

INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STUDIES

**TRANSFER OF POWER
IN INDONESIA
1942-1949**

by

J. K. RAY



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To :

A.,

L.,

K

INTRODUCTION

THIS RESEARCH-STUDY on the transfer of power in Indonesia, 1942-49, begins with the Japanese invasion of Indonesia and ends up with the conclusion of the Hague Agreement that formalized the termination of Dutch colonial rule over Indonesia. A chapter entitled *Background* has been added to help readers, especially non-specialists, in following easily some of the developments of the stormy period 1942-49.

The period 1942-49 throws up episodes and issues that are extremely important not only in terms of Indonesian history but of international relations in general. They lead up to crucial questions demanding a thorough investigation. Some of these are indicated below.

A. Domination of one country over another resulting in an exploitation of the latter by the former has characterized the Asian scene for several centuries. In brief, it is designated as colonialism or imperialism. Since, in Asia, this has been practised for the most part up to the middle of this century by powerful European countries, it is commonplace to find Asians coupling the adjective 'European' with the term 'colonialism' or 'imperialism'. But, is it fair to accuse only the Europeans of the propensity towards empire-building?

B. Students of international relations cannot but be struck by the fact that even in the middle of the twentieth century some statesmen, instead of staging a graceful retreat and renouncing colonial possessions, unequivocally proclaim their intention to retain a colony. What are the arguments or excuses advanced by them in support of their standpoint?

C. When a world organization like the United Nations comes into being, a colony striving to do away with foreign domination can legitimately expect effective help from such an organization. Can it really depend on the U. N. for gaining freedom?

D. What is the relative importance of violent means and peaceful negotiations to struggling nationalists? Can the latter be exclusively relied upon to bring about independence?

Answers to these questions, strewn throughout the book and concentrated in *The Argument*, may be summarized as follows:

A. Empire-building is not the peculiar property of a particular group of people or country. Asians are as much adept in this game as Europeans or anyone else. They are quite capable of quickly hatching up a machinery of exploitation making colonialism profitable. All this has been illustrated by Japanese rule over Indonesia during 1942-45.

B. Indonesians do not deserve self-government. They have no respect for democratic principles and no ability to maintain law and order. There has been no genuine nationalist upsurge in Indonesia. The self-appointed leaders of the so-called Indonesian national movement are only power loving conspirators who neither enjoy mass support nor care for it.

These are the typical arguments advanced by the Dutch statesmen who sought to reimpose colonial domination upon Indonesia at the end of the second World War. To Indonesian nationalists fighting under the leadership of men like Sukarno, Hatta or Sjahrir, these appear not as arguments but as worn-out excuses for perpetuating colonial rule. Nationalists point to the inaccuracy of these accusations hurled by the Dutch against them by contrasting the situations in territories administered by them and in those administered by the Dutch during the few turbulent years preceding the transfer of power. The urge for national independence has permeated all the strata of Indonesian society. The Dutch are mistaken when they propagate that Indonesians, devoid of nationalist feelings, have welcomed the re-entry of the Dutch after the second world war. Even the Indonesian civilians who worked under the Dutch in Dutch-occupied territory at the end of the second world war, have expressed eagerness for national independence and the end of Dutch rule. The

strength and mass underpinning of the Indonesian national movement has been squarely attested by a large group of Dutch journalists visiting (in early 1947) the interior of the territory held by nationalists (see chapter III), and by the Consular Commission in its report (October 1947) to the Security Council (see chapter IV).

C. The U. N. was not inactive in the hot-cum-cold war between Holland and Indonesia during 1945-49. But its activity could not significantly further the cause of Indonesian independence. Its most influential members were so much torn by the conflict between ideals and commitments of power politics, and were so much immersed in rivalries that they could do far less than what Indonesian freedom-fighters expected of them for quickening colonial emancipation. Credit, however, must go to certain states, e.g., Australia, India, the United States or the Soviet Union, for occasionally lifting the U. N. out of near-paralysis.

D. Nationalists may prefer peaceful negotiations to violent means in order to avoid the destruction of material resources and especially of goodwill which is of immense value in the post-independence era. But when the foreign enemy refuses to negotiate or, what is more dangerous, uses negotiations to gain time for a military offensive designed to obliterate the strength of nationalists completely, the latter can save themselves and reach their goal only by commanding sufficient military power. When communists, under instructions from abroad, stage insurrections even before the withdrawal of the colonial power, and thus try to subvert the nationalist movement itself, peaceful intentions or negotiations are of little avail. Even the U. N., sticking to peaceful negotiations, can achieve very little; and neighbours, condemning colonialism enthusiastically in one or two international conferences, accomplish almost nothing. All these circumstances, dramatized in the Indonesian case, make it inevitable for nationalists ultimately to rely on violent means in order to fulfil their aims. They are indeed lucky if the scale and extent of violence resorted to by the colonial power is such that they themselves can avoid military means.

The major findings of this research-study, summarily indicated above, are not to be regarded as totally impeccable or universally valid generalizations. A student of international relations can seldom, if ever, aim or arrive at conclusions completely acceptable to experts concerned or applicable without reservations to situations similar to those treated in his research-study. The present writer feels, however, that his findings will, to some extent at least, aid the academician in his perennial search for truth and help the policy maker in his quest for more practicable lines of action.

This book does not claim to be an exhaustive study of Indonesian history during the period 1942-49. It attempts to grapple with certain fundamental issues which are themselves the focal points of important controversies. The subject-matter is such that intended or unintended bias may creep in and vitiate interpretations. Sometimes one may detect a bias even in the relative emphasis placed on different sources of materials. In certain sections of the present research-study sources such as the *Voice of Free Indonesia*, *Merdeka* or *News Bulletin* (of the Indonesian Information Service) loom large. This is not due to any bias, but due to the unique significance of these sources in the contexts in which they are used, and because in many earlier works on similar subjects these sources have been unduly ignored. Moreover, since this research-study has yielded certain interpretations and conclusions favourable, in general, to the cause of Indonesian nationalism (as manifested during 1942-49), the present author has tried his utmost, especially in sectors of crucial controversies, to furnish evidence from sources of purely non-Indonesian origin in support of events or comments with a penumbra of apparently pro-Indonesian-nationalist and anti-colonialist bias. His success in such an endeavour is likely to be limited.

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B A C K G R O U N D

INDONESIA'S CRESCENT of rich green islands reaches the magnificent total of three thousands—Indonesians are a 'people against Geography'. The major islands are only four in number—Bali, Java, Sumatra, Borneo. This peculiar geographical feature is to be specially mentioned because the awakening of national sentiment does not take place simultaneously in all parts of a large country and wayward geography makes it increasingly more difficult in the case of Indonesia. This fact, therefore, also serves to illustrate the quality of statemanship demanded of those heroes of freedom movement who have to work untiringly in order to form public opinion, organize public action and canalize popular energy avoiding any overflow.

This Chapter will present an extremely sketchy survey of the nationalist movement in Indonesia during the first four decades of the twentieth century. It is advisable, however, to preface this survey by noting the fundamental factors that underlie a nationalist upheaval against colonial domination.

The most important factor in Indonesia, as in many other countries dominated by Europeans, was the emergence in the colony of an indigenous educated elite exposed to the ideas and ideals preached by Europeans though not practised by them in relation to the people in the colony. Indonesians, initially a small number of them, having access to Dutch schools in their country or in Holland, learned the doctrines of rights of man and national self-determination from a study of Dutch history and literature as also from the sermons of Christian missionaries in Indonesia. They resented the reluctance of the Dutch to apply such principles in regulating relations with the subject people. This resentment rose as Indonesians with requisite qualifications were debarred from hold-

ing key posts in administrative hierarchy, apparently reserved for Hollanders, simply because they were Indonesians. Such discrimination, usually practised by colonial rulers on the dependent people, made Indonesians feel that they were inferior citizens in their own country. Even the Eurasians in the Netherlands East Indies enjoyed certain privileges, e. g., as regards employment, which the Indonesians could not claim.

Among the Dutch themselves were some enlightened advocates of colonial upliftment. But they could not accomplish much to mitigate the discontent among Indonesians. It is true that they argued out the case for concessions to the conquered, and the colonial administration became aware of the civilizational aspects of their Indonesian enterprise at the beginning of the 20th century. Since the 18th century Dutch interests and activities in the Indies centred round what was essentially commercial and tangibly profitable. With the opening of the 20th century, in some spheres at least, exploitation gave way to paternal despotism. In 1901, the Queen of Holland, while inaugurating the session of the Dutch Parliament, declared: 'The Netherlands, being a Christian nation, have the duty to permeate their policy with the conviction that they have a moral obligation towards the people of these territories (the Netherlands Indies).'¹

The Queen's declaration underlined the adoption by the colonial administration of what the Dutch for long characterized as the Ethical Policy. The Netherlands Indies government took some steps to relieve the economic suffocation of the common people, e.g., extension of irrigation and credit facilities to peasants. But the Ethical Policy had a hard, brief life. Idealists among Dutch administrators strove in vain to preserve the spirit of the Ethical Policy in the administration of the colony. Other officials found the Ethical Policy opposed to their corrupt, selfish practices and acted vigorously to defeat the idealists. Dutch businessmen found the Ethical Policy unprofitable and pressed for its abandonment. The Dutch government at home too found the policy uneconomical as it meant a big expenditure on public welfare projects. All these conspired to produce the gradual, though officially unannounced, evaporation of the Ethical Policy.

Educated Indonesians, carried to new heights of expectation

with the announcement of the Ethical Policy, soon experienced a shocking fall that drove them further apart from the alien rulers. They believed that administrators would revamp their attitudes and treat Indonesians honourably. But many government officials refused to live up to the tenets of the Ethical Policy, and continued to look down upon Indonesians. The gap between the theory and practice of Ethical Policy startled Indonesians and strengthened their determination to eliminate foreign domination.

Even if one assumed, just for the sake of argument, that the Ethical Policy was a genuine success, one could not expect it to restrain nationalists from striving for self-government. Nationalists would never reconcile themselves to the position of wards tutored by their foreign guardians. For them good government was no substitute for self-government. They were not interested simply in good administration that meant permanent subordination to alien masters. They wanted to establish a national administration.

Indonesians realized that only a national government would be willing and able to raise the standard of living of their people. The Dutch in Indonesia enjoyed a far higher standard of living than the Indonesians. The Dutch in Holland too had a standard of living that an average Indonesian would deem quite high. The Dutch people had a national government that really cared for their interests. Indonesians concluded that they needed a national government if they were to improve their economic lot. This conclusion was reinforced by certain vivid examples of economic exploitation of the colony by the colonial power. The Dutch government adopted certain policies of export and import—usual in a case of colonial relationship—that clearly swelled the profits of Dutch investors without raising the living standard of Indonesians. Nationalists hoped to remove such injustices by installing a government of their own.

The outstanding success of the national government in Japan greatly enthused Indonesians. Japan modernized herself and lifted herself to a status of equality with the European countries. Even the small number of Japanese in Indonesia earned a status of equality with European residents. The defeat of Russia, considered to be a European country, in 1905 in

the hands of Japan, an Asian country, created a feeling of confidence in Asians. Indonesians, like all Asians, hoped that they would be able to eliminate foreign overlords if they, like the Japanese, could command technological efficiency. Nationalism in Japan provided ideas as also dramatic examples of ideas in action. These to an extent filled up the anarchic vacuums in the lives of Indonesians created by the negligent attitude of alien administrators.

The Chinese revolution of 1911 too stirred Indonesians. It provided a precedent justifying the urge of Indonesians for sweeping internal reconstruction. They were impelled to rescue themselves from the disorder into which colonial up-bringing had plunged them. The Chinese in Indonesia appeared to be inspired by developments at home, and agitated for a revision of their status. They acted in an organized fashion, and their agitation became successful, freeing them from certain restrictions regarding travel and residence under which Indonesians were still smarting. The success of the Chinese incited among Indonesians a jealousy toward the Chinese just as it also stimulated a hope of success. Indonesians grew zealous for a strong national government which alone could remove all their disabilities imposed by foreign conquerors.

The thoughts and actions of the Indonesian elite did not always coincide with those of the masses, and more so because Indonesians had diverse racial, religious and linguistic affiliations. The nationalist intelligentsia, however, were determined to capitalize one important advantage accruing from colonial rule, e.g., an administrative unity binding all Indonesians. This served to focus a sense of common historical experience, i.e., domination by the Dutch, which again generated a feeling of national unity. Such a feeling built a bridge between the Westernized elite, initiating the national movement in urban centres, and the masses slowly coming under the influence of the former.

The first glimpses of the coming freedom-movement in Indonesia could only be caught by a few advanced minds. And here we must look at a letter written as early as 1900 by a Javanese woman named Kartini, daughter of an Indonesian aristocrat, to one of her friends.² 'With heavy hearts', she

wrote, 'many Europeans here see how the Javanese, whom they regard as their inferiors, are slowly awakening....But we are going forward, and they cannot hold back the current of time....Many of them (Hollanders) are among our best friends, but there are also others who dislike us, for no other reason than we are bold enough to emulate them in education and culture....'

The first association to be formed with a nationalistic outlook was also associated with Kartini's name. Of course, nationalism had to be contented with an humble beginning because the association was primarily cultural.³ Kartini in 1902 founded a school where western education would be imparted to women who were for the first time enabled to reap the fruits of modern female education. But the membership was limited and granted only to the female progenies of Indonesian officials. In spite of this aristocratic basis the school undoubtedly furthered national ideals. In spite of the Mohammedan religion, the Indonesian women found a common cultural platform which could be easily utilized to form a political association.

The next important step in the direction of a national cultural movement was taken by a Javanese medical man M. W. S. Husodo. He aimed at enlightening his countrymen on Western teachings plus Indonesian heritage. Unsuccessful at the beginning, he was mightily backed up by medical students of aristocratic birth in founding in 1908 the organization, Budi Utomo, the name standing for 'Noble Endeavour'. Two of its prominent founders were Sutomo and Mangunkusumo who later on played an important role in the national movement. The organization looked to the elders for mature guidance, to the young men for a forward drive. Within a year the membership total recorded significant increases. In its earlier days the Budi Utomo had no political aims at all, agitating only for more education and better social conditions. The Budi Utomo was, in fact, an organization of the educated sections of the Indonesian society. The masses were not drawn to this organization. Even when its aims were later expanded into political objectives and membership increased, it remained a party of the intelligentsia. This was, however, the only

social and political association of Indonesians that counted upto 1911.⁴

The first politically based organization commanding mass-appeal was the Sarekat Dagang Islam (Moslem Chamber of Commerce), founded in January 1911, by Hadji Samanhudi, a Surakarta businessman. This organization registered rapid advances and received wide following within a short period of time. Like Budi Utomo, it was in origin a non-political organization, but later launched on a political career, the objective being democracy and social justice. The strength of the organization was vastly enhanced under the leadership of Hadji O. S. Tjokroaminoto. His political insight and understanding was prudent and perspicacious. He is regarded as the father of the Indonesian national movement. In 1912 he changed the name of the association into Sarekat Islam. At first it sought to organize social life on Islamic principles. One reason for the popularity of Sarekat Islam was that the majority of Indonesians are Moslems. Another reason was its economic programme of bolstering up Indonesian traders as against Chinese competition. The people, therefore, gravitated to this organization in large numbers and it grew to be the first mass organization of Indonesia. Thousands, and ultimately, millions of Indonesians paid their allegiance to it.⁵

While the masses hailed the existence and expansion of Sarekat Islam with all enthusiasm, the reaction of the aristocratic classes was different. They watched with anxiety the division of interests between them and the people brought out by the leaders of Sarekat Islam. Anxiety gave birth to a feeling of insecurity that turned into active opposition. The Sarekat Islam taught the masses to hate social injustice, and, therefore, the aristocrats, who were the legatee of privileges. Especially, Indonesian civilians could no longer be trusted by the masses to be the repository of goodwill and justice. Some of the laws were oppressive and sometimes the Indonesian officials executed them without trying to mitigate their rigour. In effect, people began to look down upon the Indonesian administrative officers as the custodians of such tyrannical laws.

Side by side with the growth of Sarekat Islam, nationalism found a powerful exponent in another party—the Indies Party founded in December 1912 by Dr Djipto Mangunkusumo. It

had certain novel features. Firstly, it was the product of a Eurasian-Indonesian combination. Secondly, it marked the rise of modern nationalism based on the oneness of the people inhabiting the same country and bound together by a common cultural heritage. On the contrary, nationalism promoted by the Sarekat Islam was rooted in uniform religious beliefs. Thirdly, the Indies Party frankly challenged the Dutch Government and proclaimed openly the goal of self-government—unlike any of its predecessors. The government, too, grew hostile.⁶

The suspicion of the government increased when the name of the party was changed into Insulinde and its propaganda became more pungent and censorious. In August 1913, the government exiled three principal leaders of the party, Dr Mangunkusumo, Ki Hadjar Dewantara and Dr Douwes Dekker, as it began to adopt revolutionary tactics.

This party could not muster mass-support because of its mixed composition. The common people could not identify their national status with that of Eurasians many of whom joined that party because they felt themselves to be Indonesians. The ordinary men in Indonesia mistook many Eurasians for colonial-minded Hollanders. The intelligentsia, however, were attracted to this party and became its mainstay. One is reminded of the Budi Utomo whose influence also was largely confined to the intelligentsia. But there was one significant difference. The Insulinde cast its shadow over different parts of Indonesia, whereas the Budi Utomo could not spread its following beyond Java. The party once more changed its name into Indian National Party (National Indische Partij). Its sharp propaganda fanned up nationalistic feelings and its influence mounted.⁷

With the exile of the Insulinde trio many Eurasians, imbued with nationalism, looked for leadership and found it in the Dutch officials, Sneevliet, Brandsteder and Dekker, who brought Marxist notions to Indonesia. In May 1914, they established the East Indian Social Democratic Association at Semarang. The Marxist ideology gained a firm footing in Indonesia.⁸

The Sarekat Islam had to assume the role of a primarily non-political organization upto 1916 as the government did

not grant the right to plunge in full-scale political activities. But the government could not slumber over its growing popularity, nor could it go all the way in suppressing Sarekat Islam altogether; that might have been dangerous, evoking universal hatred and rebellion. Therefore, the Dutch authorities resorted to the novel plan of non-recognition. They would not acknowledge the unity of the organization so that its strength could be sapped in a roundabout but nonetheless effective manner. To that end the government passed an Act in March 1914, whereby it accepted the legal status of the different branches of Sarekat Islam, but refused to grant the same for the association as a whole. This policy undermined the strength not of the party as a whole but of a section of the party. The central organization of the party was largely composed of the champions of Islam. Hence their authority was weakened as they became isolated from the local branches of the party ruled by leaders given over to Marxist ideas as a result of the mounting influence of the East Indian Social Democratic Association. The government policy thus paved the way for a predominance of communistically inclined leaders.

This change in the Sarekat Islam was further facilitated because Sneevliet's grasp of political reality was immense and he knew how to capture the imagination of Indonesians. He was a Marxist while in the Netherlands and also while in the Indies. Indonesians must be won over to Marxism, he decided, and set himself to the task of infiltrating Sarekat Islam which exercised at that time the greatest influence over the Indonesians. He began to make increasing and effective contacts with communistically inclined leaders of the Sarekat Islam. He succeeded in securing a Marxist orientation of Sarekat Islam with the help of some leaders of the Sarekat Islam, namely Darsono and Semaun. Darsono and Semaun joined Sneevliet's Association but they did not leave the Sarekat Islam. They began to aid the germination of Marxist ideas in the Sarekat Islam.⁹

There were three principal reasons rendering Sneevliet's task easier. The Russian scene of 1917 considerably influenced the events in Indonesia. Indonesians became increasingly responsive to ideologies that pledged, at least theoretically, the emancipation of the toiling humanity. Secondly, the first world

war produced political and economic instability, made the people restless and sensitive to radical thoughts. The third factor was, as mentioned before, the domestic legislation that led to a split in the Sarekat Islam as between the central organization and the various branches, the latter being admitted as legal entities while law did not recognize the unity of the party as a whole.

As the branches of Sarekat Islam pressed more and more for communist orientation of the party, the central organization had no alternative but to yield and modify its principles in the light of recent resurgent tendencies. The effect was discernible in the programme adopted at the Second Congress in October 1917, at Djakarta. At this Congress, Semaun, only 19 years of age, raised a dissentient voice and opposed the ideological moorings of the party. His Marxist bias was quite apparent. His challenge could not be ignored. The need to recast the party programme was quite evident. The former aim of self-government now gave way to the new demand of independence coupled with various schemes of social reform. By themselves these aims were not opposed to the tenets of Islam. But, significantly enough, they were accompanied by an unfeigned denunciation of capitalism. The proceedings at the Third Party Congress in October 1918, further underlined the Marxist bias of the organization and the manifest revolutionary tone of its ideals. In its programme the demands for regulating wages and working conditions figured prominently. The Congress favoured co-operation with the Dutch and hoped to persuade them to grant self-rule.

It is only in the context of the growing nationalist activity that we can examine the turns of Dutch policy. The national movement, fortified by the Russian example, bolstered up by Sarekat Islam, strengthened by the inroad of Marxist ideals, brought home to the Dutch authorities the ever-apparent need for change. To these we might add the demand of Socialists in Holland for a liberalization of the colonial rule. The visible result was the establishment in 1918 of the 'Volksraad' or 'Peoples' Council', although the bill was passed by the Netherlands Parliament in 1916. Restricted franchise, indirect election, racially determined voting strength discriminating against Indonesians, all combined to make the Volksraad an unrepresentative

sentative body. Indonesians were not satisfied with a Parliament that had merely advisory powers and no real legislative power. With the nominated members looming large and the Dutch forming a majority and enjoying an in-built predominance, the Volksraad failed to become a safety valve to seething nationalist sentiments.

Indonesian opinion was clearly reflected in the proceedings of the Volksraad even during the first year of its working. Many members agitated for far-reaching reforms and initiated motions designed to transform the Volksraad into a powerful legislative chamber and an effective organ of public opinion. At that time the Russian Revolution had its repercussions in Holland also. Revolutionary tendencies began to grow in Holland and instilled fear in the Dutch Governor General of Indonesia. He nervously reacted to pressures in Indonesia reinforced by circumstances in Holland. He rashly promised the Council quick and extensive reforms in the governmental structure. But he forgot those promises, made in November 1918, as soon as the spectre of revolution haunting Holland seemed out of sight.

The Governor General misjudged the whole situation. Empty promises could not pacify nationalist opinion. On the contrary, they incited more deepseated resentment and provoked more widespread unrest. From now on a larger number of Indonesians became sceptic about the outcome of co-operation with the Dutch.

The Volksraad served as a focus of nationalist agitation. But there came forth a division, so long dormant but being drawn up, in the nationalist front. This division did not centre round the objective, which remained independence; it centred round the means thereto; it lay broadly as between the Communists and non-Communists, between non-co-operators and co-operators, between impatient advocates of immediate insurrections and others less impetuous. In spite of Sneevliet's arrest and exile in 1918, the Communist infiltration of Sarekat Islam went on systematically under the inspiring guidance of Semaun, Darsono, Alimin and Tan Malaka. They had no faith in co-operation with the Dutch and never tried to join the Volksraad. Semaun, with the help of three other leaders mentioned above, built up a strong leftist section in the Sarekat

Islam. The cleavage between the two sections became sharper and sharper, although even in the Fourth Party Congress of 1919 the Marxists were not to control the organization. That explains why Semaun, being disgusted of the central leadership of Sarekat Islam, along with his followers in the Social Democratic Association, transformed themselves into the Communist Party of the Indies, shortly known as the PKI, on 23 May 1920.

The Communists, however, stuck to spiking the Sarekat Islam from within. The three prominent followers of Semaun, i.e., Darsono, Alimin and Tan Malaka, retained their membership of the Sarekat Islam. They stayed on to oppose the leaders of that party consistently and to propagate Marxism uncompromisingly. The leaders of the Sarekat Islam, e.g., H. A. Salim and Abdul, were impelled to adopt a sterner attitude to Communist dissidents. A split seemed imminent. At the Sixth Party Congress of October 1921 in Surabaya, an order was issued forbidding members to accept the simultaneous membership of the PKI. The clashes at the Congress widened as one section was willing to co-operate with the Dutch while continuing the struggle for self-government. Others, mainly Marxists, condemned such co-operation. And their leaders were vociferous in attacking the central leadership for being oblivious of class conflict and being religiously minded. H. A. Salim came to the rescue and won by a vitriolic counter-attack that the Prophet had expounded Socialism and Materialism centuries ago. This completed a formal split and signalled the secession of the Communist group from the Sarekat Islam.³⁰

Those leaders of the Sarekat Islam who pinned their faith in parliamentary action and co-operation with the rulers resorted to a purge and formed a new organization called Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (P.S.I.I.) after the Madiun Congress of February 1923. The Communist wing's answer to this was the organization called Sarekat Rakjat Merat (Red People's Association) which combined with the PKI.

In 1925 the controversy with regard to co-operation with the Dutch authorities again came to a head as in that year Indonesian representation in the People's Council was extended. The powers of the Volksraad were also increased, in-

cluding such important ones as the power to alter government bills, to pass the budget and to put questions that might lead to debates and even a vote of confidence. As usual, the reactions of the two camps were quite different. While the moderates were jubilant over the victory of parliamentary nationalists, the Communists called it a betrayal of the nationalist cause.

The P.S.I.I., anxious to expand its authority, launched the missile of Pan-Islamism. In a pre-eminently Moslem country like Indonesia the call for a unity of Moslems in different parts of the world as against the onslaughts of infidels served to rally popular sentiments. An All-Islam Congress was established calling itself the 'World Islamic Congress, East Indies Section, or M.A.I.H.S. (Muktamar al-Alam al-Islam far'al Hindasj-Sjarayah)', and participating in the World Islamic Congress at Mecca in 1926. This in a way served to guard the ramparts of the P.S.I.I. against Communist inroads.

The Communist front, while expanding, was the victim of an internal division. Two sections fought for mastery. One section believed that the time for a revolutionary overthrow of the Dutch Colonial government was not ripe as yet. Another section was wedded to the use of violence leading to a speedy dissolution of Dutch authority. Even the members of the latter group were not agreed as to the exact timing of the inevitable coup. The task of the Indonesian Communists became more complicated as they had to pick up directives from Moscow. These directives were not always unequivocal and became more perplexing with the intensification of Stalin-Trotsky rivalry. Stalin opposed the Trotskyite policy of fomenting insurrections abroad if it was likely to prove Trotsky right. He would lend half-hearted support to such a venture and supply perfunctory assistance provided it led to a failure of the uprising and thus discredited Trotsky. This happened in China and made the Stalinist strategy transparent. Stalin, in opposition to Trotsky, supported Chiang Kai Shek, but he changed his policy after the Shanghai massacre of the Communists in 1926, ordered by Chiang Kai Shek. This only proved Trotsky's insight into the Chinese situation. So Stalin changed his policy and authorized a revolt in Canton in 1927. But he framed his policy in such a way as to stigmatize Trot-

sky. He did not try to provide the ill-starred Communists in Cantoa with requisite assistance. The coup was a complete fizzle.

In Indonesia desperadoes of the PKI were eager to launch a revolution. But they had to wait for Stalin's beacon fire. In 1925 Muso and Alimin, two top leaders, went to Moscow for support. 'But Stalin reportedly turned them down on open support.'¹¹ According to Darsono, the Soviet leaders at first sanctioned a Communist upsurge in Indonesia, and later on shrank back; this had been Kremlin's policy towards Germany in 1923.¹² The Indonesian Communists plunged into a rebellion in Java in November 1926, and in Sumatra in January 1927. When the first blow was struck on 12 November 1926, it was vehemently repulsed by the Dutch authorities. The revolutionary disturbances were summarily quelled by active state measures. The Dutch Government announced that on 16 November 1926, 13,000 Indonesians were arrested. The government could crush the resistance easily because of lack of popular enthusiasm. Powerful popular support would have seriously jeopardized the safety of the government with only 10,000 white soldiers. Successful strikes and even successful fighting against Dutch forces occurred in several areas, but they were not plastered by strong mass support, and lacked co-ordination. Even the leaders of the Communist Party sometimes displayed a fatal ambivalence in their attitude. Tan Malaka opposed the coup and withdrew his support. And the Dutch were not ready to lose any ground by remaining on the defensive. They took this opportunity to repress the national movement in all possible ways. The government exercised extraordinary powers to intern people without any trial. The Dutch troops hunted down revolutionaries, suspects and innocents in an orgy of fear and vengeance. Because of a fear-complex the Dutch officials often mistook a peaceful nationalist for a plodding revolutionary. They began to act so as to prevent any similar upsurge in future.

The Netherlands Indies Government instituted rigid controls over freedom of speech, expression and assembly. Trade unionism had already been suppressed by a series of government regulations beginning from 1920. In 1925 the government had issued an ordinance for arresting the leaders of the PKI

and banning that party and the Sarekat Rakjat. The 1926-27 coup only brought a climax to the Dutch tactics of repression and violence. The Volksraad received in May 1929 a statement from the government showing 52 children, 420 women and 1124 men as banished to Boven Digul, a swampy disease-infested region of West Irian. Indonesians, however, put the figure at roughly 4500 many of whom died of tropical diseases and other 'unknown causes' in the unhealthy environment of Boven Digul. "These internment orders were so hated that people spoke about them in a proverbial way as 'di-digul-kani'—'to be digulled'."¹³

The Netherlands Indies government could pride itself on smartly sapping the Communist strength. 'But there is one thing which cannot be forgotten and that is that this revolt showed the Indonesian people that the Dutch could be thrown into confusion, that colonial power could be shaken, and that this power was not eternal.'¹⁴

The rebellions of 1926-27 were a traumatic experience for the Dutch. Here was a moment when the Dutch could demonstrate their political sagacity by initiating important policy-changes. They could encourage the moderate Indonesian nationalists and train them up for eventually taking up the responsibilities of self-rule. The Dutch, however, preferred to proscribe political activities with a view to perpetuating their domination. Not to speak of the Governor General, the Political Information Service and the police were vested with far-reaching powers to imprison or exile anybody on mere suspicion. The Indonesian intelligentsia became almost permanently alienated from the foreign rulers. The Ethical Policy, never officially abandoned by the Dutch, was denuded of all substance.¹⁵

The Indonesian nationalist movement was now at cross-roads and soon took a new turn. The significant turn in Indonesian nationalism was evident from the non-political associations to which the peoples and leaders began paying greater attention and through which they chose to eliminate the curses of foreign rule and elevate the masses. This decision was necessitated by the strong government measures against any attempted political change. Thus, a large section of the non-communist bloc of Sarekat Islam entered the Muhamma-

dijah. The Muhammadiyah was an organization as old as 1912, its founder being K.H.A. Dahlan, a staunch advocate of Islam modernized. The first target in its programme was education. Later the programme expanded to cover many aspects of social welfare such as medical aid, popularization of the Koran and, therefore, its publication in several indigenous languages, founding of schools, libraries, etc.¹⁶ But although there was professedly no political aim of the organization and its collective activity centred round Modernist Islamic ideas, there could have been no bar to the fruition of individual political bias and action. Islam prescribes brotherhood among all peoples as the basis of world peace. This has an unwritten corollary, the elimination of colonial exploitation without which true brotherhood cannot be achieved. An unequal law imposed by a foreign power on a colony cannot produce fraternity and peace. Islam also enjoins a democratic system of government the absence of which will always pinch the disabled devotees of Islam in a colony. Hence the principles and activities of Muhammadiyah must have had their political offshoots. Modernist Islamic ideas had political riders and Muhammadiyah must have contributed to the political growth of Indonesians.

The Taman Siswa movement, launched by the Javanese educational leader Soewardi Soerianingrat, exercised a good deal of influence.¹⁷ The word Taman Siswa means 'the garden of pupils'. It was first established on 3 July 1922, in Djakarta. The system of education provided by the Dutch in Indonesia was faulty in two respects: (a) it did not offer extensive facilities to Indonesians; (b) it was impractical. Dewantara aimed at harmonizing the Western and Indonesian methods in building up an educational system that would equip the young Indonesians with practical sense and spiritual self-sufficiency. The Taman Siswa showed rapid progress and had 27 branches in 1929, 181 in 1935 and 215 in 1942. Many persons, trained in these schools, later turned out to be nationalist leaders. That proves the political efficacy of this pronouncedly non-political organization.

Of great importance was the somewhat complete unification of the hitherto scattered youth movements. There were various youth groups working in different parts of Indonesia.

As early as March 1915 students of the Djakarta secondary school instituted the Youth Movement Tri Koro Darmo. (The three Noble Principles of Strength, Character and Service.) These principles were consecrated in their first published journal that came out on 10 November 1915. The movement changed its name to 'Jong Java' (young Java) in 1918, the motto remaining unchanged. Other islands emulated this example and many youth movements, e.g., 'Jong Sumatran Bond', 'Jong Celebes', 'Jong Ambon' came into existence. All these youth organizations had their headquarters in Djakarta which had the largest number of secondary schools drawing students from all parts of Indonesia. This obviously supplied a bond of unity among youth organizations that tended to grow with time. Representatives of various movements began to come together and deepen the consciousness of Indonesian unity. In 1925 they formed a Committee and paved the way to the first Indonesian Youth Congress held in Djakarta. At the second Youth Congress in December 1928 an attempt to amalgamate the different organizations fell through. But it reaffirmed a lasting faith in Indonesian unity. In the same year the different youth associations accepted the principle of merger in their separate associations. A preparatory Committee was set up. It framed a charter on 31 December 1930, incorporating all the youth movements in one grand assembly. The Indonesia Muda (Youth Movements Union) came into being as an organ expressing Indonesians' unity enshrined in the hearts of young Indonesians.

The women too did not lag behind. The women had their organizations in different parts of Indonesia. They brought out papers in Java, Sumatra and other regions. Their task was mainly educational, intended to lift the Indonesian women from the centuries-old slavery to customary laws. But they began to support the nationalist cause avidly with the growth of national consciousness and the progress of the freedom movement.

In the period between the failure of Communist rebellion and the Japanese interlude, the 'Perhimpunan Indonesia' (Indonesian Union) was one of the greatest forces shaping the national movement.¹⁸ The PI (Perhimpunan Indonesia) had its roots in the East Indian Association (Indische Vereeniging)

established in Holland in 1908 by Indonesian students carrying on their studies in Holland. From Holland they would render as much support as possible to the freedom struggle in the mother country. The name of this Association was changed into the PI which strove unceasingly to act as the gallant spokesman of the Indonesian freedom movement in Europe. Europeans were repeatedly reminded of the sufferings and successes of Indonesian nationalists. In Berlin in 1926 the 'League against colonial oppression and for national independence' was established. At the meeting of the League in February 1927, Dr Hatta, the President of the PI, represented the organization and for the first time Indonesia's demand for self-government had a world platform. The importance of such propaganda at the formative stage of the national movement can hardly be over-rated. But the activities of the PI frightened the Netherlands government into adopting a policy of repression. In September 1927 four leaders of the PI including Hatta were accused of inciting rebellion against the Dutch government, and arrested. They were, however, released by the court at the end of an exciting trial. This trial moved the masses in Indonesia and undeniably stimulated their national consciousness. That many of the post-1927 leaders of the Indonesian national movement were the active members of the PI is a commentary on its influence.

In the same year, i.e., 1927, Indonesians saw the birth of the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party), or the PNI, in Bandung with Sukarno as the Chairman. Sukarno had the rare acumen to effect a symbiosis of the Eastern and the Western, himself having a measure of both Western and Moslem education. He had also the unique capacity to convey all these to the illiterate in an intelligible and forceful fashion. His party aimed at full political and economic liberation. Its emphasis on non-cooperation with the Dutch was significant. Sukarno spoke of united resistance against the Dutch, divested of any religious bias. Any division along religious lines would mar unity. After all, independence was as much a necessity to the Moslems as to the non-Moslems of Indonesia.¹⁹

The PNI concentrated on moulding the labour unions and building up a system of national education. For the latter task

they found a useful ally in the Taman Siswa Movement which already provided a framework. Oratorical brilliance of leaders like Sukarno and a sincere implementation of the programme brought the party the reward of rapidly increasing membership. We must not, however, forget the contributions of the government to the growth of the PNI. The communist revolution was followed by the Governor-Generalship of De Graeff. He was liberal and tolerant. He did not try to crush the flourishing organization that would one day seek to remove the very chair he occupied. The role of the PNI becomes all the more impressive as we note its attempt to achieve unity amongst the various nationalist organizations in Indonesia. It effected a flexible coordination through the Consultative Council of Indonesian National Political Organizations, shortly known as the PPPKI founded on 17 December 1927. The whole freedom movement, now coming under the dominant influence of the PNI, assumed an attitude of noncooperation.

With the birth of the PPPKI the government felt the necessity to foment divisions in the nationalist camp. It issued a Declaration placing nationalists into two groups, evolutionists and extremists. Against the latter it advocated stern measures. The PPPKI opposed this move by a resolution in its conference of December 1928. The conference also passed resolutions calling for the abolition of notorious internment camps at Boven Digul and recommending the despatch of a memorandum on forced labour in Indonesia to the International Labour Organization. The PPPKI further discommoded the Dutch as it decided at its conference in Jogjakarta in March 1929 to resist some odious provisions of the Criminal Code. The Netherlands Indies Government formulated certain provisions of the Criminal Code with a view to bar political activities and strikes and thereby dam up the nationalist agitation. The PPPKI threatened to organize mass-meetings to express their opposition to the cramping Criminal Code. It also instructed the PI in Holland to arouse international public opinion on Indonesia's misfortunes.

But the government could not for ever sit complacently over the alarming growth of the PNI which was the nucleus of the PPPKI. The PNI's criticism and attacks against the government thoroughly embittered the feelings of the Dutch in Indo-

nesia. Their agitation became more and more organized and their propaganda more and more dashing. The government began to plan severe measures against the PNI. On 29 December 1929, Sukarno and a few of his associates were arrested.²⁰ Sukarno got 4-years' imprisonment; his colleagues received less. Many Dutchmen felt that Sukarno had been unjustly arrested and imprisoned. The Dutch professor of criminal law at Djakarta, Dr J. M. J. Schepper, wrote a pamphlet in which he fervidly contested the validity of the Sukarno trial. Liberal Hollanders in Djakarta did not believe that Sukarno was ready to use violence and encourage armed clashes between the nationalists and the government.

Sartono, second to Sukarno in the leadership of the PNI, could retain the support of a large number of his old associates and formed a new organization 'Partai Indonesia' (generally known as Partindo), after the lapse of more than a year, on 29 April 1931. Its means were not extremist, but it abridged neither the goal of complete self-government nor the slogan of non-cooperation bequeathed by the PNI. Many members of the PNI disapproved Sartono's scheme to build the Partindo on the ruins of the PNI which had been dissolved on 25 April under Sartono's initiative. Sartono's critics thought he was afraid that he would have to follow the footsteps of Sukarno to the prison-house if he did not disband the PNI. Those who stood against Sartono formed the Independent group (Golongan Merdeka) which too held fast to the principles of the late PNI. But initially it was not a political party properly so-called. The Partindo over-shadowed it both as to membership and the programme.²¹

In 1932 Hatta and Sjahrir, two Sumatrans of extraordinary calibre, returned from Holland. Those members of the old PNI who resented Sartono's move now welcomed the leadership of Hatta and Sjahrir in the 'Independent Group' (Golongan Merdeka). Sjahrir reached his country later than Hatta, and after his return the name of the organization was changed to Indonesian National Education Party (Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia). Now it became a full-fledged political party proclaiming some new principles, e.g., collectivism. This new PNI, however, never cast away the basic tenets of the old PNI.

Hatta and Sjahrir sought to educate the public steadily while at the same time encouraging the growth of auxiliary leadership upon which the movement could fall back in the case of an arrest of the frontmost leaders. The Dutch after a time came to realize the forthcoming results of this party's policy. Hatta and Sjahrir were arrested in February 1934, and were not released till the Japanese attack in 1942. They were exiled to New Guinea without trial. Many of their followers also were exiled without trial. Yet the organization did not die and it confirmed the sincere workmanship of leaders and the solidarity of the bands of disciples as they followed their captains and filled the prisons.²²

Fortunately for the freedom movement, Sukarno had been released on the last day of the year 1931. On 2 January 1932, Sukarno attended the meeting organized by the PPPKI and spoke about the need for national unity. He said, the two parties established after the destruction of the old PNI should come together and oppose Dutch colonialism jointly. He assiduously attempted to combine the Partindo and the Pendi-dikan Nasional Indonesia into a unity. Failing in that task he chose Partindo and was instrumental in increasing the strength and popularity of the organization. The government could not overlook the overt danger and promptly arrested him in August 1933 and exiled him to Flores island and thence to Benculen.²³ He too was not free till the Japanese invasion in 1942.

The government policy was one of plain repression. All the eminent nationalist leaders were arrested and exiled. Persecution has its uses; repressive measures severely affected the Indonesian nationalist movement. It appeared that the Dutch statesmen were not ready to adjust their policy to the aspirations of Indonesian nationalists.²⁴ Unlike the Americans in the Philippines, or the British in India, the Dutch could not reconcile themselves to the prospects of a transfer of power to Indonesian nationalists in the near future.²⁵

Repeatedly the people saw the grim determination of the Dutch to crush the nationalist machine whenever it was deemed to be sufficiently menacing. They realized that victory was hard to accomplish, and thought of extracting concessions from the rulers without wounding their vanity or inviting a

terrorist reaction. It stood to reason to recognize the superior physical strength of the enemy and its capacity to be ruthless. That explains the formation of the Great Indonesian Party (Parindra) in 1935 led by Sutomo, Thamrin and others.²⁶ It was alive to the situation at hand and would adopt non-cooperation or cooperation conveniently. In the Volksraad it came out as the most powerful organization. But its activity and influence lay more in the social than in the political arena. It promoted agrarian banking and co-operation; it instituted a drive against such social vices as illiteracy.

But if the revolutionists could not gain their ends and were crushed, the moderates too were not to experience a smooth sailing. The year 1936 proved to be disastrous for the evolutionists. The Volksraad passed a resolution, celebrated as the Sutardjo proposal, providing for the self-government of Indonesia within the Dutch kingdom through a cabinet responsible to the Volksraad. This plan would pacify nationalist sentiments, and at the same time soothe the colonizing sensibilities of Dutch diehards. However, it was summarily rejected by the authorities. The high hopes of a victory for parliamentary means were nipped in the bud. The rulers would not concede anything to the peace-loving national leaders in Indonesia.²⁷

Even this disillusionment could not smother the political initiative of Indonesians. We witness the formation in April 1937 of a new political organization, Indonesian People's Movement, GERINDO (Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia).²⁸ This new party accepted and recast the familiar principles of the old PNI, the Partindo and the new PNI into the objectives of social, political and economic democracy in a liberated Indonesia. The Gerindo did not denounce cooperation, although it was a leftist nationalist party. This was a striking feature indeed. The leaders of the Gerindo included Dr A. Sjarifuddin and Dr A. K. Gani who later on occupied key cabinet posts in the free Republic of Indonesia. An increasing awareness of the strength of Fascist totalitarianism on the offensive all over the world moulded the outlook of the Gerindo. At that time the Soviet Union was busy upbringing a United Front against Fascism. The Comintern, therefore, in August 1935 issued a directive that the communists

in all countries could combine with the detestable bourgeois democratic elements only to counteract the more detestable menace of Fascism. Muso, therefore, returned to Indonesia from Moscow in 1935 in order to popularize the new communist strategy. He inspired the communists in Indonesia to adopt the new party line professed by Moscow and urged them to join the Gerindo. This party showed a mixture of firmness and moderation. Its leaders, Gani, Sartono, Sjari-fuddin, became all radicals as regards their attitude to the mischiefs of a heartless administration. But at the same time they dreaded Fascism and on that account developed a tendency to help the Dutch in their fight against the fascist coalition. They joined the Volksraad and backed the government on acceptable affairs; but they were insistent in their pressure for obtaining self-government.

In 1939, war and the fear of Fascism shook the whole world but served as a unifying factor in Indonesia where the political parties formed together the Federation of Indonesian Political Organizations or GAPI (Gabungan Politik Indonesia).²⁹ The manifesto of the GAPI, issued in the same year, called for a parliamentary system of government in Indonesia directed towards the achievement of democracy, social, political and economic, cradled in popular elections. Of course, the manifesto did not fail to point out the necessity of a united anti-fascist action of the parties in Indonesia and the Netherlands. Mr M. Wirjopranoto placed the Manifesto before the Volksraad. In December 1939, the GAPI organized a Peoples' Congress which approved this manifesto. The slogan 'Indonesian berparlemen' began to be increasingly popular. In August 1940 the GAPI passed another resolution insisting on (i) the transformation of the Volksraad into a popularly elected Parliament with each political or racial group having satisfactory representation; (ii) the replacement of Heads of Departments by Ministers responsible to the legislature.

As an answer to all these political demands the government decided to supply a sedative. The crisis in Europe awakened it to the necessity of wooing Indonesians. It tried a harmless but ineffective device of an enquiry commission. In September 1940, the Volksraad appointed a Committee with Mr Visman as the Chairman. It was entrusted with the task

of ascertaining the state of political organizations in Indonesia and reporting on it. The report of the 7-man Visman Committee was published in 1941—it covered the period between the two world wars. Essentially, the report noted the progress of the nationalist movement and the urge for equality with the Europeans amongst the non-Europeans. It opined indifferently that Indonesia could get a Parliament only after Holland had been cleared of German invaders. The Committee achieved nothing and satisfied nobody. It only hardened the people in the belief that the Netherlands was not ready to quit her colony or quench their thirst for self-determination. The Committee merely pretended to respect their political aspirations. And it failed to deceive the people.

While Indonesian antipathy for the Dutch deepened, it served to promote Indonesian national integration. This was reflected at the Peoples' Congress in September 1941. Out of it arose the *Majlis Rakjat Indonesia* (Indonesian Peoples' Assembly) having a cabinet called the *Dewan Pemimpin*. It was considered to be a representative body for the nationalist movement as a whole and comprised the GAPI, the Federation of Moslem Organizations, the Federation of Government employees, and also Women's Organizations, Youth Organizations, and the Trade Union Movement. Thus for the first time nationalists had a common forum because they could shed the differences in doctrines and dogmas, means and ends. Of course, differences could not be totally eliminated; only they were relegated to the background by a wave of enthusiasm that could emerge as a unified national outlook and finally even with an organization. This combination of parties attempted clearly to lay down the bases of parliamentarism in Indonesia. It also spoke well for the morale of Indonesian freedom-fighters. Repeatedly in the past the Dutch had unequivocally demonstrated their colonial policy of pitiless persecution. Yet the Indonesian nationalists, much to the amazement of the foreign rulers, time and again rebuilt their crumbling citadel and strove for unity and success.

Very soon Indonesians had to face an entirely new situation. The Indonesian national movement came to be affected by new forces in international relations. On 8 December 1941, Japan bombed Pearl Harbour and brought about one of the

greatest calamities in American and world history. Within a few months her invading armies swooped down upon the countries of South East Asia and made short work of Western dominance. Since then the freedom movement in Indonesia was visibly shaped by the changing pattern of world politics. The fate of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia was to be conclusively determined by the progress of the second world war and some of the divergent currents of world politics after the war.

Before Japan occupied Indonesia certain traits of Indonesian national movement were prominent: 'firstly, a tendency for revolutionary nationalism to become more moderate; secondly, a concentration of the strengths of the political parties; thirdly, the aspiration for a Parliament.'³⁰ The parties could form federations because of the common inviolate goal of Indonesia Merdeka (Free Indonesia), although there were roughly three big currents in the national movement, 'the leftist national group, the national Islamic group and the moderate national group.'³¹

The moderates were perhaps the most frustrated group in the struggle for freedom. They looked upon a few small concessions by the Dutch as the precursor of more far-reaching reforms culminating in complete independence. They knew the Dutch were not being humanitarians as they granted those concessions, but the changes were welcome. The Dutch scornfully spurned the striving for liberty in Indonesians. In the 18th century Edmund Burke requested the English King to renounce the colonial gains in America so that relations between England and America might endure profitably. Burke's argument did not convince English administrators till they suffered military disasters in the colony. The Dutch administrators in Indonesia also revealed a stubborn indifference to the rightful demands of the colonial people. Indonesians were strapped by laws after laws shattering freedom of thought and speech. They were disillusioned, their agony snow-balling into chronic frustration and suspicion. 'This administration', exclaims Sjahrir,³² 'will progress only bit by bit, if conditions force it to do so. By itself it does nothing, and, anticipating events, I shall say that *it will do nothing*.' The Dutch threw

away the opportunity to build up lasting friendship with Indonesians tending to their mutual advantage.

The Dutch all the time prided themselves on following an ethical policy. But, as a Dutch politician poignantly observed: "Everything short of naked force was called 'ethical' by the colonial Dutch before they were put into the camps by the Japanese."³³

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¹ Van Mook, *Stakes of Democracy in South East Asia*, p. 107. Also see Appendix 1.

² Raden Adjeng Kartini, *Letters of a Javanese Princess*, p. 43. The words 'Raden Adjeng' suggest her membership in the Javanese nobility.

³ It is to be emphasized, however, that Kartini is respected by her compatriots chiefly because of her pioneering ventures for the emancipation of Indonesian women. See Appendix 2.

⁴ Robert Van Niel, *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite*, pp. 56-62.

⁵ Harold W. Sundstrom, *Indonesia: Its People and Politics*, pp. 76-84.

⁶ Van Niel, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-66.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 123, 137, 159-62.

⁸ Arnold C. Brackman, *Indonesian Communism: A History*, p. 6.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 9. Also see B. H. M. Vlekka, *Nusantara*, p. 359.

¹¹ R. S. Kain, 'Moscow in Indonesia', *Current History*, August 1949, p. 66.

¹² Louis Fischer, *The Story of Indonesia*, pp. 57-58.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ This is a quotation from Aidit, *A Short History of the Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 10. Also see Van Mook, *SDSEA*, p. 115.

Sometimes a writer may be unaware of this impact of the Communist revolt on the Indonesian mind. See, for example, Louis Fischer, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58.

SDSEA: Abbreviation for 'Stakes of Democracy in South East Asia'.

¹⁵ Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. McVey, *The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents*, Introduction, pp. XVII-XVIII; Brackman, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

¹⁶ Vlekke, *op. cit.*, p. 351; Van Niel, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

¹⁸ Margueritte H. Bro, *Indonesia: Land of Challenge*, p. 50. Sundstrom, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89.

¹⁹ Sundstrom, *Ibid.*, pp. 89-91.

²⁰ Vlekke, *op. cit.*, p. 374.

²¹ Sundstrom, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-93.

- ²² G. M. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, p. 93.
- ²³ Vlekke, *op. cit.*, p. 384.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 397.
- ²⁵ Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, p. 3.
- ²⁶ Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, p. 95.
- ²⁷ Vlekke, *op. cit.*, p. 394.
- ²⁸ Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 96.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 97, 100; Vlekke, *op. cit.*, pp. 395-97.
- ³⁰ Roeslan Abdulgani, 'Parties and Parliament,' *Indonesian Affairs*, Oct.-Nov.-Dec. 1952, p. 7. Issued by the Ministry of Information, Republic of Indonesia. Abdulgani was at that time the Secretary General of the Ministry of Information.
- ³¹ Ali Sastroamidjojo (for sometime the Indonesian Premier), 'Survey of the Indonesian National Movement', *Indonesian Life*, March-April 1947.
- ³² Soetan Sjahrir, *Out of Exile*, p. 209.
- ³³ J. De Kadt, 'Dutch Bourbons', *The New Statesman & Nation*, 15 December 1945, p. 402.

JAPAN OVER INDONESIA

FREQUENTLY MYTHS and mystical prophecies leave a profound impression on peoples in this materialistic era even on matters of vital moment. The 14th century Javanese King Djojobojo¹ passed on his prediction to the 20th century Indonesians that after centuries of domination by a white race they would be liberated by a yellow race whose physical features and geographical whereabouts he could foretell with equal magical might. This was a possible reason why the Japanese invasion, when it came, did not take Indonesians unawares, nor was the thought of the Japanese occupation wholly unwelcome. These liberators, Djojobojo predicted, would come from the North, be of yellow skin and small height, and would reign for less than a year.

Japan borrowed and learnt the scientific techniques of the West with incredible speed and efficiency. She also successfully copied the Western states such as England, France or Germany in the game of power politics. A junior member of the club of imperialist powers, Japan practised the trade of imperialism with an astonishing assiduity and rapidity that left the Western powers awe-stricken. She marched upon China in 1894, Russia in 1904, Korea in 1910, Manchuria in 1931, and again China in 1937. The outbreak of the second world war provided Japan with a hand-tailored opportunity to realize the goal of a Japanese-led Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere comprising China, Manchuria, Thailand, Malaya, Indo-China, Netherlands East Indies, etc. The term 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' supplied a philanthropic embroidery to what was indubitably a plan of political dominance and economic exploitation by Japan. Europe's intensifying crisis was

Japan's priceless blessing. 'Japan apparently was resolved to make full use of the opportunities created by the defeat of Holland, the downfall of France, the seemingly hopeless position of great Britain, and the internal dissensions in the United States. The prize was here if she was ready to grab it.'² In July 1940 the Japanese Cabinet boldly formulated the creation of a New Order in Greater East Asia as a fundamental tenet of foreign policy.³

The vulnerability of the Netherlands East Indies (the NEI) to foreign attacks becomes readily apparent at the outbreak of a world war—for at such times communications with the Netherlands are closed. The first world war did not pose any serious danger for the NEI as Japan was no enemy of the U.K. and the U.S.A. But during the second world war, with Japan casting covetous looks at her and Hitler aiming at the Netherlands, the position of the NEI became extremely insecure. The collapse of Holland and the fall of France left the NEI at the mercy of Japan. But Japan did not immediately swoop down upon the NEI as she eagerly awaited the defeat of England. The fall of England would enable Japan to avoid British opposition to her imperialist venture; she could easily occupy a suitable military base like Singapore.⁴ This would perhaps make Hitler magnanimous enough to allow Japan a free hand in the NEI. Besides, Japan looked upon the NEI as the dearest treasure⁵ in Greater East Asia and wanted to grab the natural resources without any loss. A direct military attack might provoke a scorched-earth policy; the vast oil-fields could be easily set on fire.⁶ Hence Japan cleverly tried the weapon of economic penetration coupled with political pressure. On 27 August 1940, the Japanese government appointed Ichiro Kobayashi as special envoy to the Netherlands East Indies where he arrived on 12 September 1940. Kobayashi threw out a feeler for cooperation between the NEI and Japan. The Dutch diplomats were skilled enough not to yield to such a mischievously vague overture.⁷ They also scaled down the sweeping demands of Japan with regard to oil supplies. Kobayashi was frustrated and went back to Japan. The Japanese government appointed another special envoy, K. Yoshizawa, who arrived in the NEI on 28 December 1940.⁸ While Yoshizawa carried on negotia-

tions astutely the Japanese press screamed threats and spoiled Yoshizawa's attempts at economic infiltration.⁹ The Dutch did not accept his extravagant demands for extensive Japanese participation in the economic life of the NEI.

Japan probably should have avoided a war with Britain and the U.S.A.¹⁰ But Hitler could not beat Britain. She herself could not drag the NEI into the Co-Prosperity Sphere by means of diplomatic pressures. The European war drew out, its uncertainties increased. The long twilight in the China War, again, had already exasperated Japan.¹¹ Smarting under the double spur of economic greed and political ambition, obsessed with a military pride, she could not wait indefinitely. Japan decided for war¹² and directed a lightning attack on Pearl Harbour. This fateful assault paralyzed the U.S. Navy, left the whole of South-East Asia defenceless, and led Japan from victory to victory.¹³ She captured Hongkong and Singapore, she conquered Malaya. The attack on the NEI was staged on 14 February 1942, and met fumbling opposition that steadily dwindled to surrender.¹⁴ As a result, 'within eight days the centre of Dutch rule built up with such energy during three centuries, collapsed to the bewilderment of the Javanese and the arrogant surprise of their new conquerors.'¹⁵

In this connection a fundamental question that would perplex any student of international relations is whether this military campaign was a part of Japan's over-all conspiracy for a domination over East Asia, the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. As a matter of fact, this was the allegation against Japan put forward by the prosecution at the IMTFE (International Military Tribunal for the Far East). But Dr R. B. Pal of India, one of the Presiding Justices at the IMTFE, has denied the validity of this charge against Japan in his dissentient judgment in the Tokyo War Crimes Trials. According to him, the available evidence did not indicate 'any aggressive design on the part of Japan though it may be that Japan was casting her wistful eyes on the underdeveloped resources' of Indonesia. One can confess that the border-line between casting wistful eyes on a country and harbouring an aggressive design against it may not always be clear. Nevertheless, as Pal adds: 'Not a single powerful member of the so-called international

society can perhaps say that its behaviour does not disclose similar concern with foreign resources.¹⁶

The collapse of the Dutch empire before the Japanese onslaught could be regarded as the logical outcome of the emergence of a powerful Asian state that could contest the British naval strength. Holland was Britain's neighbour in Europe, and Britain's security was tied up with Holland's independence. A Big Power in Europe, if successful in establishing control over Holland, could easily use Holland as the base for an invasion against Britain. The rich colony of Indonesia was a safeguard for Holland's independence, and Britain was interested in helping Holland to preserve her colony. In the twentieth century, wrote A. E. Sokol, 'it was British sea-power that helped to protect the Dutch holdings in the archipelago, and it was British goodwill that kept the Dutch in possession of the widespread and rich island region.' This British support ceased to be effective with the outbreak of the second world war, for Britain was busy fighting her mortal European enemies. When Japan invaded South-East Asia, her armies enjoyed the protection of fleets and planes stronger than what was available to her opponents. The collapse of the Netherlands' empire in the East Indies was inevitable.¹⁷

The foremost reaction of Indonesians to Dutch defeat was, of course, the undermining of Dutch prestige in their eyes. This feeling became strengthened as some Indonesians surmised a repetition of the Vichy French business in Indo-China¹⁸ on their own soil—the Dutch surrender might be followed by another period of Dutch rule under Japanese patronage. Another important reaction was the belief that Indonesians, if militarily trained and equipped, might have dealt the same blow to the Dutch as the Japanese had done. These feelings drew further support from the lack of courage that the Dutch C-in-C. had displayed in depriving himself of the British and American military assistance immediately available against the aggressors. Many Indonesians seemed also to share a joy of success as the Japanese had been victorious at the expense of the Dutch oppressors.¹⁹

As regards the reaction of the people to Japan's entry the attitude initially was one of easy acceptance²⁰ resulting from a multitude of factors. There was the Djojobero myth²¹ always

flashing in popular memory. Besides, perhaps Indonesians thought that a change-over from Dutch²³ to Japanese overlordship might not be worse. Above all, the Japanese were clever enough to placate their sentiments and they permitted the flying of the Indonesian national flag accompanied by the singing of the national song. This appeal was absent in the Dutchmen's approach. And many people were quick in hailing the Japanese. They had not yet tasted the fruits of Japanese occupation and were not capable of sober assessment. Of course, even at the beginning of the Japanese rule there were many Indonesians who would have preferred the Dutch having democratic faiths, however overshadowed, to the Japanese professing fascist beliefs, however obscure. There were others again who would welcome neither the Dutchmen nor the Japanese and would build a resurrected Indonesia on the retirement of the Netherlands and Japan. They deplored²³ the popular fervour about Japan's success and predicted²⁴ a transformation in popular attitude once the Japanese settled down as conquerors.

Average Indonesians had a sense of uplift as they were permitted to print daily papers in their own language. The Japanese set up a civil administrative body (the *Hodohan*), a military administrative body (*Kenetsu Han*) and a semi-official body to provide assistance to the Indonesian national press²⁵ (the *Djawa Shinbunkai*). This sense was reinforced as the Indonesian officials²⁶ all got promotion to two or three degrees higher jobs formerly held by Dutchmen shortly sent to internment camps. The Japanese did not know the indigenous languages; they did not know how to do without Indonesians even in the highest offices. The Japanese extended the favour to Indonesians as a matter of expediency; to Indonesians it came as the fulfilment of long-cherished expectations. Of course on the top of all these was the Japanese military administration and paragraph 2 of the military lawbook laid down that the Commander of the Army of Dai Nippon holds the highest powers of military government and also all powers which previously were held by the Governor General. Yet, as S. M. Gandasubrata writes:²⁷ 'The self-respect which in Dutch colonial time was not visible among our people now grew little by little.' For, not only as regards administrative matters

but also as regards educational and military affairs the invidious distinction between the rulers and the ruled based on the supposed inferiority of the latter was done away with. 'Holland for centuries had held the opinion that the Javanese could not become satisfactory soldiers....Japan was willing²⁸ to invite the Javanese people to oppose the Allied attack with her' and so helped the formation of an Indonesian armed force immensely valuable in later national struggles.

In the sphere of religion, too, the Japanese tactfully adopted a policy of placating Indonesians. They tried to secure the allegiance of Moslem religious leaders. The Japanese were aware that these religious leaders had a great sway over the minds of the masses. They also knew that these religious leaders had a predominantly anti-Western outlook. The Japanese, therefore, proceeded to consolidate their position in the new colony by patronizing the religious leaders and lending them a social and political prestige which their predecessors, the Dutch, had refrained from.²⁹

Elated by the early success attending their first contact with Indonesians the Japanese puffed themselves with the fond thought of shooting out their exploiting machinery without having to concede materially anything to Indonesia's nationalist aspirations. To that end they started the Triple A Movement in April 1942. The three A's stood for three ways in which Japan would associate herself with Asia as a unit; that is, as a Leader, Protector and as the Light of Asia.³⁰ "The 'three A's Movement' was an undisguised attempt to achieve a greater Japan. For this purpose, the Indonesians had to be educated and indoctrinated as good Asiatics according to the Japanese understanding of the term. This meant that the Indonesians must be educated as good Japanese. They must learn the Japanese language, manners and customs, and they must also acquire a Japanese soul."³¹ It did not take long to disillusion the Indonesians of Japanese sincerity and the Japanese of Indonesian sympathy. The Indonesians could look through Japan's talk of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere.³² Their real policy could not for long be hidden under richly worded propaganda pieces. Under their very eyes the Indonesians found transshipment of various goods to Japan who did not reciprocate. Indonesians were forced to sell ex-

portable crops at fixed prices.³³ The extortionate agricultural policy of the Japanese produced alarming famines. The Japanese sometimes irrationally dictated the adoption of their agricultural practices which might not be suited to the soil or climate in Indonesia.³⁴ Coprosperity was seen to mean only the prosperity for Japan with the cowering cooperation of the subjugated land.³⁵ Furthermore, Indonesians resented the Japanese intervention in schooling and the outrageous policy of pushing the Japanese language as a part of the curriculum above the primary stage. Teachers were trained in Djakarta where they would learn the Japanese language, Japanese drills. They were recruited from different schools where they had been working. On completion of the training they would go back to their institutions and give those courses to the students.³⁶ Surpassing all these came the instances of rude personal behaviour on the part of the Japanese—often a Japanese would slap an Indonesian taking advantage of the power of the state behind him.³⁷

Soon the Japanese were to take cognizance of the growing Indonesian antipathy sometimes causing violent anti-Japanese outbreaks in different parts of the archipelago. Insults and injuries heaped upon Indonesians by the Japanese in their daily personal intercourse inflamed Indonesians. Their growing discontent sometimes erupted. The Japanese ordered the students to shave their heads. It was an act of irreparable stupidity. Students rebelled.³⁸ Japanese war-lords asked villagers to work long hours and produce food for their troops. But they did not bother whether the overworked villagers were starving.³⁹ The Japanese talked of Asian solidarity but practised discrimination in hotels⁴⁰ and shops many of which were reserved for the Japanese only. Their attitude to the women was also shocking. They would throw Indonesian women into the troubles of hard labour or the ignominy of providing carnal pleasures.⁴¹ All these provoked popular uprisings.⁴² But these also nourished national selfconsciousness and hardened the Indonesians in their determination to wipe out foreign domination.⁴³

In another significant way the Japanese further bolstered up the Indonesian national cause. They released the Indonesian leaders imprisoned or exiled by the Dutch authorities, the

most notable of them being Sukarno, Hatta and Sjahrir.⁴⁴ The Japanese wanted to enlist their services in the anti-Western propaganda drive. But these national heroes were not to be disabused of their ingrained ideas regarding the Japanese fascism, its content and context. Contacts were established between these three leaders resulting in an agreed decision to conduct the national movement in two channels,⁴⁵ legal and non-legal, above the ground and underground. Sjahrir took charge of the underground movement while Sukarno and Hatta would work through the conquerors and utilize legal machineries in their favour, e.g., manipulating the services of the radio station. It is only expected that this dual role would evoke attacks from interested quarters branding Sukarno and Hatta as quislings. But Sjahrir notes,⁴⁶ Sukarno regarded the Japanese as 'pure fascists and felt that we must use the most subtle methods to go round them, such as making an appearance of collaboration.' While Japan would seek to gain her popularity through Sukarno's popularity, Sukarno would try to wrest concessions to nationalism. Similarly, Hatta 'always regarded himself as a democrat and a nationalist who had been prevailed upon to accept a position by force majeure. Using this position, he tried to do what he could for our cause.'⁴⁷ This political strategy of a two-layer movement was unavoidable because the Japanese summarily suspended the normal functioning of independent political parties.⁴⁸ Besides, Hatta and Sukarno could help the underground organizations financially and secure to their leaders easy cross-country communications by virtue of the high legal position they were enjoying. And Sjahrir acknowledges the faithful services of Hatta who always maintained links with the underground movement. 'He also received our reports and warned us when he heard something was brewing on the Japanese side. I heard from him everything that took place among the Japanese and among the collaborating Indonesians.'⁴⁹

The Japanese sought to restore by propaganda what they lost in practical politics. The Japanese wanted to deceive Indonesians into believing that they were eager to resurrect Indonesia politically as also economically. They were ruling as absolute dictators. But they posed to be champions of Indonesia's freedom. Even before their Indies campaign the Tokyo

radio-station⁵⁰ would pour out 'Indonesia Raya' (the Indonesian national anthem) and also talks and commentaries glorifying Japan and villifying the Western powers. After the conquest of Indonesia Japan smothered the political freedom of Indonesians. Even the right to discuss the activities and orders⁵¹ of the military government was forbidden. But the Japanese pretended to foster nationalism and encourage nationalist activities. They organized a mammoth political association, the Putera⁵² (Pusat Tenaga Rakjat or the Centre of the Working Strength of the People).

The Chairman of the Putera, Sukarno, and his subordinate compatriots, had to spread the gospel of Japan's New Order.⁵³ The Putera was later on converted into the Hokokai (the Centre of Peoples' Service) where the control of the military rulers was made more manifest and firm.⁵⁴ '... it is difficult to give the name political party to these two organizations, because the prerequisite of the presence of certain aspirations concerning the state and society was not satisfied. Furthermore membership was compulsory for every resident.'⁵⁵

Indonesian leaders in the Putera or the Hokokai were urged to aid the Japanese war-effort in two ways: by persuading the people to enlist themselves in the Japanese war-services, by indoctrinating the people against any sympathy for the Allies. This was not enough. In order to elicit greater cooperation in war operations the Japanese Premier Tojo⁵⁶ broadcast in June 1943 a hint of independence for Indonesians. Tojo emphasized the need for a comprehensive political organization among Indonesians piloting towards independence. In the same year the Japanese offered to Indonesians some bigger and apparently attractive concessions. On 5 September⁵⁷ were set up the Central Advisory Council and also Advisory Councils for Municipalities and Residencies for facilitating popular participation in government. At first these were established in Java; in Sumatra the Central Advisory Council was not established before 27 June 1945.⁵⁸ As a token of appreciation of Japan's conciliatory move, Sukarno, the Chairman of the Council, and two other members, Hatta and Hadikusumo, paid a visit to the Japanese capital, expressed keen appreciation and conveyed 'the thanks of 50 million Indonesians from Java'.⁵⁹

There was a striking interplay of opposing forces in the ac-

tivities of the Putera or the Hokokai. The Japanese created them for mobilizing Indonesia's material and human resources in view of the war against the Allies. Furthermore, if Indonesians could not be taught to revere the Japanese, they could at least be taught to hate the Allies and even to fight them—so thought the military governors in the Indies. Indonesian leaders, on the other hand, sought to secure through the organizations widespread mass-contact and mass-sympathy for the kindred cause of nationalism—the Dutch had barred, as we can remember, effective contacts between the leaders and the peoples, which could now be re-established freely and frequently.⁶⁰ The most significant benefit was the annihilation of inferiority-complex natural to a downtrodden people and an immense addition to the nationalist potentials of the country. Popular self-consciousness, so long dormant, was worked up to ceaseless activity. In a measure this was rendered possible by services of the radio on which Sukarno was an indefatigable participant. 'At prescribed hours the population was required to listen to...official broadcasts, including the frequent speeches of Sukarno.'⁶¹ In these, according to his instructions from the Japanese, he attacked the Allies, extolled the Japanese and called upon the population to support their war-effort. An examination of these speeches, however, will support Sukarno's contention that '75 per cent of their content was pure nationalism'. Moreover, they were full of subtleties and double talk which passed over the heads of Japanese monitors but were meaningful to the population, especially those of Javanese culture. Such talk made it easy for the peasant to equate 'anti-imperialism' with 'anti-Japanese'. Van Mook also attests that it is wrong to view all Indonesians 'who accepted office in what were obviously puppet positions as mere collaborators or vain and egoistic weaklings'.⁶² He admits that 'the ideal of an independent Indonesia was a very real part of' Sukarno's character and that in Sukarno's 'most bombastic rantings against the Allies ('we shall iron out America and break up the British') there were always ambiguous sentences concerning the future relation to Japan.'⁶³

The Japanese also planted other organizations to indoctrinate and regiment the people. The Peta⁶⁴ (Pembela Tamah

Air or Defenders of the Fatherland) was set up to offer military training to Indonesians whom the Japanese dreamt of employing in the war against the Allies. Another military organization set up by the Japanese was the Heiho forming the auxiliary armed forces. Indonesians recruited in the Heiho⁶⁵ were sometimes employed in guarding the internment camps. Later on members of these defence organizations played a splendid role in warding off Dutch attempts to recolonize Indonesia.

The Japanese were weatherwise to establish spying and propagandist organizations to cover the youth as also older public. The Seinendan clawed the young people,⁶⁶ the Keibadan embraced the older generation.⁶⁷ Religious prejudices were also utilized by the politic Japanese who founded the Masjumi to fan religious fanaticism and make Moslems anti-Christian and therefore anti-Western.⁶⁸

The high-pressure tactics of Japanese propaganda could not contain discontent among Indonesians. The Japanese machinery of exploitation was too cruel to be hidden under constant propaganda. The sight of Indonesians forcibly employed in unhealthy areas to prepare roads or construct bridges for the Japanese army was too horrifying to be compensated by propaganda. 'The villages were decimated by starvation and sickness, particularly malaria, for which no medicine was available. At the same time the Quinine factory in Bandung, which had produced quinine for the whole world, operated day and night at a full capacity, producing for the Japanese military forces. In some villages the Japanese labour conscription took such a heavy toll that only women remained.'⁶⁹ The Japanese used the Indonesian labour force 'not only in the Indies but in Malaya and Burma as well.'⁷⁰ People perished in thousands in fertile food-surplus regions⁷¹ owing to certain policies of production and procurement adopted by the Japanese militarists. Even the appeal to Islam as against Christianity could not evoke popular loyalty as the Japanese enforced profane practices:⁷² every Indonesian must bow to the Japanese Emperor's picture, they must show reverence to Japanese soldiers.

Indonesians also found galling inequalities in the military corps which they were invited to join and which gave them

military training. Indonesians in the Heiho were given the same type of military training as the Japanese but were treated 'badly and coarsely' and given worse food. 'This was similar to the experience of Javanese soldiers at the time of the Netherlands Indies; they were never given potatoes to eat.'⁷³ These military organizations, moreover, offered some unsightly exercises⁷⁴ shocking the conscience of Indonesians. Increasingly they were driven to the arms of underground organizations. This shows that 'the Javanese youth had not fallen hook, line and sinker for Japanese methods and propaganda,' although many Hollanders thought otherwise.⁷⁵ They strengthened the striking arm of the Indonesian national movement. Simmering hatred among Indonesians sometimes exploded in frantic flare-ups aided by the underground in many places like Indramaju, Tasikmalaja, etc.⁷⁶ Revolts broke out even in the ranks of the Japanese sponsored army corps in Blitar and other places.⁷⁷ The sway of the underground organizations magnified as the Japanese, in spite of their hardest efforts, could not conceal their multiplying defeats in the hands of the Allies.

The Japanese too became agonizingly aware of the approaching doom as the year 1944 advanced. Military disasters made them acutely conscious of the need to make significant concessions to Indonesian nationalism. They might not be able to rule Indonesia for a long time, but they might leave an independent Indonesia resisting a reimposition of Western dominance. The West would then, to a vicarious satisfaction of Japan, be baulked of the fruits of hard-earned victory. After the setting up of the Central Advisory Council 'further Japanese steps towards Indonesian independence did not follow until after the allied military action had become a direct menace to Java, but then kept pace with that action.'⁷⁹ The Tojo Cabinet in Japan resigned under the shadow of Allied advances. Koiso succeeded Tojo. The Japanese military authorities disagreed⁸⁰ as to the offer of indulgences to Indonesian nationalists. A compromise⁸¹ was effected on 2 September 1944. Koiso was to declare to the Diet that the Indonesians would be eventually granted independence. However, the Japanese military authorities quietly forgot to fix up any date when their promise would be fulfilled.

Koiso announced it to the Diet on 7 September 1944. It was

easy to discern the fundamental factor forcing Koiso to issue this Declaration. This was chiefly a matter of military strategy. By July 1944 the Allies inflicted such strategic losses on the Japanese as to make the latter apprehend that the Philippines would very soon be captured by the Allies. That would mean a disruption of sea communication between Japan and Indonesia. Indonesian oil would not then be available to Japanese defenders of the homeland, nor would mainland Japan be able to help in the defence of Indonesia against an Allied invasion. Moreover, the Japanese could not be sure of success in the double battle against Allied invaders and Indonesians trying to wrest freedom immediately. The Koiso announcement, therefore, appeared to be dictated by considerations of military necessity.⁸²

Sukarno welcomed the announcement and declared⁸³: 'Today the 70 million inhabitants of Indonesia received the confirmation that the Dai Nippon Taikoku has sanctioned the future independence of the whole Indonesian people so that, as is hoped, the lasting and eternal prosperity of the whole people of Indonesia might be built up....' But Japan's brain was divided. Japan's heart was torn between faintest hopes of survival and awful signs of defeat. On 1 November 1944, an Indonesian Journal, subsidized by the Japanese, castigated people who were impatient because of the delay in getting independence.⁸⁴ The Allied forces had already landed in the Philippines⁸⁵ on 19 October. The Japanese announced on 7 November⁸⁶ that Indonesia would be granted independence. Towards the end of November a Japanese officer informed Gandasubrata—the officer claimed to be transmitting an announcement of the Japanese Army—that 'Japan has given freedom to the Indonesian people and country'.⁸⁷ But Gandasubrata was frustrated as he listened to the Radio Djakarta announcing that Indonesia 'would be freed in a few days' time'.⁸⁸ The Japanese would not acquiesce in complete instantaneous independence as long as they hoped, however dimly, to turn the scales in war. 'While the war was in their favour the Japanese unequivocally indicated that Indonesia's independence must wait until the end of the war in the Pacific.'⁸⁹ Even when they lost their hope they would perhaps erect

psychological barriers against the excruciating feeling of impotence. They would not firmly act on the withering hopes.

The Japanese offensive was at an end. Even their resistance began to fail. There were serious weaknesses in the Japanese military machine which foretold ultimate military collapse. Firstly, the Japanese underestimated the military capabilities, actual and potential, of the United States, when they launched the surprise attack on Pearl Harbour. This attack swept away all American hesitation about direct participation in the second world war on the side of the Allies. The United States economy switched over to the production of war materials in full swing, and the Japanese economy was no match for it. The Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere, although it commanded important resources like rubber, tin, kapok, etc., could not succeed significantly because of a lack of access to outside markets. Moreover, Japan had always profited from borrowing Western technological devices. This borrowing mechanism did not work properly during the war, while Western technology, spurred by war, took a tremendous leap forward. The progress of Japanese technology fell behind that of Western technology.⁹⁰

As the war progressed and defeat chased the Japanese, they were impelled to take some decisive steps towards Indonesia's freedom. The Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Java issued a decree⁹¹ on 1 March 1945, declaring the formation of an Investigating Committee for preparation of Independence. The working period of this Committee could not be fixed, announced the Japanese government on 28 April 1945 'as it does not only depend on the productiveness of the Committee but also on the general course of the war and on other circumstances.'⁹² It must not be supposed, however, that the Japanese founded this Committee solely on their own initiative. Indonesians pressed for it and popular revolts forced⁹³ the Japanese to be more complaisant. The first session⁹⁴ of the Investigating Committee was held from 29 May to 1 June 1945. During this session on 1 June Sukarno came forward with his formula of five principles serving as the keystone of a free Indonesia which he boldly announced before the Committee of Investigation. Sukarno, remarkable for his synthetic approach to national problems, presented an elaborate combination of

principles, Eastern and Western, rural and urban, communistic and non-communistic, sectional as well as secular, in his celebrated formulation of Pantja Sila. An examination of these principles is important not only because it records the genuine impressions of a dauntless devotee to country's cause but because it helps us to realize the policy-foundations of a major Asian country till lately smarting under Western dominance. According to Roeslan Abdulgani, 'it was by the Pantja Sila that Indonesia got a national identity in the world. The Five principles are not only a registration of the Indonesian peoples' own personality traits but also constitute a directive power for the future.'⁹⁵

The first of these principles is nationalism conceived in a very wide sense to cover all the inhabitants 'from the Northern tip of Sumatra to Irian'.⁹⁶ It is rid of imperialistic tendencies. As Sukarno asserts:⁹⁷ 'Undoubtedly there is a danger involved in the principle of nationalism. The danger is that probably men will narrow down nationalism to chauvinism... do not let us say that the Indonesian nation is the noblest and most perfect, whilst belittling other peoples. We should aim at the unity and brotherhood of the whole world.' Sukarno referred to Gandhiji's saying 'I am a nationalist but my nationalism is humanity.' The second principle is this humanitarianism or internationalism, deducible from the first. Here, too, his view is well-balanced, steering midway between narrow nationalism and cosmopolitanism. He lays down:⁹⁸ 'We should not only establish the State of Free Indonesia, but we should also aim at making one family of all nations....But when I say internationalism, I do not mean cosmopolitanism, which does not recognize nationalism, which says there is no Indonesia, no Japan...and so on. Internationalism cannot flower if it is not rooted in the soil of nationalism. Nationalism cannot flower if it does not grow within the garden of internationalism.' The third principle⁹⁹ is 'the principle of consent, the principle of representative government, the principle of consultation.' "The Indonesian State shall not be a state for one individual, neither a state for one group, nor for the wealthy. But we are to establish a state 'all for all', 'one for all', 'one for all, all for one'." In the fourth place, Sukarno postulated social upliftment or social justice. Sukarno put the

following interrogation:¹⁰⁰ 'Do we want a free Indonesia whose capitalists do as they wish, or where the entire people prosper, where every man has enough to eat, enough to wear, lives in prosperity, feels cherished by the homeland that gives him sufficient keep?' In Indonesian this is the principle of Ratu Adil. 'The people wish for prosperity. The people, who recently have felt themselves what it is not to have enough to eat nor enough to wear, wish to create a new world in which there is justice, under the leadership of Ratu Adil.'¹⁰¹ Lastly, Sukarno expounded the religious principle of belief in God. He explained:¹⁰² "Not only should the people of Indonesia have belief in God, but every Indonesian should believe in his own particular God....But let us all have belief in God. The Indonesian state shall be a state where every person can worship God in freedom...without 'religious egoism'." 'Let us observe, let us practise religion, whether Islam or Christianity, in a civilized way. What is that civilized way? It is the way of mutual respect.'¹⁰³

But the master synthesiser would not stop there. He would reduce the first two principles to socio-nationalism, the next two to socio-democracy. And then he would put forward the Indonesian term 'gotong rojong' (mutual cooperation) as standing for the five principles now compressed into three. And he stated:¹⁰⁴ " 'Mutual Cooperation' is a dynamic conviction, more dynamic than 'brotherhood', gentlemen. Brotherhood is a static conviction, but 'Gotong Rojong'—mutual cooperation, portrays one endeavour, one charity, one task....The piety of all for the interests of all!" In this way, 'Pantjasila becomes Trisila, Trisila becomes Ekasila—one principle'.¹⁰⁵ The birth of Pantjasila marked the triumph of democratic ideas in Indonesia. Sukarno's unreserved attachment to democracy came out as he spoke fully and eloquently about the five principles. It serves to delete the notion that Sukarno was a Japanese underling won over to Fascism. In spite of strict Japanese censorship¹⁰⁶ Sukarno fearlessly upheld the principle of democracy. He 'never relinquished the democratic idea during the whole period of the Japanese occupation. He held fast to it and always tried to find a way to realize it.'¹⁰⁷

The second session of the Investigating Committee was held from 10 July to 17 July 1945. Reportedly the Committee reach-

ed agreement on the 'constitution, government, economic problems, defence, education, etc.'¹⁰⁸ Thereupon the Committee was adjudged to have completed its work.¹⁰⁹

Meanwhile Indonesians were getting more restless as the psychological warfare¹¹⁰ launched by the Allies made them sense Japan's cataclysm. It also sapped the Japanese morale as reflected in a 'rise in the proportion of surrenders to killed among Japanese troops from 0.6 per cent in the first three months of 1944 to 12.5 per cent in June/July 1945, with an equally significant rise in the proportion of voluntary surrenders.'¹¹¹ As the belief in the impossibility of Japan's surrender vanished, the military governors in Indonesia took another step towards the liberation of Indonesia. On 7 August 1945, they announced that the Preparatory Commission for Indonesian Independence would be set up in the middle of August.¹¹² Discussions between Sukarno, Hatta, Wedijodiningrat and Japanese authorities took place in Batavia¹¹³ on the evening of 8 August 1945. The three Indonesian leaders next morning flew to Dalat near Saigon for a meeting with Marshall Terauchi,¹¹⁴ the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army in the Southern Territories. Possibly they conferred on the membership of the Preparatory Commission¹¹⁵ and on finalizing the grant of independence.¹¹⁶ Membership of the Preparatory Commission for Indonesian Independence (PPKI or Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia) was later declared to be 21 representing the whole of Indonesia.¹¹⁷

Before he left for Saigon Hatta had a crucial discussion with Sjahrir who asked him to draw a sharp dichotomy between Japanese and Indonesian interests in the coming interview so that Indonesians 'would be forced into a position of open conflict'¹¹⁸ with the Japanese. Sjahrir was in favour of making the situation 'as revolutionary as possible' in order that disunity among Indonesians resulting from a show of collaboration by many of them might be dissipated. Since the beginning of the Japanese occupation the undergrounds had strengthened their organizations, amassed striking power and augmented their fighting zeal so that the colonial evil might not reappear. It is not clear how far the undergrounds, in spite of their preparation and determination, could succeed in their contemplated insurrection. For there is a strong opinion that

'the Japanese forces could easily have maintained control if they had desired; they had Sukarno and his associates under their hand in Batavia, and needed only to seize upon them in order to deprive the movement of leadership'.¹¹⁹ This opinion, of course, needs to be balanced by the fact that Sukarno was not in direct charge of the underground movement. The undergrounds were not supported by pro-Dutch elements or even the Chinese as they had expected. The pro-Dutch elements had made no preparation¹²⁰ for underground activities and after mass arrests by the Japanese they could not even try for it. The Chinese¹²¹ gave but little assistance in the form of smuggled arms—this they did presumably on profit-motives and not on nationalist sympathies. Nevertheless, the undergrounds commanded courage, if not the required strength, to fight the Japanese in order to erect a Free Indonesia.

Hatta returned to inform Sjahrir that the Japanese had fixed the date for declaration of independence on 19 August. But during the absence of Hatta, Sjahrir got a report that Japan was about to capitulate. He spurned the 19 August offer as a pious fraud. He told Hatta (it was 14 August) that the Japanese might surrender before 19th and independence must be proclaimed before surrender.¹²² He insisted on immediate proclamation. It would be a drastic step. But it would have a singular advantage. The proclamation would be interpreted to be the result of Saigon parleys. That would perhaps urge Indonesians in the Japanese Administration to act loyally under nationalist leaders. Furthermore, the proclamation would be the signal to resistance organizations for a united offensive against the Japanese.¹²³

Sukarno did not agree. He was afraid, an immediate proclamation might infuriate the Japanese to retaliate.¹²⁴ Sjahrir went to his place and persuaded him to proclaim independence at 5 p.m. that day, i.e., 14 August.¹²⁵ Messages were accordingly transmitted to underground organizations. Thousands of youngmen assembled outside Batavia to wait for the proclamation, and then to march in, ready for demonstrations and even fighting. But Sukarno threw a bomb-shell just before 6 p.m. He sent a message seeking postponement for a day.

It was an explosive situation. Members of the underground organizations got exasperated. Many of them desperately suggested that proclamation should take place without Sukarno. But Sjahrir did not accept it.¹²⁶ He wanted to avoid dissensions in the nationalist camp. Others thought of kidnapping Sukarno when Sukarno turned down the request of a delegation from that assemblage. Sjahrir rejected the plan, but some youngmen, mainly students, became quixotic and kidnapped¹²⁷ Sukarno and Hatta.

The Japanese detected that Sukarno and Hatta had been kidnapped and found out the place of detention. Mass arrests would have taken place but for the interposition of nationalists working under the Japanese and their friends in the Japanese Navy. The captains were released and went to the residence of Japanese Admiral Mayeda after Sukarno had promised to make the proclamation on the 16th. Sjahrir felt chagrined¹²⁸ as the proclamation ceased to be a popular revolutionary affair. He was disappointed that the odium of Japanese initiative would attach to the proclamation if it was issued by the Preparatory Commission. He refused to participate in the meeting of the Commission and discuss the proclamation. The meeting was held in Mayeda's house and later on Sjahrir was satisfied to learn that Mayeda was 'personally sympathetic toward Indonesian national aspirations' and that the Japanese did not influence the deliberations of the Commission.¹²⁹

A critic can twist this development to prove that Indonesian nationalism was simply a byproduct of collaboration between the Japanese and the Javanese. This is, for example, the viewpoint of Professor Gerbrandy expressed in his book *Indonesia*. Gerbrandy appears to forget that nationalist feelings were quite strong in Indonesia even before the second world war. Nevertheless, all Dutch scholars do not share the same view. Thus, J. H. Francois, in his book '37 years of the Indonesian National Movement' (37 JAAR Indoneische Vrijheids Beweging, Hilversum, De Drihock, 1946) has taken an unprejudiced attitude. Francois, a 'retired adviser to the Department of Internal Affairs in the Netherlands Indies Government' wrote this book 'with the avowed purpose of correcting the misconception prevalent in Holland that the Republic was a

purely Japanese tool, a creation through which a few rabble-rousers would rule for the benefit of Nippon over ignorant masses still profoundly loyal to the [Dutch] Queen,' attests P. M. Kattenburg.¹³⁰

Although the Japanese Navy was viewing the problem compassionately and rather idealistically,¹³¹ the Army was destined to oppose the move of proclamation. (As a matter of fact, the policy of encouraging Indonesian nationalists as underlined by the Koiso Declaration of 7 September 1944, had always been handicapped by a sharp cleavage of views between the Japanese Navy and the Army.)¹³² Leaders demurred. But the friends of revolutionary groups in the Japanese press office (the Domei) 'forced the issue by broadcasting the proclamation to the world, and on the seventeenth Abdul Rachman finally read the proclamation on the lawn of his house. He was to be the President and Hafil the Vice-President of the new Republic.'¹³³

Curtain dropped on the short-lived Japanese hegemony in South East Asia. Uprisings of the subjugated peoples and defeat at the hands of the Allies left the Japanese regime tottering. These uprisings furthermore confirmed the view that the Indonesian nationalists were not merely Japanese creatures. One would be impressed that 'the Japanese, far from surveying the flamelike spread of nationalism with the proud air of Machiavellian progenitors, regarded it more like people who found that what they had mounted as mules or donkeys had suddenly turned into outsize tigers.'¹³⁴ Many uprisings occurred in different parts of South East Asia during the short-lived Japanese Empire. 'The guerrillas in the Philippines as well as the Thakins in Burma swelled and drilled and resisted. Nationalism of these countries could not be allied to the imperialism of Japan. They stood for freedom in terms to be translated into their own lives. Thus was Japan's doom sealed even before the Atom Bomb.'¹³⁵ The Japanese regime totally collapsed with the fall of nuclear bombs.

On Indonesians the Japanese interlude bestowed lessons immensely valuable for the national movement. The sweeping victories of Japan over Europeans made them feel that white domination was not permanent or impossible to overturn.¹³⁶ Japan's tyranny taught them to hate all forms of colonialism,

white or yellow. 'During the centuries in which white men alone had been in any position to practise imperialism an assumption had grown up, on the part both of the subjected peoples and the imperialists themselves, that this was an art or crime (whichever you like to call it) peculiar to white men. The Japanese taught us otherwise.'¹³⁷ The Japanese excelled the Dutch in tyranny. This has been attested by Indonesians, e.g., Djajadiningrat and Sjahrir.¹³⁸ The former wrote: 'Dutch rule had been replaced by another foreign domination that was considerably worse.' The latter commented: 'Under the Japanese, the people had to endure indignities worse than any they had known before...' Nor could the Japanese impress Indonesians by their intelligence. 'The well-educated native of South-East Asia, agile and as a rule soundly trained, could see no mental supermen in the general run of Japanese who professed to be his superiors or his equals; he often found them rather stupid and mediocre.'¹³⁹ The Japanese were stupidly arrogant in their personal behaviour and administrative actions. While their tyranny steeled the minds of Indonesians, their stupidity gave Indonesians a sense of superiority.

This sense was vivified as they became more confident with the acquisition of military training and administrative experience under the Japanese rule.¹⁴⁰ They could infer that given suitable facilities they would not lag behind the Japanese or Europeans (who had suffered many defeats in the hands of the Japanese) in military or administrative capacity. The Japanese further injected them with political ambitions as they set up a school (Ashrama)¹⁴¹ where Indonesians would receive discourses on political science and listen to eminent personalities like Sukarno, Hatta, or Sjahrir. The school became an inventory of nationalist energy and talents. 'The courses I gave', wrote Sjahrir, 'concerned nationalism and democratic principles, and I must admit that I derived some pleasure from the results. Quite a few of those who took the course later became capable fighters for our freedom and our republic.'¹⁴²

Oppression and hatred, propaganda and training, agony and expectation, all boiled up in the Japanese era to kindle nationalism. The legacy of Japan to Indonesia was renewed

confidence in a capacity for self-government, a raging indignation against foreign dominance and a grim determination to stave off colonialism at all costs.

REFERENCES

- ¹ Dorothy Woodman, *The Republic of Indonesia*, pp. 173-74.
- ² Vlekke, *The Story of the Dutch East Indies*, p. 200.
- ³ *International Military Tribunal for the Far East* (hereinafter referred to as *IMTFE*), Exhibit 541.
- ⁴ *IMTFE*, Record of Proceedings, pp. 11724-7.
- ⁵ *IMTFE*, Exhibits 1335 and 1336.
- ⁶ Sontag and Beddie (ed), *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-41*, p. 310. [ed.=Editorial.] Also see *IMTFE, Record of Proceedings*, pp. 11724-7.
- ⁷ Van Mook, *Netherlands Indies and Japan*, pp. 42-45.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 64.
- ⁹ F. C. Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia*, p. 245. Also see *IMTFE, Record of Proceedings*, p. 11743.
- ¹⁰ 'It had seemed impossible that Japan would court destruction in war with Britain and the United States, and probably Russia in the end.' Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. III, p. 471.
- ¹¹ Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 316.
- ¹² Japan's ambassador in Germany worked hard to keep Germany out of the fray for the Indies spoils. On 22 May 1940, Germany assured Japan that she was not interested in the N.E.I. *IMTFE*, Exhibits 517, 518, 519.
- ¹³ Van Mook, *SDSEA*, pp. 134, 138.
- ¹⁴ Woodman, *The Republic of Indonesia*, p. 176; Sjahrir, *Out of Exile*, p. 231.
- ¹⁵ Woodman, *The Republic of Indonesia*, p. 176.
- ¹⁶ R. B. Pal, *International Military Tribunal for the Far East*, pp. 498-99.
- ¹⁷ A. E. Sokol, 'Communism and Production in Indonesian History', *Far Eastern Quarterly*, August 1948, p. 352.
- ¹⁸ Sjahrir, *Out of Exile*, p. 219.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 218-19.
- ²⁰ One section of the people in Indonesia was thoroughly dissatisfied with the Chinese. See Appendix 3.
- ²¹ Sjahrir, *Out of Exile*, pp. 232-33.
- ²² Djajadiningrat, *The Beginning of the Indonesian-Dutch Negotiations*, p. 1. Also see Appendix 4.
- ²³ Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 232.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 233.
- ²⁵ Roeslan Abdulgani, 'The National Press and its Social Function', *Indonesian Affairs*, Aug./Sept. 1952, p. 26.

It must not be supposed that the press was free. The Japanese Administration controlled the news and sought to utilize newspapers for securing their propaganda objectives. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

²⁶ Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

²⁷ *An account of the Japanese occupation of Banjumas Residency, Java, March 1942 to August 1945*, p. 10. Mr Gandasubrata was promoted to the post of the Resident in that area.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

²⁹ For an illuminating study of the position of Islam under the Japanese occupation, see Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*, esp. pp. 201-2.

³⁰ E. R. Dickover, 'The Japanese War-Machine: Its Strength and Weakness,' *The Department of State Bulletin*, 18 February 1945, p. 245.

³¹ Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-47. Also see Aziz, *Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia*, pp. 212-13.

³² Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay, 'Freedom Movements in Asia', *United Asia*, May 1948, p. 27.

³³ I. N. Djajadiningrat, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

³⁴ Gandasubrata, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

³⁵ Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 247. Also see Appendix 5.

³⁶ V. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 206. Also see Appendix 5.

³⁷ 'The Japanese officers and men were harsh to the inhabitants of all races. As a result, people generally felt afraid. To strike the head and so on was their custom.' Gandasubrata, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

³⁸ 'The order to all students to shave their heads, and the use of slap on the head as a pedagogical technique, contributed considerably to strengthen the feeling of self-consciousness and self-confidence.' Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

³⁹ Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

⁴⁰ *The Voice of Free Indonesia*, Dummy Number (1945 ?), p. 11.

⁴¹ Gandasubrata, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁴² Aidit, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁴³ 'Everywhere, where Indonesians gathered in intimate circles, they were talking about when and how they could get rid of this Japanese spiritual and material oppression, and become free.' *The Voice of Free Indonesia*, Dummy Number (1945?), p. 12.

⁴⁴ Statement of de Weerd (IMTFE, Exhibit 1351).

⁴⁵ Ubani, *op. cit.*, p. 16. Also see J. A. Verdoorn, 'Indonesia at the Crossroads,' *Pacific Affairs*, December 1946, p. 346.

⁴⁶ Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

⁴⁷ Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

⁴⁸ Roeslan Abdulgani, *Indonesian Affairs*, Oct/Nov/Dec/1952, p. 8.

⁴⁹ Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

⁵⁰ Djajadiningrat, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁵¹ Van Mook, *SDSEA*, pp. 146-47.

⁵² IMTFE, Exhibit 1351.

⁵³ Aziz, *Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia*, p. 214.

⁵⁴ Roeslan Abdulgani, *Indonesian Affairs*, Oct/Nov/Dec 1952, p. 9.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Tojo was prepared to assure Indonesians in definitive terms that ultimately they would be granted independence. See Evidence of Tojo, *IMTFE*, Record of the Proceedings, pp. 36466-7. But the Supreme Command and the Japanese Governors in the East Indies were opposed to it. At the Imperial Conference of 31 May 1943, the Japanese could agree to accord Indonesians some share in the administration. *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *U. N. Document—S/Ac.10/Conf.2/SR3—10 December 1947, Annex. I, p. 12.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* Also see *IMTFE*, Exhibit 1344.

⁶⁰ Certain sections of the people, notably the Chinese and Eurasians, were excluded from membership in the Putera. Perhaps this was favourable to the growth of solidarity among Indonesian nationalists although the Japanese only tried to play off one section against another. *IMTFE*, Exhibit 1351.

⁶¹ Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, p. 108.

⁶² Van Mook, *SDSEA*, p. 143.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 151, 154.

⁶⁴ General Harada expressed his willingness to form the volunteer forces in October 1943. *IMTFE*, Exhibit 1351.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ Van Mook, *SDSEA*, p. 152. In this book Van Mook has nowhere referred to the Putera.

⁶⁸ *IMTFE*, Exhibit 1351.

⁶⁹ Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 2500. 'The villagers were decimated by starvation and sickness, particularly malaria, for which no medicine was available. At the same time the Quinine factory in Pandung, which had produced Quinine for the whole world, operated day and night at full capacity, producing for the Japanese military forces. In some villages the Japanese labour conscription took such a heavy toll that only women remained.'

⁷⁰ Thompson, 'Japan's Blueprint for Indonesia', *Far Eastern Quarterly*, February 1946, p. 204. Also see Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, pp. 247-50.

⁷¹ *Ibid.* Also see *The Voice of Free Indonesia*, Dummy Number (1945?), pp. 22-23. Also Gandasubrata, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁷⁴ Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

⁷⁵ Laurens Van Der Post, 'Some Considerations on the New South Asia', *Political Quarterly*, Vol. II, 1951, p. 129. Also see Ubani, *United Asia*, Jan-Feb. 1949, p. 417.

⁷⁶ *U. N. Document—S/Ac.10/Conf.2/SR3—10 Dec. 1947, Annex. II, p. 23.*

⁷⁷ Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 251. Also see *Merdeka*, 31 May 1948, p. 40.

⁷⁸ Significantly enough, Sjahrir is hardly mentioned in Professor Gerbrandy's book, *Indonesia*, although he had always painted the promoters of the Indonesian Republic as Japanese puppets. After all, Gerbrandy is not an Indonesian. But even Aidit does not mention the name of Hatta or Sjahrir while he discusses the Japanese occupation of Indonesia.

⁷⁹ U. N. Document—S/Ac.10/Conf.2/SR3—10 December 1947, Annex. I, p. 12.

⁸⁰ *IMTFE*, Exhibit 1344.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, Exhibit 1348.

⁸² Benedict R.O.'G. Anderson, *Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics Under The Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945*, p. 2.

⁸³ U. N. Document—S/Ac.10/Conf.2/SR.3—10 December 1947, Annex. I, p. 9.

⁸⁴ Louis Fischer, *The Story of Indonesia*, p. 73.

⁸⁵ U. N. Document—S/Ac.10/Conf.2/SR.2—10 Dec. 1947, Annex. I, p. 13.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Gandasubrata, *op. cit.*, p. 20

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ Djajadiningrat, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁹⁰ E. R. Dickover, 'The Japanese War-Machine: Its Strength and Weakness', *The Department of State Bulletin*, 18 Feb. 1945, p. 242.

⁹¹ U. N. Document—S/Ac.10/Conf.2/SR.3—10 Dec. 1947, Annex. I, p. 13.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ Lahirnja Pantjasila (The Birth of Pantjasila). Ministry of Information, Republic of Indonesia, Djakarta, January 1952, p. 7.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9—in the Introduction written by Dr K. R. T. Radjiman Wedijodiningrat who had been the Chairman of the Investigating Committee.

⁹⁵ Roeslan Abdulgani, *In Search of an Indonesian Identity*, p. 17.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 22

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 26

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 27. The Javanese speak of the goddess of justice as Ratu Adil.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 28

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 30

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* Also see appendix 6.

¹⁰⁶ See *The National Struggle (Past & Present)*, Issued by the Information Services Indonesia, New Delhi, p. 6.

¹⁰⁷ *Lahirnja Pantjasila*, p. 9—stated by Wedijodiningrat. One cannot but add here that Sukarno of 1965 is very much different from Sukarno of 1945.

¹⁰⁸ U. N. Document—S/Ac.10/Conf.2/Sr.3—10 December 1947, Annex. I, p. 13.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ For details see *Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff* by the Supreme Allied Commander, S. E. Asia, 1943-45, by Earl Mountbatten.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

¹¹² U. N. Document referred to in Note 103—p. 14. Also see IMTFE, Exhibit 1351.

¹¹³ U. N. Document (in Note 103), p. 14.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ Djajadiningrat, *op. cit.*, p. 5. Also see U. N. Document (in Note 108).

¹¹⁷ Ubani, *Merdeka*, 31 May 1948, p.16.

¹¹⁸ Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

¹¹⁹ Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia*, p. 381.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 244.

¹²¹ *Ibid.* Also See Van Mook, *SDSEA*, p. 149; Gandasubrata, *op. cit.* p. 3.

¹²² *Out of Exile*, pp. 253-54.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

¹²⁷ It was reported that the followers of Tan Malaka did the kidnapping—John Coast, *Recruit to Revolution*, p. 12.

¹²⁸ *Out of Exile*, p. 258. Also See Louis Fischer, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76.

¹²⁹ *Out of Exile*, p. 258. Also See Anderson, *Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics Under the Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945*, p. 96.

¹³⁰ *Pacific Affairs*, 1947, pp. 454-5.

¹³¹ *The Voice of Free Indonesia*, Dummy Number (1945?), p. 12. Also See Anderson, *op. cit.* p. 97.

¹³² Anderson makes an elaborate study of this cleavage in Chapter 1 of *Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics Under the Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945*.

¹³³ *Out of Exile*, pp. 258-59. Hafil is the pseudonym for Hatta, Abdul Rachman is the pseudonym for Sukarno.

¹³⁴ Laurens Van Der Post, *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 2, 1951, pp. 129-30.

¹³⁵ Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay, *United Asia*, May 1948, p. 27.

¹³⁶ John Coast, *Recruit to Revolution* (hereinafter to be referred to as RR), p. 8.

¹³⁷ John Strachey, *The End of Empire*, p. 130.

¹³⁸ Djajadiningrat, *op. cit.*, p. 3; Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 249. Also see M. H. Bro, *Indonesia, Land of Challenge*, p. 53.

¹³⁹ Van Mook, *SDSEA*, p. 145.

¹⁴⁰ *The National Struggle* (Past and Present), issued by the Information Services Indonesia, New Delhi, p. 19.

¹⁴¹ Indonesian Students in the National Struggle by A. B. I., *Merdeka*, 31 May 1948, p. 40.

¹⁴² *Out of Exile*, pp. 251-52.

2

BRITISH TROOPS IN INDONESIA

THE BRITISH TROOPS landed in Djakarta harbour on 29 September 1945, while Japan had unconditionally surrendered on 14 August¹ and the South East Asia Command (SEAC) of the Allies suspended its operations on 15 August although the preparation for an assault on Malaya² had been already made and resources moved and mobilized accordingly. The landing of Allied forces in Indonesia could not take place earlier because the entire plan of the SEAC had to be modified. Netherlanders, who looked forward to a speedy re-establishment of colonial authority in the Indies, mourned the delay as it gave the nationalists in Indonesia the much-needed respite to consolidate³ their authority. They also interpreted it as a cynical betrayal⁴ of the interests of a small power associated with big powers whose activities could not be dictated by the former, however compelling its need might be. Hollanders, too anxious to resurrect their colonial authority, overlooked the various causes of delay.

A major cause of the delay was the administrative re-organization of the South East Asia Command.⁵ On 24 July it was decided at Potsdam that the SEAC would be expanded to cover the whole of Indonesia and parts of Indo-China. Initially, Lord Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander, SEAC, had only Sumatra under his care. The expansion had been recommended to relieve General Macarthur of the SWPAC (South West Pacific Area Command) and to enable him to prepare a final assault on Japan. The transfer of areas to the SEAC, however, posed tremendous problems for Mountbatten. He did not have the requisite intelligence services, shipping facilities or the advantages of a properly fortified base. Re-

sources of the SEAC needed diversion from the projected invasion of Malaya that was guiding the SEAC policy before Japan's surrender. The British Pacific Fleet⁶ did not assist Lord Mountbatten while the areas under his command enlarged. Intelligence Staff and Files on the new areas were never made available to him. Mountbatten commented: 'In war, no new operations in these areas had been contemplated until after October; now my responsibilities were immediate and urgent, but neither the troops, the shipping, nor the Intelligence I had asked for, were available to me Nor were they ever made so....'⁷ Mountbatten was further worried by the presence of fully armed large battalions of Japanese soldiers in various parts of South East Asia.⁸ They might or might not have received the surrender news.⁹ They might decide to ignore the surrender orders and resist allied occupation.¹⁰ Above all, resources available to Lord Mountbatten were totally insufficient for a full-scale occupation although they might have sufficed for war-operations. Responsibilities of full-scale occupation far outweighed the resources at the disposal of the SEAC and were thoroughly different from those of invasion only. An invader is not troubled by the difficulties of peace-time demands and national aspirations of local peoples. An occupying power, after the surrender of the enemy, is beset with many such complicated problems.

All these accounted for the delay in the arrival of Allied Forces in Indonesia. To avoid Japanese resistance it was decided that occupation should await¹¹ the acceptance of final surrender terms by MacArthur in the Tokyo Bay. Occupation had also to depend on the establishment of a base in Singapore that would facilitate the movement of supplies.

Meanwhile the Republic, since the proclamation of 17 August 1945, surged forward. 'The effect of the proclamation was tremendous. It was as though our Indonesian people had been electrified. A majority of the Indonesian civil servants, administrators, police and military groups immediately declared their support of the Republic. National strength and unity reached greater heights than anything we had known before.'¹²

The Preparatory Commission for Indonesian Independence set about the task of reconstructing the political machinery of the country. The task was arduous as the debris of centuries

of foreign exploitation had to be cleared: 'The Dutch occupied Indonesia for three and a half centuries, the Japanese for three and a half years.'¹³ On 18 August the Preparatory Commission formulated the Constitution¹⁴ of the Republic of Indonesia. The Constitution proclaimed the faith of Indonesians in popular sovereignty and sought to realize parliamentary democracy. It is important to note that, contrary to the propaganda and misgivings of many Dutch statesmen and writers, fascistic principles were not enshrined in the Constitution. On the same day the Preparatory Commission elected Sukarno and Hatta as the President and the Vice-President respectively, who appealed to the people to maintain discipline and order.¹⁵

On 19 August the Preparatory Commission divided the Republic into 8 provinces and constituted 12 ministries.¹⁶ It took more important steps three days later as it established the foundations of (a) the Indonesian parliament, (b) the party system and (c) the National Army by deciding to create respectively (a) the Central National Committee (Komite Nasional Pusat), (b) the Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia), and (c) the Peoples' Security Board (Badan Keamanan Rakjat).¹⁷ As regards the formation of the Indonesian Nationalist Party the leaders were in a quandary. Fully armed Japanese were still a menace to the security of the infant Republic. Doubts about the winning of international recognition haunted the leaders. They began to ponder whether parties should exist as instruments of struggle or whether the parliament, strengthened by one political party reflecting the unity of the people, should be the agency to preserve freedom. The government declared on 31 August¹⁸ that the formation of the Indonesian Nationalist Party was postponed. This indicated the importance of the parliament as the instrument of nationalist action and also permitted political parties to be used as levers for national interests.¹⁹ The parties would further the aims of national independence by working through the Indonesian Parliament (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat or KNIP) and also by working themselves outside the KNIP.

The Constitution stipulated the formation of a Cabinet²⁰ to aid the President. The members of the Cabinet will be responsible to the President²¹ following the model in the U.S.A.

The President himself is answerable to the popular assembly.²³ The Presidents' Cabinet was finally set up on 4 September 1945, while the KNIP had been inaugurated on 29 August.²³

The surrender and the birth of the Republic must have disbalanced many of the Japanese. Many became fatalists and ceased to assert authority.²⁴ Others refused to accept the authority of nationalists and were involved in skirmishes. Sometimes prolonged clashes between the Republicans and the Japanese resulted in heavy casualties. Some Japanese voluntarily surrendered arms either in order to strengthen Indonesians as against the victorious enemies of Japan²⁵ or to buy off their security from the attacks of the resistance organizations. The members of resistance groups attacked the Japanese simply to satisfy old grievances or to capture arms necessary for opposing the restitution of the Dutch regime. The Japanese were sometimes easy targets partly because they were tired of dramatic events, caught in sad uncertainties, disappointed with frustrated hopes.

Sukarno directed Indonesians not to obey the Japanese.²⁶ This precipitated pitched battles between the Japanese and Indonesians in some places. The Republic wanted to liquidate Japanese authority and the hangovers of the Japanese era. The Preparatory Commission, therefore, disbanded²⁷ the Hei-ho and the Peta. The Japanese felt humiliated and bewildered—many committed suicide.

Their bewilderment rose as Mountbatten ordered the Japanese Commander to preserve law and peace. Perhaps Mountbatten had no alternative²⁸ as he did not find any internationally recognized government that could be entrusted with the maintenance of law and order. He might be excused if he had an inadequate understanding of Indonesian politics and the strength of nationalists. He was judicious in not relying upon the gimcrack shadow government²⁹ formed by Dutch internees on receipt of the surrender news.

Indonesians did not obviously welcome Mountbatten's order calling upon the Japanese to maintain law and order. "The decision taken by the Allies to use the Japanese *enemy* rather than the 'oppressed' Indonesians to maintain law and order, must surely at the start have undermined any possible Indonesian trust in Dutch intentions, and focussed Indonesian

attention on the inescapable fact that the Dutch, not the Japanese, were their real antagonists."³⁰

Dutch colonialists and their sympathisers complain that the Japanese simply scamped the directive of Mountbatten in the hope of bolstering up the Republic. The complaint is false. Japanese soldiers were not always ready to obey the orders of the newly founded Republic. They did not calmly abdicate their authority. There was widespread fighting between the Republicans and Japanese soldiers. Students often took the lead in these hostilities.³¹ That the Japanese were not trifling the orders of the Allied Commander totally could be further illustrated by their cooperative role in guarding and distributing supplies brought by Mercy Ships of the Allies.³²

The Hollanders had their fill of jubilation as they saw the atom-bombed Japanese surrendering unconditionally. They immediately thought of recolonizing the Indies with the same pre-war zeal. Their attitude contained an embarrassing legacy of the period in which they followed a policy of repression and mistakes.

The Dutchmen affected to believe that they would follow an enlightened policy toward war-ravaged order-thirsty Indonesia. They expected natives to trust their liberal policies³³ because even before the end of the war and as early as 6 December 1942, Queen Wilhelmina delivered a speech outlining a colonial policy that was vaguely conciliatory. The Queen assured that 'after the war it will be possible to reconstruct the kingdom on the solid foundation of complete partnership, which will mean the *consummation*³⁴ of all that has been developed in the past . . . I know that the Netherlands more than ever feels its responsibility for the vigorous growth of the Overseas Territories and that the Indonesians recognize in the ever-increasing collaboration the best guarantee for the recovery of their peace and happiness.' The Queen spoke on behalf of the Netherlands' government-in-exile. Indonesians could not be blamed if they were not enthused by the nobly nebulous utterances of a refugee government that could not defend itself or the colony. A few months earlier the Queen visited the United States and addressed both the Chambers of the Congress on 6 August 1942. There also she asserted³⁵ 'that with regard to Indonesia her policy aimed at the con-

stant development of democracy and progress.' Hollanders looked upon all these as sufficient proofs of their liberal intentions and expected³⁶ Indonesians to feel likewise.

The Dutch felt despirited as they saw the infant Republic marching ahead. Indonesia's determination to oppose their return aggrieved them. Indonesians were foolish, they thought, in not depending on the Dutch for creating order³⁷ out of the chaos produced by Japanese imperialism. Their disappointment became all the more galling as they did not have the resources³⁸ to reconquer Indonesia. They had some troops by which they could begin occupation. But the Allied military authorities could not make available to Holland requisite shipping facilities.³⁹ Holland concentrated her attention on Indonesia. For Great Britain and the United States, Indonesia was a secondary matter. 'While the Dutch, Japanese and Indonesians might very well imagine that the allies kept a hard, beady eye on Indonesia at every moment, the reality was very different. Power lay in the hands of the British and Americans, and naturally British and American interests were going to be seen to before the Dutch were allowed effectively to stake their claims.'⁴⁰ Holland felt herself forlorn and shored up her fading hopes by thinking about the Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs Administration (NICA) Agreement.

This NICA Agreement between the British and the Netherlands Governments at first concerned Sumatra (belonging to the SEAC) and shaped by discussions during April 1944 in London and Kandy.⁴¹ The Agreement visualized a phased transfer of authority to the NICA staff after reoccupation. During the first phase the Allied Commander will have supreme responsibility of conducting military operations and restoring law and order. In the second phase with the return of normalcy the NICA officers will have to shoulder all responsibility. But Mountbatten was not informed before August 1945⁴² that he might assume the Agreement as accomplished. On 4 September⁴³ Van Mook and Mountbatten resolved that the NICA Agreement concerning Sumatra would be applicable to the rest of the Netherlands East Indies.

On 12 September⁴⁴ Mountbatten accepted the surrender of Japanese forces of the Southern Territories. Mountbatten faced an extremely delicate situation as regards Indonesia. The NICA

Agreement had been drawn up in anticipation of enemy resistance and regardless of local nationalist movement. The Netherlands Intelligence Services⁴⁵ in Australia could not calculate, or would not admit, the strength of the nationalist forces in Indonesia and the baffling complications of the situation. Mountbatten was placed in a quandary. He could not allow his troops to extinguish a national liberation movement in view of the declared policy of the British government to grant self-government to colonies like India. This feeling became stronger as the Allied Forces in the Netherlands East Indies had a large contingent of Indian soldiers obviously sympathetic to nationalist cause. Besides, employing them to suppress nationalists in Indonesia would evoke serious protests from India. When, therefore, Rear Admiral Patterson⁴⁶ arrived in Java on 8 September with an advance-party he was instructed by the Supreme Allied Commander not to release British soldiers to repress the Republic.

On the other hand, the British government had to avoid estranging the Dutch. The Dutch had to be put on their legs with the help of the British forces. But helping the Dutch might mean undermining the authority of the young Republic. The problem became more perplexing as the safe and sane way of undertaking the minimum tasks of relieving internees or restraining the Japanese soldiers lay through negotiations with the Republic.⁴⁷ The Republic had sufficient strength to help the British in those tasks. But to solicit help of the nationalists would look like severing ties of friendship with Holland.

All these considerations weighed heavily on the mind of the Supreme Allied Commander as he decided to limit⁴⁸ the tasks of the British forces in Indonesia. These tasks included the rescue of Allied prisoners of war and internees, concentration and disarming of the Japanese. Preparations for an ultimate transfer of administrative responsibility to the NICA staff were not included, nor was the aim of establishing law and order over the whole of the Netherlands East Indies that would facilitate the former.⁴⁹ The British forces would only occupy the strategic areas of Batavia and Surabaya and maintain law and order there. This deflation of aims surely irritated the Dutch and deviated from the NICA Agreement. But there had also been a fundamental change in the conditions

of territories not reckoned by the framers of the NICA Agreement. The existence of an assertive national movement constituted the fundamental change and really magnified the responsibilities⁵⁰ of Mountbatten rather than a mere addition of half a million square miles to the area of the SEAC.

The curtailment of objectives must have appeared justified to the British troops as they encountered no resistance from the Republicans during their first landings on 29 September. It further illustrated the sober authority of Republican leaders and belied the Dutch contention that Republicans were nothing but vengeful terrorists and blood-thirsty extremists. Republicans did not oppose landing because they hoped the British would not put down the freedom movement and batter the free Republic and would merely confine themselves to the twin objectives of disarming the Japanese and rescuing the prisoners of war and internees; Indonesians also wanted to avoid blood-shed and refrained from fighting the British troops.⁵¹ This act of wisdom was repaid as the British authorities did not heed the request of Dutch officers demanding an immediate arrest of Republican leaders.⁵²

The NICA officers accompanying the British troops immediately set to wipe out the Republic. Their assiduity overflowed and they began to recruit soldiers from amongst Dutchmen and Eurasians. Very soon they were found attacking the Republican troops with ferocity.⁵³ The latter retaliated, of course, with that youthful energy born of love for freedom. Thus began the long, sad story of continuous deterioration in Dutch-Indonesian relations.

The Dutch could not tolerate their amphibious existence. When Japan was beaten the pre-war masters of the Indies must be saddled with authority. They wanted to get back the reins of authority temporarily usurped by Japan and now snatched by the nationalists. They found themselves legal owners of Indonesia yet deprived of lawful authority. Eliminating the Republic, therefore, became their supreme endeavour. So long as the Republic could not be smashed irreclaimably the Dutch began to circulate hideous lies⁵⁴ about it: (A) there was no nationalism in the Indies which would always welcome back the sagacious colonial rulers, asserted many Hollanders who were unrepentantly colonial-minded; (B) they

dubbed the Republican leaders as Japanese hirelings hindering a graceful resuscitation of Dutch power; (C) the Republican leaders, immersed in Japanese propaganda, were upholding totalitarianism; (D) even if recognized, the Republic was incapable of discharging the onerous responsibilities of administration.

The critics forgot that (A) nationalism in the Indies was at least 37 years old, if one would take Budi Utomo as the starting point, leaving aside the various anti-Dutch uprisings throughout the 19th century which undoubtedly derived much of their strength from nationalist fervour. '...the 19th century for Indonesia was a century full of revolutions for the sake of freedom...from 1825-30 in mid-Java under the leadership of Diponegoro; in 1850 in Central Sumatra by Imam Bondjol, and from 1872-1904 in North Sumatra.'⁵⁵

(B) Leaders of the Republic included not only those who worked and feigned cooperation with the Japanese in the interests of the independence movement, but also those plucky underground leaders who kept the flames of nationalism alive under a constant threat of Japanese terror. This was not simply affirmed by Indonesians but also recognized by dispassionate foreign observers. The Dutch weekly, *Uitzicht*, Vol. II, No. 5, contained an editorial referring to 'the misconception existing in Holland on the political parties of the Republic. The parties are considered part of the liquidated Japanese heritage. It should be kept in mind that the greater part of these parties existed already before 1940.'⁵⁶ Again, as *The New Statesman & Nation* commented:⁵⁷ 'The argument that many nationalist leaders worked with the Japanese is misleading, for collaboration appeared to many of them the next stage to liberation from their Western conquerors and those movements do now in fact represent the national feeling in those countries.' Robert Trumbull's remarks in his despatch from Batavia also appear to be very important in this connection:⁵⁸ 'Responsible Dutch persons here are staunch defenders of the Indonesians against the accusations of collaboration. The Dutch as well as the Indonesians deprecate the publicity given to the role of the Japanese in the formation of the Republic in August 1945, a few days after the war's end.'

(C) The Constitution of the newly founded Republic could

be branded as totalitarian only by a monstrous application of logic. As Hatta affirmed:⁵⁹ 'Please remember that, although the Japanese were in power at the time we planned and discussed the form and shape of the Free Indonesian State, we did not in any way copy Japanese principles or ideas. We deliberately chose the type of political structure we had advocated and demanded for the past fifteen years, namely, a republic based on the sovereignty of the people.' The same view was forcefully reiterated in the political manifesto issued by Republicans.⁶⁰

(D) Even in the turbulent days of Japanese atrocities, Dutch manoeuvrings and British connivance, just after the birth of the Republic, its mettlesome followers displayed their administrative capacity which, one can recall, had also been reputably demonstrated in the Japanese era.⁶¹ Donnison noted that while Hollanders 'pushed on with their plans for the establishment of NICA administration as soon as the forces of occupation arrived, realization grew among the British that the Republican Government and the nationalist movement were stronger and more firmly established than had been suspected. The Republican government had by now taken over charge of some at least of the public utility services and was operating them not ineffectively.'⁶²

The immense mass upheaval in Indonesia did not appeal to the Dutch who further expected the British officers to dislodge the Republicans. The British could not totally forget the interests of their wartime ally. At the same time, experiences⁶³ in Burma and Malaya suggested the unquestionable desirability of recognizing popular forces and acting through them. All these spelt contradictions in British policy in Indonesia. On the one hand, the SEAC Notice to the People of Java read:⁶⁴ 'Troops under the Supreme Command of Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten have arrived in your country to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces, on behalf of the United Nations, and to protect the people and maintain Law and Order until such time as the lawful Government of the Netherlands East Indies is once again functioning.' The Notice also emphasized that the laws of the Netherlands East Indies would be applied and enforced by the NICA officers. These must have infuriated Republicans⁶⁵ who displayed

patience and forbearance as they did not launch large-scale hostilities against the small number of British forces immediately on their arrival. For the Notice clearly marked the goal of restoration of the Dutch colonial authority through British bayonets.

On the other hand, General Christison announced:⁶⁶ 'Our sole job is to rescue prisoners of war and disarm the Japanese. We are not going to interfere with the political position in Java. I have made it clear that we are not going in to put the Dutch back into power. I am going to keep law and order, and I shall expect the political leaders to cooperate with me.' This showed that the British concern for placating the Dutch was tempered by a friendly appreciation of the Republic's strength. It showed that the British could comprehend the strength and achievements of the nationalists in Indonesia and would not follow the Notice in every detail.

In spite of this policy of enlightened conciliation a battle between the British and the Indonesians could not be averted for a long time. In Java the AFNEI occupied Batavia and Semarang. Then as it proceeded to occupy Bandung it met some unsuccessful resistance from the Republicans. Next came the untoward occupation of Surabaya. The British officers did not seek any permission for landing from the local Republican authorities although the latter had pleaded for that. At first troops entered upto 800 metres from the seaside beyond which Indonesians would not allow them to move.⁶⁷ Presently they entered the town without any resistance as they gave assurances⁶⁸ which they forgot as soon as they were in possession of the town apart from the naval base. Surabaya was not lawless at that time, but the British resolved to make her lawful, first, by arming the sharp-shooting Hollanders and second, by haughtily ordering Indonesians to surrender their arms to the British.⁶⁹ The people of Surabaya proved resistive; they ignored the threat of punishment for a refusal to surrender arms. Fierce fighting broke out on 28 October.⁷⁰ Scenes of devastation were laid throughout the city. The entire British Brigade would have been destroyed but for the intervention of Sukarno⁷¹ who flew to Surabaya and arranged the truce on 29 October 1945. The extremist Indonesians thought it inopportune but the truce was only an index of moderation

pervading the whole Indonesian national struggle for self-government.

In spite of the truce fighting did not stop in all quarters. The truce provided for an immediate cease-fire, maintenance of law and order by Indonesians and the establishment of a Contact Bureau for liaison purposes. But neither this nor Sukarno's appeal could stop all hostilities. And on 30 October Brigadier Mallaby was killed while facing a mob which was probably infuriated by mistaking the truce for a surrender. The death of Mallaby was an important episode in British-Indonesia relations. But the circumstances of this death appear to be confusing. According to Rajendra Singh, Mallaby, accompanied by some Indonesian leaders, was touring the town of Surabaya. While the Indonesian leaders were trying to explain the agreement to the mob, 'some extremists in the crowd', writes Rajendra Singh, 'shouted down their leaders and shot dead Brigadier Mallaby.' But Dorothy Woodman gives a different impression about the incident. 'Brigadier Mallaby was killed in circumstances which have never yet been officially explained.' On the other hand, Indonesians affirm that there were 'evidences given by Indonesian as well as British personnel that the death of Mallaby was caused by an Indian soldier, who dropped a hand-grenade too close to the General's motor car'. On the whole, one would agree with Rajendra Singh when he comments that 'accidents do happen in history and an accident of a miserable nature happened at Surabaya on 29 October and changed the course of Anglo-Indonesian relations adversely.'⁷²

President Sukarno declared: 'The incidents that occurred after the landing of the Allied Forces of Surabaya created a serious situation which I regret . . . I learned to my greatest regret after my return to Djakarta that fighting has been renewed and that Brigadier Mallaby, whose braveness I witnessed and honoured during the fighting of Surabaya, has become a victim of the disorders. We have ordered to stop fighting, and we shall take appropriate measures to master the situation while I shall keep myself in close cooperation with the Allied Army.'⁷³ But General Christison decided to adopt a stern attitude and issued the following warning: 'Unless the Indonesians responsible for the death of Brigadier Mallaby and

the breaking of the truce surrender to my forces I intend to bring the whole weight of sea, land and air forces under my command, with all the weapons of modern warfare, against them until they are crushed. If in this process innocent Indonesians should be killed or wounded the entire responsibility will rest with those Indonesians who have committed the crimes I have mentioned.'⁷⁴

Sukarno⁷⁵ appealed to world opinion for helping Indonesia out of this blood-bath. He appealed to Attlee and Truman requesting them to reverse the pro-Dutch policy followed by the British and Britain's Indian troops in Indonesia.⁷⁶ He entreated Stalin to aid the suffering peoples of Indonesia. Mr Nehru in India tried in vain to go to Indonesia—the British Government did not permit his tour. Mr Jinnah, India's Muslim League leader, pleaded for withdrawal of Indian troops.⁷⁷ The tense situation, however, did not improve. The Indonesians were impelled towards a Holy War to annihilate the Allies. The Fifth Indian Division could no longer be kept in the sea. With them devastation entered Java. The bloody battle of Surabaya did not end till it took the toll of thousands and the city was minutely occupied. The British Commander's warnings or the Indonesian Governor's attempts failed to avoid the cataclysm. Indonesians fought to death the Sherman tanks sometimes with daggers and sometimes utilizing the Japanese training and organization. Whether organized or not, they could only die or retreat before advancing regiments equipped with the paraphernalia of modern warfare. The most ferocious encounter took place on 10 November. "The tussle between the demon of colonialism and the spirit behind the proclamation of independence came to a head when masses rose in anger at Surabaya on 10 November 1945. The explosion of the mass struggle...astonished the world, causing that 10 November to be recorded in history as 'November 10 that shook the world'."⁷⁸ Yet, it cannot be said, therefore, that 'from the Indonesian point of view the battle of Surabaya was a complete waste of time, of life, of ammunition, and property.'⁷⁹ For, this intense fighting indicated the national sentiment animating Indonesians and uniting them towards a conjoint endeavour, however painful the resulting experience might be. It also initiated fresh thinking in the British gov-

ernment on this challenging subject; either there must be a fullfledged war or a new political manoeuvre. Labour leaders were not all for war. Nor were all the Dutch. Thus Mr de Kadt in 'Het Parool'⁸⁰ admitted as the only solution 'the recognition of independence and an attempt to make an agreement as to cooperation between Holland and Indonesia on that basis.' But there were a few Netherlanders to nourish such opinions, and fewer to preach them.

The British, in their confused response to Dutch intentions and nationalist activities, had asked the Japanese to maintain law and order till they would themselves take over. Dutch internees were shocked as they were to be protected by those who had committed repulsive crimes⁸¹ against them recently. Indonesians were perturbed as they interpreted it as a sign of mistrust and as a prelude to Dutch authorities being installed by the British friends. This suspicion was confirmed when the Japanese were employed by the British to fight and suppress the nationalists,⁸² e.g., in Bandung, Medan and Semarang.

All this did not augur well for negotiations between nationalists and the British who further outraged Republican sentiments by hoisting the Dutch flag in their headquarters.⁸³ The red-and-white national flag at that time was flying all over Indonesia and its sanctity seemed to be challenged by the Dutch flag.

A far worse enemy of negotiations was the inflexible attitude of the Dutch who refused to have any truck with the nationalists. They wanted to act as if the world around had not changed, as if nationalism was a fantasy and the Republic was non-existent.

Prospects for negotiations improved as the British General solicited the cooperation of the Republic in the evacuation and transportation of the internees and the Japanese.⁸⁴ The Republic warmly responded and became more hopeful when General Christison announced that he would do his best 'to ameliorate the position by bringing together for the first time round a conference table the leaders of the Nationalist Movement and the Dutch government representatives.'⁸⁵ Many Hollanders, reading in every conciliatory move a mark of doom, condemned the British for this hasty act that amounted to

'unconsidered recognition'.⁸⁶ They regretted that the British officers were not satisfied to act only through them. They forgot that 'the needs of the military forces, of the prisoners and internees, and the need to distribute food to the people of Indonesia, forced the British to come to administrative arrangements with the Indonesians direct.'⁸⁷ They vilified every British attempt at negotiation with the Republic as a policy of appeasing foolhardy rebels.

Not all Dutchmen were, however, impermeable to the needs of puissant nationalism. Mr Van der Plas, the Dutch representative on the staff of Lord Mountbatten, and Dr Van Mook, the Lieutenant Governor General, wanted to face realities and negotiate⁸⁸ with the Republicans. In October they tried to initiate negotiations, but their moves were sternly repudiated by the Hague. The Netherlands government at that time was following a reactionary policy at home and abroad. It liquidated in Holland the traditional rights of representation⁸⁹ and the royal decree of 12 April professed to set up nominated councils all over the country. In Indonesia it treated the nationalist government with indifference and ruled out any concessions to nationalists who, according to the Dutch government, were simply Japanese stooges.

When the Dutch condemned the Indonesian nationalists as Japanese parasites they ignored three important facts. Firstly, they refused to understand that collaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation was but a temporary strategy. Allan Dawes made a significant comment on this strategy. He wrote: 'Collaboration assumes a new aspect in a country where the subject race, once its rulers had gone, felt itself entitled to make every post a winning post in its struggle for freedom.'⁹⁰ Secondly, the Dutch did not recognize the important fact that all Japanese did not welcome the proclamation of the Republic. The Japanese tried to counteract the upsurge of popular feelings preceding and following the proclamation. On 19 September, for example, the Japanese Kempeitai tried to prevent Sukarno from attending a public meeting. They even placed tanks and machine guns around the spot where the meeting was to take place. But, as thousands of Indonesians streamed in, the Japanese gave way.⁹¹ Thirdly, the Dutch did not pay sufficient attention to

the fact that the Japanese fought Republicans even after surrender. Indonesian youth organizations formed the spearhead in this battle against the Japanese.⁹² And, as regards military activities of Indonesians after the British landing in Surabaya, *The New York Times* of 20 November 1945, specifically stated: 'British circles said there was no proof that the Japanese were masterminding or leading the Indonesians.'

Even London sometimes appeared to have accepted the Dutch propaganda, even though the Dutch did not always make a very charitable interpretation of British activities in Indonesia. One former Dutch Minister for Overseas Territories declared at an Amsterdam meeting that the British had supplied arms and ammunition to the Republic of Indonesia.⁹³ During his South-East Asian tour the Secretary of State for War, Mr Lawson, had stated that Britain was not obliged to help her allies in their struggles against nationalists in the colonies.⁹⁴ But Mr Attlee's statement on 17 October was quite different: the independence movement in Indonesia had been 'sponsored by the Japanese for two or three years', he said, and echoed Dutch propaganda.⁹⁵ Its effect on Republican opinion was easily conceivable and its inequity was slightly mitigated by the noble attempt of 60 Labour M.P.s who issued a statement on 25 October urging negotiations with Indonesians and reflecting uneasiness over 'military operations calculated to restore the Dutch Empire in Indonesia'.⁹⁶ Indonesians were particularly shocked to see Dutch troops being smuggled in by British forces.⁹⁷ To them the British seemed to set the seal of approval on the terrorist practices of many Dutchmen who were quick at the trigger and had an irresistible desire to hit at anything Republican, flag or man.⁹⁸ Their suspicion about British intentions grew and was almost confirmed when in Surabaya the British broke their promises and when the raging battle of Surabaya for a time razed to the dust the high hopes of British-Indonesian cooperation.

The Republic's cooperative attitude was sufficiently vindicated when it did not attack the British forces landing in Indonesia, when it eagerly accepted the British request to help them in the evacuation and transportation of prisoners-of-war and internees and the Japanese, when Sukarno ordered all Indonesians to minister to the efforts of the occupation

army in restoring law and order.⁹⁹ The organ of the Republicans, *The Voice of Free Indonesia*, expressed a conciliatory—and not an extremist or rebellious—attitude as it underlined the need for Great Power assistance¹⁰⁰ in renouncing colonialism and rebuilding Indonesia. Sukarno's statement in late September was also clearly conciliatory as it invoked the Atlantic Charter in defence of the right of self-determination for Indonesia, and eschewed violence.¹⁰¹

But this fraternal frame of the Republican mind did not mean even a faint compromise with colonial intrigues propelled by the Dutch. The Constitution of the Republic said in the preamble: 'Since independence is the right of every nation, any colonial system in this world is contrary to humanity and justice and must therefore be abolished.' The Netherlands government, however, went against the intentions of some far-seeing Dutch officials like Van Mook.¹⁰² On 31 October Van Mook met Sukarno at the residence of Christison, and he issued to the Press the following declaration of policy on 5 November:¹⁰³ 'The Government recognize the legitimate aspirations of the Indonesians towards a national existence, and are convinced that these aspirations can be realized by a process of evolution through the friendly cooperation between Indonesians and Netherlands. Indonesia will be called upon to become a full partner in the kingdom, which will be organized as a Commonwealth consisting of the participating territories.'

This Declaration of Policy contained many things perturbing to the ardent nationalists.¹⁰⁴ And Hatta came out with a concrete and scathing condemnation of this evolutionary policy, appealing less to passions and more to factual realities. He said: 'And why must Indonesia willy-nilly be made partner of a Commonwealth in which the Dutch tail wag the Indonesian dog? We Indonesians just fail to see why it is incumbent on us to become willing partners of the Dutch Commonwealth. The Dutch are graciously permitting us entry into the basement while we have climbed all the way to the top floor and upto the attic. Indonesia today has achieved her own administration as a result of her own efforts. And what earthly reason is there for Indonesia to return to her former status as a colony of a foreign nation which did practically

nothing to defend her from the Japanese? The Dutch should not remain under the delusion that they can thwart Indonesia's desire to remain independent.¹⁰⁵ It should further be noted that the 5 November declaration stood almost totally invalidated by the Hague announcement on 3 November that Van Mook was negotiating with Indonesians against¹⁰⁶ the instructions of the Netherlands Government. Professor Logemann also had announced that in spite of his government's intention to make Indonesia self-governing within the Netherlands Union it was not ready to negotiate with Sukarno.¹⁰⁷ The Republic's foreign minister Subardjo, on the other hand, answered that his government was willing to meet Allied Representatives but refused to have a discussion with the Dutch. Under these circumstances what was needed was a sympathetic but vigorous programme embarked on by the British Cabinet. *But Attlee's announcement on 17 October* only bore out Dutch propaganda and misunderstanding. At about the same time Hatta told Pressmen¹⁰⁸ of the dire possibilities of any forced implementation of a colonialistic programme, whether cloaked as a membership in a Dutch Union or not. A few more blood-curdling years, he added, would only be added to world history without any surety of Dutch hegemony over Indonesia.¹⁰⁹

But Hatta, a hardboiled realist, would not be contented with a negative approach and outlined a scheme which General Christison might profitably follow. The scheme demanded a *de facto* recognition of the Republic of Sukarno, removal of Dutch forces from the Indonesian soil and prohibition of their further entry, and stressed the acceptance of concentrating and disarming the Japanese and protecting the prisoners-of-war as the twin objectives of the AFNEI. Above all, Hatta declared before the Pressmen his earnest desire for a solution reached through the International Court¹¹⁰ and guaranteed the Republic's adherence to it, even if not thoroughly welcome. But British forces poured in and sometimes the Dutch troops accompanied. And Sukarno complained of an un-neutral attitude on the part of the British.¹¹¹

The British really faced a hard task. For the Dutch Minister for Overseas Territories, Professor Logemann, and the Dutch Foreign Minister, Dr Van Klaffens, accused the British of a

pro-Republican attitude. The British had been urging negotiations with the Sukarno government, which the Dutch government resented.¹¹² Leftist opinion in Holland too favoured negotiation which the government defied. The Republic, in its Political Manifesto released on 1 November urged cooperation for mutual benefit. If, however, the Manifesto added, the Dutch wanted to re-impose colonialism on Indonesians then 'it will result in endless bloodshed and sacrifice of life, for only by force and force alone can the Dutch try to pull down the government which we have set up.' The Manifesto put the fundamental question squarely: Have the Hollanders 'the vision and the ability to adjust themselves to changed conditions and, through the way of peaceful discussion, secure for themselves and their descendants in this country the predominant place they hold in trade and industry, thereby also making it possible for themselves to live here and earn their livelihood in peace and security?' But this call for peaceful discussion and cooperative intercourse went unheeded.

In the tense atmosphere of British landings and apprehension of a renewal of Dutch stranglehold on Indonesia, Sjahrir issued a brochure entitled 'Our Struggle'.¹¹³ This brochure proves that even when fighting foreigners patriots do not always try to conceal the defects and difficulties hindering the national movement even though it might expose the vices of fellow-countrymen. Sjahrir pleaded for strengthening the socio-economic foundations in order to knock the bottom out of Fascism. He deplored the effects on Indonesians of Japanese propaganda extolling Facism. He condemned racial hatred generated in the process of the national struggle and called a halt as a safeguard against possible foreign intervention.

Sjahrir wanted to eliminate Fascist influences in the Republic. Apologists of Dutch colonialism interpreted it sinisterly as an assault on Sukarno.¹¹⁴ Sjahrir's plea for racial toleration was likewise interpreted as a wholesale censure on Indonesians' attacks against foreign troops and civilians. But Sjahrir 'was attacking not his friend Hatta, or Sukarno, or others who in agreement with him acted as collaborators of Japan for the good of the country. His targets were those who copied Japanese dictatorial methods because they had absorbed Japanese political thought.'¹¹⁵

Undoubtedly many Indonesians used terrorist methods. Unsettled times inevitably breed terrorist gangs. But whenever an Indonesian killed a Dutchman it was not the result of racial fanaticism or blind terrorism. Before hurling a verdict on Indonesians a number of factors have to be remembered. (1) Indonesians did not kill the Dutch internees they had at their mercy. They did not adopt a policy of mass slaughter.¹¹⁶ (2) After the Japanese surrender the Indonesians did not become revengeful towards Dutch civilians till the NICA authorities under British protection began to unleash violence and horror.¹¹⁷ (3) The warning of Sukarno that the reentry of Dutch troops might incite attacks on Dutch civilians was simply ignored.¹¹⁸ Once the British warned against the landing of Dutch troops but later on yielded to Dutch pressure.¹¹⁹ (4) Indonesians' appeals to foreign powers¹²⁰ for stopping Dutch and British atrocities bore no fruit; British tanks and planes vomited death and devastation. They became naturally more and more exasperated. Their faith in the professions of big powers regarding self-determination began to dwindle. They realized sorrowfully that their military vigilance alone could win the battle for freedom. Military operations always have a penumbra of terrorism which is not justified by the needs of securing the objective, but unavoidable. If the limited terrorism of isolated Indonesian ruffians not deriving any support from the Republican government was to be blamed, that would only focus our attention on the primary factor that made the Republican military operations inevitable—the unbending intention of the Dutch to subjugate Indonesia with British connivance.¹²¹ (5) Indonesians became more desperate as they found troops of the ex-enemy state Japan being employed by the British. The British sometimes tried to deny¹²² the use of Japanese troops for fighting Indonesians, but even the Dutch Minister Logemann affirmed it.¹²³

Sjahrir had issued his pamphlet a few days before he became the Prime Minister of the Indonesian Republic. The Dutch continuously refused to confer with Sukarno whom they fancifully condemned as a Japanese agent. It was really an excuse¹²⁴ for the Dutch to delay negotiations. Republicans, therefore, resolved to appoint Sjahrir as the Premier for he had a clear anti-collaborationist record that defied the name-

calling zeal of the Dutch. The appointment of Sjahrir might have another additional advantage. For a long time Sjahrir had been leading the underground organizations and in close touch with the armed groups which constantly fought foreign troops in defence of the Republic. His Premiership might act as a check on their enthusiasm sometimes overflowing and turning into acts of unnecessary extremism.

Sjahrir became the Premier of the Indonesian Republic on 15 November;¹²⁵ Sukarno's powers were reduced. Chances of peaceful negotiations with the Dutch appeared to improve. The Netherlands expressed its willingness to confer with Sjahrir¹²⁶ but did not take any active step. Troops were pouring in. The grim battle of Surabaya cast a long shadow over the probable peace proposals. The British government also displayed a lack of information or of appreciation as regards the Indonesian situation. Mr Bevin issued on 23 November a statement¹²⁷ that recognized Dutch sovereignty over Indonesia and England's duty to rehabilitate her ally—it, therefore, irritated Indonesians. The statement urged negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic and therefore hurt the feelings of Hollanders.¹²⁸ Mr Bevin seemed to be unaware that fighting in Indonesia involved many parties other than the nationalists; he served a moral exhortation to Indonesians asking them to stop fighting and 'begin talking'.¹²⁹

In spite of Sjahrir's appointment the Dutch government did not offer any agreeable proposal to the Republic. British planes hovered over Indonesia sometimes dropping bombs. Dutch troops landed whenever they got the opportunity. The Dutch organized savage attacks on Republicans including civilians. Indonesians too became impassioned and took to vendettas. Indonesians stained their names on 23 November as they mercilessly butchered R.A.F. airmen who had crashlanded in Java.¹³⁰ The British forces truculently counterblasted by setting fire to the whole village of Bekasi¹³¹ and committed appalling atrocities in Ambarawa.¹³² The Indonesian Ministry of Information issued the following statement:¹³³ 'On behalf of the people of Indonesia Mr Sutan Sjahrir, Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, has expressed his regret to the Allied Commander-in-Chief of the Occupation Army in Java, Lieutenant General Sir Philip Christison, for the happenings that

took place in Tjakung, Bekasi and Ambarawa that were brought about by misunderstandings between the Occupation troops and the people.'

That Sjahrir was always ready for negotiations and never lacked peaceful intentions was again undoubtedly proved in the Press Conference on 4 December 1945. He stated: 'If the Dutch recognize our right to independence then we shall accept Dutch cooperation in the economic and technical spheres. We should even be ready to give them a privileged position in view of their special contacts and their long association with the Indies.'¹³⁴ He even signified his willingness to adhere to a U.N. decision even if not wholly favourable. To the Dutch in the Hague these were not worth any serious consideration and the Whitehall allowed itself to be swayed by the same attitude. But Sjahrir was never tired of attempts at conciliation. Thus he built up a Peace Army which escorted the Allied envoy in moving supplies from Djakarta to Bandung.¹³⁵ Safety for the British troops was required and was secured by this Peace Army. A Peace Preservation Corps was also formed to guard trains.¹³⁶ The British were satisfied too and proposed that this Peace Army be engaged in disarming the Japanese in Central and East Java, and evacuating them. This British suggestion was wise, reflecting the confidence that could now be reposed in the Republic's ability to enforce peace. Sjahrir gladly announced: 'We are prepared to co-operate on a basis of justice to seek the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted by the United Nations to British forces and to maintain the general peace and security of the territories occupied by the Allies.'¹³⁷

The Republic clearly indicated its zeal for peaceful negotiations. The ball was fairly on the Netherlands court. But the Netherlands did not play it properly. On the contrary, in the beginning of December Dutch leaders accompanied British leaders to a conference in Singapore¹³⁸ that produced a consensus in favour of stronger measures against the Republic. Sjahrir rightly demanded¹³⁹ a clarification of Singapore decisions and pleaded for U.N. intervention. He asserted that the arrival of new troops would only make Indonesians more venomous in their resistance. Any decision to intensify British and Dutch military operations would only result in large-

scale conflagration, Sjahrir added.¹⁴⁰ Sjahrir and unmistakably demonstrated his ability to be moderate and cooperative in regard to helping prisoners and internees. Now it was left to the British government to press the Dutch for friendly negotiations. The British pressure, if systematic and not sporadic, would move the Dutch surely as they had to depend on British military might. Mr Noelbaker,¹⁴¹ a British M.P., suggested that both the Netherlands and the Republicans appoint representatives with full powers; their negotiating zeal should not be curbed by the possibility of a later captious repudiation by the governments; for in the past Van Mook's attempts to confer with Sukarno had been whimsically censured by the Netherlands government.

The U.S.A., in spite of repeated appeals from the Republic, did not hold out any promise of mediation. On 19 December the State Department expressed¹⁴² concern over developments in the Netherlands East Indies. It urged negotiations for a peaceful settlement and earned the applause of Republican sympathizers. But the announcement indubitably recognized the Netherlands to be the territorial sovereign in Indonesia and therefore did not contribute to a softening of Dutch attitude. The United States could not boast of a loving concern for nationalist aspirations in Indonesia.¹⁴³ Similarly, the British government, even when trying to facilitate a peaceful settlement by convening a conference in London in late December,¹⁴⁴ palpably failed to enter into the feelings of nationalists. The London Conference excluded the Republic whose fate it would discuss; the British statesmen invited the Dutch leaders but left out Sjahrir always pining for cordial negotiations.¹⁴⁵ The legitimate progeny of the London Conference was a communique¹⁴⁶ with an effete plea of restoration of law and order preceding any grant of autonomy that could only lie in the darkness of an uncertain future. The Dutch could continue in their old trigger-happy mood. And they shot at Sjahrir¹⁴⁷ who escaped by sheer luck. The timing of London discussions and the attempt on Sjahrir's life almost coincided. Indonesians thus could not be blamed unreservedly if they committed atrocities on Dutchmen.

Hollanders multiplied their assaults on Indonesians. They went ahead setting Indonesian homes on fire.¹⁴⁸ Their out-

rages even called for a reprimand by Admiral Helfrich who forbade reprisals;¹⁴⁹ the order was ineffective. The government at the Hague too marched in step with the Dutch extremists in Indonesia. It ordered enquiry into Van Mook's conduct¹⁵⁰ presumably on account of his farsighted initiative for negotiating with the Republic; the hope of amity receded; Sjahrir deplored the enquiry move.

Djakarta became too dangerous a place for Republican leaders on account of aggravated Dutch maraudings. Djakarta brought out too conspicuously the support given by the British to the Dutch. To lessen their pains the Republican leaders transferred the seat of government to Jogjakarta on 4 January 1946.¹⁵¹ In mid-January Sjahrir revealed a good deal of his political insight as he announced unambiguously that parleying with the Dutch was not likely to lead to a fruitful settlement and preferred U.N. aid.¹⁵² Sjahrir's announcement was just in time to serve a rude reminder to the English and the Dutch that at the ensuing meeting of the U.N. an unsympathetic member might lash out at their joint venture in Indonesia and lay them low before the world public.

Ukraine sent a letter to the U.N. Security Council condemning the use of the British and Japanese forces in Indonesia against the local population. Mr Mannuisky, the Ukrainian representative, stated before the Security Council that he 'considered it inadmissible' that the British troops were used for the suppression of the national movement of the Indonesian people and that Japanese forces were used in operations against the Indonesian nationalists.¹⁵³ He urged 'the creation by the Council of a special commission for the investigation of the situation on the spot and the establishment of peace.'¹⁵⁴ Queerly enough, the Ukrainian representative 'did not raise the question of the withdrawal of British troops from Indonesia'. Either he hesitated to condemn fully the conduct of the wartime ally Great Britain or he doubted the wisdom of leaving the young Republic to the tender mercies of the colonial Dutch, or perhaps he had some misgivings about the national movement in Indonesia; lastly, the presence of Japanese troops yet to be disarmed pointed to the necessity of keeping British troops in Indonesia.¹⁵⁵

This Russian assault on British policy had the singular effect

of compelling the British statesmen to take an unequivocally patronizing attitude toward Dutch imperialism. It left them with no opportunity to honour Indonesian aspirations even if shabbily. The British representative unfeignedly stated before the Security Council that the Dutch were the legal sovereign in Indonesia and it was 'the definite decision'¹⁵⁶ of the Allies to restore the territory taken by the enemy to the sovereign authority.' He said that the British were obliged to use Japanese forces 'to forestall wholesale assassination throughout the country'¹⁵⁷ and alluded to the death of General Mallaby. He could have recollected that (a) the British had ordered the Japanese to maintain law and order long before the Mallaby tragedy;¹⁵⁸ (b) the facts about this tragedy did not enable him to blame Indonesians squarely; (c) it was not realistic to talk of maintaining law and order throughout the country when after months of struggle the British forces could not overwhelm the nationalist opposition and expand beyond a few precariously held cities; even amidst set-backs nationalism seems to acquire new and titanic vigour.

Even in its infancy the U.N. began to be shaken by legal claptraps. The British representative deftly utilized the domestic jurisdiction clause in the U.N. Charter. The appointment of a commission, he said, would violate the Charter by interfering in the internal affairs of the Netherlands.¹⁵⁹ The British representative had backed up Dutch claims with impressive sincerity. The Dutch representative repeated his arguments and made a virtuous proposal that 'he would not stand in the way of having a commission in regard to the question only of conduct of the British troops in Indonesia, but refused to accept a commission which would busy itself with matters within domestic jurisdiction.'¹⁶⁰

It is undeniable that Britain's vigorous defence of Dutch imperialism at the U.N. did away with whatever pretensions to caring for Indonesian nationalism existed in Attlee's statement of 17 October 1945, and in Bevin's statement of 23 November 1945. At the same time Russia's defence of Indonesian nationalism does not mean an undiluted concern for the rights of exploited peoples. Russia's attack on British policy in Java was simultaneous with an attack on British policy in Greece. This sharp assault on British policy was intended to further

Soviet strategic objectives in the Middle East.¹⁶¹ Since the days of the Czars Russia had always nurtured political ambitions in the Mediterranean. She used force whenever convenient. With the collapse of France after the Second World War she expected Britain to recognize her strategic interests in that region. Britain was too experienced in power-politics to ignore the Russian menace. Hence the Soviet onslaughts. But if Russia could not immediately gain any strategic advantage by her policy in the U.N. she would at least reap a propaganda benefit.¹⁶² She could pose as the champion of the oppressed peoples. At a time when her armies were steadily tightening her colonial grip on East European countries this propaganda would be valuable.

When the Security Council began to discuss the Ukrainian complaint, it inaugurated a valuable precedent. It affirmed the right to consider a problem involving complex colonial relations.¹⁶³ Ukraine's laborious efforts at the Security Council achieved nothing immediate and concrete. Her resolution pleading for a U.N. Commission fell through on 13 February.¹⁶⁴ Meanwhile Batavia witnessed important changes in British and Dutch functionaries. The British government appointed Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, ex-Ambassador in Moscow, to carry out a peace-mission in Indonesia with a 'fresh mind'.¹⁶⁵ General Christison handed over his charge to General Stopford. The Dutch deputed an intrepid militaryman, Lieutenant General Spoor, to Indonesia. While the appointment of Clark-Kerr revived hopes of negotiations, the arrival of Spoor could be interpreted as the sign of a gathering storm. Spoor was too much of a devotee of old-fashioned colonial wars to adapt himself to the necessity of restrained negotiations.¹⁶⁶

Republicans were setting the stage well for negotiations. Press reports indicated that Dutch internees in Indonesian camps¹⁶⁷ were sympathetically treated and not used as targets for reprisals against continued Dutch landings. The Dutch government vitiated the atmosphere for negotiations by offering scurvy autonomy for Indonesians within a Netherlands kingdom and also withholding the right of secession.¹⁶⁸ It further expressed the gunman mentality by continuing to send Dutch soldiers. Neither the anti-Dutch mutiny¹⁶⁹ in the Netherlands Indies Army units nor the desertion¹⁷⁰ of many Moslem

members of the British Indian troops unwilling to fight Moslem brothers in Indonesia could deter the Dutch government in its mission of war.

Under the circumstances the Netherlands government offer of 10 February 1946 could only be looked upon as still-born. On that day the Netherlands government issued a statement of policy regarding the Netherlands East Indies containing certain introductory remarks of Dr Van Mook who asserted:¹⁷¹ 'The statement of policy...represents a departure in the relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia. For the first time in the history of that relationship a definite goal is set for the political development of Indonesia. Recognizing the right of self-determination for the citizens of this country, the proposals embody a clear and workable way towards democratic liberty. A period of transition, necessary to restore the shattered economy of this country and to consummate the work of nation-building, will have to be determined. If it should not suffice, its prolongation will be subject to agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia or, failing such an agreement, to the decision of an impartial third. At the end of this period of transition, Indonesia shall be completely free to decide its political future....Many details will have to be discussed and filled in; many questions will need an answer; many points will have to be explained. But the general principles are clear. Self-determination and independence need a solid foundation in these strenuous days. My government consider it their first duty to assist the population of Indonesia in repairing, constructing and consolidating that foundation.'

The statement of policy reiterated the necessity for a transitional scheme and added: 'The Netherlands government, therefore, intend, in consultation with authoritative representatives of Indonesians, elected from a large variety of groups, to draft a structure for the kingdom and for Indonesia, based on democratic partnership. This structure will remain in force for a given period of time, during which it is believed that the conditions which will make possible the making of...free decision (among the Indonesians) will be fulfilled. After that period, the partners shall independently decide upon the continuance of their relations on the basis of a complete and voluntary partnership. Difference of opinion regarding the

question whether that period should be further extended before a free decision can be taken, shall be submitted to a procedure of conciliation or, if necessary, of arbitration.¹⁷²

On 26 February the Dutch had to amplify some of the proposals and expand some of the suggestions in order to end any 'intentional distrust' of their move.¹⁷³ 'The promotion of an early membership of the U.N.O. and the express acceptance of article 73 of the Charter of that organization as the guiding principle for the conduct and the admittance of this country (Indonesia) as a full partner in the kingdom, all point in the same direction, while the time of transition will provide the necessity to work along properly planned lines, and to realize its completion within the period prescribed.'

The Dutch proposals were forbidding. Sjahrir¹⁷⁴ declared them as unacceptable to Indonesians. His zeal for negotiations, however, did not diminish. He worked with amazing patience even when Dutch reactionism combined with internal revolutionism to upset his government. Tan Malaka, a leader of the 1926 Communist revolts, organized a United Peoples' Front¹⁷⁵ (Persatuan Perdjuangan) and plotted to unseat the Sukarno-Hatta-Sjahrir trio. He aimed a double-shot. He wanted to exterminate the Dutch and at the same time pave the way for a communist seizure of power. Tan Malaka and his followers had no faith in the policy of peaceful negotiations. The Communists believed such a policy helped only the Dutch colonialists in consolidating their hold. One could sympathize with them when they condemned the Dutch for their delaying tactics. But when they planned a coup to overturn the existing Republican government they could only be branded as traitors bent on backstabbing the infant Republic. The projected coup did not materialize as Republican troops acted promptly and imprisoned the PP (Persatuan Perdjuangan) stalwarts including Sukarni, Yamin, and, of course, Tan Malaka.¹⁷⁶ The PP even failed to capture power when Sjahrir resigned¹⁷⁷ and Sukarno offered the Cabinet to the PP. Sukarno and Sjahrir played, one can suppose, a great diplomatic game. They called the PP's bluff. The PP, in spite of its name, could not offer a united front. Leaders failed to sink their differences and distrust in forming a Cabinet. Sjahrir came back¹⁷⁸ and started negotiations with renewed impulse and reaffirmed par-

liamentary accord. The PP tried the revolutionary way, and was muzzled.

Armed with a 5-point Presidential mandate¹⁷⁹ Sjahrir got full authority¹⁸⁰ to negotiate with the Dutch. The first point in the 5-point mandate was the most important as it emphasized the Republic's recognition to be the basis of all negotiations. Other points in the mandate related to the reconstruction of the Republic socially, economically, politically and its defence and progress. The Republic was fully ready to discuss with the Dutch. But she confidently demanded full recognition. This was a stumbling block, thought the Dutch, and imported more troops sometimes at the risk of domestic opposition. This was the minimum, insisted the Republic. While fighting between Indonesians and foreign troops continued, the peace initiatives of Sjahrir and Clark-Kerr (he was surely affected by Englishmen's protest¹⁸¹ against unprofitable and undignified use of British troops in Indonesia) remained the redeeming features.

Landing of Dutch troops never ceased. Sjahrir protested¹⁸² in vain and in vain did he try to pacify the extremist group of his countrymen. Under these circumstances Bandung¹⁸³ became a storm centre and the Surabaya affair was about to be repeated. But Major General Hawthorn conferred with the Indonesians, toned down opposition and, to a large extent, foiled the partnership of vengeance and hostilities.¹⁸⁴

Almost surely negotiations take time but delays are not always congenial for settlement. Just as time heals momentary excitements, sometimes it causes second thoughts churning up doubts and dissatisfactions. At a meeting in the house of Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr sufficient agreement was achieved to despatch¹⁸⁵ three Indonesians, designated by Sjahrir, with Dr Van Mook and Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, to the Hague. Not much was gained as the three men on their return merely announced that they were not dissatisfied.¹⁸⁶ The language was obviously diplomatic; but the achievement had not been considerable. General elections in Holland, scheduled for May 1946, were partly responsible for this, because no permanent decision on Indonesia could be taken pending the formation of the new government. The fundamental reason for the failure of these talks (known as the Hoge Veluwe talks after the name

of the conference place) was obviously the perennial refusal of Hollanders to reconcile them to transfer of sovereignty.¹⁸⁷ Hollanders remained more uncompromising as many of them resented the British efforts towards making them confer with the Indonesians. It was unfair for the British, they pondered, to undermine the legal authority of the Netherlands.¹⁸⁸ To urge negotiations with the Republic was to extol its virtues and to reduce the value of Dutch colonial claims. To create a facade of negotiations was not to meet legitimate nationalist demands, thought the Republicans on the other side. However, the visit facilitated comparison of thoughts and opinions and created an urge for mutual settlements. Van Mook, on his arrival in Batavia, expressed hopes for resuming discussions.

Events in Indo-China shaped Dutch ideas considerably.¹⁸⁹ There the Republic of Vietnam had been set up but the Republic was a part of an Indo-Chinese Federation within the confines of the French Empire.¹⁹⁰ Here was a plan, the Dutch imagined, to placate republican sentiments and at the same time to preserve the Empire pride. The Dutch sought to set up a Republic of Indonesia within the Netherlands Commonwealth. Van Mook had sent a representative to Indo-China to study the French experiment.¹⁹¹ The Minister for Overseas Territories at the Hague issued a statement on 2 May¹⁹² that indicated an approach hitherto absent. It outlined the formation of a Federation of Indonesia comprised of a Republic of Java and other free areas functioning within the kingdom of the Netherlands. Besides Holland and Indonesia, other parts of the Empire were Curacao and Surinam. For the first time the Dutch authorities acknowledged the mass support behind the Republic which they were consistently denying previously. 'The Government...feels certain that the group which is now governing the Republic, is being regarded as representative of the national aim....' The word 'Republic' too was used for the first time although it was emphasized that there was '...no reason for the widespread erroneous conclusion that recognition of the Republic means the relinquishment of the rights of the kingdom.' The statement urged compatibility with the Policy Statement of 10 February and therefore banned any extravagant connotation of the word 'Republic'. The

Republic's reaction was easily conceivable. Sjahrir declared that the proposals were a step backward.¹⁹³

The Dutch concept of the Republic did not tally with the Indonesian concept and the Dutch plan did not merit acceptance in Indonesian eyes. Indonesians could not be contented with a Republic (as indicated in the 2 May announcement) that did not include Sumatra.¹⁹⁴ And if the Dutch pointed to disorders in the Republican territory Indonesians would immediately refer to the stationing of Dutch troops inciting that disorder.¹⁹⁵ The Republic was firmly established and steadily progressing and there could be no talk of a frayed partnership within the Dutch Empire instead of an alliance.¹⁹⁶

Many Netherlands often believed they were giving too much to the Republicans. They thought they had offered much on 10 February and were adding more on 2 May. The offer was below expectations, said Sjahrir.¹⁹⁷ Indonesians felt that the Dutch Plan of Federalism wrapped up inside Imperialism would bury alive the little Republic. For the Dutch "interpreted the term 'federal' to mean equal status with equal voices tuned in key with that of the Netherlands."¹⁹⁸ Even this plan was regarded as too liberal by some parliamentarians in Holland.¹⁹⁹

Popular patience, though exhausted, did not always run amock. And the Dutch could thank themselves as their troops in larger numbers began to take over control of territories from the British hands without any major incidents. In order to avoid an armed encounter between Dutch and Indonesian troops a no man's land was created near the village of Tangerang²⁰⁰ inhabited by the Chinese. It was here that popular lawlessness could operate unhampered and spread devastation in Chinese houses. Sukarno proclaimed the state of emergency.²⁰¹ And the same accusations and counter-accusations were repeated. The Dutch complained of the inability of the Republican Government to maintain order, and Sjahrir held the import of Dutch troops and the alleged cooperation of the Chinese with the Dutch responsible for disturbances.²⁰² However, these mutual accusations could not lessen the pains of the injured or provide any safeguard against future assaults. But extremists soon committed another lawless act, and on 27 June kidnapped Sjahrir²⁰³ along with several others. If this

act did not expose the weakness of the Republic in securing law and order, it surely indicated the strong extremist sentiments within the Republic.

Extremists followed up on 3 July by attempting to coerce Sukarno into signing a document setting up a Cabinet consisting of PP leaders.²⁰⁴ Sjahrir had been kidnapped by the followers of Tan Malaka, the PP leader.²⁰⁵ Power motivations in the PP undoubtedly played a part in this gangsterism;²⁰⁶ Tan Malaka wanted to rule the Republic. But there was another no less fundamental reason behind this extremist outburst. For months Indonesians had been witnessing the methods and outcome of peaceful negotiations. These negotiations showed the rock-ribbed determination of the Dutch not to yield to the Republic. While negotiations proceeded slowly and fruitlessly²⁰⁷ the Dutch imported troops steadily. Negotiations-weary Indonesians had been stock-piling grievances against the Dutch and against the Republican negotiators. Negotiators could not stop the entry of Dutch troops; they could not check the restoration of Dutch authority; one after another Batavia, Surabaya and other key places were being transferred to the Dutch command. Negotiators appeared to be humbly tolerating the restitution of Dutch colonialism. Unable to hold their patience, extremists struck. But the extremists were not in a dominant position. This was proved by the early release of Sjahrir and his companions by units of the Republican National Army.

It would have been happier if the Great Powers could take some positive steps in resolving the Indonesian deadlock. The U.S.S.R. put the issue before the U.N., but it merely served to embitter East-West relations. The U.S.A. still followed a policy of isolationism. Professor Raymond Kennedy of Yale University, author of *The Ageless Indies* and *Islands and Peoples of the Indies*, deplored this American attitude, and said: "America's stand is the crucial factor which turned the balance against Indonesian independence. America has retreated to a policy of 'hands off' with the hope that all will turn out well. The provincialism, ignorance and isolation of the American public and American statesmen is applying a 'Jim Crow' attitude to the world."²⁰⁸ Indonesians had always looked to the U.S.A. for help. *The Voice of Free Indonesia*²⁰⁹

often expressed—and so did the *Political Manifesto*²¹⁰ of the Republic—their lurking expectation of American assistance in the struggle for freedom and afterwards. They were disappointed. Some Englishmen thought that the threat²¹¹ of an early withdrawal of troops by Britain might force the Dutch to be conciliatory. It was also reported²¹² that the British were planning a fast withdrawal. But a speedy withdrawal or its threat meant nothing if it was accompanied by an accelerated programme of restoration of Dutch authority. This was precisely what the British appeared to do as they handed over to the Dutch control of different areas.²¹³

Among foreign states Australia seemed willing to play a progressive role in the Indonesian conflict. During the Second World War Australians came closer to Indonesians and developed friendly ties.²¹⁴ They also felt acutely the need for a strong, free and friendly neighbour without which their defence arrangements might be shattered in the face of a militant power like Japan.²¹⁵ It was reported in the first week of May that Australia²¹⁶ might present the Indonesian issue before the U.N. if suitable actions were not otherwise forthcoming.

The Dutch, however, did not sit idle. Their confidence increased as they regained possession of areas donated by the British. As they posed to negotiate and took the low path of invective and propaganda against the Republic, they further employed the lethal weapon of divide and rule. In the later part of May Van Mook said²¹⁷ in a radio broadcast that the Netherlands government was planning to hold a conference of representatives from different parts of the Netherlands East Indies. This broadcast could be regarded as the precursor of an active policy of separatism designed to dismember Indonesian nationalist movement. A month later²¹⁸ it was further announced that Van Mook would confer with representatives from territories outside Java and discuss the future status of these territories. The Dutch acted on the assumption that pro-Republican sentiments would not prevail in territories outside Java. They assumed they could get hold of a sufficient number of yesmen to side with the Dutch and weaken nationalists. They overlooked the fact that even outside Java people, especially youngmen, had been fighting desperately against

foreign troops.²¹⁹ The Dutch did not like to remind themselves that the strength of the puppet leaders would be extremely limited in view of rising nationalist fervour.

On 14 July the South East Asia Command transferred authority over all territories excepting Java, Sumatra and Riau islands, even though it was not actually exercising that authority everywhere, to the Netherlands government, and vested it in the Lieutenant Governor General, Van Mook, at a ceremony in Macassar.²²⁰ Van Mook acted quite swiftly. On 16 July he opened the conference at Malino.²²¹ The Republic was sidetracked. Hirelings from territories under Dutch control crowded the conference. Van Mook harped on the stereotyped theme of an Indonesian Federation within the Dutch kingdom. Hirelings in the conference resolved to set up a Federation comprised of Java, Sumatra, Borneo and the Great East (i.e., Celebes, Moluccas, Bali, Timur, New Guinea and outer islands).

Van Mook claimed that the conference observed democratic precepts as the representatives were elected. They were not. The Dutch might think the conference signaled the declining authority of the Republic. They were wrong. Because the Dutch were humiliated by a cold rejection²²² of their invitation to some popular leaders in territories formally under their control. The Dutch did not care to elicit popular will; they selected persons who had never served the people in any representative capacity. Moreover, the Dutch killed and jailed hundreds of nationalists, including youths, so that there might be no difficulty, caused by nationalist opposition, in appointing yesmen and convening the conference.²²³ Nor did the Dutch pay any heed to the proportionality of representation as between European and other communities. In South Celebes, for example, the Dutch nominated 2 representatives from the Chinese and 5 from Hollanders, although the number of the Chinese was five times that of the Hollanders.²²⁴ It thus appeared that the Dutch were not in a mood to respect popular will. They merely wanted to sound a propaganda horn to the outside world and to drive a wedge in the nationalist front.

The Malino Conference created a machinery for consulting popular representatives and designing the political structure—

this was the Commission-General for Borneo and the Great East. It also set up an Advisory Council acting for an ad interim parliament consisting of 7 Indonesians and a Dutch Chairman.²²⁵ The delegates resolved to meet again as soon as possible.

Van Mook left no doubt in the minds of Indonesians about his intention to sabotage the Republic as he organized in October another such conference at Pangkalpinang.²²⁶ Nor should he be personally blamed for attempting to throttle Republicans. For in the meantime the Dutch government had set up a Commission-General to reopen negotiations and the members of this Commission attended the conference. The Dutch government at home, though taciturn, approved in this way the political moves of Van Mook. The conference lasted for more than a week and concluded on 12 October. The resolutions²²⁷ reiterated the need for Indonesia's partnership with the Netherlands or any other solid link²²⁸ and also agreed with the Malino resolution concerning an Indonesian Federation. One resolution postponed the consideration of detailed constitutional proposals to another conference to be held later on at Den Pasar. In visualising the various possible patterns of Netherlands-Indonesia partnership the Dutch might well have noted from the writings of Indonesians that the latter could see through their stratagem, if they had conceived any, of creating a new imperial structure consisting of four component parts including Curacao and Surinam, and of manipulating the votes of Curacao and Surinam to the disadvantage of Indonesia.

Anybody expecting immediate practical results from the Pangkalpinang Conference would be surely disappointed. Nothing important could follow from deliberations at a conference where Java and Sumatra were unrepresented. The Dutch could only pour fourth self-congratulatory pronouncements as when Van Mook said that the conference had ended 'in a much more cheerful mood, and with more faith in the future, than that with which it began.'²²⁹

In Djakarta (Batavia for the Dutch) Indonesians celebrated the first anniversary of Independence Day although the Allied authorities had prohibited that, while the USSR news agency shortly reported a projected major military offensive by the

Dutch.²³⁰ Negotiations between the Indonesians and Netherlands were suspended pending the arrival of Lord Killearn, the new British mediator, his predecessor, Sir Clark-Kerr, having departed for taking up the post of the Ambassador to the U.S.A. Immediately after his arrival at the end of August, Lord Killearn began to confer with Van Mook and Sjahrir.²³¹ Prospects for negotiations improved as the Dutch Commission-General led by Prof. Schermerhorn reached Djakarta on 18 September. Prospects improved also because at that time Dutch officials headed by Koets were visiting the interior of Republican territories, and they submitted a report²³² favourable to the Republican cause. The report emphasized that (a) the Republic was not a made-in-Japan product, (b) it had not failed to secure mass support, (c) it indubitably possessed an administration that was sound and progressing. For Republican sympathisers the report was a welcome confirmation of the memorandum²³³ submitted by the Indonesian officers in the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration to the Dutch government through Van Mook as early as November 1945. The Memorandum had stated, *inter alia*, that there was 'normal functioning of public services, public traffic, mines, light and water, provisions, all things generally needed to establish social order in the difficult circumstances for the young but vital republic' and "that the 'Indonesia Merdeka' (Independent Indonesia) inspired the whole Indonesian population."²³⁴

The Republic had further vindicated her strength and efficiency when on 27 July she signed an agreement for supplying 700,000 tons of paddy to India obtaining consumer goods in return. This was 'a proof of the falsity of the Dutch imperialists' propaganda which endeavours to depict before the world that Java is facing a food shortage,'²³⁵ commented Republicans. Republicans joyfully looked upon the agreement as according *de facto* recognition²³⁶ to the Republic. They added to it their success in relieving prisoners of war, disarming and transporting the Japanese.²³⁷ They confidently expected that the Commission-General would readily appreciate the importance of these facts.

But the Commission-General did not extend any immediate recognition to the Republic. Nor did Dutch terrorism subside. Dutch troops were landing in Indonesia in increasing num-

bers. They intimidated the Indonesians and General Spoor was not in a mood to restrain them. He even said²³⁸ that he acted under instructions from Van Mook. He thereby 'completely shattered the effect of the sweet-sounding words which have been painstakingly chosen by Dr Van Mook in his endeavour to win the Indonesians over to his side.'²³⁹

Thanks go to Lord Killearn who, in an unruffled but zealous way, tried to bring the parties together. He visited the Republican territory and was castigated by some Dutchmen who looked upon the journey as undermining European prestige.²⁴⁰ This attitude did not forebode well of the forthcoming negotiations. Another difficulty in negotiations was the attitude of the Netherlands Minister for Overseas Territories, Mr Jonkman, who curtailed²⁴¹ the powers of the Commission-General with the injunction that the members should move along strict constitutional lines. He conveniently forgot that constitutional rigidities did not always, or in crucial cases, mould the decisions of the Netherlands government. When the Dutch government fled to London during the war it did not observe constitutional procedures; the despatch of Dutch troops to Indonesia also crossed the bounds of the constitution which had to be amended.²⁴² The Dutch also spoiled the atmosphere for negotiations by cramping the Republic with a rigorous economic blockade. This not only impoverished the Republic by making an inflow or outflow of goods difficult, but also disbalanced world trade in tropical products.²⁴³

However, Lord Killearn assiduously established large-scale contacts with Indonesian and Dutch statesmen and held many exploratory talks²⁴⁴ that resulted in the formation of a Truce Committee.²⁴⁵ It held meetings in the house of the British Consul General and passed unanimous resolutions on the conclusion of a truce and its execution. At the same residence the Indonesian and Dutch delegates conferred, under the Chairmanship of Lord Killearn, and unanimously accepted the recommendations of the Truce Committee. The truce was done on 14 October 1946²⁴⁶—Lord Killearn felt relieved and held a reception at the Indies Hotel in Djakarta.²⁴⁷ The truce stipulated that Dutch troops would take over strong-points held by the British army, that neither party should launch any attack beyond certain demarcation lines, that additional Dutch

forces would come in to take the place of British forces who would leave by the end of November.²⁴⁸ Of course, there could not be any enduring settlement, as Sjahrir said to newspapermen,²⁴⁹ until the problems of clearly demarcating the Republican territory, military agreements, U. N. membership, etc. were solved.

In spite of the truce the Dutch could not renounce a most enduring relic of the colonial past—impatience. Dutch troops that came to Java in ever-increasing numbers²⁵⁰ often violated the truce. Indonesians complained²⁵¹ to the Dutch authorities, they also retaliated. By the beginning of October there were 47,000 Netherlands troops in Indonesia, according to the report of the Netherlands War Ministry.²⁵² They could not always be expected to observe restraints. Indonesians too were quick to hit back. Before the war their parties carried on the fight for liberation; now they were 'struggling by means of the state.'²⁵³ No doubt, some Indonesians acted irresponsibly even after the truce. But 'Indonesian irresponsibilities were usually confined to local or junior levels', while on occasion 'both Spoor and Pinke²⁵⁴ were capable of forcible activity which threatened the political discussions...'²⁵⁵ Indonesians became more confident as the Republican government issued²⁵⁶ on 16 October 1946 a new paper currency. 'The first day that the Republican currency was seen in actual circulation assumed the character of a national holiday.'²⁵⁷

In spite of alleged truce violations negotiations were not terminated. Meetings were being held under the chairmanship of Lord Killearn which ultimately led to the initialling of a document at Cheribon on 15 November styled as the Linggadjati Agreement as much of the preparatory discussions had been held in Linggadjati, a few miles apart from Cheribon. This Agreement, also known as the Cheribon agreement, was a landmark in Dutch-Indonesian relations, as it recognized the *de facto* sovereignty of the Republic over Java, Sumatra and Madura.²⁵⁸ The Agreement was initialled by Sjahrir, Rum, Susanto and Gani on the Indonesian side; by Schermerhorn, Van Mook, Van Poll and De Boer on the Dutch side.

After the dreadful campaigns in Burma the British soldiers faced a queer situation in Indonesia. In an unknown country they fought for an uncertain cause. Now they could take pride

—and especially Lord Killearn—in facilitating the conclusion of a Dutch-Indonesian agreement.²⁵⁹

The British troops completely evacuated Indonesia on 30 November 1946.²⁶⁰

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⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Lord Mountbatten, *Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff* by the Supreme Allied Commander, S.E. Asia, 1943-45; see especially pp. 182-86.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 182-83.

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⁹ Raymond Westerling, *Challenge to Terror*, Translated by W. Root (William Kimber, London, 1954), p. 33.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* See also Donnison, *op. cit.*, p. 422.

¹¹ Donnison, *op. cit.*, p. 422. Also Van Mook, *SDSEA*, p. 175.

¹² Sjahrir, *Out of Evil*, p. 259.

¹³ Sukarno, 'Towards Justice and Peace', *Indonesian Affairs*, October-November 1951, p. 25.

¹⁴ *The Voice of Free Indonesia*, Dummy Number (1945?), pp. 1-5 and p. 23.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

¹⁷ Roeslan Abdulgani, 'Parties and Parliament', *Indonesian Affairs*, October/November/December 1952, p. 9. Also *The Voice of Free Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

¹⁸ R. Abdulgani, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Art. 17, Sec. 1. *The Voice of Free Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

²¹ Mohammed Hatta, 'Indonesian Aims and Ideals', *The Voice of Free Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²³ Roeslan Abdulgani, *op. cit.*, p. 10. Also, *The Voice of Free Indonesia* (hereinafter to be referred to as *The V.F.I.*), *op. cit.*, p. 27.

²⁴ Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

²⁵ Westerling, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

²⁶ Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

²⁷ *The V.F.I.*, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

²⁸ The order had been issued on 6 September. Westerling perverts the meaning of the order to suggest that Mountbatten 'ordered the Japanese to dissolve the Republic immediately'—See Westerling, *op. cit.*, p. 36. Also see Donnison, *op. cit.*, p. 422 and Van Mook, *SDSEA*, p. 185.

²⁹ Donnison, *op. cit.*, p. 418 and p. 422.

³⁰ Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 93. Also see Rajendra Singh, *Post-War Occupation Forces: Japan and South-East Asia*, p. 254.

³¹ Westerling, *op. cit.*, p. 33. Also see Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

³² Mountbatten, *Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

³³ Louis Fischer, *The Story of Indonesia*, pp. 77-78.

³⁴ Van Mook, *SDSEA*, pp. 180-181. The 'consummation of all that has been developed in the past' must have meant to Indonesian nationalists a consummation of centuries-old system of exploitation.

³⁵ U. N. Document—S/Ac.10/Conf.2/SR.3—10 December 1947. Annexure I, p. 6.

³⁶ Van Mook, *SDSEA*, p. 183.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 167-68.

³⁸ Donnison, *op. cit.*, p. 425. Van Mook, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

³⁹ Donnison, *op. cit.*, p. 426. Van Mook, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-84.

⁴⁰ Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

⁴¹ Donnison, *op. cit.*, p. 415.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 417-18. Also see United States Office of the Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch Report 3250, pp. 2 f, September 1945.

⁴⁴ Mountbatten, *Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

⁴⁵ Donnison, *op. cit.*, p. 423.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 424-25.

⁴⁹ Van Mook, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

⁵⁰ Donnison, *op. cit.*, p. 422.

⁵¹ Sukarno, *Indonesian Affairs*, Oct/Nov. 1951, p. 25.

⁵² Sjahrir, *Out of Exile*, p. 261. Louis Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

⁵³ *Out of Exile*, pp. 261-62.

⁵⁴ See books by Professor Gerbrandy (*Indonesia*) and Raymond Westerling (*Challenge to Terror*).

⁵⁵ *Indonesia—Impressions of the Fight in Defence of Freedom and Democracy in Indonesia* (1946?), published by Berita Film Indonesia, Surakarta—Issued by the Ministry of Information, p. 7. Also see Susi S. Prawirawinata, *Indonesia in Brief*, pp. 14-15.

⁵⁶ *The V.F.I.*, 1 February 1947, p. 192.

⁵⁷ *The New Statesman and Nation*, 29 October 1945, p. 256.

⁵⁸ *The New York Times*, 27 October 1946, p. 24.

- ⁵⁹ *The V.F.I.*, Dummy Number (1945?), p. 16.
- ⁶⁰ *Political Manifesto of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia*, Djakarta, 1 November 1945.
- ⁶¹ For details see Wolf, *The Indonesian Story*, pp. 3-14.
- ⁶² Donnison, *op. cit.*, p. 424.
- ⁶³ *The New Statesman & Nation*, 20 October 1945, pp. 255-56.
- ⁶⁴ The Notice is reproduced in Donnison, *op. cit.*, p. 457.
- ⁶⁵ That is why Donnison remarks that this notice 'was scarcely appropriate to the situation now developing'; *op. cit.*, p. 427.
- ⁶⁶ *Sunday Times*, 30 September 1945. Also see *The V.F.I.*, 7 December 1946, p. 91.
- ⁶⁷ *The V.F.I.*, 4 January 1947, p. 144.
- ⁶⁸ This is noted by Donnison also; *op. cit.*, p. 428. Also see *The V.F.I.*, 4 January 1947, p. 144.
- ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁷¹ *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1946-48, p. 7809A, *The New York Times*, 30 October 1945, p. 4.
- ⁷² Rajendra Singh, *Post-War Occupation Forces: Japan and South-East Asia*, p. 227. Woodman, *The Republic of Indonesia*, p. 212. Government of Indonesia, Ministry of Information, *Indonesia—Impressions of the Fight in Defence of Freedom and Democracy*, p. 16.
- ⁷³ *The New York Times*, 1 November 1945, p. 1, C. 3.
- ⁷⁴ K. C. A. (*Keesing's Contemporary Archives*), 1946-48, p. 7809A.
- ⁷⁵ *The New York Times*, 12 November 1945, p. 1, C. 6.
- ⁷⁶ *The New York Times*, 9 November 1945, p. 1, C. 2.
- ⁷⁷ K. C. A., 1946-48, p. 7812. Also see A. Mehta and P. Patel, *The Revolt in Indonesia*, p. 16.
- ⁷⁸ President Sukarno, *Indonesian Affairs*, August/September 1952, p. 12. Also see *The New York Times*, 20 November 1945, p. 2, C.2; *Indonesia* (Note 55), p. 20.
- ⁷⁹ David Wehl, *The Birth of Indonesia*, p. 67.
- ⁸⁰ Reproduced in *The Republic of Indonesia* by Dorothy Woodman, p. 215.
- ⁸¹ Donnison, *op. cit.*, p. 419.
- ⁸² *The V.F.I.*, 7 December 1946, p. 92. Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 262.
- ⁸³ *The New Statesman & Nation*, 20 October 1945, p. 256.
- ⁸⁴ Van Mook condemns this as a sudden reversal in the policy of 'non-recognition of the revolutionary republic'; *op. cit.*, p. 187.
- ⁸⁵ *Sunday Times*, 30 September 1945.
- ⁸⁶ See Van Mook, *op. cit.*, p. 211. Also see P. M. Van W. Palthe, *Psychological Aspects of the Indonesian Problem*, p. 3, for an unusually partisan view.
- ⁸⁷ Donnison, *op. cit.*, p. 429.
- ⁸⁸ Gerbrandy, *Indonesia*, pp. 102-3.
- ⁸⁹ 'The reactionaries are trading on the fatigue of the people after the nightmare of the Japanese occupation.' *The New Statesman & Nation*, 26 May 1945, p. 330.

⁹⁰ Allan Dawes, *The New York Times*, 18 November 1945, p. IV, 5.

⁹¹ *Indonesia* (Note 55), p. 5.

⁹² *The V.F.I.*, 4 January 1947, p. 144. Also see Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

⁹³ *The V.F.I.*, 1 March 1947, p. 271.

⁹⁴ *The New Statesman & Nation*, 6 October 1945, p. 218. Gerbrandy (*op. cit.*, p. 100), expressed his irritation at this comment by Lawson.

⁹⁵ *Hansard*, 17 October 1945, Col. 1153. Also see Mehta and Patel, *op. cit.*, p. 16 and Westerling, *op. cit.*, p. 74 for contrasting views.

⁹⁶ *The New Statesman & Nation*, 27 October 1945, p. 274.

⁹⁷ The British brought in 'Dutch troops under the excuse that they were part of the South-East Asia Command.' President Sukarno, *Indonesian Affairs*, October/November 1951, p. 25.

⁹⁸ *Indonesia* (Note 55), p. 26. Also see Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

⁹⁹ *The New Statesman & Nation*, 6 October 1945, p. 218.

¹⁰⁰ *The V.F.I.*, Dummy Number (1945?), p. 2.

¹⁰¹ Statement of 24 September 1945. See *The New Statesman & Nation*, 20 October 1945, p. 256.

¹⁰² Van Mook wanted to confer with Sukarno in mid-October and in early November, each time baulked by the home government. See *The New York Times*, 16 October p.4, 2 November p. 6, 4 November p. 37 (1945).

¹⁰³ For details see David Wehl, *The Birth of Indonesia*, p. 89. Also see K.C.A., 1946-48, p. 7809; *The New York Times*, 7 November 1945, p. 13, C. 4.

¹⁰⁴ *The New Statesman & Nation*, 10 November 1945, p. 310.

¹⁰⁵ David Wehl, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

¹⁰⁶ K.C.A., 1946-48, p. 7810.

¹⁰⁷ *The New York Times*, 17 October 1945, p. 6, C. 2.

¹⁰⁸ Statement of 18 October. See *The New York Times*, 19 October 1945, p. 2, C. 6.

¹⁰⁹ This was also emphasized in the *Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia* issued on 1 November 1945.

¹¹⁰ See *The New Statesman & Nation*, 27 October 1945, p. 274. According to this journal, Hatta's 'programme suggests a way out of the present crisis.'

¹¹¹ Sukarno wrote to Christison: 'Your attitude is far from neutral. It is decidedly pro-Dutch.' See *The New Statesman & Nation*, 27 October 1945, p. 274.

¹¹² For example, a few days before the Surabaya battle the British invited the Republican Minister Subardjo to a conference where Subardjo could explain the Indonesian situation, *The New York Times*, 23 October 1945, p. 5, C. 1. Also see *The New Statesman & Nation*, *op. cit.*

¹¹³ For details see *The New York Times*, 2 December 1945, p. 35. Sjahrir, *Out of Exile*, p. 262. Louis Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

¹¹⁴ Even the editorials of *The New York Times* carried this wrong impression. See the editorial in p. 18, 14 November 1945.

¹¹⁵ Louis Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

¹¹⁶ Donnison, *op. cit.*, p. 429. Also see Appendix 7, and Rajendra Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

¹¹⁷ *Indonesia* (Note 55), p. 27. Also see De Kadt's comments, Appendix 8.

¹¹⁸ *New York Times*, 13 October 1945, p. 3, C. 8.

¹¹⁹ *New York Times*, 23 October 1945, p. 5, C. 1.

¹²⁰ For instance, see Sukarno's and his followers' appeals—*New York Times*, 25 October 1945, p. 4; *New York Times*, 26 October 1945, p. 2; *New York Times*, 9 November 1945, p. 1; *New York Times*, 8 November 1945, p. 7; *New York Times*, 12 November 1945, p. 1.

¹²¹ Dutch troops landed in Indonesia whenever possible and infuriated Republicans. It was reported that the Dutch planned to land 20,000 troops before Christmas 1945. See *New York Times*, 6 November 1945, p. 5, C. 1.

¹²² *New York Times*, 26 November 1945, p. 1, C. 6.

¹²³ *New York Times*, 17 December 1945, p. 5, C. 2.

¹²⁴ Cf. Jane Foster, *New York Times*, 15 July 1946, p. 24.

¹²⁵ Sjahrir, *Out of Exile*, p. 264.

¹²⁶ *New York Times*, 14 November 1945, p. 1.

¹²⁷ *New York Times*, 24 November 1945, p. 5. Westerling, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

¹²⁸ Gerbrandy, *Indonesia*, p. 101.

¹²⁹ "The Advice then to 'begin talking' might have been directed at Holland". Louis Fischer, *The Story of Indonesia*, p. 90. Also see Dorothy Woodman, *The Republic of Indonesia*, p. 217.

¹³⁰ *New York Times*, 25 November 1945, p. 1.

¹³¹ *New York Times*, 14 December 1945, p. 4. Also see Mehta and Patel, *The Revolt in Indonesia*, p. 18.

¹³² *Indonesia* (Note 55), pp. 29-30.

¹³³ K.C.A., 1946-48, p. 7811.

¹³⁴ K.C.A., 1946-48, p. 7813.

¹³⁵ *New York Times*, 13 December 1945, p. 3. In this way Indonesians tried to counteract the impression that 'the Indonesian leaders' control of the country is too slight,' remarks Ralph A. Coniston.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ K.C.A., 1946-48, p. 7812.

¹³⁸ *New York Times*, 21 December 1945, p. 5, c. 2.

¹³⁹ *The New Statesman & Nation*, 15 December 1945, p. 398.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² *Department of State Bulletin*, 23 December 1945, p. 1021.

¹⁴³ That this is not merely an Indonesian or Asian reaction can be proved by the following editorial comment in *New York Times*, 21 December 1945, p. 20. 'It [the statement] does not in any way propose the liquidation of the Dutch or any other empire for it specifically acknowledges the Netherlands as the territorial sovereign over the East Indies.'

¹⁴⁴ *New York Times*, 26 December 1945, p. 6. *New York Times*, 27 December 1945, p. 3.

¹⁴⁵ Sjahrir said: 'There have been discussions in London between the British and the Dutch about Indonesia. Much has been said about these talks. But it must be clear to everybody that we, Indonesians, cannot pay much heed to decisions made about us, but without us.' *Indonesia* (Note 55), p. 33. Also see Dorothy Woodman, *The Republic of Indonesia*, p. 220, and *The New Statesman & Nation*, 29 December 1945, p. 433.

¹⁴⁶ *New York Times*, 29 December 1945, p. 6, c. 6.

H. L. Mathews cabled from London: 'There is no evidence, however, that either the Netherlands or the British policy has been modified, and it was made clear that home rule for Indonesia was a long way off.' *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ *New York Times*, 27 December 1945, p. 3, c. 8.

¹⁴⁸ *New York Times*, 4 January 1946, p. 9.

¹⁴⁹ *New York Times*, 5 January 1946, p. 4.

¹⁵⁰ *New York Times*, January 18, 19, 1946. In December 1945 Van Mook had urged upon the Netherlands Cabinet to recognize the Republic. The Cabinet turned down his request. *New York Times*, 25 December 1945, p. 17.

¹⁵¹ 'The transfer of the seat of government from Djakarta to Jogjakarta on January 4, 1946, was interpreted by the world as a sign that Indonesia is not going to surrender'. Sukarno, *Indonesian Affairs*, August/September 1952, p. 13.

¹⁵² *New York Times*, 6 January 1946, p. 2.

¹⁵³ *Year Book of the United Nations*, 1946-47, p. 338.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ Perhaps it was some such reason that prompted Sjahrir to oppose the withdrawal of British troops just at that moment. See *New York Times*, 23 January 1946, p. 9 and 24 January 1946, p. 20.

¹⁵⁶ *Year Book of the United Nations*, 1946-47, p. 338.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 339.

¹⁵⁸ See the statement of General Christison—*New York Times*, 30 September 1945, p. 30.

¹⁵⁹ *Year Book of the United Nations*, 1946-47, p. 339. Also see A. M. Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations*, p. 41.

¹⁶⁰ *Year Book of the United Nations*, 1946-47, p. 340.

¹⁶¹ See article by J. B. Reston in *New York Times*, 27 January 1946, Section IV, p. 5.

¹⁶² See article by J. B. Reston in *New York Times*, 10 February 1946, Section IV, p. 5. See article by A. O. McCormick, *New York Times*, 18 February 1946, p. 20, especially the reference to a Soviet Embassy Bulletin proclaiming Soviet strategic objectives.

¹⁶³ A. M. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

¹⁶⁴ *Year Book of the United Nations*, 1946-47, p. 340.

¹⁶⁵ See the statement of Clark-Kerr in *Singapore*, 31 January 1946.

¹⁶⁶ This is borne out by the militant strategy adopted by Spoor later

on in Indonesia, and the very high esteem in which he was held by another terrorist armyman, Raymond Westerling. See Westerling's book *Challenge to Terror* for copious references.

¹⁶⁷ *New York Times*, 26 January 1946, p. 6, c. 6.

¹⁶⁸ *New York Times*, 6 February 1946, p. 14.

¹⁶⁹ *New York Times*, 23 February 1946, p. 23. *New York Times*, 24 February 1946, p. 19.

¹⁷⁰ *New York Times*, 17 January 1946, p. 18. Sometimes deserters joined Indonesians to fight foreign troops.

¹⁷¹ K.C.A., 1946-48, p. 7814. Also see David Wehl, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

¹⁷² *Ibid.* ¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ *New York Times*, 23 February 1946, p. 2. *The New Statesman & Nation* commented: 'The terms offered to the Sjahrir government are not satisfactory, even to moderate Indonesian nationalists.' 16 February 1946, p. 113.

¹⁷⁵ Roeslan Abdulgani, 'Parties and Parliament', *Indonesian Affairs*, October/November/December 1952, p. 14.

¹⁷⁶ Westerling, *op. cit.*, p. 75. Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

¹⁷⁷ *New York Times*, 3 March 1946, p. 36.

¹⁷⁸ *New York Times*, 5 March 1946, p. 14.

¹⁷⁹ *New York Times*, 6 March 1946, p. 3.

¹⁸⁰ *New York Times*, 11 March 1946, p. 3.

¹⁸¹ For example, see the correspondence page of *The New Statesman & Nation*, 22 December 1945, pp. 425-26.

Professor H. J. Laski had said: 'We must be careful not to become the agents of Dutch imperialism in Indonesia...' *New York Times*, 13 January 1946, Section II, p. 11.

¹⁸² For Sjahrir's protests see *New York Times*, 10 March 1946, p. 1. *New York Times*, 12 March 1946, p. 15.

¹⁸³ *New York Times*, 26 March 1946, p. 18.

¹⁸⁴ K. C. A., 1946-48, p. 7815.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.* Also see *Madjalah Merdeka*, p. 18; the names of the 3 Indonesian delegates are: Dr Pringgodigdo, Dr Sudarsono, Dr Suwandi.

¹⁸⁶ K.C.A., 1946-48, p. 7916. Also see *New York Times*, 25 April 1946, p. 9; John Coast, *Recruit to Revolution*, p. 22.

¹⁸⁷ For details see I. N. Djajadiningrat, *The beginnings of the Indonesian-Dutch Negotiations and the Hoge Veluwe Talks*. Cornell University, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project, 1958.

¹⁸⁸ Van Mook, *SDSEA*, p. 215.

¹⁸⁹ Van Mook, *SDSEA*, p. 213. British opinion also sometimes favoured the solution in Indo-China and recommended it to the Dutch. See *The New Statesman & Nation*, 16 March 1946, p. 186.

¹⁹⁰ A. A. Schiller, *The Formation of Federal Indonesia*, pp. 20-21.

¹⁹¹ *New York Times*, 2 April 1946, p. 2.

¹⁹² K.C.A., 1946-48, p. 7916.

¹⁹³ *New York Times*, 26 May 1946, p. 15.

¹⁹⁴ *New York Times*, 20 June 1946, p. 2.

¹⁹⁵ Allan Dawes in *New York Times*, 18 November 1945, Section IV, p. 5—'The Indonesians admit they cannot guarantee tranquillity anywhere so long as the hated Dutch are in evidence.'

¹⁹⁶ It was sometimes suggested that "something like the 'Free State' formula which solved the Irish problem might here [in Indonesia] be useful." *The New Statesman & Nation*, Dutch Diary, 17 August 1946, p. 113.

¹⁹⁷ *New York Times*, 5 June 1946, p. 12.

¹⁹⁸ Charles Wolf, *The Indonesian Story*, p. 46.

¹⁹⁹ *New York Times*, 7 May 1946, p. 2.

²⁰⁰ K.C.A., 1946-48, p. 7979.

²⁰¹ *New York Times*, 9 June 1946, p. 1.

²⁰² *New York Times*, 6 June 1946, p. 8.

²⁰³ Roeslan Abdulgani, *Indonesian Affairs*, October/November/December 1952, p. 14. *New York Times* editorial wrongly puts the date of kidnapping on 29 June—see *New York Times*, 1 July 1946, p. 30.

²⁰⁴ *Indonesian Affairs* (Note 203), p. 14.

²⁰⁵ See the statement of the Republican Minister Md. Natsir, *New York Times*, 6 July 1946, p. 4.

²⁰⁶ *Indonesian Affairs* (Note 203).

²⁰⁷ For a caustic attack on this policy of peaceful negotiations, see D. N. Aidit, *A Short History of the Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 22.

²⁰⁸ *New York Times*, 5 May 1946, p. 26.

²⁰⁹ Dummy Number (1945?).

²¹⁰ Djakarta, 1 November 1945.

²¹¹ 'A settlement may of course come through any day if the Dutch are convinced that the British will withdraw unless they accept a reasonable settlement.' *The New Statesman & Nation*, 16 March 1946, p. 353.

²¹² *New York Times*, 7 May 1946, p. 2.

²¹³ *The V.F.I.*, 7 December 1946, pp. 91-92. Also see Rajendra Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

²¹⁴ *The V.F.I.*, 23 August 1946, p. 1.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.* Also see *Indonesia* (Note 55), p. 11.

²¹⁶ *New York Times*, 7 May 1946, p. 2.

²¹⁷ *New York Times*, 22 May 1946, p. 10.

²¹⁸ *New York Times*, 25 June 1946, p. 9.

²¹⁹ *The V.F.I.*, 9 November 1946, pp. 26-27.

²²⁰ K.C.A., 1946-48, p. 8010.

²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²² In Southern Borneo, for example, 'The NICA authorities...failed to induce the leaders of the organization Serikat Rakjat Indonesia to be sent as representatives to Malino.' The Serikat Rakjat Indonesia was a popular nationalist organization. *The V.F.I.*, 3 August 1946, p. 9.

²²³ The Dutch selected 'Indonesians who never before have charged themselves with any duty in which they are responsible to the inhabitants of their respective areas.' *Ibid.*

'To clear the way for the Malino Conference (16-24 July 1946), the

Dutch shamelessly and indiscriminately annihilated all elements opposed to the Dutch colonial aims.' *Merdeka*, 25 April 1949.

²²⁴ *The V.F.I.*, 3 August 1946, p. 9.

²²⁵ *K.C.A.*, 1946-48, p. 8101.

²²⁶ Schiller, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

²²⁷ *K.C.A.*, 1946-48, p. 8346.

²²⁸ See, for comments, Dr Abu Hanifah, 'The Dutch-Indonesian Question', *The V.F.I.*, 3 August 1946, p. 7.

²²⁹ *K.C.A.*, 1946-48, p. 8346.

²³⁰ *Madjalah Merdeka*, p. 38; *New York Times*, 20 August 1946, p. 14.

²³¹ *New York Times*, 28 August 1946, p. 9.

²³² John Coast, *Recruit to Revolution*, pp. 29-30.

²³³ Published by Perhimpunan Indonesia, London Office; cited in Woodman, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-16.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

²³⁵ *The V.F.I.*, 10 August 1946, p. 3.

²³⁶ Speech by Hatta—*The V.F.I.*, 23 August 1946, p. 4.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²³⁸ *The V.F.I.*, 23 August 1946, p. 9.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁰ *The V.F.I.*, 7 September 1946, p. 2.

²⁴¹ *The V.F.I.*, 7 September 1946, p. 3.

²⁴² *Ibid.*

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

²⁴⁴ *K. C. A.*, 1946-48, p. 8101, p. 8160.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 8243.

²⁴⁶ 'The Status of the Republic of Indonesia' by Sastroamidjojo and Delson; Canberra, the Federal Capital Press, 1949, p. 7. Sastroamidjojo was the then Representative of the Republic of Indonesia in Australia.

²⁴⁷ *Madjalah Merdeka*, p. 40.

²⁴⁸ Sastroamidjojo and Delson, *op. cit.*

²⁴⁹ *K. C. A.*, 1946-48, p. 8243.

²⁵⁰ Sukarno said: 'The aggressiveness of Dutch troops increased in ratio to their strength,....' See *Indonesian Affairs*, October/November 1951, p. 25.

²⁵¹ *New York Times*, 30 November 1946, p. 6.

²⁵² *New York Times*, 24 November 1946, p. 34.

²⁵³ Statement of Sjarifuddin, the Defence Minister of the Republic—See *The V.F.I.*, 23 August 1946, p. 5.

²⁵⁴ Pinke was the Dutch Admiral in Indonesia.

²⁵⁵ John Coast, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.

²⁵⁶ *Madjalah Merdeka*, p. 46.

²⁵⁷ *The V.F.I.*, 9 November 1946, p. 18.

²⁵⁸ Sastroamidjojo and Delson, *op. cit.*

²⁵⁹ *The V.F.I.*, 23 November 1946, p. 60. Rajendra Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

²⁶⁰ *K.C.A.*, 1946-48, p. 8276.

FIRST MILITARY ACTION

I

INDONESIAN LEADERS could look upon the initialling of the Cheribon Agreement as a diplomatic victory.¹ But, while praising the diplomatic ability of negotiators, it would be unfair not to emphasize the role of the Republican troops and revolutionary youngmen whose constant vigilance and heroic self-sacrifice² forced the Dutch to negotiate. After the Japanese surrender Hollanders had intended to reconquer Indonesia as quickly as possible. They duped themselves with the comforting belief that the Republic was not the representative of Indonesian nationalism. They did not recognize the Republic and blamed the British who urged negotiations. The Dutch were determined to wipe out the Republic and their troops were aggressive; but the strength of the Dutch forces was too insufficient; the Republican troops and revolutionary youths proved themselves too powerful.

The T. K. R. (Peoples' Security Army) was the Republic's official army, formed by a decree of 5 October 1945.³ Its name was slightly changed into 'Peoples' Safety Army' on 4 January 1946.⁴ It was further announced on 25 January that the Peoples' Safety Army would be replaced by the 'Indonesian Republican Army' (T.R.I.).⁵ The T.R.I. led the struggle against foreign troops after the fall of Japan. 'Apart from the T.R.I. there were also operating a great many fighting organizations formed by the people, whose objectives generally were to strengthen the defence of the state, side by side with the T.R.I.'⁶ Youths naturally formed the core of these organizations. The following⁷ were the more important among these

armed youth forces: the Pesindo (Socialist youth), the B.P.R.I. (Revolutionary Army of the Republic of Indonesia), the *Bari-san Banteng* (Army of the Black Buffalo), the *Lasjkar Buruh* (Workers' Army), the K.R.I.S. (Force of the People of Indonesia from Sulawesi), and the P.I.M. (Indonesian Youth from the Moluccas). The existence of these organizations disproved the Dutch contention that nationalist agitation was confined to Java. The Dutch propaganda that the activities of these youth groups were entirely uncoordinated and always irresponsible was also a travesty of truth. "In order to ensure that the course of these organizations would not deviate from the original path of defending Indonesia's freedom, a Bureau was instituted in the Ministry of Defence, bearing the name of 'Bureau for Fighting Organizations' (*Biro Perdjuangan*). This body was given the task of coordinating the various fighting bodies one with another..."⁸

Fierce clashes with the Republican forces had left the Dutch aware of the Republic's strength and their inability to oust the Republic immediately. They condescended to negotiate—till perhaps they could accumulate sufficient power to harry the Republic. It was not simply the negotiating zeal and moderation of the Republican leaders that could produce a *Linggadjati* Agreement. The indomitable courage and unyielding resistance of the T.R.I. and the militant youth corps compelled the Dutch to look for a respite. That this estimate of Dutch motives and actions is not inaccurate can be proved by the dogmatic interpretation of the Agreement favoured by the Netherlands and by the persistently bellicose behaviour of Dutch troops who sometimes humiliated even Indonesian officials."

The essential features of the *Linggadjati* Agreement¹⁰ are contained in Articles 1, 2, 6, 8 and 12. According to Article 1, 'The Netherlands Government recognizes the government of the Republic of Indonesia as exercising *de facto* authority over Java, Madura and Sumatra. The areas occupied by Allied or Netherlands forces shall be included gradually, through co-operation, in the Republican territory.'¹¹ By Article 2¹² the Republican and the Netherlands government pledged to 'co-operate in the rapid formation of a sovereign, democratic state on a *federal* base, to be called the United States of Indonesia.'

Article 6 would set up a Netherlands-Indonesian Union¹³ 'to promote the joint interests of the Netherlands and Indonesia.' The Union consisted 'on the one hand of the kingdom of the Netherlands comprising the Netherlands, Surinam and Curaçao, and on the other hand the United States of Indonesia. Article 8¹⁴ placed the King (or the Queen) at the head of the Union. Article 12¹⁵ assured that the Union and the U.S.I. (United States of Indonesia) would come into being before 1 January 1949.

Immediately after the initialling of the Agreement the Republican Ministry of Information issued an explanatory note¹⁶ stressing the sovereignty of the Republic. The note declared that the Agreement paved the way for peaceful negotiations, but it did not impair the sovereignty of the Republic; the proposed Dutch-Indonesian Union would not have the status of a super-parliament or a super-cabinet.¹⁷ This interpretation of the Agreement was quite justified for, as Hatta had stated, 'Our people can hardly live again as a colonized people. No people is willing to abandon in such a way the rights which they have acquired.'¹⁸

But the Dutch were apathetic to the Republic's achievements and aspirations. The Netherlands Government and its troops in Indonesia vied with each other in heating troubled waters to a boiling point. The signing of the Agreement was importunately delayed.

The Commission-General submitted an explanatory Memorandum to the Netherlands government which stated with shocking clarity that the Dutch government would retain their sovereignty over Indonesia till the formation of the Union.¹⁹ This interpretation of the Linggadjati Agreement was upheld by Minister Jonkman whose speech to the Dutch Parliament on 10 December 1946 oozed out a cavalier disregard²⁰ for Indonesian nationalism. He said that the King of the Netherlands 'shall continue to be entrusted with the supreme role' as the Head of the Union.²¹

Jonkman treated the personality of the Republic with scorn as he emphasized that the Agreement was not a treaty to be ratified by the Dutch Parliament. Indonesians felt that Jonkman's interpretation 'reduced the political significance of the agreement to less than minimal demands of the Republic';

they were aggrieved as 'Minister Jonkman, contrary to explicit provisions in the preamble to the Agreement, claimed it was not a treaty which needs ratification.'²² His empire-mindedness was divulged as he referred to Queen's 6 December promise as the ultimate goal. His insincerity was uncovered as he endorsed the notorious policy of divide and rule by recognizing the Malino areas; Jonkman lashed the Republic as he commented acridly that Indonesian nationalism had multifarious forms. The Malino make-believe was one of those forms.²³

Imbued with this Malino spirit Van Mook went ahead with his plans of puppet states in complete disregard of the Linggadjati terms. Article 2 of the Agreement prescribed that the Dutch and the Republican governments should cooperate in the establishment of a federal U.S.I. But Van Mook ignored the Republic, organized a conference at Den Pasar on the Malino model and set up the state of East Indonesia on 18 December 1946.²⁴ This flagrant unilateral act showed that the Dutch were not prepared to implement the Linggadjati Agreement. Indonesians too were not ready to submit to Dutch machinations; many of them declined the Dutch invitation and refused to send any delegate to the conference. For example, the S.K.I. (Sarekat Kerakjatan Indonesia), a popular organization in Borneo, refused to send any delegate; the Persatuan Indonesian Ternate, the popular organization of North Moluccas, also refused and 'pledged to stand squarely by the Republican government.'²⁵ Indonesians further noted that the Dutch had no respect for freedom of expression; Dr Hovens, the Chairman of the Den Pasar Conference, bluntly ordered 4 Indonesian journalists to walk out.²⁶ At the Pangkalpinang Conference, again, an Arab representative, when he began to express his views freely in favour of the Republican Government, was ordered by the Chairman to stop.²⁷ The Republican government always encouraged Dutch journalists to inspect its system of administration.²⁸ On the other hand, the Dutch did not allow Indonesian journalists to visit territories occupied by them.²⁹ With sweeping intolerance they seemed willing to write off the Linggadjati values: goodwill and cooperation.

Many Dutch politicians on the home soil wrathfully assailed

the Linggadjati Agreement. Some of them like De Bruyn strongly advocated the maintenance of rigid **empire discipline**; Logemann repented, perhaps the Netherlands lacked the power to kill the Republic; Lieutenant General Roell recommended an undercover war.³⁰ Gerbrandy, an ex-prime-minister, still dished out the thesis of a Japanese-sponsored Republic.³¹ Sentiments of Dutch statesmen were understandable indeed. But it was deplorable how a foreign observer sometimes tended to misrepresent Indonesian nationalism. For instance, David Wehl made up his mind on **utterly** insufficient evidence as he concluded that the majority of Indonesians at that time welcomed a return to prewar colonial rule mainly because this was argued out, almost fatuously, in a letter written by one Mas Slamet to the Netherlands Queen.³²

Dutch troops in Indonesia reciprocated the wishes of Dutch statesmen who could not attune their minds to decision by discussion. Pinke did not relax the naval blockade; Spoor tightened up the army offensive.³³ Bogor was suddenly assaulted by the Dutch who liquidated the Republican administration in that city.³⁴ This faithless attack shocked the Republic, and her Commander-in-Chief, Sudirman, spoke against it in terms naturally mordant.³⁵ The Dutch interpreted Sudirman's speech as a war-cry and expressed **apprehension**. But Sudirman had only 'passed the advice to his men to tighten their vigilance and to be better prepared for the worse.'³⁶ The Defence Minister, Dr Sjarifuddin, said in his radio-speech on 4 January 1947:³⁷ 'The Bogor incident points out that the Dutch policy is not conciliatory, but a policy based on force and violence. This is indeed the desire of General Sudirman to unify all available energies of the people, realizing that the Hollanders are attempting to undermine the sovereignty of the Indonesians.'

The Dutch did not stop at Bogor. They ravaged other Republican territories, notably Palembang. Their ruthless bombardment in Palembang in early January resulted in heavy casualties especially among the Chinese. The Chinese Consul estimated Chinese casualties at 2050 killed, 1000 wounded, 600 missing, and 900 homeless.³⁸ Antara reports said, the total material loss was about 5 million Straits dollars.³⁹ The

Dutch military operations and provocative actions seemed to come in an endless string while the Agreement lay unsigned.

Indonesians, conscious of darker possibilities, complained that the Dutch were only 'utilizing both the Truce and the Linggadjati draft agreement as an instrument for the strengthening of their position, both politically and militarily, in order to be able to crush the Republic and to restore their rule in this country.'⁴⁰ They became hardened in their suspicions about the ultimate outcome of the Linggadjati accord especially as the prescription in the Commission-General's Memorandum⁴¹ 'that the sincerity of the intentions of the governments should not be made dubious by irresponsible action of individuals, either military or civilian, in the daily relations in Indonesia and in the Netherlands' was daily violated by Dutchmen in Indonesia. Indonesians felt that the Dutch legislature did not reject the draft mainly because it might ruin Holland's international prestige,⁴² and also because the statesmen hoped to manipulate adroitly the vague provisions of the Agreement and to execute ceaseless military manoeuvrings.

The provisions of the Linggadjati Agreement were often vague and uncertain; they were bound to be so. The Linggadjati Agreement was not drawn up as an impeccable legal document; it was significant not simply as a legal document but as a 'political document'.⁴³ Indistinct provisions inspired partial interpretations; they generated acute misgivings in the minds of Republicans, especially concerning Article 8 and 14.⁴⁴ Many Republicans feared that Article 8 sought to reimpose Dutch political sovereignty, and Article 14, by asking the Republic to recognize 'the claims of all non-Indonesians to the restoration of their rights and restitution of their goals,' would perpetuate economic exploitation by the Dutch. These fears seemed justified as the Commission-General and Minister Jonkman interpreted the Agreement to mean Dutch sovereignty in the interim period and the monarch's supremacy in the Union.⁴⁵ Thus, it is difficult to see how, as Wolf maintains, 'from a purely political point of view the Netherlands seemed to have made the greater concessions' in the Linggadjati deal.⁴⁶ The Dutch viewed formal agreements as a means of throwing a sop to the national aspirations of mil-

lions of Indonesians while preserving the essential privileges of a few Dutchmen.⁴⁷ They ought to have understood that the equation could not work out in the long run.

It was quite expected, therefore, that many Republicans would oppose the Agreement. The KNIP, i.e., the Republic's Parliament, could not meet as it was awaiting a reorganization and expansion of its membership.⁴⁸ The Republican Government called a meeting on 14 January 1947, where political leaders were invited to discuss the pros and cons of the Draft Agreement.⁴⁹ Many leaders frankly expressed their apprehensions as regards Articles 8 and 14. Those who supported the Draft Agreement mainly argued that it provided a 'minimum base' for furthering national aims.⁵⁰ The government while accepting the Agreement did not maintain that it guaranteed the fulfilment of all objectives; the Agreement was just a step forward. Sjarifuddin said: ⁵¹ 'Our revolution will not be realized in one single stroke! We shall reach our socialist goal, but for the present we are facing the national phase of the revolution! We need concentrate our efforts and our vital enterprises, organize our labour and farmer unions, in order to realize an Indonesia that is strong enough to meet the imperialism of foreign powers!' For all these tasks the Republic needed a 'breathing space' which, argued Sjarifuddin, was provided by the Agreement, and justified its acceptance.

The KNIP met at Malang, after reorganization, to discuss the policy of the Sjahrir government. On 5 March⁵² it approved the government policy in general and the Linggadjati Agreement in particular. Many Dutch journalists, representing the most reputed Dutch journals in Holland and Indonesia, attended the KNIP Conference at Malang. They had the opportunity to visit the interior of the Republic. They were never treated in an undignified manner. They were not looked upon as suspected foreigners. It should be noted that on their return from Malang to Dutch-occupied territory these journalists were treated in a way which the Dutch daily *Nieuwsgier* condemned as a 'downright outrage' and 'a most violent contrast with our experiences in the Republic, which have been of the most pleasant nature.'⁵³ Republicans did not spy on them or check and censure their papers. They were free to form their own impressions about the young struggling Re-

public which were written into a manifesto they issued later on.

This manifesto is to be considered one of the most important documents in studying the eclipse of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia. The manifesto proclaimed⁵⁴ that (1) 'the Republican idea is not merely felt by a thin stratum in society but by all shifts of the people as well'; (2) 'this Republic is not based on race-discrimination or hatred against the whites, but that it is tolerant'; (3) it carries out a policy of peace and democracy.

The KNIP's approval of the Agreement did not mean that the Republican government accepted the Dutch interpretations of the Agreement. The Dutch felt more and more self-righteous in their interpretations as they increased the strength of their troops in Indonesia.⁵⁵ But Indonesians could not be browbeaten. The Republican Delegation sternly objected, in its letters⁵⁶ to the Commission-General dated 14 February 1947 and 15 March 1947, to the treacherous modifications of the Draft Agreement. The Dutch had to yield. The Commission-General, in its letter of 24 March 1947, declared that it could sign the Agreement even though the Republic did not accept the Dutch interpretations.⁵⁷ Next day the Linggadjati Agreement was signed.

For the Dutch the signature was not very important. It did not mean any vital change in their aggressive policies. Their actions remained stereotyped. They increased their troops strength, while the Republic reduced its armed forces in accordance with Article 16 of the Linggadjati Agreement.⁵⁸ The Dutch forces went on invading Republican territories. They occupied Modjokerto,⁵⁹ a Republican territory. They seized vessels in the Republic's territorial waters.⁶⁰ One important case of unlawful seizure was that of the American Steamship 'Martin Behrman'. The protests of Mr Ryan, the supervisor of the ship, were unavailing. Mr Ryan stated that 'the Dutch Naval Warship, the destroyer 'Kortenaer', committed a most serious breach of international law by making a naval raid in time of peace into the Indonesian-controlled territorial waters and port of Cheribon and seizing there by force the American steamship 'Martin Behrman' which was lying peacefully at anchor and then by force compelling her and her

crew and cargo to proceed from Cheribon and later enter the Dutch-controlled port of Batavia while accompanied at all times by the Dutch destroyer which had threatened to sink her if she attempted to escape while on the enforced voyage from Cheribon to Batavia.⁶¹

Hollanders rendered the Agreement a pathetic little paper edifice by the policy of creating a number of separatist states. On 4 May 1947, they hatched up the state of West Java,⁶² exploiting a few conspiratorial leaders and encouraging the growth of the regional Sundanese language in that area. 'Actually the whole movement was a farce', comments Charles Wolf,⁶³ 'from start to finish. In the first place, the two top leaders chosen for the movement were the most impossible selections imaginable. Soeria Kartalegawa, the President, had been widely regarded as a never-do-well and Raden Mas Koestomo, the Prime Minister..., had been released from a mental institution in Buitenzong only a few months before the proclamation of independence!' Hollanders utilized the puppet Sundanese Peoples' Party which 'had no contact whatsoever with the Sundanese people as such, since the organization had never ventured outside the Dutch-held cities of Bandoeng and Buitenzong.'⁶⁴ Indonesian nationalists rightly held the movement as a kind of blackmail 'reminiscent of the methods used by fascist minorities which spearhead projected annexation as the period prior to the outbreak of second world war had so many instances to show.'⁶⁵ The political record of Surya Kartalegawa was a mixture of opportunism and atrocity. Before the Japanese invasion he 'attended the Dutch interest more devoutly than the Dutch themselves.'⁶⁶ During the Japanese occupation he turned into a tyrannical enemy of all Hollanders.⁶⁷ Surya Kartalegawa and the Sundanese Peoples' Party were simply pursuing selfish objectives devoid of any nationalist aim.

Kartalegawa and other Dutch agents could not claim that they were voicing the nationalist aspirations of a group of people inhabiting a particular area and bound together by the Sundanese language. For the people were pertinaciously opposing Dutch machinations. When the Republican President, Dr Sukarno, visited the districts of the Sundanese people, he was warmly welcomed.⁶⁸ When the puppet state of West

Java was proclaimed, the Sundanese people organized mass meetings to pass resolutions professing loyalty to the Republic.⁶⁹

In other territories also people gallantly fought Holland's separatist strategems. In the absence of popular support separatism was converted into crude terrorism. Celebes was the worst victim of Dutch terrorism. In Celebes the Dutch employed Raymond Westerling⁷⁰ to pacify the people revolting against the Dutch. Westerling had the peculiar mental make-up of a blood-thirsty savage.⁷¹ Here was a man who could write the following (in pp. 31-32 of his book) about the end of the second world war: 'While the world was joyfully celebrating the end of hostilities, I was plunged into gloom. My thirst for adventure had not yet been sated...Hostilities were over, peace had come, the world settled down to a quiet, tranquil, humdrum existence again, welcome no doubt to most of its inhabitants, but intensely boring to a nature like mine...' Westerling frankly narrated in his book how he carried out his missions in Celebes with breath-taking ruthlessness. Perhaps later on the Netherlands Government was startled by its own policy and condemned Westerling. Westerling complained: '...it has been convenient for the Dutch government—which has not, however, had the good faith to publish the various official, military, judicial and parliamentary reports on the pacification of the Celebes—to make of me...a scapegoat for the abuses and excesses committed by all those who operated under its authority.'⁷²

But peoples' all-conquering passion for freedom rose up again and again to thwart Dutch nostrums. The people in Minado, Northern Celebes, set up a Congress of Republican Political Parties⁷³ to fight the Dutch menace in a concerted way. It recognized only the Republican government as the legitimate authority over the whole of Indonesia without being afraid of systematic persecution by the Dutch. Kahin wrote: 'Most resistance leaders who were not killed were jailed. Over one-fourth of the Indonesian aristocratic rulers of Southwest Celebes (including the most important of them) were removed by the Dutch and replaced by more amenable individuals. The remainder were thus convinced that retention of their positions depended upon their supporting Dutch

policy.⁷⁴ President Sukawati, the head of the puppet government, remained silent;⁷⁵ he toured Holland while the whole of Celebes was groaning under Dutch brutality. Antara reported on 2 May 1947 that in Makassar alone, during December 1946-March 1947, the Dutch summarily executed about 40,000 persons who were suspected of pro-Republican sympathies.⁷⁶

Reports of heroic struggles of the people outside the Republic filled Republicans with anxiety, admiration and also 'additional confidence'.⁷⁷ Sjahrir declared before the KNIP that for him there did not exist any such thing as a Malino Territory⁷⁸ but only one entity, Indonesia, over a part of which the Republic had yet to establish its authority and oust Hollanders permanently.

The Dutch did not take any lessons from popular reactions which made heresies of cherished dogmas about colonialism. They would not face facts and acknowledge the strength of the Republic. The realm of possibilities was for the Dutch a frightening place. They blindly proceeded to set up the puppet States of West Borneo and East Borneo on 12 May and 17 May respectively.⁷⁹ As usual, the people opposed the Dutch move. They set up associations all over Borneo with the sole aim of an immediate merger of their territory with the Republic.⁸⁰ An obvious parallel to the role of Kartalegawa in West Java was that of Sultan Hamid in Borneo. Sultan Hamid energetically assisted the Dutch in forming the puppet State of West Borneo. He had 'indeed many reasons to be grateful to the Dutch and feel greatly attached to them.' For, 'before the war he served as a lieutenant in the Dutch army. Soon after the Dutch returned to Indonesia he was promoted lieutenant colonel by General Spoor. A short time afterwards followed his appointment as Sultan of Pontianak.'⁸¹ The strength of those fragile states was little more than growing portions of Dutch military power which could be scraped off from their overall commitments in Indonesia. Dutch troops never stopped pouring in. Reports from Amsterdam indicated that on 25 April 1947 Dutch marines boarded 'Booissevain' on the way to Indonesia, and on 2 May 'Indrapoera' would start with another 1200.⁸²

Meanwhile the Republican government gained confidence

as it began to receive political recognition and moral support from the outside world, and could reasonably expect more in future. Abdul Munim, a representative of the Arab League, visited the Republic and told Sukarno that the States of the Arab League would recognize the Republican government.⁸³ Indonesians heartily interpreted this as a genuine expression of Arab goodwill towards them.⁸⁴

The Republic became buoyant as she was invited to participate in the Asian Relations Conference meeting in New Delhi from 23 March to 2 April. Republicans were elated particularly because for the first time they would be sending delegates to an international conference.⁸⁵ Indonesians were glad that they were not being guided or accompanied by foreign advisers at the Conference. The greatest significance of the Republic's participation, emphasized by Abu Hanifah, the leader of the Indonesian delegation, was 'that the Indonesian people cannot easily be kept in an isolated position as before.'⁸⁶ Abu Hanifah declared that Indonesians loved peace and wanted peace also with the Dutch; but, the Dutch must recognize their independence.⁸⁷

The Asian Relations Conference symbolized the growth of common consciousness and solidarity among Asians and their bold determination to play a prominent role in world affairs. They wanted, it was apparent, to end the state of quiescence to which they were consigned by their former imperialist masters.⁸⁸ They discussed at the conference various common problems and thereby developed mutual understanding that could inspire active cooperation. But the Conference was not conceived in a spirit of narrowness⁸⁹ and did not constitute a flamboyant challenge of Asians to the rest of the world. 'Asia stretches her hand out in friendship to Europe and America as well as to our suffering brethren in Africa.'⁹⁰ Asia sought to answer the past European conquests by delivering a message of love and truth and thereby completely subjugating the West.⁹¹

This conference provided, indeed, a grand forum for the expression of noble thoughts of international collaboration. But it did not assure any positive action against the perpetuation of colonialism in some Asian countries who were struggling desperately. It did not even pass any vague resolution

promising concerted action by Asian States to prevent the suppression of national freedom in Asia. An Indonesian delegate rightly pointed out that mere expressions of sympathy were ineffective and that the conference should produce something of concrete assistance to freedom fighters.⁹² An Indian delegate frankly declared that only moral support⁹³ could be offered to countries like Indonesia or Vietnam; otherwise, he was afraid, the areas of conflict would widen. Under these circumstances, Nehru was quaintly ambitious when he declared that Asians must also help Africans to take a rightful place in the community of nations.⁹⁴

Abu Hanifah found an ally in the leader of the Vietnam delegation, Tran Van Luan, and published a joint statement urging collective action by Asian States to save the people of Asia from falling a prey to imperialism.⁹⁵ This statement was not surely to achieve anything, and only perhaps focussed attention on the failure of about 250 delegates coming from 30 countries to evolve any formula for collective action. Indonesian delegates, however, could return home with one balmy memory: the plenary conference unanimously adopted a *Report on National Movement for Freedom in Asia* which contained a suggestion that the Republic of Indonesia should be immediately recognized by other Asian states. The minds of Asian statesmen snugly flew on the plane of harmless generalities and aspirations: "Let us therefore put all our energies into the task of making this conference as the beginning of mutual endeavour on the part of the Asians for a better world in which the granting of political, social and economic justice to all will lead to a 'One Asia' which will in time expand into 'One World'."⁹⁶

While the Asian Relations Conference was in session and promising recognition of the Republic by other States, Britain extended *de facto* recognition⁹⁷ to her and undeniably raised her status in world opinion. The life of struggling Republicans was by its very nature one of deep mortification, but they had their compensations as they received foreign recognition. On 17 April, the U.S.A. granted *de facto* recognition to the Indonesian Republic of Java, Sumatra and Madura.⁹⁸

But the Dutch failed to convert the breathing space afford-

ed by the Linggadjati Agreement into a political initiative. They only extended the application of their archaic policies. As already noted, Dutch troops crossed the demarcation line established by the truce agreement and suddenly invaded Modjokerto⁹⁹ which indisputably belonged to the Republic. In Bogor, the Dutch gradually destroyed the Republic's apparatus of civil administration functioning before and during the British occupation. The Dutch pledged to respect the *de facto* authority of the Republic in civil affairs after the departure of the British.¹⁰⁰ They violated the pledge deliberately and augmented the distrust of their intentions prevalent among Republicans. Events like these only demonstrated, said Sjahrir in his official comment, that 'reduction of the Dutch forces in Indonesia was still essential for the practical implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement.'¹⁰¹

Hollanders always believed that if troops and armaments could be brought to Indonesia in sufficient quantity they could impose a solution by force. After uninterrupted import of troops and a successful blockade, the belief became a certainty. Many eminent politicians in Holland as also the right-wing newspapers screamed threats of war.¹⁰² The government of Holland at that time was a Catholic-Labour coalition. The Catholic group always agitated for war to weed out all complications in Indonesia. The Labour group was less aggressive and some leaders like Schermerhorn, an ex-Prime Minister and an author of the Linggadjati Agreement, wanted to avoid war. The Labour government in Britain could perhaps use some influence¹⁰³ on the Labour leaders of Holland and arrest the drift towards war, especially because Britain had helped the Dutch to return to Indonesia and also strengthened them by keeping large stocks of ammunitions. Yet the extent of that influence was surely limited because the rank and file of the Dutch Labour Party became war-minded and won over persons like Schermerhorn.¹⁰⁴ War came nearer when the Dutch Prime Minister, Beel, and the Minister for Overseas Territories, Jonkman, came to Djakarta and conferred with Van Mook, the Commission-General; Van Mook accepted the view that the situation called for forceful methods.¹⁰⁵ 'It was in fact a pre-war conference.'¹⁰⁶ Beel decided that 'military action might be necessary.'¹⁰⁷

The Republic's military machine was reorganized on 6 May when a presidential decree unified the official armed forces and irregular fighting groups into one national army.¹⁰⁸ But the Dutch army was far stronger with its highly mechanized and better trained units. Dutchmen confidently began to prepare a pretext for starting largescale hostilities. It, therefore, caused no surprise to the Republican government when the Dutch Commission-General handed over an ultimatum on 27 May 1947, broaching the alternatives of unreserved acceptance of a catalogue of demands by the Republic or their forceful imposition by the Dutch. It only made the long-anticipated dangers more imminent. The memorandum of 27 May had the little concealed aim of securing Holland's political and economic dominance over the whole of Indonesia until 1 January 1949, when Indonesians would be granted independence. An interim government, the memorandum said, would rule Indonesia till that date, and the Dutch would control that interim government. During this interim period the final decision-making authority would be vested in the hands of a representative of the Dutch crown. This interim government, a slightly overhauled version of the old colonial government—and not the Republic—would determine the foreign economic and political relations of Indonesia. Furthermore, a joint Dutch-Indonesian gendarmerie, made up of an equal number of Dutch and Indonesian soldiers, was to maintain law and order in Indonesia including the Republican territory. The memorandum, of course, contemplated the termination of Dutch sovereignty on 1 January; but this temporary domination definitely contained the alarming possibility of a permanent conquest. Even if this was not the real aim, the provisions of the memorandum were sufficiently pernicious to the Republicans who were ordered to abandon all they had gained after years of harrowing struggle. It thus included many items which the Indonesians had refused to accept at the time of the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement. What was supposed to have been cancelled proved to have come back in another guise.¹⁰⁹ The whole tone of the 10000-worded document was high-handed and pointed to the possible penalty of war for non-compliance.

It could not be deemed unnatural if the Republic rejected

the memorandum. Sjahrir, the realist, could sense the coming of war. Sjahrir, the moderate, wanted to continue negotiations although the Dutch were set against that. He tried to avoid war, even if temporarily. Sjahrir knew how to carry on negotiations in the face of the opponents' impossible demands, without jettisoning his vital interests. In his Note of 8 June to the Dutch he accepted the plan of interim government in principle but suggested modifications in the Dutch plan. For example, he refused to grant supreme power to the representative of the Dutch crown and rejected the proposal of a joint Dutch-Indonesian gendarmerie. Sjahrir made a show of appeasing the Dutch and won congratulations from a section of the press in Holland.¹¹⁰ But the Note of 8 June firmly challenged the surmises about the Republic contained in the memorandum of 27 May. The memorandum repeatedly professed the idea that the Republican regime was devoid of law and order, peace and prosperity. The Republican Note expressed astonishment 'since visitors to Republican territory, not few in number, including also Netherlands in official and unofficial capacities, were able to witness themselves with their own eyes the prosperity and peacefulness prevailing in the Republican territory. Against this there are many signs in the territory occupied by the Netherlands that point to the inadequate presence or else the absence of the guarantees for the manifestation of the truly democratic principles, as for example, the arrest of leaders, the detention of people with inadequate warrants, the searching of journalists.'¹¹¹ . . . The Note protested against the constant crossing of demarcation lines by the Dutch and the separatist movements sponsored by them. It also recognized the establishment of Republican authority in areas partly or fully occupied or controlled by the Netherlands Army as the natural consequence of the formation of an interim government.¹¹²

But Sjahrir's conciliatory mood could not make any breach in the wall of Dutch indifference and hostility. The Commission-General sent a letter to him stating with frankness that its plan for the interim government was to be accepted as final,¹¹³ and leaving no room for further negotiations. Sjahrir was forced to make unbelievable concessions with the drooping hope of postponing a conflict. In his Note of 20 June to

the Commission-General, and also in his Radio Speech of the preceding day, he agreed to grant *de jure* special powers to the representative of the Dutch crown in the interim government in accordance with the 27 May memorandum. On 21 June the Commission-General sent another letter in which it expressed satisfaction over Sjahrir's letter of 20 June. But Sjahrir's latest move caused a cabinet crisis.¹¹⁴ The letter of 20 June had to be drafted hastily and in an atmosphere of extreme urgency. Sjahrir did not have the opportunity to consult all his colleagues excepting a few. They turned against him and condemned his policy of concessions which, they could argue, made a doubtful virtue out of an imposed necessity. But this argument was not the real explanation of their withdrawal of support from Sjahrir's policy. At least two of them, Abdulmajid and Sjarifuddin, at first accepted his policy and immediately afterwards turned into bitter antagonists. The real reason of opposing Sjahrir seems to be political opportunism and jealousy of his colleagues who grabbed a chance to unseat him; Sjahrir resigned on 27 June. This view will be upheld by the fact that the next cabinet, headed by Sjarifuddin, did not repudiate Sjahrir's concessions.¹¹⁵ It should also be emphasized here that Sjahrir was never a blind appeaser and conceded a special position to the representative of the Dutch crown only initially. He declared pointedly that 'during the *first period* of the setting up of the interim government the representative of the Crown occupies a position which is *de jure* and formally in accordance with what was proposed in the Commission-General's note. In its further development, however, we expect the interim government to approach nearer to what we have pictured out in our counter-note, to be dissolved finally into the sovereign government of the United States of Indonesia.'¹¹⁶

Soon after Sjahrir's resignation his opponents realized their mistakes, upheld his policy and urged him to come back to the cabinet as the Prime Minister. President Sukarno also made the same request. Sjahrir declined. In his opinion, 'it had already become clear there was a likelihood of war. I did my best to avert this catastrophe, and resigned only when it appeared to be unavoidable.'¹¹⁷ He was right. The cabinet crisis almost coincided with the attempt of the Dutch to launch a

colonial war in Indonesia averted only by the last minute intervention by the U.S.A. One could say that 'the Dutch troops, over-confident and arrogant because they somewhat foolishly imagined that a mechanized drive to Jogja' would kill Indonesian nationalism, were straining at the leash.'¹¹⁸ Lieutenant General Spoor, the Commander of Dutch land-forces in Indonesia, issued an Order that the Dutch troops must attack the Republic on 30 June provided no different instructions were issued on 28 June.¹¹⁹ Republicans fortunately got the news in the afternoon of 28 June. The Republic's Ministry of Information immediately referred the matter to Van Mook and demanded an official statement. Van Mook pleaded ignorance and at first refused to contradict the news officially. Later on he agreed, and Radio Batavia officially repudiated the news of an armed Dutch action.¹²⁰ William Foote, the United States Consul, was working promptly and decisively at this critical moment. On the same day, i.e., 28 June, he handed over an aide memoire of the State Department to the Republican government. Possibly the resignation of Sjahrir was interpreted by the Dutch as the termination of all negotiations and, according to many Republicans, it was this aide memoire which stopped the Dutch military action and enabled Sjahrir's successors to carry on further negotiations.¹²¹ Sukarno sent a message to the State Department expressing his gratitude.

The State Department Note stressed '*to the Indonesian Republic* the sufferings likely to result from a further deadlock.'¹²² It stated that economic rehabilitation in Indonesia had to await political stability which could be earned by the formation of an interim government 'on a basis of mutual benefits for both sides'. The Note tactfully talked about the possibility of U.S. aid flowing to Indonesia after the establishment of the interim government.¹²³ The Note was impolitic in one respect; it was an exhortation to the Republic but not so directly to the Netherlands government. 'The American Note was regarded as having been sent to the wrong address; American pressure was needed most where the desire for war was strongest—in the Hague.'¹²⁴ Of course, the State Department could defend itself that it upheld the principle of mutual benefits and did not ignore Indonesia's needs

and sentiments. Indonesians too felt flattered as the State Department explicitly recognized their importance 'as a factor in world stability, both economic and political'.

The U.S. aide memoire forced the Dutch to keep the door of negotiations partly open. But they never conceived of negotiations as anything less than an unconditional acceptance of all their demands. This became apparent as Sjarifuddin, who succeeded Sjahrir as the Republican Premier, offered far-reaching concessions and was utterly disappointed.¹²⁵ In a Note of 8 July the Republican government informed the Dutch that it agreed to have a representative of the Dutch Crown, wielding *de jure* supremacy, in the interim government; to refrain from conducting foreign relations independently during the interim period; to recognize the rights of foreigners to plantations.¹²⁶ In trying to conciliate the Dutch the Republic almost capitulated. Yet the Dutch were not satisfied. They adamantly stuck to the demand of a joint Dutch-Indonesian constabulary and issued an ultimatum that the Republic should once again order a cease-fire, hinting thereby that the Republic had all the time been violating the truce agreement. It was impossible for the Republic to fulfil these demands.¹²⁷ Nor was it unnatural for the Republic to believe that their satisfaction would prompt the presentation of other demands. She even went so far as to permit the interim government to assume control over those areas where her policemen might fail to maintain order. But the Dutch were unyielding; war seemed inevitable. Republicans' long-felt apprehensions were being justified by current developments.¹²⁸ On the Dutch side military preparations were intensive and stepped up; in Holland many newspapers prescribed war as the only way out of the Indonesian impasse.¹²⁹ On 20 July 1947, Beel, the Premier of Holland, ordered the first military action to blow up the Republic.¹³⁰

Holland's military expenses in Indonesia were enormous and almost exhausted her gold reserves. She failed to expand trade. Moreover, visible economic rehabilitation in the Republic's territory irritated her. The Dutch could no longer bear the indeterminate situation in Indonesia. Hence the ultimatum of 27 May 1947, and the armed assault of 20 July 1947.¹³¹

Holland offered two excuses for the commencement of the

colonial war. The Dutch-occupied territories in Indonesia were facing a food crisis which could only be met by forceful methods, for the Republic was eminently successful in blocking supplies of food-grains to those territories. This accusation was true, but irrelevant in the sense that the Republic, possessing the food-producing areas, could not be expected to feed Dutch soldiers who were determined to crush herself. Secondly, the Dutch wanted to restore law and order¹³² in the Republican territory which, they complained, was plunged in chaos and disorder on account of an inefficient administration. This accusation was false. The Republic was steadily progressing in enforcing control over her territory despite severe political and economic handicaps.¹³³

The mechanized columns of the Dutch infantry, aided by a death-spitting air-force, quickly advanced far inside the Republican territory. The Republicans accepted the challenge. 'Let us take position in every wood, house, ditch or river. Conquer every inch of ground that has fallen into the enemy's hands,' said Sukarno.¹³⁴ The Republicans fought resolutely. Their troops lacked modern equipment, yet they faced Dutch motorized units fearlessly.¹³⁵

Holland forgot that she could retain Indonesian goodwill if she had renounced force, although that would entail speedy withdrawal. She ought to have taken this risk, since the risks of war are always greater.

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⁷ *Indonesian Affairs*, June-July 1952, p. 9.

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⁹ *The V.F.I.*, 7 December 1946, p. 93, p. 80.

¹⁰ For the Text, see *The V.F.I.*, 23 November 1946 and Sastroamidjojo and Delson, *op. cit.*

¹¹ Sastroamidjojo and Delson, *op. cit.*, p. 31. Wolf does not mention the Dutch recognition of *de facto* Republican authority over Madura in his admirable summary of the agreement in pp. 43-44 of *The Indonesian story*.

¹² Sastroamidjojo and Delson, *op. cit.* (Italics mine.)

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⁴⁶ *The Indonesian Story*, p. 44.

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⁴⁸ *The V.F.I.*, 18 January 1947, p. 173.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

⁵² *The V.F.I.*, 15 March 1947, p. 293. Incidentally, this was the birthday of Prime Minister Sjahrir.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 304-6.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 295.

⁵⁵ Sjahrir, *Out of Exile*, p. 265.

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⁵⁹ *The V.F.I.*, 19 April 1947, pp. 359, 365.

⁶⁰ John Coast, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

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- ¹¹¹ *The V.F.I.*, 14 June 1947, p. 483.
- ¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 488.
- ¹¹³ *The V.F.I.*, 28 June 1947, p. 516.
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¹²⁴ Woodman, *op. cit.*, p. 234. Van Mook is not correct when he says that the 'United States government presented a note to both parties urging acceptance of the draft proposals' (i.e., those in the 27 May Note). Van Mook, *SDSEA*, p. 242. Also see Appendix 9.

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¹²⁶ *New York Times*, 9 July 1947.

¹²⁷ This was readily admitted by all impartial foreign critics: 'On the two points which are now the most important at issue—a cease-fire order and creation of a joint constabulary—the Republicans would seem to have the weight of logic on their side.' *New York Times*, 18 July 1947, p. 16.

¹²⁸ *The V.F.I.*, 12 July 1947, p. 545. Also see Van Mook, *SDSEA*, p. 242.

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¹³⁰ Van Mook, *SDSEA*, p. 243.

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SECOND MILITARY ACTION

THE LINGGADJATI WEDLOCK did not last long. The Agreement was buried firstly under an avalanche of obstructive interpretations and finally under a ruthless military operation.¹ The Dutch threw aside all legalistic hypocrisy, which they resorted to after the signing of the Agreement, and took opportunity to make war upon recalcitrant Indonesians. However, the all-out Dutch attack against the Republic served one important purpose—it turned the Indonesian issue from being a somewhat isolated issue to a burning international problem.² The Dutch armies marched steadily into the interior of the Republican territory and began to capture major cities. But, they could not achieve their military goal, namely, the destruction of the Republican troops. The reason was the latter's adoption of the tactics of a prolonged guerilla warfare. This was the only rational alternative for the Republicans whose military organization was much inferior to that of the Dutch, and who were ill-equipped in heavy armmunitions. As a corollary the scorched-earth policy was also adopted, and it harassed the Dutch considerably. India expressed keen indignation at the Dutch aggression especially as it was directed against one of her continent-mates long oppressed by colonial dominance. Nehru said on 24 July:³ 'No European country, whatever it may be, has any business to set its army in Asia against the people of Asia. When it does so, Asia will not tolerate it.' He further said on 28 July⁴ that India would raise the Indonesian issue in the United Nations deliberations. As for the attitude of Great Britain and the U.S.A., both had recognized the Republic of Indonesia after the Linggadjati Agreement had been signed. Both the governments decried Holland's bellicosity but would not take any concrete steps to-

wards terminating the conflict. They were only moved to offer good offices perhaps to pacify world opinion and especially Asian opinion. The British foreign office (on 21 July) expressed the 'keenest disappointment' at the 'breakdown of ...ceaseless efforts during the past 18 months to promote a peaceful settlement of the exceptionally difficult situation which has persisted in Java and Sumatra since the Japanese surrender....' It further stated that 'His Majesty's Government have made it plain to the Netherlands Government that they would always be ready to place at the disposal of the parties their good offices.'⁵ It is also interesting to note that 'the action of His Majesty's Government has throughout been taken in full consultation with the U.S. Government' which in its turn held out a similar offer on 31 July 1947.⁶ Diplomatic attempts at negotiations served the Dutch very well in their aggressive moves which could be pursued uninterruptedly. Negotiations take time even to start—far more to ripen—and meanwhile Dutch colonial ambitions might well-nigh be fulfilled. It was, therefore, with a spirit of suspicious welcome that Indonesians took these offers and were more willing to place its trust on the U.N.⁷ They did not accept these offers because these might merely prolong the state of crisis while giving a theoretical protection to the aggrieved; it was better to rely on positive U.N. action which, they believed at that moment having no direct experience, could promptly check warfare. On 7 August, in a note to the U.S. Government, Premier Sjarifuddin expressed reluctance to accept sole U.S. good offices and urged the U.S.A. to try to set up a U.N. Arbitration Commission.⁸ U.N. action should also have been deemed preferable by England and the U.S.A. since a third party is very often unjustifiably criticized and vilified by a dissatisfied disputant—they could avoid such situations as confronted the British troops in Indonesia after the Japanese surrender. Instead of accepting the unenviable position of a mediator they could prefer acting as agents of the U.N. in preserving world peace.

A firm initiative came from India and Australia who, on 30 July, laid the dispute before the United Nations.⁹ India resorted to Article 34 of the U.N. Charter and argued that international peace and security was threatened in Indonesia and

urgent U.N. action was needed. Australia invoked the more important Article 39 as peace had been already broken, and pressed the Security Council for ending hostilities and starting arbitration according to the terms of the Linggadjati Agreement. It is to be noted that Article 39 belongs to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter dealing with U.N. action regarding threats to or breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, whereas Article 34 forms a part of Chapter VI dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes. Australia proposed a strongly worded resolution which failed to muster the majority support of the Security Council. On 1 August the Security Council accepted the U.S.-sponsored resolution calling upon the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia 'to cease hostilities forthwith, and to settle their disputes by arbitration or other peaceful means'.¹⁰ The resolution also asked both the parties to inform the Security Council of the progress in peaceful settlement.

Holland's performance at the Security Council showed a characteristic burst of intransigence and a mind fixed too firmly in the past. In his vague and enigmatic way her representative was trying to prove that a war is not a war. On 21 July the Netherlands representative to the United Nations addressed a letter to the Secretary-General stating that his government had no alternative but to resort to force in order to restore peace and order which the Republican government had failed to maintain.¹¹ World reactions to the undeclared Dutch war shocked the Netherlands. Arabs of the Middle East immediately cabled protests to the Dutch and the U.N. In Singapore many organizations established a Committee to set up a volunteer fighting force against Hollanders.¹² When, ultimately, India and Australia brought the matter before the Security Council, Holland decided to obstruct the proceedings. And she had to swallow a number of rebuffs since world opinion swayed against her. Her representative, Van Kleffens, reiterated before the Council the archaic argument that the Republic was not a state and that the Security Council had no jurisdiction over Holland's internal affairs. This argument was patently invalid. For in Article 1 of the Linggadjati Agreement the Netherlands government unequivocally 'recognizes the Government of the Republic of Indonesia as exercising

de facto authority over Java, Madura, and Sumatra.' The Preamble to the Agreement also clearly refers to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. Van Kleffens put forth the maladroit argument that the Linggadjati Agreement conferred a sovereign status on the projected United States of Indonesia.¹³ But this was a talk of the future and could not nullify the recognition extended to the Republic by Article 1. The Republic would retain her sovereignty and in future she would join the United States of Indonesia till the formation of which she could not surrender her authority to a non-existent state. This view is strengthened by Article 15 of the Linggadjati Agreement which required the Netherlands government 'to reform the Government of the Indies in such a way that the composition and procedure shall conform as closely as possible to the *recognition* of the Republic of Indonesia.'¹⁴

The Security Council did not uphold the Dutch plea of domestic jurisdiction. The resolution of 1 August expressly mentioned the 'Republic of Indonesia' and rejected thereby the Dutch assertion that the war in Indonesia was a purely internal problem. The Council further rebuffed the Dutch when it refused to adopt the Belgium-proposed resolution¹⁵ seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice as to whether the Council was competent to exercise jurisdiction over the Indonesian question; the Council thereby revealed itself to be politically conscious and not too fastidious about legal conundrums. The Dutch were also snubbed when the Security Council permitted Sjahrir, a representative of the Republic, to participate in the discussions of the Council, but turned down a proposal to invite delegates from Dutch-monitored States of East Indonesia and Borneo. In anguish they behaved irresponsibly and held up the transmission of the Security Council decision (of 1 August) to the Republican government for many hours.¹⁶ The Dutch hoped to create a wrong impression among foreigners about the Republic's readiness to abide by the Council's decision. They also tried to prevent the Republic from being invited to the November Conference of the Economic and Social Council, and failed.¹⁷

The role of the custodians of peace and security, i.e., mem-

bers of the Security Council, was often discouraging and dishonourable. Belgium, Britain and France supported Holland's colonial ambitions with great consistency.¹⁸ They overtly sympathized with Holland's contention that the Republic was not a State; they opposed the decision to allow a Republican representative to participate in the discussions of the Security Council; they demanded that representatives of certain Dutch puppet States in Indonesia (this time the U.S.A. joined them) be invited to participate in the discussions of the Security Council.¹⁹ From the standpoint of a struggling Indonesian nationalist, the Soviet Union appeared to play a laudably impartial role—even if less due to her innate attachment to nationalist aspirations in view of the imperialist treachery in East Europe and more due to cold war motivations. She punctiliously measured up the requirements of the Republic and shaped her proposals accordingly. She proposed at the Security Council that the Dutch and the Republicans should be asked to withdraw to positions held by them before the military action.²⁰ The proposal was not accepted, but the Soviet Union gained Indonesian goodwill. The Soviet Union also proposed that the Council should set up a commission to supervise the cease-fire order and was supported by the U.S.A. This proposal was defeated on account of the French veto.²¹ And the U.S.S.R. remained the noble champion of the Republican cause. Her insights into the sentiments and necessities of the Republic were clearly recognizable when the line adopted by Sjahrir on 14 August almost coincided with that of the Soviet proposals. On that day Sjahrir gave before the Security Council a telling account of Indonesian freedom movement and proposed that the Dutch should withdraw to positions in conformity with the truce of 14 October 1946; he also suggested that the Council should appoint a commission to oversee compliance with its cease-fire order.²²

Australia's attitude thoroughly annoyed the Dutch.²³ Australia proposed that the Council should set up a 3-member arbitration committee. This proposal was decisively defeated; excepting Colombia and Syria, no state (not even the U.S.S.R.) supported it. The U.S.A. commendably averted deadlocks more than once, but her attitude was not always scrupulous or straightforward, especially in terms of the Republic's ex-

pectations. Republican leaders looked upon the U.S.A. as the home of liberty and were always enthused by the character and achievements of U.S. statesmen like Abraham Lincoln. Thus, when the Dutch launched the military operation, Sukarno addressed a stirring appeal to Indonesians to fight for freedom, and he quoted Lincoln²⁴ as on many other occasions. Indonesians were disappointed as the U.S.A. did not advocate any prompt Council action to stop the Dutch who were advancing steadily and consolidating gains accruing from military superiority, in spite of the cease-fire order. However, the U.S.A. deserved praise for sponsoring the 1 August resolution; Indonesians surely thanked the U.S.A. as they saw Britain, Belgium and France abstaining when that resolution was voted. They, of course, had the right to abstain; but the Indonesian sentiment was outraged.

The Security Council, still in its infancy, had to deal with a situation unusually delicate. It could make up for its lack of experience if it was not torn by intense rivalries and jealousies; that was not to be. The action of the Council was prompt but inadequate; the resolution of 1 August was timely but toothless; Dutch troops continued to thrust far into the Republic's territory.²⁵ The Council did not have the will to employ enforcement measures; the Dutch knew it and had good courage to ignore the resolution of the Security Council. The Council could act more effectively if it accepted Sjahrir's insistent recommendations; Sjahrir recommended to the Council that the Dutch troops must retreat to the positions occupied prior to the military action, that the Council should send a Commission to supervise the observance of the cease-fire resolution, that the Council should directly undertake the arbitration of the dispute. It only issued a simple cease-fire call;²⁶ and the Dutch attacked this as an encouragement to the lawless among Indonesians and as discouraging to moderates willing to cooperate with Holland.²⁷ It was not the U.N. intervention but the Dutch military action which dashed the hopes of moderates and seemed to vindicate the belief of extremists among Indonesians that the craving for cooperation and negotiation with the Dutch was only prolonging the period of Dutch mastery.

On 25 August the Security Council perambulated a few

steps forward as it adopted two resolutions. China and Australia sponsored the first resolution²⁸ setting up a Commission consisting of those career consuls at Batavia who represented states having seats in the Security Council at that time; this Consular Commission would report the implementation of the cease-fire order. The second resolution, sponsored by the United States, formed a Committee of Good Offices²⁹ consisting of three members; each contending party was to select one member; the two members, so selected, would choose the third member. The Republic chose an Australian; the Netherlands chose a Belgian; the Australian and the Belgian chose an American. The Security Council could realize that an immediate step, other than a mere cease-fire resolution, was essential in order to stop fighting. It had to expedite matters; it decided wisely to make use of the local Consuls, i.e., the men on the spot. At the same time, the Council tried to reach the long-range goal of conciliation by despatching a subsidiary Committee to the area of conflict, i.e. the Committee of Good Offices.³⁰ The Consular Commission made no delay in proceeding with the work. The Committee of Good Offices did not arrive in Djakarta till the end of October 1947.

The Consular Commission began to submit its reports to the Security Council from the beginning of October 1947. Between 3 October and 31 October, the Security Council held discussions on them, especially on the particularized Report by the Consular Commission at Batavia to the Security Council, dated 22 October 1947.³¹ This Report is an illuminating document on the attitudes and behaviour of the Dutch, on the state of the Republic-administered territories. It confirmed the allegations of Republicans against the Dutch, although persons who drafted the report were clever enough not to expressly hold the Dutch to be the guilty party. But what they wrote was sufficient to reveal Dutch atrocities. The report, furthermore, apprised sceptics of the strength of the Republican administration. The Commission noted that the whole situation was clouded by mutual mistrust which made itself felt even in official declarations. Their past experience, declared the Republicans officially, taught them that, unless a third neutral party continuously controlled the implemen-

tation of the cease-fire agreement, there was no guarantee that the Dutch troops would not unilaterally violate the same.³² The Commission pinpointed the most prominent reason for the failure of the ceasefire arrangement: it was the disagreement on the (everexpanding) area of Dutch-controlled territories. In fact, the Dutch behaved as if the U.N. did not exist and they ignored the U.N. debates and deliberations. They followed their own plans and realized their major military objectives. Furthermore, they drew up an imaginary line, designated as the Van Mook Line, connecting conjectured points reached by the advancing Dutch armies; this line often ran through and included big chunks of territories under the Republican sway. The Republic rejected this line and the Commission never accepted it; the Commission upheld the Republican contention that in places the notorious Van Mook Line went much ahead of the Dutch-controlled points. Besides, as the Commission noted, the Dutch executed protracted mopping up operations. 'The subsequent fanning out by the Dutch forces and their establishment of small posts in areas which they had not previously occupied, but which they claimed to control, was considered by the Republicans to be a breach of the cease-fire agreement,' the Commission reported.³³ The Republic, therefore, found safety in assailing those Dutch posts.

The same Report also contained a review of the general administration of Republican territories. While as a result of the military action food prospects in Dutch territories brightened up, the Republicans went on suffering shortages. Economic adversity was as much the result of communication difficulties as of the tight blockade imposed by the Netherlands for a prolonged period. Yet, the Report categorically stated, the general standard of civil services and public administration was nowhere below expectation especially in view of unending hostilities and threats. In spite of an emergency situation, the Commission commented, the Republican government did not betray any lack of interest in education and social services, not to speak of agricultural activities. From these remarks of the Consular Commission we are entitled to conclude that the charges of maladministration directed by Van Mook³⁴ against the Republic were prompted more by a

regard for misrepresentation than for a realistic survey. The Commission also attested the strength of the Indonesian national movement as it observed, with respect to Indonesians officering the Dutch administration in Dutch areas, that 'practically all the officials spoken to stated that they were nationalist at heart and wanted a free and independent Indonesia and to be able to fly their own flag.'³⁵ It completely belied the favourite story given by the Dutch that Indonesians in Dutch-controlled territories stood against the Republic. The Commission vouched for the dignity of the Indonesian struggle as it gave an unqualified support to the view that a nationalist, and not a communist, upheaval underlay the whole movement. The Commission honoured the nationalists who, it said, manifested in the course of their struggle strong anti-Dutch but pro-U.N. sentiments.

The Dutch, however, had little faith in the world organization and had no fear in violating its cease-fire resolution. Van Mook went even so far as to assert publicly³⁶ that the Dutch should obliterate Republican authority. Mr Pillai, the Indian delegate to the United Nations, justifiably remarked that 'the Security Council's resolution calling for the cessation of hostilities was obeyed by the one side and disregarded or circumvented by the other.'³⁷ Not unnaturally, therefore, Republicans clamoured ceaselessly for the removal of Dutch forces to positions held by them before the military drive. With this aim the Soviet Union and Poland introduced proposals in the Security Council, which were quickly defeated, the opposition coming from Belgium, Britain, France and the U.S.A. The typical case was the defeat of the Soviet-sponsored resolution of 31 October advocating withdrawal of Dutch troops to positions occupied before the military action; Australia, Colombia and Poland were in favour of it; Belgium, Britain, France, and the U.S.A. were against it; others abstained.³⁸

Once again the U.S.A. broke the impasse created by Dutch militancy in Indonesia and inaction of the Security Council, as the resolution sponsored by her was adopted on 1 November 1947. This resolution called upon the Netherlands and the Republic 'forthwith to consult with each other, either directly or through the Committee of Good Offices, as to the means

to be employed to give effect to the cease-fire resolution.³⁹ The resolution also said 'that the use of the armed forces of either party by hostile action to extend its control over territory not occupied by it on 4 August 1947, is inconsistent with the Council Resolution of 1 August.'⁴⁰ Poland opposed the resolution, while the Soviet Union abstained; their support would not have harmed the Republican cause; but they were as much embroiled in the game of power politics as Britain or France and could not take a less prejudiced view. The resolution, however, was weak in so far as it bypassed the issue of the Van Mook Line and its root, the military action. The resolution requested the Consular Commission as also the Committee of Good Offices to assist in the execution of ceasefire agreements; it assigned to the Committee of Good Offices the all-important duty of trying to reach a stable political equilibrium in Indonesia. The Council's limp attempt predictably left the Dutch unperturbed; they went ahead with their plans of military aggrandisement. They even crossed the Van Mook Line and overran other Republican areas. Kahin adduced a convincing evidence on this point. He quoted the despatch of U.P. correspondent Arnold Beckmann who wrote that the Dutch were openly violating the security Council's cease-fire resolution; Arnold Beckmann and some other correspondents were touring Indonesia at that time.⁴¹

The formal session of the Committee of Good Offices did not open till 8 December 1947, on board the U.S.S. 'Renville' lying at Batavia. The tenacious endeavours of the Committee compose an unbroken record of Dutch obstreperousness, the Republic's helplessness and the extremely limited capacity of the U.N. to quicken colonial emancipation. The Committee could not crack the glacial indifference of the Dutch. The first two plans framed by the Committee proved acceptable to the Republic, but the Dutch accepted the first only in part and the second as only a working paper.⁴² The insincerity and intransigence of the Dutch once again paid them a high dividend. The Committee reformulated its proposals primarily to meet Dutch desires. These proposals, submitted on 26 December, were embodied in the Christmas Draft Message. Twelve principles, believed to facilitate a permanent political decision, were enumerated along with pro-

posals for a truce. The Republic accepted the proposals and all the principles. But, as usual, Holland's aggressive self-confidence spurred her to create tensions, exploit weaknesses and gain victories. The Netherlands presented a set of twelve principles which drastically modified those offered by the Committee. The crumbling shibboleth of colonialism was once again expressed in these proposals embodying totally unsubstantial, if unsurprising, concessions. The Dutch counter-proposals⁴³ did nowhere mention the Republic by name. Nor did they provide for the Republic's representation in the interim government pending the transfer of sovereignty. They were silent on the evacuation of Dutch troops from Republican areas occupied by the military action, and the restoration, there, of the Republican authority. Furthermore, the Dutch counter-proposals refrained from relying on international institutions or requesting the Committee of Good Offices to resolve differences between the parties during the interim period. They included a provision for free elections to determine the political loyalties of the people; but unless the U.N. superintended the free elections—and this was not provided for—these would be controlled by the Dutch and would not amount to self-determination by the people.

What was most deplorable in the Dutch counter-proposals, they contained the warning that the Dutch would resume liberty of action if the Republic failed to accept them unconditionally.⁴⁴ No less shocking to the suffering colonial peoples was the capitulation of the U.N.; it could not curb Holland's separatist activities. Van Mook unilaterally proclaimed the inauguration of another puppet state, East Sumatra, on 29 December 1947—this territory had been wrested away from the Republic; the U.N. could not resist. The Dutch, incited by military advantages gained during the preceding months, issued another ultimatum on 9 January: they wrote to the Committee of Good Offices that unless the Republic unconditionally accepted their counter-proposals within three days, they would regain freedom of action.⁴⁵

The Committee of Good Offices tried to get out of the muddle. Its American member, Dr Graham, worked hard to amend the Dutch counter-proposals and coax the parties to accept them as amended. He formulated six additional prin-

ciples which the Committee accepted. These gave the Republic the status of a state within the projected United States of Indonesia and a fair representation; these guaranteed continued U.N. participation in the Indonesian issue, whether for assisting a party (and the other party could not have the right to object to that) or supervising a plebiscite. These additional principles made the Dutch counter-proposals less unpalatable and Graham's pertinacious pleadings persuaded Republicans to swallow them. More onerous was the task of getting Holland to subscribe to them. Holland ultimately accepted the additional principles, but that was the victory of the U.S. State Department and not really of the U.N. Graham informed Marshall, the U.S. Secretary of State, that the Dutch must be restrained, or else the Indonesian problem could not be solved peacefully. Marshall's steady advocacy⁴⁶ of the six principles bent Dutch attitude; the Dutch finally accepted them. The Renville Agreement was signed on board the U.S.S. Renville on 17 January and 19 January 1948. It comprised a truce agreement, twelve principles as the basis for political discussions, six additional principles for negotiations toward a political settlement. The Van Mook Line was accepted as the basis of the truce—this was a complete victory for the Dutch and a token of the U.N.'s weakness. The twelve principles were:⁴⁷

1. That the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices be continued in the working out and signing of an agreement for the settlement of the political dispute in the islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura, based upon the principles underlying the Linggadjati Agreement.
2. It is understood that neither party has the right to prevent the free expression of popular movements looking toward political organizations which are in accord with the principles of the Linggadjati Agreement. It is further understood that each party will guarantee the freedom of assembly, speech and publication at all times provided that this guarantee is not construed so as to include the advocacy of violence or reprisals.
3. It is understood that decisions concerning changes in administration of territory should be made only with the

full and free consent of the population of those territories and at a time when the security and freedom from coercion of such population will have been ensured.

4. That on the signing of the political agreement provisions be made for the gradual reduction of the armed forces of both parties.

5. That as soon as practicable after the signing of the truce agreement, economic activity, trade, transportation and communications be restored through the co-operation of both parties, taking into consideration the interest of all the constituent parts of Indonesia.

6. That provision be made for a suitable period of not less than six months/not more than one year after the free discussion and consideration of vital issues will proceed. At the end of this period, free elections will be held for self-determination by the people of their political relationship to the Republic and to the United States of Indonesia.

7. That a constitutional convention be chosen according to democratic procedure to draft a constitution for the United States of Indonesia.

8. It is understood that if, after signing the agreement referred to in item 1, either party should ask the United Nations to provide an agency to observe conditions at any time up to the point at which sovereignty is transferred from the Government of the Netherlands to the Government of the United States of Indonesia, the other party will take this request in serious consideration.

[The following four principles, out of the twelve, are taken from the Linggadjati Agreement.]

9. Independence for the Indonesian peoples.

10. Co-operation between the peoples of the Netherlands and Indonesia.

11. A sovereign state on a federal basis under a constitution which will be arrived at by democratic processes.

12. A union between the United States of Indonesia and

other parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands under the King of the Netherlands.

The six additional principles were:⁴⁸

1. Sovereignty throughout the Netherlands Indies is and shall remain with the Kingdom of the Netherlands until after a stated interval the Kingdom of the Netherlands transfers its sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. Prior to the termination of such stated interval, the Kingdom of the Netherlands may confer appropriate rights, duties and responsibilities on a provisional federal Government of the Territories of the future United States of Indonesia. The United States of Indonesia, when created, will be a sovereign and independent state of equal partnership with the Kingdom of the Netherlands in a Netherlands-Indonesian Union at the head of which shall be the King of the Netherlands. The status of the Republic of Indonesia will be that of a state within the United States of Indonesia.
2. In any provisional federal Government created prior to the ratification of the constitution of the future United States of Indonesia, all states will be offered fair representation.
3. Prior to the dissolution of the Committee of Good Offices, either party may request that the services of the Committee will be continued to assist in adjusting differences between the parties which relate to the political agreement and which may arise during the interim period. The other party will interpose no objection to such a request; this request would be brought to the attention of the Security Council of the United Nations by the Government of the Netherlands.
4. Within a period of not less than six months or more than one year from the signing of this agreement, a plebiscite will be held to determine whether the populations of the various territories of Java, Madura and Sumatra wish their territory to form part of the Republic of Indonesia or of another state within the United States of Indonesia, such plebiscite to be conducted under observation by the

Committee of Good Offices should either party, in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 3 above, request the services of the Committee in the capacity. The parties may agree that another method for ascertaining the will of the populations may be employed in place of a plebiscite.

5. Following the delineation of the states in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 4 above, a constitutional convention will be convened, through democratic procedures, to draft a constitution for the United States of Indonesia. The representation of the various states in the convention will be in proportion to their populations.

6. Should any state decide not to ratify the constitution and desire in accordance with the principles of Articles 3 and 4 of the Linggadjati Agreement, to negotiate a special relationship with the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, neither party will object.

The Renville Agreement endorsed the Van Mook Line and squeezed the Republican territory into a skeleton; and the U.N. agent, the Committee of Good Offices, was a party to this disintegration. The view that 'Renville saved the Republic'⁴⁹ is not at all convincing. True, the Republic was facing overwhelming economic difficulties and could not afford any delay⁵⁰ in ending the political stalemate. But the Renville Agreement was based on the Van Mook Line which deprived the Republic of rich food-surplus areas and left to her food-deficit areas. Nor did it terminate the naval blockade which was strangulating the Republic. Hence, it cannot be argued that "Diplomacy on the 'Renville' had robbed Holland of the fruits of her military victory."⁵¹ On the contrary, the Renville Agreement legalized Holland's robbery, and prolonged the resultant economic crisis in the Republic. The Renville Agreement, it may be argued, saved the Republic further military disasters. To this it may be replied that a military truce was not then unsuitable to Holland's strategy. She perhaps decided to have a respite and consolidate her gains; she would later on resort to a military action, if necessary, and actually did so in December 1948. Meanwhile, she could ignore the Agreement, stage unfree elections in terri-

tories overrun by her, and accelerate the formation of a puppet United States of Indonesia; as a matter of fact, she began to do so immediately after the signing of the Renville Agreement.

The *New York Times* wrote editorially on 16 January 1948: 'We believe the judgment of history will be that the Republicans made more concessions to their legitimate aspirations for independence than did the Dutch in their desire to hold on to a rich colony. . . .' Sjahrir thought 'that the Renville Agreement had been a bad defeat for the Republic'.⁵² Many Republicans were likewise pessimistic; their dissatisfaction with the Renville terms hardened into an opposition to the then Premier Sjarifuddin and produced a cabinet crisis. Sjarifuddin departed; Dr Md. Hatta became the next Premier of the Republic. It cannot be denied, however, that the Republican government had accepted the Renville terms simply because it was in a desperate situation. It was afraid of a renewed military campaign by the Dutch, and it was plainly told by the Committee of Good Offices that the Security Council would not be able to provide any effective help in such a contingency.⁵³ The impotence of the U.N. was shockingly clear. Instead of asserting that the Republic was rescued from a military menace by the Renville Agreement, one could more accurately say that the Republic was blackmailed—and that despite the participation of the U.N. The Republican government, while yielding to Graham's pressure, was also probably lured by the hope of more resolute U.S. assistance in future in solving the fundamental political problem.⁵⁴ Another thought impelling the Republican government to sign the Renville Agreement was that the free plebiscites would work out in its favour.

As to the drafting of the Agreement, although hundred per cent clarity could not be ensured because of the shortage of time in the face of a Dutch ultimatum, vagueness surely remained a big loophole through which conflicting interpretations made their way. It could be very well anticipated that the Dutch would exploit this vagueness and harass the Republic.

The Republic's compromising gestures and eagerness for a timely settlement had been sufficiently revealed in the acceptance of the Renville Agreement. These were also revea-

led in the execution of the same. As a result of the acceptance of the Van Mook Line evacuation of troops became the burden of solely the Republicans as many advanced Dutch points had behind them Republican military formations. About 25,000 members of the Republican Army had to be evacuated from these 'pockets'. They moved out in perfect order.⁵⁵

But the paths toward a permanent political settlement proved less easy to explore as these concerned not simply the Republicans but the Dutch as well. The Dutch preferred to delay the settlement as that way lay the financial ruin of the Republic and the possibility of propping up a federal government with Dutch patronage so that the Republic would be politically more and more isolated and infirm under the severe impact of all-round separatist movements. That is why as regards the exercise of sovereignty during the interim period, the Dutch contention was that the 'Indonesian provisional federal government should, under the supreme authority of the Netherlands, be organized step by step and receive its powers only gradually'.⁵⁶ The Republicans could forecast the ill-wind and refused to be bound by such a proposal. The Linggadjati Agreement had long ago accorded *de facto* recognition to the Republic which was determined to transfer, during the interim period, the jurisdiction over such subjects as foreign affairs and defence, not to the Netherlands but to a federal United States of Indonesia. Otherwise she would be drawn to Dutch confines step by step—past progress towards self-government would be undone.

Another problem of implementing the Renville Agreement centred round financial difficulties but was related to the fundamental question of ad interim sovereignty as well. The Truce Agreement in Article 6 stipulated that 'trade and intercourse between all areas should be permitted as far as possible; such restriction as may be necessary will be agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Committee and its representatives if required'.⁵⁷ But increase of trade was not appreciable as the provision was not accepted in practice. The economic condition of the Republic became critical owing to acute shortages. The Dutch blockade grew tighter and left no means of alleviation. The Good Offices Commit-

tee, in its Report of 22 July 1948, referred to foreign occupation and post-war dislocation as the origin of the economic blizzard blowing over the Republic but held the Netherlands immediately responsible for failing to implement the Agreement and thereby mitigate the economic hardships of the Republic.⁵⁸ The Dutch replied that they had to impose harsh trade regulations only in order to check illicit traffic; they claimed sovereignty in the interim period and consequently the liberty to control trade. The Committee was powerless to resist the Dutch move.

On 29 July, the Security Council adopted the Chinese resolution. This too could not solve the vexed question of sovereignty. The Resolution⁵⁹ simply instructed both parties to punctiliously abide by the provisions of the Truce Agreement and to head towards the indicated political goal as swiftly as possible. It failed to console the Republic as it also failed to check the Dutch in their colonial ambitions which were intensified with the retreat of the Republic revealed in her bowing down to the Dutch proposals in the Renville negotiation. The same reason which prompted the Republic to accept it underlay the continuing Dutch insincerity and intransigence—the fear of a resurgence of the Dutch colonial war banking on the not-very-hidden sympathies of some leading states. While the Republic had submitted to a drastic reduction of political boundaries and economic resources, the Dutch claimed still more and demanded full ad interim sovereignty. The Dutch could refer to the first of the six additional principles in the Renville Agreement and try to justify their claim. But that would be a perverse interpretation of the Renville Agreement. The Republic and the Netherlands, two sovereign entities, concluded only the Truce Agreement on board the Renville. They also agreed to twelve principles and six additional principles; but—and this is most important—these were only principles to arrive at a political agreement; these did not constitute a finally agreed pact. “In other words, the Republic of Indonesia has come to an understanding with the Kingdom of the Netherlands to conclude an agreement with the latter to be based on the concept of sovereignty of the Netherlands over Indonesia pending the establishment of the United States of Indonesia, but before the conclusion of

the agreement the status of the Republic, nay, the status of both parties do not in any way change. With regard to this, Prof. Graham hit the nail on the head when at the time of the signing of the Renville Agreement he said that the Republic remained as it had been before: 'You are what you are!'"⁶⁰

The Dutch hampered negotiations in other ways too. While Hatta, on being appointed the Prime Minister, began to pursue a joint programme of economic reconstruction and political resettlement via the Renville Agreement, the Netherlands government made a noticeable delay⁶¹ even over appointment of representatives and thereby postponed discussions and negotiations. Add to all these the separatist activities, which, championed by Van Mook, were never at an ebb; and the willingness of the Dutch to be faithful to the spirit of the U.N. Charter becomes an impossibility. Van Mook busied himself in establishing a provisional federal government with himself at its head. He even issued a decree with such intentions as early as 10 March 1948. The Republic could not be blamed if she grew sceptical of Dutch intentions. And the Dutch were not a whit justified in their calculated assaults on the defenceless Republic.

The Republic complained against increasing Dutch separatist activities to the Security Council. The outcome was the usual passage of a harmless resolution, on 28 February, moved by China, exhorting the Good Offices Committee to pay serious attention to the political developments in Western Java and Madura and report to the Council thereon at quick intervals.⁶² But, as before, the Dutch acted as if there was no U.N. to submit to, no Agreement to abide by. They were determined to destroy the Republic which could be allowed to exist only as a minor part of a Dutch Empire wearing the garb of a Commonwealth. With all energy they began to sponsor an interim federal government. Thus, on 21 January, a few days after the signature of the Renville Agreement, Van Mook announced the formation of a state of Madura with Tjakranigrat as the President. This Tjakranigrat came of the ancient ruling family of the island and remained a feudal aristocrat. He was previously appointed the Republic's Resident in Madura and resigned when the Dutch army occupied it. Later it was found out that he made a

deal with the Dutch whereby he would be the chief executive of Madura and pledged cooperation with the Dutch Commissioner for Administration ('Recomba').⁶³ He then proceeded to help the Dutch Commissioner in conducting a plebiscite inside Madura although a state of siege and war had been declared which debarred the exercise of civil rights. That it was a mockery of a plebiscite was also proved by its being a public one. Although the Dutch wanted to justify their formation of the state by a reference to the democratic procedure of plebiscite, its usefulness was vitiated by its unilateral character, the Republic remaining out of the picture. This was also in violation of the terms of the Renville Agreement as the Committee of Good Offices was not the supervisor and as 'freedom of assembly, speech and publication,' was not allowed. Further, as the Committee stated, "while legally the governmental organization of Madura had been changed from a Residency to a 'Free Madura State' in practice no administrative changes have so far been made."⁶⁴

Van Mook's next target was West Java. A separatist movement had been launched there in March 1947, with the support of a puppet organization, the Sundanese People's Party, although popular support behind it was lacking.⁶⁵ Further steps were taken in October 1947, when the Dutch Administrative Commissioner (Recomba) convened the First West Java Conference. Forty-five Dutch-nominated Indonesian delegates met in Bandung to decide 'the way in which West Java could participate now in the central administration and in the establishment of the United States of Indonesia.'⁶⁶ The Conference then adopted a resolution for setting up 'a Contact Commission to request the authorities to call a Second West Java Conference...in order to bring about the establishment of a provisional governing organization of West Java on a democratic basis.'⁶⁷ The Second West Java Conference took place in December 1947, attended as usual by the Dutch-nominated delegates, one hundred and fifty-four in number, of whom 42 belonged to communities other than the Indonesian. It adopted a resolution for convening the Third West Java Conference that would set up a representative assembly looking toward a provisional government for the state of West Java.⁶⁸ These convocations were contrary to the

provisions of the Renville Agreement. But a Dutch decree of 26 February recognized the Third Conference, convened between 23 February and 5 March, to be the provisional West Java government. The Republic lodged formal protests to the Dutch authorities, and, in a letter (dated 15 March 1948) to the Good Offices Committee, the Republican Government referred to Van Mook's letter (dated 12 February 1948) stating that 'the formation of the provisional federal government was eventually to evolve from the political negotiations between the government of the Republic of Indonesia and the government of the Netherlands.'⁶⁹ These protests evoked no satisfactory response from either the Dutch or the Security Council or the leading Powers. Yet matters for the Netherlands were not all too encouraging as they could not build up any general following in the areas they controlled and over which they continued to impose a state of war and siege. They had to countenance a strong Plebiscite Movement in Western Java sponsored by Republicans and launched on 1 February 1948. Kusuma Atmaja, the leader of the anti-separatist movement, was requested to form the first cabinet of the puppet West Java state. He refused, as the Dutch formed the state in distinct violation of the Renville Agreement.⁷⁰

The Dutch employed all the powers of the press, police and radio to put down the Plebiscite Movement. They contended that such a movement could not start prior to the conclusion of a final agreement between them and the Republic and they did what was forbidden by the Renville Agreement: suppression of freedom of speech and assembly. The leaders of the Plebiscite Movement could not legally call any meeting, nor could the pro-Republican political parties.⁷¹

That the Dutch could not succeed in estranging the people from the Republic was reflected in the proceedings of the Third West Java Conference, even though of the 100 delegates to this conference 47 were directly appointed by the Dutch; and 'owing to the disruptions of administration and communication, it had proved impossible to hold elections in many areas,' which increased the number of appointed delegates still more.⁷² Yet a strong pro-Republican front was built up amongst the delegates and it passionately asserted itself forcing a resolution that not only sought to convert the Con-

ference into a 'Provisional Representative Body' of the 'Provisional Government' but also provided that 'the status of West Java' would be 'determined by a plebiscite' according to the terms of the Renville Agreement.⁷³ However, next day, 25 February, the Chairman took steps to adopt a mutilated resolution without the plebiscite clause by disallowing discussions on it.⁷⁴ And, on the following day, the Netherlands Government hastened to approve the resolution that transformed the Third West Java Conference into a Provisional Assembly of a provisional government. The Netherlands government acknowledged finally the birth of a new state, the state of West Java.

In Sumatra, too, Van Mook succeeded in installing an administrative organization needed for a new state. It was largely manned by aristocrats and retired Dutch civilians. The former took this opportunity of enjoying a new lease of life unthinkable under the democratic regime of the Republic. An emergency ordinance was a handy weapon for proclamation of new states where popular sentiments did not permit a mere show of democratic procedures. This was utilized in East Sumatra and East Java to increase the number of puppet regimes in Indonesia. A few common features are noticeable in the formation of such states. The atmosphere of liberty was lacking. Untrammelled exercise of basic civil liberties was ruled out by the imposition of a state of war and siege by Dutch authorities who also policed private as well as public meetings. At the same time nowhere did the people take any initiative in setting up new administrations. The Dutch sponsored them and took care to maintain democratic pretensions, but the thin disguise over authoritarian methods could not endure. People coming from Dutch-occupied areas affirmed that in these states real power was concentrated in the hands of the Recomba, the Dutch Commissioner.⁷⁵ Lastly, the Dutch always tried to select members of the feudal aristocracy as popular representatives forming the new governments. The days of privilege granted by the Dutch, however temporary, were welcome to them especially as the Republic would not have brooked these privileges.

The Dutch now addressed themselves to the greater task of organizing an Interim Federal Government. Hatta express-

ed the Republic's willingness to join such a government and transfer some important powers to it.⁷⁶ This offer of co-operation was rejected by Van Mook on the ground that such an offer could not be accepted pending a final agreement between the Republic and the Netherlands. Van Mook began to sponsor a non-Republican Interim Federal Indonesian Government to which later on the Republic might be admitted, if at all, as a fossilized fragment. The Republic was treated with the deadliest weapon, i.e., indifference. On 9 March Van Mook declared the formation of this government⁷⁷ consisting of a hierarchy of Dutch civil servants assisted by Indonesians bereft of pro-Republican sentiments; and one could not view with equanimity the Dutch contention that this was an advance towards self-government. The Republican government issued a statement deploring that the structure and function of Van Mook's Provisional Federal Government did not in the least correspond to the Provisional Federal Government which the Renville Agreement had in view.⁷⁸ It further said that the newly established government was nothing but a reformed Netherlands Indies Government.⁷⁹

The Dutch plan could be viewed in all its dangerous potentialities with the convocation of the federal conference between 27 May and 17 July 1948, at Bandung, where Van Mook inaugurated the Conference and affirmed:⁸⁰ '...it did not seem possible to continue waiting for the moment when the Republic would join us: the problems we have to deal with are too urgent and of too great importance to all of us to postpone this conference any longer. This seemed to confirm Republican suspicions regarding the unilateral Dutch plan of forming a federated Indonesia outweighing the Republic's authority. The Republican fears were also rooted in the Dutch contention that 'they consider a federation without the Republic in no way an impossibility', and that 'the further expansion of the federation goes on.'⁸¹ The Conference continued to sit, in spite of Republican protests, and was attended by Dutch-nominated delegates representing 18 non-Republican states. They were present there 'initiated, inspired, abetted' by the Dutch Government, said the Filipino delegate to the Security Council. The Good Offices Committee received protests from the Republic, but it could only

report to the Security Council on the new situation and could not itself take, or persuade the Security Council to take, any steps to avert the latent dangers. The Security Council too did not bend to take any action on the report. It was too much interest-ridden for that. And it was only due to the pressure of American and Australian members in the Good Offices Committee that the Belgian member's insistence on shunning any adverse report on Dutch policy could be over-ridden and the Security Council had glimpses of Dutch manoeuvrings through the Committee's report.⁸²

This Federal Conference, however, did not mean an unblemished triumph for the Dutch. The people in the Dutch-occupied territory strongly expressed their disapproval through their political parties commanding the support of more than 90 per cent of the people in the occupied area.⁸³ The Republic's influence was markedly felt in the proceedings of the Conference. The Dutch wanted Hilmen Djayadinigrat to be the Chairman of the Conference; he was defeated by Adil Puradiredja, the candidate sponsored by the pro-Republican groups.⁸⁴ The Conference unanimously decided upon the use of the Indonesian language in the proceedings; this was another symbol of the pro-Republican sympathies of the delegates. The Dutch were also worried by the opposition, firmly voiced in the Conference, to their manoeuvre to set up a United States of Indonesia without the Republic. A. Z. Abidin, a representative from Borneo, cautioned others: 'We must remember that the Dutch-Republican negotiations have come to a deadlock....Therefore the regional representatives must be careful and go as close as possible to the aim of the Republican struggle which constitutes the vanguard in the present revolution.'⁸⁵

The situation that arose was more than a deadlock, and threatened a rupture in Dutch-Indonesian relations. The spell of misunderstanding could only be broken by a bold initiative either from the Security Council or its agent, the Committee of Good Offices. Dissensions paralyzed the Security Council and the Committee too faced difficulties because of the pro-Dutch affiliations of its Belgian member. It now fell upon the American and Australian members of the Committee, C. Dubois and T. Critchley, to take a useful step, and

they rose equal to the occasion by submitting a secret working paper, reasonable and practicable.⁸⁶ These compromise proposals of 10 June 1948, known as the Dubois-Critchley Plan, 'envisage a general election throughout Indonesia to elect representatives to a Constituent Assembly and setting up of a joint commission of technical experts to delineate the future member states. The number of the delegates to the Constituent Assembly from each electoral district will be in proportion to the population of the district such as one delegate for half a million inhabitants. The election will be free and uncoerced as stated in the Renville Agreement and assurance is made immediately to try those who abuse those principles. The election will be in the form of secret ballot under the observation of the Committee of Good Offices. The Constituent Assembly will also convene a Provisional Parliament. The Provisional Parliament will form a responsible Provisional Federal Government which in its turn will appoint the Premier who will select his cabinet. The Constituent Assembly will draft a constitution for the United States of Indonesia.'⁸⁷

As in many previous instances, the Netherlands failed to strike a spirit of compromise and rejected the plan outright on the framed-up excuse of the leakage of the confidential draft to pressmen. The charge was palpably false. As foreign correspondents in Batavia made it clear to Kahin,⁸⁸ the leakage was the work of the Dutch authorities meant to miscolour their real attitude. The Republic accepted the plan and wanted to follow it as the basis for a more comprehensive settlement; the Netherlands checkmated their intentions. The Republic was prepared to start with the Dubois-Critchley plan; but the Dutch sternly set their face against it. There was a deadlock again which the Security Council did not endeavour to end in spite of repeated notices from the Good Offices Committee regarding its inability to control the dangerous turn of events. There was simply a debate on 1 July in which even the modest Chinese proposal for examining the Dubois-Critchley Plan was thrown down, the U.S.A. opposing it and thereby disillusioning the Indonesian of any U.S. guarantee behind the implementation of the Renville Agreement.⁸⁹ Indonesians remembered that the objective re-

ports of the Committee of Good Offices acquainted the Security Council with how the Dutch were unilaterally setting up puppet regimes in clear violation of the Renville Agreement. 'Yet the Security Council did not dare to introduce any measures to check the Dutch in their transgressions.'⁹⁰ Indonesians had a feeling that the Security Council was failing them.⁹¹

The signing of a truce agreement, of course, is only a beginning and always holds mixed potentialities. Much more important and much more difficult are the negotiations toward a lasting political settlement. But the Dutch did not take the truce seriously;⁹² and they conducted negotiations in an uncompromising fashion only to gain time for fragmenting and encircling the Republic politically and immolating it financially. They moved troops in such a way as to achieve some military objectives quickly in case they started a military offensive. They completely disregarded the Renville principles as they massacred the people in Macassar because of the peoples' pro-Republican sympathies. There 'the entire population was confined, several thousands at a time, in an enclosed compound and then shot because the people refused to, or could not, identify Republicans among them who were opposed to Dutch rule.'⁹³ Republicans, moreover, dreaded the early renewal of a military action when they scanned Dutch press reports.⁹⁴

After the failure of the Dubois-Critchley Plan the Good Offices Committee made another attempt. That was another retreat, a bigger concession to Dutch demands. Merle Cochran, the American member of the Committee and the successor of Dubois, submitted confidential oral proposals to the two parties.⁹⁵ These proposals were substantially similar to the Dubois-Critchley proposals; but the Cochran proposals were more satisfying to the Dutch as under these proposals elections would follow and not precede the formation of an interim government. Besides, the Dutch were placated by the provision that the constituent states of the proposed federation would have independent militias and that the Netherlands High Commissioner would have the power to veto legislation.⁹⁶ The Republic accepted the proposals with some reservations; but the Dutch demands were too high-strung to

allow further talks; the proposals died even before they could crystallize into a formal plan.

Indonesians derived quite a few lessons from these after-growths of the Renville Agreement. The acquiescence of the Security Council in the misdeeds of the Dutch made them alarmed; the neglectful policy of the U.S.A. kept them despairing. But there were many Indonesians who would be bold and attempt a surgical operation instead of waiting indefinitely and sustaining Dutch blows in search of the mirage of a lasting compromise. They were the Communists who profited from the all-round economic degradation of the people⁹⁷ and the political humiliation of the Republican government. They were considerably strengthened when the ex-Premier Sjarifuddin joined them openly; he even claimed that he had been a secret member of the Communist Party of Indonesia for a long time and also when he had been the Premier of the Republic.⁹⁸ The return of Musso from the U.S.S.R. after years of exile was another decisive event.⁹⁹ Musso was a leader of the Communist Party in the 1920's, one of the ring-leaders of the abortive Communist insurrection of 1926. The Communists had a wily leader in the veteran Musso. At the party conference of August 1948, Musso sponsored a resolution¹⁰⁰ entitled 'The New Road for the Republic of Indonesia', which was adopted. This resolution accorded top priority to armed struggle¹⁰¹ as the Dutch colonialists were ceaselessly increasing their strength. It unambiguously rejected the Linggadjati and the Renville Agreements.¹⁰²

The Communist Party found it easy to condemn the U.S.A. who was often pro-Dutch, and to praise the U.S.S.R. who was more alert in nursing Asian nationalism in the Security Council. The attempts of the U.S.A. to solve the Indonesian problem were often improvident;¹⁰³ the wordy support that the U.S.S.R. gave to Indonesian nationalism was practically futile but consistently soothing. In the new world of South East Asia Soviet diplomacy was definitely shaping better. It was clear to everybody that the U.S.A. was the only State who could effectively influence Holland to mend her ways. Holland had to spend \$1,000,000 per day¹⁰⁴ to maintain her troops and the naval blockade in the Indies; she was poor primarily because of this imprudence; and, the Communists could declare, the U.S.A.

was lending huge sums to Holland, thereby enabling her to carry on the imperialist gamble.¹⁰⁵ The U.S.A. might plead that she was not directly responsible for Holland's militarism in Indonesia. Nobody could deny that; at the same time everybody could affirm that the U.S.A. enjoyed a unique position because of which she would be held guilty even if she was totally inactive on certain matters. There was no doubt that the U.S.A. could surely have stopped the Dutch by making an all-out official move, and that she had not done it.¹⁰⁶ The U.S.A. was worried about the Communist menace in Indonesia, but she did not have the diplomatic vision to forestall it. The Dutch used American-made bombs and bullets in Indonesia; this was the strongest argument of the Communists. As the score for the U.S.A. went low in Indonesian eyes, that for the U.S.S.R. went high automatically, though not always logically. The U.S.S.R., too, did not lose sight of her business in Indonesia. She actively fomented a revolution in Indonesia as part of the over-all strategy of insurrection in Asia. That strategy was firmly enunciated and adopted at the historic Calcutta conference of Communist leaders held in February 1948. This strategy, it should be noted, was not simply the product of the Asian situation. It had a European background; the Marshall Plan evidently closed the door to Soviet expansionism in Western Europe; the Soviet Union, therefore, became more active in Asia. The Moscow-directed Calcutta resolution was the signal for Communist uprisings which exploded in Burma, Malaya and Indonesia in the same year (and in India in 1949).¹⁰⁷

Indonesian Communists were stirred to believe that in the final struggle against Dutch imperialists the Soviet Union would come to their rescue by undoing the plots of Anglo-American imperialists.¹⁰⁸ Before that, they should make no delay in ousting the Anglo-US hirelings like Sukarno and Hatta and seize power. They struck at the distressed Republican government on 18 September 1948, and captured Madiun which was long known to be the 'red city', a communist stronghold. The Republican government acted firmly and promptly in the face of the double disaster of Dutch blockade and civil war and in an unpromising atmosphere of doubts and dissatisfactions. The government troops staged sure-footed

movements. Sukarno and Hatta lost no time in enlightening the people on the vile conspiracy tormenting the young Republic. Sukarno appealed to the people that they would have to choose between Musso and his Communist Party, who would frustrate the formation of a free Indonesia, and the government of Sukarno and Hatta who were working for a free Indonesia not dominated by any foreign state.¹⁰⁹ Hatta argued that 'Musso once before destroyed our national movement when he incited a rebellion against the Dutch in 1926 without proper and adequate preparation.... We must stop Musso from destroying for a second time our hopes for a free Indonesia.'¹¹⁰

It may be affirmed that the Indonesian Communists got a fertile soil for planting revolutionary ideas primarily because of Dutch obstinacy that produced a prolonged stalemate and aggravated the misery of the people.¹¹¹ The Dutch behaviour after the outbreak of the rebellion was remarkable. At first they offered assistance to the Republic;¹¹² the Republic tactfully rejected the offer; the Dutch were irritated. So the Dutch began to propagate that the Republic was unable to chastise the rebels.¹¹³ This was contradicted by the success of the government troops. Next, the Dutch announced that the Republican government itself had arranged the coup as a stage show in order to deceive the world and hide its own communist leanings. However, these propaganda stunts expired as the communist insurrection began to fade out. The Dutch sometimes obstructed the efforts of the Republic to capture the communist rebels; for example, they refused to hand over rebels escaping from the Republic's territory into the Dutch-occupied area.¹¹⁴ The Republican government broke the back of the rebellion within a month¹¹⁵ even though the last batch of insurgents was arrested in December. It appeared that the rebels were not very well-organized as the onslaughts of Republican troops saw them quickly melting away in the hills and jungles.¹¹⁶

With the outbreak of the Madiun Coup the point was reached when the Republican government had to demonstrate firmly that it was a government and meant to govern, or it had to get out. The result was patently disastrous for the Communist movement in Indonesia—many top-flight Communist

leaders like Musso and Sjarifuddin were dead. The failure of the revolt 'destroyed most of the fruits of three decades of difficult and dangerous boring from within by the Indonesian comrades.'¹¹⁷ Correspondingly, the Republic gained prestige and confidence as she convincingly proved her military capacity and administrative efficiency. Without outside help she humbled the Communist pride. The people could repose greater faith in the Republic. Indonesia's nationalist aspirations were matched by the requisite administrative ability.

The contribution of the people to the failure of the Communist uprising was vital. The people did not support the Communists. Sometimes villagers united to capture the Communist rebels. The Communist leaders were guilty of an over-estimation of popular support behind them. The people at that time were surely discontented on account of economic maladies and the delay in political liberation. But the Communists were wrong to equate this discontent to a readiness to overthrow the government headed by Sukarno and Hatta. The people were not expected to destroy the Republican Government, a veritable fortress of nationalist hopes, on a signal of revolt from the Communist Party.¹¹⁸

Aidit tried to explain away the significance of the Communist debacle in the Madiun affair. He wrote in the official party history that the Communists had no plan to seize power in Madiun, and that the Republican government circulated a lie about the Communist revolt in order to stifle the PKI by arrests and murders. The Communists only acted in self-defence against the terror unleashed by the Republican government, reminiscent of the terrorist tactics of the Dutch government during 1926-27.¹¹⁹ Perhaps Aidit offered this explanation to wipe out the stain of defeat in the Madiun coup.

Formerly, the U.S. policy of pleasing Indonesians without alienating Holland disgusted the Republic. But the Moscow-manoeuvred insurrection showed that the U.S.S.R. could go much further than the U.S.A. in striking at the Republic. Communists had not welcomed the birth of the Republic in August 1945—Indonesian and Dutch Communists in Holland joined hands in denouncing the Republic as a Japanese puppet.¹²⁰ Moscow Radio paid no heed to the proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945.¹²¹ As the insurrection erupt-

ed, Moscow radio beamed that the Madiun revolt 'was a popular uprising against the government of the Fascist Japanese Quislings, Sukarno and Hatta.'¹²² The Republic felt she had to fear more from the U.S.S.R. than from the U.S.A. At the same time the U.S.A. could note that the Republic was not, as the Dutch would have them believe, a tottering regime headed by incompetent fanatics. She was also cured of the illusion, carefully cultivated by the Dutch, that the Republic's leaders were Communist extremists deserving Anglo-American apathy. 'There is reason to believe, therefore, that the ease with which the Republic put down the revolt has disappointed none more than the Dutch authorities.'¹²³ It could be anticipated that the U.S. policy towards Indonesia would be reoriented. The U.S.A. would perhaps no longer lean strongly towards the Dutch. She would not rely on a rebellious colony controlled by the Dutch. She would prefer a free Indonesia functioning as the eastern flank of a South Asia anti-Communist arc.

The Dutch were disappointed more as they contrasted the ability of the Republic to crush the Madiun Putsch to their own failure to check widespread revolt in territories occupied by them. The Dutch were constantly harassed by popular resistance movements inspired by pro-Republican sentiments. Clashes between the local people and the Dutch soldiers were continuously straining the Dutch administration; casualties were high; Dutch officers were sometimes murdered by the people.¹²⁴ The people were so much animated by the pro-Republican spirit that in Modjokerto they defied the Dutch ban on the use of Republican currency; they refused to use Dutch currency in a Dutch-controlled territory;¹²⁵ the Dutch must have thought the Republic was winning a battle without even directly participating in it. The people in Dutch-occupied territories were antagonized as the Dutch violated the Renville Agreement and suppressed freedom of speech and expression. They bravely celebrated the 3rd Anniversary of the Republic in spite of Dutch prohibition, while they boycotted Queen Wilhelmina's birthday and Queen Juliana's Coronation ceremonies.¹²⁶ The most serious challenge to Dutch authority came from the Darul Islam movement in the Dutch-sponsored West Java State (Negara Pasundan). This move-

ment, supported by Moslem religious teachers, aimed at the establishment of a Moslem State; the movement was backed up by an army that often menaced Dutch military strongholds. This army could easily take to guerilla activities and Dutch military operations against it repeatedly failed.¹²⁷ Republicans were afraid the continued tension in the Dutch territories and the mounting frustration of the Dutch might provoke them 'to destroy the Republic, the symbol and the inspiration of the people's fight for total freedom in the Dutch-occupied territory.'¹²⁸

That the Dutch would ultimately use force was clear from what Van Mook stated to a Pakistan Times correspondent in July 1948; the Dutch were getting constant appeals from the people in Republican territories to come to their help, said Van Mook;¹²⁹ obviously he was trying to catch hold of the familiar imperialist excuse and justify armed intervention in the Republican territory. The Dutch did not rely on negotiations as the most important instrument for achieving their objective. But they did not completely break off negotiations with the Republic as they had to mark time for renewing the military offensive. They were also beguiling world public opinion that they stood for peaceful negotiations. The U.N., working (rather unsteadily) to wake up a sleeper from sweet dreams to cruel reality, could expect little gratitude from Hollanders. Hollanders did not pin their faith in the Committee of Good Offices. They doubted its impartiality.¹³⁰ Van Mook even told a Straits Times correspondent that the U.N. was one of the chief impediments to the formation of a well-organized Indonesia.¹³¹ Dr Beel, too, who succeeded Van Mook as the Governor of the Netherlands East Indies, had no reverence for the Committee. The Committee was bypassed by the Dutch who started direct negotiations with the Republic. The Dutch pretended that the Committee did not exist; the Committee had to act and show that it was not a disembodied ghost; but it stood motionless. It was announced by the Dutch on 11 December 1948 that at that stage negotiations under the guardianship of the Committee were futile.¹³² Dr Hatta wanted to break the imbroglio. On 13 December he solicited Mr Cochran's help in reopening negotiations and put forward a number of proposals. Mr Cochran

transmitted those proposals to the Dutch. In these proposals Hatta went a humiliating distance to meet the Dutch—it was one more page in the long story of neverending concessions offered by the Republic. Hatta conceded that the Netherlands High Representative for the Crown (or the High Commissioner) would have a veto power over acts of the interim federal government; he was also prepared to grant emergency powers to the High Representative in a state of war, siege or insecurity.¹³³ He even gave the High Representative the right to decide when extraordinary powers were to be exercised, and only requested that 'certain standards be laid down to govern the High Representative's decisions' to exercise emergency powers or the veto power.

These were far-reaching concessions—a pitiable surrender and a sign of the progressive deterioration in the bargaining power of the Republic. But the Dutch remained adamant—they insisted that Republican proposals must exactly chime with their own economic necessities and political prejudices. The Dutch replied to Hatta's note on 17 December; they demanded that the Republic must agree to enjoy the same status as other puppet territories in the contemplated federation, to grant unlimited powers to the Netherlands High Representative, to allow the Dutch troops to move anywhere in the country.¹³⁴ The Dutch reply demanded a quick answer from the Republic—within eighteen hours. The Republic naturally could not satisfy an eighteen-hour ultimatum. The Dutch had sent the reply to Mr Cochran who could not but admit that his position, and the obligations it implied, did not entitle him to 'press Dr Hatta to reply summarily to the conditions imposed by your telegram because it calls for a non-negotiated blanket assent which would preclude the possibility of *bona fide* negotiations rather than effect their resumption'.¹³⁵ On 18 December Hollanders terminated the Renville Truce Agreement¹³⁶ and restored freedom of action formally (informally this was done long ago). They communicated their decision to Mr Cochran who was then in Djakarta; other members of the Good Offices Committee were at that time in the Republican territory, Kaliurang.¹³⁷ Cochran received the news at 11-30 P.M.; the Republican delegate in Djakarta got it at 11-45 P.M. Neither he nor Cochran could communi-

cate it to the Republican government or the other members of the Committee since Jogjakarta lay isolated; the Dutch had destroyed all communication links. The Dutch did not let the Republican government know their fateful decision till they bombed Jogjakarta airfield on 19 December.¹³⁸

After the termination of the first military action the Dutch fell into a state of despair as apparent from their utterances inside or outside the U.N. Now they impatiently pushed forward.

The second Dutch Military Action had begun. Dutch troops marched upon and captured the Republican capital. They stormed simultaneously key-points in Java and Sumatra. It was a sudden attack and an all-out attack. The Dutch planes, using rocket-fires, steadily bombed Republican cities and streets. Mobile forces and para-troops combined to ravage Republican territories and hamstring all lines of communication. They atrophied all organized resistance—especially because the Republic was caught unprepared. The Republicans could not anticipate, with the formation of an interim federation still under consideration and the Good Offices Committee still on the soil of Indonesia, such an avalanche attack. In a few days the Dutch tore away main cities from the Republic and seized centres of communication. Arrests followed—Indonesian representatives at Djakarta were arrested; so were national leaders like Sukarno, Sjahrir, Hatta and Salim. Nehru's plane was scheduled to take Sukarno on a goodwill trip to India on the same day when he was arrested in his Presidential Palace. The whole Republic was in convulsions. 'With unheard-of treachery, the Dutch launched a sneak attack.'¹³⁹

The Dutch military action stifled the Republican government and terrorized its people. It defied the U.N. decision and violated the Truce Agreement. It shocked the conscience of the outside world. But the Security Council remained almost idle. The Dutch took a perfectly well-timed shot, for the Christmas holidays intervened to disable the U.N. The Republican appeal could not induce the Security Council to review the Indonesian issue. The American representative to the Security Council quickly responded to Republican feelings. On 20 December 1948, he pleaded for an emergency

meeting of the Security Council to discuss the Indonesian question. On 22 December the U.S.A., Syria and Colombia laid down a draft resolution before the Security Council urging upon the parties 'to cease hostilities forthwith; and immediately to withdraw their armed forces to their respective sides of the demilitarized zones'¹⁴⁰ as provided for in the Renville Truce Agreement. The Resolution could not secure the required majority for many States opposed it on different grounds. Argentina and China disapproved of the provision concerning withdrawal of troops; Soviet Russia and Ukraine condemned the resolution as too weak; but France and Belgium asserted that the Security Council had no jurisdiction in the issue. The U.S.S.R. moved a fresh resolution parts of which were acceptable to many members. It sought to issue certain specific directions to the Security Council and also to set up a Commission of the Security Council.¹⁴¹ But this also failed to secure the required majority. On the same day, i.e. on 24 December the U.S.A., Syria and Colombia submitted another proposal that was carried. This Security Council Resolution called upon the parties '(a) to cease hostilities forthwith; and (b) immediately to release the President and other political prisoners arrested since 18 December.'¹⁴² The Resolution further instructed 'the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Security Council fully and urgently.'¹⁴³

But the Dutch turned their back upon the U.N. Resolution and did not slow down the pace of their advances into the Republican territory. In some areas, for example in Java, military operations, as stated by the Netherlands representative on 27 December,¹⁴⁴ were practically at an end. This representative complacently announced to the Security Council on the same day that the Netherlands Government was giving 'serious attention'¹⁴⁵ to the U.N. resolution. It was clear that the Security Council must resort to further moves if the Dutch were to be restrained. It adopted two resolutions on 28 December—one Chinese and another Colombian. The Chinese Resolution renewed the invocation for releasing the Republican President and other political prisoners as laid down in the Resolution of 24 December and called upon the Dutch 'to set free those political prisoners forthwith',¹⁴⁶ and also to report to the Security Council within a day. The Colombian

resolution requested a report from the Consular Commission which suspended its activity as the Committee of Good Offices came to Indonesia. But the latter was paralyzed by the Dutch military action—hence the Colombian requisition. The Netherlands answer to the Security Council Resolution of 24 December came on 29 December. Dr Van Royen courteously called the attention of the Council to the possibilities of a cessation of hostilities in Java by the last day of the year, and 'two or three days later' in Sumatra.¹⁴⁷ After this, Van Royen stated, the Consular Commission would be disencumbered because the restrictions attendant on the military action would be abrogated. But while in this way the Security Council's recommendations were being steadily disregarded the Security Council simply adjourned and put off discussion till 7 January 1949 on a matter touching about 76 millions of people.

Indonesians sorrowfully saw the U.N. being merely caught up in events. In vain did they want the world organization to control them.

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- ⁴ *The Hindu*, 29 July 1947.
- ⁵ *Documents*, RIIA (Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1947-48, p. 746. Also see *The New Statesman & Nation*, 26 July 1947, p. 61.
- ⁶ *The Department of State Bulletin*, 3 August 1947, p. 230.
- ⁷ Coast, *Recruit to Revolution*, p. 51.
- ⁸ *Facts on File*, 1947, p. 245. John Coast is mistaken when he says that Sjahrir rejected the offer; Sjahrir was not the Premier at that time. Coast, *op. cit.*, p. 51.
- ⁹ *The Hindu*, 31 July 1947.
- ¹⁰ *Official Records of the Security Council*, 2nd year, no. 68, pp. 1702-3. Also U.N. Document S/459.
- ¹¹ U.N. Document S/426.
- ¹² *Facts on File*, 1947, p. 238.
- ¹³ Article 2 of the Linggadjati Agreement.
- ¹⁴ Italics mine.
- ¹⁵ U.N. Document S/517.
- ¹⁶ *Facts on File*, 1947, p. 246.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

¹⁸ J. C. Campbell and the Research Staff, *The United States in World Affairs, 1947-48*, p. 223.

¹⁹ *The New Statesman & Nation*, 23 August 1947, p. 142; for a contrast, see Van Mook, *SDSEA*, p. 253.

²⁰ *Official Records of the Security Council*, 2nd year, no. 68, p. 1710.

²¹ *Official Records of the Security Council*, 2nd year, no. 83, pp. 2199-2200.

²² 'The impression that he [i.e., Sjahrir] made on the Security Council was tremendous and, fortunately for Indonesia, enduring.' Coast, *op. cit.*, p. 51. For a similar view, see Woodman, *op. cit.*, pp. 238-39.

²³ The 'greatest grievance' of Dutchmen 'was against the attitude of Australia,' says Van Mook, *SDSEA*, p. 252.

²⁴ Sukarno's radio speech on 24 July 1947.

²⁵ Kahin, *NRI*, p. 216.

²⁶ According to H. S. Bloch, this is one of the many cases to prove the insistence of the Security Council 'that all possibilities of prevention must first be exhausted' before the employment of enforcement measures. *Annual Review of United Nations Affairs*, 1949, p. 162.

²⁷ Van Mook, 'Indonesia and the Problem of South East Asia,' *Foreign Affairs*, July 1949.

²⁸ U.N. Document S/525 I.

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³⁰ W. M. Jordan has nicely analyzed the need for Committees and Commissions set up by the Security Council: *Annual Review of United Nations Affairs*, 1949, pp. 126-27.

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³⁴ *SDSEA*, pp. 238-40.

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⁴¹ Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

⁴² 'Statement of Senator Graham on the Indonesian Situation', *Congressional Record*—U.S. Senate, 5 April 1949, p. 3922.

⁴³ Wolf, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

⁴⁴ Statement of Senator Graham, *op. cit.*, p. 3922.

⁴⁵ U.N. Document S/649.

⁴⁶ Fischer, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-5.

⁴⁷ Sastroamidjojo and Delson, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47; *RIIA, Documents, 1947-48*, pp. 753-54.

⁴⁹ Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

⁵⁰ Prime Minister Sjarifuddin's memorandum to the Security Council, U.N. Document S/649, pp. 34-35.

- ⁵¹ Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 106.
- ⁵² Coast, *op. cit.*, p. 90.
- ⁵³ Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 228.
- ⁵⁴ See the comment by Hon. L. H. Smith in the U.S. House of Representatives on 18 June 1948: *Congressional Record*, Vol. 94, Part XI, 1948, p. A 4131 (Appendix).
- ⁵⁵ *Republican Review*, 1 November 1949, p. 40.
- ⁵⁶ U.N. Document S/848/Add.1.
- ⁵⁷ RIIA, *Documents*, 1947-48, p. 752.
- ⁵⁸ *Official Records of the Security Council*, 3rd year, Supplement for July 1948, pp. 90-106.
- ⁵⁹ U.N. Document S/933.
- ⁶⁰ Prof. Dr Supomo, 'Dutch sovereignty in Indonesia,' *Merdeka*, 25 July 1948, p. 6.
- ⁶¹ J. F. Collins, 'The United States and Indonesia,' *International Conciliation*, March 1950, pp. 152-53.
- ⁶² U.N. Document S/689.
- ⁶³ U.N. Document S/786.
- ⁶⁴ *Official Records of the Security Council*, 3rd year, Supplement for June 1948.
- ⁶⁵ Wolf, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
- ⁶⁶ U.N. Document S/729.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁹ U.N. Document S/787.
- ⁷⁰ *Merdeka*, 22 April 1948, p. 11.
- ⁷¹ U.N. Doc. S/729. [Doc.=Document.]
- ⁷² *Ibid.*
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁵ *Merdeka*, 5 July 1948, p. 10.
- ⁷⁶ *The N.Y.T.*, 16 February 1948.
- ⁷⁷ *The N.Y.T.*, 10 March 1948.
- ⁷⁸ *Merdeka*, 22 March 1948, p. 4.
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁰ U.N. Doc. S/842.
- ⁸¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁸² *Ibid.*
- ⁸³ *Merdeka*, 25 July 1948, p. 3.
- ⁸⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.
- ⁸⁶ *Christian Century*, 13 October 1948.
- ⁸⁷ *Merdeka*, 5 July 1948, pp. 2-3.
- ⁸⁸ Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 249.
- ⁸⁹ *Official Records of the Security Council*, 3rd year, No. 91, p. 14.
- ⁹⁰ *Merdeka*, 5 July 1948, p. 3.
- ⁹¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁹² See L. H. Smith's remark in the U.S. House of Representatives on

18 June 1948. *Congressional Record*, Vol. 94, Part XI, 1948, p. A4131 (Appendix).

⁹³ *News Bulletin*, No. 85, 28 August 1948 (Indonesian Information Service, New Delhi), p. 2.

⁹⁴ *Merdeka*, 25 July 1948, p. 5.

⁹⁵ *U.N. Doc. S/1085*.

⁹⁶ J. F. Collins, 'The United States and Indonesia', *International Conciliation*, March 1950, p. 162.

⁹⁷ Some aspects of the staggering economic problem are indicated in *News Bulletin*, No. 95, 4 October 1948, p. 3. Also see *Merdeka*, 25 July 1948, p. 8.

⁹⁸ Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 108. Also see D. L. Schorr, 'No man's land of the Far East', *The N.Y.T.*, 3 October 1948.

⁹⁹ D. L. Schorr, *Ibid.*: 'From the moment of Musso's arrival events moved fast...'

¹⁰⁰ D. N. Aidit, *A short history of the Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 27.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 30.

¹⁰³ *Christian Century*, 13 October 1948.

¹⁰⁴ Estimate given by R. S. Allen in the *New York Daily Mirror*—cited in *News Bulletin*, No. 96, 8 October 1948, p. 7.

¹⁰⁵ See comments by the *Washington Post*—quoted in *Merdeka*, 25 July 1948, p. 8.

¹⁰⁶ *Christian Century*, 13 October 1948.

¹⁰⁷ Frank N. Trager, *Marxism in Southeast Asia*, pp. 262-73. Also See Ruth T. McVey, *The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian Uprisings*.

¹⁰⁸ See A P despatch from Batavia, dated 19 September 1948, quoted in *News Bulletin*, 31 October 1948.

¹⁰⁹ Radio Speech of 19 September 1948.

¹¹⁰ Hatta's speech of 20 September 1948.

¹¹¹ *San Francisco Chronicle*, 2 September 1948.

¹¹² *News Bulletin*, No. 100, 17 November 1948, p. 4.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ *News Bulletin*, No. 98, 21 October 1948, p. 2.

¹¹⁵ *Republican Review*, 1 November 1949, p. 40.

¹¹⁶ *News Bulletin*, No. 95, 4 October 1948, p. 1. Also see Andrew Roth, *Indian News Chronicle*, 27 December 1949.

¹¹⁷ Ronald S. Kain, 'Moscow in Indonesia', *Current History*, August 1949, p. 65.

¹¹⁸ See memoirs of Suripno, a Communist leader, quoted in Brackman, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-101. Also see Kahin, 'The Communist Revolt in Java: the crisis and its aftermath', *Far Eastern Survey*, 17 November 1948.

¹¹⁹ Aidit, *The Birth and Growth of the Communist Party of Indonesia*, pp. 33-36.

¹²⁰ Brackman, *Indonesian Communism: A History*, p. 54.

¹²¹ Ruth T. Mc Vey, *The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution*, p. 3.

¹²² This was reported by a member of the Secretariat of the U.N. Committee of Good Offices—Kahin, *NRI*, p. 294.

¹²³ *News Bulletin*, No. 102, 8 December 1948, p. 1.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4. 'Other reports reveal that the number of incidents in the Dutch occupied territories of Banjumas, Central Java, have been on the increase. Reports of clashes between the local populace and Dutch soldiers have been constant, especially at Tjilatjap, the big port on the South Coast of Java.'

¹²⁵ *News Bulletin*, No. 96, 8 October 1948, p. 4.

¹²⁶ *Merdeka*, 15 September 1948, p. 3.

¹²⁷ *Chicago Tribune*, 9 August 1948.

¹²⁸ *News Bulletin*, No. 91, 17 September 1948, p. 1.

¹²⁹ *Merdeka*, 25 July 1948, p. 5.

¹³⁰ Van Mook, *SDSEA*, pp. 256-59.

¹³¹ *News Bulletin*, No. 100, 17 November 1948, p. 2.

¹³² *U.N. Doc. S/1117*.

¹³³ *U.N. Doc. S/1129*.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ Report of the Committee of Good Offices dated 19.12.48—*Press Release SC/820*—U.N., Department of Public Information, Press & Publications Bureau, Lake Success, New York, 20 December 1948.

¹³⁷ A cable from the Committee of Good Offices, *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ B. A. Ubani, "The Indonesian Question Reviewed", *United Asia*, December 1948, p. 352; also see *The N.Y.T.* (Editorial), 20 December 1948.

¹³⁹ Said Sumitro, Indonesian Minister of Foreign Trade and Finance. *The N.Y.T.*, 20 December 1948.

¹⁴⁰ *U.N. Doc. S/1142*.

¹⁴¹ *U.N. Doc. S/1148*.

¹⁴² *RIIA, Documents*, 1947-48, p. 754.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.* Also see *The N.Y.T.* (Editorial), 31 December 1948, for a comment on U. S. policy.

¹⁴⁴ *Official Records of the Security Council*, 3rd year, No. 135, p. 2.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ *U.N. Doc. S/1162*.

¹⁴⁷ *Official Records of the Security Council*, 3rd year, No. 137, pp. 26-27.

5

1949 : FREEDOM

THE DUTCH expressed a mock surprise over the report of the Committee of Good Offices to the Security Council, dated 19 December 1948.¹ They submitted a memorandum on 21 December taking issue with some of the conclusions contained in the report of the Committee. The memorandum denied the contention of the Committee that the formation by the Dutch of an interim federal government without the participation of the Republic 'would complicate negotiated settlement and might create serious unrest in Indonesia', and that this would increase the possibility of large-scale hostilities.² The opening days of the year 1949 saw the Dutch enthusiastically concluding their military operations which had begun on 19 December 1948.³ But this violent enterprise did not end the confusion in Indonesia, nor could it lead to a permanent settlement commendable to the Netherlands. From the beginning of the new year, attempts were made at different levels to settle the Indonesian issue: India tried to bring the pressure of Asian opinion to bear upon it; the Indonesian nationalists combined the tactics of guerilla warfare with the strategy of noncooperation; the Dutch for a time continued to negotiate with non-Republican elements and would not abandon the fixed path; and there was the Security Council to resume its interminable debates and discussions.

Pandit Nehru⁴ declared his intention to convene an Afro-Asian Conference on the Indonesian situation and issued invitations to different countries. Ultimately 20 states participated in the Conference, Turkey being the only state which declined the invitation. These were: India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Nepal, Siam, Philippines, Nationalist China, Per-

sia, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Abyssinia, Australia, New Zealand and Indonesia. Of course, some of them hesitated to send representatives and decided to despatch observers only—Nationalist China, Nepal, New Zealand and Siam. The Conference took place at Delhi from 20 to 23 January and recorded the 'conviction of the countries taking part that certain principles of freedom and self-determination must now decide the relations between Eastern and Western countries.'⁵ While the Conference stressed the immediate restoration of conditions prior to the Dutch military action, it never lost sight of the ultimate aim of total elimination of colonialism. Some delegates even thought of sanctions by the Asian countries against the Dutch under certain circumstances.⁶ The Conference condemned the role of the Dutch in Indonesia as repugnant to the principles of the U.N. Charter, as superseding the claims of Indonesian nationalism and endangering world peace. It made some recommendations to the Security Council. These included: (a) The Republican leaders should be released immediately and unconditionally; (b) The Netherlands should withdraw troops from the Residency of Jogjakarta immediately and from other territories of the Republic by 15 March 1949; (c) All territories under the authority of the Republican government prior to the Second Dutch Military Action should be restored to it; (d) The Dutch should withdraw the economic blockade; (e) An interim government consisting of representatives from Republican and non-Republican territories should be established before 15 March 1949; (f) Elections to an all-Indonesia Constituent Assembly must be arranged before 1 October 1949; (g) Transfer of power over the whole of Indonesia must take place at a date not later than 1 January 1950.⁷

It is true that this 'was an issue on which Asian unity could be taken for granted'.⁸ For 'none of the Asian Conference countries was dependent either on the Dutch or on Dutch interests in Indonesia and all of them could oppose the Netherlands without fear of adverse consequences political or economic for themselves....'⁹ But it is not correct to state, as one writer¹⁰ does, that opposing the Dutch would not evoke

* Mentioned in Note 8

the antipathy of the big powers like the U.S.A., Russia and Britain; because the U.S.A. and the U.K., at least, were linked up with Holland by the common objective of a crusade against Communism. Yet the Conference ended without providing for any strong action by Asian countries against a possible repetition of the Dutch aggressive moves. The Security Council might or might not accept the recommendations of the Conference. It might or might not enforce them even after acceptance. No joint action was envisaged by the Conference in these eventualities. Thus, any expectation that there might be created 'a new focus of power in the world' did not materialize.¹⁰ At the same time the Conference was a warning to the Netherlands—'a serious affair,'¹¹ according to the official Socialist paper *Het Vrije Volk*. In spite of all limitations, it must be recognized that the Conference tended to swing Western opinion to the view that "'Asia for the Asiatics' is a sound principle. If we believe in democracy for ourselves we must believe it for others".¹² Lastly, it was a personal triumph for Mr Nehru, India's Prime Minister, and it was even held that the U.S.A. should 'enter into intimate consultation'¹³ with him on the Indonesian situation. The Soviet Union, feeding Asian sentiments at the U.N. so energetically, lost her restraint on this occasion. Radio Moscow attacked the Conference on Indonesia as 'an Anglo-American scheme to aid Western domination'.¹⁴ The suspicion of Western diplomats, that the Soviet Union would placate Asian opinion only so long as it did not have the dangerous potentiality of forming a centre of power independent of Soviet control, was confirmed.

Meanwhile, the Republican resistance to the Dutch offensive, never quite weak, was growing. The Republican Army, mechanically much inferior to the opponent, was tactful not to offer any frontal resistance. It relied on a protracted guerrilla warfare combining it with a scorched earth policy.¹⁵ The Dutch had rejoiced too soon over the occupation of Jogjakarta; the Republican troops withdrew to the mountains but returned to the lost capital every night. The Dutch army was too small to occupy vast areas; they felt flattered by the fact that they gained control of the main cities; but the large territories outside those cities were under the Republic's autho-

city. The first shock of the attack had been terrible; and then the morale of the Republican troops made the difference between defeat and survival. As time passed it was revealed that the Republic's military machine had been much improved since the first military action.¹⁶ The military administration and the territorial commands were already unified (they had not been so unified during the first military action). By means of a persistent guerilla warfare the Republican soldiers tried to retain control over an entire area while they did not mind losing control over single cities; they had, of course, to resist the temptation of defending such important cities as Jogjakarta; but their strategy was paying; the Dutch-held cities were like so many pockets in areas controlled by the Republic.¹⁷

Not to speak of tanks, planes and motorized units with which the Dutch army was heavily equipped, even the minimum arms required for the guerillas could not be supplied by the Republic; sometimes homemade grenades were the only weapons of most of the guerillas. Republicans, in order to obtain arms and ammunition, organized successful raids on Dutch supplies.¹⁸ The Republican troops had also to face the pressing problems of food and clothing. These could be solved and guerilla operations carried on primarily because of a very real unity between the troops and the people. The successful story of Republican guerilla warfare was thus largely one of successful cooperation between the army and the people. In fact, the army was only a part of the gigantic battle waged by the people of Indonesia. Their heroic resistance was the uninhibited response of the entire nation to a challenge suited to bring out the best in it. Village women organized special kitchens for army units stationed in one area. Often the villagers paid a part of their taxes in food-grains which they set apart for army consumption.¹⁹ The people did not lose their morale even though their leaders had been imprisoned. M. H. Bro rightly observed:²⁰ '...the fact that the President and his associates were held prisoner fired the people as even their presence might not have done. Their exile, which seemed at the time a trump card for the Dutch, may have given the Indonesians the final trick.' In many cities occupied by the Dutch the people arranged to

collect rates and taxes payable to the Republican government and passed them on to the Republican officials just outside the city. They sometimes refused to accept anything except the Republican currency and the Dutch were on the rocks.²¹ Dutch administration in occupied cities was paralyzed by sustained noncooperation of the people including the civil officers. The exemplary conduct of the Sultan of Jogjakarta, splendidly lonely in his remote palace, stimulated the popular morale. He plainly refused the headship of a special territory organized by the Dutch; he also refused to confer with the enemies of the Republic.²²

The Dutch troops resorted to terrorist tactics. Indiscriminate bombing and strafing killed scores of non-combatants.²³ At night they raided the houses of innocent civilians; they would sometimes disguise themselves as Indonesians in order to loot and murder; they also utilized gangsters among Indonesians for oppressing the helpless public.²⁴ But it was impossible to subdue popular spirit by these brutal methods; and the Dutch would learn it only from their failure. Public sentiments were aroused more as popular leaders and intellectuals like Dr Santoso and Mr Hendromartono were killed by Dutch terrorists.²⁵ The lightning success of the Dutch at the beginning of the military action and the quick occupation of Jogjakarta was rather misleading; the Republic was much greater than Jogjakarta and much more than a group of people; the Republic symbolized the ideal of freedom of all Indonesians. The nationalist machine, badly damaged by the Second Military Action, seemed to move by secret springs and with mysterious efficiency. No amount of military force or propaganda could destroy it. On 1 January 1949, General Spoor announced that he would be able to crush the guerillas within approximately three months.²⁶ It rang hollow in the face of growing Republican resistance. New recruits continuously increased the strength of the guerillas. The guerillas constantly received whole-hearted cooperation from the people in Dutch-occupied areas; at the same time the people noncooperated with Dutch administrators and sabotaged their plans. Consequently, there was no peace and tranquillity in areas occupied by the Dutch; the Dutch failed to maintain law and order²⁷ and their troops became lawless looters; still

they clasped the argument that they were protecting the Republic against lawlessness. The barbarities of the Dutch after the second military action for ever debased the Dutch.

The Queen of the Netherlands tried to justify the second military action (in a broadcast speech) as a check on lawlessness.²⁸ Her loyal representative in the Security Council, Dr Van Royen, used the hackneyed argument of Republican lawlessness when, on 7 January, the Council reopened discussions on the Indonesian situation. Van Royen also placed a timetable for the transfer of power in Indonesia.²⁹ Perhaps this was more due to the realization by the Dutch that they had underrated the Republic's strength and less to a desire for creating a favourable world opinion. Van Royen said (a) that the transfer of sovereignty would be effected in 1950; (b) but elections would be held 4 to 6 months earlier; and (c) within a month, i.e., within February 1949, the interim federal government would be established. Whatever good impression was created by this plan vanished as soon as the members of the Council came to know the inhuman condition of the imprisoned Republican leaders from a report of the Committee of Good Offices, dated 17 January 1949.³⁰ The pitiable condition of the interned Republicans was one compelling reason why the Security Council shortly moved to take a stiffer stand.³¹ There were others too. In 1949 there was a change in the composition of the Security Council. Three of the non-permanent members, Belgium, Colombia, Syria, gave way to Norway, Egypt and Cuba. Clearly it was a loss to Holland as Belgium had to depart. It was a gain to the world organization as there would be less obstruction to its taking a strong step. A third factor inducing the Security Council to take a firm attitude was the strong recommendations of the Afro-Asian Conference on Indonesia held at Delhi.³²

The U.S., Cuban, Chinese and Norwegian representatives in the Security Council moved a synoptic resolution on 21 January 1949; this was passed on 28 January. It³³ called for (a) the immediate and unconditional release of the political prisoners taken by the Dutch since 17 December 1948; (b) the discontinuance of military operations on the part of the Dutch and of guerilla warfare on the part of the Republic; (c) the reinstatement of the Republican Government in Jogjakarta;

(d) the opening of negotiations between the two parties on the basis of the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements and the Cochran proposals of September 1948, with a view to (i) the formation of an interim federal government by 15 March 1949, (ii) holding elections to a Constituent Assembly by 1 October 1949, (iii) the transfer of sovereignty by 1 July 1950. To the Republicans 'the most doleful feature of the resolution is that the Dutch are not going to respect it.'³⁴ This was natural as the Netherlands Foreign Minister, Mr Stikker, had already condemned the proposed resolution as an unnecessary outside interference based on a misconception of the South East Asian situation; it would actually hinder the settlement of the issue, said Stikker.³⁵ The Dutch reaction hovered between lukewarmness and direct opposition. Their representative in the Security Council pointed out prosaically that the Netherlands would carry out the Council's resolution only so far as it did not contradict her exclusive responsibility 'for the maintenance of real freedom and order in Indonesia.'³⁶ The U.N., however, ought to have acted more vigorously to close the confidence gap that separated it from the smaller nations. It was perhaps too much to expect, in view of the past performance, that the Security Council would prescribe definite means for enforcing its resolution. But the resolution did not even fulfil a minimum requirement, i.e., the evacuation of Dutch troops from Republican areas overrun after the second military action.

Of course, the Security Council did something more than passing this resolution. It took the significant step of setting up the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (briefly, UNCI), which replaced the Committee of Good Offices and was vested with greater powers.³⁷ Membership remained the same as in the Committee of Good Offices—the old members, Australia, Belgium and the United States, were still there. There was a welcome change in the process of decision-making; decisions could be reached by majority agreements; deadlocks would be easier to avoid as unanimity was not required. It was 'a step forward', said Hatta.³⁸ This Commission was to assist in 'the earliest possible restoration of the civil administration of the Republic.'³⁹ It would help in the negotiations between the parties and the implementation of the

resolutions of the Security Council. It was empowered to issue recommendations to the Republic, the Netherlands, and also the Security Council.

It was not easy to think that the Dutch policy would evolve at a short notice into a less belligerent one. Yet, gradually, Holland sensed the futility of relying on force alone. Her military position began to deteriorate and, by the end of January 1949, the military initiative was wrested by the Republican army.⁴⁰ The miraculous leadership of Nasution in Java and Hidajat in Sumatra enabled Republicans to launch a mighty counter-offensive.⁴¹ She had to open negotiations lest her bargaining power should dwindle further due to a military disaster. On 26 February the Netherlands government signified its intention not only to facilitate the transfer of sovereignty but also to shorten the time-limits prescribed by the Security Council for that purpose.⁴² The Netherlands government expected the inauguration of the United States of Indonesia much earlier than 1 July 1950, i.e., the date stipulated in the Security Council resolution of 28 January. It declared that a Round Table Conference would be held at the Hague on 12 March to consider the ways and means for the earliest possible transfer of sovereignty. The Conference would deal with the establishment of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union, arrangements for the intervening period, and the formation of an interim federal government. This plan, known as Beel's plan, further envisaged that the Hague Conference would be able to conclude its work by 1 May so that the final transfer of sovereignty could be accomplished by 1 July 1949.

A careful analysis shows Beel's plan to be a part of the tactics of planned bewilderment: Holland staged menacing troop movements while speaking of negotiations; she talked of negotiations which were to be conducted in such a way as to make the proposals unacceptable to the Republic. According to Beel's plan, the Conference would not be held under the auspices of the UNCI; the UNCI would be admitted to the Conference as an observer or adviser; Republicans disliked this attempt to evade the Security Council's resolution. Beel's plan stored all initiative for a solution solely in the hands of the Netherlands, and nothing in the hands of the

Republic or the UNCI. All proposals made by participants must be compatible with the responsibility of the Netherlands in Indonesia: Republicans noted the sinister implication of the word 'responsibility'. Since the federal government, set up through the Hague Conference, would not have the needed administrative capability, Beel's plan envisaged the retention of Dutch troops in Indonesia for helping the new government. Republicans rejected Beel's plan. They condemned it as 'the latest Dutch plan to restore Dutch colonialism in Indonesia.'⁴³ The UNCI opposed the Dutch proposals as they sought to override the Security Council's instructions of 28 January.⁴⁴

The troubles of the Dutch might have been less if they were content to let them die down. Instead they continued feuding. They thought they could go ahead with their plan of a papery Indonesian federation even without the support of the Republic. The Netherlands government announced on 1 March that it would hold the proposed Hague Conference even if the Republic refused to attend.⁴⁵ The Netherlands government relied on the support of the puppet states; it soon came to know the real sentiments of those states. The Netherlands government had set up the Federal Convention or the Federal Consultative Body (the BFO) at the Bandung Conference of the federalists in 1948; it sought to utilize this BFO, a machinery of consultations among the federalist leaders, as an instrument to bypass the Republic and the U.N.; it was soon aware of the challenge hurled from that quarter.⁴⁶ The challenge was not unexpected. Dutch administration in the puppet territories was a strange mixture of regimentation, brutality, and neglect, combining lip-service and lofty mottoes with inefficient bureaucracy and apathy. Popular resistance to Dutch authority was always strong. In place of a stable popular government the Dutch got a chaos in the puppet states that officially called itself nationalist and pro-Dutch. Many leaders of these Dutch-sponsored governments were genuine Republicans, concealing their intentions till they found it insufferable or till a favourable opportunity turned up. The governments of the two most influential Dutch-sponsored states, East Indonesia and Pasundan, resigned in protest against the second military action.⁴⁷

The barrier between the so-called Federalists and Republicans was never impassable; it existed only because of Dutch meddling and began to collapse as soon as Dutch military superiority became doubtful. The increasing momentum of the Republic's military success assured the Federalists that no longer the Dutch were the giver and the Republic a mere receiver. They gathered courage and began to publicize their pro-Republican sentiments. The BFO ceased to be a Dutch stooge and demanded full internal and external sovereignty for the Indonesian nation.⁴⁸ The Dutch were shocked as this demand coincided with that of the Republic. On 3 March the BFO passed a resolution calling for (i) a cease-fire order, (ii) the restoration of the Republican government in Jogjakarta, and (iii) the recognition of the UNCI's authority in the Indonesian-Dutch dispute.⁴⁹ The Dutch were downcast to find that they had failed to pull the puppet states out of their natural orbit. They were dismayed to find the horse they had ridden, i.e., the BFO, turning into a full-size tiger. This stimulated their interest in a negotiated settlement. Previously they found that loud professions about peaceful intentions were paying provided these were not being acted upon. Now they were forced to think of a change in tactics.

The U.N. had not the capacity to order outright intervention, nor could it afford quiescence, except by totally alienating Asian opinion. The U.N. ought, therefore, to have got negotiations going quickly. But it appeared that the U.N. had come to grips with the problem on a superficial plane. It did not even dig deeply into its own resources for strength. The U.S. representative in the Security Council demanded⁵⁰ a thorough implementation of the Council's injunctions of 28 January 1949. But he could not achieve much except soothing Republican sentiments. The Canadian representative proposed⁵¹ that the UNCI should assist the parties in reaching an agreement on the implementation of the Council's 28 January resolution without prejudice to the rights, positions and claims of the parties, and an agreement on the time and conditions for holding a Conference at the Hague. The resolution was passed on 23 March; in the eyes of Indonesians it watered down the resolution of 28 January.⁵² For the 28 January resolution made the restoration of the Republican

government in Jogjakarta unconditional, whereas the 23 March resolution made it conditional on the preservation of the rights and claims of the parties. Republicans wondered why the Council did not specifically order the cessation of military operations and why it accorded soft treatment to the Dutch.

On 26 March the UNCI requested the two parties to reopen negotiations.⁵³ Preparatory discussions, the Commission pointed out, would be held in Djakarta. The Netherlands and the Republic agreed. But the Republic rightly insisted that discussions at the outset should be limited to the restoration of the Republican government in Jogjakarta. The UNCI's request did not weigh much; if the Dutch decided to try limited conciliation that was more due to the Republic's military ability and also to decisive diplomatic pressure from the U.S.A.⁵⁴ The U.S.A. increasingly realized that the Republic looked upon her as an ally of imperialistic Netherlands. To a Republican, the execution of Dutch military programmes appeared impossible but for the huge economic aid flowing from the U.S.A. The U.S.A. nourished the economy of the Netherlands and thereby seemed to sustain the Netherlands' war efforts against the Republic.⁵⁵ But the U.S.A. wanted to win over Republicans as she did not like to be portrayed as a champion of imperialism in South East Asia. The U.S.A. was also influenced by another vital consideration. To weaken the Republic in Indonesia by continuously placating the Dutch would be to strengthen the forces of Communism in Indonesia. Republican leaders were to be brought without delay to the effective centres of power as otherwise in their absence Communist leaders and sympathizers might mobilize public opinion in their favour. On 6 April the U.S. Senate passed a resolution according to which 'aid to Holland would cease if the U.N. Security Council voted sanctions against her—an intimation to The Hague that the Truman Administration might suggest such sanctions.'⁵⁶ Holland took the hint.

The United States was possibly impelled to reappraise its policy towards the Dutch-Indonesian conflict on account of the advances made by the Communists in China. At a time when the Dutch in Indonesia went ahead with their second military action, the Communists seemed quite near to possession of complete political control in China. To reverse the

tide of Communist victories in China was impossible. But in Indonesia there was still time to prevent a repetition of the situation in China. The Republican leaders, by taking drastic measures to uproot the Madiun uprising, had also induced fresh thinking on the part of the U.S. Department of State. Hence the United States proceeded to restrain the Dutch in a businesslike fashion.⁵⁷

The Second Dutch military action, again, deflated the moral stature of the Western Powers. It was a great propaganda advantage for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union could now plead that, contrary to the assertion of the Western Powers, colonialism was not on the retreat, and that the Asian countries had no alternative but to rally behind the Soviet Union in the anti-colonial struggle. The United States, therefore, moved to take a positive anti-colonial stand and threatened to switch off the flow of aid to Holland.⁵⁸

In pursuance of the Security Council's directive of 23 March 1949, the UNCI invited the Republican and the Dutch delegates to meet together in Djakarta; on 14 April the first meeting under the auspices of the UNCI was held.⁵⁹ Discussions continued for about three weeks during which disagreements duly appeared and, as in many previous stages of negotiations, these were resolved primarily at the expense of the Republic. On 7 May Mr Rum, the Republic's foreign minister, reached an agreement with Mr Van Royen, the Dutch representative. The Dutch were satisfied to receive the personal assurances of Sukarno and Hatta regarding (a) the cessation of guerilla activities, (b) cooperation in the preservation of peace and order, (c) participation in a Round Table Conference at the Netherlands capital, and (d) the acceptance of these terms by other members of the Republican government; in return, according to this Rum-Van Royen Agreement, the Dutch pledged (a) to restore Republican rule in Jogjakarta, (b) to set free all political prisoners confined by them since 17 December 1948, unconditionally and instantaneously, and (c) not to organize any States in the Republic-governed territories as they stood before 19 December 1948.⁶⁰

Holland took to negotiations primarily because the two assumptions behind the second military action were disproved: the assumptions were that the nationalist revolt was small

enough to be crushed by such action and that other Powers and the U.N. would remain inactive. But Holland did not offer substantial concessions to the Republic. The Rum-Van Royen accord was simply a compromise and valuable only because it was a compromise although devoid of any other merit.⁶¹ For the Republicans felt rebuffed in many important ways. (1) The Republican territories occupied by the Dutch after the first military action of 1947 remained unaffected. They were not returned to the Republican government. There was no guarantee that a U.N.-directed plebiscite would be held to determine their future position. But these areas would be represented in an All-Indonesian Federation including the Republic. Instead of thriving within the Republic they would, under Dutch instigation, serve to corrode the authority of the Republic. (2) Even the areas belonging to the Republic prior to the second military action were not restored to the Republican government. Only Jogjakarta would return to Republican control.⁶² (3) Not to speak of 'the Republican territories' population prior to first military action, their population before the second military action was not less than 40 per cent of the whole of Indonesia. Yet, as the 7 May Agreement laid down, the Republic would have only one-third of representation in an All-Indonesian organization.⁶³ This would assure a comfortable majority to Dutch-controlled territories.

Rightly did the *Washington Post* comment that 'the new agreement leaves almost every important question unanswered.'⁶⁴ On many previous occasions chances of peace in Indonesia were ruined because the Dutch found out some alibi for aggression. Republicans were naturally sceptical; their mood of hopefulness was based perhaps on nothing more substantial than a long sigh of relief; they accepted the agreement with the mental reservation that they would bring into play a merciless guerilla warfare if the agreement turned out to be another subterfuge employed by the Netherlands.⁶⁵ However, many Hollanders had a strange belief that Van Royen failed to extract anything from Rum and that Van Royen gave way on all fronts.⁶⁶ According to them, 'the guiding motive' of the Dutch 'was that something might be saved from the wreck if friendship with the Indonesian Republic could be bought, since, anyway, the Republic would soon be

in control not only in Java but also in other parts of the archipelago.⁶⁷ But the Dutch could not relinquish the habit of violating agreements. Only four days after the signing of the Rum-Van Royen accord, on 11 May, Beel recognized the so-called Provisional Council of Representatives of Tapanuli.⁶⁸ This was an attempt to split up Republican territories—a flagrant violation of the 7 May accord. Beel soon resigned (as also General Spoor) in protest against the Rum-Van Royen Agreement.⁶⁹ He was one of those Hollanders who preferred an expensive stalemate to a prudent capitulation, who did not realize that Holland would only lead herself to approve surrender later on due to sheer exhaustion if she did not immediately give independence to Indonesia. Beel was succeeded by Dr A. H. T. Lovink who declared in a conciliatory fashion: 'It is both the end of the old order and the beginning of the new.'⁷⁰ The sudden death, on 25 May (due to a heart attack), of General Spoor, noted for his tough reactionism, was also welcomed by Republicans.⁷¹ The Dutch troops began to vacate Jogjakarta on 24 June and by 30 June the withdrawal was completed. There were no major incidents. The Republican troops triumphantly took charge of Jogjakarta; Republican leaders exultantly entered the city on 6 July 1949.⁷² Rum and Van Royen announced, in a joint statement issued on 30 July 1949, that a cease-fire agreement had been reached between the Republicans and the Netherlands.⁷³ The agreement was signed on 1 August.⁷⁴

The so-called federal areas were in ferment. The federalists had already realized that the Dutch had lost the battle for colonies. They were ready to rectify the mistake of bypassing the Republic. They made a cool appraisal of the situation, and brought into play a youthful capacity to face an enigmatic future. Once they had betrayed the Republic and sided with the Dutch; now they proceeded to parley with Republican leaders in Inter-Indonesian Conferences, held at Jogjakarta and Djakarta, from 19 to 22 July and again from 30 July to 2 August. The significance of these conferences, in the words of President Sukarno, was 'that the attempt of the colonial power to arouse divisions in the ranks of the Indonesians was frustrated by the revival of the spirit of unity among Indonesians from all parts of the motherland.'⁷⁵ Dele-

gates came from the Republic, East Indonesia, East Borneo, South East Borneo, West Borneo, Greater Dajak, Bandjar, East Sumatra, South Sumatra, Palembang, Bangka, Billiton, West Java, Central Java, East Java and Madura. The BFO comprised all these territories except the Republican. Participants realized the vital necessity of working out a good understanding among themselves before meeting the Dutch delegates at the forthcoming Hague Conference.

The Conferences discussed the fundamental principles of the transfer of real, complete and unconditional sovereignty to the Indonesian people.⁷⁶ It hammered out agreement on many important points. It was agreed that the sovereign federal State representing the Indonesian nation would have a republican form of government; Indonesian would be the official language, Indonesia Raja the national anthem; the national flag would be the Republic's red-and-white flag. The President of this forthcoming sovereign State was to be elected by representatives of the Republic and the BFO. He was to act together with representatives of the member States in appointing three members of the Cabinet. The future Indonesian Parliament would consist of two Chambers, a peoples' representative body and a senate. The Conference decided that the Republic's army (the T.N.I.) would act as the nucleus of the new national army. Principles of economic policy for the national State were also agreed upon. Cultural matters too were discussed; all units of the new federal State would be entitled to improve and foster their own culture, while Indonesian national culture was defined to be based upon religion, humanity and democracy. One important result of these Conferences was the formation of a preparatory Committee consisting of representatives from the Republic and the BFO; the Committee's function was to coordinate and implement, before, during and after the Round Table Conference at the Hague, the tasks emerging out of the decisions of the Inter-Indonesian Conferences.

Hatta, the leader of the Republican delegation, said at the opening session of these Conferences in Jogjakarta that the Conferences constituted a landmark in Indonesia as they heralded the return of nationwide unity; Sultan Hamid, the leader of the BFO delegation, expressed his profound satis-

faction that the gulf between the Republic and other areas of Indonesia was bridged.⁷⁷ So, the Dutch policy of separatism did not succeed in freezing the non-Republican territories into a pro-Dutch mould. This failure produced a greater sense of urgency in the Dutch, and this was needed to eliminate the pride and prejudice inherent in colonial ambition. The Dutch accepted the unconditional transfer of sovereignty as a consequence that could not be avoided (as pointed out by Hatta,⁷⁸ the Chairman of the Republican delegation, in his address at the official opening of the Round Table Conference on 23 August 1949 at the Hague).

Indonesians, however, were not too sure of the results of the Hague Conference. Sjahrir⁷⁹ thought that the Republican leaders had overhastily departed for the Hague as they had not had sufficient time for preparation; he felt that details should have been discussed in Indonesia; he was also afraid that international pressure at the Hague Conference might work against the Republic. More confident was H. A. Salim,⁸⁰ the Republic's Minister for Foreign Affairs. He said that the Conference would not see Indonesians as a dependent nation; it was the battleground of two equal, independent countries; he was not afraid of a deadlock as Indonesians were accustomed to it and could bear the consequences bravely; this was demonstrated by post-Linggadjati and post-Renville experiences. Dr A. K. Gani,⁸¹ an ex-Vice-Premier of the Republic, struck a more militant note and expressed the most vital point: if the RTC (Round Table Conference) failed, the last decision would rest with the military strength of Indonesians. Pressmen asked the Republic's Defence Minister Sultan Hamengku Buwono: 'What if the RTC should fail?' 'Then we will fight,' was the reply.⁸²

There was a danger that the Conference would jog on for so long a time—baffled by controversies old and new—that the Indonesian situation might go beyond control; for the prolonged imminence of a solution might give birth to intolerance. The air remained heavy with diplomatic clichés. Two issues, in particular, were brakes on the wheels of the Conference, and seemed to threaten the Conference with a dismal failure: the size of the debt to be taken over by the United States of Indonesia and the fate of West Irian (Indo-

nesian name for the Dutch New Guinea). It is admitted that Cochran, the American member of the UNCI, worked at this moment with great initiative and diplomatic adroitness, and he pushed himself to the centre of things. He 'combined diplomatic skill with the aura of American loans. He was able to lay down the actual line of compromise between the conflicting Dutch and Indonesian claims.'⁸³ Finally, the Indonesians accepted 4,300,000,000 guilders of Dutch debts, the original Dutch demand being 6,400,000,000 guilders.⁸⁴ The imposition was heavy; it was definitely unfair especially if one recalls the amount of debt the Dutch had to incur for the purpose of militarizing Indonesia. It proved once again that the world is still a place in which a more powerful state can accomplish things denied to its lesser comrades. On West Irian the following compromise formula was adopted: negotiations between the Dutch and Indonesians would determine its fate at the end of one year, during which period sovereignty over West Irian would be vested in the hands of the Dutch.⁸⁵

The Draft Constitution of the United States of Indonesia was initialled at the Hague on 29 October.⁸⁶ It described the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI for short) as independent and sovereign, 'a democratic State of federal structure, governed by justice.'⁸⁷ The Government, together with the House of Representatives and the Senate, would exercise the sovereign authority of the RUSI.⁸⁸ The President and the Ministers constituted the Government, the President being the Head of the State.⁸⁹ The President, in agreement with the delegates of the participant territories, was to appoint a Committee of three for the purpose of forming a Cabinet.⁹⁰ The Senate represented the participant territories, each of them having two members in the Senate.⁹¹ The House of Representatives represented the Indonesian people as a whole; the Republic got one-third of seats in the House; special provisions were made to have the Chinese, European and Arabian minority groups represented by 9, 6 and 3 members respectively.⁹² The federation was composed of participant and non-participant territories. The participant territories were divided into two types: *Negaras*, e.g., the *Negara Republik Indonesia* (the State of the Republic of Indonesia), 7

in total, and 9 autonomous constitutional units, e.g., Bangka; other territories of Indonesia, e.g., minor isles, did not have the status and rights of participant territories.⁹³ The Constitution contained a section on fundamental human rights and freedoms.⁹⁴ It guaranteed equal treatment and equal protection of the law to everybody, as also equal protection of person and property. Everyone was granted freedom of thought, opinion and expression, conscience and religion, etc. A Constituent Assembly, made up of double the number of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate, would enact as soon as possible the Constitution of the RUSI, which would replace this provisional (Draft) Constitution.⁹⁵

The Round Table Conference wound up on 2 November when the Hague observed the ceremony⁹⁶ of the formal acceptance of a settlement. The Hague Agreement, a dirge on Dutch dominance in the Indies, was born.

The Agreement placed the last date for transfer of sovereignty at 30 December 1949;⁹⁷ the kingdom of the Netherlands was accordingly to transfer sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI) fully, immediately and unconditionally. The RUSI's sovereignty would extend to all the areas—excepting West Irian—which formerly constituted the Netherlands East Indies. The Republic, as a unit of the federal RUSI, would possess the areas under its control prior to the second military action. But Indonesians would not look upon the RUSI's sovereignty as an outright gift from the Dutch; as Hatta asserted, Indonesians knew they had a sovereign State even before the RTC met.⁹⁸

The Hague Agreement sought to regulate the relations between the Netherlands and the RUSI. It provided for the establishment of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union aiming at the promotion of the common interests of the Partners through cooperation in realms of defence and foreign relations, primarily, and in financial and cultural matters, as far as required.⁹⁹ The two Partners would cooperate 'on the basis of free will and equality in status with equal rights' without prejudicing 'the status of each of the two Partners as an independent and sovereign State.'¹⁰⁰ The RUSI and the Netherlands undertook to respect the principles of democracy and the independence of the judiciary in their systems of gov-

ernment, and also to recognize fundamental human rights.¹⁰¹ The principal organs of this Union were: (1) a ministerial conference composed of three Dutch and three RUSI Cabinet ministers deciding by a unanimity of votes, its decisions requiring the ratification by the parliaments of the two parts of the Union;¹⁰² (2) a permanent union secretariat headed by two secretaries-general; (3) a Court of arbitration composed of three Indonesian and three Dutch judges. The six judges were appointed for ten years. They could reach decisions by a bare majority. All legal disputes arising out of the Union Statute or agreements between the two parties or joint regulations accepted by them were to be settled by this Union Court of Arbitration. If the judges were equally divided in their opinion in any case the Court was to adopt, for a re-examination of the case, an additional member who may be the President of the International Court of Justice, or an international authority acceptable to both the countries, or a person belonging to a different nationality.¹⁰³ But the primary instrument of cooperation as between the two Partners was the Conferences of ministers meeting at least twice annually. These were expected to clarify matters not touched by the Hague Agreement. These would enable the Indonesians and the Dutch to consult on matters of common interest.

The Hague Agreement envisaged economic cooperation between the two Partners. According to Hatta, 'economic co-operation could be planned in such a way that reconstruction in Indonesia would be coordinated with the establishment of new Netherlands industries to meet Indonesia's need for materials and equipment.'¹⁰⁴ The RUSI retained final and complete authority over matters of economic and financial policy. It could expropriate, nationalize, liquidate, compulsorily cede or transfer rights 'exclusively for the public benefit, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law' and against indemnities to be determined by agreement or judicial decision.¹⁰⁵ But the RUSI would not renounce all economic arrangements inherited from the Netherlands East Indies government. Thus she was ready to recognize and restore 'the rights, concessions and licences properly granted under the law of the Netherlands Indies and still valid on the date of transfer of sovereignty,'¹⁰⁶ and also admitted the

possibility of 'an extension, a renewal, or the granting of rights, concessions and licences' subject to necessities of public interest.¹⁰⁷ The RUSI agreed to accord the most-favoured-nation treatment to Holland; but this did not mean much, for nationals of other States would have equal rights to trade with and participate in the economic activity and industrial development of Indonesia. While the RUSI promised not to subject Dutch interests to any discrimination she reserved the right to enact rules 'necessary for the protection of national interests.'¹⁰⁸ Holland gained one important concession, though temporary; the RUSI agreed to honour the trade arrangements binding upon the old Netherlands East Indies administration which had been manipulated by the Dutch to serve their interests rather than the interests of Indonesians¹⁰⁹—but these agreements were to be changed soon and changes were to be enforced in October 1950. It may be concluded, therefore, that Holland could not retain an economic stranglehold over the former colony, despite the assumption of a debt burden by the RUSI. Holland maintained some economic privileges, which could at any time be liquidated as contravening public interests, and some concessions waiting for an early termination.

As regards foreign relations, the Partners agreed to aim at coordination and consultation whenever possible; but each Partner would conduct her own foreign relations and determine her own foreign policy.¹¹⁰ The Partners decided to exchange High Commissioners; they agreed to have common diplomatic representation abroad, whenever necessary, as also in international negotiations.¹¹¹ In the field of defence, similarly, each Partner resolved to bear full responsibility so far as her own territory was concerned; one of the Partners, only if she was so requested, would come to the assistance of another; they would consult with one another in the case of a threat of aggression to either or both of them; they would exchange military missions.¹¹² It was explicitly stated that this agreement on defence matters 'shall not prejudice the rights and obligations of the Partners under the Charter of the United Nations or under international arrangements based thereon.'¹¹³

At the RTC the agreement on cultural relations was reach-

ed most quickly. J. H. Marseveen, the leader of the Dutch delegation and Overseas Territories Minister, remarked that this would explode the thesis that East and West could never achieve mutual understanding.¹¹⁴ The purpose of the agreement was to promote cultural relations between the two Partners 'based on complete freedom, volition and reciprocity'; the Netherlands and the RUSI would each appoint seven persons and set up a joint Committee of fourteen members entrusted with the task of promoting cultural relations.¹¹⁵

On 27 December 1949, Hatta received the instrument of transfer of sovereignty from Queen Juliana: the Netherlands finally transferred sovereignty over the old Netherlands East Indies, excluding West Irian, to the RUSI. The Hague Agreement, churned up by more than two months of wrangling, meant an end to three centuries of Dutch rule. It also terminated the combats rending the Republic with varying fury since the defeat of Japan in the Second World War. The establishment of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union should leave no doubt about the actuality of the transfer of sovereignty.¹¹⁶ It is true that many Indonesians had misgivings about the Hague Agreement. These arose out of an insufficiency of information¹¹⁷ and a sense of being left out of crucial negotiations which took place thousands of miles away in the Dutch capital. The control exercised by the Netherlands over news circulation and the inefficiency of Indonesian newspapers combined to confuse the people in Indonesia.¹¹⁸ The Netherlands-RUSI Union, however, was a wasted Union. It had no real powers. The Queen of Holland was to act as the head of the Union. But the head of the Union would only represent 'the spirit of voluntary and lasting cooperation'¹¹⁹ between the two Partners. The position of the head of the Union illustrated the strength of the Union. The head was powerless; so was the Union. The Union had one salient feature: its harmless novelty.¹²⁰ The transfer of sovereignty was a matter of substance.

The significance of the Hague Agreement was multifold; according to Mr R. Harremans, the Belgian member of the UNCI, it meant 'the end of the conflict, the solution of the problem, the birth of a nation, and the foundation of a Union.'¹²¹ Mr W. Austin, head of the U.S. delegation to the

U.N., said that the Agreement was 'a tribute to the spirit of the United Nations which inspired the parties, as well as the United Nations Commission which assisted in reaching this successful result.'¹²² But the Security Council failed to pass a resolution welcoming the transfer of sovereignty owing to the Soviet veto of 13 December 1949:¹²³ the Soviet Union questioned as to whether the transfer of sovereignty was real or it covertly perpetuated Dutch control under American patronage.¹²⁴ The Indonesian Communist Party toed the Moscow line and outlined its policy as absolute rejection of any agreement, i.e., the Hague Agreement, that served the imperialist interests of the U.S.A., England or the Netherlands; it circulated pamphlets threatening that the Army of the Party could establish its control over a large part of the Republican Army in East and West Java; the pamphlets declared that a Soviet People's Republic should be established in Indonesia.¹²⁵

THE ARGUMENT

Now it is the responsibility of the enquirer to pinpoint the most important determinant of Indonesia's independence. It is always safe to provide an omnibus explanation soothing diverse sensibilities. Indonesians achieved freedom—it may be argued—because of powerful nationalist resistance, U.N. mediation, the pressure of liberal world opinion, and a belated return to sanity on the part of the Dutch.¹²⁶ This explanation, too broad to be meaningful, seems especially to be uncharitable so far as the role of Indonesian freedom-fighters is concerned. It is inaccurate as it does not place the role of the U.N., of the big Powers, and of the Netherlands in their proper perspective. Correspondingly, it fails to highlight the unbending strength of the nationalists.

While the U.N. was dedicated to negotiations, the Dutch were dedicated to the use of force. The Dutch did not realize that a policy of military pressures was antiquated in the age of nationalist upheavals calling for subtle tactics and long-term negotiations. Indonesians might regretfully remind themselves that the strength of the Dutch was negligible when

they began to reoccupy Indonesia in 1946 under British protection. Indonesians did not fight it out at that time and relied on enlightened world opinion.¹²⁷ They placed their trust on the Western Powers who could influence Dutch policies. But with the lapse of time the Dutch interest in negotiated settlement vanished because of their growing consciousness of superiority in military strength. Indonesians became the victim of the first military action. They placed their faith in the U.N. and were soon disillusioned; through the years of bitter struggle the U.N. did not do much to end this feeling of disillusionment. Indonesia's faith in the U.N. imposed upon it a moral obligation which it could not fulfil. The U.N. was engaged in a prolonged trial of strength—or, more accurately, of intentions—with the Dutch colonialists. It must be credited, of course, with occasional lapses into candour, as when it condemned Dutch behaviour. But the Dutch attitude to the U.N. was one of non-chalant irreverence and arrogant disobedience. This attitude was prominent even after the conclusion of the Hague Agreement when Dr Van Royen told the Security Council clearly that it had no jurisdiction in the Dutch-Indonesian discord.¹²⁸ And the U.N. did little but to make some face-saving gestures; it did not take any effective step to check Dutch intransigence; it was not strong enough to face the reality and, therefore, was temporizing all the time. It may be cogently argued that the U.N. would not have been able to render any assistance¹²⁹—it was a little bit—in the Indonesian issue but for the ability of the Republic to survive the Dutch military actions. This failure—and it would be unfair to call it anything else—seems all the less excusable as the problem of checking the Netherlands, a small Power, was not intractable. One could not blame the Indonesians if they thought it inaccurate to express thanks for having had the U.N. support in a major crisis and improvident to seek it in the next one.

The U.N. was a worried, unskilled mediator. The Western Powers were vacillating. Their concern with cold war considerations added to their indecision and made them look less than responsible. They were attempting to have it both ways: to acquiesce in Dutch adventures in order to ensure Holland's fidelity to an anti-U.S.S.R. bloc and also to profess adherence

to the U.N. principles for satisfying Asians. The Netherlands suffered from a combination of anaemia and old-world ambitions; vanity corroded her political judgment. The Western Powers, especially the U.S.A., could assert and monitor her decisions for a graceful dismantling of the colonial fortress. But their anti-U.S.S.R. strategy in Europe crippled their anti-colonialist strategy in Asia. They did not promptly save the Dutch from their folly and their own prestige among Asians. The Netherlands painted the Republican government as Communist and thereby sought to avoid Western intervention in favour of the Republic. But the Madiun revolt exposed the nature of Dutch allegation. The Dutch treated the bogey of communism as an ace of trumps which could be played to defeat nationalism with Western support. It turned out to be a three or four of clubs. The West could not remain idle after the Madiun coup. The choice was not between a Dutch Indonesia or a nationalist Indonesia, but between a Communist Indonesia and a nationalist Indonesia: the fundamental assumption that a pro-Western government could be maintained by force had to be abandoned.¹³⁰ The wise and overdue step of a Western warning (in the form of a U.S. threat to withdraw economic aid from Holland) came rather late. That it was not too late to be useful was simply due to the Republic's gigantic fighting ability that decisively switched the balance of power against Dutch troops in Indonesia. So it can never be said that this belated U.S. move saved the Republic; perhaps it roused Holland from the opium dreams of the past. However, the West could not cure herself of misgivings about the new Asian State; this lingering suspicion, expressed through diplomatic pressure exerted by the UNCI at the Round Table Conference, worked in favour of Holland. Holland retained her hold over West Irian and the right to use the naval base at Surabaya; this was deemed valuable by the West in view of future military necessity; the Western Powers probably felt it would be easier to use West Irian or Surabaya for military operations if the Dutch retained control over them. Perhaps the necessity of this move appeared more pressing to the Western Powers because of the victory of Communists in China.

The physical control exercised by the Dutch in Indonesia

since the Japanese invasion was largely fictitious, and not simply precarious. But they played skilfully on the themes of inefficiency and disintegration of the Republic; they also became the slave of their own propaganda, failing to think out a rational policy. They did not realize that if the people in proving their loyalty to the Republic could defy shooting and oppression, that was as decisive as a genuine military defeat. They talked of peace, and peace meant a world where there would be no resistance to their threats and bullying. The strategy of Holland, after coming back to the Indies at the end of the second world war, was to create a long period of intermittent crisis in which the threat and use of force would be increasingly important and the Republic would be slowly buried under periodic convulsions. Throughout the Indonesian archipelago the machinery of nationalist agitation was grinding into motion. The Dutch were applying the old-model policies to the new world of the post-war era. Instead of taking a calculated risk, by conciliation they were out to hew away the slender bridges of negotiations. From the outset they were bent on having a showdown with the Republic and the tortuous negotiations were merely a smokescreen behind which they waited for an opportunity to attack. The first military action was not an act of sudden indiscretion, or instinctive reaction to provocations, but a premeditated assault. The Dutch were not prepared to pay for the friendship of Indonesians in the only currency which the latter valued: due appreciation of their nationalist aspirations.

Exchanges on transfer of power went on rumbling. But the Dutch started preparing the second military action with the last one still around. They went on hoping that the Republic could be strangled. Whether the Dutch liked it or not, the real issue was not whether they could maintain their positions of special privilege, but how cheaply they could cut their losses. They considered matters from the standpoint of mistaken prestige and not of commonsense. But the military illusions on which the Dutch policy rested were finally shattered by years of conflict. During the second military action the Dutch were compelled to alter the obsolete image of the strength of Indonesian nationalism; they were facing a military fiasco in Indonesia. They at last perceived that they had underrated the

Republic's fighting strength. Their built-in superiority complex, which had proved to be a liability, was undermined.

It must never be supposed that the transfer of sovereignty was due to a change of heart¹³¹ in the Dutch. The transfer of sovereignty was not a product of Dutch generosity, but of nationalist endurance. The Netherlands was forced to suspend further military operations as these were rendered unprofitable by the Republic's military victories. She was fighting for a frenzy, but she could not pay an unlimited price for that. It is now-a-days fashionable to argue that empires are unprofitable and hence outdated. This argument cannot conceal the fact that the unprofitableness of an empire is primarily due to the nationalist upsurge which makes military adventures more and more costly and risky. Empire-builders grumble—and this is surely no humanist reaction—that empires are obsolete only when the expenses of subduing nationalists exceed the returns, making some allowance for the prestige value of a colony. There was a time when Holland could maintain her Indonesian possessions with only 40,000 troops; in 1949 she could not accomplish it with 1,45,000 troops.

At this stage one question may be pertinently considered: whether the nationalist movement in Indonesia enjoyed a mass support during the revolutionary years, i.e. 1945-49. While the testimony offered by Indonesians in this matter would undoubtedly underline the existence of such support, the testimony given by foreign observers also would confirm the Indonesian view. After the Japanese surrender in 1945 Rear-Admiral Patterson (of the British navy) came to Java and attempted to appraise the political situation there. He thought it fit to consult the Japanese military officials who unanimously attested the strength of the Indonesian nationalist movement and the widespread popular enthusiasm propelling that movement. They advised the British to observe utmost caution in dealing with the Indonesian national flag and the national anthem; any disrespect, real or suspected, caused to the flag or the anthem, was sure to bring forth largescale retaliation by the people. The Japanese military officials further emphasized that although there were rivalries between Indonesians, all of them agreed to the aim of national freedom and were determined to work for it. Japanese

officials recommended that the British should extend due recognition to the Indonesian independence movement, refrain from treating Sukarno and Hatta as war-criminals, and thus ensure a cooperative response from Indonesians.¹³²

This verdict of the Japanese officials was confirmed by other observers travelling in the villages of Indonesia after the second world war. Even remote villages flew the Indonesian national flag. The common people in towns, when asked what their nationality was, declared themselves as Indonesians forgetting their regional bias. The people formed numerous trade unions lending a powerful assistance to the freedom movement. The most important evidence of the mass support enjoyed by the Republicans was furnished by the success of the guerilla movement. The guerillas could carry on their relentless operations against the Dutch largely because they were being continuously aided and sheltered even by the village folks. Peasants protected guerilla fighters looking upon the latter as their own children.¹³³ The guerilla movement would not have succeeded unless it was sustained by steady popular support, and the Dutch would not have agreed to independence for Indonesia unless they confronted overwhelming resistance from Republican guerillas.

The spirit in which independence is professed to be granted is as important as the fact of independence. Holland had a last chance. She could convert defeat into a moral victory by an astutely sympathetic handling of negotiations in the RTC. In this way she could survive in Indonesian esteem the sickeningly interminable war, with its conspiracies, ferocity and perennial fanaticism. She lost this chance by inept altercations over the debt problem and the West Irian issue where the West favoured her through the UNCI. If, after the transfer of sovereignty, Holland and the West could not retain Indonesian goodwill, they had only themselves to blame. If the conflict had not lasted for years, Holland's position would have been much better. Holland's misguided militant tactics cost her men, money and prestige which she could ill afford. By refusing, for years, to cede anything, Holland was about to end by losing everything.¹³⁴

Lastly, the present author would consider it unfortunate if the preceding pages have generated the impression, common

to many Asians obsessed by the memory of centuries of European overlordship, that the propensity to colonial domination is a European monopoly. Indonesia's experiences under Japanese occupation can be deemed sufficient to discard such an impression. The Indonesian case surely underlines the fact that so far as the chances and dangers of foreign domination are concerned, a weak Asian state has to fear as much from a distant European country as from a neighbouring Asian state. No dogmatic, even if comforting, beliefs should be entertained on this issue: the concept of Asian solidarity is remote from reality. If Japan was an expansionist Asian country before the second world war, so is Communist China after the second world war. What is more interesting and alarming, Indonesia, a victim of colonial exploitation by both an Asian and a European country, appears to have expansionist designs against Malaysia.¹³⁵ An Asian country, therefore, cannot ignore the threats to independence even after the transfer of power from a European master to her own hands; she must guard against another transfer—this time perhaps to a neighbour distracting the potential victim with the slogan of European colonialism and the misleading doctrine of Asia for the Asiatics.

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¹⁶ *Republican Review*, 1 September 1949, p. 41.

¹⁷ This was stated by Dr Sjarifuddin Prawiranegara, Head of the Republican Emergency Government. *Merdeka*, 25 February 1949, p. 14. Also see Taylor, *Indonesian Independence & the U.N.*, p. 194

¹⁸ *Republican Review*, 1 September 1949, p. 42.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ M. H. Bro, *Indonesia: Land of Challenge*, pp. 69-70.

²¹ Reported by H. R. Isaacs—*Merdeka*, 10 March 1949, p. 13.

²² *Republican Review*, 1 September 1949, p. 39; *Merdeka*, 10 February 1949, p. 20.

²³ *News Bulletin*, No. 115, 30 March 1949, p. 8.

²⁴ *Merdeka*, 10 March 1949, p. 12.

²⁵ *Merdeka*, 10 February 1949, p. 19.

²⁶ *Het Parool*, 15 March 1949, scoffed at this assertion which was falsified by facts.

²⁷ *News Bulletin*, No. 115, 30 March 1949, p. 7.

²⁸ *The Times*, 7 January 1949.

²⁹ *Official Records of the Security Council*, 4th year, No. 4, pp. 2-18.

³⁰ U.N. Doc. S/1213.

³¹ Taylor, *Indonesian Independence & the U.N.*, p. 192.

³² Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, p. 11.

³³ U.N. Doc. S/1219.

³⁴ *Merdeka*, 10 February 1949, p. 4.

³⁵ *The N.Y.T.*, 23 January 1949.

³⁶ U.N. Bulletin, 1949—VI, 159.

³⁷ U.N. Doc. S/1234.

³⁸ Statement of Premier Hatta on 19 July 1949.

³⁹ U.N. Doc. S/1234.

⁴⁰ *News Bulletin*, No. 115, 30 March 1949, p. 7. For attestation by Kahin, see NRI, p. 391.

⁴¹ *Republican Review*, 1 November 1949, p. 41.

⁴² *The N.Y.T.*, 27 February 1949.

⁴³ *Merdeka*, 10 March 1949, p. 3.

⁴⁴ U.N. Doc. S/1270. *External Affairs*, June 1949, p. 34—Monthly Bulletin of the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.

⁴⁵ *Netherlanas News*, 4 March 1949.

⁴⁶ *Merdeka*, 10 May 1949, p. 5.

⁴⁷ *News Bulletin*, 26 June 1949, p. 3. Also see Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

⁴⁸ *News Bulletin*, 30 March 1949, p. 6.

⁴⁹ *Merdeka*, 10 May 1949, p. 5.

⁵⁰ *Official Records of the Security Council*, 4th year, No. 19.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Nos. 20 and 21.

⁵² *News Bulletin*, 30 March 1949, p. 1.

⁵³ U.N. Doc.S/1373.

⁵⁴ *The Hindu*, 17 April 1949.

⁵⁵ See Comments by Soemitro, the Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the U.S.A. in 1949; *United Asia*, January-February 1949, p. 431.

⁵⁶ Louis Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 127; Gerbrandy, *Indonesia*, p. 164; *The Hindu*, 17 April 1949.

⁵⁷ Feith, *op. cit.*, p. 12; Brackman, *Indonesian Communism: A History*, p. 106; Bro, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

⁵⁸ Brackman, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

⁵⁹ *External Affairs*, June 1949, p. 21.

⁶⁰ U.N. Doc.S/1373.

⁶¹ *The Pakistan Times*, 18 May 1949—for denunciatory comments by *Pravda*.

⁶² This did not mean that Republicans accepted it as permanent. See Sukarno, *Republican Review*, 1 September 1949, p. 19.

⁶³ U.N. Doc.S/1373.

⁶⁴ *The Washington Post*, 10 May 1949. Also See *Merdeka*, 13 May 1949, p. 1.

⁶⁵ *Merdeka*, 10 June 1949, p. 3.

⁶⁶ Gerbrandy, *Indonesia*, p. 166.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 166-67.

⁶⁸ *News Bulletin*, 25 June 1949, p. 1.

⁶⁹ *Merdeka*, 25 May 1949, p. 2. Also See Comment by the Indonesian weekly SIKAP, Quoted in *News Bulletin*, 25 June 1949, p. 1.

⁷⁰ *Merdeka*, 10 June 1949, p. 3.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

⁷² *News Bulletin*, 7 July 1949.

⁷³ *News Bulletin*, 30 July 1949, p. 1.

⁷⁴ U.N. Doc.S/1373, Appendix VIII.

⁷⁵ *Indonesian Affairs*, August/September 1952, p. 13.

⁷⁶ An authentic account is available in: *Republican Review*, 1 September 1949, pp. 22-25.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* Also see Leslie H. Palmier, *Indonesia and the Dutch*, p. 69.

⁷⁸ *Republican Review*, October 1949, p. 2.

⁷⁹ *Republican Review*, November 1949, p. 44.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Republican Review*, October 1949, p. 8.

⁸³ Andrew Roth, 'Independence of Indonesia', *The Hindu*, 17 December 1949.

⁸⁴ *The Hindu*, 30 October 1949.

⁸⁵ *Hague Agreement, Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty*, Article 2.

⁸⁶ *The Hindu*, 30 October 1949.

⁸⁷ Chapter I, Section I, Article 1, Para. 1.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 2.

⁸⁹ Chapter III, Section I, Articles 68-69.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, Article 74.

- ⁹¹ Chapter III, Section II, Article 80, paras. 1-2.
- ⁹² Chapter III, Section III, Articles 98-100.
- ⁹³ Chapter I, Section II, Article 2.
- ⁹⁴ Chapter I, Section V.
- ⁹⁵ Chapter V, Articles 186-187.
- ⁹⁶ *The Hindu*, 3 November 1949.
- ⁹⁷ U.N. Doc. S/1417.
- ⁹⁸ *Republican Review*, October 1949, p. 1.
- ⁹⁹ *Hague Agreement: Union Statute*, Article 2.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, Article 1.
- ¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, Article 3.
- ¹⁰² *Ibid.*, Articles 7-10.
- ¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, Articles 13-19.
- ¹⁰⁴ U.N. Doc. S/1417.
- ¹⁰⁵ *Hague Agreement: Financial and Economic Agreement*, Section A, Article 3.
- ¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, Section A, Article 1.
- ¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, Article 4.
- ¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, Article 11.
- ¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, Section C, Articles 21-22.
- ¹¹⁰ *Hague Agreement: Agreement concerning Foreign Relations*, Article 2.
- ¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, Articles 1 and 4.
- ¹¹² *Hague Agreement: Agreement on cooperation in the field of Defence*, Articles 1, 3, 7, 8.
- ¹¹³ *Ibid.*, Article 15.
- ¹¹⁴ *The Hindu*, 3 November 1949.
- ¹¹⁵ *Hague Agreement: Agreement concerning cultural relations*, Articles 1-3.
- ¹¹⁶ Maurice Zinkin, *The Manchester Guardian*, 4 November 1949.
- ¹¹⁷ *The Manchester Guardian*, 3 October 1949.
- ¹¹⁸ *The Hindu*, 17 December 1949.
- ¹¹⁹ *Hague Agreement: Union Statute*, Articles 5-6.
- ¹²⁰ *The N.Y.T.*, 27 December 1949.
- ¹²¹ *The Hindu*, 3 November 1949.
- ¹²² *The Hindu*, 4 November 1949.
- ¹²³ U.N. Doc. S/1431.
- ¹²⁴ 'The Soviets, furious that they have not been permitted to father' the RUSI, 'snarl that it is not really legitimate and predict that it will not be able to walk by itself.' Andrew Roth, *Indian News Chronicle*, 27 December 1949.
- ¹²⁵ *The Hindu*, 7 November 1949.
- ¹²⁶ Such explanations are the usual ones appearing in books and newspapers; e.g., the editorial in *The Tribune*, 5 November 1949; and the view of Louis Fischer, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-29.
- ¹²⁷ This was also the editorial estimate of *The N.Y.T.*, 31 December 1948.

¹²⁸ *The N.Y.T.*, 13 December 1949. Also see for comments on the competence of the Security Council, Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 367, 371-72.

Trygve Lie, the U.N. Secretary General, issued a statement saying that the UNCI 'has given valuable assistance in helping to bring about the agreement reached at the Hague'.

¹²⁹ *The Hindu*, 3 November 1949—Statement of Trygve Lie, the U.N. Secretary-General.

¹³⁰ 'The U.S. and Great Britain have perhaps belatedly come to realise that their interests in Asia can better be served by encouraging the nationalist movement in these countries rather than by identifying themselves with the status quo and consequently being suspected of sympathising with outmoded colonialism.' *Merdeka*, 22 June 1949, p. 3.

¹³¹ Contrast the view of Woodrow Wyatt. *The Statesman*, 15 August 1949.

¹³² Benedict R.O.'G. Anderson, *Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics Under the Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945*, pp. 120-22.

¹³³ W. F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition*, pp. 319-20. Paul M. Kattenburg, *A Central Javanese Village in 1950*, p. 13.

¹³⁴ For an able analysis of the various causes of estrangement between the Dutch and Indonesians, see Palmier, *Indonesia and the Dutch*, Chapters 13, 14 and 15.

¹³⁵ This was written before Suharto ousted Sukarno and proceeded to terminate confrontation with Malaysia.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

Van Mook believes that although the Queen's declaration of 1901 'was a new accent' in the policy of the Netherlands Government, 'for the Dutchmen in the Indies the interests of the colony had already been paramount for many years in a very special way.' *SDSEA*, p. 107. According to him, 'These men and women identified themselves much more with the country and its people than the British ever did in India or Malaya, the French in Indo-China or the Americans in the Philippines.' *Ibid.*

While it is impossible to draw such comparisons it must be mentioned that the fusion between the European and the Asian was frustrated by the force of colonial exploitation. Furthermore, with the startling progress in communications, 'the voyage home became so easy that Europeans no longer felt permanently attached to the East.' See H.G.Q. Wales, 'A Cultural Approach to the Postwar Problems of South East Asia,' *Far Eastern Quarterly*, May 1945, p. 218.

APPENDIX 2

'Convention in those days decreed the imprisonment of marriageable daughters in the parental home until the time when they were married to a man selected by their parents. See *Indonesian Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 4/5, April/May 1951, p. 37. 'A girl was then supposed to lack any opinion of her own, or, at least, was not allowed to express it if she had one.' *Ibid.*

Indeed, many women resented the requirement of *adat*, i.e., customary law in Indonesia, whereby they were subordinated to the parents and afterwards to the husbands without being considered fit for any other duty. "...there were more girls of her time with the same ideals as she, but they were not in a position to make their weak voices heard.... Kartini came to national fame and became the mouthpiece of these common ideals through the many letters she wrote to a Dutch friend

telling of her mental struggles. After Kartini's death a collection of her letters was published in book form, as 'Door Duisternis tot Licht' (Through Darkness to Light)." See *Indonesian Affairs*, April/May 1952, p. 29.

Kartini's intellectual height and passion for reforms can be gauged if we take the following lines written by her at the age of 19. 'We know what is in store for us. Ours will be a life full of struggle, disappointment and sorrow... To assist in paving that way which leads thousands towards freedom and happiness; which brings inevitably millions of our compatriots to a higher moral standard; and thus to contribute in the carrying out of the eternal task to attain perfection; a gigantic job to which age after age the better part of mankind have dedicated their life, to lift mankind towards still higher moral standards, in brief, to bring our beautiful world nearer to perfection—is that not a task worthy of our life's struggle?' See *Merdeka*, Special Number, 31 May 1948, pp. 62-63.

APPENDIX 3

The Chinese in Indonesia had for a long time past bitter feelings towards the Japanese. One reason for this was a deep-seated inferiority complex nurtured by a discriminatory policy adopted by the Netherlands. "...the Japanese were accorded in Java a legal status equal to that of 'Europeans', and in 1909 they were allowed to have a Japanese Consul in Batavia, although the number of Japanese citizens residing in the Indies was, and until World War II always remained, very small." Sidney B. Fay, 'Revolt in the Netherlands Indies', *Current History*, December 1945, p. 543.

APPENDIX 4

Many people in Indonesia pondered that their plight in the Dutch regime was so bad that it could not be worse in a Japanese regime. Perhaps this was a reason why Indonesians refused to cooperate with the Dutch militarily in countering the Japanese threat. 'To meet the emergency the Governor General instituted a limited militia through the Peoples Council.' But different indigenous organizations, 'in short, the entire people of Indonesia opposed its introduction, because it was intended only to maintain Dutch Power in Indonesia.' B.A. Ubani, 'Indonesian fight for freedom', *United Asia*, January-February 1949, p. 417.

Possibly a more important reason was that much before the Japanese invasion Indonesians wanted to cooperate with the Dutch in galvanizing the war-effort. The Dutch disdainfully rejected this faithful offer. 'The loyal and legal Indonesian nationalists offered to form an Indo-

nesian militia and to assume responsibility for it in support of the war-effort. Their offer was ignored. It was felt to be unimportant; experiments with nationalists, which might later be a source of disturbance, were considered unnecessary. Soetan Sjahrir, *Out of Exile*, p. 218. Also see Aidit, 'A Short History of the Communist Party of Indonesia,' p. 17.

The people were thoroughly contemptuous of the British behaviour of Dutch troops and automatically swung to Asia. 'welcome Japanese troops. The Dutch had clearly shown themselves to the world that they were as impotent to defend their fatherland as the Japanese troops, they did more looting and destruction than the invaders.' Sumonegoro, 'The part Indonesia played in world upheaval', *The Voice of Free Indonesia*, Dummy Number (1945?), p. 22.

APPENDIX 5

'Concisely, Japan's economic blue-print for the Indies consisted of sending thence to Japan the materials needed for prosecuting the war and for making victory eventually profitable, and in the interval of making the area itself self-sufficient.' Virginia Thompson, 'Japan's blue-print for Indonesia', *Far Eastern Quarterly*, February 1946, pp. 202-3. It is, however, difficult to agree on the latter part of this comment, and decide how far the Japanese were really interested in making the Indies self-sufficient. The Japanese plans to remodel Indonesian agriculture were too dangerous and did not reveal a concern for Indonesia's self-sufficiency. '...the peasants were arbitrarily forced to plant whatever the Japanese thought might be to use, sometimes castor bean seeds, sometimes cotton. Experiments were conducted on a large scale with both the ground and the people. If the experimental crop failed, the work of hundreds of thousands of people came to nothing.' Sjahrir, *Out of Exile*, p. 247.

Japan's East Asian plan contained not an economic and political but also a cultural blue-print. Japan wanted to proclaim her cultural sovereignty. "Japan's obsession to assert her cultural hegemony in the East manifested itself in Indonesia, as elsewhere in South-Eastern Asia, by the establishment of numerous Japanese-language schools,...the diffusing of literacy and elementary vocational instruction through 'revised textbooks' and 'reformed teachers', the distribution of literature and pictures and the broadcasting of programmes that would redound to the greater glory of Japan..." V. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

APPENDIX 6

In order to have a glimpse of the charms of oratory that Sukarno exer-

cised we can go through the following passage: "Gentlemen: I have already proposed to you 'The Principles of the State'. There are five. Is this Pantja Dharma? No. The name Pantja Dharma is not suitable here. Dharma means duty, whereas we are speaking of principles. I like symbolism. The symbolism of numbers also. The rites of Islam are five in number. Our lines write five on each hand. We have five senses. What more is five for us. Ours (One of those present: Pendawa Lima, the Five Pendawas, five characters in the Mahabharata epic.) The Pendawas also were five persons and now, the number of principles: nationalism, internationalism, a high prosperity and belief in God, also five in number." *Indira at the Sila*, p. 29.

APPENDIX 7

'The care of APWI is one of the main responsibilities resting with the Indonesians immediately after the overthrow of the Japanese administration. These APWIs were then found in Japanese concentration camps where they had suffered heavily for over three years. . . . 'The task of protecting and safeguarding the APWIs personal safety and security was given to the Republican forces. . . . How well they have done their job may be confirmed from official reports made by International Red Cross representatives who at any time were in the opportunity to visit those camps.' *Indonesia*, Issued by the Ministry of Information, p. 21.

APPENDIX 8

The sentiments of Hollanders will be confirmed by the following passage written by a famous politician in Holland about average Dutchmen in Batavia and also Dutch internees. "In their heart none of these colonial and would-be colonial Dutch approve of Mr Van Mook's policy or of the policy of the Government in Holland or even of the very vague promises made by the Dutch Government in exile and in Queen Wilhelmina's speech of December 1942. All this is only weakness in other view, humanitarian humbug, or, as the jargon used here runs, 'ethical foolishness'. . . . And the majority of my fellow-prisoners during these years of hardship not only were far more anti-Indonesian than anti-Japanese, but they were resolved that there should be no 'ethical' nonsense about their policy when they came back in Government again." De Kadt, 'Dutch Bourbons', *The New Statesman & Nation*, 15 December 1945, p. 402.

No wonder, then, that after the Japanese surrender 'The national struggle turned from the Japanese to the NICA and the Dutch; the NICA became our number-one enemy.' Sjahrir, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

APPENDIX 9

A. C. Brackman's comments on the U.S. aide memoire of 28 June 1947, are revealing: 'What the Anglo-American powers failed to appreciate, however, was that although the United States had withdrawn from the Philippines in 1946, and although the British were preparing to withdraw from the Indian subcontinent that summer, the continental Europeans had no intention of leaving Asia. The United States aide memoire also reflected Washington's insensitivity to the dynamic of post-war Asian revolution: the quest for human dignity. The United States promised financial assistance to Indonesia if the republic acceded to the Dutch demands. The logical course, if dollar diplomacy was to be brought into play at all—and its advisability is open to serious question—would have been to sweeten a Dutch withdrawal with financial aid in the form of Marshall Plan funds. But apparently, Washington felt this to be too crude a method of dealing with the Dutch, but not with the Indonesians.

'The tragedy for the West was that in the end, Marshall Plan funds financed the Dutch colonial wars in Indonesia in 1947 and 1948-49 in the face of hostile Western public opinion.' *Indonesian Communism: A History*, pp. 61-62.

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No. 67. 171st meeting (31 July 1947). No. 68. 172nd & 173rd meetings (1 August 1947).

No. 69. 174th meeting (4 August 1947). No. 72. 178th meeting (7 August 1947).

No. 74. 180th & 181st meetings (12 August 1947). No. 76. 183rd & 184th meetings (14 August 1947).

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- Nos. 16-35. 241st to 260th meetings (5 February—2 March 1948).
 No. 82. 316th & 317th meetings (10 June).
 No. 86. 322nd & 323rd meetings (17 June).
 No. 89. 326th meeting (23 June 1948).
 No. 91. 328th meeting (1 July).
 No. 92. 329th meeting (6 July).
 No. 99. 341st & 342nd meetings (29 July).
 No. 131. 387th meeting (20 December).
 No. 132. 388th & 389th meetings (22 December).
 No. 133. 390th & 391st meetings (23 December).
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- No. 1. 397th meeting (7 January).
- No. 2. 398th meeting (11 January).
- No. 4. 400th meeting (14 January).
- No. 5. 401st meeting (17 January).
- No. 6. 402nd meeting (21st January).
- No. 7. 403rd meeting (25 January).
- No. 8. 404th & 405th meetings (27 January).
- No. 9. 406th meeting (28 January).
- No. 13. 410th meeting (16 February).
- No. 19. 416th meeting (10 March).
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12. *The Washington Post*.

ABBREVIATIONS

AFNEI	Allied Forces Netherlands East Indies
APWI	Allied Prisoners of War and Internees
BFO	Federal Consultative Assembly
DOC.	Document
H.M.S.O.	His Majesty's Stationery Office
IMTFE	International Military Tribunal for the Far East
K.C.A.	Keesing's Contemporary Archives
NICA	Netherlands Indies Civil Administration
NRI	Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia
N.S.&N.	The New Statesman and Nation
N. Y. Times	The New York Times
RIIA	Royal Institute of International Affairs
RUSI	Republic of the United States of Indonesia
SDSEA	Stakes of Democracy in South East Asia
SEAC	South East Asia Command
SWPC	South West Pacific Command
U.N.	United Nations
UNCI	United Nations Commission on Indonesia
U.P.	United Press
U.S.A.	The United States of America
U.S.S.R.	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
V.F.I.	The Voice of Free Indonesia

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