

METAPHYSICS

AT

A GLANCE

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To
The loving memory
of
My teacher
The Late Prof. Haridas Bhattacharyya,
M.A., B.L., P.R.S., Darsansagar

PREFACE

The West Bengal market is teeming, if not overflooded, with books on Philosophy, written mainly in Bengali. To add one more to them and that in English calls for an explanation that the author has got to offer. If the books are many, the readers are many more still, each with his or her peculiar aptitude, liking and comprehensibility. Considered from that angle of vision, no new book on whatsoever subject that might be, is redundant or unwelcome ; and none can say, with certainty, which one of them would suit which class or classes of readers. Similarly, in these days of craze for regional language being used as the medium of instruction, books have yet to be written in English for those of our boys and girls as also for the general readers who do not know the regional language or who may, at any rate, prefer English to any other language. Their need has got to be served. But for that, the book cannot claim any special fascination excepting that it is a very small and handy one and that it has, without mincing matters, attempted to cover the syllabi of the universities of India in a style easily understandable to all.

The author has some obligations to acknowledge to a few of his colleagues who have read and compared the MS. with the proof, whenever requested ; and they are Profs. A. Ghosh, A. K. Ghosh, A. Chakravarty, A. Banerji, A. K. Ray, Dr. S. K. Bhattacharyya and lastly the author's student and Librarian Sri M. Bhattacharyya.

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At the end, it may be stated that the bibliography does not exhaust the names of the eminent scholars whose books the author has utilised and whose references, in many cases, have also been made in the body of the book.

S. R. DAS GUPTA

CONTENTS

	PAGE
The need for the study of Metaphysics	1

CHAPTER I

Epistemology

(A) Prolegomenon	3
(B) The Method of Approach to Reality	22
(C) The Subject	30
(D) The Object	40
(E) Judgment, Concept and Inference	47
(F) Truth and Error	57

CHAPTER II

Matter and Life

(A) Matter	63
(B) Life	71

CHAPTER III

Mind, Soul, God and The Absolute	...	81
----------------------------------	-----	----

CHAPTER IV

The Ethical Approach to Reality	...	111
---------------------------------	-----	-----

CHAPTER V

The Aesthetic Approach to Reality	...	126
-----------------------------------	-----	-----

CHAPTER VI

	PAGE
The Conclusion	146

Appendix

(A) Philosophy Anti-metaphysical ...	148
(B) Intellect <i>vs.</i> Intuition ...	154
(C) Immortality of the Soul ...	159
(D) Freedom of Will	165
(E) Metaphysics and Religion ...	170
(F) Yoga—Karma, Jnana and Bhakti ...	174

THE NEED FOR THE STUDY OF METAPHYSICS

The need in a man indicates a feeling of want. The want is always for an object yet unattained. The need of Metaphysics, therefore, is a need or hankering in man for the attainment of the knowledge of what is yet unattained and what is beyond the world of the senses. Without entering, just at present, into the question of whether or not there is anything like the ontological reality or realities and whether or not the human mind is capable of knowing it or them, we have just to see why and how such a feeling arises in human mind. The analysis of mind, as in psychology, reveals three aspects of mind conventionally known as cognition, emotion and volition. Each of them, although inter-woven, has a specific approach of its own to the object it cognises, feels and wills. Experience shows that the objects, amenable to human understanding, are, by nature, self-surpassable. Subjectively, the more one knows, feels and wills, the more he wants to know, feel and will. Truly speaking, there is nothing like complete or full satiety in the quest of truth, be it in the realm of science, of philosophy and lastly religion. To quote a few out of many, the sciences of Chemistry and Physics could go no further than the fundamental particles like electrons, protons, etc., that are, by themselves, not self-explanatory. They point to something more fundamental than what is till then known. For example, in the science of Biology, the advent of the first life-germ is still an open question. The true nature of the self or self-consciousness is an enigma for the science of psychology yet to solve. The proverb of the collection of pebbles at the sea-shore of knowledge, associated with the name of Newton, testifies to

the truth of the partial and limited knowledge of all sciences. Similarly, in love-making, the lovers remain, to a great extent, strangers to each other. Strangeness accentuates feelings ; the unseen adds to the glamour of the seen, and the unknown contributes substantially to the beauty of the known. In short, the sentiment of beauty or of love thrives on the recognition of these two polarities and stands on the border line between the two leaning always towards the unseen and the unknown. Likewise, the attainment of the moral good in life invariably points to a still greater good to struggle for. There is virtually no end of this striving, intellectual, emotional and volitional. Metaphysics, as a science or philosophy, pursues this natural or rather instinctive conatus in man to its logical end and makes an attempt to comprehend intellectually what it is to which the whole being of man, consciously or unconsciously, is ever moving forward with no break or pause. In the words of Prof. C. H. Whiteley, "The central and principal part of philosophy is that which tries to deal, not with any part or aspect of reality, but with the whole, and to provide us with a comprehensive picture of what the universe is in its completeness. This . . . branch of philosophy, which is concerned with the general nature of reality, was called "First philosophy" by Aristotle, and is now generally known as Metaphysics. Under this head come discussions about the nature of Matter and of Mind and how they are related, of the existence and nature of God, of the freedom of the human will, of the immortality of the soul". (An Introduction to Metaphysics, P. 7).

CHAPTER I
EPISTEMOLOGY
(A)
PROLEGOMENON

Is this attempt worth-taking, or is it all futile ? In other words, is knowledge of the reality or realities possible ? This leads to the fuller study of the problems of knowledge—its nature, sources, conditions, limitations, etc. If on examination of each of the above, it appears that the knowledge of reality, even if it exists, is beyond human comprehension, metaphysics as an intellectual pursuit may better be given up. The science, that deals with these problems, is called epistemology. People there are who are peace-loving, lacking in initiative and parasitic by temperament. They naturally lean on what persons of superior wisdom have said and done. ‘Mahajana jena gata sha pantha’. Paths trodden by the wise and the great in search of the Truth are the paths for all to follow. “Nanya pantha vidyate ayanaya”. Besides this one, there is no other way of approach to reality. They believe in these maxims and dogmatically follow them. Contrariwise, there is yet another class of people, who are over-conscious of their own ability and strength. Unlike the thinkers, as stated above, they believe in the capacity of mind to know the reality or realities independent of other’s help or without any prior examination of the conditions, limitations etc., of human knowledge, as dealt with in the science of epistemology. For both of these classes of thinkers, the study of epistemology means wastage of time and energy. They are

called dogmatists for, collectively or individually, they have dogmas to follow and the theories or the Isms that they sponsor are, in general, called dogmatism. The search after truths, historically viewed, begins with dogmatism. The dogmatic philosophy assumes certain principle as axiomatically true and deduces therefrom the manifold of the world. In the words of Caird, "it is the direct effort to understand and interpret the world—the efforts of mind which is as yet troubled by no scruple as to its own competence, or as to the efficacy of the methods and principles of its use. The mind is too busy with its objects to attend to itself." (Caird: *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, p. 2). In pre-historic days, mythological gods and goddesses were characterised as the creators of the world. In Homeric poems or in the theogony of Hosiad, the union between Heaven the father and Earth the mother, caused by Eros the god of love, brought forth into existence the world that we live in. Similar naturalistic-cum-polytheistic theories we come across in the Vedas of the Hindus, for man as man is essentially the same, and the thinkers, all the world over, think alike under similar circumstances. In the Rig-Veda, the Heaven and the Earth have been deified and shown as wedded to each other. They are the universal parents of gods like "the Sun, the Dawn, the Fire, the Wind and the Rain". (S. Radhakrishnan: *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, P. 76). Considered subjectively, these are the creators of the world, and objectively they form, as it were, the stuff, the world is made of. In short, in the pre-historic period, theogony took up the position of metaphysics and philosophy in the explanation of the world . . . its origin and growth. Subsequently, in the pre-sophistic age,

the centre of enquiry is shifted from the mythical beings to the natural forces and elements. In place of many gods, there is only one elemental stuff behind the multiplicity of the world. Pluralism is replaced by monism. Ionian philosophers (physicists) differ among themselves on the question of the nature of the primordial stuff. Thales declares Water to be the original reality out of which everything comes into being. For him, all things come from water, and to water do they all return at the end. According to Anaximenes, on the other hand, the first principle of things is not Water but Air. The element of Air or breath, that keeps our body living and fit, is actually the principle that creates and sustains the universe. All things arise from Air through a process of rarefaction and condensation. When rarefied, it becomes Fire and when condensed, it becomes in turn wind, cloud, water, earth, etc. All other things of the world emanate out of their combination ; and this composition is possible only through Motion which is also as eternal as the Air. For Empedocles, there is no one element at the root of the things of the world. They are Earth, Air, Fire and Water.¹ It is out of their combination and recombination that the universe crystallises into existence. It is abundantly clear from what is stated above that no

¹ The Carvak system of philosophy in India believes in these four elements being the ultimate stuff of the world. The Vaisesika system adds one more to them, viz., Ether (Akasa). Kanada the founder of the system, distinguishes them as physical elements, opposed to the non-physical elements of the name of Space, Time, Soul and Mind (Manas). For him, therefore, there are nine kinds of substances in totality. In Sankhya philosophy, these five gross elements, viz., Ether, Air, Fire, Water and Earth are not accorded the status of primary elements. They are emanations out of the primal stuff called Prakriti.

two philosophers agree with each other on the question of the ultimate stuff, the world is made of. For the one, it is Water, for the other it is Air, and yet for the third it is all . . . Water, Air, Earth and Fire.

Different systems of dogmatic philosophy arrive at different conclusions which again contradict one another. Naturally, therefore, the theogonies and cosmogonies of the philosophers of the pre-historic and pre-sophistic periods become the butt of ridicule of the Sophists who pose, traditionally for themselves, the monopoly of all wisdom. The dialectical arguments, put forward by them, in vanquishing the adversaries, while vindicating their protest against the paradoxical conclusions of the nature-philosophers, eventually lead themselves on to the epistemological pitfall of scepticism . . . a theory in itself self-suicidal. The very denial of knowledge is an affirmation thereof. To say that knowledge is not possible is itself a pointer to the fact that, to that extent at least, knowledge is possible. That is, knowledge is possible. The question, therefore, is not so much of the possibility or impossibility of knowledge, as of the limit and means of knowledge ; and here Epistemology, as the science of knowledge, practically begins to function. The knowledge-situation is roughly divisible into the polarities of subject and object, the knower and the known. Added to them, is the problem of the relation between the two. The question of how the subject knows the object or how the object gets known by the subject depends finally on the solution of the problems of the origin, the sources²

² (a) The Carvaka system in India advocates sense-perception as the only source of knowledge.

and the methods of knowledge. The sources of knowledge, historically upheld by the philosophers, are basically of two kinds . . . Sense-experience and Reason. The philosophers, all the world over, admit of classification on the basis of their advocacy for either of the two. The empiricists like Bacon, Locke, Hume, Mill, Spencer, etc., in the West and thinkers like Carvakas, the Buddhists, etc., in the East are the sponsors of the former, while Descartes, Spinoza, Hegel, etc., in the West with their counterparts as in Sankara, Ramanuja, etc., in the East are of the latter. The 'Isms' in these two cases are respectively called Empiricism and Rationalism. According to the former, knowledge is made up of sense-experiences. Impressions come from without and they form, as it were, the alphabets of the language of knowledge, if we can, of course, call it a language at all. The

- (b) The Jaina system adds Inference and testimony to them.
- (c) The Nyaya system believes in four separate sources of knowledge, viz., Percept (pratyaksa), Inference (Anumana), Comparison (Upamana) and Testimony (Sabda).
- (d) According to Sankhya philosophy, there are five sources or organs of knowledge (Jnanendriya). They are Eye, Ear, Nose, Tongue and Skin yielding knowledge respectively of colour, sound, smell, taste and touch. Added to them are the Mind (manas) and five organs of activities (Karmendriyas).
- (e) The Mimamsa philosophy of Jaimini insists mainly on faith in what the Vedas say as also on the self-evidence of all kinds of knowledge, provided the senses are sound and the objects presented before the sense-organs are in proper setting and provided also the inference, whenever made, are based on sufficient data. If there is, of course, any doubt anywhere, there is no knowledge, for there is no belief, and knowledge minus belief is no knowledge. In short, according to Jaimini, the sources are the Faith, the Inference and the Reason alike.

mind is at birth a *Tabula-rasa*, a blank tablet or a white sheet of paper on which everything has to be written. There is no innate idea, no a priori element, that has anything to do in a knowing-situation. Had there been any innate idea, Locke argues, that should have equally been present in all men; be he or she an idiot, a child, a lunatic or a genius. The facts of experiences invariably testify to the truth otherwise. The geometric principle like the three angles of a triangle being all together equal to two right angles is something more than what an unintelligent student can easily grasp, while for an intelligent boy, it is a pleasant question easily answerable. The moral laws or the notion of God are not, as Descartes believes, innate for they are not universally and uniformly acceptable to all. There are savages who have little sense of morality, and a conception of God or religion. Morality and religion both admit of gradation as a process towards perfection, one stage differing from the other often lock, stock and barrel. In some respects, they sometimes contradict one another. In the sphere of religion, Idolatry is good in Hinduism, but it is bad in Mahommedanism and Christianity. Polygamy is permissible in Islamism, but it is a taboo in Hinduism and Christianity. All these, according to the empiricists, are proofs enough in support of the fact that in knowledge

- (f) The Vedanta philosophy of Sankara rejects the things of the world as appearances and illusions, conjured up by God by His inscrutable power called *Maya*. Senses, therefore, do not give men knowledge of reality. For that they have to depend on reason and meditation of truths obtained through the study of Vedanta under the guidance of an enlightened and competent teacher who has realised the Truth in his life.

there is nothing a priori and that everything is a posteriori. In fact, everything is derived from experience. Itself a passive entity, if it can be called an entity at all, the mind has got no contribution to make towards the making of knowledge, that grows out of the combination and recombination of the sense-data in accordance with the Laws of Association,³ viz. Similarity, Contrast and Contiguity, spatial and temporal. The mind here is given the status of a dead recipient only. It has got no dynamic urge, far less any internal organ having anything to do with what is called knowledge. There is nothing in the intellect that was not originally in the senses. All that is, . . . call it mental or material, . . . is but clusters of sensations. All knowledge springs out of sensations and to sensations, in the final analysis, is it reducible. This is, in short, the essence of all empirical thoughts in the East as well as in the West with deviations here and there to suit local needs

³ The Laws of Association indicate a psychological process by which a given percept or an idea raises up into full consciousness past ideas that remain latent in the subconscious or the unconscious region of mind. They are as follows :—

- (a) The Law of Similarity : It is based on the proverb that the like always recalls the like. When there is similarity say, for example, in the appearance of two things or two persons, the percept or the idea of the one immediately stirs up or recalls the image of the other in the mind of the perceiver or the conceiver. The sight of one brother reminds the perceiver of the other, because of family-likeness in appearance between the two.
- (b) The Law of Contrast : Unlike the Law of Similarity that is based on likeness, the Law of Contrast is equally based on difference. If in the case of the former, the like recalls the like, in that of the latter, the opposites recall one another. For example, night suggests day, darkness light and poverty richness.

and temperamental differences. For example, Locke unlike Hume adds internal experience to external experience or, in other words, reflection to sensation as the double sources of knowledge. "Reflection or internal sense . . . supplies the mind with ideas of its own operations, such as perception, thinking, doubting, reasoning, knowing and willing." (Thilly : History of Philosophy, p. 310). Thus for Locke, the sense-data come both from within and without. The *sensa* plus the habits of mind make up the world of knowledge, as it is. It savours of Kantianism and may better be regarded, however insufficient, as the anticipation of the critical philosophy of Kant. For Kant both *sensa* and reason, independent of each other, lack self-sufficiency as the only source of knowledge or as instrumental to the fact of the acquisition of knowledge. For him, both must co-operate and supplement each other. This is exactly the view or the theory that is proverbially associated with his name. In his Critique of Pure Reason, he has made an elaborate discussion on this theory. The senses supply the raw materials of knowledge, and the reason gives them shape

- (c) The Law of Contiguity : "Presentations which occur together, whether simultaneously or in close succession, tend afterwards to revive or suggest one another." This law admits of two forms—one of space and the other of time. Smell of an orange reminds the person who smells of the other qualities like taste, colour, softness, etc., that belong to the orange, as a whole. It is an illustration in favour of the former. As for the latter, an example may be found in the train or succession of ideas in which each preceding idea suggests the immediately succeeding one.

The modern psychologists have reduced these three laws into a fundamental one ; and it has been given the name of the Law of Redintegration. For a detailed study, see any book on Psychology.

and form. They both, in their combination, constitute the elements of all our knowledge, and none can go without the other, for percepts by themselves are chaotic, and the concepts are empty. "The understanding by itself cannot intuit or perceive anything ; the senses by themselves cannot think anything. The understanding furnishes the forms of Space and Time that hold, and the categories of Substance, Causality, etc., that unify, the otherwise discrete and isolated sense-data. Mind is thus not a passive receiver or a receptacle of impressions, cast by the senses, as the empiricists believe, but an active agent having a substantial amount of contribution to make towards the formation of knowledge. The notions supplied by reason are *a priori* and the *sensa* supplied by the senses are *a posteriori* elements of knowledge. But the question is . . . can they in their combination yield knowledge of the thing-in-itself as it is behind the ever-shifting panorama of the world of phenomena, subjective and objective ? Bound up within the region of sense-experience, made up of categories and *sensa*, that furnish no rational clue to the apprehension of the supplier of categories or the producer of sensations, Kant does not find any way out of the world of phenomena, sundered away from the world of noumena. For him, Rational Cosmology, Rational Psychology and Rational Theology are all, from the side of the intellect, records of futile attempts ever made to pry into the secrecies of metaphysics, which is thus virtually reduced to what might be called a pseudo-science. It appears that he could hardly get over the shock given by Hume and that his philosophy, in that sense, is at par with and not better than that of Hume. He becomes as Humean as Hume himself.

Is he, for that, anti-God, anti-soul or anti-matter ? Evidently, he is not. His solitudes for their existence, in spite of the contrary verdict of the Critique of Pure Reason, constitute proofs thereof. He wants to say, "things in themselves exist ; indeed, they must exist, otherwise sensation is inexplicable. Corresponding to phenomena, there must be something that appears, something extra mentem, something that affects our senses and supply the matter of knowledge. . . . Although we cannot know it, we can think it". (Thilly : History of Philosophy, pp. 407-408). What is a pious sentiment in the Critique of Pure Reason is metamorphosed into a fact in the Critique of Practical Reason. Here he establishes his God, his soul on moral ground. The practical or the moral sense demands perfect coincidence between virtue and happiness, vice and pain, which unfortunately is not very often the case in the world we live in. Hence there is the necessity of postulating a supreme moral governor, who makes the above coincidence possible in the life to come hereafter, if not in the present life, and who, because of his omniscience and omnipotence, is indeed God Himself. On the very same ground, freedom of will and the immortality of the soul⁴ are equally guaranteed. Guarantee or no guarantee, the unknowability of the metaphysical reality or realities, as per findings of the Critique of Pure Reason, is a settled fact ; and no amount of emotional proclivity or volitional urgency can prove it otherwise. The result is that there is an automatic reversion to phenomenalism over again putting up arguments in favour of the empirical origin of the

⁴ For detailed discussion, see Appendices III & II.

so-called innate ideas of the rationalists and the categories of Space, Time, etc., of Kant. But if the Space, for example, is only a conception created out of touch-cum-muscle feelings (impeded and unimpeded), if Time is but an idea, born out of the experiences related to memory and expectation, if the idea of Substance is formed by the repeated experiences of togetherness of certain sensations and lastly if Causality is but the invariable, immediate and unconditional event antecedent to another event and finally and, in brief, if the empiricists' attempt at bringing the elements a priori down to those a posteriori in a knowing-situation by furnishing an empirical explanation of the origin of the innate notions as also of the categories of Space, Time, Substance, Causality, etc., succeeds, the subject as opposed to the object or mind as opposed to matter is instantaneously reduced again to the status, similar to that of the *Tabularasa* of Locke or the epiphenomenon or the by-product of the old materialists. Here again the old problem crops up. Can *sensa*, of themselves, make up what we call knowledge? Evidently, they cannot, unless referred to something like a subjective ego, which utilises them in the formation of knowledge. Subjective contribution is as vital as objective impressions. Besides, the arguments put forward by the empiricists in support of the sense-experiences being the father of the categories, if scanned carefully, reveals a truth contrary to their contention. In fact, they appear to have assumed previously what they propose to prove subsequently. Repeated experiences of the co-presence of certain sensations may look for similar co-presence of the said sensations in future, but not anything other than that. The idea of a substance

behind them is added by the mind to them. It is a pre-supposition in, and not a creation of, the sensations, standing in relation of togetherness with one another. Similar results we arrive at in respect of the remaining categories like Causality, Space, Time, etc. They are equally anticipations and not creations of sense-data. In short, "Empirical truths are without necessity, they are accidental propositions . . . universal and necessary propositions cannot be derived from the senses ; they have their seat and origin in mind^a itself," or in what is otherwise called reason. Spencer's doctrine of the hereditary transmission of acquired powers attempts a compromise between the two. In us, in the present generation of the human race, the categories are innate and a priori. But our forefathers in the remote past acquired them through sense-impressions in the manner, stated above. What was a posteriori to them is a priori to us. This theory of extended experiences or evolutionary empiric-

^a The traditional empiricists, dependent as they are on sense-perceptions, as the only source of knowledge, end their philosophy in what is called Sensationalism, Phenomenalism, Associationism, etc. Whatever be the name given to the self-same theory, the sensations, by nature discrete and disconnected, one with the other, cannot, of themselves, form into what we call knowledge. Knowledge to become what it is demands some notions not derivable from sensations. They are presupposed in, and not born of, sensations. The notions like space, causality, etc., give shape and cohesion to the otherwise shapeless and chaotic materials, supplied by the senses. They naturally, therefore, come from a source other than the senses. And there is a class of thinkers, called Rationalists, who believe that these notions are supplied by the mind. The extremists among them go to the opposite extreme by holding reason as the only source of knowledge. If permanence and immutability are the *sine qua non* of the truth that knowledge reveals, sense-experience can have no access there. What the senses furnish is changeable from man to man, place to place and time to time. The

ism, advocated by Spencer and his followers, means no improvement on the situation. The question is not about time, but about how knowledge is formed, be it in the past, in the present or in the future. Mere antiquity or the theory of extended experience cannot save the situation, nor can it work wonder ; and the criticism that is levelled against empiricism as a theory, can equally be brought to bear, *mutatis mutandis*, upon Spencer's theory of evolutionary empiricism with equal force. In fact, left to itself alone, empiricism, evolutionary or non-evolutional, cannot create knowledge, nor can mind alone do it. Kant is right when he says that in knowledge-making, the mutual co-operation between the subject and the object is an indispensable necessity. But he fails to give a proper account of how this co-operation is possible and how it happens. When the impressions come from the world (unknown) and the categories come from within the mind (equally unknown) and when both are, because unknown, alien to each other, none can, on that account, yield to the demand of the other. Interplay between the parties concerned necessitates, in all cases, some sort of affinity somewhere and somehow between

very same phenomenon, under different perspectives, appears differently to different persons, and even to the same person at the different moments of his life. The extraordinarily tall man is a dwarf in the vicinity of an elephant. A beautiful face is less beautiful, when compared with a more beautiful one. What it actually is, no sense-experience can vouch for. For the knowledge of the reality or what is permanent and changeless in the midst of the changes, the help of reason has to be sought for. The reason supplies the innate ideas of God, soul, the categories, scientific and mathematical axioms, etc., that have got universal appeal and that furnish the clue to the knowledge of the reality or realities, as the case may be. The key to the secrets of Truth lies with reason and reason alone.

the two. When a baby plays with a doll, they are, in terms of material bodies, related to each other. Similarly, the creation of a poet or an artist thrills human sentiment not because of its artistic excellence as such, but because, as an offspring of the mind, it touches human soul at its core. One is, at the level of the mind, identical with the other. So in the art and science of knowledge-making, although Kant fails to recognise it, the subject and the object, the supplier of the categories and the producer of the impressions must be, at bottom or in essence, identical with each other. Unlike the traditional materialists and the idealists who find their reality respectively in matter and spirit and who convert mind into matter and matter into mind, the modern neo-realistic thinkers find this identity in the neutral entities which are neither matter nor mind, but which are objective, all the same, as opposed to what is called subjective. For them consciousness, like physical objects, is out there in the physical environment and is open to general observation. There is nothing subjective about it. Consciousness and its objects are made up of the same elemental stuff which, in one relation or grouping, is mind and, in another, matter. Consciousness in fact is the totality of the objects at the cross-section, illuminated by what they figuratively call the mariner's searchlight or, in other words, responded to by the nervous organism of a living body that speaks, simultaneously, both for the subject and the object alike. Within the subsisting universe, a mind or consciousness is a class or a group of entities ; so the physical object is another class or group. By identifying the subject with the object, the self with the not-self, the radical neutralists are making approximation

towards Behaviourism. Holt, an American realist, unreservedly declares that "Behaviourism will be able to give a complete account of cognition without invoking the services of the metaphysical subjects or any of its swarming progeny of egos". (The Freudian Wish, pp. 176-177). With the elimination of essential distinction between the knower and the known, much of the epistemological hurdles that centre round the theory of cognition ceases to vex the neutralistic-cum-behaviouristic thinkers to a considerable degree. But it is a kind of the cessation of vexation, for example, of a dead body that no more troubles the disembodied soul. It by-passes some of the important aspects that are inextricably associated with the theory of knowledge. The notion of an I or an Ego in a knowing-situation is something more than what the cross-section illuminated by a searchlight can fully account for. The searchlight too, indicating only a response of the living organism, guided by the same physical laws that govern the objective world, can hardly speak for the subject that knows the object. There is nothing wrong in the contention, we believe, that the subject and the object are at bottom the same, provided of course the subject, for that, is not denied a distinctive existence or identity apart from and independent of the object of which it is the subject. In no case can this be brought down to the level of the object. In equating the knower with the known, the neutralists and the behaviourists have virtually shelved for good the epistemological problems, associated with the theory of knowledge. There are, however, some neo-realistic thinkers, say for example, Moore, Russell and mainly Alexander, who are in favour of the retention of mind in some

form or other in the scheme of realities. Although out and out object-dependent, the subject, according to them, has, nevertheless, a unique status of its own not completely definable in terms of the object that the subject cognises. The searchlight theory of mind, in a sense, points to this direction. With a view to retaining the sanctity of mind and, as a matter of fact, of object too, they go so far as to affirm that in knowledge there is no mental representation of the object in the subject, nor does the object, for its existence, depend, in any way, on being known by a mind. In spite of the subject-object relation in a knowing situation, the relations are as much independent of one another as they are of the terms (subject and object) they relate. In short, the terms are external to one another ; so the relations too are to one another and to the terms that they are supposed to relate. In this respect, the neo-realistic thinkers in Great Britain and America are indebted to, and greatly influenced by, the theory of knowledge, as propounded by Prof. G. E. Moore. He disproves the contention, as in the Berkelian formula, of 'Esse is percipi'. For him, there is an essential difference between the awareness as such and its objects, In fine, awareness makes no difference to the object aware of. It is outside consciousness and remains as it is, whether aware of or not. Similarly, consciousness also exists apart from the object of which it is conscious. It does not lose its purity or sanctity in a knowledge-situation any more than being only conscious of the object which, in all cases, is independent and outside of consciousness. The sensation of something blue or red is always different from the object or 'something' of which blueness and redness are but colours. The object, as

the Idealists contend, is no part of consciousness. The one is independent of the other. As soon as, for example, the object is removed from its presence, there remains only unalloyed consciousness and no awareness of 'blue or red'. The purity or unalloyedness of mind, susceptible to no affectation by the object of which the mind is aware, has more elaborately been dealt with by Prof. S. Alexander in his theories of Contemplation and Enjoyment. The contention of the directness of perception of the object without the intervention of any representative idea in between the subject and the object which, for the neo-realistic thinkers, is at once a promise to fulfil and a problem to tackle, has more systematically been discussed and given a shape by Alexander in the aforesaid two theories. In a knowing-situation, he believes, the mind and the object stand in the relation of compresence or togetherness with each other. There is nothing unique about it that may deserve special sanctity. It is just the same kind of relation that exists between any two objects, say, the table and the chair, the book and the pen, etc. They are thoroughly independent of each other. None affects the other any more than being simply close to each other in the relation of togetherness with one of the terms so related, viz., the subject, having unlike the other, the quality of consciousness, or to be more accurate, being consciousness itself. Another name for compresence or togetherness, when referred to the subject, is contemplation. The act of mind, when directed to the object, is contemplation and the very same act, when considered apart from the object, is enjoyment. In a knowing-situation, the mind contemplates the object and in so contemplating enjoys itself. There is no know-

ledge, therefore, except through the combination of the two. "These are no two separate mental acts, one of enjoyment and one of contemplation. The mind, in enjoying itself, has before it and therefore contemplates, the object. Contemplation is the name of the same act of enjoyment, only in reference to the object," (See S.T.D., Vol. I, p. XIV). Whatever Alexander might have stated about enjoyment and contemplation, the fact that stands out conspicuous and noteworthy is that the contemplation, by itself, being only a fact of togetherness between the subject and the object can yield no knowledge. Similarly enjoyment too, being purely subjective, can have nothing to do with the object that is assumed to be thoroughly unrelated to it.

Related or unrelated, the mind, strictly in conformity with Alexander's principal assumption that in knowing the known is, in all cases, non-mental and independent of the knower, cannot know or enjoy itself or mind as mind. As an object of knowledge, it becomes as non-mental as other objects are. The result is that there is either no mind and even if there is any, that can neither cognise nor can itself be cognised. In all fairness, it is as good as non-existent. Neo-realism eventually, therefore, lapses either into old Materialism or into what is known as Behaviourism. Phenomenalism fails because it can no where find out an ego that ties up the otherwise discrete and the fleeting phenomena into a coherent system of knowledge. Mentalism errs when it ignores the world of matter by converting matter into the ideas of a mind, particular or universal. Kant anticipates and rather finds the thing-in-itself out ; but he fails to recognise it because of the stupor of phenomenology that over-

powers him. What Kant fails to catch, Hegel grasps. For him, thought and being are identical. The distinction between the essence and the appearance, the inner and the outer, the mind and the body, God and the universe and so on leads to arbitrary and false abstraction. God (Idea) without a second beside Him manifests Himself, through a process of evolution, in the world of matter, life etc., till at last it reaches the stage of human-consciousness, when and where God attains self-consciousness. What is true of the self is true equally of the not-self. The categories of Space, Time, Causality etc., are both subjective and objective alike. There is nothing like the subjective imposition on the objective world of something that is foreign to it. In fact, there is no imposition at all. Only the like can know the like. God as mind knows God as matter and that through a process of dialectic rationalism, ending finally in the intuitive and mystic vision of the oneness of God and man, of the Absolute and the universe.

(B)

THE METHOD OF APPROACH TO REALITY*

The awareness of the sources of knowledge alone will not do. Proper utilisation of the sources for the realisation of the end in view necessarily calls for the adoption of a certain kind of ingenuity or method, tapping the sources, regulating the processes and finally ending in the attainment of the goal. Philosophy as a speculative enterprise has a method of its own to follow. But there is no one method commonly supported by all philosophers. Broadly speaking, there are three kinds of method . . . Faith, Reason and Intuition. The first one relates to the first awakening of human consciousness to the problem of the existence of something permanent in the midst of what is impermanent. The world, as it appears before the senses, is a cinema-show changing in colour and form every moment. Something behind the show that does not change is sought for. The method employed to get at it is a simple faith, as in mythology, in the existence of gods and goddesses conjuring up the show and yet themselves remaining unchanged and unchangeable or, in short, unaffected by the show. In the pre-historic days, the means and the end, the method and the objective are both shot through with poetry and fancy, that cater to the pleasurableness of sentiment but not so much to the reasonability of the reason. But sciences, physical or metaphysical, insist on reason and not on sentiment, that is by nature blind and hence non-

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dependable. Dogmatic acceptance of this or that element of nature as the permanent substratum behind the ever-changing appearances of the world marks the beginning, however vague, of the employment of reason as a method in the quest of the Ultimate and the Fundamental. The assumption of Water by Thales as the matrix of all existences on the pretext or in consideration of moisture forming the essence of what constitutes life, or of Air by Anaximenes, more or less, on similar grounds (to quote a few among many) furnishes instances of Reason taking up gradually the roll of the method, employed in the fields of philosophical investigations. Coming just immediately after the mythical period, the method of reason, as employed by the Ionian philosophers, is intermixed with bits of mythical faith, as is evident in their belief in the automatic transformation of one substance into another, nature herself, as Aristotle tells us, being looked upon, by these philosophers, as alive. The history of philosophy is hence-forward the history of the use of reason as a method in a variety of manners in various kinds of the development of philosophical Isms. In the theory of Phenomenalism that reduces the world of matter and mind into so many heaps of passing phenomena, the reason is just like the link, furnished by the laws of Association, that ties up together the otherwise discrete sense-data, supplied by the senses. So is it, as in the case of Idealism and Spiritualism, a unifying principle, that ignores the phenomenon in preference to the noumenon, the appearance in preference to that which appears, the many in preference to the one. Both lead to the partial revelation of the truth. Kant's critical method yields no better result. The a priori and the a

posteriori elements, the outer and the inner contributions in a knowing-situation fail to get at the reality, as it is, and confine eventually Kantianism, like Humeanism, within the four walls of Phenomenalism. As a consequence thereof, the union between the two breaks down ; and there is an automatic reversion to the original status of outer experience and Inner comprehension as the two methods thoroughly independent of each other. The philosophies of J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, etc. are the typical illustration of the former method and its result. So are the philosophies of Berkeley, Bosanquet, etc., of the latter. These are again too greatly deepened so as to lose their original colour and shortcomings. New Realism is based on this new type of empiricism. So is New Idealism based on this New Rationalism. With the former, Analysis, based on observation and experiment, is the method that philosophy has to employ. "The essence of philosophy", says Russell, "is analysis and not synthesis." (*Mysticism and Logic*, p. 113). He says further, "my philosophy is analytic because it holds that it is necessary to seek the simple elements of which the complexes are composed and that the complex things presuppose the simple things whereas the simple things do not presuppose complex things." E. G. Spaulding defines analysis as "the discovery or possibly, the invention of parts . . . the parts of the whole analysed. (Holt and others: *The New Realism*, p. 155). This is exactly the method that, the neutralists believe, science uses and that may profitably be employed by philosophy as well for, philosophy differs from science only in range and not in spirit. This raises two questions demanding solutions. The one is in respect of the pro-

blem of whether or not the parts in their combination may make up an organic whole which, in all cases, is something more than the sum-total of the parts. The other is in respect of the feasibility of identifying science with philosophy or philosophy with science both in spirit and method. The answer to the first question is that the neo-realists, in their solicitude for the parts, easily ignore the efficacy of the whole and finally, by a process of division and elimination, bring in a position whence they find no way back to the whole. If the stray bones and flesh, however systematically put together, fail to make up an organism or produce life in them, no neutral entities or logico-mathematical concepts of the neo-realists, which are by assumption independent of one another and independent of the relations into which they enter, can bring into existence this world of life and mind. In the words of Dr. Evans, "the unqualified ultimates of New Realism are too abstract and thin to construct a rich and full reality." (D. L. Evans: *New Realism and Old Reality*, p. 112). Again, if the relation is altogether external to and distinct from the terms it relates, it requires, as Bradley points out, additional relations, on both sides, to relate itself with the terms, and as all relations are external, they require another set and so on ad infinitum. The result is that the terms are never related. (See Bradley: *Appearance and Reality*, p. 21). The defect of the analytical method of the neutralists has, to a considerable degree, been compensated by the method that S. Alexander, yet another neo-realistic thinker in Great Britain, employs in his philosophy. He defines the method of science not as analysis alone. To it he adds synthesis too. According to him, expe-

rience includes not only sensation but thought as well. "Sensations, though integral parts of experience, are not the only ones. Thoughts are experienced as much as sensations and are as vital to experience." (S. T. D., Vol. I. p. 5). Sensations minus thought are chaotic and thought minus sensations is a thought about nothing. It savours of Kantianism which it evidently is not. This thought is not an a priori element superimposed on the materials of the senses. It is a part and parcel of the very process of experience in which the one is always presupposed in and anticipated by the other. They go hand in hand and none is detachable from the other. Is this method of science competent enough to pry into the secrecies of philosophy? According to Prof. Alexander, it is for, he believes that the distinction between science and philosophy is not one of spirit but of range. Here the Professor seems to have fallen into an epistemological error of judgment. Science and philosophy differ from each other not only in range alone but in spirit as well. Conceptual thoughts, as in science, deal with what is dead and static; "when, however, they extend their operations to the world in which everything is moving, growing, becoming, living, they mutilate and falsify the real." Besides, like science Philosophy is no compartmental study that naturally ignores and fails to comprehend the spirit of the whole, for the whole, say for example, an organism is something more than the sum-total of the parts. Similarly, a limb detached from the living body is something other than what it is when related to the body. Philosophy deals with this inclusive whole in which nothing is left out or in which the phenomenon is as much important as the noumenon is.

It is concerned with the actual universe as actual and not with the universe as analysed. To philosophy, the reality is, as a matter of fact, given and not discovered through analysis. It cannot forget, like science, the irreducible difference that always exists say, for example, between one man and the other, or in other words, philosophy does not obliterate all differences and reduce the individuals to the level of its kind. On account of these differences, subsisting between philosophy and science, both in range and in spirit, philosophy must have a method of its own that is different from that of science. The method, involved in the study of the whole of an organism, is certainly other than what is necessary for the study of the detached limb for, in the former case, there is an additional factor, viz., life that has to be reckoned with. Science, on account of its partiality for parts, cannot give a satisfactory account of this new advent. The fact is that no method can go beyond itself. Science has no doubt achieved wonder within its own sphere by the application of its own method ; and philosophy may get wiser by the experiences as gathered by sciences in so far as they reveal the partial aspects of the reality, but to get the whole of it, which philosophy wants, it has to employ its own method, that may incorporate within itself the method of science, but is not, for that, one with it. It is intuition. Intuition is a sort of inner feeling, a kind of spiritual apprehension in which the knower and the known, the seeker and the sought, the lover and the beloved coalesce into one, for duality, however much thinned out, nevertheless, retains something private, something unknown in each of the polarities of thought. Bergson in the West and Sankara in

the East are the traditional upholders of this view with the difference that whereas, according to Bergson intellect or reason, based as it is on conceptual thought, deals with what is crystallized in death, for Sankara, on the contrary, intellect is just the fore-runner of the inner vision or a sort of preparation, for the individual self merging, as in intuition, its own identity, by way of realising its own self, in the ocean of the Supreme Self. "Siva Aham" or 'I am God' is what the intuitive vision or the divine sympathy makes the seeker of Truth feel like. This inner vision is often misunderstood by some thinkers for poetic imagination. The essence of the reality is no doubt more dynamic than static, more poetic than prosaic. In catching the reality in its flow, in its push onward, there is certainly something romantic about it, and to that extent, it is poetic no doubt. But if poetry means fancy, as opposed to fact, it is indeed a fact and not a fancy. The vision of truth is not like the vision of eyes, while in relation to the objects outside. It is something like entering into "the flow of life (reality) and living it." There is always an aura of mysticism all around it, that is amenable more to the romantic appreciation through emotion, than to the prosaic cognition of the intellect. The reality is "Abang Manasa Gocara", i.e., beyond the range of words and logical thought. Yet it is no negation but fulfilment or consummation of reason and even of uncritical faith. It does not so much annul as affirm them both. What is an implication in faith, an ideal in reason, is an actuality in intuition. The Vedantists believe that the knowledge of the basal reality (God) is not, at the first instance, obtained by reasoning, but by faith in the testimony of

the scriptures and the revelations of the seers. Lotze, an eminent western philosopher, opines that proofs given in favour of the existence of God are all "pleas put forward in justification of our faith," that is, as it were, an "obscure impulse which drives us to pass in our thought—as we cannot help passing—from the world given in sense to a world not given in sense, but above and behind sense." (Lotze: *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 8-9). The blind faith chastened by the exercise of the intellect finally ends in the intuitive vision of the Truth. Truly speaking, therefore, the method, employed in the study of metaphysics, begins with faith, passes through reason and culminates in intuition.

THE SUBJECT

The next problem that we take up for consideration is that of the subject that knows the object through the tapping of the sources and by the employment of the methods, dealt with in the last chapter. As is habitual with the big thinkers, individually and collectively, the philosophers give different interpretations in respect of the identity of the subjects or of what the subject in essence is. The 'Ism' they follow contributes substantially to the definition they give of the self. In the pre-historic age, when there was no Ism yet in vision and, when people used to live more on instinct than on reason, they had had a vague notion of what the ego in man is like. Spiritual or non-spiritual, they had a naive belief in the existence of some kind of entity that survives bodily death. The problem of wherefrom it comes and whereto it goes after the dissolution of the body does not concern them. Plato, for the first time in the West, has given a rational and philosophical interpretation of the origin of soul, its essence and its subsequent rehabilitation in heaven or star after the death of the body. Simultaneously with the World-Soul, analogous to the Mahat or Hiranyagarva of the East, God created lower gods and rational souls, the irrational or the bodily parts, susceptible to decomposition and decay, being created by these lower gods. The ethical and the religious excellences of the human self lie in how far it can cut away from and transcend the physical shackles and realise its purely rational nature in the contemplation of the Ideas in the Ideal world, away from the ravages of

time and space and from the world of matter. Failure in the consummation of this Ideal or in the upward movement to that direction leads to the opposite tendency of driving the souls, down the paths of lower and lower births, (transmigration) into the lower and lower animal bodies in consonance with the lower kinds of deed, done by the transmigrating souls, under the baneful spell of animality, that surrounds them. This theory of the transmigration of the soul, caused by deeds physical or mental, during one's life-time, as also that of its liberation or *mukti* through the culture of the right and proper type of knowledge, bear a striking similarity, although not in all respects, to the Karmavad of the Mimamsa philosophy, the Naya-Vaisesika and lastly the Sankhya philosophy of the Hindus. "As you sow, so you reap" is the gist of what Platonic philosophy in the West and the Karmavad of the Mimamsa philosophy in the East preach to the world. For them both, there are as many number of souls as there are individuals. Both believe in the emancipation of the soul from the bondage of the body and its return, as in Platonic philosophy, to its original abode the Star whence it came and, as in Mimamsa philosophy, to heaven through self-realisation, based on self-culture, good conduct and performances of the Vedic rituals and sacrifices. But on the question of the essential nature of the soul, they differ in their opinions. Like what Sankhya and the Vedanta philosophies teach, Plato's soul is all consciousness or reason, whereas for the Mimamsa and the Naya-Vaisesika philosophies, consciousness does not form the essence of the soul but is an adventitious quality arising out of touch or union with what we call matter, that exists independently of

the soul. Unlike Sankhyakara and like the Vedantist, Plato believes that essentially rational in nature, human soul partakes of the nature of the Universal Soul that is, for him, God and, for the Vedantist, Brahman. Again, of the different interpretations of the Vedanta philosophy, Plato appears to be more in agreement with Ramanuja than with Sankara, for the Ideal that he holds up for men in Ethics to follow is "to fly away from the earth as quickly as (he) can and to fly away is to become like God" and not God himself, and also for the reason that Plato does not, like Sankara, dismiss the world of matter as unreal or as a dream-land. The immortality of the soul, that is, its pre-existence or survival after death, is guaranteed in consideration of the fact that the soul, as a simple entity, refuses division or decomposition ending in death, as also of the fact that life, being a principle of spontaneity, cannot end in inactivity or death. Plato adds further to them, as a proof, the doctrine of the reminiscence signifying the presence of ideas or elements of knowledge in the soul prior to its birth. "All knowledge is reminiscence and all learning is reawakening". Sensations provokes ideas but do not produce or create them. Knowledge comes from within and not from without. The Pravakara School of Purva-Mimamsa proves the existence of soul, independent of matter, through the analysis of the facts of knowledge. In every act of knowing an object, the self is known as the subject that knows the object. Knowledge is self-revealing (Svayam-prakasa). When I feel pain, I am simultaneously conscious of the 'I' as the subject alongside the pain as the object that the subject feels. In fact, in knowing the object we are aware of the subject. They go together.

It is like Samuel Alexander's definition of self-consciousness as awareness of the awareness of the fact of the subject knowing the object. It is like I know that I know. In a knowing-situation, the awareness of the object and that of the subject are inextricably united together. According to the Pravakara school of Mimamsa philosophy, in every act of knowledge, there are three factors present, and they are the subject (Jnata), the object (Jneya) and lastly the knowledge (Jnana). In fact in a knowledge or in a knowing-situation, the self is as immediately known as the other two factors, viz., the jneya and the jnana are. But nevertheless, the subject is not, like the other two, an object of knowledge for as the knower, it cannot be known in the manner and in the sense the other two are. In knowledge the subject reveals itself as the knower and not as an object known. As different from objects that belong to or spring out of the world of objects, it does not perish with the disintegration of the body in death. The Jaina philosophy proves the existence of the soul with the help of uncontradicted perception. When we perceive the colour of an object, we perceive equally the substratum that bears the colour. In perceiving, in feeling the feeling of pleasure and pain, in remembering past events or sometimes in doubting a thing, we are simultaneously in perception of the subject, the ego that perceives, feels, remembers and doubts. Descartes's "Cogito Ergo Sum" or "I doubt, therefore, I am" agrees with and lends support to the argument, as stated above. The arguments, based on Inference, lends support, although indirectly, to the same contention, i.e., to the contention of the self-existence of the soul apart from and independent of matter. "The

body can be moved and controlled at will like a car and, therefore, there must be some one that moves and controls it. The senses of sight, hearing, etc., are only instruments, and there must be some agent who employs them. Again, there must be some efficient cause or producer of the body, because material objects which have a beginning are found to require some agent for shaping their material cause". (Dutta and Chatterji : An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, p. 108). A similar argument do we meet with in Aristotle's philosophy. "The body is an organon or an instrument ; instruments are intended for use, presuppose a user ; a soul is that which moves the body and fixes its structure." (Thilly : The History of Philosophy, p. 87). As for the essential nature of the soul, Aristotle differs considerably from Plato, his teacher. The soul is not all spirit but body too. The highest moral good for a man consists in self-realisation, which means the harmonious development of his body and mind alike. It is what Aristotle calls Eudaimonia constituting probably the roots of the term Eudaemonism (Perfectionism) held out as a moral standard in the science of Ethics. But when he identifies again the human soul with the spark of the Divine mind, that is all reason and no matter, he appears to have, as in religion, ignored matter altogether and made man essentially one with God. The notion of the identity of man and God has been given greater emphasis on and a mystic interpretation in the philosophy of the Neo-platonists. Not to speak of perception and inference, even thought fails to catch at the Ultimate or make man feel his oneness with God. It is possible only in a state of ecstasy, when the soul transcends its material limitations, loses itself in

the Universal Soul and becomes one with it. It savours of Vedantism as interpreted by the thinkers of the Advaita school of thought. The aphorism like 'Tat tvam asi' (Candyogya Upanisad) or 'That thou art' is expressive of the same truth, as indicated above. The realisation of the self is identical with the realisation of God in him. So 'Atmanam biddhi' or 'know thyself' is the call made equally by the seers in the East as well as in the West to persons suffering from the agonies of life and death.

The modern era is an age of revolt against traditionalism against authority of any kind and in fact against all that is old. Nothing is taken for granted ; everything is tested, before acceptance, in the acid test of reason. There is something like the awakening of the spirit of reflection, of the quickening of the art of criticism in the air. Direct perception and rational thinking are given preference to faith and the so-called inner vision. To a few of these thinkers, the self or the ego is nothing but a name given to the sum-total of the series of sensations, bound up together by the forces of the Laws of Association. Mind is no substance that thinks, feels and wills, but is rather thinking, feeling and willing to the totality of which the name 'mind' is given. Mind is a name and not a reality, independent of the psychical phenomena or experiences. David Hume, the strongest of the supporters of the above theory says, "When I enter intimately upon what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself, at any time, without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception". A similar attitude in respect of the nature of the self is taken by an

eminent modern philosopher like W. James when he, in his *Text-book on Psychology* writes, "The consciousness of the self involves a stream of thought, each part of which as 'I' can remember those which went before, know the things they know, and cares paramountly for certain ones among them as 'Me' and appropriates to these the rest . . . the thoughts themselves are the thinkers", (pp. 215-216).

The thinkers concerned appear to have presupposed or taken for granted what they propose to explain. In saying 'I stumble on some perception', Hume appears to have already been in the possession of the awareness of 'I' or have anticipated the consciousness of the self before he feels like stumbling against the percept. Likewise each part of thought of William James is recognised as such only because there is the 'I' or the self already in existence there to recognise the part as part, or as an object that the 'I' as the subject knows. The thing is that self-consciousness is presupposed in and not born of sensations or perceptions. The Laws of Association and sensations, unless controlled and guided by some spiritual principle existing prior to the sensations, are so many mechanical factors that, blind as they are, cannot, in their combination, make up what we mean by 'Ego' that, besides knowing itself as existing in the present, anticipates its presence in the future and recollects its existence in the past. An orthodox empiricist like J. S. Mill has himself been constrained to admit that "There is a bond of some sort among all the parts of the series which makes us say that they were the feelings (sensations) of the same person throughout and this bond constitutes the ego". To go contrary to this presumption or to iden-

tify the soul with the cluster of sensations is equivalent to falling into the error or fallacy of substituting the abstract for the concrete, the appearance for the real. Similar error, although from a different standpoint, as we have already discussed in Chapter II, has been committed by the neutralistic thinkers for whom both mind and matter are made up of the same elemental stuff called the neutral entities. By identifying the subject with the object, the self with the not-self, the neutralists make steady approach towards Behaviourism and finally, in the words of Dr. Evans, "reduce human activity to two factors, stimulus and response and interpret both of these factors in terms of empirical science". (Dr. D. L. Evans: *The Journal of Religion* IV, p. 348). Both of these factors, guided as they are by the mechanical and blind forces, cannot account for the phenomenon of consciousness, and far less for the fact of self-consciousness that, as seen above, is presupposed in every kind of knowledge and not a resultant of the processes thereof.* Prof. Alexander's identification of knowing with self-knowing yields no better result, although in his own way, he retains the subjectivity of the mind independent of the objective world. When perceiving is knowing and knowing is self-knowing, even the animal world is endowed with self-knowledge. Reflective thought is, in that case, no prerogative of man alone. Self-consciousness is a fundamental fact that, in all cases, is an antecedent and not a consequent of the processes of consciousness as in cognition, emotion and volition. It reveals itself through them but, in itself, is always *sui generis*. Metaphysically considered, the self-consciousness in man indicates a unity

* See page 25.

in the midst of plurality or a self which, although working in and through the mental states and processes, is not, for that, merely the sum-total of them all, and which is, in the ultimate analysis, identical with the Universal Self or God. The logical Idea of Hegel manifests itself in and through a process of evolution in nature and finally in the consciousness of man when and where it turns back to its own manifestations and by contrast thereto, becomes self-conscious. Self-consciousness or subjectivity in man is virtually the self-consciousness and subjectivity of God through the instrumentality of man. Man is, therefore, both human and divine, at the same time. The divinity or the spirit in him makes him God and the flesh makes him man. The combination of the two . . . the Purusa and the Prakriti, the soul and the body . . . make up what we call the Jivatma^a in man to which alone the attribute of subjectivity in relation to its objective counterpart is ascribable. To the Purusa and, as a matter of fact, to the Purusattama on whom the Prakriti has had no hold, nothing can be attributed. The Paramatma whose spark human soul is, is all perfect and as such is in want of nothing. Yet through the Jivatma, partaking both of the spirit and the prakriti, the Paramatma or God thinks and is thought of, feels and is felt, desires and is desired. The Jivatma and the Atma are, as it were, two birds living in the same tree (body). The former participates in the world-drama and the latter is only an observer thereof, undisturbed or unaffected by

^a The Hindu philosophy makes a distinction between the Atma and the Jivatma, the soul and the ego. The former belongs to and is rather one with Brahman; the latter is an emergent arising out of the combination of Purusa and Prakriti or the soul and the body.

the show. The former eats the fruits of the tree and the latter simply watches him so doing. The one suffers and enjoys for all his misdeeds and deeds, and the other is beyond all suffering and enjoyment. Yet when the former feels his identity with the latter, which essentially he is, he goes beyond the clutches of Prakriti and is consequently above all agonies of birth and death. For him, there is no world, no subject, no object, but only Brahman or the Absolute with which he is one. The subject-object polarities exist for Jivatma and not for the Atma that is identical with the Paramatma.

Da suparna sajuja sakshaya,
Samanong brikshayong parisasyajate,
Tayoranaya pippalong swadatya,
Nasnonanyo avicakasiti.1

Samane brikshye puruso nimajnoha,
Nisaya sochati muiyayamana,
Yustong jada pasyatyanyamisam,
Aaisa mahimanamiti bitasoka.2

(Mundakopanisad, Chap. III, Sloka, 1 & 2).

দ্বা সুপর্ণা সমুজ্জা সখায়ী

সমানং বৃক্ষং পরিষস্বজাতে ।

তয়োৱন্যঃ পিপ্পলং স্বাদত্যা—

নশ্ননন্যো অবিচাক্ষীতি ॥ ১

সমানে বৃক্ষে পুরুষো নিমগ্নোহ

নীশয়া শোচতি মুহমানঃ ।

জুষ্টং যদা পশ্যত্যন্যমীশম্

অস্ম মহিমানমিতি বীতশোকঃ ॥ ২

(মুণ্ডকোপনিষৎ Chap. III, Sloka 1 & 2).

(D)

THE OBJECT

The nature of the object in a knowing-situation corresponds considerably to the nature and scope of the source and the method of knowledge. The limits of the knowability of the knower determines substantially the colour of the object, he knows. In days when no epistemological problem struck human mind, the naive thinkers believed in the senses as being the only sources of knowledge, and the object perceived as being just what it appears to perception. Knowing makes no difference to the being of the object known. The object remains what it is, independent of its being known or unknown by a mind. The subject has no contribution to make towards the making of the nature and essence or existence of the object. Innocent of all philosophical speculations, the problem of how to account for the objectivity of the illusory vision of the rope for a snake did not occur in the mind of primitive men. It is an effect as well as a symptom of the growth of reason in man. Locke, for the first time, makes a distinction between the object as it actually is and as it appears to be or, in other words, between the reality and its appearances. The perception of impenetrability and extension speaks for what the external object in actuality is. These are the primary qualities of the object: colour, taste, smell, etc., are all secondary qualities and are mind-dependent. The primary qualities inhere in and form the essence of the

object, and the secondary ones are occasioned by the object in the subject through the mechanical display of the physical forces that have nothing like secondary qualities about them. Yet they impress these qualities on the mind of the observer. The sound is only air-waves, themselves soundless, that produce sound in the mind of a man through the affectation of his auditory organs. Similarly, there is nothing like colour in the world outside. The ether-waves, themselves colourless, produce the sensation of colour in man when in touch with the requisite sense-organs, that is, the eyes. The external world (therefore) is . . . neither light nor dark, neither silent nor resonant, neither hot nor cold but (only) extended and impenetrable, for none can imagine an object that is neither extended nor impenetrable. The colour of an orange may come and go, but its impenetrability and extension must persist so long as its 'thinghood' exists. The beauty of a face may appear differently to different persons . . . to the one it is more, to the other it is less beautiful and yet to the third, it may not be beautiful at all. But that it has length, breadth and thickness cannot be denied by any of them, for to deny them is equal to the denial of the very existence of the face as such. This theory is supported, besides Locke, by thinkers like Reid, Hamilton, etc., who belong to the Intuitionist school of thought that is generally known by the name of Scientific Realism, as opposed to Naive or Popular Realism of men on the street.

Whatever be the difference between the primary and the secondary qualities, the one thing that cannot escape the attention of an intelligent observer is that, in either case, what the perceiver perceives is a mental represen-

tation of the object perceived and not the object as it is and that again through the senses none of which can have any special privilege of getting into direct touch with the reality or the object, bereft of mental representations. The tactual sense-organ, supposed to have touch with the primary qualities, is as good or as bad as the other sense-organs are. The primary and secondary qualities are both sense-dependent and explainable in terms of the external forces and nervous responses. Both are, in the ultimate analysis, neural complexes appearing as mental. In the words of Dr. Paulson, "The distinction between primary and secondary qualities cannot be adhered to. Extension, solidity, motion are no more absolute qualities of things than colour and sound. The same arguments that lead us to refer the secondary qualities to the subject compel us to assume the subjectivity of the so-called primary qualities. We get our ideas of them from the same source . . . the perception." (Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 346-347). Here the philosophical thoughts stand at the cross-road whence they may take to any of the two paths leading either to the realistic or to the idealistic interpretation of the object as also of the subject of knowledge.

A futile attempt at the direction of a compromise between the two (Realism and Idealism) was, however, made by Kantianism. The object of knowledge is not mind-dependent, nor the subject, for its existence is dependent upon the object. Yet in a knowing-situation, each supplements the other. The non-sensuous or the metaphysical object that supplies the materials of knowledge, by nature chaotic and devoid of any epistemological significance, or the ontological subject that supplies

the forms or the categories of thought for the systematisation of the above raw materials into the facts of concrete knowledge remain both, in their turn, ever unknown and unknowable. The result is that, for all practical purposes, there is no subject or no object as such, for the quality of existence is not ascribable to anything that is not known and that cannot be known in future. Hence for Kant, all knowledge is confined within the four walls made up of phenomena on the one hand and categories on the other. This is Humeanism under a different garb and name. For Hume, there is no substance, physical or mental ; the world is the mixture of the *sensa* put into shape by the Laws of Association. It is beyond one's wit to understand how the blind *sensa*, of themselves, with or without the assistance of equally impurposive laws can evolve a world, full of meaning and value for a subject, that is itself a creation of the above *sensa* and the laws, and that, nevertheless, deciphers its meaning and appreciates its values. Logically therefore, Kantianism like Humeanism ends in chaotic phenomenalism in which both the subject and the object lose their identity.

New Realism, as a philosophical doctrine, reduces the secondary qualities into the primary ones and denounces, at the same time, both matter and mind as the ultimate reality out of which the universe evolves. It gives a death-blow both to Materialism and Idealism alike. Still in its attitude, it is more objective than what the orthodox Materialism is. The object and, as a matter of fact, the subject too are made up of the same elemental stuff which, because it is neither mind nor matter, is given the name of neutral entities. None can define

what the stuff in actuality is. In the opinion of Bertrand Russell, it is, so to say, substanceless and contentless and is yet not a vacuum. It is given the name of neutral entity only to meet the demands of ordinary men who cannot think except in terms of some entities. By identifying or equating the subject with the object, New Realism paves way to Behaviourism that eventually retains the objectivity of the object rejecting, simultaneously, the non-physical or spiritual subjectivity of the subject by mechanically interpreting the same as an act of response, made by the nervous system, as a whole, to the stimuli coming from the object outside. Opposed to it, Idealism, as in the philosophy of Berkeley, goes to the other extreme of merging the primary into the secondary qualities and thereby defining the object of knowledge or the *sensa* as so many ideas in the minds of man and finally in the mind of God. For Berkeley, there is no extra-mental reality, all percepts being ideas in mind. For him, *Esse* is equal to *percipi*, or to exist is to be perceived. The objects, not perceived by a particular mind (and no particular mind can perceive all things and that for all time) are the contents of, or ideas in, The Divine Mind. "The Divine Mind perceives the world in its fullness or completeness and causes finite minds or spirits also to perceive certain portions of it." (Marvin : Introduction to Philosophy, p. 201). Here the object of knowledge not only loses its objectivity as something existing outside of mind, but is finally given the status of contingent existence. The existence of the world as a system of ideas in God's mind depends on His free choice. He may or may not think of the ideas and may exist without the world of objects. In short, His existence is

in no way dependent on the existence of the world, we live in. The objects, based as they are on the whimsicality, be it of the human or The Divine Mind, fail to inspire any genuine thirst for the attainment of the knowledge thereof in a rational mind. Hegel demurs or objects to this theory of the objective world as also of God. For him, both are inseparably related to each other. Both in their combination form an organic whole in which none can be left out, although in all cases, it should be remembered that the object is subordinate to the subject or the nature to God. If God stands for the life-force, the world represents the body. None can imagine life except in a body or a lifeless body that defies disintegration. Mind and matter, God and nature are but one reality ; and the reality, as a whole, is a living, developing process. Considered from the standpoint of temporality, The Idea or God is the "potential universe", gradually manifesting Itself, through the process of evolution and dialecticism, in the forms of matter, life, etc. It is at the stage of human mind, when reached, that the Idea looks back to its own manifestations or creation, that is, to the world of objects by contrast whereto the mind (geist) becomes a self-conscious subject, perceiving and thereby knowing the universe as the object of knowledge. God is both the subject and the object at the same time. He is both within man and outside there in the world of matter and life. The self, as the subject, knows its own self as the object. The categories of Substance, Space, Time, etc., as also the qualities (Primary and Secondary) are both subjective and objective at the same time. "The forms or categories of thought which logic evolves are identical with the forms of reality.

They have both logical and ontological or metaphysical values." (Thilly : The History of Philosophy, p. 471). The categories of the subjective thought are likewise the categories of the objective universe. "Thought and being are identical." (Ibid, p. 465). And as like can know like, the subject can know the object as it is. Kant errs when he differentiates the knower from the known, the subject from the object and "splits up reality into essence and appearance, inner and outer, substance and attribute, forms and its expressions, etc., and gives us nothing but false distinctions and arbitrary abstractions." The fact is that the subject and the object, the inner and the outer are both identical reality, and as there is a subject, as shown in the last chapter, there is an object too in a knowledge-situation ; and both being born of the same fundamental reality—The Idea, there is no difficulty involved in the cognitive or other relationships subsisting between the two, that is, the subject and the object.

(E)

JUDGMENT, CONCEPT AND INFERENCE

It is abundantly clear from what we have seen in the last three sections that a fact of knowledge, when analysed, reduces itself into three parts, viz., the subject, the object and a relation that relates the two extremes. Logically put, it is, as a whole, a judgment consisting of a subject, a predicate and a copula that binds them both together. In logic the two extremes . . . the subject and the predicate . . . are each called a term or a concept, getting united with each other in a judgment. Now the question is as to which one of the two, viz., the judgment or the concept comes first or, in other words, which one of them forms the unit or the atom of knowledge. The answer is both in the affirmative and in the negative. According to thinkers like Locke and others of his way of thought, the atoms of knowledge are the concepts or the general ideas.⁷ Conceiving or ideation comes prior to judging. Men think in terms of general ideas or terms. There is first the awakening of a notion, for example, of a general idea of Man by reference to which the individuals like Ram, Shyam, Jadu, Madhu, etc.,

⁷ Not to speak of general idea to which the term concept is given, the particular idea too, psychologically considered, is, in a sense, a general idea; a concept based on many past judgments. My idea of my friend Sushil is made up of, and a generalisation from, the percepts that I have had of him on different occasions, say for example, in different dresses—Bengalee, English, Burmese, etc.

are known like what they are. Had there been no general notion of man already present in the mind, each of the individual men, as stated above, would have each been a new phenomenon or a new case to tackle. According to others, the ideas or the concepts themselves, for what they are, depend on a good number of judgments, which have been made in the past and which are, therefore, prior to concepts. For Kant, "Judgment is the unit of knowledge". In a logical proposition (whose other name is judgment, while in mind) like 'man is mortal', the two terms man and mortal bear no meaning at the first instant. That man is man and not an animal is a kind of knowledge or a concept which arises out of various judgments based on analysis and synthesis, abstraction and generalisation, contrast and unification of the percepts of man, as a rational being, on different occasions in the life of the perceiver. Similar is the case in respect of the mortality of men, as stated in the above example. There are thus two opposite camps of thinkers supporting two opposite views, one giving priority to concepts and the other to judgment. To us, however, it appears that they are both partially right and partially wrong. Any kind of knowledge, at its start, is hazy and vague. In the words of William James, "It is one of big blooming buzzing confusion. That confusion is the baby's universe, and the universe of all of us still is, to a great extent, such a confusion". (Psychology, p. 16). It is not properly conscious, although not unconscious. It is the first reaction of an uncontaminated mind to the object of knowledge. It represents a state of consciousness that is very difficult to define. It is a state neither of consciousness nor of unconsciousness and far less non-

consciousness. It is somewhere in between the two, analogous to a situation subsisting between deep sleep and just awakening. It is indeed the unit of knowledge, if any unit is sought for ; and it is just an impression and is neither conceptual nor judgment-like. Thinking, as a cognitive function, is an incessant flow and never a stagnant pool. As a process, it always goes ahead. The vague awareness of a thing, as in a child and, as indicated above, gradually, by assimilation and differentiation of things of the similar and dissimilar patterns, assumes the colour of more and more vividness in tune with the process, as it advances. The more the thought moves on, the more of the general ideas, the concepts or the laws do men get and the more of the economy of thoughts, so very indispensable in higher intellection, do they obtain. The whole of the process, as shown above, of analysis and synthesis, of contrast and unification, is essentially the process of judging the thing or the object of knowledge in respect of its identity, differentiated from things or objects other than itself. And to that extent it may be stated that judgment precedes concept and that the concept follows the judgment.* Contrariwise, it may be said in favour of the concept also that, unless there are already in existence the concepts, that

* Whether or not the judgments are the atoms of knowledge, they have certain characteristics, deniable by none. They are (a) Necessity, (b) Universality, (c) Analysis and Synthesis.

(a) *Necessity* : Necessity necessitates recognition and affirmation of the judgment by the judgment-maker as also, he believes, by his follow-beings. Whenever a judgment is made, there is an automatic faith in the authenticity of the said judgment, else it fails to add to any knowledge which it must. Even when there is an erroneous judgment in respect, for example, of

form the subject or the predicate of a judgment or a proposition there can be no judgment as such. They may be, as stated above, very vague and hazy, but nevertheless, they are there ; else there can be no judgment. The fact is that they both supplement each other and no man can say as to which one, like points in a circle, precedes the other. They go together at least in the conscious realm of thought. Thought or intellection, as a conative urge, follows a process of evolution. It starts with undifferentiated and vague impressions, passes through judging and conceiving till at last it reaches the stage of inference wherewith it starts investigation into the realm of the unseen and the unknown, as opposed to what is seen and known. It is a process of continuity in which each stage anticipates the next one which is, as of necessity, potentially present in it. The simple judgment like, for example, 'Ram is a man' is the outcome or the result of a sort of inference indicative of a process from the known to the unknown, from the known fact of what man is to the till then unknown fact of Ram being a member of the species called humanity. Inference, be

the rope taken as a snake, there is still that sense of indisputably necessary existence of the snake until the illusion is off. Judgment is, in no case, a sheer imagining or a mental fiction. It has its existence, independent of the mind, adding to, and being in coherence with, the stock of knowledge that the judgment-maker is already in possession of. And knowledge means harmonious adjustment of the new information, conveyed through the judgment, with the old information (judgments) already in the mind of the knower as also of others. This points to the fact of enhancement of knowledge with the increasing number of judgments being made one after another. Any judgment, whimsically made, that does not fit in with the old setting of judgments, cast on the mental canvas of the judgment-maker, bears no characteristics of necessity and is, as such, by nature barren and unworthy of being called a judgment at all.

it deductive or inductive, has certain essential characteristics common to both : and they are assimilation, association and discrimination. Assimilation is based on the Law of Similarity whose utility in the science or art of reasoning or in inference is undeniable. A storm-tossed sailor gets frightened at the sight of cloud. The reasoning or inference behind it is like this : Once he suffered a ship-wreck in a sea, made wild by a storm, accompanied by clouds in the sky. The present patches of dark cloud remind him of the storm. Immediately he assimilates the cloud that he saw in the past with what he now finds on account of the similarity that obtains between the two and hastens to the conclusion, by way of inference, that this time too he might have to face a similar wreck. Next he associates with it the painful and the suffocating feeling that he had felt, while swimming in the storm-tormented sea. That is how and why he, by way of assimilation and association, infers a similar end and gets frightened at the sight of the patches of clouds in the north-west corner of the sky. On similar grounds and on the basis of the same kind of reasoning, a little boy will

(b) *Universality* : Judgment is no private possession. Privacy is the negation of universality. What is, of necessity, true is a truth for all. Necessity and universal consent go together. The judgment that is true for me is supposed to be true for all. To the extent a judgment is private, to that extent, it is out of joint with the common stock of human knowledge ; and knowledge is always beyond and above the limitations of individualism and subjectivism. For example, when a man makes a judgment to the effect that a particular flower is green, he believes, at the same moment, that all persons looking at it will find it green. The negation of it means that his judgment is wrong and that he has had no knowledge of the colour of the flower.

(c) *Analysis and Synthesis* : There is an element of analysis in the sense that, in every judgment, the subject and the predicate

not dare approach fire again, when once he has got one of his fingers burnt by it. Assimilation and association, although the chief ones, are not the only characteristic of reasoning or inference. Apprehension by differentiation has equally an important role to play in correct reasoning, that is supposed to be free from all errors. To refer to the above example, the said sailor, with the growth of experience and knowledge, makes an opposite inference in spite of the presence of the clouds, leading to the absence of fear, when he finds that he is in a weather-proof vessel, big enough to withstand the assaults of the storm. The boy too modifies his inference, as above, when he too finds that a finger soaked in icy-cold water does not instantaneously catch heat, when put into fire. No knowledge, gained through reasoning is, at any stage, final. It is always on the move forward, gaining greater and still greater perfection as it advances. Of the two kinds of logic, Deductive and Inductive, Deduction is a kind of reasoning that leads to a conclusion from one or more premises, the conclusion being, in no case, more general than any of the premises or the premises, taken together. In a syllogistic argument like 'All men are

are first differentiated from each other. Each of them is taken apart and understood separately before they get synthesised or united as parts of judgment, taken as a whole. It does not, for that, rake up that old problem of the terms coming prior or posterior to judgment. As discussed already, it is, at the start, just a vague and lump impression, say, for example, of the rose-green complex. The next step is the differentiation or separation of the subject, that is, of the content 'rose' from its attribute greenness and vice versa. The rose might have got another colour, say, redness. Equally, the colour greenness could have belonged to another thing or content, for example, the leaf of a tree. But here in the above example, 'The flower is green' we affirm greenness of a particular flower before us. Thus there are analysis

mortal, Ram is a man, therefore Ram is mortal', the conclusion 'Ram is mortal' is already included within the major premise 'All men are mortal'. Thus the conclusion, as stated above, is not more general than either of the premises or the premises taken jointly. Equally, in the case of Immediate Deductive Inference wherein the conclusion follows from one premise only, the conclusion is, as in a syllogism, anticipated in the premise. For example, the conclusion 'Some mortals are men' drawn from the premise 'All men are mortal' testifies to the truth of the above statement. Presently, it raises a question as to the efficacy or sufficiency of the deductive inference, mediate or immediate, as a method worthy of being adopted for the enhancement of human knowledge. If what comes as a conclusion is already present

and synthesis, differentiation and unification in each of the acts of the acquisition of a new knowledge, based as it is on judgment.

Identity in difference : The above statement brings in another problem for consideration and solution. Is greenness as predicate of the subject rose identical with the rose ? If so, the judgment 'the rose is green' is equivalent to saying that the green-rose is green. It is a case of sheer tautology, indicating no advancement in learning. So far as the judgment is concerned, the knower knows nothing new and the learner stands exactly where he was. On the contrary, if the attribute greenness is unrelated to and absolutely different from the rose, there remains no reasonable chance of one getting attached to the other. The result is that there is no possibility of the formation of a judgment with the terms (subject and predicate) being ever foreign and alienated from each other.

Unrelated things or terms can never be related to one another. A man is related, as in love, to an animal on account of the affinity they have on the level of their body. There are thus both identity and difference subsisting between the two. Similar is the case in a judgment. The subject and the predicate in a judgment stand simultaneously in the relation of identity and difference or, to be more accurate, of identity in difference. They are each different

in the premise or premises, there is no new information to add to the stock of knowledge that the seeker already possesses. Logically it leads to the fallacy of begging the question or *petitio principii*. According to Mill, this fallacy consists in taking for granted, overtly and covertly, the very fact that it proposes to prove. There is, therefore, no expansion of the vista of intellectualism.

Is this charge against deductive reasoning tenable ? Universal truths are always cryptically expressed in the form of a concept or a law. Its application to particular cases is, for the majority of people, something new to learn. For example, the geometrical enunciation like, 'Any two sides of a triangle are together greater than the third side' is for the average students too difficult a problem to understand and solve, unaided by a teacher. The fact is that there is not only necessity, but novelty as well in each of the deductive reasonings. There is necessity because the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. There is novelty for the conclusion goes beyond the premises. Mill makes a confusion between the enumerative universal proposition and the real universal proposition. The former is only the sum-total of the particulars for which it stands, whereas the latter is too general to refer to any particular case. The knowledge of a law does not warrant the knowledge of the particular facts to which the law is applicable. Mill's next

from the other, and yet because of their unity in a judgment, they are one ; and there, as a whole, they yield a kind of a new knowledge hitherto unknown to the knower. There is a new addition to the stock of knowledge that the knower already possesses. What is true of the process of thought, as is evident in a judgment, is equally true of the reality which is a unity in diversity.

argument against deductive logic is that men do not ordinarily reason from the universal to the particular ; but in almost all cases they infer from particular to particular. A child dreads fire only because he remembers the particular instance of his finger being once burnt in the past. From the recollection of that instance, the boy infers that in case he goes close to fire, it may again burn his finger. What is apparent is not always actual. Here in this case, the child certainly cannot think or infer that the fire that has once burnt his finger shall again burn it, unless he has already in his mind, subconsciously or unconsciously, an idea of something like a permanent and universal bond existing between fire and burning. Fire burnt in the past, burns in the present and shall burn in future. Until there is, however vague, the knowledge or the feeling of a law, a norm, valid equally in the past, the present, and the future, no man can predict anything on the basis of a particular experience. There is, as in the case referred to above, a tacit assumption, in the mind of the boy, of the law of causality connecting fire with burning for eternity. It is psychologically as also logically true, although in some cases, as in enthymeme, the premises (Major and Minor) jointly or singly or even the conclusion may be kept suppressed. Side by side with deductive (formal) reasoning, there is a kind of reasoning (material) that is known as Inductive Logic. It is a science that helps man, more than what the deductive logic does, in the investigation of the unknown through the known. There is actually a leap in the dark inasmuch as the conclusion arrived at in induction is, unlike that of deduction, more general than the premises taken separately or jointly ; and the premises, furnishing

instances or cases of investigation, may be of any number to suit the need of the investigator. Inductive logic examines the material and, for that, the formal validity of the premises and the conclusion by what we call observation and experiment and arrives at, by the application of some methods known as experimental methods, a universal conclusion that eventually occupies the position of the major premise in a syllogism. The more the syllogistic reasonings are made and found valid, the more is proved the validity of the conclusion arrived at in induction and the more the conclusion, originally a hypothesis, gets the chance of being promoted to the status of a theory, a law and finally of a fact. Induction supplies the major premise of deduction, and the latter repeatedly verifies the authenticity of the conclusion of the former. As such, they both supplement each other and help investigation into the world unknown through what is known.⁹ In due course, they lose their separate identities as two offshoots of the original source called Reason, and coalesce into what we may call Intuition, giving vision of the Truth as it is.

⁹ Further importance has, in modern age, been attached to Logic as a science by a band of thinkers generally known as Neo-realists. With them, it is no longer a science of correct thinking, but of being. It is a science other than epistemological and akin to what is metaphysical. And as being is prior to knowing, Logic is at the basis of and prior to all sciences.

(F)

TRUTH AND ERROR

Truth admits of different interpretations, epistemological and ontological, and is roughly divisible into theories of Correspondence, Pragmatism, Coherence and Identity. Correspondence reiterates the commonsense belief of the ordinary man on the street in the exactitude of what is perceived in the world outside. There is nothing like representations or phenomena lying in between the sensation and the sensed, the perception and the percept. What the senses perceive is not the representation of the object of perception but the object itself. The approach is direct. This naive belief of the naive man is upheld, for philosophical justification and proof, by the neo-realistic thinkers. Neo-realism, as a theory is, by profession, an advocate of commonsense realism and, at the same time, a revolt against transcendentalism and absolutism. C. E. Moore may be regarded as the father or the leader of this new movement. In refuting the contention of the idealistic thinkers, as summed up in their oft-repeated saying, viz., 'Esse is percipi', which means that to exist is to exist in mind, Moore takes the help of arguments, positive and negative, direct and indirect alike. "To have a mental image of an object is not the same thing as knowing the existence of an object." For example, when a man perceives a snake, the snake is certainly not in his mind but out there in the objective world, else he would not have run away for the safety of his life. Again, if an object has had no extra-mental existence, the poison, for example, would

not have killed a man or medicine cured him. To these positive arguments, Moore adds a negative one. "If what we know is not an object outside knowledge, but a content of knowledge then we cannot assert the independent existence of even knowledge or the self. For knowledge then cannot be shown to be separable from and independent of the knowledge of knowledge, and the self cannot be shown to be existing independent of the knowledge of the self. Not to allow the object its independence of the knowledge of it is, then, to deprive idealism itself of its own grounds. If idealism avoids the suicidal conclusion and holds that knowledge and self can exist independently of the knowledge of them, it must concede that other objects of knowledge also can exist independently of the knowledge of them. Thus unknown objects can also exist." (D. M. Dutta : *The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophies*, pp. 304-305). In the words of E. B. Holt, "everything that is, is and is as it is". (*The New Realism*, p. 359). If the object is independent of the subject, if knowing is knowing the object as it is, it means that in perception the perceiver is in direct touch with the percept or the object without in any way interfering with the nature of its existence. In the light of the observation, as above, even error and illusion must have their rightful places in the objective world outside. There are already in existence contradictions, in laws and facts, latent in the universe. These contradictions, independent of the subjective interference, causes the existence or subsistence of errors and illusions that are as amenable to human perception as the physical percepts are. The fact of a stick being seen bent, while in water, and straight when out of it, is ex-

plainable, Holt argues, in terms of different perspectives under different sets of circumstances. There is nothing like subjective imposition anywhere.

Perspective or no perspective, circumstances or no circumstances, the question that demands immediate answer is whether or not the same stick is simultaneously both bent and straight or, in other words, whether or not the stick exists both as bent and straight at the same time. To say 'yes' is to fall into the paradox of incongruity or contradiction. A thing cannot be both white and not-white, existent and non-existent at the same time. To say again 'No' is equal to going contrary to the neo-realistic contention of the non-subjectivity or objectivity of the reality, hitherto upheld by the neo-realistic thinkers. To avoid this difficulty, as it were, W. P. Montague, yet another neo-realistic thinker of great eminence, relegates error and illusions to the realm of subsistents. They are not real in the sense that they exist, but they, nevertheless, subsist in the world of subsistents. What is this realm of subsistents? As non-existent, it is unreal; and as unreal, it is neither, in essence, material nor mental, and is not definable by either of them. Yet the world of matter and mind, as the neo-realists believe, emanates out of it, for the neutral entities, the primordial stuff or the matrix out of which the world of matter and mind is made, belong to this realm. Does it not hint at the Hindu Idealism,¹⁰ where Brahman is neither *Sat* nor

¹⁰ "Na tatra Surya bhati, na Chandra Tarakam
Ne ma bidyuta vanti, kuta ayam Agni,
Tameba vantam anuvati sarvam,
Tasya vasa sarvam idam bivati."

—(Katopanisad, Chap. II, Sloka 15).

Asat and is, strictly speaking, indefinable and without any quality to be qualified with? Brahman is not *Sat* (being) for the *Asat* (non-being) cannot be anything outside of it. It is neither *Asat* on the similar ground. It is beyond the being and the non-being and yet entertains both within its fold. They are nothing independent of it, and are not yet identical with it. The indefinability or unrecognisability of the ultimate reality has, in all probability, led the pragmatic thinkers to the opposite extreme of assigning only utilitarian existence to truth or reality. That which acts favourably for a man is a truth for him ; that which does not is untruth. Thus there can be no fixed truth equally for all. Truth varies from man to man in accordance with his need, although common features in men may, under similar circumstances, lead them to the acceptance of some common truths. Nevertheless, truths have only relative existence and that too always in reference to the needs of man. Utility supersedes existentiality. A thing exists, for it serves some practical purposes of man, else it is as good as non-existent. Anything that is out of joint with the over-all interest of man is an error and the opposite, as stated above, is a truth for him. Although practice and applicability is the most useful test of the truth of a thing, it is not, for that, identical with the truth or reality, as it is. Verification is a means and not an end in itself. Tasting of sugar by tongue may indeed inform the taster of the truth of sugar as opposed to salt, but the nature

There no sun shines, nor the stars twinkle ; lightening does not illuminate it ; what to speak of fire ? Yet because of its light the universe is lighted, and because of its brightness, things are bright.

of sugar cannot, for that, consist in being so tasted. And here the pragmatists err. The subjective interpretation of truth, as is given by the pragmatic thinkers, gets its fuller implications implemented in the theory of Coherence. Coherence refers to the congruity of the elements of thought which, to the supporters of the theory, is, more or less, an organic system in which each of the parts depends on the whole, the whole too equally depending on the parts. Any part incongruous with the whole system, indicates a case of maladjustment and, as such, it is an error and has to be shunned. Any new idea, obtained, must fit in with the already existent stock of knowledge that is, by nature, a harmonious whole, else it is what we call an error. Truth thus pertains to thought with little reference to the object thought of. A man may build up a superstructure of truth on the basis of false materials, if only the materials, so utilised, are put one upon another in a proper and systematic manner. And here again we feel like saying, in tune with the pragmatists, that the truths are man-made, and not found out. What is true to one may not be true to the other because of the inherent differences between man and man as also their power of absorption of what is new with what is old, already in stock. Furthermore, what is true to a man today may be untrue to him to-morrow and vice versa. The fact of the sun moving round the earth was once a truth only to be replaced subsequently by another truth, viz., the earth moves round the sun. To say that Truth admits of degree is a misnomer and virtually a negation of Truth as it is. Truth is above all changes and fluctuations, for they mean death and annihilation ; and Truth is eternal. The notions of degree

and, as a matter of fact, of coherence, utility, etc., are meaningful with reference only to the seeker of the Truth, but not to the Truth as such, which is beyond all qualities and qualifications, although no quality or qualification can exist apart from or independent of it. To know the Truth is to steer clear out of these adjectives and feel one's identity with it. A thing is best known when the knower becomes, as it were, one with the known. A mother feels her identity with her child more than a physician does. Child's pain, therefore, is her own pain, while to the physician, it is only a physiological concern and a matter of diagnosis. In this sense, Correspondence, point to point, ending finally in the identification of the knower with the known, the lover with the beloved is equal to what we may call truth-realisation. Truth and the Truth-knower are identical. "Brahmavid Brahmaiva vavati." The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman himself. That which does not agree with what is Brahman in the East and the Absolute in the West is untrue, false and merely a phenomenon.

CHAPTER II

MATTER AND LIFE

(A)

MATTER

Now that the epistemological enquiry has proved, beyond doubt, that the human mind is capable of knowing the reality as it is, we may, therefore, begin profitably the study of metaphysics that bears different names, when looked at from different standpoints. Viewed from the standpoint of science which studies the universe compartmentally, metaphysics is the science of all sciences. As the compartments, into which the world is divided, are many in number, so the sciences are. The results that each of the sciences arrives at are naturally at variance with those of others. Metaphysics brings about a unification of them all with reference to their ultimate source . . . the reality that gives them sustenance and meaning. Again, if each of them, by itself, constitutes a branch of knowledge, otherwise called a philosophy, there are as many philosophies as there are sciences. Metaphysics, as the philosophy of all philosophies, like science of all sciences, is called the general philosophy. It is also called Ontology (onto = being and logos = discourse) for it is a discourse on the problems of being, the reality as it is, opposed to or different from what it looks like to the senses. Equally it is called metaphysics (meta = beyond or after and physics = the physical world) for it makes a search for the reality beyond the physical or the phenomenal world. The names are different but the named

is the one and the same, ever making attempt at the apprehension of the reality as it is. However much a man may feel proud of his spiritual heritage, as a child of the earth, he is matter first and spirit next. He has got to pass through the physical limitations even if he attempts the unlimited. So his first approach, in quest of the unseen beyond the seen, is to and through matter. By matter is meant the constituents of the physical world occupying space and enduring through time. They are the stuff with which the things of the world are made. Physical things, amenable to the senses, are unaccountably large in number and are in possession of qualities, traditionally known in philosophy, as the primary and secondary ones. The secondary qualities are variable by nature and, as such, do not stand the test of persistence and endurance in time which is the touchstone to test the reality of a thing. The colour or the taste of a thing fades away as time moves on. They appear, further, differently to different persons and to the same person at the different moments of his life. The differences in the case of colour are explainable in terms of the reaction of the sense-organs to the ethereal waves that emanate out of the object seen and dash against the visual nerves that produce the colour sensation in the visual centre of the brain. And in the case of taste, the chemical processes affect the nerves of the tongue and produce the taste sensation. In no case does the colour or the taste pertain to the essence of the thing seen or tasted. What persists permanently in physical things is, extension or occupation of space, big or small, besides impenetrability, an attribute that denies penetration. Things, as sensed by the senses, admit of change

both in shape and size. But the minutest particles of matter that permit no further change or, in other words, no further division, not only physically but conceptually as well, are called atoms. Like points, as in geometry, they have position in space, but unlike them, they have magnitude, that refuses further division. Historically considered, Dêmocritus,¹¹ a greek philosopher, is the father of the Atomic theory in the West, while in the East, Maharsi Kanad of the Vaisesika philosophy is his counterpart. Minus the respective differences in details, both believe in the atoms being uncreated and eternal. They can be arrived at by cutting down an object to smaller and still smaller pieces till at last no further division, even conceptually, is possible. In Vaisesika system, Akasa or space is described as an eternal and all-pervading substance whereas, with the Atomists in the West, it is what Perminides calls a non-being. To deny existence to space is to deny the possibility of motion and change. Yet it is not real in the sense in which the atoms are. They do not, it appears, identify existence with reality. Space simply exists without being real. They define existence in a general or in rather a very liberal sense and not in terms of corporeality alone. To persist is equal to exist. The hypothesis of a vacuum or space is an unavoidable necessity for the possibility of the movement of atoms which are, by nature, inert and motion-

¹¹ Philosopher like Aristotle and a few others believe that Lucippus was the originator of this theory. Democritus, his disciple, has only developed and given a shape to the theory, propounded by his master and taught in his school at Abdera where Democritus sat at his feet as a pupil and learnt philosophy.

less. Blind and impurposive forces, by their impact on the atoms, make them move about in the empty space. In course of movements, they come in contact or into collision with one another and finally and indeed quite accidentally evolve, in the long run, through action and reaction on one another, as also through a gradual process onward, a universe like what we live in. Everything is left to chance-happenings. From the nebulous or the indiscriminate gases right up to the advent of rational minds on earth, the blind forces and the equally blind atoms are at work. There is no question of why and how the world was created, if of course the term 'created' is permissible. It is created and is ever being created every moment, the Atomists believe, by the atoms and the natural forces working together, obviously with no purpose in view. Next to Democritus, the name that is inextricably associated with the Atomic theory (since A.D. 1808) is that of Dalton. According to him and the scientists of his way of thought, there are in all 92 kinds of elements, each of which is the resultant of the combination of their own atoms. These elements are distinguishable in respect of property and weight, the uranium being the heaviest and the hydrogen being the lightest. In between them, the remaining 90 elements are heavier and lighter, as the case may be, in comparison with one another. Atomism, as a theory, leaves everything to blind forces and chance-happenings and thereby exposes itself to certain criticisms, not easily controvertible. Materialistic philosophy has certain principles or axioms that the philosophers have to take for granted and follow without questioning. One of them is the theory of conservation of energy, which implies that the quantity of physical

energy, remaining always the same, one form of physical energy may only be transferred to another form of physical energy and never to anything non-physical. Consequently, therefore, nothing mental as opposed to what is material may arise out of the physical energy. Even if for argument's sake, we still admit that somehow or other mental activities arise out of the transformation of the physical energy located in the brain, there must be quantitative diminution of the said energy while the mind is at work, intellectual, emotional and volitional. But human experiences give an opposite verdict. The more a man thinks, feels and wills, the more there is the quantitative augmentation of the said energy in the brain. Given an epistemological twist to the same problem, the fate of materialism, as a philosophical theory, is worse still. The direct knowledge that a man gets is always of his mind or what is in his mind. He has had no touch with anything other than what is mental. What he knows of matter is known only as mental representation and not matter, as it is. If any priority, therefore, is ever to be given, it must be given to mind. In no case thus can matter explain mind. Attempts have been made by modern realism at the reduction of mind to a still more basal reality than matter. It is neither matter nor mind, but is, nevertheless, more objective and anti-spirit than what materialism itself preaches. Russell in England and his co-thinkers like Perry, Holt, etc., in America put forward a theory of neutral particulars, which subsist in the subsistential realm, and do not exist in the existential world and which, in certain relation or grouping, constitute what we call mind, and in another, matter that exist in the world of existence.

Matter and mind, being in essence identical, are both out there in the objective world. Thus consciousness is no distinctive subjective reality, but is only a particular grouping of objects, defined by the specific response of the nervous system, equally made up of the same objective elements. The mind is out there in the objects, in the cross-section, illuminated by the nervous system figuratively called the mariner's search-light. In the above sense, even the trees and the animals are also accredited with consciousness, for they too have nervous systems. But on account of the inferiority of their organisms, their consciousness is of inferior type. (See Holt : The Concept of Consciousness, Chap. X). The question of inferiority or superiority in respect of the nature of consciousness is of little significance since mind, as defined by the above thinkers, is, in the ultimate analysis, as objective as the material particles are. The fact is that by identifying the self with the not-self, the subject with the object, these thinkers have virtually reduced mind to the status of matter guided by physical laws in all its activities. Alexander's definition of mind as a higher emergent quality, distinguishable and different from matter, is indeed an improved one, compared with that of other realistic thinkers. But by identifying it, lock, stock and barrel, with the neural complexes in the brain and finally with the spatio-temporal contour, he has given a status to mind no better than that of the epiphenomenon or the brain-product of the orthodox materialists. And as such, the very same old problem of how what is non-mental can produce what is mental or how what is essentially non-purposive and blind can build up a world full of purpose and moral or spiritual excellences, naturally crops

up. And the arguments that are generally put forward against the materialistic interpretation of mind, based as it is on atoms on the one hand and blind forces on the other, are equally applicable against neo-realistic interpretation as well.¹² The concept of two independent existences . . . one of atoms and the other of forces, essentially alien to each other and yet working together so as to evolve or create a world as we know, appears repulsive and hence unacceptable to many of the modern philosophers of whom special mention may be made of Faraday, Thomson, Rutherford, etc. They eliminate one in favour of the other. They prefer force to atoms. Their's is called the dynamic theory as opposed to the static theory of Democritus and Dalton. For them, the atoms are not the indivisible and, at the same time, the simplest bits of matter. They are further divisible into what they call protons and electrons which, in themselves, are but clusters of forces. An atom is a centre of positively-charged electrical unit called proton round which one or more electrons or bits of negatively-charged electricity is or are moving with great rapidity.¹³ An atom is no longer a solid particle of matter. It is equal to electrical charges, positive (proton) and negative (electron). Matter is completely dematerialised and the atom deatomised. All that remains is force. If it can now be

¹² For fuller study see chapter III.

¹³ Lord Rutherford has very aptly described each of the atoms as in itself a miniature solar system, the proton standing for the sun and the electrons for the planets. The variations in the number of electrons moving round the proton speak for the variation in kind of the atoms. An atom of the element of hydrogen consists of one proton and one electron, whereas in an uranium, there are ninety-two electrons moving round the proton.

somehow proved that the said force is purposive, that is, mental, the hitherto unbridgeable gulf between matter and spirit, science and religion, will no longer remain a fact. It is finally bridged over. Sri Aurovinda in his book entitled "The Brain of India" has made an attempt to show, by an analysis of the human system and finally of the brain, that there is something like an element in the human body that is called *Oja* and that is more akin to spirit than to matter. The highly attenuated matter, in course of gradual evolution, backed up by *sadhana* or spiritual pursuits, helps creation of *Oja*, delightfully manifested as halo round the face and body of a man, leading a pious and religious life. We meet with this phenomenon almost in all men of saintly character.

The world is ever in growth in its movement onward. At certain stages, the growth becomes conspicuous enough to catch human attention and get amenable to human comprehension, or solid and tangible enough for the human senses to touch, feel, smell, etc. Such tangibility is detectable in what is material. Life and mind, although not tangible, are comprehensible indeed. How life comes out of matter or if life is just a new advent having nothing to do with matter is the problem that the materialists have got to solve before they take up the problem of mind for consideration. And it naturally, at the outset, raises the question of what life in itself is

(B)
LIFE

To know a thing is to distinguish it from what it is not and specially from what is in resemblance with it in many of its characteristics. Organism and machine furnish an instance of two such allied things. Both consist of parts working together for a common end in their respective sphere. Both are wholes of parts, the whole depending on the parts and the parts too, depending on the whole for their specific existence. The points of similarities between the two encourage the materialistic and the naturalistic thinkers to attribute to an organism the status of a machine, only more complicated and more perfect. Scientific analysis of a living organism reveals the existence of germs (protoplasmic cells) pulsating with vitality. Further analysis shows that they are made up of elements like hydrogen, oxygen, carbon and nitrogen. Each of the cells has certain characteristics that have contributions to make towards the multiplication of its number and creation of different species. There is in each cell a habit of self-division into two cells each of which again divides itself, ad infinitum, into two. This division warrants not only increase in number but in kind too for each of the cells inherits, in addition to its own spontaneous growth, the growth equally spontaneous and fortuitous in the parent-cell. Thus there are spontaneous and fortuitous variations in each of them plus the variations that each inherits from the parent-cells ; and they, in their combination, speak for the differentiation of species of the living beings on earth. The increase in number as also in kind

(species), as stated above, should have long ago made the world too small for the living beings to live in. They would have spilled over the boundary line of the Earth if, of course, spilling is at all possible. The nature has its own way of tackling the situation and meeting the emergency. The struggle for existence of the living germs among themselves as also against the antagonistic forces of nature served the purpose of the elimination of the weak and the weakest and the survival of the stronger and the strongest. This is what Darwin means by "Natural selection and survival of the fittest". (For detailed study, see Darwin's *Origin of Species*). Ironically enough for the intellectuals of the world, no two big minds are ever in agreement with each other on problems of fundamental importance. The problem of biological evolution is no exception thereto. Lamarck, yet another biologist of great eminence, rejects 'The Theory of Fortuitous variations', as propounded by Darwin, in favour of his own, viz., "The theory of variation or modification, caused by external or environmental forces". It is not that an organ, say for example, the eye or the ear, fortuitously, spontaneously or accidentally comes first out of an organism and then experiences the corresponding objects in the world outside. But it is the object that acts on the organism and forces it to shoot out into an organ or organs answerable to what it makes a demand for. Beauty calls forth the eye into existence; so does, for example, sound in respect of the ear. It is not that there is light because there is an eye, but that there is an eye because there is light. In fact, variations, in all cases, ending in the differentiations of species, are all caused by pressures from outside and not by acciden-

tal movements from within the cell. They are impositions on and no innovation in the cell. As for the theories of 'The struggle for existence and heredity', there is no difference of opinion between the two thinkers excepting that while Lamarck believes in transmission, through heredity and inheritance, of the acquired modifications to posterity culminating, at the end, in the emergence of new species, Darwin insists on the accumulation, preservation and finally transmission, to the next generation, of the spontaneous and fortuitous variations or modifications alone and not of the acquired modifications or variations as such. What was formulated by Darwin was subsequently reoriented and given a push ahead by a very distinguished German biologist of the name of Weismann. His Theory of the Germ-plasm has created a stir among the biological thinkers and is reckoned as one of the big contributions ever made towards the development of the science of biology. For him the germ-plasm constitutes the germinal matter contained within each of the Germ-cells. The fusion of the germ-cell of the father with that of the mother during coition, while contributing considerably towards the formation of the body, retains a substantial portion of the Germ-plasm in tact within the said body of the offspring which he, in due course, hands over to his own offspring, the body-cell getting perished with the death of the body. And it is this preserved germ-plasm that is handed down from generation to generation and not that which helps constitution of the body. While the variations in the germ-cell are, in all cases, fortuitous and accidental, the offspring inherits only the attributes that relate to the above mentioned preserved

germ-plasm and that the plasm spontaneously develops and not what it acquires through contact with the external environment; and it has already been seen that the bodily attributes, if any, perish with the death of the body. Recent biological researches, say for example, of distinguished biologists like Sumner and Kammerer seem to lean towards the view that the acquired characters too are transferable to the offspring. Subsequent writings of Darwin also bear indications enough of his falling in line with Lamarck in respect of acquired modifications and their transmission to posterior generations. The fact of any or both of the above two theories, either being valid or invalid, would little afford answer to the fundamental question of how the material entities, call it germ or anything, you like, with the equally mechanical and blind urges may shoot out into what we call life and finally develop into so many beautiful species living on earth. Bergson puts up a long list of phenomena taken from varieties of life, vegetable, animal, etc., that are not explainable in terms of mechanistic principles. If, he argues, the determining factor in evolution is simply adaptation to environment, evolution should have stopped working long ago. "A very inferior organism", he points out, "is as well adapted as ours to the conditions of the existence, judged by its success in maintaining life: why, then, does life which has succeeded in adapting itself, go on complicating itself and complicating itself much and more dangerously. . . . why did not life stop wherever it was possible? Why has it gone on?" These are the problems that demand a rational solution. The identification of machine with organism furnished an instance of wrong analogy worse than that can be drawn between

an ass and a horse. The one is a whole made up of parts and the other besides being, like the machine, a whole of parts, is essentially something more than the mere sum-total of the parts. Here "there are infused into the parts the elements of order, proportion, diversity of form and distribution of functions according to a general end". (Caird: Philosophy of Religion, P. 98). In the former, the whole depends on the parts, whereas in the latter, the parts entirely depend, for their existence, on the whole, the dependence of the whole on the parts being of considerably lesser significance. In a machine, the parts are externally related. One is added to the other by a foreign agency or agencies. In an organism, on the contrary, the parts grow from within the organism itself. Unlike a machine which is, out and out, an artificial whole, the organism is a self-developing unit, that assimilates things, taken as food from outside, repairs itself, wherever necessary, and by way of propagation brings forth new life into existence. The aforesaid attributes of an organism are symptomatic more of a tendency towards an end to realise than of a non-conscious move onward with no aim in view. If everything is left to chance-happenings, nothing can be foreseen or foretold in respect of what is coming next and, in all probability, what is likely to come about is all chaos and no cosmos. But the universe is, nevertheless, a cosmos and not a chaos. In the words of a poet,

Asima sunyatale saurajagatakata
 Vrantihina vrame cira chinhita patha
 Rugna sisure dhari janani baksapari
 Ushna kapole chume nayane asrumari
 Visvadrisyajata asti prachare.

Within the infinite space above, the innumerable solar systems are moving, without deviation, round their own orbits (for deviation means collision and destruction). The mother clasps her ailing child on her bosom, puts sweet kisses on his or her warm cheeks with tears rolling down her face. All these are the indications of the existence of a Supreme Spiritual Principle, working in and through the above systems.¹⁴ The evolution—mechanical, biological and mental—is all purposive and teleological in the sense that it is in and through them that the said Principle realises its end, that is, realises its own self. This disposes of the difficulties associated with the otherwise unbridgeable gaps or hitches lying in between the inorganic and the organic worlds; between matter and life and finally between life and mind.¹⁵ Unable to explain how matter passes over to life and life

¹⁴ The solar system could only have been evolved out of its nebulous state into that which it now presents if the nebula possessed a certain size, mass, form and constitution—if it was neither too rare nor too dense, neither too fluid nor too tenacious; if its atoms were all numbered, its elements all weighed, its constituents all disposed in due relation to each other—that is to say, only if the nebula was, in reality, as much a system of order, for which intelligence alone could account, as the world which have been developed from it". (Flint: Theism, PP. 191—192).

¹⁵ Minus purposiveness or anything of the sort of an unchangeable reality, call it God, the Substance or the Absolute, Bergson, one of the eminent philosophers of the modern age, is in agreement with the view-point, stated above. He too does not believe that life or mind comes out of matter. As a matter of fact, matter for him is more a phantom, an appearance than a fact. Biogenesis and not abiogenesis, as a theory in the science of Biology, is what is acceptable to him. Life can only come out of previous life (*Omne vivum ex vivo*), and not out of non-living or lifeless matter. As for the first life, Darwin himself was constrained to admit that, in all probability, God and no material agency" breathed the breath of life into a few of

to mind, Samuel Alexander, one of the eminent realistic thinkers of the modern age, appeals to the natural piety of the investigator to accept facts as they occur without questioning. Such an attitude, on the part of the truth-seeker, may indicate a warm heart but not a seeking brain. Truth-seeking knows no compromise, and it demands a rational explanation for all that happen in this world. And for such an explanation nothing short of an intelligent principle, as above, is what is needed. To cope with the situation, as it were, the Sankhya Philosophy of the East, as atheistic in leanings as all materialistic philosophies are, posits intelligent principles of the name of Purusas whose presence alone serves as an impetus for the non-conscious material principle called Prakriti, to move into activity evolving, as it proceeds on, newer and newer types of emergences. The first child of Prakriti is called Mahat or Buddhi. Next comes Ahankara or the sense of I, the Ego that a man possesses. From Ahankara with the predominance of the elements of sattva weighing on it, arise five Jnanendriyas, five

the germ-cells that served as starters of biological evolution. Matter, for Bergson, is a creation of the intellect in man that "makes cuts across the living flow of reality, otherwise, called *Elan Vital*, and carves out of it solid objects which we call material objects". (See C. E. M. Joad: *Introduction to Modern Philosophy*, P. 97). Thus intellect is a function that disturbs the vision of man and makes him see reality not as it actually is but as it appears to be. It has efficiency or efficacy in the world of phenomena no doubt, but for the knowledge of the Truth or Reality as it is intellect has to be discarded in favour of intuition—a sort of feeling of oneness with the *Elan Vital*, the vital surge, which is a constant flow and not anything that flows. It is a kind of flow, a change and not anything that flows and changes. 'Becoming and no being' is the theme that Bergson preaches. His philosophy thereby is, in essence, akin to the Heraclitian philosophy of the West as also of the Buddhistic

Karmendriyas and lastly the Mana. With the excess of Tamagunas, the self-same Ahankara blossoms forth into five Tanmatras as the potentialities of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. These Tanmatras eventually get crystallised into five gross elements of the name of ether, air, fire, water and earth in the same order. The movement, from the standpoint of Prakriti, a collective name given for the three Gunas of Sattva, Raja and Tama, is indeed a mechanical one controlled, nevertheless, all through by spiritual principles called Puruṣas. Similar truth in respect of spiritual guidance we arrive at in the Naya and Vaisesika philosophies as well. They believe in the spiritual agency called God moulding the otherwise independent materials of the world into forms and shapes that are in consonance with "the moral deserts of the individual souls" inhabiting the earth "for the proper realisation of their moral destiny". How far this theory satisfies or fails to satisfy the religious sentiments of a man is quite beside the point here. What it attempts to show or argues to prove is that the process of evolution, either in the sphere of matter or of life, is more rational

philosophy of the East. Matter, life or the so-called ego in man are all but phenomenal excrescences created on account of the interruption made, in the flow, by the intellect. It is the result of the back-flow, caused by the said interruption in the vital surge that, left to itself, is ever in the move forward. We may not be in agreement with Bergson in respect of the definition of the Reality, as given by him, but this disagreement, in the words of C. E. M. Joad, "should not be allowed to detract from the great value of his biological work, and of the achievements, which assuredly stand to his credit, as being the first to make a serious breach in that mechanistic view of life and the universe, which held almost undisputed sway during the later part of the nineteenth century". (Introduction to Modern Philosophy, p. 110)

than mechanical, more spiritual than material. There is something like a purpose working all through the process of evolution. The doctrine of hereditary transmission of acquired modifications, as upheld by Lamarck and Spencer and that of fortuitous variations and natural selection, as sponsored by Darwin are, by themselves meaningless, becoming meaningful only when referred to this purposive Mind. The same purpose works both in the life-cell as also in the environment or the physical world outside. That is why there is perfect harmony between the two, between what is within and what is without, one supplementing the other in each level of new existences that emerge in course of the evolutionary process. It accounts satisfactorily, besides, for the change-over from the stage of the struggle for existence, as is evident in the plant and animal levels, to that of mutual tolerance and help as is evident, very often than not, in human conduct.¹⁶ The feeling of sympathy supersedes that of antipathy. Love and fellow-feeling get the better of hatred and animosity, and provide for a check against the process of elimination, hitherto followed, of the weak in preference to the strong. In the words of Darwin himself, "we civilised men do our utmost to check the process of elimination (Of the weak in body

¹⁶ Here we see the difficulties with which the naturalist is confronted in attempting to apply to human society the merely stud-bull principles of the individual struggle for existence as it is waged amongst the plants and animals. The entire range of the problems of morality and mind are necessarily ignored. The higher qualities of our social evolution with all the absolutely characteristic phenomena contributing to the highest organic social efficiency remains outside his vision". (Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. IV, P. 405).

and mind); we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed and the sick ; we institute poor laws ; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of every one to the last moment". (Descent of Man, Chap. V., p. 168). The automatic and blind urges, as the materialists believe, in the inorganic, organic and the animal world cannot, all of a sudden, switch over to conscious activities in man of the kind referred to above, unless that consciousness, however dormant, was somehow present in all the preceding stages, as indicated above, for nothing can come out of nothing. What this Universal consciousness vis-a-vis the consciousness in man in actuality is, is the problem that calls for immediate consideration.

CHAPTER III

MIND, SOUL, GOD AND THE ABSOLUTE

Mind yields to no definition for it is itself the definer of all that is definable. It is a presupposition and not a resultant of any psychical fact or facts. "It is something *sui generis*, new and distinctive, unique and creative". It admits, therefore, only of description and no definition. It is that which thinks, feels and wills. In writing out this paper, I am thinking of the materials that I shall use, feeling interested in them and willing to put them all into the forms of words and sentences on the canvas of paper. That it is consciousness is admitted by all thinkers irrespective of the classes they might belong to. Consciousness varies in degree of intensity beginning from the state of unconsciousness to that of full consciousness via subconsciousness. Unconsciousness is not to be mistaken for non-consciousness. It is no absence of consciousness, but is consciousness asleep or dormant. The very fact of the mind having been suddenly awakened to the fact of a long forgotten incident or not losing the sense of self-identity in spite of occasional breaks in consciousness, as in sleep or in swoon, etc., is a definite proof for the existence of consciousness all through. That in which, however, the thinkers differ, classwise, from one another is in respect of what, in essence, mind is. The materialists believe that the mind is nothing more than the by-product of matter. Matter is the only ultimate and fundamental reality out of which everything arises.

Mind is no exception. Like heat, generated out of the friction of the two otherwise heatless stones, consciousness appears as a product of molecular activities in a highly organised portion of the animal or the human body, that is called brain. When the activities of the brain cease, the so-called mind also ceases to exist. In the words of Prof. C. H. Whitley, "consciousness is the property of certain complex material objects—namely, animal organism. It is not an essential or fundamental property of matter, but a derivative property, which matter acquires or produces under certain rather peculiar conditions, when it is arranged in certain rare and special ways. Occasionally a material system, having got into an unusually complex sort of arrangement, becomes conscious, and remains so just as long as this complex arrangement continues. When the arrangement of material particles is broken up and replaced by another arrangement, consciousness ceases, while the permanent attributes of matter remain". (An Introduction to Metaphysics, P. 28). Thus if any permanent reality behind this ever-changing conscious flow, like the flow of a stream, is ever to be sought out, it is matter and matter alone. If the science of psychology needs any metaphysics, it is the metaphysics of atomism, guided all through by physical forces and laws.

Does this contention stand the test of reason? Is mind, only because of its emanation, as they say, out of matter, is, in essence, material? If so, is it eternally present, however dormant, in matter? If the answer is in the affirmative, the traditional definition of matter has to be abandoned in preference to a new one. It is mind-matter with all its implications and not matter alone.

Again if the answer is in the negative, it invites a second question as to how an altogether new thing may crop up in an alien land having nothing in common with it. No rational answer acceptable to all, has hitherto been given by any of the materialistic thinkers. In despair, as it were, S. Alexander, an eminent neo-realistic thinker of the modern age, suggests, as has already been stated in a previous chapter, dependence on the natural piety of the investigator. Mind is a unique existence having nothing in common with matter and is yet dependent, for its existence, on certain collocation of the material stuff. The investigator has to take it for granted without questioning. This is indeed a bare statement of fact that fails to put up any rational explanation as to how the fact so happens. More of sentiment than of reason is displayed in what is stated above ; and it logically and naturally leads to the belief in the existence of mind, independent of matter and hence to Dualism as a philosophical theory in respect of the relation between matter and mind.

According to Descartes and his followers, matter and mind are the two independent substances having nothing in common with each other. Matter is extended and impenetrable. Mind is pure and unalloyed consciousness. Yet they co-operate and interact. The fact of every-day experience of every man points to such an intimate connection between the two. A slap on the cheek of a boy by his mother has a corresponding sensation of pain in the mind of the boy. Similarly the feeling of sorrow, for example, in the mind of the above boy, has its bodily expression in tears rolling down his cheeks or in the contraction of the muscles of his face in crying. Descartes accounts for this interaction with the help of

the pineal gland of the human brain which, he believes, is the seat of the soul and through which the soul sustains its relation with the physical world. Movements caused by the sensible objects in the animal body are transferred, through appropriate nerves, to the pineal gland where and when they get transformed into mental sensations. Psychical states, likewise, pass over to the physical body and end in appropriate movements through the instrumentality of the same gland. Thus "the relation of mind and body is clearly conceived by Descartes as causal : through the mediation of the pineal gland, a certain interaction is brought about between them".

What is this pineal gland ? Undoubtedly, as a part of the physical organism, it is, however, etherealised, material and as such, the old question of how matter acts on mind and mind on matter remains, all the same, unsolved. Too much of anxiety to give to the world of matter as also of mind complete freedom to go its own way ends in the total segregation of the one from the other, denying, therefore, the possibility of interaction between the two. And yet they co-operate and interact. Interactionism as a theory, although as old as the first awakening of human consciousness and based, more or less, on common sense, fails to give a rational justification of how they meet and act on each other, for only the like can act on the like. An unbridgeable gulf as before, still yawns between the two. The followers of Descartes, therefore, reject the theory of Interactionism in preference to what is called the theory of Occasionalism. They take recourse to the will and the intervention of God in the explanation of the body-mind relation. Physical and psychical occurrences furnish occa-

sions for the Divinity to come down and intervene. He is omnipresent and whenever there is any change in the mind, He makes the corresponding change in the body. For example, whenever there is any desire in the mind of a man to move forward, God makes the legs move on in the direction the mind desires. The business of the mind ends with the desire only. Conversely, the affection of any part of the body is material and explainable in terms of material and mechanical forces and laws. But the corresponding sensation of pleasure or pain in the mind is caused by God. There is no causal connection but only correspondence between the two that, in all cases, is brought about by God Himself. "Every operation that combines the outer and the inner, the soul and the world, is neither an effect of the spirit, nor of the material world, but simply an immediate act of God. When I exercise my volition, it is not from my will but from the will of God that the proposed bodily motions follow. On occasion of my will, God moves the body ; on occasion of an affection of my body, God excites an idea in my mind. The one is but the occasional cause of the other."

To call in God or to seek for His assistance, on every occasion of the body-mind relation, is equivalent to, for example, President's rule in a state, unable to run its own government properly and independently. It bespeaks of a sense of frustration in the Cartesian philosophers, who fail to give a reasonable explanation of the above relation. The poor God, so requisitioned has got no rest in day or sleep at night, busy as He is, every second, in bringing about a union between the two, and that everywhere in the universe. It does not speak very

well of the efficiency and ability of God, who is presumed to be all perfect. Even an ordinary mechanist is not in need of constantly watching and interfering with the machine that he has built up. Once the two clocks, for example, are set in tune with each other, they will keep on maintaining the same time without any aid or intervention of the clock-maker. God the Mechanist of all mechanists, is supposed, therefore, by some thinkers to have simply pre-established at the start, a relation of harmony between matter and mind regarding how best they should get on working together and since then they have been working in a relation of harmony and adjustment, one with the other. In the words of Prof. Thilly, "God in creating minds and bodies has so arranged it, from the very beginning, that the two shall go together: the relation between soul and body is a relation of harmony pre-established by God. Causal interaction is out of question. There is a parallelism or concomitance between the mental and the physical states: in this sense the body is the material expression of the soul". (The History of Philosophy, p. 372). This is the theory of the name of Pre-established harmony sponsored by Leibnitz and his followers. For Leibnitz, matter and mind are not, in reality, two independent substances. They are both made up of the same primordial stuff called the monads. The monads admit of no qualitative distinction, for each of them possesses infinite possibilities, latent within it. The difference of the one from the other is the difference of the degree of fruition of the above possibilities in them. The soul in man is called the queen monad, in comparison with the monads that constitute the body, because of the presence of con-

sciousness in her which the body-monads do not possess till then. God, the Monad of all monads, has pre-ordained or prearranged organic relationship between the queen monad on the one hand and the body-monads on the other. They all together constitute the organism, each of its parts acting in perfect co-ordination or unison with the rest on account of the aforesaid pre-ordination and prearrangement, made by God. There can be, ex-hypothesis, no causal connection between one monad and the other, for the monads are all windowless. All that happen, in the physical as also in the psychical world, or in short, in the universe at large, are instances of thorough-going harmony pre-established by God Himself. "The sources of mechanics lies in metaphysics" is the tenet or the truth that Leibnitz intends to teach in his philosophy.¹⁷

Dualism between body and mind, as is presupposed or anticipated in Interactionism and Occasionalism, ends in Monism in the philosophy of Leibnitz and in his theory of pre-established harmony. It is indeed a monism of kind and not of number for the monads, better called

¹⁷ "The theory of pre-established harmony differs from the theory of Occasionalism on an important point. The latter assumes a special divine intervention every time the soul and the physical organism are to agree. God regulates the soul by the body or the body by the volitions of the soul, as a watch-maker constantly regulates one clock by the other. According to Leibnitz, the harmony between the movements of the body and the state of the soul is the effect of the creator's perfect work, as the perpetual agreement between the two well-constructed watches results from the skill of the mechanic who has constructed them. Those, who assume that the creator constantly intervenes in the work, regard God as an unskilful watch-maker who cannot make a perfect machine. . . . Not only does God not intervene at any moment, but He never intervenes." (Weber : History of Philosophy, p. 354).

spiritual atoms, are infinite in number and are not the emanations or creations of a supreme monad, although Leibnitzian philosophy appears occasionally to have lent support to this view. Parallelism between body and mind, suggested in pre-established harmony, as a theory, attains to its fuller significance in the philosophy of Spinoza. Matter and mind are not two substances. They are the attributes of the Supreme Reality which Spinoza calls by the name of Substance. Besides, matter and mind are not the only attributes that the substance possesses ; of the infinite number of attributes, they are but two amenable to human comprehension. They are each, in its own way, infinite indeed, but are not so in the absolute sense, for there are other attributes beside them. Looked at from a particular standpoint, the substance appears as extension and from another, it appears as thought. Outwardly seen, the man is a body, and inwardly felt, he is a soul. What the substance in itself is, Spinoza himself is not very explicit in his statement. It may be the unseen and the unknown of Spencer, the mere name given to the sum-total of attributes, the organic unity comprising, or composed of, these attributes or it may be a reality manifesting itself in and through the attributes and yet in essence, independent of and detached from them all. Spencer's is a self-contradictory statement. To say that the reality is unknown and unknowable is equal to the admission of the fact that it is, to that extent at least, known, although not seen in the sense of being perceived by the senses. And again, according to a good number of thinkers, senses are not the only sources of knowledge. The saints, all the world over, shut the external senses up, while in meditation of

God or the Absolute. This shows that for communion with the supernatural, there is an inner sense in man essentially different from the outer senses that, however much indispensable in maintaining communication with the phenomenal world outside, are the sources of distraction and dissipation of the mind, while in communion with God. For the vision of God, what is primarily necessary is an unruffled mind in an equally unagitated body. To define reality as a mere name given to the sum-total of the attributes or as the organic unity which is not anything apart from the attributes and yet, at the same time, something more than that, is not acceptable on the ground that both body and mind vanish out of existence in death and as such, either as a name or an organic unity, the body-mind or the attributes of thought, extension, impenetrability, etc., cannot stand for reality or God, which or who knows no birth, no death and is unchangeable and unperishable. The last alternative definition of reality, as both manifested and unmanifested, both inside and outside and independent of the world of phenomena appears to have satisfied common sense and reason alike. God is, in spite of manifestations or creations and yet in-itself remains ever inexhaustible. Not to speak of Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Hume, etc., who have all ascribed supra-natural and supra-rational existence to God beyond the world of matter and mind, the philosophy of Bradley too that identifies God with the Universal Experience, in the ultimate analysis, lends support to the above view. The nature of the reality "is that it is experience, but this experience is very different from all that we ordinarily mean by experience. It does not belong to any person and is neither perception,

feeling nor thought, but a reality in which all thinking, feeling and willing have merged and become transfused. Whatever this may be, it is.....neither mind nor anything mental", and far less material. (Das Gupta: Indian Idealism, P. 21). For Bacon, scientific and rational investigations lead to no God and encourage Atheism. To know Him "we have to quit the small vessel of human reason and put ourselves on board the ship of the church, which alone possesses the divine needle for justly shaping the course. The stars of philosophy will be of no further service to us. As we are obliged to obey the divine law, though our will murmurs against it, so we are obliged to believe in the word of God, though our reason is shocked at it. The more absurd and incredible any divine mystery is, the greater honour we do God in believing it. After all, it is more worthy to believe than to know as we now know: for in knowledge the human mind is acted on by sense which results from material things, but in faith the spirit is affected by spirit, which is the more worthy agent. Hence, sacred theology must be drawn from the word and oracles of God, not from the dictates of reason". Descartes too, as we have seen above, segregates God from matter and mind and "agrees with Duns Scotus that we can accept reason only in so far as it does not conflict with revelation". We do not know the real essence. Reason cannot tell us how He looks like. All that man can reasonably say is that God is and that "He is only active, matter is only passive but man's soul (mind) is both active and passive". (Thilly : History of Philosophy, p. 319) In the opinion of David Hume, rational cosmology, rational psychology and lastly rational theo-

logy are all but futile attempts, ever made by men, at seeking out the Truth. Limited blind, and weak as human reason is, it cannot pry into the secrecy of the non-phenomenal. Yet on the question of the being or existence of the ultimate reality or God, there should or could be no controversy or two opinions. "No truth is so certain as the being of God, it is the ground of all hopes, the surest foundation of morality, the firmest support of society . . . yet we cannot represent the Deity as similar to human mind : to do so would be to fall into anthropomorphism". (Ibid, pp. 358-359). The empirico-rational philosophy of Kant, as is elaborated in his Critiques, proves that there is a thing-in-itself, a noumenal reality that produces phenomena and supplies categories, but is not itself phenomenal nor bound by any of the categories. Supra-physical and supra-psychical existence of the Supreme reality is admitted by Hegel who, although usually shown as a believer in the identity of God and the world, envisages a status of the Idea "in its purity, in its nakedness before the (said) Idea or God has created the world". It is as it were, a shadow world of essenceless forms. It is in pursuance of this thought that Hegel often states "that the Idea has no actual being", and as non-actual, it is distinct and different from what is actual in the world of matter and mind. This mystic interpretation, as in the West, had its climax already reached, a good many centuries ago, in the philosophy of the Upanishads in the East. In the Keno-Upanishad, Brahman or the Ultimate Reality has been described as unapproachable by words and thought. It is beyond the reach of sensuous experi-

ences and logical thought alike. Its nature is different from all that we know and do not know.

Na tatra sakshu gaccati na bag gaccati no mana
 Na bidmo na bijanimo jatha atat anusisyat
 Anyadeva tatbiditat atho abiditat adhi
 Iti susrum purvesam je na tat byachayakhire.

—(Kenopanisad, Chap. I, Slokas 3 & 4).

The *Risi* says the eye cannot see Him. No word can describe Him. No mind can comprehend Him. I know not, therefore, how to make Him known to others. He is different from what is known and what is not known. This is what we have been taught by the seers of the past. Yet it is the ultimate source from which all things originate, and which is realisable through something like a mystic intuition that the *Rishis* possessed and made their disciples also possess. All must have to pass through a sort of spiritual discipline, before they are found fit to get possession of this inner vision or into touch with the reality. Idealism, as preached in the Upanishads has, in comparison with or in contrast to its counterpart in the West, been very aptly called, by Dr. S. N. Dasgupta, a kind of mystical idealistic Absolutism. A review of the philosophical thought, as set forth in the Katopanisad reveals that the ultimate reality is spiritual and is the basis or the source of all that is material and mental and is yet not definable in terms of either of the two.¹⁸ How it is related to matter

¹⁸ It is to be noted here, that mind and soul are used in identical sense in western philosophy. Unlike it, Indian philosophy recognises soul as thoroughly distinct from mind which belongs to Prakriti and as such, emanates out of what is non-spiritual. What is a by-product of matter in western materialism is a step or a station in the process of evolution of the Pra-

and mind and yet remains unaffected by the changes and modifications that they both undergo remains a mystery ever to be solved by a mystical intuition, referred to above, and never by the dialectics of thought.

Honsa suchisat basu antariksasathota

Vedisat atihi duranasat

Nrisat barasat bomasat abja gaja

Ritaja adrija ritom brihat.

—(Katopanisad, Chap. II, Sloka 2).

He moves everywhere. He is the Sun shining in both the worlds. He puts everything in order. As air He soars in the imperceptible space. He is fire. He is in the universe. He is the Soma in the pitcher. He is the man of all men, God of all gods. He is the Truth, the sky and the conch in water. He is plants on earth and the utensils of the Yajna. He is the river flowing down the hills. He is omnipresent and hence is in the world of phenomena also ; and yet in essence different from and uncontaminated by any of the above, for He is the Great

kriti in Sankhya and Yoga philosophy. On account of the proximity of Purusa, the Prakriti starts evolving. The first step ahead is Mahat or Buddhi ; next comes Ahankara ; from Ahankara, on account of the excess of sattva arise five sense-organs of knowledge (Jnanendriya), the five organs of karma or deed (Karmendriya) and the mind which is called the Uvayendriya inasmuch as it is in itself the organ both of jnana and karma or knowledge and action. In the absence of mind, none of the jnana or karmendrias can function. Thus mind is a child or product of Prakriti and has, thus far, nothing to do with Purusa or the self. The Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophy, on the contrary, ascribes independent and eternal existence to mind as a substance (Anu). It helps the Atman or the soul, essentially non-conscious, as an instrument for the perception of the psychical qualities like pleasure, pain, etc. At any rate, it is no part of or in any way related to the soul or the Prakriti. Apa-

expressions of the self-same reality called Visnu by him.¹⁹ Visnu is the only independent being, the other two, like what Descartes in the West says, always remaining dependent on Him. Madhva mentions "two kinds of expression of God, the independent (Svatantra) and the dependent (Paratantra). The former is the principle, and the latter is the effect in operation". Thus far "the dependent illustrates the richness of the independent". (History of Philosophy : Eastern and Western, Vol. I, p. 335). The nature and man, the unconscious and the conscious are both dependent and the independent, as the principle, points to Brahman (God Visnu) as the only self-sufficient reality. Yet as dependent, the world of matter and that of souls are relatively independent of God and stand apart and distinct from Him. Visnu, whose other name is Brahman, is all perfect, for the root meaning of the term Brahman is the Great or that which is "endowed with all qualities of perfection. And Sri Visnu, as the supreme being, is endowed with Brahman, that is, all perfection. To secure salvation is to know Him ; to know Him is to obtain His grace ; and grace falls on those alone who have got bhakti, based on listening to (Sravana) as also reflection (Manana), meditation

¹⁹ Visnu possesses personality and personality thrives on differentiation. He is different from human souls and from Prakriti. Madhva is a monist in the sense that there is nothing independent of Visnu. He is a dualist, when he draws a line of difference between God on the one hand and soul and Prakriti on other. He is a pluralist again in his belief in the plurality of human souls as also of the elements of matter. He is equally a polytheist and an atomist with the proviso that the souls are not for that, so many gods for there is only one God and He is Visnu and that there are no material atoms independent of a divine purpose working from within them and creating a world like what we live in. But there is a difference of opinion in

(Nididhyasana) on the texts of the scriptures" In short, philosophical study, actuated by devotion to Sri Visnu, elicits divine grace on man that finally releases him from the fetters of bondage, caused by association with Prakriti, and brings about his Moksa or salvation, which consists in release from transmigration and eternal existence in Baikuntha with Narayan or Visnu. The souls are innumerable in number ; each of them has an eternal and separate existence of its own ; each is subject to transmigration in accordance with its karma, till at last it attains mukti. Essentially different as one soul is from the other, the nature of salvation that one attains is different from that of another. Virtually "they fall into three groups, viz., (a) the lesser gods, pitrs, risis, kings and a few other select class of the gods ; these are destined to salvation ; (b) those who are neither sufficiently good to belong to the first class nor sufficiently bad for the third ; these are destined to perpetual transmigration (Samsara) ; and (c) demons, sinners, etc., and specially followers of the Maya-doctrine and other heretics ; these are destined to eternal hell". (The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 8, p. 234). Such a

respect of the proper definition of Dvaitavad. According to some "dvaitavad does not mean the dualism of spirit and matter or that of good and evil, but the distinction between the Supreme being (Purusattam) and the dependent principle of life (Jivatma). (See Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 8, p. 234). Again according to some, the difference, as between God and souls, is not absolute as is in the case of God and matter, for the human souls have got features like sentience and bliss (though qualified) in common with God. It is on this principle of similarity that Madhva sometimes explains the upanishadic statement like "Tat Tvam Asi" or 'That Thou Art' It does not, according to Madhva, imply identity of God and man as the Advaitists believe but mere resemblance. (See Hiryanana : The Essentials of Indian philosophy, p. 192).

statement, as above, smacks of narrowness and bigotry, detectable, more or less, in all religions. 'Mine is the only way to salvation' is the promise made very often than not by the religious preachers of the world. But it is difficult to guess if the statements, as above, form parts of the commentary itself or if they are but subsequent interpolations made by the disciples. The ultimate metaphysical reality that science and philosophy seek for, is Visnu ; and the world of matter as also of soul, although relatively independent of, are essentially dependent on, Him. In the words of Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, "He is the author of creation, maintenance, destruction . . . bondage, salvation . . . and is yet different from all material objects, souls, prakriti, etc." (History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. IV, p. 155). Unlike the ordinary theistic conception of the theory of creation that presupposes a time when God was all alone, and when at a particular instant of time God, although self-sufficient, and in no way in need of any kind of creation, nevertheless, at His sweet will or in sports, as it were, created a world of multiplicity, the philosophy of Madhva lends support to the belief in the eternal existence of the Prakriti, as the seat or origin of the three gunas of Satva, Rajas and Tamas that constitute the material cause of the physical world, and of the existence of souls as well, equally subsisting eternally with God. Besides, the world, as it now is, is not a sudden creation, but the resultant of a process of evolution that the Prakriti passes through. Here Madhva is in agreement with Sankhya and Yoga philosophies in respect of the theory of evolution with the distinction that, while for them Prakriti is a name given to the gunas in their combina-

tion, for Madhva, as stated above, Prakriti is the seat or the origin of the gunas. In dissolution, the universe gets back to its original state of Prakriti with an innumerable number of souls knowing no dissolution, no decay or no change. "When things are destroyed their differences are also destroyed ; but the five differences between God and souls, between souls themselves, between inanimate objects themselves, between them and God, and between them and souls, are all eternal ; for the differences in eternal things are eternal and in non-eternal things non-eternal." (Dr. S. N. Das Gupta : A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. IV, p. 155).

This theory of dependence and independence of souls in relation to God appears to have reached its greater logical and speculative perspicuity in favour of dependence in preference to independence, in the philosophy of Ramanuja, traditionally known as Visistadvaitavad or qualified monism. In tune with Hegel in the West, as it were, he believes in one Supreme reality that manifests itself in and through the manifold of the universe. The world is not anything apart from and independent of Him, nor is it a creation out of nothing. "The real (sat), without a second, wills to be many and becomes the world of name and form (nama-rupa) by its inner creative urge. God before creation is without any difference of name and form, and the same after creation, differentiates itself into the infinity of space-time world and individuals and becomes the inner self. The cosmos is a physical and moral order and is sustained by the will of the Lord . . . creation and dissolution take place in cyclic way endlessly and the cosmic purpose of the world process is the liberation of the souls". (His-

tory of Philosophy: Eastern and Western, pp. 312-313). In elucidating the contents of the thought or philosophy of Hegel and Ramanuja, the term manifestation is more significant than, and preferable to, the term 'creation' for it has, in all cases, a reference to or a tendency to denote the created as something other than the creator ; whereas in Hegelianism or Ramanujism or, what is called, Visistadvaitavad, there is nothing outside the Idea of Hegel and Brahman of Ramanuja. In spite of similarity in the frame-work of these two thoughts in the West and in the East, there are enough of differences and divergences in details. For Hegel, God as the logical Idea, does not exist "as a self-conscious logical process before the creation of the world. . . . He can not be conscious without a world ; He is a developing God and becomes fully self-conscious only in the minds of human beings, who make explicit the logical dialectical process that lies implicit in the Universal Absolute Reason". (Thilly: History of Philosophy, p. 471). For Ramanuja, on the contrary, the Absolute is all perfect and is in no need of further development for greater perfection or say, self-realisation. He is eternally self-conscious and self-realised. He is omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent. The universe is, for Him, all sports affording opportunities to the Jivatmas to attain salvation through His grace, obtainable through bhakti. In analogy with human organism, Brahman may be regarded as the immanent soul of which the conscious human souls and the unconscious matter form the body. The relation between the two . . . God on the one hand and souls and the physical world on the other . . . is one of inseparability or, in the words of Ramanuja, of

aprthak-siddhi. None can be imagined apart from the other. They both go together. Yet, one is not completely identical with the other. The limbs say for example, the hand, the eye, the leg, etc., in an organism, has each a specific identity of its own, although each is susceptible to decomposition and decay, when detached from its relation to the organism as a whole that keeps it living. "The final Upanisadic teaching, according to Ramanuja, is that while Brahman, the soul and the physical world (prakriti) are all different and equally eternal, they are, at the same time, quite inseparable." (Hiriyanna: *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy*, p. 178). They are one and, at the same time, different ; and this theory forms the quintessence of the Visistadvaitavada of Ramanuja, ostensibly in opposition to the uncompromising Advaitism of Sankara. Ramanuja teaches monism no doubt for all is Brahman ; but his is a qualified monism (Visistadvaitavad) for there are rooms enough in Brahman for the existence of the individual souls and the physical world. Like Sankara and other commentators of the Vedanta-sutras, he has his arguments based on Upanisads. His findings found their chief support in the teachings of Brhadaranyaka Upanisad. Brahman has been described there as antaryamin, as the inner ruler of the universe at large in all its branches. In a passage in the Svatesvatara Upanisad, stress is likewise given on the threefold unity, in Brahman, of the empirical subject (bhokta), the objective world (bhogya) and the power that instigates (pravitr). All these show that Brahman is one with many and not one without many. "The affirmation of identity between the two absolutely different terms is meaningless ; simi-

larly meaningless is the assertion of the identity between the two identical terms, for it leads to the fallacy of tautology. The assertion is therefore possible between the two forms of the same substance." " 'Tat Tvam Asi' or 'That Thou Art' means qualified identity between God and man. 'That' stands for God as God and 'Thou' stands for God as in the form of a man. There is a relation of bheda and abheda simultaneously subsisting between the two." Stress being given on the bheda aspect, there is the possibility of a religion of love and reverence, as between God and man.

Sankara, on the contrary, gives emphasis on the latter and takes this aphorism in its literal sense. Brahman and soul are but two names of the self-same reality. They are, in essence, identical. This aphorism provides for a lesson for man (jiva), bound up as he is within the cage of nama and rupa, born of Avidya, to learn that he is not what he appears to be. He is chinmoy and not mrinmoy. He is essentially unalloyed consciousness (chaitanya) and not the so-called body-mind. According to Sankara, 'Tat' stands for Brahman, and 'Tvam' for jiva or the phenomenal ego and the copula 'Asi' signifies a relation of apposition between the two. What is inconsistent in the connotation of the two is to be rejected and only what is consistent is to be retained, and that is Intelligence or Chaitanya. The bheda and, at the same time, abhedavad of Ramanuja is self-contradictory. "They cannot be predicated of the one and the same thing. It makes the nature of the thing self-contradictory and contradiction, according to Sankara, points to falsity". (Hiriyanna: *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy*, p. 154). The central pivot round which the entire

philosophical system or structure of Sankara moves is "Sarvam Khalvidam Brahman". All is Brahman. There is nothing beside or beyond Brahman. There is no 'Many' ; there is only 'One' and that 'One' is Brahman. The physical world with its diversity is an illusion (mithya). It is like seeing a serpent where there is only a rope or, in other words, mistaking a rope for a serpent. When the illusion is off, there is the rope only, and no serpent. The latter, that is, the serpent or the world with all its belongings, completely disappears. Is the illusion of the serpent then unreal (asat) in the sense that it is absolutely nothing ? No, for so long as the illusion persists, there is the serpent. Is it then real (sat) ? The answer is equally in the negative for the serpent vanishes out of existence with the disappearance of the illusion. And reality (sat) means eternal existence which is ascribable to Brahman and Brahman alone. The physical universe, therefore, is neither real nor unreal in the sense in which the serpent is both real and unreal. The existence of the illusion of the serpent depends on the existence of the rope, but the existence of the rope, for that, does not depend on the existence of the serpent. In applying this analogy, in the bigger context, to Brahman and the world, it may be stated that the world which is an illusion or a cluster of appearances depends, for its existence, on Brahman ; but Brahman for that, does not, for its existence, depend on the world. These illusory appearances thrive on avidya (ignorance) of man ; the other name of this avidya, when referred to Brahman, is Maya.²⁰ While Maya cannot exist independently of

²⁰ The existence of Ignorance or Maya is proved in the following manner.

Brahman, Brahman is beyond and above the control of Maya. When the Maya or the Avidya is off, there is no world ; and there is, like the rope, Brahman alone. Maya, looked at from the standpoint of empiricity, is co-present with Brahman putting up a magic-show of reality in what is unreal, diversity in what is only One.²¹ Brahman with Maya is what Sankara calls God of the theists ; and the world as it appears, has only a vyavaharika and no ultimate satta or existence. Brahman minus Maya is nirgun to whom no attribute is attributable ; but Brahman with the world, born of Maya, is saguna and personal. He is God and is regarded as the Creator, the sustainer and the destroyer of the universe. He is in and, at the same time, outside the world of appearances and stands in a relation of reciprocity with human souls which have, in spite of their dependence on God, relatively independent existence of their own. This is exactly what panentheism or theism as a theory intends to support. Exoterically considered, Vedanta admits of personal God, personal human beings and a world with all its belongings. Here both theogony and cosmogony go together. God in His infinite love for

There is in each man consciousness of the fact that he is ignorant. If the consciousness is true, it is a proof for the existence of Ignorance ; if untrue, it is indeed a stronger proof for it. Sankara here makes a distinction between Maya and Avidya. The same Maya is called Avidya while it forms the adjunct of the finite self and, while in relation to Brahman, it is called Maya. But there is a difference between the two to the effect that although mingled with the falsity of Maya, Brahman is always unaffected by her, while the individual souls are.

²¹ The same thing was preached by Plato according to whom, this world is the world of shadows and not of realities. To Kant too this is a world of phenomena and not of things-in-themselves.

His creation (for example, man) takes up different names and shapes to suit the temperament of His devotees. Even Avatarvad, on this ground, is justifiable. In a psychic attitude like this and in conformity with the belief in Saguna-Brahman and the Vyavaharika satta of the world, as stated above, Sankara, although a staunch supporter of pantheism (Advaitavad), propitiates goddesses like Gonga, Sitala, etc. All philosophical theories in respect of God's relation to man and the world, viz., polytheism, Ditheism, Dualistic theism, Theism and lastly Panentheism,²² are all meaningful in the context

²² (a) *Polytheism* believes in many gods who are naturally, therefore, limited and finite. They are supposed to be the governors of the different departments of the world and are at war with one another, whenever there are clashes of interests. It bespeaks of a world of strife and discord. Such a theory is revolting to human reason, for the deities here are just like human beings with all their frailties, their sympathy and antipathy. The only difference is that the deities are more powerful and may or may not be more merciful. Reason in man seeks for a unity in the midst of multiplicity; and polytheism fails to give it. It is more mythological than philosophical.

(b) *Ditheism* means belief in two gods. One is good and the other is evil. As two personal beings, they limit each other. The good god wants to create a perfect world where there is no evil, but he fails to have it done on account of the resistance that he gets from the evil god. Hence the world is neither all-good nor all-evil, but a mixture of the two. There is pleasure and there is pain; there is life and there is death. This theory also, like that of polytheism, smacks of mythology and anthropomorphism and thereby falls far short of what a man, in religion, wants.

(c) *Dualistic Theism*. Here too, as in Ditheism, two independent realities exist. The only distinction is that one of the two is inert matter and the other, as before, is a personal God. There is indeed no clash between two gods; but there is still a clash between God on the one hand and matter on the other. The Obduracy of the intractable matter resists God in all His attempts to give to the world just the shape He wants to give

of the above theory of God and the world. But esoterically considered, all these pertain to the lower (apara) Brahman in contrast to the higher (para) Brahman

to it. It deprives God, among others, of His omnipresence and omnipotence ; and a powerless and finite God is as good as no God.

(d) In *Deism* matter too, as a self-existent reality, goes out of existence, leaving God alone as the only reality with no second beyond or behind Him. He is the personal God possessing all the attributes of omnipresence, omnipotence, omniscience, etc.

Thus in *Deism*, *Monism* (*Manotheism*) appears to have replaced *Dualism*. But traditionalism is too sticky to be easily effaced out of existence. The world of matter again appears as a creation of God. It is invested with all the forces and facilities necessary for its historic growth and development, independent of any external agency or agencies including God Himself. Like an artificer, in relation to his machine, God is outside the world that He creates. *Dualism* thereby creeps out again under the garb of *monism*, for the world is shown relatively independent of God who lives somewhere away from it. This creates a situation going counter to the religious sentiments in man. To a mind saturated with religiosity, the nearest and dearest of all is his God. To think of Him as staying far away from him and from the world in which he happens to live is simply unthinkable to him.

(e) *Theism*, as a theory, however, satisfies, in its own way, the demands both of the head and the heart of a man of religion. In relation to the world, God is both immanent and transcendent, and in relation to man, He is the spiritual essence residing in his body and making him the possessor of the virtue of personality. As partaking of the nature of God, man is, to a great extent, identical with God and as a personal being, he is, at the same time, relatively independent of God. This unity in diversity, the oneness in the many forms the essence of the religious experiences of the saints all the world over. Duality is a pre-necessity for a man to love or to be loved. This duality does not mean absolute separation of the one from the other for no two alien realities can ever act, react and far less love each other.

(f) *Panentheism*. It means that all is in God. It admits of the existence of many in the one with varieties of qualities

which, in-itself, is ever out of touch with the empirical show of Maya or with Maya herself. There is no physical world, no empirical ego or jivatma which subsists so long as the Maya persists.²³ Moksa or liberation for a man means cutting through the fetters of the Avidya, corresponding to Maya while in relation to the Cosmos,

that they might possess. Looked at from the side of the universe, Panentheism is all right, but studied from the standpoint of the Absolute, Pantheism is the last word, where all this ends in that . . . the phenomenon in the noumenon, the matter in spirit, the individual in the universal and lastly the personal God in the impersonal Absolute. Ramanuja and Hegel are historically known as the supporters of Panentheism, while Sankara and Bradley are of Pantheism.

(g) *Pantheism* has its basis in Monism which, as the seed, sprouts out into a tree with, besides others, two relatively independent branches, one being called the man and the other the God. In essence the tree is one. In the Absolute, there is no duality, no God, no man. They have their existences, as shown in the body of the book, in the phenomenal and empirical level of existence. Once a man gets over it, he loses his identity in, and with him the world phenomena too vanishes into, the ocean of the Absolute or Brahman. Here the philosophy of Bradley, to a considerable degree, agrees with that of Sankara. Curiously enough, too much of rationalism ends in mysticism; too much of intellectual quickenings end in the cessation thereof. In short, here philosophy ends and mysticism begins. This is Pantheism (Pan=All and Theos=The Absolute). There is nothing other than the Absolute or Brahman. But it is no denial of Panentheism.

²³ There is illusion in the vision of the phenomenal universe as also of the empirical self. But there is, nevertheless, a sharp difference between these two types of illusions. In the case of the physical world, it ceases, like the serpent, as shown in the body of the book, to exist when the truth of the rope is discovered. But in the latter case the self does not cease to exist. Only what is empirical (asat) ends in what is noumenal (sat). At this stage, what a man feels like is that his personal self, after enlightenment, becomes one with the Universal Self. There is only a change in the standpoint that a man takes up and nothing else.

and realising his own self as belonging, in totality, to Brahman Itself or, in other words, becoming Brahman himself, which he undoubtedly always is but which he, unfortunately, forgets because of the Avidya that surrounds him. It is not like knowing any object that is other than the subject that knows, nor is it any new possession of the subject, till then unpossessed by it. The subject here knows the subject. It is a case of the self-knowing the self. It is self-knowledge or self-realisation. Here the 'Me' knows the 'Me' and there is nothing other than the 'Me', that is, Brahman. The realisation of the self is equal to the realisation of Brahman. This is possible through right knowledge, attainable through vairagya, sravana, manan, dhyana, etc. Vairagya means an attitude of detachment signifying adherence to duty for the sake of duty alone, as taught in karmayoga of the Gita. Sravana means sitting at the feet of a Guru and listening, with devotion, to his teachings on Advaitavad. Manan is reflexion, on the part of the disciple, on what the preceptor teaches and getting convinced, within his own self, of the illusoriness of the world and the essential identity of God and man. It is still nothing more than merely an intellectual comprehension. There is no anubhava or the direct experience or vision of the Truth. In short, there is no feeling of oneness with the Absolute. For that, what is necessary is dhyana or meditation. Karma, Jnana, Dhyana, etc., are all means to an end and the end is the realisation of the self by the self. As soon as this is attained, these media are all cast off as unnecessary and the man becomes liberated. He is called Jivanmukta for he still lives in the world of the living. He has his body-mind

with all its kosas or petals, viz., Annamoy-kosa, Pranamoy-kosa, Manomoy-kosa, Vigyanamoy-kosa and lastly Anandamoy-kosa lingering with him. But the difference between him and an ordinary man is that he has felt the prakriti's illusoriness as a magician feels about his own show and is, therefore, above her control. Within a human-frame, he is, for all practical purposes, Brahman or the Absolute Himself. He has lost his own identity into that of the Absolute. As already stated, "Brahmavid Brahmaiva Vavati". The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman himself. Still for the good of his fellow-beings on earth, he somehow retains a so-called personality of his own which too he loses when he dies and when he attains Vidheha-mukti. There is also another kind of Mukti which is called the gradual or progressive liberation (Karma-mukti). It is applicable "in the cases of those persons who make advances on the right lines but do not, in this life, aim directly at right knowledge. After death, they progress from one higher life to another until they acquire direct experience of the Ultimate and are finally liberated". (Hiriyanna: The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, p. 174). A mukta-purusa²⁴ cries out saying, as it were, "Brahma satya, Jagat mithya, Jivo Brahmaiva naparah". Brahman is the only being; the world is an illusion; Jiva (soul) is Brahman or the Absolute himself and nothing else.

²⁴ According to the Hindus, there are five kinds of Mukti.

- (A) Sarsti : Attainment of all the attributes of God.
- (B) Salokya : Living in the same sphere with God.
- (C) Samipya : To go to and live with God.
- (D) Sarupya : Becoming God-like.
- (E) Sajujya : Becoming one with God.

"Atmanam Vidhi" or "Know thyself" is the essence of the teachings of Sankara and for that, people say, he came.²⁵

²⁵ Sankara differs considerably from his counterparts in the West, for example, Bradley, Hegel, etc. The reality for them is all objective whereas, for Sankara, it is subjective. The self in man speaks more for the reality, as it is, than the Universal Experience of Bradley or the Idea of Hegel does. For them, the reality is pre-eminently Thought or Reason. For Sankara, on the contrary, it is, as shown above, only a means to an end and is cast off as soon as the end is reached.

CHAPTER IV

THE ETHICAL APPROACH TO REALITY

Of the different functions of thinking, feeling and willing that a human being possesses, thought alone cannot and should not claim to have the monopoly of access to the Supreme. Approach, if it has ever to be made, must be made by the whole of man to the whole of reality. Limitation on either of the two warrants self-division, for it presupposes unapproachable recesses both in the knower and the known. This is an assumption untenable both on logical and epistemological grounds. Each of the functions has, in its own way, a peculiar sort of approach, swift or slow, more rigorous or less rigorous, more pleasing or less pleasing, to the reality. Volition, as a function, therefore, has its own manner of approach, and that is through moral deeds. Human deeds are morally right or morally wrong with reference to the highest Good that is equivalent to the Truth that reason seeks and the beauty that the aesthetic sentiments and the science of beauty try to appreciate. What that Good in-itself is, is the question that awaits an answer here. Consistently with the metaphysical standpoint that the philosophers take up, the Good admits of different interpretations. For the empiricists to whom the universe is but a cluster of ever-changing phenomena and the self equally a cluster of sensations, both having no past and no future, pleasure, necessarily physical and gross, is the only end that the human beings have in view in all their activities. This is the only end

to realise. "Eat, Drink and be Merry" is the sole motto in life.

Hrinon kritwa ghriton pibet

Javat jivet sukhon jivet.

'Borrow money which you need not repay and live in affluence till you die' is just the equivalent of the English proverb, as stated above. Carvaka in the East and Mandeville and Helvetius in the West, among others, are the proponents of this theory. Gross and egoistic as the hedonistic theory is, it has its defects latent within it, that kill its own purpose and frustrate its own end. Constant strife; consequent hatred and ill-will, apprehension, at every moment, of the dispossession of what one possesses point to a sort of psychical disquietude in man ending in the negation of what is called peace, happiness and finally pleasure in man. The theory of Altruistic hedonism which aims at the greatest good of the greatest number, creation of organisations, political or social, for the attainment of the said end, are all but futile attempts at the displacement of egoistic Hedonism as a moral standard for, in the final analysis, all these are only the means to an end and the end is always pleasure, personal and egoistic. Minus any kind of reference to one's own self and his own interest, there is nothing like the virtue of benevolence, like society and state to him. They are meaningful to him only when they contribute to his own interest. There is, therefore, something like a vicious circle surrounding the theory. If pleasure is the moral standard, it cannot help being egoistic. Again egoistic Hedonism fails to subserve its own end, as shown above. Qualitative distinction, advocated by Mill, as between good pleasure

and bad pleasure with the belief in the former being, in all cases, the end of all moral activities, leads automatically to the rejection and finally death of Hedonism as a moral standard. It is no longer the pleasure, as such, but the fact of being good that constitutes the moral standard. In this respect, the attitude of Bentham is more logical than that of Mill, for pure Hedonism admits only of quantity like intensity, extensity, duration, etc., and not of any quality, good or bad, for once this distinction is admitted, the moral excellence, as stated above, pertains to the quality of 'Good' and not to pleasure as such. Finally Hedonism, egoistic or altruistic, as a theory of moral standard, is self-suicidal. The more eagerly or directly one seeks, or aims at, pleasure, the less of it does he get. Suddenness adds to its sanctity and intensity while anticipation mars a great deal of its sweetness. Pleasure is best obtained, when least sought for and thought of. What a man actually and directly aims at is always an object whose attainment yields pleasure. "If any one violates the law of his own being by living upon his feelings rather than upon the objects to which these feelings normally belong, his power of feeling becomes gradually exhausted and he defeats his own end. He commits emotional suicide". (Dewey: *Psychology*, p. 299). The assumption of Law, social or political, made by Hobbes and others, as the test or standard of morality yields no better result. Laws by themselves are not self-sufficient. They are always means to an end . . . the end being both in the society and the state the well-being of the human beings, living in the said society and the state ; and that too is based upon the presupposition of some higher standard. Laws

vary in nature, society and statewise. They change from place to place and age to age. What is right in one society or state is wrong in another. Cow-killing is bad in Hindu society, but there is no legal bar to so doing in the Muslim and the Christian societies. The claim, put forward by a married daughter for the inheritance of the property of her father, is justifiable in one state while unjustifiable in another. Laws are subject to criticism and amendments that, in all countries, are made by Parliaments or similar other organisations. They are actually the creations more of prudence than of wisdom, more of self-interest than of the interest of others. Above all, Laws, man-made as they are, do not cover all kinds of human activities and touch only a fractional part thereof. What is in the mind of a man is, in all cases, beyond their reach. Again, deeds externally done by the thieves, cheats, black-marketeers, etc., very often than not, elude the grasp of laws, social or political. Some of them, if not all, carry on their deceptive trade, untouched by laws till they die. Thus laws, of whatsoever kind they might be, fail to constitute the highest standard that the moral instinct in man demands. What is this moral instinct? Is it a source of demand only or has it some sort of contributive function in the discernment of moral values in human conduct? According to some thinkers like Hutcheson, Herbart, Ruskin, etc., it is just like or akin to the aesthetic sense in man, that appreciates beauty in the face of a girl or in the petals of a flower. What is beauty to the lover is moral goodness to the moralist only with reference to human conduct. The aesthetic-sense discerns beauty and goodness alike in the harmonious adjustment of parts of the object as

also of the conduct of man, called respectively aesthetically beautiful and morally good. Disharmony and deformity equally speak for the absence of beauty and goodness. Beauty is objective, so is goodness. They have no reference to anything other than the thing or the deed that is beautiful or good. The subject has got no contribution to make towards the making of beauty or goodness. Beauty inheres in the object, called beautiful, so is moral goodness and badness, rightness and wrongness written large on the deeds of a man. The theory of intellectual Intuitionism likewise believes in the objectivity of moral values. But it differs from Aesthetic-sense theory on the ground that for it there is no sense, call it aesthetic or otherwise, other than reason in man. Objectively there are certain immutable and eternal differences and relations subsisting among things themselves, among human beings themselves and lastly between things and men on earth. Moral values in human conduct consist in how far the said conduct is in congruity or incongruity with these fixed and unalterable relations. If the deed fits in properly with the relations, it is morally right, if not, it is morally wrong. The result follows as of mathematical necessity ; and it is as certain as the mathematical deductions are. In mathematics, deductions are made from the mathematical relations, so also in the evaluation of the moral deeds, deductions are made from the relations in which a person stands with his fellow human-beings and things around him. What these relations, in themselves, are, is amenable only to reason whose proper cultivation, therefore, is of supreme importance to man. The philosophers like Cudworth, Clarke, etc., are the supporters of the above theory. The

more a man knows of these relations, the more successfully can he set all his activities in tune with these relations and the more of virtue does he acquire. Knowledge and virtue thus go together ; in other words, knowledge is virtue.

Whether or not aesthetic-sense or reason discerns moral excellence in human conduct, the question that still remains unanswered is as to what is it that constitutes the essence of this excellence and puts up a moral ideal for men to follow. Fitness and unfitness, congruity and incongruity, as Clarke holds, do not create morality, but it is by reference to morality alone that the human activities are found fit or unfit, congruous or incongruous. After all, reason and the aesthetic-sense are but means to an end and, as such, cannot be identified with the end itself which, in this case, is the highest moral standard. Even as a means, the latter cannot be safely relied upon. Aestheticism refers to a kind of sentiment which, by nature, is always variable and, to a great extent, blind. In feelings particularly, men differ from one another and, as such, there can be no common moral standard for all, strictly on the basis of emotion and sentiment. Every one becomes a law unto himself. Besides, experiences bear testimony to the fact that feelings, very often, deceive men by putting up a show of beauty for what is not beautiful, good for what is not good. A sense of relish and joy hoodwinks the sense of duty that is stern and obligatory. It is the stern voice of God that a man must listen to and act up to as well, if he wants to attain moral virtue. To use a human metaphor, duty speaks for what is masculine in man, and the feeling of relish and joy for what is feminine in him;

and it is the former and not the latter that is capable of, and hence called for, struggle, wherever needed, be it in the sphere of morality, politics or elsewhere. But in one respect, if not in all, the aesthetic theory as also the intellectual or the rational theory are in agreement with each other, and that is in their insistence on the objectivity of the moral values. In the modern age the modern realistic thinkers have, in a more logical manner, attempted to prove the objectivity of all values, ethical and non-ethical. In the words of Prof. J. Laird, "there is beauty, I take it, in the sky and cloud and sea, in lilies and in sun-sets, in the glow of bracken in Autumn and in the enticing greenness of a leafy spring. Nature indeed is infinitely beautiful and she seems to wear her beauty as she wears colour and sound. Why then should her beauty belong to us rather than to her?" (*A Study in Realism*, P. 129). Similarly does he think of the ethical world or the ethical value of human conduct. Moral values of good and bad belong to the action just in the same manner as redness belongs to cherry. (See *Ibid*, P. 144). The rational, the moral or the aesthetic sense only appreciates it and, in no case, has any contribution to make towards its being or existence. The majority of the English and American realists have gone a step forward in ascribing even non-physical existence to values. In fact, they believe in the eternity of the same in the realm of subsistent and not of existence. To put an example, goodness for Moore, is a simple indefinable reality. To try to define it by reference to some extra-physical reality ends in the error of metaphysics. Equally it leads to an error of naturalism, when defined by reference to some natural objects. Goodness, there-

fore, cannot be identified with any of the things called good. The impersonal and non-physical character of values and here, in this case, of the moral good, finds its antithesis in the subjective interpretation thereof, as given by the idealists, the religionists and the pragmatists. Idealism bases its theory of values, of which the moral good is one, on a Substance which is non-physical and according to some, for example, Bradley, Bosanquet, etc., experiential. Ultimate values, viz., Truth, Beauty and Goodness are identical with the ultimate Substance which, for the above-mentioned philosophers as also for the believers in their way of thought, is universal Experience. Error, ugliness and evil are all but passing phenomena which appear to have existence only in reference to this world of matter, but which are reshaped, reoriented and finally transformed into what we call Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, when looked at from the standpoint of the Absolute. From the side of this Ultimate Reality, there is nothing like error, like ugliness and like evil. In religion, the values are regarded sometimes as contents in the mind of God, and sometimes as His attributes that "make up the essence of divinity." (Rev. Ralph Inge: *The Eternal Values*, PP. 5-12). Religion relies upon divine personality for the maintenance and continuation of all values, moral, aesthetic and cognitive. Although in agreement with the Idealists and the Religionists in respect of the subjectivity of values, the pragmatists, as a class, go a step forward in denying them the absolute and supra-personal existence. Each value, for example, the moral good, is what it is only in so far as it is an instrumental to a practical end. The test of a theory lies in its effect on man, the practical pur-

pose that it serves. For James, the renowned pragmatist, goodness is a means to an end and that end is the sustenance and the growth of life. You cannot say that it fulfils a moral purpose because it is good, but it is good because it serves a vital end. The value of goodness thereby loses its self-existence and self-sufficiency and becomes subservient to something other than itself. Thus the volitional demands bend before the vital claims. Life is the most imperious claimant. Life is not for the sake of moral good but the moral good is for the sake of life. Too much of intellectual casuistries thereby end in the justification of vital needs in moral deeds. These were the forces in the world of thoughts that Prof. S. Alexander had to take note of and consider. As an appreciator of all that is good in others, he believes, with his co-thinkers in England and America, in the self-existence of the moral good, but unlike them, he rejects the notion of non-subjectivity and subsistential existence of the same. Similarly with the religionists and the idealists, he believes in the contribution of the subject in the creation of the said value, but he refuses, at the same time, to believe in the total submersion, on that account, of the value in mind or spirit. He avoids extreme subjectivity of the pragmatists that tends to become individualistic, but readily accepts the inner sociological implications of the pragmatic standard of reality. For him, both the subject and the object have equally a say in the creation of values. The appreciation of good and evil, right and wrong arises out of the community of minds, when related to the objective counterparts. But this community of minds does not represent any finite reality. It stands for the co-operation of different minds that create stan-

dards of approval and disapproval in respect, as in Ethics, of the moral deeds of human beings. As an offspring, born of the union of the standard mind and the objective counterpart, it does not virtually belong to either of them. What applies to the moral good, applies equally to other values, say for example, Truth and Beauty. In the words of Prof. Alexander, "The tertiary qualities are not objective like the secondary ones, nor peculiar to mind and thus subjective like consciousness, nor are they like the primary qualities common both to subject and object. They are the subject-object determination". (Space, Time and Deity, Vol. II, p. 238). Like all other values, the ethical value of goodness has nevertheless its self-existence. It is different from the subject and the object just as a child is different from his or her father and mother. Similarly, as a creation of the subject-object determination, it is different from the Reality itself which is neither good nor bad, neither right nor wrong. No quality is ascribable to it. "Reality is not true nor false, it is Reality." (Ibid, p. 237). Reality is above all qualities and qualifications. But for that, it is not less real than the Reality itself. Born of the union of the subject and the object, both emanating out of the primordial stuff called Space-Time, the value of goodness, as the grand-child of Space-Time, cannot be identified with anything unreal. To quote Prof. Alexander, "The mind is the highest empirical reality we know, strange that its touch should be thought to derealise its creations". (Space, Time and Deity, Vol. I, p. 245). If the value is as real as the reality itself, then why is there a side-tracking like this of the value of goodness and, as a matter of fact, of all the tertiary qualities from the main

line of emergence with which Prof. Alexander attempts to explain the universe at large from Space-Time right up to Deity? It may be that there is something like an apprehension in the Professor's mind that the value of goodness, singly or in combination with other values, viz., Truth and Beauty, may usurp the position of God or that there may be some other inner contradictions vitiating the theory of emergence, in the sense in which the Professor has taken it up, if the values are given a status ahead of mind and below the deity. The result is that the value of goodness, including others, has been given a position which is, strictly speaking, neither real nor unreal. It is not real for the reality is what it is independent of any mind or minds having any knowledge or appreciation of it, whereas in the absence of the mind to appreciate the value, there is no value at all. It is not unreal for, as begotten of two realities, viz., the subject and the object, it cannot but be real. It is, besides, out there stimulating human activities to some better ends. Then what is its intrinsic nature? The Professor fumbles and fails to give a straight answer to the question excepting cherishing a pious hope like what is stated above. He forgets that being and value are not two things, sundered away from each other. They are, like fire and heat, two aspects of the same thing. With the gradual growth or, to use the Professor's happy terminology, emergence of being, there is the concomitant growth or emergence of its meaning too that in mind, the highest emergent hitherto known to man, has resulted in a peculiar power of appreciation that consciously appreciates the goodness or badness in the conduct of man. Alexander errs when he mistakes this appreciability for the creativity of the

value. When the reality and the value are identical, there is goodness in the human conduct as also in the mind that discerns it. Growth from within and without goes together. Similarly in the sense in which the Absolute, as the all-perfect being, is above all emergence and growth, the highest value or the highest Ideal too, as identical with the highest Real, is above all emergence and growth. Yet in the sense in which the Reality is both eternal and progressive, the value too is both changeless and changeful. The fact that none can get the whole of the goodness indicates that it is both actual and ideal at the same time. Strictly speaking, it is more ideal than actual, for there is always something unattainable about it. Each case of the attainment of the moral good points always to the greater good yet unattained. This ever-progressive trend both from the side of the Reality and man forms the quintessence of what the science of morality or Ethics deals with. There are, therefore, two ways of approach to the Supreme moral Ideal—one from the side of God and the other from man. In the former case, the self-determination of God supersedes the freedom of man. Morality as God's work is indicative of His way of life and men are but tools or instruments in His hands. "The close identification of the moral life with the realisation of the supreme spiritual Principle has always created a difficulty for the ethical idealism (of the human beings). For it is obvious that, the more the identification is emphasised, the more we tend to treat the contribution of the moral individual towards the fulfilment of the supreme purpose as the expression, through him, of the operation of that Principle itself. The more we assimilate the moral life and

the divine life, the greater the difficulty in distinguishing between what in a given act is the individual's doing and what is God's. If the distinction is denied, the individual's self-determination disappears, and with that the spiritual freedom, which is the very basis of the value of the individual to himself." (Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 5, P. 410). Such a contention has further no rational explanation to offer in respect of the existence of the disvalues of the world. This view is entertained by Spinoza and subsequently by Green and others. If, on the contrary, the moral life pertains to the level of the human beings only and the supreme reality has had nothing to do with it, the moral principle, however big, with no moorings in the highest real, seems to float, as is seen in the philosophy of S. Alexander, somewhere in between the reality and man and as such, strictly speaking, is neither real nor unreal. The old difficulty crops up again. Even if the moral excellence is supposed to be rooted finally in the ultimate reality, the freedom of man, once allowed, to choose his own way in the sphere of morality, leads to the dependence of the Divine will in carrying out its own purpose on the "success or failure of the individual finite will". The attainment of the divine end is thereby left at the mercy of contingency or of man. There is the third alternative that seems to reconcile the self-realisation and self-determination of God with the moral initiative in man. The philosophy of Hegel in the West or of Ramanuja in the East is a pointer to that direction. The human self is both identical with and independent of God. Looked at from the side of empiricity, man has got an identity of his own, but from that of the Divine, he is one with God. In the

former case, man is not merely a tool in the hands of God, but a free agent working for Him. Man, in this sense, is "God's fellow-worker". The historical movement of the Reality, as elaborated in Hegelianism, is based on the conception of the unconscious Idea gradually getting, in course of evolution, self-conscious in the mind of man. The physical and the vital existences are but particular stages in its onward movement towards the self-realisation both of God as also of man as the reproduction of God on earth. Men are just like the shining sparks emanating out of the vortex of fire that is God. "The nature is a stage of transition through which the Logical Idea passes, in its evolution, into mind or spirit (Geist). That is, the Idea, which embodies itself or is externalised in nature, returns into itself and becomes mind: in mind the Idea reveals itself to itself". (Thilly: *The History of Philosophy*, P. 478). This revelation, however, admits of degree. A genius is more fully conscious or self-conscious than an ordinary man on the street. The fact of these differences in the degree of revelation as also the fact of the historical process from the lower to the higher emergences put up a rational justification for the existence of disvalues arising out of devolution which is a necessary adjunct to the evolution of the world. What is a logical process in the Idea or God is a free initiative in man. On the question of the personality of man, Ramanuja supports the above contention on the plea that although God is one, "He is not one without the 'Many' but with the 'Many' organically related to Him. The human spirit is one of those 'Many'. It is rooted in God; yet like a limb that has a specific existence apart from the whole of the organism, the spirit

has a separate existence of its own. There is, therefore, no incongruity between human personality and the divine infinitude and predetermination. Both God and man move to the same end, it being, for God, self-consciousness and for man self-realisation. Both mean the same thing. When the identity of the finite with the Infinite is fully realised and felt in a man's life, there is an automatic cessation of all movements, all moral struggles in him, for the Idea of Hegel, as the Absolute of Bradley, and God of the theists, or as the Nirguna Brahman of Sankara, is above all attributes of goodness and badness, rightness and wrongness, truth and untruth, etc. No attribute is attributable to It, although no attribute may subsist apart from and independent of It. What is sub-specie temporis ends in what is sub-specie aeternitatis. There is no duality between God and man. The will of man becomes one with the will of God and vice versa. There is no clash between the two. Freedom and necessity go together. What is freedom sub-specie temporis is a necessity sub-specie aeternitatis. History stops working. The Ideals, ethical, spiritual and lastly metaphysical, finally converge one into the other. Here the moral struggle, the religious restlessness and lastly the intellectual quickenings—all vanish, for the man has become God which he originally and essentially is. There is no want in him. The theory of Perfectionism (Eudaemonism), in the above sense, is acceptable as the highest standard of morality. If it means, however the harmonious development of the body and mind simply, it falls far short of the Ideal that morality demands and Metaphysics makes attempts to find out.

CHAPTER V

THE AESTHETIC APPROACH TO REALITY

Aestheticism supports a theory of life that identifies the moral good with the aesthetic value. Goodness and beauty are identical. Symmetry and harmony of the parts, making up the whole, is as much necessary in music as in human conduct, called good. They may start and work with different materials, but the purpose and the principle are the same. Indeed the good life is in-itself an art. A common impulse urges them both to work and create something new. The artist works from his love for the beautiful ; so does the moralist to realise the ideal of moral goodness in his life. The Platonic and Aristotelian conception of beauty tallies with the theory, as stated above. For them, beauty resides in harmony, symmetry and proportion. "Measure and proportion are the elements of beauty and of perfection." "I do not" says Plato, "mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning but . . . understand me to mean straight lines, circles, and the plane and solid figures which are formed out of them ; . . . for these I affirm to be not only relatively beautiful like other things, but they are eternally and absolutely beautiful". (Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 2, p. 445). Aristotle also subscribes to this view when he says that beauty consists in order, united to magnitude. In spite of this agreement between the two master minds their differences, based on their respective metaphysical standpoint, are

not negligible or less important. For Plato, beauty has its abode in the supra-sensuous world of which the perceived beauties on earth are only passing shadows ; whereas for Aristotle, beauty resides in the well-ordered things of the world themselves where human intelligence perceives it through the channels of the senses and through its power of imagination. Ostensibly here beauty gets the better of goodness. All values of life are, in the final analysis, aesthetical in nature. Moral good is only a means to an end and the end is the realisation of the value of beauty in life. The sense of moral obligation is an indication of some sorts of maladjustment of parts in human conduct that the man must get over to enjoy what is truly beautiful in life. Too much of emphasis on beauty at the expense of the moral good has its natural reaction leading to the opposite extreme of the total segregation of the one from the other. The moral good is independent of the aesthetically beautiful. An immoral man can have access into the temple of the beautiful, if only he has had the requisite sense to perceive it. Similarly a person, aesthetically blunt, may possess a character morally ideal. Again art is for Art's sake. It has got no reference to anything other than the beautiful. Aesthetics, therefore, "is the philosophical study of beauty regarded in itself and in its application to Art and Nature". (Ibid, Vol. I, p. 154). Etymologically considered, the term aesthetics means nothing more than the study of sense-perceptions. That it is the science of the beautiful was proclaimed for the first time, in the West, by Baumgarten who, however, relegated this science to the lower rank of sensations as opposed to the clear thinking of the intellectuals. In the modern age, Aesthetics is no

longer a science of sensations alone ; it has taken up the position of the philosophy of the beautiful. What in essence beauty is, eludes definition, for it is something unique having no genus from which it is deducible and no differentia from which it may be differentiated. It admits, therefore, of description only, (See Dr. S. N. Dasgupta ; Saundaryyatatva, Chap. 1). In India there is practically no records showing the existence of Aesthetics as a science. Only recently, Pandit Jagannath has, in his work 'Rasagangadhar', given a description of beauty as something evoking pleasing emotion in human mind. It is an emotional thrill unmotivated by any personal, social and worldly gains. Tagore Rabindranath has, in his different articles on beauty, described it as a kind of feeling, completely disassociated with the daily necessities and exigencies of human life. Dr. S. N. Dasgupta has gone a step forward in suggesting that it is not only unnecessary but is as well untouched by considerations, ethical or metaphysical. It is beauty irrespective of whether or not it is true or good. Beauty is not morally good or bad ; it is beauty. Truths revealed in scientific investigations have no relation to beauty that a lover appreciates in the face of the beloved or a poet finds in his poetry, an artist in his artistic creations. Beauty is independent both of the moral good and the scientific truth. It is only appreciated by the appreciator having the requisite sense for it. The philosophers differ, as they almost always do in all spheres of intellectual enterprises, on the question of the nature and source of beauty. It is subjective ; it is objective ; "Aesthetics is a mixed science borrowing its principles from both metaphysics and psychology so that it includes two classes of questions, the

one class bearing on the subjective feelings and the other relating to the qualities of things". There might be the third or an additional class of questions related equally to the subject and the object simultaneously. Nothing is causeless. Beauty too has its cause or causes behind. There is no phenomenon like the apprehension or appreciation of beauty always and under all circumstances. It is only on certain antecedent conditions getting fulfilled that there is in human mind a kind of a feeling of what we call beauty in the objects of the world. Thinkers there are who believe that there is, at the depth of the human mind, an urge always for the actualisation of these conditions or circumstances on the fulfilment of which depends its (man's) appreciation of beauty, nay, the existence of beauty as such. The heart of a man cries for beauty and it is this cry that brings forth into existence that which we call beauty. The beauty is in the mind of the poet and not in the poetry, in the conception of the artist and not in the artistic creations. The poem, the architecture, the paintings are so many strokes of pens and pencils brought into life by the imaginative touch of the poet and the artist. The mind adds flavour to what is otherwise flavourless and life to what is lifeless. This creative urge in mind has been identified by Rabindranath with a deity whom he calls *Kautukamayee*, eternally playing hide and seek with the poet and the lover. . . .

Eki Kautuka nitya nutan,
Ogo Kautukamayee,
Ami jaha kicu chahi balibare,
Balite detaca kai ?

Croce, an eminent Italian philosopher of the modern age is a staunch advocate of the subjective interpretation of what beauty is. He does not subscribe to the view of the existence of beauty in the objective world. For him, beauty and the appreciation of beauty are identical facts. "Monuments of art, which are the stimulants of aesthetic reproduction, are called beautiful things or the physically beautiful. This combination of words constitutes a verbal paradox, because the beautiful is not a physical fact ; it does not belong to things but to the activity of man, to the spiritual energy." (Theory of Aesthetics, Chap. xiii, p. 159). In another place Croce has said, "A picture is divided into the image of the picture and the image of the meaning of the picture ; a poem into the image of the words and into the image of the meaning of the words ; but this dualism of images is non-existent ; the physical fact does not enter the spirit, but causes the reproduction of the image (the only image which is the aesthetic fact) in so far as it blindly stimulates the psychic organism and reproduces an impression answering to the aesthetic expression already produced." (Aesthetics, Chap. XV, p. 171). The significance of what has been quoted above is that, for Croce, it is the form, the meaning or the beauty that the aesthetic-sense imposes upon the object ; and it is, in no case, the contents of the object that constitute its beauty. To quote Croce again, "We must reject the thesis that makes the aesthetic fact to consist of the contents alone, that is, the simple impressions, in like manner with the other thesis which makes it to consist of a junction between form and content, that is of impression plus expression. In the aesthetic fact the aesthetic activity is not added to the

impressions but these latter are formed and elaborated by it. The impressions reappear as it were in expression like water put into a filter which reappears the same and yet different on the other side. The aesthetic fact, therefore, is formed and nothing but formed." (See S. N. Dasgupta: *Saundaryyatva*, p. 38). The quotation, as above, in spite of what Croce pleads for, admits of double interpretations. The one is subjective and the other is objective. The one, as the giver of shape and form or as the filter itself or as the subject, has had its contribution to make towards the making of beauty and the object is supposed not to possess it except in terms of the aid rendered by the subject. The other, unlike what the idealistic thinkers like Kant, Schopenhauer, Bradley, Bosanquet, etc., uphold, is that beauty, although dependent on mind for its form and appreciation, is nevertheless rooted in the object itself. The purity of water is there in the water itself which no filter can create. This objective tendency is further accentuated in the philosophy of the naturalistic and lastly in the neo-realistic thinkers of the modern age. They believe that beauty is out there in the object independent of any mind or minds to appreciate it or to give it shape and form. G. E. Moore defines the non-subjectivity, and as a matter of fact, the independence and the universality of values (of which beauty is one) in the two following statements, which base their arguments on the intrinsic nature of things that possess value. (1) "It is impossible for what is strictly one and the same thing to possess that kind of value at one time, or in one set of circumstances, and not to possess it at another; and equally impossible for it to possess it in one degree at

one time or in one set of circumstances, and to possess it in a different degree at another, or in a different set." (2) "If a given thing possess one kind of intrinsic value in certain degree then not only must that same thing possess it, under all circumstances, in the same degree, but also anything exactly like it, must under all circumstances possess it in exactly the same degree." (Philosophical Studies, pp. 260-261, Edn. 1922). And subjectivity implies variations in values because of different kinds of appreciation by different minds. In his paper on the "Elements of Ethics" in the Philosophical Essays, B. Russell also subscribes to the above view of G. E. Moore. (See, Philosophical Essays, pp. 4-15). Alexander, yet another neo-realistic thinker of Great Britain, differs considerably from his co-thinkers in Great Britain and America as also from the pragmatists and the Idealists alike on the question of what the tertiary qualities of which beauty is one, in essence, are.²⁴ Beauty is neither subjective nor objective, but is what is called subject-object determination. Its existence depends on the union of the two, and is not ascribable to any of them or to the reality as such, "for the reality is reality" "and is neither beautiful nor non-beautiful." (See S. T. D., Vol. II, p. 237). "The rose would be red whether known to me or another and before there were eyes to see it. But the proposition is true, only because there is human appreciation of it." (Ibid, p. 237). A thing is true for there is a belief in its truth. Similarly a thing is beautiful, because there is in human mind an appreciation of the beauty. By itself, therefore, nothing is

²⁴ See Chapter on "The Ethical approach to Reality."

true, nothing is beautiful or their reverse. It smacks of pragmatism. But in fact, Alexander's theory of beauty and that of the pragmatists stand poles asunder. The pragmatists ascribe only utilitarian existence to beauty and, as a matter of fact, to all values ; but for Alexander they are as real as other realities of the world are. Begotten of two realities (Subject-Object), that emanate out of the Supreme Reality (Space-Time), it cannot but be real. It is, however, worth mentioning here that in the creation of beauty the subjectivity or the constitutive function of mind is by far greater than what it is in the spheres of Truth and Morality. And it is for this alone, if not for anything else, that Prof. Alexander calls beauty partly illusory and partly real. It is illusory because, as a percept, the object possesses no beauty. It is beautiful only when it stands in a peculiar relation to an aesthetic sense. The aesthetic sense endows the object, as it were, with beauty which, in the absence of the sense, is only a fact that, however much true, is not beautiful at any rate. Apparently in the natural objects of beauty, such as the graceful movements of animals or the beauty of human faces, etc., the beauty seems to inhere absolutely in the object. But a deeper reflection reveals that here only the parts cohere more systematically so as to stir up aesthetic feelings in whose absence, beauty is no beauty. In the creations of arts, in poetry, architecture, in paintings, etc., the subjective elements in beauty are rather more clearly discernible. But it will be a mistake, if we, for that, think that it is wholly subjective. Appreciation is always based on the coherence of the parts of the object called beautiful. Actually speaking, as has already been stated before, it is neither subjective

nor objective, but like other values, is midway between the two. Although unlike other values, personal taste or feeling has a great amount of say in the appreciation of beauty, beauty, as such, ultimately depends on the appreciation of a collective mind or society. The coherence of these collective minds, based on the coherence of the parts of the objects, yields beauty, and the absence of this coherence means ugliness. To put in a different manner, "Beauty resides in order, but we add, in expressed order. That is to say, if the order realised in a work of nature or of art is to be aesthetic, it must be manifest, evident to the sense and the intelligence. The more evident and attractive an artist can make the dominant character or principle of the chosen order, the more complete and more penetrating will be the contemplation of the percipient mind: consequently the more beautiful will the work be." (*Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. II, p. 44).

By making beauty nothing more than the creation of the subject-object determination, the thinkers like Alexander and others of his way of thinking are swerving the values and here, in our case, the beauty far away from the main line of emergence and, as such, from the Reality itself which is what it is irrespective of any mind or minds having any knowledge of it. It is not a reality, for it does not come directly out of Space-Time; and to that extent at least, we may call it unreal. The argument, based on the belief that born of subject-object combination, both of which emanate out of Space-Time, beauty too belongs to that primordial stuff, as put forward by Alexander, smacks more of sentiment than of reason. If beauty depends, to some extent even, on the

appreciation of the appreciator, if the value of beauty is a mental invention, although like other inventions, its materials are independent of the inventor, can we not equally say that the qualities too (Primary and Secondary) depend on the perception of the perceiver or the invention of the inventor, although the materials may be independent of the inventor? If coherence is the result of the selection of a selector, the qualities too may, on the same ground, be the selection of a subject. The colour of a thing has its meaning with reference to the eyes that see; so has the solidity of an object with reference to the touch-sensation that one obtains of the said object. This trend of thought, based on the subject-object relation, if once let loose, may, we are afraid, lead to subjectivism which goes contrary to the presupposition of the subject-object relationists. Our idea is that the thinkers, advocating the above theory, may get over the impasse, if they could believe in the identity of being and value and, to be more precise, if they could declare that the reality is at once a fact and a value. The realists commit a mistake when they define the ideal in terms of the real; the idealists err, when they define the actual in terms of the ideal;²⁷ the sponsors of the theory of subject-object relation make a similar mistake when they make beauty nothing more than an offshoot of the above relation. The right attitude is that which hinges

²⁷ "To say that because beauty implies a mind, therefore it is an internal state, and its physical embodiment is something secondary and incidental, and merely brought into being for the sake of permanence and communication . . . this seems to me a profound error of principle and a false idealism." (Bosanquet: *Lectures on Aesthetic*, pp. 67-68).

on the belief that the ultimate reality has both existential and axiological import. "That the world of values. . . . should have no relation to the world of facts. . . . that is the one intolerable conclusion." (Pringle Pattison: *Idea of God*, P. 45). The ultimate reality is at once both actual and ideal, fact and value. At every stage of evolution, there is not only the emergence of being but of value also. Value represents the dynamic feature of the reality but for which evolution loses all its meanings. There is, therefore, always in the reality the progress of value in conformity with the progress of being at every stage from the lower to the higher emergence. "Below the level of life, values appear in what Prof. Laird called by the name of natural election." (Alexander: *Beauty and other forms of Values*, P. 289). The sensual attraction that a male animal feels for a female one speaks, however vaguely, for the fact of the apprehension by it of what we call the value of beauty. This vague inkling into beauty in the lower kinds of being gradually, in course of evolution, becomes more and more sharpened till at last it takes up the role of higher appreciation in man. Even in man, the power of appreciation differs in degree in different persons. A poet deciphers beauty in the face of a girl or in the petals of a flower more than what an ordinary man perceives. The world is an inexhaustible objective reality of fact and value and corresponding to that there is a subjective mind which is equally a fact and a value and into which the beauty of the object enters in so far as the mind is capable of receiving it. The beauty is not what the subject creates in combination with the object, but is that which is simultaneously present both in the subject and the

object alike. If beauty stands for the value of the object, the power of appreciation of the said beauty is the value of the subject. The like can know the like ; and unless there is beauty in both of them (the subject and the object alike), there can possibly be no co-operation between the two yielding what we call beauty. The object is beautiful for there is a mind to see and appreciate it. Equally the mind appreciates beauty for there is in the world outside an object actually possessing beauty ; else beauty-appreciation on the part of the subject is no better than a pleasant imagination or a phantasmagoria. Both are conjoined together, nay, they emanate out of or are the expression of the self-same reality. It is called Brahman by the Hindus, the Absolute by the western idealists in general and the 'Idea' by Hegel. According to Hegel, the nature is not all material. It is the restricted and inert manifestation of the supreme Reality or Reason. There is in mind the potentiality of the 'Reason' more or less explicit. What is in the mind of a man or in spirit is, as a promise, in matter also. The only difference is that what is manifested in the former is unmanifested in the latter. Matter may better be called spirit or reason or the 'Idea' objectified. Essentially they are identical.²⁸ And as such, beauty resides both in the subject as also in the object. The unusually beautiful mind gleams beauty sometimes in

²⁸ "Objective spirit means the spirit which has issued forth from its inwardness and subjectivity and embodied itself in an external and outward world. The external world is not the world of nature . . . it is a world which the spirit creates for itself in order to become objective, existent and effective in the actual world."

the minutest thing that usually escapes detection by an ordinary mind. Similarly, a more beautiful object elicits perforce, as it were, the approbation or appreciation of a mind normally averse to the aesthetic features of the world of objects. The Reality or the Idea of Hegel grows both from within and without ; and there is perfect harmony between the two. What is the aesthetic comprehension of beauty in science and philosophy is the indication of a way of approach to the ultimate source of beauty or God in religion. What science or philosophy attempts intellectually to grasp, religion endeavours practically to realise. Beauty creates attraction in mind for what is beautiful, and the other name of this attraction is love. Religions, all the world over, have an element of love inherent in them. Of them Christianity and Vaisnavism of the Hindu-cult are essentially religions of love. In Christianity God is identified with love. Because of His infinite love for the human beings, He sent His own son down to the earth to atone for their sins. The Cross is the symbol of this atonement as also of the love that God bears unto His creatures. Of the significance and meaning of the death of Christ on the Cross, different views have been held by the Christian thinkers. Of them, the following may better be noted. "As a conquest of demons ; as a ransom paid to the devil (Origen) ; a recapitulation of humanity, or restoration to its condition before the fall (Irenaeus) ; a satisfaction rendered to God's honour for the insult of man's disobedience (Anselm) ; a substitutionary endurance of the penalty of man's sin exacted by the Divine righteousness (Reformers) ; an equivalent for man's punishment accepted for the ends of the Divine government

(Grotius) ; an evidence of God's sympathetic participation in man's condition (Bushnell) ; a vicarious confession or repentance (M'Leod Cambell, Moberly)." (Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 3, P. 597). Whatever be the interpretation of the event of the crucifixion of Christ, the fact that stands out unquestionable and undeniable is that The God in Christ suffered for His creatures on earth. It is not only a historical incident happening once for all. It happened in the past, is happening in the present and shall happen in the future. A mother is an eternally living example of one sacrificing her own good or interest for the sake of another. The very birth of a child results, to some extent, in the loss of the vitality and, to that extent, of the life of the mother. Besides, this kind of self-denial or self-sacrifice has had no national or geographical barrier. Siva, the prince of the ascetics, drank off poison for the redemption of mankind and the *devatas* or the gods. Bhagavan Buddha and Pralhad refused salvation for themselves leaving their fellow-brethren behind on earth to suffer the pangs of birth and death. But love can never be an one-sided game. A Christ shall ever be coming, loving and atoning for the sins of men who, in their turn, shall always be adding to them. This is unthinkable and unreasonable. Christ's atonement furnishes a chance for men to catch hold of and utilise. Else, like the five foolish virgins, they will fail to make use of the opportunity offered them and miss their ends. Blessings of God cannot be showered at random. They are based on inexorable spiritual Laws that even God does not, at His sweet will, set aside. Man is made in the image of God and given freedom of thought and

action. He is not naturally and essentially depraved. The defects found in him are the results of the misuse of the freedom given him. Of his own accord, he tasted the fruit of the forbidden tree and thereby brought death and misery into the world.²⁹ Equally can he get back to the path of divinity, if only he so wills. The God in Christ suffered for the man on earth. Similarly did the man in Christ suffered for the attainment of the divinity that, through stupidity, he managed to forget all about. Only the like can know and love the like. Man wouldst not be seeking God, if he didst not possess Him already. In tune with the above, Goethe writes,

"Were not the eye itself a Sun,
No Sun for it would ever shine,
By nothing God-like could heart be won,
Were not the heart itself divine."

Al Hallaj, a sufist, goes a step forward when he says, "I am the Truth ; I am He whom I love ; and He whom I love is I : We are two souls dwelling in one body. When thou seest me, thou seest Him, and when thou seest Him, thou seest me." (See S. Radhakrishnan : *The Heart of Hindusthan*, p. 96). The approach is two-sided—from God to man and from man to God. And the approach, in all cases, is based on mutual love and sympathy. Like the Avatars of the Hindus, Christ is both God and man in the same person, testifying to the truth of the spiritual and religious intercourse between the two ending, on the part of man, in the realisation of oneness with God. "Tat

²⁹ "Of man's first disobedience, and the fruit,
Of that forbidden tree whose mortal taste,
Brought death into the world and all our woes."

'T'vam Asi' (That thou art) and 'I and my Father are one' are indicative of the truth of this at-onement or identity between God and man. The divine pair of Radha-Krishna is a typical symbol, in the Vaisnavic cult, lending support to the above truth. Sriradha is the personification of the love of man, while the Lord Krishna stands for God. One gets merged, as it were, into the other retaining, at the same time, an unimaginably thin kind of personal identity, needed for the sports of love between the two. For all spiritual purposes, however, they are one. In the eternal Vrindavan, the eternal Radha and Krishna or, in other words, man and God, are in the eternal game of love with each other. Such a stage in the hierarchy of religious advancement is not reached all at once. For men on earth, it is more an ideal than an actual. But for that, it is not a mirage in the desert adding greater misery to an already thirsty and dying soul. Approximation to this end is possible only when a man wills and loves God in the manner Vaisnavism teaches. Here the Vaisnavic theory of love differs considerably from the theory, as enunciated in Christianity. Of the different aspects of love, Christianity recognises or emphasises only that which exists between the father and the son or the master and the servant. In Vaisnavism, on the other hand, love, in all its aspects, is taken account of as ways of approach to Reality or God. In man's relation to God, temperamental differences, as between man and man, are given full recognition. Spiritual and philosophic contemplation, servant-like obedience, friendly attraction, parental affection and lastly conjugal attachment and romance are each, in its own way, a gateway to the city of God, if

only properly pursued. Take to any of the paths and you get your salvation. The Lord promises in the Gita, "In whatever form men approach me, in that form I accept them."³⁰ The above branches of love have been given the following names by the Vaisnavas and they are (1) Santa Bhava, (2) Dasya Bhava, (3) Sakhya Bhava, (4) Batsalya Bhava and lastly (5) Madhura Bhava. The terms, as given above, are indicative of the gradual unfoldment of the petals of the flower of love till at last it reaches its full bloom in the Madhura Bhava that eludes intellectual comprehension and logical definition. In the Santa Bhava, there is more of philosophical contemplation and meditation than of love subsisting between man and God. There is more of the feeling of respect than of love in man keeping him naturally, as the respecter, at a respectable distance from the respected. Here the devotee is dazzled more by the glamour of the Lord than charmed by his personal charm and beauty. He feels as if he is so small and He is so big. He bows down before Him and, to that extent, keeps his Deity away from him. In short, it is a kind of colourless attachment which, if anything, is not love-making at any rate. The rishis and the saints having philosophic and meditative bent of mind are the traditional pilgrims treading this path. In the Dasya Bhava, the barrier between the two is, to a considerable degree, removed for, there as a servant, the man gets into close touch with his God whom he serves to his heart's content. Bhaktas like Bidur, Pralhad, etc., are the followers of the above path.

'Ye yatha mam prapadyante,
Tam tathaiva bhajamyaham.

(The Bhagavat Gita, Chap. IV, Sloka, 2).

In Sakhya Bhava, the contact is still closer. As friends, they are equal, and like equals they treat each other. Subal, Sudam, etc., the shephard-boys of Brindavan, looked upon Krishna more as a loving friend than as God incarnate. To them, He is more human than divine. They love and often quarrel with Him. Yet the beauty of the body and mind of the Man-God has so enamoured their heart and soul that they can hardly bear the pangs of His separation even for a moment. They are, as it were, Krisna-intoxicated. In Batsalya Bhava, the sweet sentiment of filial love and affection is instrumental to the attainment of God looked upon as a helpless child demanding affectionate care of His parents. Mythological characters like Jasoda and Kousilla are the typical representatives of the saints, following this particular path leading to their salvation or mukti. The Madhura Bhava comprises all the aforesaid four Bhavas and is yet a push ahead. This indicates a sort of love that a devoted wife bears unto her husband or, to put it more accurately, that a wife feels for a person other than her husband. In the latter case, the flow of love becomes more and more powerful and intense because of the social barrier standing in the way of free mixing. It reached its ideal climax in the life of Radha and Krisna, so beautifully delineated in Brahmapurana. An excerpt from Dwija Bidyapati's work like—

“Janama abadhi ham (Syam) rupa neharenu,
Nayana na tirapita vela,
Lakha lakha yuga hiye hiye rakhanu,
Tabu hiye yurana na gela.”

(Since my birth I have been enjoying the beauty of Syam ; still my eyes want to see more of it. For millions

and millions of *jugas*, I have been hugging him to my breast that knows yet no satiety) bears ample testimony to the above truth. It is an eloquent expression of the unparalleled love and attraction that Sriradha entertains for Srikrishna. The more she loves, the more she wants to love Him. The more she hugs Him to her bosom, the more the bosom craves for the touch of the beloved. Embracing, hugging, kissing, etc., psychologically analysed, are symptomatic of attempts at becoming one with the beloved whom he or she hugs, embraces and kisses. This oneness is bound to happen in the long run, else this urge, bodily and mental, is meaningless which it can not be, for genuine cries of body-mind must have their wants fully satisfied somehow and somewhere. Hunger points to food; thirst to water. So does the thirst for beauty points to the infinitely beautiful. “*Nalpe sukham asti ; vumaiva sukham.*” No finite can yield real happiness and bliss; only the infinite can. The urge in the lover to become one with the beloved must, therefore, end finally in merging the lover into the beloved or, in other words, in the unity of the two. Radha and Krishna are not two personalities, but they are essentially one.³¹ The duality

³¹ Reference may be made to the dialogue as between Sri Chaitanya and Rai Ramananda in respect of the highest spiritual Ideal that the human beings have to strive for. Of all the stages of love from Santa to Kanta prem, Ramananda defines Kanta prem as the highest one. Sri Chaitanya wants to know if there is still any stage higher than the highest, as stated above. As soon as Rai Ramananda, as a reply to the query, begins to talk about Prema-Bilasa-Vivarta which means complete identity of the lover with the beloved, of man with God, of Radha with Krishna, Sri Chaitanya suddenly places his hand on the lips of Rai Ramananda just to stop him talk any more about it, for he

thus vanishes into identity. Dualism ends in monism. Of "I and my Father" only the Father exists, for the son loses his identity and disappears in his Father. Similarly, of "That Thou art" only That persists and the Thou is merged in That. There is no Jiva but only, Siva, no Radha but only Krisna, no individual self but only the Universal Self. From the standpoint of man on earth, this is what the Vedanta (according to Sankara's exposition) calls *mukti* whose other name in Buddhism, is *Nirvana*. At this stage, only Brahman or the Absolute exists with no second beside or beyond it, if of course the category of existence is at all attributable to the attributeless, for it is *nirguna*. Brahman is the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end of the world-drama staged on the phenomenal platform of space in an equally phenomenal series of time.*

feels that it is too big for the average human beings to understand and act up to. Religion thrives on duality. The absence of duality means the absence of religion, for there is no worshipper and the worshipped, no man and no God. It bespeaks of a state, rationally understandable, but appreciable and realisable only through inner vision and mystic insight. But as all men have no mystic vision, this is meant for a favoured few who are not, for that, irreligious but are supra-religious. They are above all bonds of religiosity. They feel like saying,

"Na So Ramana, Na Hama Ramani,
Duho Mana Manovava Pesala Jani."

There is obliteration of the distinction of sex, of caste and creed ; in fact there is obliteration of everything excepting the Supreme One. That One exists and none else.

* Based on a talk at the Rotary Club, Barrackpore, in August, 1967.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

From what has hitherto been discussed, it is now abundantly clear that the metaphysical reality is not approachable through intellect alone, but is amenable to emotion and volition as well. But are the functions of mind, on that account, totally divorced from one another so that, for example, what the intellect knows the volition does not will nor does the emotion feel ? It means negation of mind as a unitary whole which it obviously is not, for it goes counter to the most ordinary experiences of the human beings. Mind is one unit that comprises thinking, feeling and willing. In a conscious situation, there can, therefore, be no artificial separation of the one function of mind from the rest. The question is one of degree only in respect of the predominance of one function over the remaining two. None is totally absent in any of the conscious situation. Jnana, Karma and Bhakti always march together to the common end. In thought, there are, however vague, certain elements of feeling and willing ever present. Similar is the case when either of the two, feeling or willing, dominates consciousness. Thought without any love for the object, thought of, that springs out in some sort of bodily activities, is naturally dry and short-lived. Similarly willing is aimless and random unless it refers to a known object that inspires love for it. Lastly, the feeling of love, without the knowledge of the object of love, that stimulates activities in a lover, is empty and vague and is susceptible

to the pitfalls of moral lapses and delinquencies. The fact is that a "man's whole psychical constitution is involved in his movement" towards the Truth, metaphysical, moral and aesthetical. The whole of man goes to the whole of the Reality that we may better call the Absolute or Brahman, if any name may ever be given to the nameless and the unnameable.


APPENDIX

(A)

PHILOSOPHY ANTI-METAPHYSICAL

Yet there are philosophical thoughts that are anti-metaphysical in attitude. Not to speak of Kantianism and Humeanism, particular reference, in the modern age, may be made to Pragmatism & Logical Positivism. The term pragmatism comes from the Greek word 'Pragma' which means action. It was used, for the first time, by C. S. Peirce in his article entitled "How to make our ideas clear" published in the popular Science Monthly for January, 1878. Action on man is the criterion of truth. All theories, metaphysical or non-metaphysical, shall therefore ultimately depend, for their acceptance or non-acceptance, on how far they do or do not satisfy the practical needs of man. This being the criterion of truth, there can be no fixed truth or reality as such that is acceptable to all. It is changeable from man to man. The objects of perception, in the world outside, are not the same for all men. No one object is just the same to two persons at a time. To each of them, it is uniquely its own, although superficially to an unscientific mind it may appear just the same thing. Guided always by a sense of self-interest, the will in man exerts a tremendous influence on his perceptual and, as a matter of fact, on all his activities. He carves out of the perpetual flux, a brute reality, whose nature is ever unknown to all, facts of perception that are of interest to him. It is, as it were, a statue, carved

out of shapeless block of marble, that is of little interest to the statue-maker. The reality, because of its meaning in his life, lies in the statue only, the marble being left out of consideration. "What we say about reality depends on the perspective into which we throw it. The 'That' of it is its own ; but the 'What' depends on the 'Which' and the 'Which' depends on us. As a concrete illustration of such human determination of reality,



James gives the adjoined figure which can be treated as a star, or as two big triangles crossing each other, or six triangles hanging together, etc. Though the

'That' given in sensation is the same, the 'What' is determined by human treatment, even the number of the sensed object is a matter of human choice. And what is more instructive, all the human treatments of the 'sensible that' are true. We at once understand that there may not be any inconsistency in there being many truths about what is ordinarily regarded as the same reality. The so-called 'given' reality is an ambiguous stuff which can be variously treated by the mind according to its own interest, purpose and choice, and it thus gives rise to diverse realities and truths. Reality is not found by us, but it is made by us." (D. M. Dutta: *The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy*, PP. 217-218). The maxim "Man is the measure of all things" is thus seen very faithfully maintained by the pragmatists as the touchstone of all their philosophical thoughts, metaphysical, psychical or logical. From what has been stated above, it appears abundantly clear that pragmatism, as a philosophical theory, stands at the cross-road between Idealism and Realism. Emphasis on

mind as the creator of reality smacks of Idealism ; similar emphasis on the objective back-ground which exists independently of the subject and out of which realities are carved by minds indicates leaning towards Realism. Truly speaking, it belongs to none, and rather holds a balance between the two, and in so doing entertains a philosophical theory which is undoubtedly not anti-metaphysical but metaphysical in the general sense of the term and which is neither solipsistic nor realistic or which, in a different sense, is both. In the face of the definition of reality as a changing dynamic process or in view of its belief in a dumb, evanescent, aboriginal objective stuff as the ideal limit ever incomprehensible by human mind or in consideration of many other facts or factors including what is stated in James's varieties of religious experience,³² it appears to be no question of the denial of metaphysics but the type of it that pragmatism seems to favour. And in the interpretation of the 'seeming', the majority of the thinkers lend support to Idealism. Likewise, Logical positivism, more antagonistic to metaphysics than even pragmatism, cannot fully do away with metaphysical speculations (in a liberal sense of course), when in each case, a protocol statement, in order to be what it is, necessitates verification with reference to an object, not itself an experience or a proto-

³² We and God have business with each other ; and in opening ourselves to his influence our deepest destiny is fulfilled. The Universe, at those parts of it which our personal being constitutes, takes a turn genuinely for the worse or for the better in proportion as each one of us fulfils or evades God's demands. As far as this goes I probably have you with me, for I only translate into schematic language what I may call the instinctive belief of mankind. God is real since he produces

col statement.^{32a} That object may not be, in the strict sense of the term, trans-empirical, but is not, for that, transformable into empiricity. It is independent of human experience and of the protocol statements made thereof. This objective counterpart consisting, as the logical positivists believe, of empirico-logical and mathematical facts or truths, is indeed knowable but is not, on that account, knowledge-dependent. It has its existence out there independent of the mind that knows it. By defining language as the symbolic representation of the facts that are experienced, and by identifying elements of knowledge with pictures of atomic facts of experience, Wittgenstein is virtually lending support to the above view. The theory of verification, sponsored by Rudolf Carnap and his fellow-thinkers is an instance, furthermore, of the reiteration of the statement, as above. Reduction of the datum of experience into simple propositions or, in other words, into simple sentences consisting of words and avoidance thereby of the 'beyond'

real effects.....God's existence is the guarantee of an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved. This world may indeed, as science assures us, some day burn up or freeze; but it is part of His order, the old ideals are sure to be brought elsewhere to fruition, so that where God is, tragedy is only provisional and partial, and shipwreck and dissolution are not the absolutely final things". (W. James; *The varieties of Religious Experience*, P. 507).

^{32a} What an atom is to the scientists, a protocol statement is to the Logical positivists. All significant propositions, constituting the subject-matter for the Logical positivists to deal with, are reducible to protocol statements. They are, by nature, simple propositions derivable from and verifiable in experience. Any proposition, not reducible to empirically verifiable protocol statements, is, for the above thinkers, of no philosophical significance and has to be shunned as useless.

or extra-language existence of reality, is analogous, in its own way, to the reduction, by the idealists, of the world of matter to the world of Ideas. As Ideas cannot hang in the air and bear any meaning except in relation to a container of ideas, necessarily universal, for the ideas are universal properties, so language (proposition) too refers to a common meaning-sustainer but for which or whom language is a barren sound either of the strokes of pen or of the movements of tongue conveying no sense. This container of ideas or the sustainer of meanings, by virtue of being universal, is beyond total comprehension by any of us, however rich in thought, acute and keen. And thus far at least it is ontological. To argue still that metaphysics is an art of expression (dealing with outburst of sentiments, as in lyrics, exclamations, etc., having nothing objective to correspond to),³³ while the philosophy of language, based as it is on empirical sciences, is that of representation does little improve the situation in the direction the logical positivists desire. If the former is basisless or objectless, so the latter too is, for it has had, ex-hypothesis, no touch with the objects

³³ "If, for instance, somebody is laughing, we may take this as a symptom of his merry mood; if on the other hand he tells us without laughing: 'Now I am merry', we can learn from his words the same thing which we inferred in the first case from his laughing. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental difference between the laughter and the words: 'I am merry now'. This linguistic utterance asserts the merry mood, and therefore it is either true or false. The laughter does not assert the merry mood but express it. It is neither true nor false, because it does not assert anything, although it may be either genuine or deceptive. Now many linguistic utterances.....have only expressive function, no representative function. Examples of this are cries like 'Oh, Oh' or, on higher level, lyrical verses". (Morton White: *The Age of Analysis*, P. 219).

whose representations only, the logical positivists believe, they deal with. In both of these cases, on their own assumption, the reality or the object, as it is, is ever out of human grasp. If, on the contrary, representation refers to something that is represented, language-philosophers, because of their recognition of the seen world as tallying with the world of representation, unknowingly, as it were, refer to the existence of a world of reality or realities beyond the world of representations, and to that extent at least, the philosophy of language becomes identical with metaphysics. Truly speaking, metaphysics is the science and art both of expression and representation alike for, in the ultimate analysis, the terms are, more or less, of identical meaning. It represents facts tangible and expresses meanings hidden. Even the lyrical verses, referred to above, have objective references, often tangible enough for representation (as in descriptive poems) and sometimes hidden enough for philosophical interpretation (as in romantic and reflective poems). Philosophy (metaphysics) passes from the seen to the unseen, from representation to expression and denies none. Therefore, language-philosophy or, we may add, Pragmatism too, is as much metaphysical as Hegelianism is. And they set sail all together in search of the Truth as Colombus did for the discovery of America.

APPENDIX

(B)

INTELLECT VS. INTUITION

All sources of knowledge, when fully analysed, finally trickle down to what we call Intellect and Intuition. And philosophers all the world over pass on to either of the two camps supporting the one and denying or, at any rate, belittling the other. The rationalist stigmatises Intuition as something of the kind of feeling that is naturally fluctuating, blind and hence undependable. Feeling changes from man to man, and that too again takes up a new shape and colour under different circumstances, physical or psychical. A thing appears extremely lovable to one person while to the other, it is no better than the average ; and even to the very same person, under a different set of circumstances, the lovable thing becomes an unlovable and often detestable one. Sometimes it is colourless, as it were. Instances of two loving souls turning out inimical to each other are not rare in the world. Even the claim, put forward by the Intuitionists in favour of Intuition as the only source of knowledge, depends on the verdict of Reason and Reason alone. To kill Intellect, one has to take the help of the Intellect. In the pursuit of Knowledge, one cannot, therefore, do away with Intellect or reason. It is Reason and Reason alone that only has a say in the discernment of truth or in truth-realisation. Opposed to it, the supporters of the theory of Intuition have some counter arguments of their own to give. In-

tellekt as a method supports analysis. The essence of philosophy, if any, is, in the words of Prof. Russell, "analysis and not synthesis." The rationalists, in their solicitudes for the parts, lose, in course of division and elimination, the vision of the thing as a whole which is primarily the object of knowledge and not the parts, as analysed. An elephant, for example, is known adequately and properly or, in short, truly only when it is known as a whole and not as parts segregated into so many plantain-tree-like legs, winnowing fan-like ears, etc. And the whole is more amenable to the sympathetic intuition than to the, what we call, rationalistic comprehension of a man. What is true of the elephant is more true in the case of the Truth that is beyond the grasp of the senses. Again, although not as deeply as it is in the case of feeling, personal factor, for a rationalist also, plays an important part in the assessment of the truth of a thing with the result that a thing, as it is, bereft of all personal equations, is never known. Each one of men takes the view of a thing from his own standpoint or angle of vision ; he takes, therefore, only a sectional view of the thing and the section can never speak for the whole. The world is what it is to his sectionally tinged intellect and not what, in totality or in fact, it is. So long as he fails to get over the limitations of the intellect, he is tied down to a world of his own, dissimilar to what it is to others or what, in reality, it is. An apparently common thing is not quite common to all. There is an intrinsic difference in each case of perception or, in other words, in each case of knowledge, based on intellection. Perception and intellectual apprehension or, what we call, the rational knowledge belongs to the personal level

of human experiences ; and as each man is different from others of his kind, there is a difference in the nature of knowledge that each obtains or possesses. Intuition, on the contrary, obliterates this distinction between man and man, object and object and lastly between man and object. It is something of the kind of sympathy that makes the knower and the known identical ; and identity leaves no unapproachable recesses in either of the two getting identified with each other. Knowledge here is thorough without any gap or reservation any where. The dualism of the Intellect vanishes into the monism of the Intuition. And for this, Bergson "holds that the method by which we arrive at metaphysical truth consists not in the exercise of the intellect, but in the deliverances of a faculty which he calls intuition. It is through intuition, and through intuition alone, that we realise our participation in the vital surge," which, for him, is the Ultimate Reality that philosophy seeks and sciences cry for. (Joad: Introduction to Modern Philosophy, P. 94).

Discussions, as above, naturally lead to the contention that Intellect and Intuition are the two absolutely detached faculties of human mind going, in all respects and in all relevant spheres, counter to each other: What is true for the one is false for the other and vice versa. If the Intellect is partial in vision, the Intuition is dogmatic in assertion with chances of lapsing into the illusions of phantasmagoria or of wistful thinking. Is this contention, however, justifiable? Unless there is something like what is anarchical in the spirit of a man, no two functions of mind can reasonably be at loggerheads with each other in the manner, indicated above. If the

mind is a unitary whole, all functions thereof must be interrelated, one with the other, without losing, of course, their respective identities. They are separable and inseparable at the same time. They are separable for each of them has a specific roll to play ; they are inseparable for they are but limbs, as it were, of a common organic whole from which each draws its sustenance . In this sense, Intellect is no negation of Intuition nor the Intuition is of the Intellect. They are but different stages or stations, indicative of a process onward from the lower to the higher perfections of human mind or its capabilities. Sensation, perception, reasoning and lastly intuition constitute the history of how a mind develops, step by step, each one of which reaches its fulfilment in the next higher one. Naturally, therefore, the last one, viz., the Intuition does not so much annul as engulf or, in other words, fulfil them all . In the light of what is stated above, Intuition is sensation, perception, reasoning, etc., and is yet something more than the mere sum-total of them all. It is mystical in nature, but not non-rational or even non-perceptual therefor . It is the consummation of all the faculties of a man . It is this mystic insight that culminates in the vision of the Truth or the Reality that is away from the clutches of the senses and reasonings of man.

Nayamatma prabachanena lavva
 Na medhaya na bahuna srutena
 Yamebaisa brinute tena lavaya
 Statsaisa atma bibrinutetanun syam.

(Katopanishad, Sl. 23).

The Atma (Reality) is not knowable through the study of the Vedas nor through the sharpening of the intellect

nor by hearing talks on sastras. He, to whom the Atma reveals itself, knows the Atma or the reality as it is. "Mysticism and not Rationalism is the last word in the science of God and the Ultimate."

APPENDIX

(C)

IMMORTALITY OF SOUL*

If immortality of soul is a postulate of religion, religion too, in a sense, is a postulate of the theory of immortality. If God exists and if religion in the form of an eternal relation between God and man is a fact, then the permanence of the human soul or its survival after death is a truth that none can deny. Deny religion and deny the immortality of the soul or assert religion and assert the immortality of the soul. These are the two alternatives open to mankind for acceptance. The materialists accept the former and the idealists the latter. In spite of differences amongst the materialists or the atheists with regard to the nature of the soul, they are nevertheless one in their opinion that the soul is made of dust and to dust (matter) it returns after death. It has no independent existence that survives bodily death. It is indeed a brain function with which it rises and falls or arises and collapses. Hume and Mill defined mind as a collective name given to the bundle of impressions, received through the senses and connected together by the forces of association. Whether or not, these impressions or the mental states are bound up together by the laws of association, it goes beyond one's wit to understand how these states separately or in their combination ac-

* Taken from the Author's book entitled 'Some Problems of the Philosophy of Religion' with a little addition and alteration here and there.

count for the idea of the selfhood in men or for the sense of 'I' that is actually understood in and, therefore, precedent to, each of these mental impressions or states which, but for it, are mere abstractions. It is indeed the one abiding and persisting agent that unifies these otherwise disconnected and hence meaningless states into a coherent and meaningful whole by appropriating them all as its own states of knowing, feeling and willing. It is, as it were, the string on which each of the flowers hangs so as to constitute a garland. Cut out the string, and there is no garland of flowers. The 'I' or the 'Ego' indicates a reality that is above and beyond the mere sum-total of these mental states and processes, and by reference to which alone they are what they are. And it is the soul that does not die with the cessation of the above processes. Plato, in course of various dialogues, has developed as many as ten arguments in favour of the theory of immortality. The most important of them is what is based on the assumption of the 'simplicity' of the soul. Here he differs considerably from his master Socrates who entertains an attitude of agnosticism towards the problem of the immortality of soul. Simple as the soul is, it is uncompounded, and as such, indissoluble. Hence it is above death for death means dissolution. Neo-realistic thinkers like Russell and others of his way of thought steer clear out of both matter and mind in the sense in which they are conventionally used, and identify mind with the cross-section of the neutral entities. They are neutral in the sense that, in themselves, they are neither mind nor matter. As a matter of fact, they are no entities at all. Viewed at the cross-section, it is mind, and the self-same entities, looked at from a different pers-

pective, constitute matter. In spite of the obliteration of all distinctions between mind and matter, the neo-realistic thinkers are, by temperament and profession, objective in leanings. Out-Heroding Herod, as it were, they have gone a step forward in depriving mind of the subjective or even epiphenomenal status that the traditional materialists and the atheists condescended to ascribe to it. Mind is as objective as matter, and there is not the slightest tinge of subjectivity around it. Essentially the subject is equal to the object or, in other words, they are identical. Ontologically less mindful as they are, the British and the American neo-realists do not bother much about the epistemological problem of how mind, as a self-conscious agent, acts on and is reacted against by the objects. As a matter of fact, they fail to give a plausible account of mind as a self-conscious entity. The only exception is found in the philosophy of Samuel Alexander, which admits of qualitative and not quantitative distinction between matter and mind. Mind is an emergent quality arising at, and certainly not caused by, a certain stage of neural complexes. This is the highest quality that has hitherto emerged out of Space-Time in its nisus towards the "Deity". He identifies consciousness with self-consciousness. Knowing is equal to self-knowing. In knowing an object, the knower knows himself. Whether knowing, in all cases, anticipates self-knowing, or whether self-knowing comes next to knowing is not the problem that concerns us here and now. The point at issue is that Alexander, unlike his co-thinkers, proposes to accord a unique status to mind which, although not independent of Space-Time, is not, on that account, reducible to, or caused by, matter and

finally by Space-Time. It is obviously as transitory as the epiphenomenon or the brain-product of the traditional materialists. Take away neural complexes, and finally Space-Time, and there is no substantive mind. In final analysis, it becomes identical with spatio-temporal contour which, if anything, is not conscious at any rate. And as such, the arguments that are generally put forward against the materialistic interpretation of the status of mind, are equally applicable in the case of neo-realism as well.

That there is matter is known in and through mind. The theory of the directness of perception or of comprehension and enjoyment, as advocated by Samuel Alexander, cannot do away with the mental character of knowledge. It is the subject that knows the object and not *vice versa*. Minus mind, there is nothing that is knowable. If priority is ever to be given, it is to be given to mind which is known first and which is perhaps the only thing known, for knowledge is confined to ideas and mental representations of objects, if any, in the world outside. The theory of Conservation of Energy provides no less difficulty for the materialists to account for the advent of mind out of matter. If one form of physical energy is transformable into another form of physical energy only, mind as a non-physical entity cannot be a product thereof without, at any rate, any diminution of the stock of energy that is supposed to remain constantly the same in quantity. Mind or soul (used in the same sense in Western philosophy) is thus independent of matter. So the death of the body does not mean the death of the soul. Besides these logical proofs, there are certain rational-cum-sentimental grounds as well, that justify

the theory of the deathlessness of the soul. Both in religion and in morality, there is one supreme Ideal to follow. This supreme Ideal does never become actual for, in that case, it loses its ideality as also its superiority in preference to a still superior one, for the universe, physical and mental, is ever on the move forward and is never at rest. For the religionists, God is the supreme Ideal. Partaking of the nature of the Absolute Self, the human self, consciously or unconsciously, is ever making approach towards Him. The more he knows, the more he wants to know of Him. There is no hide and seek game, no mirage, no deception at any step. At every stage, there is the bliss and at every step ahead, there is more and more of it. God is infinite and so the quest after Him is through infinite time. In this eternal game of love between God and man, between the divine and the human spirits, as in religion, none loses its identity. God is eternal and so the human soul is. The self-surpassability of the intellectual curiosities, emotional appreciability and volitional motivity tend to support this contention, for these innate urges in man cannot all be in vain or for nothing. On a similar consideration, the pursuit of the supreme Ideal in morality anticipates the eternal existence of the soul that knows no death or decay. Kant, in his Critique of Practical Reason, employs the same argument in proving the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. The moral sense demands that virtue and happiness must go together. Very often than not, the reverse happens in the world. Honesty brings in misery and dishonesty affluence. This state of things cannot continue. It must have its end, when not in this life, in the life and lives to come hereafter. As of neces-

sity, therefore, the soul of man with his personal identity must survive physical disintegration.³⁴ Similarly to associate virtue with happiness and vice with misery, there must be an unerring dispenser of justice, who is all-knowing, all-powerful and, in short, all-perfect. He is God. As the embodiment of the moral excellences that the moralists strive for, He is at once the supreme Ideal of the moralists and God for worship and reverence of the theists. In this eternal game of morality and religion, both God and man, as partners, are eternally present.

³⁴ In recent days, members of the Psychical Research Society have taken to observation and experiment as methods employed in the objective study of the spirits and their activities. Physical phenomena "like the movements of objects, responsive raps, levitation of human beings, etc., and the Psychical phenomena like thought-transfusion, automatic writing and speaking of messages which lie beyond the knowledge of the medium" are, for many of the members of the Society, proofs, beyond doubt, for the survival of spirits after physical death.

APPENDIX

D

FREEDOM OF WILL*

Society, state and international ethicism enjoin some obligations on each of the citizens of the world. Obligations, on their part, call for certain rights and privileges for the citizens to enjoy. Of them the freedom of choice is the most fundamental one. Denial of this basic right virtually means the denial of responsibility on the part of the responsible. What is true of the day-to-day secular life of man is equally true of man in his dealings with his God. If he is not free to approach his God in the manner he wants, if his love or aversion for God is not his own doing, credit or discredit, virtue or vice cannot and should not cling to him on account of his love for or hatred against God.³⁵ Yet there are some philosophical theories that appear to have lent support to what we call grim determinism in the workings of nature and man. For example, the materialists attach no sanctity to mind exercising discretion in all its acti-

³⁵ "Our wills are ours, to make them Thine" is the basal faith of the religious devotee; and unless our wills are ours, in the first instance, such a faith could hardly be more than an empty mockery. (Cunningham: Problems of Philosophy, P. 370).

* Taken from the Author's book entitled 'Some problems of the philosophy of Religion' with a few additions and alterations.

vities. As a by-product of matter, it is under the control of the same law of causality that reigns supreme in the physical world. The volition in a man is an effect of some antecedent events, physical or mental, working as cause in an unbroken series of causes and effects. The strongest of the volitions, when arisen, automatically bursts forth into the inward or outward deed of a man in which, personally, he has had no initiative to take. It occurs as a matter of course. If a man thinks that he has done a thing at his own discretion, the leaf of a tree, had it been a self-conscious reality, could have equally felt and said that it had, at its own accord, fallen down, while in actuality it had been drawn down to the earth by the force of gravitation. The sensationalists, like the materialists, uphold the same theory of necessitarianism both in the world of matter and of mind. By nature self-imposing, sensationalism, as a theory, ignores subjectivity in the workings of mind. In volition, as in cognition and emotion, it is not a subject or an ego but the sequences of events in the impurposive causal nexus that work and count. Liberty is a meaningless term, for it means a break in the causal chain. Each of the volitional activities is, in that case, just a causeless new beginning, and no science, worth its name, can think of an event having no cause behind. What is mechanical determinism to the scientists and certain sections of philosophers ascends to what is called pre-determinism in religion.³⁶ To God who is omniscient, there is no-

³⁶ Christianity, as a religion, retains the freedom of man, however, on arguments similar to what is stated below. "When God breathed into his (man's) nostrils the breath of life and man became a living soul, he was pure and spotless, untouched

thing unseen and unknown. He has fore-knowledge of all that had happened in the past, is happening in the present and shall happen in the future. So in the eye of God, every action of man is predetermined and he has had nothing to do independently and at his own initiative.

Determinism or pre-determinism, man as man is, in both the cases, reduced to the status of an automaton. In either case, consciousness or self-consciousness in man is an unkind joke, cut by God and/or by the blind forces of nature ; at any rate, it is a superfluity that ought not to have come into existence at all. But the fact of the distinction between a machine and an organism as also the fact of human reason, that alone is the sole judge to decide whether or not man's activities are predetermined by agencies or agency other than the self, go a long way to support the contention that there is something in man, which does not admit of mechanical interpretation, and that in all his activities, man is relatively independent of the extraneous forces or agencies. It is called 'Relatively' for self-determination does not deny the theory of causality and the possibility of the self being influenced by external forces, physical or mental. What it wants to insist on is that these influences are absorbed in and by the self and the final say or initiative, in all its deeds, rests always with the self alone.

by sin, innocent of evil ways ; through the free act of will Adam, the first man, disobeyed the command of God and fell, and with him fell the entire race of mankind. Evil is sin ; sin is transgression of God's will,.....Thus came evil into the world ; the free will of man is its gateway. The postulate of freedom is therefore necessary as an explanation of the fact of evil." (Cunningham: Problems of Philosophy, PP. 371-372).

The choice made in favour of one desire in preference to all others, as at the stage of the conflict of desires (Motive), the discretion exercised in the adoption of means for the realisation of the end (Intention) are the factors, indicative of the freedom of man. The term 'strongest motive' is meaningless, for as a chosen desire, it is only one with none to vie with. Strong or weak, the desire, the motive and the intention are meaningful only, when related to an ego, which desires, intends and in whose absence they are only mechanical urges, indistinguishable from one another. That which gives them sense can, by no logic, be itself made sensible by them. Further, there is no incongruity between the human personality and the divine predetermination. Human activities are set in time series. Events in the past and in the future are both absent in the present. But in the Absolue or in the eye of God, there is no past or future. Both shrink to perpetual present. In Him, there is eternal here and now and no hereafter or heretofore. In Him, there is nothing like beginning, nothing like end, everything is. The following quotations From BHAGAVADGITA will bear ample testimony to what is stated above.*

"Ithai kastham jagat krtsnam
pasyadya sacracaram
mama dehe gudakesa
yaccanyad drastum icchasi".

Here today, behold the whole universe, moving and unmoving and whatever else thou desirest to see, O

* The Chap. XIth, as a whole, may be read.

Gudakesa (Arjuna), all unified in my body. (Shree Bhagavad Gita, Chap. XI-7).

“Tasmat tvam uttistha yaso labhasva
jitva satrun bhunksva rajyam samriddham
mayai vaite nihatah purvam eva
nimitta matram bhava savyasacin”.

Therefore arise thou and gain glory. Conquering thy foes, enjoy a prosperous kingdom. By Me alone are they slain already. Be thou merely the occasion O savya sacin (Arjuna)”. (Ibid, Chap. XI-33).

“Dronam ca Bhisman ca Jayadratham ca
Karnam tatha anyan api yodhaviran
maya hatan tvam jahi ma vyathistha
yudhyasva jetasi rane sepatnan”.

Slay Drona, Bhishma, Jayadratha, Karna and other great warriors as well, who are already doomed by Me. Be not afraid. Fight, thou shalt conquer the enemies in battle. (Ibid, Chap. XI-34.)

APPENDIX

E

METAPHYSICS AND RELIGION.*

Similarity

Both aim at the Fundamental or Fundamentals that is or are at the back of the universe. Both attempt to get beyond the veil of phenomena in quest of the noumenon or noumena behind them. Both enjoin mental discipline as the prerequisite for the attainment of truth. Both have faith in the capacity of human mind to get into touch with the reality. Both underestimate phenomena in preference to the noumena. Both start with the ordinary experiences of life, which they do not deny but which they chasten and intensify.

Difference

They differ on the question of the method to follow. Metaphysics supports mainly the method of induction, and religion supports that of deduction. The former undertakes scientific treatment of the transcendental, and the latter encourages surrender to the spiritual. The former is primarily objective, and the latter is subjective in leanings. For the one rational investigation yields knowledge of truth, whereas for the other, love for and faith in God bring a devotee face to face with his God. The one has no preconceived notion of what it seeks, and the other starts with a belief in God

* Taken from Author's book entitled 'Some Problems of the Philosophy of Religion'.

The one knows the truth theoretically, and the other realises it practically. The one is rational in outlook, and the other is mainly emotional in leanings. The one is wider in scope inasmuch as it deals with the reality in its relation to the world at large, and the other deals primarily with God in relation to man. The one is comprehensive enough to include all the elements of the human mind—thought, emotion and volition for investigation and study, the other is wedded mainly to the softer side of the nature of man in its attraction for the ultimate. The one is for knowing and the other is for feeling the truth, as it is. The one is cosmocentric, and the other is ego-centric. The one wants to know the truth and the other wants to touch it. The one satisfies the intellectual hunger, and the other fulfils the emotional need. The one belongs to the head of a man, and the other to his heart. In the words of Galloway, religion differs from metaphysics," in beginning with the idea of God instead of reaching it at the last". In the case of religion, "it is terminus a qua" and in the case of metaphysics it is "terminus ad quem.....Philosophy treats the Absolute as primarily logical idea.....religion regards it as object, the mind or spirit which appears and reveals itself" to man. (Galloway: *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 42). For Metaphysics, the reality is fundamentally impersonal and abstract; for religion, it is personal and concrete. The one is extensive in scope, and the other is intensive in attitude.

There is, besides these points of similarity and difference, certain amount of antagonism between the two. Philosophy (Metaphysics) is a dispassionate and disinterested study, but theology, as the science or philo-

sophy of religion, is dependent on the religion, it supports. Each of the religions, as such, has a theology of its own. Its function rests with the explication and systematisation of the truths that the religion concerned upholds. In recent times, mention may be made of the name of Ritchl, who has supported the above view and has argued very strongly against the intrusion of metaphysics into the domain of religion. Truths of religion have to be taken as scientifically valid. If the philosopher is bent on developing a world-view, he must have it done on the basis, supplied by religion.

Is this contention tenable? Can there be a bifurcation of the human self into two sharply divided halves, one dealing with independent thought and the other with thought, as subservient to the needs of religion? These are the questions that pose for a reply. As an organic unit, human personality is not divisible into independent parts, although each has a specific function within the whole. Considered from the objective side, "no single aspect of reality is cut off with a hatchet from the remainder, and to know any one thing, you must see its relation to other things". So "to understand the ethical and spiritual value of" any religion, "one must realise not merely its distinction from, but its relation to other religions" and, here in our case, we may add, to other relevant aspects of the reality that science and philosophy discover. In a unity no segregation is permissible, although differentiation is not objected to.

Whatever be the points of agreement and difference, or the nature of antagonism between the two, the fact that stands out conspicuous is that the one supplements the other. An emotionless Metaphysics is dry and

a thoughtless religion is blind and susceptible to the errors of hallucination and illusion. The fact is that serious thought is always associated with an emotion of love for the object thought of. Similarly, love for God anticipates an amount of knowledge of God, for none can have love for an unknown thing or person. That is why a thorough-going metaphysician or a scientist becomes, in the majority of cases and at his journey's end, spiritual, and a spiritualist, on the contrary, turns up an acute thinker or a metaphysician. Jnana and Bhakti always go together and cannot be separated, one from the other, for all time to come.

APPENDIX

F

YOGA—KARMA, JNANA AND BHAKTI

Yoga has been defined by Maharsi Patanjali as *citta-vrttinirodha*. It means, at the end, the cessation of all functions of mind ; and a mind minus all its functions, like a piece of cloth bereft of all its threads, is sheer nothing. It is no mind. It is dead, as it were. Of the body, mind and soul that constitute the identity of a man, if the mind as the seat or source of all distractions and dissipations, is killed, the soul, although still engaged within the shackle of a material body, readily gets into touch (yoga) with the Supreme Soul for there is, with the death of the mind, no barrier to obstruct the natural flow of the river (soul) to the Ocean (the Universal Soul) from which it came and to which it finally returns. Yoga in the sense of intercourse between the Atma and the Paramatma actually happens here, and it admits of different kinds, viz., *Salokya*, *Sayujya*, etc., (See page 109). To bring about this yoga or to realise the at-onement between the two, what is necessary is the adoption of some methods, viz., Karma, Jnana and Bhakti corresponding to the chiselling and spiritualising of the faculties of volition, cognition and emotion respectively in man. Any one of these methods may be adopted by any person according to his ability, aptitude and inclination. For the common run of People, Karmayoga appears to be the most suitable one. However much proud a man may be of his spiritual heritage, he is a body first and a

spirit next. He cannot "all at once jump into the life divine with a bony shackle aching behind. The march forward is from the earth to heaven and not from heaven to earth or from spirit to body". Karmayoga that relates more to body than to soul is, at the start, therefore, prescribed, in the Gita, by the Lord Krishna for Arjuna to practise as a discipline, meant for the realisation of his self. The life germ or the protoplasmic cell is ever pulsating with vitality ; and Karma is co-extensive with life. Whether a man wants it or not, there is activity in him and that without any break anywhere.

Na hi kascit khanamapi jatu tisthatyakarmakrit
Karyate hyabasah karma sarbah prakritijaigurnai.

(Srimadvagavat Gita, Chap. III, Sl. 5).

In no circumstances, can a wise or a fool remain without work. The natural tendencies, born of Prakriti, of attraction and repulsion compel them, as it were, by force to take to some sort of work. The facts of the circulation of blood, of inhalation and exhalation of air, etc., are the apt illustrations thereof. The question, therefore, is not so much of the stoppage of work as of the proper use thereof for the benefit of the self. Self-centred as a man naturally is, he likes work for himself or, at any rate, for those whom he might call his own. He takes to Vedic sacrifices with a view to opening a bank Account with God in heaven. That shall help him in the life to come hereafter. But the Account excites insatiable greed and its balance too has, one day, its end. Ways out of it for permanent bliss must have to be sought out. Karmayoga is one of them. Each one, as the Gita teaches, has a definite station in life as also a sort of specific duty to perform. "Swadharme nidhanam

sreyah, paradharmo vayavaha' (The Gita, Chap. III, Sl. 35.). It is better to die doing one's allotted duty than to try other's that is dangerous. To carry out one's own duty for the sake of the duty alone or as God's work without any selfish motive behind is what Karmayoga teaches. Here it differs considerably from the theory of 'Inaction' of the Buddhists. The Gita prefers 'Niskarmata' to 'Naiskarma'. A seeker of Truth or an aspirant after salvation must develop an attitude of disinterestedness in respect of the fruits of all his activities. Such an attitude shall, in course of time, cleanse his body, purify his mind and eventually make him feel like being one with his God. He loses his self and all that his self stands for into the eternally abiding Self of his God, whose instrument is he in all his activities in life. Personally, he has had nothing to lose or gain in this world. He is above egoism that binds a man down to the world of matter. Whatever he does he does for the delight or satisfaction of his God.

Yajnarthat karmanonyatra lokoyam karmabandhanah
Tadartham karma Kaunteya muktasanga samachara.

(The Gita, Chap. III., Sloke 9.)

Actions not consecrated to Bhagwan Visnu lead to the bondage of man ; Oh Kaunteya, do your duty, therefore, for the satisfaction of Visnu alone with no other selfish motive behind.

In so doing, he shines in the effulgence of spirit and he is thus free and mukta. Like Karma, Jnana and Bhakti are equally two of the gateways to salvation. Although none of them denies the other, each has a specific approach of its own to the Reality. Besides, Karmayoga ends in Jnanayoga. Truth flashes before the mind's

eye that is free from the illusions caused by the ruffles of passion ; and as such, ethical discipline precedes metaphysical speculations. The Gita admits of two kinds of knowledge—Vijnana and Jnana. "The former deals with the visible and the latter tackles the invisible. The one is lost in the diversities of the world that lack self-sufficiency and the other seeks out the unity that binds them up together" and makes them meaningful. The one is pre-eminently intellectual and the other is primarily mystical in attitude. The latter, however, does not so much negate the former as fulfil it, and for all practical purposes, it comes more as a boon from heaven than as an achievement made by a man by his personal efforts. All that he can and is expected to do is to remain ever in alertness to receive the boon when it comes down. And this alertness is manifested in and through Pranipata, Pariprasna and Seva.

"Tadbiddhi pranipatena pariprasnena sevaya

Upadeksyanti te jnanam jnaninah tatwadarsinah".

(B. G., Chp. IV. 35)

Know the Truth by reverence, inquisitiveness and service. Wise men who have seen the Truth will instruct thee in knowledge.

"Once awakened to the sense of the Real, he knows no slumber of Avidya again. The manifold of the phenomenal world, born of ignorance, vanishes in favour of the One—the Brahman. He is One and all is in Him. Visvarupdarsana is a testimony thereof." The Brahmaid or the knower of Brahman thereby loses the identity of his self into that of the Absolute. He becomes Brahman, as it were, for "Brahmaid Brahmaiva bhavati". The knower of Brahman is Brahman himself. In spite of

what is stated above, the Gita does not appear to have encouraged the vedantic theory of the identity of the Atma and the Paramatma and, ordinarily speaking, of man and God. Although in essence they are identical, there is still something like a very thin veil separating the one from the other so that they may love and be loved by each other. The reciprocity of love as between man and God is ever beyond intellectual comprehensibility. Love for others is truly love for one's own self. God is the Self of all selves. So love for Him is automatic and spontaneous soon after the shadow of Avidya or ignorance is removed through ethical discipline and philosophic wisdom, as taught in Karmayoga and Jnana-yoga respectively. This does not mean, however, that Bhaktiyoga is no original method of approach to Reality. All that it wants to say is that none of them is exclusive of the rest. They go hand-in-hand together. Jnana minus sentiment of love and proneness to service is dry. Equally love egocentric and uncontrolled by reason is likely to fan lower passions in a man. Again, Karma without Jnana and love for others goes counter to what liberates a soul from the coiling embrace of the body. They, in all cases, supplement one another, and the difference is one of degree only. Man's love for God and God's love for man are but two sides of the same coin. Bhakta and Bhagwan are two relative terms pointing each to the other. In loving his God, a Bhakta loves His creations also. In every face of his fellow-beings, he finds the face of his beloved (God) looking up. And for that, he cannot afford to hate his enemy even when he harms him. On the contrary, he prays to his Father in heaven to forgive him for he knows not what he is

doing. He does not care so much for his own salvation as for the regeneration of his fellow-beings, gone astray. He lives among them, atones for their sins and is yet not one of them. In the midst of them all, he is a solitary child in constant communion with his beloved (God). The kind of love³⁷ that subsists between the two is above all psychical comprehension and ethical evaluation. Here, in His attitude towards His Bhakta, God is more human than divine, more emotional than rational.

“Naham basami Baikunthe yoginam hridye na cha Madbhakta yatra tisthanti tatra tisthami Narada”. I live not in Baikuntha nor within the heart of the yogis. I am with my devotees wherever they are.

The quotation, as above, indicates a sort of differentiation made in favour of His devotees. But the climax is reached when the Lord insists on Aryuna to proclaim on oath to the world that His Bhaktas shall never perish.

“Pratijanihi Kaunteya na Me Bhakta pranasyati”.

³⁷ According to Vaisnavism, Love is of different kinds ; for that see PP. 141-145.

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ERRATA

Page	Line	Read	Instead of
6	16	suicidal	self-suicidal
10	8	data	sense-data
12	9	supplies	supply
13	27	reveal	reveals
31	29	Nyaya	Naya
31	14	Nyaya	Naya
37	5	as discussed in Chaps. I & II (A)	as we have already discussed in chap. II
40	4	determine	determines
60	Footnote	lightning	lightening
65	17	Parmenides	Perminides
65	Footnote	Philosophers	Philosopher
66	21	its	their
69	13	theirs	their's
82	28	Delete 'is' after matter	
87	14	lie	lies
91	2	comma after Limited	
92	3	chaksu	sakshu
92	6	byachachakshire	byachayakshire
101	3	comma after limbs and say	
113	13	suicidal	self-suicidal
119	11	ends	end
127	Title	Aesthetic	Ethical
138	20	sin	sine
143	3	shepherd-boys	shephard-boys
151	Footnote	Varieties	varieties
157	5	role	roll.

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