who lived in the court of king Harṣavardhana of Kanauj (beginning of the 7th century). Bāṇabhatta has praised the work *Vāsavadattā* in his work *Harṣacharita*.‡ Thus only this much can be mentioned with certainty that Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Vasubandhu could not have flourished later than the sixth century. Dr. Jacobi says "He (Udyotakara) may therefore have flourished in the early part of the sixth century or still earlier"§.

But Vasubandhu and Dignāga might have lived long before the 6th century A.D. Yuan Chwang who came to Nālandā Vihāra in 637 A.D. has written that within a thousand years from the death or the Nirvāṇa of Buddha, Monaratha and his disciple Vasubandhu lived. Thomas Watters writes: "According to Yuan-Chwang, Manoratha flourished...within 1,000 years after the decease of Buddha. This, taking the Chinese reckoning, would place the date of the Śāstra-master before 150 A.D.". Samuel Beal in his note to the above passage has written that at that time the Chinese Buddhists accepted the date of Nirvāṇa of Buddha as 850 B.C. On this calculation the date of Vasubandhu will fall in the 2nd century B.C. Dignāga accordingly will be of the same date.

The commentator Mallinātha has mentioned, while explaining a verse in Kalidāsa's *Meghadūta*, that Dignāga was a contemporary of Kalidāsa. This view has however not been generally accepted.

It is difficult to lay down definitely as has been done by Pandit Śāstrī that because Akalanka has criticised the definition of only Dignāga and not that of Dharmakīrti in his *Tattvārtharajavārtikā*, we should conclude that the work *Pramāṇaviniśchaya* of Dharmakīrti was not then written. In our

*सवितर्कविचारा हि पञ्च विज्ञानधातवः ।

निरूपणानुस्मरणविकल्पनविकल्पकाः ॥

—*Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu.

† न्यायस्थितिमिव उद्योत्कर-स्वरूपम् । —*Vāsavadattā*

‡ कवीनामगलहर्षो नूनं वासवदत्तया । —*Harṣacharitaṃ*

§ *The Dates of the Philosophical Sūtras of the Brahmanas* by Hermann Jacobi (Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. XXXI, 1911.).

opinion, it is very unsafe to draw such a conclusion from only this material, specially as Pandit Śāstrī himself shows that Akalanka named his work 'Nyāya-viniśchaya' on the line of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-viniśchaya* and the views of Dharmakīrti have been refuted in other works of Akalanka.

Kumārila Bhatta was not referred to in the *Nyāya Vārtikā* of Udyotakara. This may support the view of Pandit Śāstrī that Kumārila Bhatta was not at least earlier than the 7th century A.D.

A. B. Keith in his *Karma-Mimāṃsā*, pp. 10-11 writes : "Kumārila's date is determinable within definite limits; he used the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartrihari; neither Hieun-Thsang nor It-sing mentions him; he was before Śankara; he attacked the Jain theory of an omniscient being as propounded in the *Āpta-mimāṃsā* of Samanta-bhadra, but is not answered by Akalanka in his *Aśṭasati* which comments on the *Āpta-mimāṃsā*. On the other hand he is freely attacked by Vidyānanda and Prabhāchandra who both lived before 838 A.D. Vidyānanda assures us, doubtless correctly, that he criticised the Buddhist Dharmakīrti and Prabhākara, on the latter point agreeing with the result above arrived from internal evidence. The upper limit is therefore, not earlier than 700 A.D. The lower limit depends on his precise chronological relation to Śankara and the latter's exact date. Later tradition, the Śankara-vijayas of Mādhava and the pseudo-Ānandagiri would make him an older contemporary, but the interval may have been considerably longer".

We agree with the views of Pandit Śāstrī regarding his conclusion about the time of Akalanka so far as materials are available up to the present.

We have dealt with the date of Akalanka in detail as we have no other date for fixing the date of Maṇikyanandi, who we only know flourished later than Akalanka and based his work on Akalanka's writings. From what has already been discussed, we may infer that Maṇikyanandi flourished during the end of the 7th or the beginning of the 8th century A.D. He has mentioned the Chārvāka school of philosophy as well as the Buddhist, Sāṅkhya and Nyāya-vaiśeṣika systems of philosophy and Prabhākara and Jaimini.

III

Prabhāchandra was the most celebrated commentator of *Parikṣāmukham*. His work is entitled *Prameya-kamala-mārtanda*. This Prabhāchandra has been mentioned by Jināsena in *Ādipurāṇa* (838 A.D.) in the following verse :

I praise Prabhāchandra the poet whose fame is white as the rays of the moon and who has encompassed the whole world by making 'Chandrodaya' ('rising of the moon'; another meaning 'the work entitled *Kumudachandrodaya*')*

*चन्द्रांशुशुभ्रयशसं प्रभाचन्द्रं कविं स्तुवे ।
कृत्वा चन्द्रोदयं येन शश्वदाच्छादितं जगत् ॥

—*Ādi-purāṇa*.

Jināsena lived in the court of Amoghavarṣa I who reigned according to Vincent Smith from 815 to 877 A. D. (*Early History of India*, Page. 328.)

Prabhāchandra saluted Māṇikyanandi at the beginning of *Prameya-kamala-mātāṇḍa**.

Prabhāchandra's commentary is specially valuable as it quotes the views of various Hindu and Buddhist writers on Nyāya philosophy and criticising the same, establishes the Jain view.

The most widely read commentary of *Parikṣā-mukham* is *Prameya-ratnamālā*. The writer of this is Ananta-vīrya who also wrote commentaries of Akalanka's works. Prabhāchandra has mentioned at the beginning of the fourth Chapter of his *Nyāya-kumudachandra* that he has been able to study and discuss many times through the writings of Anantavīrya, the difficult expositions of Akalanka imparting a knowledge of all objects in the three worlds†. Vādirāja Sūri in his *Nyāya-viṇśaya-vivaraṇa* writes that at every step the deep meaning of Akalanka's writing has been illuminated by the writings of Anantavīrya like a lamp‡.

Though such a great writer, Anantavīrya professed utmost humility in saying at the beginning of his commentary on *Siddhivinīśchaya*: "It is a great wonder that even Anantavīrya (in another sense 'one who has infinite power') is unable to explain fully the meaning of the work of Akalanka"§.

In his commentary on *Siddhivinīśchaya*, Anantavīrya has mentioned Dharmottara, Prajñākar and Archata. The date of Archata, the author of the commentary on *Hetu-vindu*, is according to Rāhula Sankrityāyana 825 A.D. Ananta-vīrya must have therefore flourished not earlier than the 9th century A.D.

In *Prameyaratnamālā*, Anantavīrya has referred to Dharmakīrti, Vyāsa Patanjali, Avadhuta and Manu. He has mentioned the works *Āpta-parikṣā Devāgamālankāra* also known as *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* by Samanta-bhadra and Naya-chakra. He has quoted from the Vedas and *Sāṅkhya-kārika* of Iśvara-kṛiṣṇa.

*शास्त्रं करोमि वरमल्पतरावबोधो
माणिक्यनन्दिपदपंकजसत्प्रसादात् ।
अर्थं किं न स्फुटयति प्रकृतं लघीयां-
ल्लोकस्य भानुकरविस्फुरिताद् गवाक्षः ॥

—*Prameyakamala-mātāṇḍa*.

†त्रैलोक्योदरवर्त्तिवस्तुविषयज्ञानप्रभावोदयो
दुष्प्रापोऽप्यकलंकदेवसरणिः प्राप्तोऽत्र पुण्योदयात् ।
स्वभ्यस्तश्च विवेचितश्च शतशः सोऽनन्तवीर्योक्तिस्तो
भूयान्मे नयनीतिदत्तमनसस्तद्बोधसिद्धिप्रदः ॥

‡गूढमर्थमकलंकवाङ्मयागाधभूमिनिहितं तदर्थिनाम् ।
व्यञ्जयत्यमलमनन्तवीर्यवाकदीपवर्त्तिरनिशं पदे पदे ॥

§देवस्यानन्तवीर्योऽपि पदं व्यक्तुं तु सर्वतः ।
न जानीतेऽकलंकस्य चित्रमेतद् परं भुवि ॥



Sāyana-Mādhava in his *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* while explaining Saptabhaṅgi naya of Arhata Darśana has quoted Ananta-vīrya.*

Ananta-vīrya has mentioned Prabhāchandra in the beginning of his work : "When there is a moon like the work of Prabhāchandra, how can I resembling a fire-fly expect to be counted ?"†

It is mentioned in the beginning of *Prameya-ratna-mālā* that this commentary, 'Panchikā' on *Parikṣāmukhaṃ* was composed for study of Śāntiṣeṇa, at the request of Hīrapa the favourite son of Vaijeya. At the colophon of this work it is mentioned that Vaijeya was born in the family of Vadaripāla. His wife was Nāṇāmba who was also known as Revatī, Prabhāvatī and Prathitāmbikā. Hīrapa was their son. At his request, Anantavīrya has cleared the meaning of the work of Māṇikyā-nandi.‡

Prameyakamalamārtanḍa being a voluminous work and full of discussions regarding views of logicians other than Jain logicians, could not easily be tackled by those who wanted to learn the subject-matter only of *Parikṣāmukham*. *Prameya-ratna-mālā* satisfied their want, being a shorter and simpler work, though it briefly alluded to the views of other logicians wherever necessary. Many expositions of this commentary *Prameyaratnamālā* were written. Three of these are preserved in Jain Siddhānta Bhavan, Arrah.

The first is *Arthaprakāśika*. In the verses at the beginning it is mentioned that it is written by Panditāchārya (no specific name being given). Some attribute it (without however any definite proof) to Chārūkīrti. There were several Chārūkīrtis and nothing definite can be said as to who really was the author of this treatise. The *Mangalā-charaṇa*, the colophon and a

* तत्सर्वमनन्तवीर्यः प्रत्यपीपदत्—
तद्विधानविवक्षायां स्यादस्तीति गतिर्भवेत् ।
स्यान्नास्तीति प्रयोगः स्यात्तन्निषेधे विवक्षिते ॥
क्रमेणोभयवाञ्छायां प्रयोगः समुदायभाक् ।
युगपत्तद्विवक्षायां स्यादवाच्यमशक्तितः ॥
आद्यावाच्यविवक्षायां पञ्चमो भंग इष्यते ।
अन्त्यावाच्यविवक्षायां षष्ठभंगसमुद्भवः ॥
समुच्चयेन युक्तश्च सप्तमो भंग उच्यते ॥ इति ।

† प्रभेन्दुवचनोदारचन्द्रिकाप्रसारे सति ।
मादृशाः क्व नु गण्यन्ते ज्योतिरिङ्गणसन्निभा ॥

‡ श्रोमान् वैजेयनामाभूदग्रणीगुणशालिनाम् ।
वदरीपालवंशालिव्योमद्युमणिर्हजितः ॥
तदीयपत्नी भुवि विश्रुतासीन्नाणाम्बनाम्ना गुणशीलसीमा ।
यां रेवतीति प्रथिताम्बिकेति प्रभावतीति प्रवदन्ति सन्तः ॥
तस्यामभूद्विश्वजनीनवृत्तिर्दानाम्बुवाहो भूवि हीरपारव्यः ।
स्वगोत्रविस्तारनभोऽंशुमाली सम्यक्त्वरत्नाभरणाच्चितांगः ॥
तस्योपरोधवशतो विशदोरुकीर्त्तमणिक्वन्दिकृतशास्त्रमगाधबोधम् ।
स्पष्टीकृतं कतिपयैर्वचनैरुदारैर्वालिप्रबोधकरमेतदनन्तवीर्यैः ॥



portion from the middle of this work have been printed from the Mss. in Jain Siddhānta Bhāskara.

The second is *Prameya-ratna-mālā-lankāra*. After saluting Akalanka and Māṇikyanandi, the author praises Prabhāchandra the author of *Prameya-kamalamārtanda*. The author then mentions his name as Chāru-kīrti and the name of the work as *Prameyaratnamālālankāra*. From the colophon of this work we learn that this Chārukīrti resided in Sravana Belgola (where the world-renowned image of Gommateśvara exists) and belonged to Deśi Gaṇa. Gommateśvara or Vāhuvali is saluted in two verses at the end.

Pandit Bhujavali is of opinion that it is very probable that this Chārukīrti was the author of the same name who composed commentaries on *Parśvābhyudaya*, *Chandraprabhā kāvyā*, *Ādīpurāṇa*, *Yasodharācharita*, *Neminirvāṇa* etc. The Pattādhīśas of Sravana Belgola are all known by the common name of Chārukīrti. So it is difficult to settle who this particular person was.

The Mangalācharaṇa, the colophon and some portions from the middle of this manuscript have been printed in Jain Siddhānta Bhāskar, Vol. I.

The third work is *Nyāyamañidīpika*. Two Mss. of the work are preserved in Jain Siddhānta Bhavan, Arrah. The name of the author is not found in the Mss. Pandit Subayyā Śāstrī says that in some palm leaf Mss. of this work, the name of the writer is mentioned as Ajitasenāchārya. Pandit K. Bhujavali Śāstrī says that this is supported by "Catalogue of Saṃskṛit and Prākṛita Manuscripts in the Central Provinces, by R.B. Hiralal B.A. Appendix B."

The author has made obeisance to Akalanka, Anantavīrya, Māṇikyanandi and Prabhāchandra in the Mangalācharaṇa of his work*. As regards commentaries to *Parikṣāmukham*, he mentions that Prabhāchandra wrote an exhaustive commentary entitled *Prameyakamalamārtanda*. Though this work was suitable to scholars, there was a necessity for a shorter and easier commentary. Hīrapa Vaiśya the son of Vaijeya of the family of Badripāla requested Ananta-vīrya to teach Śāntisena. Anantavīrya composed *Prameya-ratna-mālā* in these circumstances†.

A commentary named *Prameya-kaṇṭhikā* on *Parikṣāmukham* was written by Śāntivarṇi. It has not been possible to ascertain details about this Śāntivarṇi or the probable time when his work was written. There are five sections (स्तवक) in this work. Following the Sūtras of *Parikṣāmukham*

* श्रीवर्द्धमानमकलंकमनन्तवीर्यमाणिक्यनन्दियतिभाषितशास्त्रवृत्तिम् ।

भक्त्या प्रभेन्दुरचितालघुवृत्तिदृष्ट्या नत्वा यथाविधि वृणोमि लघुप्रपञ्चम् ॥

† तदनु तत्प्रकरणस्य विशिष्टतमोऽतिस्पष्टः.....प्रभाचन्द्रभट्टारकः प्रमेयकमलमार्तण्डनाम-
वृद्धवृत्तिं चरीकरोति स्म । तद् वृत्तिग्रन्थस्य.....सकलविद्वच्चित्तप्रकाशकत्वेऽपि....बालान्तः
करण....प्रकाशनसामर्थ्याभावमाकलय्य तत्प्रकाशनाय....प्रमेयरत्नमालेत्यन्वर्थनामोद्वहती....
लघ्वीं वृत्तिं....अनन्तवीर्यचार्यवर्यो....वैज्यप्रियसूनुना हीरपाख्यवैश्योत्तमेन वदरीपालवंश-
मुणिना शान्तिपेणाध्यापनाभिलाषिणा प्रेरितः सन् प्रारीप्सुः

the author has refuted the views of other logicians (Bauddha etc.) and established the Jain view. A Mss. of this work is preserved in Jain Siddhānta Bhavan, Arrah.

Vālideva Sūri (12th century A.D.) composed *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra* closely following *Parikṣāmukham*. Many aphorisms are exactly the same, only synonyms being used. In some aphorisms, an attempt is seen to show some novelty by giving examples of a different kind but the examples in *Parikṣāmukham* are more simple and easily understood. In many places some extra words have been introduced in aphorisms.

Hemachandra also wrote his *Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā* in aphorisms, though Sūtra works at such a late period when he flourished were unnecessary.

IV

Parikṣāmukham is divided into six sections (Samuddeśa). In the first section *Pramāṇa* is defined and explained. In the second section two kinds of *Pramāṇa* viz. *Pratyakṣa* and *Parokṣa* are mentioned and *Pratyakṣa* with its varieties is described. The third section deals with *Parokṣa* *Pramāṇa* and its subdivisions *Smṛiti*, *Pratyābhijñāna*, *Tarka*, *Anumāna* and *Āgama*. The greater portion of this section is devoted to *Anumāna* (inference), the most important subject in all logical works. The two varieties of *Anumāna* viz. *Svārtha* and *Parārtha* are described in detail. The fourth section treats with the subject of *Pramāṇa* with its two varieties, *Sāmānya* and *Viśeṣa* and their subdivisions. In the fifth section, the result of *Pramāṇa* is described. The sixth and the last section deals with fallacies.



12. COSMOLOGY—OLD & NEW

THIS WORLD of ours is dynamic, not static. It is ever changing and progressing in a forward or a backward direction. Like the spokes of a wheel the rise and the fall follow in succession. Jain Āchāryas have divided the cycle of time into Utsarpiṇī and Avsarpiṇī, *i. e.*, the time rising and falling with a slow serpentine motion. The rise of the sun to the zenith and its fall again every evening is teaching this great lesson of Nature. The great civilizations of Rome, Greece and Babylonia, which rose to the highest point of glory and are now non-existent, are illustrations in point. The early history of modern science shows that the great scientists like Galileo and Bruno had, in their search for knowledge, to face insults and suffer tortures at the hands of the blind custodians of religion. The times have changed and the present is an age of steam and electricity. The very section of society, who had done its best to check the development of scientific ideas, is now anxious to verify the principles of its religion in the light of modern investigations.

A word of caution may be sounded at this stage. In order to make a true comparative study of one's religion and the modern science, one should not forget the spirit of the modern scientist. The present tendency is to distort every fact or religious principle so as to bring it in conformity with the theories of science, without knowing that the theories of science are not absolute truths but are ever changing. The view-point of our study should be to collect those facts which have been verified by the discoveries of science and to put forward boldly before the world those problems which do not agree with the prevalent scientific conceptions and to await solution, if one cannot explain them himself. It is a wrong policy to believe that whatever comes from the West is right; whatever is ours is wrong, although it is true that the westerners make enquiries with impartial views. But since there are limitations to human understanding, the result of enquiries is not always correct.

A present day scientific worker does not work as a Hindu, a Muslim or a Jain. The principle of a particular religion may be confirmed or contradicted by his discoveries, he does not care. He is a meek seeker after truth. Whatever stands the test of sane logic and is verified by experiment is truth in his eyes.

Science may be defined as the "promotion of natural knowledge", "the pursuit of truth," or "the systematic investigation of the world before us" and its claim to be regarded as such is based on the method which it employs for the search of knowledge. The first step is to ascertain the facts connected with the problem by experimental investigation, for Science recognizes no authority other than Nature. The next step is to classify the facts in order that their significance may be better appreciated. The third essential step is

formulation of a *theory* or *principle* to explain the facts, because science is emphatically not a catalogue of facts but an attempt to fit them into a rational scheme. It is expected of a theory or a principle that it shall be capable of experimental verification and shall lead to a search for new facts. Thus the journey is continued ever onwards into new realms of knowledge. The characteristic feature of this method is that it is constantly in touch with experimental facts and that is why science can justly claim to be the pursuit of truth. But are the theories of science absolute truths ? No, they are not.

“Science is a series of approximations to the truth; at no stage do we claim to have reached finality; any theory is liable to revision in the light of new facts.....This is both the joy and inspiration of science that there appears to be no end to new knowledge with its interest. Each advance yields a more far-reaching and interesting picture of the physical world, while at the same time opening up fresh views in the shape of new problems awaiting solution.”*

Leopold Infeld in *The World in Modern Science* says :

“Scientific theory is an attempt to form a mental picture of the reality which surrounds us. It may embrace either a narrow or wide range of facts and also experimental laws, bringing them into due order. Science is not, however, a collection of laws and a haphazard agglomeration of facts. Theory, to begin with, binds them together with a common idea, and creates a picture of reality from which particular facts follow by a process of logical reasoning.....Theory is something more; it is a creative agent, a guide to a land of new and unknown phenomena; it shows how to evolve new systems and to discover new laws. It draws its life blood from experiments which confirm its conclusions. Experiments which conflict with its deductions overthrow and destroy it. Experiment is and will always remain the final court of appeal deciding the fate of a theory.

“How do theories arise ? How is our mental picture of the world which surrounds us formed and developed ? Do we obtain at first a rough sketch, a faint outline, which, as we proceed, gains in clearness and firmness and gathers new and bright colours whilst retaining the stamp and character of the original outline ? In other words, is the development of a theory merely a process of evolution, or do there occur cataclysms, great revolutions which in a short space of time transform our whole physical outlook ?

“In the history of scientific development we discern both these processes—the *evolutionary* and the *revolutionary*. Evolution is the outcome of the collective efforts of generations, of the brilliant successes of illustrious men, and of minor but useful labours which serve to amplify our theoretical ideas; it is the gradual building up of the structure of science on foundations which have already been laid. In the course of evolution great ideas grow and

* A. W. Barton.

mature, theory is freed from assumptions, the range of facts which the theory covers gradually widens and the originally simple mathematical form of the theory becomes at the same time more complicated and far-reaching.

"We shall doubtless never succeed in understanding fully the reality which surrounds us. Now-a-days, we are conscious that our feeble efforts and unskilled attempts to grasp the laws of Nature become constantly outstripped by the complexity of the phenomena observed in the world of ours. As a theory develops, there may appear in it some minor flaws which may remain unnoticed in the triumphal progress of the theory, only, however, to manifest themselves more clearly and menacingly later on. Difficulties of this kind, disagreement between deductions from the theory and the results of experiment, inconsistencies and even vital contradictions which cannot be explained away by the theory—these often contain the seeds of fresh developments by making it necessary to enunciate new principles and to re-lay the foundation of science. When a theory is frustrated in this manner the ground is prepared for a scientific revolution. This is nearly the work of one great mind. Such a revolution involves the transfer of problems to a new sphere of investigation, it forces us to consider the scientific phenomena in a different light, and it lays a fresh foundation upon which we proceed to build a new and different world of physics."

We give below a typical example to show how the views of science change in time :

"The earth is at rest and the sun moves" was the view of Ptolemy.

"The earth moves and the sun is at rest" was the view advanced by Copernicus. Which of these two statements is correct ?

In answer, again we quote from the same work of Leopold Infeld :

"The verdict of classical physics is clear and definite in favour of the second statement (*i. e.*, the Copernican view). Is it perhaps possible, is it conceivable, that both propositions may be false ? And yet a modern physicist, listening to a discussion between supporters of the respective theories of Ptolemy and Copernicus might well be tempted to a sceptical smile. The theory of relativity has introduced a new factor into science and revealed a new aspect of phenomena. It is now known that the question of deciding between the Copernican view and that of Ptolemy is pointless and that in fact the proposition of both of them have lost their significance. Whether we say "the earth moves and the sun is at rest" or "the earth is at rest and the sun moves", in either case we are saying something which really conveys nothing. Copernicus' great discovery is to-day reduced to the modest statement that in certain cases it is more convenient to relate the motion of heavenly bodies to the solar than to the terrestrial system".

The reader should carefully note down the latest view-point of science on this ancient puzzle. The Jaina astronomers held the Ptolemaic view with regard to the relative motion between the earth and the sun and until lately,

time the fullness and joy of life, but their life is short. Our mental picture of the universe is constantly undergoing modification and change. Science is ever giving it a new shape. Science is not a structure in which only the ornamental details of secondary importance are changing. Such a picture of it would be not only sad and dreary, but quite wrong. The joys of creative work and the joys of scientific knowledge and of an appreciation of scientific principles and laws lie in their eternal youth and change. Change is progress, the road upwards leading through error and mistake. We change or modify theories in order to bring within their ambit an ever wider range of facts and to obtain an ever greater degree of agreement with observation".

The reader may well note the great contrast between the never changing laws of Nature enunciated by the Jain Tīrthaṃkaras and the ever changing theories of modern science. In view of this fact, it is never wise to reject what at present seems to be contradictory against the theories of science. Science is ever sounding the bell : "We are beginning to appreciate better, and more thoroughly, how great is the range of our ignorance".

"Truth is what the scientist aims at. He finds nothing at rest, nothing enduring, in the universe. Not everything is knowable, still less is predictable. But the mind of man is capable of grasping and understanding at least a part of Creation."*

Then there is another important feature introduced in Science by the great Theory of Relativity. Einstein has very beautifully differentiated between 'true' and 'really true'. To quote his own words—

"Is it really true that a moving rod becomes shortened in the direction of its motion ? It is not altogether easy to give a plain answer. I think we often draw a distinction between what is *true* and what is *really true*. A statement which does not profess to deal with anything except appearances may be *true* †; a statement which is not only true but deals with the realities beneath the appearances is *really true*."

According to Einstein, we can know the truth, but not the real truth or absolute truth. The following illustration taken from the domain of physics will make the point clear :


Imagine a stationary conductor charged with electricity placed anywhere upon the surface of the earth. There exists an electric field round a charged conductor. In other words, it means that if any other conductor charged with electricity is brought in the neighbourhood of the former, the latter will be attracted or repelled‡ depending upon whether it is charged with the opposite kind of electricity or of the same kind. It is well to bear in mind that there is no magnetic field round a stationary electric charge, *i.e.* a

* *The Restless Universe* by Max Born, Page 278.

† In the terminology of Jaina Scriptures 'True' refers to व्यवहार सत्य (Vyavahār Satya) and 'Really True' refers to निश्चयात्मक सत्य (Niśchayātmak Satya).

‡ There are two kinds of electric charges, called the positive and the negative,

magnetic compass brought in its neighbourhood would not be deflected by it. But as the earth is in motion round its axis, to an observer situated on a distant planet, the conductor which is stationary *relative* to the earth, will appear to be in motion. Now we have just said that there is no magnetic field round a stationary electric charge, but a charge in motion always gives rise to a magnetic field. (See adjoining figure) So if the distant observer were to make his measurements on the terrestrial conductor he would find the presence of the magnetic field. It means there is no magnetic



A represents a metal sphere charged with electricity. The arrow indicates its motion. Since moving charge is a sort of electric current, it is shown surrounded by lines of magnetic force.

field round the conductor relative to the observer on the earth, but there is a magnetic field round the same conductor with respect to the stellar observer. We arrive at the strange conclusion that the charged conductor is giving rise to and not giving rise to a magnetic field at the same time. What is the absolute truth? Is there a magnetic field round the conductor or is there none? No answer can be given to this question. Einstein says, "We can only know the relative truth, the Real Truth is known only to the Universal Observer." Universal Observer of Einstein is none else but the Almighty, the Omniscient with infinite powers of knowledge and bliss.

According to Einstein, even the measurement of Space and Time is relative. Says Eddington in the *Nature of the Physical World* :

"A fast moving traveller lives more slowly. His cycle of digestion and fatigue; the development of his body from youth to age; the watch which ticks in his waistcoat pocket; all these must be slowed down in the same ratio. If the speed of his travel is very great, we may find that, whilst the stay-at-home individual has aged 70 years, the traveller has aged one year."

This probably furnishes an explanation of the long age of thousands of years enjoyed by Devas* and of the long durations after which hunger is excited within them. It is quite possible that the Vimāns (aeroplanes) in which they live and move are moving with tremendous velocity relatively to us.

Thus we see that the truth investigated by science is relative and not absolute and its theories are ever liable to change. The reader might well

* J. L. Jaini in the *Jaina Hostel Magazine* Vol. VII, Number 3, page 10 has observed that there is a fixed proportion between the respiration, feeling of hunger and the age of the celestial beings. The food interval is 1,000 years and the respiration one fortnight for every Sāgar of age. The proportion of food interval to respiration is thus, 1 to 24000. He has further observed that if a man lived like a god, we should have a legitimate feeling of hunger only once in the day. A normal person has 18 respirations to the minute, or $18 \times 60 \times 24 = 25920$ in a day, roughly 24,000.

ask: "What is the value of science if it does not reveal the reality which surrounds us? How are we to discern, through ever-changing theory, the true outline of the world in which we live?" Remember that science has failed to answer these questions. Again in the words of Leopold Infeld, "What is the use of introducing these great questions of metaphysics into the sphere in which we are only just beginning to appreciate the immense complexity of what are seemingly the simplest phenomena of nature? . . .

Scientific theories arise, develop and perish. They have their span of life, with its successes and triumphs, only to give way later to new ideas and a new outlook."

As has been remarked by Fermor, Asia has not been scientifically asleep during the whole of the several millennia before the introduction of modern science into India by the Europeans. Researches by oriental scholars into the old Sanskrit and Pali texts are gradually bringing to light the valuable gems of the cultural heritage of India. The Jains and the Buddhists made discoveries of immense value. In fact Dr. N. R. Dhar has attributed the intellectual stagnation in India after the 12th century to the decline of Buddhism under whose aegis science had considerably developed. About the contributions of the Jain thinkers in the field of physics, biology and mathematics very little is known to the intelligent public for want of popular literature on the subject. The present work is a commentary on the fifth chapter of *Tāttvarthādigama Sūtra*. *It is an humble attempt to put before the English-knowing public the contributions of the Jains in the domain of cosmology and atomic physics. It is not an attempt to seek in ancient texts the substance of modern theories, as some are likely to think nor is there any attempt to bring by forced, distant and misleading analogies the ancient discoveries in line with the modern science. The points where the two agree and where they do not have been laid bare.

One is apt to ask: how is the present work going in any way to serve the cause of the Jain religion or of science? My answer is that the present work is only one link in the chain. When the chain is complete the world will know the peculiar merit of Jain religion, that it has treated not only the problems of soul, truth and *ahimsā* in a rational way but that it deals with matter and the physical universe in quite the same manner. With regard to the cause of science, some day some physicist, like our eminent Jain physicist Dr. D. S. Kothari may take up some prediction of Jain physics, work it out mathematically and astonish the world. The 'animistic' belief of the Jains that the plants are endowed with life has already been demonstrated wonderfully by late Sir J. C. Bose, F.R.S. Who can say that the development of the mercury-vapour turbines in America is not the outcome of the descriptions of the mercury vapour engines occurring in ancient Jain and Buddhist works like the *Samarāṅgaṇ Sūtradhār* and *Śilpa Saṃhitā*? Not only

* *Supra* Book 2, p. 21.

in America but also in Germany, an attempt was made to replace petrol engines by the mercury vapour engines in the aeroplanes. The translation of *Sūrya Prajñapti* a standard Jain work on astronomy, into the German language has elicited high admiration in the West.

We draw the attention of the scientists towards the following facts particularly :

- (i) Jains assert that the size of the universe is fixed (343 cu. *rajjus*). The red shift of the spectral lines must be attributed to some other cause, not to the expansion of the universe*.
- (ii) Ether, the medium of motion, cannot be eliminated out of the scheme of the universe. It is a non-material medium and all attempts to associate physical properties with it are bound to fail.
- (iii) Ether is the seat of a stationary system of waves.
- (iv) The field or the medium of rest, through which the forces of gravitation and electromagnetism operate, is quite a separate reality, non-active and non-material. Its functions cannot be usurped by the Space.
- (v) Space without matter and time does not mean void. Space is a substance and a reality in itself in which the property of expansion inheres.
- (vi) Space and time form a mixed continuum and this four-dimensional continuum forms a finite universe beyond which no particle of matter or energy can travel on account of the absence of ether, but beyond this finite universe there is an infinite extension of pure mathematical space.
- (vii) The postulate that the space becomes warped in the presence of matter is unnecessary at least in the explanation of a finite universe.
- (viii) According to the Jain view, even the modern atom is a molecule (*skandha*) and Raman effect would be discovered in the atoms also some day.
- (ix) According to the laws of union of the elementary grains of energy mesotrons, positive and negative, of different masses are possible.

Many more such ideas will be found dispersed in the main text and in Jain literature in general. For instance, it is mentioned in the *Gommatsār* that the shape of a *parmāṇu* is hexagonal.† A free *parmāṇu* can travel with a maximum velocity of 14 *rajjus* per *samaya* (the unit of time) i.e. it can

* Zwicky has already given an alternative explanation. According to him when light passes a large mass such as a star, not only is it deflected but it also deflects the mass to a small extent. Thus it loses energy. According to quantum theory, this means a diminution in the wave-length i.e., light looks redder or the spectral lines are shifted towards the red.

† It should be remembered that no one has yet seen the atom with eyes. The best microscopes fail in this respect. The atom models proposed by the scientists are as much like an atom as a railway map is like the actual railway it represents.

shoot from one corner of the universe to the other in one *samaya*, provided it does not meet any collision. This is the maximum velocity possible in Nature just as, according to Einstein, the velocity of light is the limit. At each successive collision the velocity is reduced. The maximum age of a star is given as a little more than one *palya* ($=4.13 \times 10^{46}$ years), showing that in the life-cycle of a star there are stages of infancy, puberty, old age and death corresponding to the modern idea of the evolution of a star. The modern view is that a star starts its career in the form of cold cosmic dust, gradually and steadily contracts and heats up to very high temperature, then flares up as a *novae* or a *supernovae* giving out enormous bright light, leaves a residue (called a white-dwarf star) which is dark and thus disappears from view.



TRADITION OF TIRTHAMKARAS

Name of Tirthamkara	Father	Mother	Birth place	Nakshatra	Height	Colour	Age	Place of Nirvāna	Interval to next Tirthamkara	Emblem
1. Rishabha	Nābhi-rāja	Marudevī	Ayodhyā	Uttarāsāḍha	500 dhanu	Golden yellow	84 lakhs of pūrvas	Mount Kailāśa	50 lakhs of crores of sāgaras	Bull
2. Ajita-nātha	Jita-śatru	Vijayā-devi	"	Rohiṇī	450 "	"	72 lakhs of pūrvas	Mount Pārasnātha	30 " " "	Elephant
3. Sambhava-nātha	Jitāri	Senā	Śrāvastī	Pūrvāsāḍha	400 "	"	60 " " "	" "	10 " " "	Horse
4. Abhinandana-nātha	Samvara	Siddhārthā	Ayodhyā	Punarvasu	350 "	"	50 " " "	" "	9 " " "	Monkey
5. Sumati-nātha	Megha-prabha	Sumaṅgalā	"	Maghā	300 "	"	40 " " "	" "	90,000 crores of sāgaras	Curlew
6. Padmaprabhu	Dharaṇa	Susimā	Kauśāmbī	Chitrā	250 "	Red like lotus	30 " " "	" "	9,000 " "	Red lotus
7. Supārśva-nātha	Supratīṣṭha	Prithivī	Kāśī	Viśākhā	200 "	Green	20 " " "	" "	900 " "	Svastikā
8. Chandra-prabhu	Mahāsena	Lakṣmaṇā	Chandrapurī	Anurādhā	150 "	White	10 " " "	" "	90 " "	Crescent
9. Puṣpadanta	Sugrīva	Rāmā	Kākaṇḍī	Mūla	100 "	"	2 " " "	" "	9 " "	Dolphin
10. Sītala-nātha	Dṛiḍhāratha	Sunandā	Bhadrikāpurī	Pūrvāsāḍha	90 "	Golden yellow	1 " " "	" "	1 crore, less 100 sāgaras	Wishing-tree
11. Śreyāṃsa-nātha	Viṣṇu	Viṣṇudri	Siṃha-purī	Śravaṇā	80 "	"	84 lakh years	" "	54 sāgaras	Rhinoceros
12. Vāsupūjya	Vāsupūjya	Vijayā	Champā-purī	Śatābhīṣā	70 "	Red	72 " "	Champā-purī	30 "	Buffalo
13. Vimala-nātha	Kṛitavarman	Suramyā	Kāmpilya	Uttarāsāḍha	60 "	Golden yellow	60 " "	Mount Pārasnātha	9 "	Boar
14. Ananta-nātha	Siṃhasen	Sarvavaśā	Ayodhyā	Revatī	50 "	"	30 " "	" "	4 "	Bear
15. Dharma-nātha	Bhānu	Suvratā	Ratna-purī	Puṣya	45 "	"	10 " "	" "	3 sāgaras, less 1/4 palya	Spike-headed club
16. Śanti-nātha	Viśvasena	Achirā	Hastinā-pura	Bharanī	40 "	"	1 " "	" "	1/2 palya	Deer
17. Kunthu-nātha	Sūrya	Śrī-devi	"	Kṛittikā	35 "	"	95,000 years	" "	1/4 palya, less 6,000 crore years	He-goat
18. Ara-nātha	Sudarśana	Mitra-devi	"	Rohiṇī	30 "	"	84,000 "	" "	1,000 crores, less 6,584,000 years	Fish
19. Malli-nātha	Kumbha	Rakṣitā	Mithilā-purī	Āśvinī	25 "	"	55,000 "	" "	54 lakhs years	Waterpot
20. Muni-suvrata	Sumitra	Padmāvatī	Kuśagra-nagara	Śravaṇā	20 "	Black	30,000 "	" "	9 " "	Tortoise
21. Nami-nātha	Vijaya	Vapra	Mithilā-purī	Āśvinī	15 "	Golden yellow	10,000 "	" "	5 " "	Blue lotus
22. Nemi-nātha	Samudravijaya	Śivā-devī	Śaurī-pura or (Dwārakā)	Chitrā	10 "	Black with inner tinge of lotus-red	1,000 "	Mount Gīrnār	84,000 years	Conch
23. Pārśva-nātha	Āśvasena	Vāmā	Kāśī	Trivīśākhā	9 hands	Blue	100 "	Mount Pārasnātha	250 years	Serpent
24. Mahāvira	Siddhārtha	Priyakāriṇī (Trīśālā)	Kuṇḍa-pura	Hastā	7 "	Golden yellow	72 "	Pāvā-purī		Lion

N. B. Dhanuṣa=4 cubits; Pūrva=84,00,000² years; Sāgar=10 × 1,00,00,000² Palya; Palya=If a 4,000 cubits pit is filled with the fleece of a week-old lamb, and then the hair are taken out @ 1 per 100 years, the time taken to empty the pit.

