

THE REVOLT OF 1857 IN CENTRAL INDIA—MALWA

by

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DEDICATION

In Sacred memory

of

**My Late Beloved Father
LALA BEHARILAL SRIVASTAVA**

*who inspired me
to undertake this
research work.*

K. L. Srivastava

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- VII Historical Record Office, Gwalior.
- VIII Foreign Office Library, Indore.
- IX Dhar State Record Office, Dhar.
- X National Archives of India, Regional Office, Bhopal.
- XI National Library (formerly Imperial Library), Calcutta.
- XII Royal Asiatic Society Library, Bombay.
- XIII Central India Agency Library, Indore.
- XIV Daly College Library, Indore.
- XV Holkar College Library, Indore.
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I shall fail in my duty if I do not mention the name of my wife Smt. Sitarani Srivastava, M.A. (History), B.T., without whose constant inspiration and help I could not have written this book.


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Author

Map of Central India
(excluding Bundel-
khand and Baghel-
khand) showing The
Revolt.



INTRODUCTION

THE THESIS presents a historical and critical account of 'The Revolt in Central India—Malwa'. On the 31st March 1856 'Central India—Malwa' comprised within its limits the following political units':—(1) Nimar Political Agency, which consisted of British Nimar (seven districts and 123 villages) and Sindhia's Nimar (13 districts and 1,456 villages); (2) Holkar's possessions (41 districts and 2,142 villages); (3) Bhopawar Agency (Jhabua, Alirajpur and Barwani); (4) Bhil Agency (Jobat, Ratlam, Mathwar, Kathiwara, Amjhera, Dhar and Sindhia's possessions of 5 districts and 202 villages); (5) Deputy Bhil Agency (Manpur); (6) Bhopal Agency and (7) Gwalior Agency. In 1856, Ratlam, Sitamau and Sailana were under the direct charge of the Agent to the Governor-General for Central India. From 27th November 1857, a new post of a Political Agent in Western Malwa was created to supervise and check the activities of the rebels in that part of Malwa.² From November 1857, Dhar was brought under British Management, on charges of Revolt.³ Though in 1854 Bundelkhand and Baghelkhand were added⁴ to the Province of Malwa, and were put under the charge of the Agent to the Governor-General for Central India, and the whole Agency was named as the Central India Agency, yet the inclusion did not materially affect the economic and political life of these two principalities and the current of events in Malwa proper remained distinctly separate. Briefly the term 'Central India—Malwa' may be taken to include the whole of the territory known as the Central India Agency excluding Bundelkhand and Baghelkhand. The boundaries of the different Political Agencies in Central India were arbitrarily drawn by the Company's Government to suit their administrative convenience, without due consideration of culture, linguistic affinity or historical background. Any historian describing events in Malwa about 1857 under

1. General File No. 288, Letter No. 56, dated 31st Mar. 1856, from A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of India.
2. Receipts Vol. 83, Letter No. 104, dated 8th Jan. 1858.
3. Issue Vol. 93, Letter No. 6 A, dated Dhar, 3rd Nov. 1857.
4. *Imperial Gazetteer* (Central India), P. 25.

the British rule will have to pay due consideration to this point.

The thesis 'The Revolt in Central India—Malwa' is significant for the following reasons. First, it supplies valuable link in the so-called War of Independence of 1857 and the History of India. The Revolt of 1857 also forms an important landmark in the history of Central India. The causes that led to the Revolt, were deep-rooted and intimately connected with the foundation of the British paramountcy in India. Without understanding this phase of Indian history one cannot completely realise how the British gained a foothold in this vast country. Secondly, the study is interesting for it throws a flood of light on the court intrigues, corruption and human foibles which were exploited by the British in establishing their suzerainty. It may be found informative and instructive. Thirdly, the subject incidentally brings out the relation among the different States of Malwa at that time, which goes a long way to explain the existing bonds amongst them. We shall come to learn how the rulers of Bhopal and Jaora gained complete independence by colluding with the British and carrying tales against the Sindhia and the Holkar; we shall also know how Nana Sahib, the Peshwa, was left in the lurch when both the Sindhia and the Holkar declined to help him against the British and how the brunt of the Revolt was borne by the petty chiefs of Amjhera, Dhar and Jhansi which became the main centres of this Great Revolt. It enables us to identify those Indian Rulers who fought for freedom and sacrificed their everything for the achievement of their ideal; those who during the critical days sat upon the fence watching the tide of events, but whose helpful contribution to the national cause might have turned the scales; and those who actually turned traitors to their country and helped the foreigners to suppress the Revolt ruthlessly. Fourthly, without following the events of the Revolt we cannot understand several institutions which sprang up as its direct results. The political, economic, social and religious effects of the Revolt in establishing various institutions cannot be overlooked. The Revolt of 1857 not only brought about the end of the East India Company's rule in India, but led the British Crown to change the whole nature and policy of the Government of India. The Revolt was a turning point in the history of India and marked an important milestone in the changed rela-

tions between the British Government and the Indian States. Lastly, the subject, gives important data to the impartial historian for drawing many practical generalisations. But I have been tempted to pursue this subject not only for the sake of its importance described above, but also for other reasons which will appear in the sequel.

As eminent English historians like Sir John Kaye, Colonel Malleson, Charles Ball, T. Rice Holmes, and a host of others have presented a readable account of 1857 and as, G. W. Forrest has lately published *Selections from the State Papers* in four volumes, it may be presumed that the last word on the subject has been said and therefore, there is neither scope for research nor the possibility of a new angle of approach. But any serious student of history pursuing the topic with some kind of sincerity and thoughtful application, will soon come to realise that the subject bristles over with details that are yet unexplored and the whole problem has got to be studied once again from a new angle. The true history of the Great Indian Revolt of 1857 can best be written now when India has gained independence and when the historian is free to tell the truth and not simply cater for and carry on propaganda on behalf of the British Government. The works of the British historians have sometimes been one-sided, and even the best among them could not escape looking at the events of the Indian Revolt through coloured glasses. To quote a few examples, Sir John Kaye writes, "Brahmanism is the most monstrous system of interference and oppression that the world has ever yet seen and that it could be maintained only by ignorance and superstition of the grossest kind."⁵ G. W. Forrest, the late Director of Records of the Government of India wrote about Tukoji Rao II of Indore, "He was careless of the lives of the English officers and in the hour of trial violated his duty to the Government to which he owed allegiance and which had, from a cottage placed him on a throne. If Holkar had been deposed and his State confiscated and divided among our faithful allies, there is not a native chief who would not have admitted the justice of our decision."⁶

5. Kaye: *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. I, P. 132.

6. *Ibid*, Vol. IV., P. 80.

Hundreds of such passages presenting distorted facts could be cited from the so-called standard works on the 'Mutiny period' which would go to prove that an impartial and critical history of the period is yet to be written.

Kaye and Malleeson's *History of the Indian Mutiny* in six volumes is the most voluminous work so far attempted on the subject. The work ranks with Grand Duff's *History of the Marathas* and Tod's *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*. But both Kaye and Malleeson being too near the events and being closely associated with many British officials who took part in the suppression of the Revolt, could not maintain a detached outlook so necessary for a historian. To take an example, in the controversy between Colonel Durand and Sir Robert Hamilton of Indore, the authors actually pleaded for the latter's case as they were his personal friends. They have, also, admitted in their preface to the first volume that they could not utilise all the material, adduce authorities in support of their statements, make use of the recorded official documents, or desist from making use of their personal opinions. Besides, an obsessing and often irritating spirit of imperialism can be easily detected in their works.

I have chosen 'The Revolt in Central India—Malwa' as the subject of my research, because I am fully convinced that the history of Malwa during the Revolt of 1857 requires to be re-written. The existing histories have not exhausted all the original sources. The existing general histories of the Indian 'Mutiny' do not give full and accurate details of the Revolt in Malwa. They are all written with an eye to the general history of India and naturally the events in Malwa have been thrown into the background. Their accounts are not localised but diffused and therefore, many important details are omitted. There are some Memoirs which deal with events solely in Malwa but they give the impressions or views of interested individuals. They contain much controversial matter and cannot give facts which a disinterested reader would like to know. Hence, their historical value is next to nothing. Again, these works were published quite a long time back. J. H. Sylvester's *Recollections of the Campaign in Malwa and Central India* was published in 1860. Sir John Kaye's *History of the Indian Mutiny* was published in 1864.

John Dickinson's *Last counsels of an unknown counsellor* was published in 1877. Even the volumes of G. W. Forrest were published as early as 1912. These 'Selections from the letters, dispatches and other State Papers preserved in the Military Department of the Government of India' (Vol. IV) give us some important letters concerning Central India. But they, by no means, exhaust all the materials or important documents. Some papers were not published because of their political and confidential nature. With the passage of time and changed circumstances, these documents have now been made available to the research student. Also, since the publication of the works of Kaye, Malleon and Forrest much water has flown and new methods of approach discerned. It is, therefore, necessary to take up the study of the subject once more.

The present thesis is intended to make good these deficiencies. It is based on all the available original sources from the National Archives of India, New Delhi, The Central India Agency Records, Indore, the Record Offices in the States of Central India, documents in private possession, folk-lore, ballads, monuments and relics of the times of 1857.

The monograph will be found to contain not only fresh material but a new presentation of matter from the Indian point of view. At the same time it has preserved the historical and critical balance. An attempt has been made for an objective study of events, free from political prejudices and partisan bias. As such, it will not fail to appeal to the scientific historian.

It not only fills a gap in the knowledge of the history of the Revolt in Central India—Malwa, but throws a flood of light on the general histories of the areas which it covers. Thus it will supply valuable material to future historians of India.

The bulk of the thesis is entirely original. Some of the fresh contributions are as follows. The condition of Malwa prior to the Revolt; the economic causes which led to it; the organisation of the armies in Malwa; the influence of the press on the outbreak of the Revolt; the dual part played by Holkar;

the tactics of Sikandar Begum of Bhopal; the inner history of the rebel activities; the life led by the rebels; the administration of Gwalior by the rebels; the influence of foreign mercenaries in Malwa; the reports of Sir Robert Hamilton about events in the States of Malwa; the political, social and economic consequences of the Revolt; the analysis of the causes of its failure; an unpublished map of the Battle of Mandsaur; the unpublished tour reports of the Political Agents in Central India; the Survey Reports and the reports on the customs and practices of the people of Malwa; besides a large number of letters from official and private sources which bring to light the fact that the conflagration did not completely die out immediately but its embers were visible as late as 1860.


For all these reasons it will be evident that in my thesis I have made a unique, though modest, attempt at presenting fresh facts leading to extend the bounds of human knowledge.

I have criticised other historians sparingly and only where their mistakes have been too glaring to be allowed to go unchallenged. The foreigners have often misrepresented facts to such an extent that any attempt to catalogue and refute them would be too extensive. I have similarly dealt with inconsistencies in the records, some of which have come under my observation and which could not go unchallenged. As far as possible, I have substantiated my statements by quoting authorities. I have adopted the spelling of proper names, etc., from the *Imperial Gazetteer* (1909 edition). It is also my main source of topography.


K. L. Srivastava

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
<i>Introduction</i>	ix
I Political conditions in Malwa prior to the outbreak of the Revolt of 1857.	1
II Political factors of the Revolt.	20
III Economic, intellectual and socio-religious factors of the Revolt.	57
IV Military factors of the Revolt in Malwa.	80
V The Revolt at Gwalior.	99
VI The Revolt at Indore.	121
VII The Revolt at Dhar, Amjhera, Mandsaur and Bhopal.	137
VIII The Revolt at the British military stations in Malwa.	146
IX The Revolt in the Deputy Bhil Agency.	157
X Suppression of the Revolt in southern and western Malwa.	168
XI Suppression of the Revolt in eastern and northern Malwa.	181
XII Suppression of the Revolt and the aftermath.	195
XIII Causes of the failure of the Revolt.	213
XIV Nature of the Revolt.	231
<i>References</i>	
C.I.A. Record Office Mutiny Papers (files, manuscripts)	244
Letter-books and registers.	258
Fragmentary letter-books.	268
Old record files.	269
Vernacular files.	271
Political Agencies' files.	275
Mutiny Papers about C.I. in the National Archives of India.	285
Local corps papers.	288
State records.	288
Printed primary sources.	289
<i>Indices</i>	
	295



Central India in 1857



Road Map of Central India in 1857



Nana Sahib Peshwa

POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN MALWA PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLT OF 1857

FROM 1818 to 1857 the policy of the British was to establish their military, political and economic control over Malwa. By 1818, the Pindaris and the Marathas were defeated, and Central India was, for the first time, brought under the supremacy of the East India Company. The East India Company's Government was naturally anxious to solve, to its advantage, a number of complicated questions and disputes between the numerous petty chiefs among the Bhils, the Bhumias, the Pindaris and the Rajputs. It had to settle the delicate question of the amount of tribute that it could claim from the States in Malwa. It had to fix the boundaries of the various States as its recent acquisitions in Malwa had rudely disturbed the territorial integrity of the different States of the place. It had to codify the laws according to British notions, regulate the trade to suit British commercial interests, control the manufacture of arms so that its political power could remain unchallenged, and close down local mints in order to introduce uniform British coinage throughout India.

The solution of such grave problems, however tactfully handled, left many bitter memories in the minds of several persons in Malwa whose interests were adversely affected by the Company's decisions. The seeds of disaffection lay undetected for a while, but they sprouted into an organized revolt when circumstances were favourable. The spirit of military adventure dominated the people of Malwa, for there was abundant scope for freebooting and pillage. The cost and difficulties of putting large British armies into operation against such people were enormous. The territories of most of the important rulers in Central India were intermixed and this afforded a chance to these people to plunder some village in one State and immediately take to flight and seek shelter in another. Coupled with this, there was natural unwillingness on the part of many rulers to co-operate whole-heartedly with the Company in maintain-

ing law and order. The police force was inadequate to cope with the situation which was worsened on account of the existence of trackless jungles. Besides, a few influential people were in league with these freebooters and secretly encouraged them.

Under the circumstances, even a Governor-General like Lord William Bentick had realized the futility of holding the Indian rulers responsible for such acts of plunder. During his time, several proposals for the suppression of the military adventurers were discussed. Firstly, it was proposed to appoint one British Political Agent at Mahidpur as the Chief Military Officer-in-Command of all the Indian and European forces in Central India. But this proposal was rejected on the ground that Central India was too extensive a territory to be effectively controlled by one Political Agent, especially during those troubled times. Secondly, it was proposed that the authority should be concentrated in one hand, namely, the British Resident who was to be stationed at some central and strategic place between Indore and Gwalior. One of his primary duties was to watch the activities of the rulers in Malwa.

This proposal had to be abandoned because some important British officers in Central India did not like it, and made a great fuss over the Sindhia's objection that the closing down of the Residency at Gwalior would lower his dignity and weaken the authority of his Government. The upshot of all this was the raising of the Malwa Bhil Corps. There was another proposal to establish law courts in Malwa to try these military adventurers. But the terrible disaster of the First Afghan War (1839-1842) led the Company's Government to devote their full resources to regain their lost prestige and weakened power in Northern India. Naturally the problems of Malwa were thrown into the background and consequently this proposal was shelved.

From 1839 to 1852, wars with the Amirs of Sind, the Sindhia, the Sikhs and the Burmese so much engaged the attention of the Company's Central Government that it was no small wonder that the Resident in Central India was just able to maintain his office.

From 1848 to 1856 Lord Dalhousie's wars and especially his high-handed policy of annexation kept the rulers of the States of Malwa under feverish excitement and in constant anxiety about their fate. Moreover, between 1845 and 1857 several States of

Malwa were under minority administration and were thus directly under the Company's supervision. The direct interference of the Company's political officers in such States further aroused the suspicion and resentment of the people. There was a Minority Administration at Gwalior during the interval between 1843 (when the Gwalior army was defeated at the battle of Maharajpur) and 1853 (when Jayaji Rao Sindhia became major). In 1843 the post of the Resident at Gwalior was substituted for that of an Assistant-in-Charge of the Sindhia's Government who was to communicate with the Central Government through the Resident at Indore. This was done by the Company's Government as a mark of displeasure at the Gwalior army's rising up against the British forces at Maharajpur. At this act the people of Gwalior rightly felt aggrieved. From 1844 to 1852 there was a minority Administration at Indore before Tukoji Rao II attained majority. During this period the Regency Council was directly under the British Resident at Indore. From 1845 to 1858 Bhopal too was under the Regency Administration as Shah Jahan Begum was a minor. Thus from 1843 to 1857 important States in Central India were directly under British administration. This led the people to imagine that the British were unduly interfering with their internal and domestic affairs.

Owing to the British policy of "divide and rule" and the moral weakness of a few Indians who succumbed to British allurements, various conflicting court parties grew up, like mushrooms, in the States of Malwa. These created fresh difficulties for the Company in its rule.

Apart from this state of the court officials, the economic status and the political consciousness among the masses were at a low ebb. The Company failed to develop them owing to the following causes. It was mostly interested in exploiting the resources in men, money and material of Malwa for waging wars of aggression in other parts of India and even outside it. Secondly, it could give little time to the improvement of the masses because its interest was chiefly commercial. Its energies were taxed elsewhere and it could devote very little time to the uplift of the masses. Further, matters were complicated owing to the extension of the jurisdiction of the Agent to the Governor-General for Central India by the inclusion in 1854 of Bundelkhand and Baghelkhand in the Province of Malwa.

The Company did not do much to improve transport facilities and maintain lines of communication in Malwa. The Bombay-Agra Road, popularly known as "the Gun Road," on which work commenced in 1834, remained up to 1850 unmetalled and unspanned by bridges for long distances. Very few of the military stations along the Narmada river were connected by good roads with this main road. Even an important military station like Mhow was not connected by a metalled road with Simrol Ghat (on the Indore-Khandwa Road).

The Company did next to nothing to educate the public. It did not spend any appreciable amount on it. As late as 1834, the Court of Directors granted only a few thousand rupees for being spent on education in Nimar. Whatever education could be obtained was mostly imparted by the Christian missionaries, whose ultimate motive was possibly the conversion of Indians to the Christian faith by taking advantage of their ignorance and helplessness. The people of Malwa considered the activities of the Christian schools as dangerous to their religion. Among the Christian schools, the Sehore School was possibly the best and owed its development to one Mr. Wilkinson.

The vast natural resources of Central India were still untapped and there was no remarkable increase in the revenues of the various States of Malwa between 1818 and 1857. The British found the opium trade with China very profitable. They knew that Malwa soil was best suited to its cultivation. They, therefore, insisted more upon opium farming than upon anything else. This increased the income of the Company, but left the cultivator in distress and poverty.

Between 1818 and 1857 the common people were not only averse to the political and economic subjection under the Company but also found in the activities of the Westerners a grave danger to their social practices and ancient customs. Several orthodox people felt that the abolition of the Sati system, the suppression of witchcraft, and the prohibition of human sacrifices and conversion of Indians to Christianity were an unwarranted restriction on and a challenge to their ancient religious practices. The sentiments of the orthodox people were very much hurt and, in self-defence, they carried on propaganda against the foreigners.

Events from 1818 to 1857 led the people of Malwa to believe

that their Rulers were made subordinate to the British, that their life of military adventure and independence was brought to an end, that their economic resources were exploited, and that the British aimed at the destruction of their caste and religion.

With these preliminary remarks, let us make a very brief survey of the political situation of the important States of Malwa under the East India Company, which will enable us to understand better the events of 1857.

GWALIOR: Between 1818 and 1857, when Central India was under the supremacy of the East India Company, the rulers of Gwalior on several occasions did not evince the tactful diplomacy and intense nationalism of Mahadaji Sindhia. Peshwa Baji Rao II wrote to Daulat Rao Sindhia thus:

"Your father, Mahadaji Sindhia, agreeably to the orders of the Sircar went to Delhi, was made a Vizier, and attained a high reputation. He served us with his heart and soul. When you became his successor, you entered into alliance with the English; thus you govern in Hindustan, and thus you show your gratitude. In thus serving us, it is befitting for you to put bangles on your arms, and sit down like a woman. After my power is destroyed, is it possible that yours should stand?"

The Sindhia helped the British in crushing the Pindaris. He remained neutral when the British forces defeated the Holkar at Mahidpur. He was a passive spectator when the British fought with the Peshwa Baji Rao II and defeated him. When the Pindaris were defeated and the Maratha Confederacy was dissolved, the Sindhia, automatically, to quote the historian P. E. Roberts, "was humbled and rendered impotent for harm." The treaty of November 5, 1817, by which the Sindhia joined hands with the British East India Company to attack the Pindaris, also contained a clause which deprived him of his sovereignty over all the Rajputana States. Soon afterwards the British Government concluded separate treaties with most of these Rajputana States. The British also secured the important district of Ajmer and the fort of Asirgarh from the Sindhia. After 1819 Daulat Rao Sindhia led an uneventful political life and died on 21st March 1827.

When Daulat Rao Sindhia began his political life, the Marathas had the *de facto* control over the throne of Delhi and were masters of a mighty and extensive dominion. He fought bravely in the Second Maratha War, but unfortunately lost a large portion of his territory in the end. The Marathas did not find Daulat Rao Sindhia of any help to them in their last struggle against the British power. His neutrality possibly brought about the ruin of the Maratha Confederacy. After the defeat of the other Maratha rulers Daulat Rao Sindhia surrendered himself to the British so much so that the last words which he uttered before his death to Major Steward, the British Resident at Gwalior, were "by the sight of you and your friendship" which conveyed to the British Resident the idea that Daulat Rao Sindhia "had unbounded confidence in the justice and generosity of the British Government." How much a nationalist Maratha would have wished that Daulat Rao Sindhia should have felt "the mortification of seeing his power reduced to comparative insignificance and himself becoming of little or no account in that extensive scene in which he had been (once) the master spirit."

Baiza Bai, the widow of Daulat Rao Sindhia, adopted on June 17th, 1827, an eleven-year old boy named Mugat Rao, widely known as Jankoji Rao Sindhia, and herself acted as Regent up to 1832. Baiza Bai was anxious to retain power even after Jankoji had attained majority. This naturally led to a conflict between her and Jankoji's supporters. The political situation became grave when young Jankoji Rao Sindhia fled, in October 1832, from his palace and took refuge with the British Resident at Gwalior. The British Government at first adopted a policy of neutrality. Lord William Bentick was hoping that these internal quarrels would afford him an opportunity "of connecting Agra with the Bombay Presidency" by annexing the territories of Gwalior.

When in 1833 the Gwalior army revolted against Baiza Bai's authority, she was compelled to retire in favour of Jankoji Sindhia. But he proved a weak ruler and during his rule, writes Charles Aitchison, "the court was one constant scene of feuds and struggles for power among the nobles. The army was in chronic state of mutiny." The welfare of the masses was sadly neglected. Jankoji Sindhia however remained conspicuously

loyal to the British Government till his death on the 7th February 1843. After his death his widow Tara Bai, herself twelve years of age, adopted a boy of eight named Bhagirath Rao popularly known as Jayaji Rao Sindhia, who was looked after by his maternal uncle commonly known as 'Mama Sahib'.

The affairs of Gwalior at this time present a sorry spectacle of court intrigues. The young widow Tara Bai became a tool in the hands of an ambitious man Dada Khasgiwala, the Household Officer, who wanted to displace Mama Sahib from power. After a lot of bickering, which it is needless to mention here, Mama Sahib was dismissed and asked to leave Gwalior. Dada Khasgiwala rose to the position of Minister. He soon became powerful with the support of the Gwalior army of 40,000 men who longed for the revival of the military glory acquired by the Marathas during the days of Shivaji and Mahadji Sindhia. He dismissed all persons who were opposed to his anti-British policy and enlisted the services of those who were formerly expelled from the Gwalior Court at the instance of the British Resident.

Thus there grew up at Gwalior a strong party which aimed at regaining its lost independence. The Resident was alarmed at the growing influence of Dada Khasgiwala and demanded that he should give up his leadership. On his failing to comply with this demand, a strong British force was sent for from Agra. The Gwalior Army leaders made the fatal mistake of allowing the British troops to cross the Chambal river without resistance. The result of this was that the British forces under Lord Ellenborough easily defeated the Gwalior army at the battle of Maharajpur in 1843. Though suppressed for the time being, the revolutionary element in the Gwalior army gathered strength and displayed its power during the Revolt of 1857. By the treaty signed on 13th January, 1844, the Sindhia had to cede permanently the revenue of some districts for the maintenance of the British Contingent Troops within the Gwalior State. The districts selected by the British for the above purpose were those adjoining the British territory. The Sindhia had to defray the expenses incurred by the British in the Battle of Maharajpur. His army was not to exceed 9,000 men (which before this had been 40,000). Of these not more than 3,000 men were to constitute the Infantry with 12 field guns and not more than 200

men as gunners with only 20 other guns.

It was also laid down that, during the minority of Maharaja Jayaji Rao, the administration of Gwalior State was to be carried on according to the advice of the British Resident at Gwalior, and that no change was to be made in the persons entrusted with the administration without the consent of the British Resident. The strategic fort of Gwalior was also occupied by the British troops and kept under a British Commander. All these restrictions were a constant reminder to the people of Gwalior of the loss of their independence and prestige. The disbanding of its large army not only adversely affected the martial spirit of the people but also led to unemployment which was also one of the conditions favouring the revolt.

From 1844 to 1853, during the minority of Jayaji Rao, the administration of Gwalior State was conducted according to the British plan by the Regency Council. In 1853 when Jayaji Rao became major he was given powers to rule. But Dinkar Rao, who owed his rise to British patronage, was appointed as the Chief Minister. Jayaji Rao was young and impulsive, Dinkar Rao was tactful and pro-British. Major Macpherson the British Resident at Gwalior, was a great diplomat and with Dinkar Rao's help he kept Jayaji Rao Sindhia as the mainstay of the British power in Malwa and parts of Northern India during the critical days of the Revolt. It is a pity that Dinkar Rao, who has been extolled by the British historians as "the great Abul Fazl of the nineteenth century" abused his genius to crush the power of his own people, and helped to consolidate the rule of the British in India.

INDORE: Maharaja Malhar Rao Holkar II lost considerably in the Third Maratha War. By the Treaty of Mandasaur, which was signed in January 1818, he recognized Amir Khan, his former dependant, as an independent Chief of Tonk and Ghafur Khan, his subordinate Jagirdar, as independent of Holkar State and ruler of Jaora. He was also made to relinquish his claims upon the Rajputana chiefs, cede all lands south of the Narmada to the British, limit his army to a maximum of 3,465 Cavalry, 2,000 Regular and 1,000 Irregular Infantry and Artillery, pay for the British Contingent Troops maintained at Indore under the British Commander, and keep a British Resident at his Court. The capital of the Holkar was transferred from Mahesh-

war to Indore. The Holkar had to leave his "tent life." Thus he lost his independence, much to the chagrin of his people.

Events from 1818 to 1857 prove that occasional disturbances kept alive the martial spirit of the people of Holkar State. Up to 1857, though the strength of the Holkar army was considerably reduced, the spirit was not crushed and the disbanded soldiers still continued to think that they formed a part of the once famous Holkar army. But the tragedy was that there was no capable leader of the calibre of Malhar Rao Holkar I who could administer the affairs of the State well and lead the people.

Two insurrections broke out in 1819. The first was headed by a youth named Krishna Kumar, who posed as the deceased Malhar Rao Holkar, brother of late Jaswant Rao Holkar. This insurrection was suppressed. The second insurrection was headed by young Hari Rao Holkar, the cousin of the ruler Malhar Rao Holkar II. After some time Hari Rao surrendered and was imprisoned in Maheshwar Fort. In 1821 and 1822 two more disturbances occurred at Rampura and Barkhera, but both were suppressed. In 1829, and again in 1830, the Holkar's district of Nandwas was invaded by the Thakur of Begu, a feudatory of the Ruler of Udaipur, but he was defeated. During the pro-British regime of Tatia Jogh, the Minister of the Holkar State, the State suffered great financial loss owing to the prevalence of bribery and private trade.

After his death in 1826 the condition of the State further deteriorated. There was a huge deficit in the State budget. Malhar Rao II made several promises for launching schemes for reforms which, however, were never inaugurated. He squandered a large portion of his ancestral property in luxury and vice. For want of pay the army became mutinous. A serious crisis was averted when Keshari Bai, the mother of Malhar Rao II, advanced money from her own privy purse and paid the arrears of their salary to the troops.

In 1831 a fresh disturbance was created by a bigot, Sathmal, who proclaimed that he was inspired by the god Khande Rao. He was attacked by the Holkar's troops and was killed near Deoguraria.

On the death of Malhar Rao II in 1833, his widow, with the approval of his mother, adopted Martand Rao who was installed on the throne in January 1834. But in February 1834, Hari Rao,

the cousin of Malhar Rao II, managed to escape from Mahe-shwar fort. With popular support, he seized the throne on the 17th April, 1834. But Hari Rao was unfortunate in his choice of ministers. His minister, Ravaji Phanse, during his two years' ministry from 1834 to 1836, reduced Indore to a land of anarchy, with an empty treasury. The troops clamoured for money. At last events became so grave that in September 1835, some 500 Makranis joined by some of the State troops attacked the palace, but they were repulsed.

In 1838, there was such a gross mismanagement of administration and finance that the Company's government thought it necessary to issue a warning that, if the administration did not improve, they would be forced to assume management of affairs. In 1843 Lord Ellenborough, the Governor-General, wrote to Maharaja Holkar asking him to entrust the administration to a capable and trustworthy minister, but before the letter was received Hari Rao died. With all his faults and idiosyncrasies, it is neither just nor true to depict him as an "imbecile specimen of oriental chieftainship" as Thornton has done. Hari Rao was brave, but he was misled by his ministers.

After Hari Rao, Khande Rao, an adopted boy of eleven, succeeded to the throne. But he died unmarried in 1844. After several unpleasant controversies, Tukoji Rao II was nominated by the Company's Government as the Ruler of Indore. But he being a minor the administration was carried on by the Minority Council under British supervision up to 1852 when he was invested with ruling powers. During the minority of Tukoji Rao II the British Government took care to train the young Maharaja under a tutor appointed by them. This work was entrusted to Umed Singh who, like Dinkar Rao at Gwalior, was a man of their choice.

Umed Singh was formerly "confidentially employed" by Sir John Clark on the Punjab frontier. He was to act under the guidance of Sir Robert Hamilton, the Agent to the Governor-General for Central India. But Tukoji Rao Holkar II was a man of individual judgment and originality. Although a young man, he had gained considerable worldly wisdom in his extensive tours. He was a true Maratha in his outlook and activities. His people were warlike. His army, in spite of all the drawbacks, was still "the army of the Holkars." There were several

people in and around the Court who still remembered the days of Maratha glory and independence. They hated foreign domination and wished to live in freedom. Tukoji Rao Holkar II "saw, on his right hand and on his left most terrible proofs of a general rebellion against the domination of the English."

BHOPAL: From 1816 to 1819 Nazar Mohammad Khan (who married Qudsia Begum in 1818) was the Ruler of Bhopal. His policy was to help the East India Company to put down the growing powers of the Marathas and the Pindaris. This made him a favourite with the British who, in due course, helped him to become independent of the Sindhia's control. By the Treaty of 1818 the Company's Government granted him five districts formerly held by the Vinchur Chief and also the Sindhia's fort of Islamnagar. The result was that the State revenues, which amounted to about a lac of rupees in 1816, increased to Rs. 15,00,000 in 1819.

The British intended to maintain the two Muslim States of Bhopal and Jaora to counteract the Maratha power. At the same time they were shrewd enough not to allow these States full freedom. Hence a British Resident was posted at Sehore near Bhopal with a force of 1,000 strong. The cost of this army, however, was charged on the Bhopal Treasury. In 1819 Nazar Mohammad Khan accidentally died. He left only one daughter Sikandar Begum. It was arranged that Nazar Mohammad's nephew Munir Mohammad Khan should succeed him under the regency of Qudsia Begum and that he should marry Sikandar Begum. In 1827 Munir Mohammad Khan wanted to gain political power for himself, but not being supported in his attempt by Qudsia Begum he had to retire in favour of his younger brother Jahangir Mohammad Khan. Qudsia Begum, being ambitious, wanted to retain authority in her own hands, and so she delayed the marriage between Jahangir Mohammad Khan and Sikandar Begum as long as 1833. Being impatient to gain power Jahangir Mohammad Khan made a plot against Qudsia Begum in 1837. But the plot was detected and he had to escape from Bhopal.

Becoming desperate, he later on declared open fight against Qudsia Begum. At last the East India Company's Government interfered and decided the case in favour of Jahangir Mohammad Khan. Qudsia Begum then retired. Jahangir Mohammad

Khan ruled from 1837 to 1844. His marital relations with Sikandar Begum were anything but happy. Hence Sikandar Begum, with her mother Qudsia Begum, left Bhopal for Islamnagar fort where on July 29th, 1838, Shah Jahan Begum was born to Sikandar Begum. When Jahangir Mohammad Khan died in 1844, he left a will in which he desired that his illegitimate son Dastagir was to be his successor. This was not given effect to by the Company which was favourably disposed towards Sikandar Begum. The supporters of Dastagir hatched a number of plots which were foiled by Sikandar Begum.

At last Shah Jahan Begum, the infant daughter of late Jahangir Mohammad Khan, was proclaimed as the Ruler of Bhopal by the Company, and the Regency Administration was to be conducted by her mother, Sikandar Begum, with Mian Faujdar Mohammad Khan as the Minister of Bhopal. But the Regent and the Minister frequently disagreed with each other, which resulted in mismanagement and chaos. The trouble, however, ended when in 1837 the Minister resigned. In 1855 Shah Jahan Begum was married to Baqi Mohammad Khan, the commander of the Bhopal Army. As a rule the Regency ought to have ended in 1855, but the Company's Government, as a mark of personal favour to Sikandar Begum for her unflinching loyalty to the British, extended the Regency period to 1859 and made Sikandar Begum the real administrator. This favour stood the British in good stead during the Revolt of 1857, when she remained loyal to them in the hope that her authority and administration over Bhopal would be perpetuated till her death.

DHAR: Raja Ramchandra Rao Puar II, the Ruler of Dhar State, entered into a treaty with the East India Company's Government in January 1819. By the intervention of the Company various districts (Badnawar, Berchha, Kukshi, Nalchha, and others) of which Dhar had been dispossessed by the Sindhia and Holkar prior to 1818 were restored to Dhar. A loan was also granted to Dhar by the East India Company to enable the Raja to improve the administration. By the terms of the treaty of 1819 the Company's Government guaranteed to protect Dhar State against external aggression, and in return the Raja of Dhar agreed to cede the tributes of Banswara and Dungarpur to the Company and entered into engagements of subordinate co-operation and friendly alliance and bound himself at all times, when

so required, to furnish troops to the company in proportion to his capacity and the strength of his army.

In 1832, the peace of the State was disturbed by the rising of Achyut Rao, the son of Murari Rao, who put forward his claims to the throne. With the support of the Bhils, he attacked Dhar. The East India Company's Government intervened. Achyut Rao had to withdraw his claims over the State in lieu of a life pension of Rs. 200 p.m. Ramchandra Rao Puar II died in 1833. He was succeeded by Yeshwant Rao II, an adopted boy of 11 years of age. He was selected through the influence of his uncle Anand Rao, the Raja of Dewas Junior, who was also a near relative of the late Raja of Dhar. Hence there remained close association between the States of Dhar and Dewas Junior. Yeshwant Rao II ruled from 1833 to 1857. It was a great misfortune that he died of cholera on the eve of the Revolt of 1857. He was succeeded by an adopted son, Anand Rao III, aged thirteen. His tender age obviously disqualified him from coping with the Revolt. The administration was therefore left in the hands of Ramchandra Rao Bapuji, the Minister who was imbued with a national spirit and used his remarkable intelligence in using the growing power of the Makrani troops and the adventurous Marathas against the foreigners.

JAORA: By the Treaty of Mandsaur 1818, Ghafur Khan who was formerly an employee and vassal of the Holkar received the State of Jaora from the British as a reward for betraying his master and was treated as an independent ruler. This was done to check the Maratha power. On the death of Ghafur Khan in 1825 Ghaus Mohammad Khan, an infant boy of 2 years, succeeded to the throne under a Regency appointed by the Company. In 1842 Ghaus Mohammad Khan was invested with the ruling powers. Captain Borthwick, who was the Superintendent during part of the Minority Administration, infused a permanent pro-British impression on the mind of Ghaus Mohammad Khan, who secretly gave information about the movements and activities of the rebels to the British authorities during the Revolt.

RAJGARH: During the settlement of Malwa by Sir John Malcolm, many villages were made over to the Sindhia in lieu of his claims for tribute from Rajgarh, and an agreement was signed by which the British Government alone had the right

to interfere in the affairs of the State. Rawat Moti Singh, who succeeded to the throne in 1831, ruled up to 1880. The British political authorities did not regard his administration as efficient and themselves took up the management from 1846 to 1856. Rawat Moti Singh was given limited powers from 1856. Jan Ali Khan, an employee and favourite of the British Government, was appointed as the Manager of the State. He could not be removed from office without the previous approval of the Political Agent in Bhopal. The Rawat was not allowed to cancel any lease which was granted by the Company. He naturally fretted under these limitations, for he felt that he was being unjustly treated and unnecessarily humiliated. During the revolt, he tried to feed fat his grudge against the Company's Government by secretly helping the rebels.

NARSINGARH: In 1818 through the mediation of the Company an agreement was reached between Sobhag Singh, the Chief of Narsingarh, on the one hand and the rulers of Indore, Dewas and Gwalior on the other, which defined his territories. In 1827 Hanwant Singh (adopted from the Bhatkhera family) succeeded Sobhag Singh and ruled till his death in 1873. Hanwant Singh was a patriot. He was severely criticised by some British officials for sheltering important ring leaders of the Revolt. Hanwant Singh followed the high Rajput ideals in not surrendering those who took shelter under him. He was a wise, thrifty and far-sighted administrator. The harsh treatment accorded to him by some of the military officials of the East India Company during the Revolt elicited much public sympathy. Hence the Company's Government did not consider it prudent to punish him openly.

RATLAM: In 1819 Parbat Singh, the Raja of Ratlam, entered into an agreement with the East India Company acknowledging the paramountcy of the British. In 1825 Parbat Singh died. Then Balwant Singh came to the throne and ruled up to 1857. He was succeeded by Bhairo Singh, aged 18 years, who ruled up to 1864. There was nothing remarkable in his administration. He favoured the British during the Revolt.

SAILANA: The British followed the policy of separating the Rajput State of Sailana from the political domination of the Sindhia. By the settlement of 1819 Laxman Singh, the Ruler of Sailana, agreed to pay an annual tribute under British guar-

antee to the Sindhia, and territories of the Sailana State were made independent of the Sindhia's control. Laxman Singh died in 1826 and was succeeded by his son Ratan Singh who died without any heir after a short rule of a year. Ratan Singh's uncle Nahar Singh ruled from 1827 to 1842 and after him his son Takhat Singh ruled from 1842 to 1850. In 1850 Dule Singh, a minor succeeded and there was a Minority Administration up to 1857. During this period reforms on British lines were introduced in the State.

SITAMAU: Sir Robert Hamilton, the British Agent to the Governor-General for Central India, wrote to the Government of India about the Sitamau State thus: "After the battle of Mahidpur Holkar's forces retreated to Sitamau. At that time, the Raja was not in possession of his Fort, he having been driven from it, through the exaction of Bapoo Sindhia. Being thus in opposition to Sindhia's officers, the Raja made himself known to Sir John Malcolm and afforded all the information in his power as to the country and the movements of the enemy. For these services and to promote our interests, Sir John Malcolm reinstated the Raja in his Fort.

In 1820 Sir John Malcolm mediated an agreement between Raja Raj Singh (descendant of the family of Jodhpur), the ruler of Sitamau, and Daulat Rao Sindhia. Raja Raj Singh was confirmed as the Ruler of Sitamau on paying an annual tribute under British guarantee to the Sindhia. He was an able ruler and ruled from 1802 to 1867. The British helped the Rulers of Sitamau in freeing themselves from the political control of the Sindhia. In spite of the charge of forgery (making certain unauthorised changes in the treaty) levelled against the State, the British helped the State in the reduction of its annual tribute to the Sindhia from Rs. 60,000 to Rs. 55,000.

DEWAS: In the hey-day of the Maratha Empire the Puars of Dewas played an important part. But the wheel of fortune turned and between 1806 and 1818 they lost considerably both in territory and influence. Alexander Macdonald, Assistant to Sir John Malcolm, thus wrote in 1818 in one of his unpublished letters about Dewas: "Before the appearance of the British army in Malwa, the condition of the petty State of Dewas seems to have been most wretched. Deprived of the resources, it drew from the tributes on other States, . . . stripped off several of

its Provinces, . . . little or nothing but a mere name was left of it." The history of Dewas for several years was "barren of all details except those of its own sufferings."

Between 1806 and 1818 the States neighbouring Dewas snatched large slices out of its territory. In 1818 the British confirmed these adverse possessions. This deprived the rulers of Dewas of any chance to regain their lost territories as long as the Company's rule lasted.

As early as 1818 there were two branches of Dewas, namely Senior and Junior. The relation between the two branches was well described by a Dewas officer to Sir John Malcolm when he said, "If one lime is presented by a villager, it must be cut into two equal parts, and divided between our two Rajas." Raja Rukmangad Rao ruled Dewas Senior from 1827 to 1860 and Raja Haibat Rao ruled Dewas Junior from 1840 to 1864.

JHABUA: It was a small Rajput State. It was once under the Holkar State but was eventually freed from its control by the Company's intervention. In this State there was a large force of the Arab military adventurers and the British laboured to reduce their number. In 1836 the Company, with the help of an armed force, crushed the mutinous Arab soldiers and established peace in Jhabua. Gopal Singh ruled Jhabua from 1840 to 1895. During his minority up to 1859, his grandmother acted as the Regent under the Company's supervision. Gopal Singh was only 17 when the Revolt of 1857 broke out.

BARWANI: Jaswant Singh ruled Barwani from 1839 to 1880. The population of Barwani mainly consisted of the Bhils who were ever anxious to lead an adventurous life. They hated foreign intervention or domination.

ALIRAJPUR: Jaswant Singh ruled Alirajpur from 1818 to 1862. During his minority, which lasted up to 1836, the Makranis were in power under the leadership of Muzaffar Makrani. The Company tried to crush their power and was temporarily successful in its attempt. But in the Revolt of 1857 the Makranis regained their power and found a good opportunity to give full vent to their spirit of military adventure.

AMJHERA: It was a petty Rajput State with an area of 584 square miles in Malwa. When the Company first established its supremacy in Malwa in 1818, its policy was to reduce the strength of the Arab soldiers employed in the States and to ter-

minate the political and military control of the Marathas over the States. W. B. Martin, the Agent to the Governor-General for Central India, wrote to the Secretary to the Government of India thus: "the policy which induced us on our first interference in the affairs of Malwa (was) to emancipate as much as possible the petty Rajput States from the yoke of Maratha power . . . by commuting the indefinite claims of the latter for the payment of a specific sum, which we guaranteed, and which was intended to constitute a full indemnity for the rights which they consented to relinquish . . . (and for the continuance of that policy) it appears to be of essential importance to the future tranquility of this part of the country that the connection which formerly existed between Maratha and Rajput States in Malwa should be severed as much as possible."

The Company's Government advanced money to the ruler of Amjhera and asked him to pay arrears to the Arab soldiers and disband them. It also guaranteed to the Sindhia the punctual payment of a tribute of Rs. 35,000 per annum by the Raja of Amjhera. But in return the Sindhia had to withdraw his troops from Amjhera and terminate his political sovereignty over the State. As Amjhera was a big opium, cotton, sugarcane and wheat producing centre, its loss to the Sindhia was considerable.

*Agents to the Governor-General for Central India
under the East India Company*

In 1818 a British Political Residency was established at Indore. Between 1818 and 1857 there were several Agents to the Governor-General with their Headquarters at Indore. Under the Agent to the Governor-General were posted a number of Political Agents and Residents who were directly attached to the States and exercised control over them. Sir John Malcolm was the first Agent to the Governor-General for the affairs of Malwa. He was a shrewd politician and an efficient organiser. He played a diplomatic role in the territorial settlements between the British and the Indian State rulers like those of Sindhia, Holkar, Bhopal, Sitamau etc. He established British military stations at Mhow, Sardarpur, Mahidpur, Neemuch, and other places. To assess the full value of Sir John Malcolm's work in Malwa will be out of place here. Suffice it to say that

he was the real founder of the British supremacy in Central India. But all those who succeeded him were not of his calibre.

Gerald Wellesley, Resident at the Court of Holkar (1818-1831) maintained the *status quo* as far as possible. Martin (1832-33) revived the days of Mughal luxury. He used to bathe in rose water. He disliked conversation with the common people. He cared a good deal for pomp and show. There were also Agents to the Governor-General, like John Bax (1834-40), who relied too much on their subordinates for work and guidance. John Bax enthusiastically carried out the humanitarian policy, as laid down by the Central Government, by abolishing the *Sati* System, suppressing the *Thugs*, prohibiting the burning of the witches and abolition of infanticide. Sir C. M. Wade (1840-44) maintained peace in Malwa, with the exception of the Battle of Maharajpur in 1843. Another man of great tact and foresight was Sir Robert Hamilton who worked as Agent to the Governor-General from 1844 to 1859 with a short break from April to December 1857 when he went on leave to England. He followed a conciliatory policy and tried to win over the rulers to his side.

But Colonel Durand (April 1857 to December 1857) who became the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General during the critical days of the Revolt was a man of different stuff. An engineer and soldier, he singularly lacked insight into the Indian mind. His anti-Indian feeling earned for him a bad name among the people of Malwa. Unfortunately there was no love lost between Sir Robert Hamilton and Colonel Durand and they carried on their personal quarrel to such an extent that it adversely affected the interests of the ruling chiefs and people of Malwa. What one did the other undid and so the chiefs could never know what was expected of them or where they stood.

In spite of their shortcomings, the Agents to the Governor-General for Central India, from 1818 to 1857, proved their worth in developing the territorial and political influence of the Company's Government. Many of them were bold enough to assert that they transformed Malwa which was a home of anarchy into a land of peace and plenty. But it should not be forgotten that many of their political and humanitarian acts failed to capture the hearts of the people. The changes introduced by them were often ahead of the times and in many cases directly opposed

to the public will. It will not be an exaggeration to state that, in the ruthless pursuit of the policy of imperialism, they often acted unjustly and gave offence to the ruling chiefs and people who during the Revolt found a suitable opportunity of taking revenge.

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POLITICAL FACTORS OF THE REVOLT

Our history of the Revolt in Malwa in 1857 takes us back to the year 1818. Malwa was then divided into a number of States both large and small. The East India Company recognised the independence of these States. It entered into an agreement with them, giving full recognition to their autonomous existence.¹ It, however, reserved to itself the right to interfere, firstly in the interest of peace, tranquility and good government, and secondly in the case of a State waging a war of aggression.

Subsequently this policy of "subordinate isolation," maintained by the East India Company with reference to the States, came to be supplemented by the Doctrine of Lapse. This Doctrine proved a handy tool for the cupidity of Lord Dalhousie whose insatiable thirst for power led him to annex the various Indian States one after another.

This policy, which is also termed by some historians as the "policy of peaceful invasion," was not a mere accidental phenomenon or a creation of Lord Dalhousie, but an inevitable result of a variety of forces such as the expansionist mania of the Company's Government in India prior to 1857. For this purpose a number of crafty methods were adopted. Some States were annexed on the flimsy pretext of "the sufferings of the millions" under their "ignominious tyrants." A few were dissolved on the basis of the so-called "right of Conquest." Some were annexed on grounds of their strategic or economic importance or for local considerations. Thus on one pretext or another the Juggernaut of imperialism rolled on claiming victims at every turn. For purposes of annexation the Company reserved to itself the right to distinguish between States which existed prior to the advent of its rule and those which were subsequently created. In the case of the latter, the Company often disallowed adoption to enable it to annex them whenever it served its interest.

The policy of annexation cannot be understood without under-

1. File No. 706 Malwa Agency.

standing the Doctrine of Lapse. It was customary for a Hindu ruler to take in adoption a male child to succeed him to the throne in the case of the ruler having no issue or direct successor. Adoption is held valid by Hindu Law, though it does not find any place in the English and Mohammadan codes. According to the Hindu Law, the objects of adoption are two-fold: secular and non-secular.² The secular object is to secure an heir to perpetuate the adopter's name and preserve his property or State. The non-secular object is to secure spiritual benefit to the adopter and his ancestors by having a son who may offer funeral cakes and libations of water to the manes of the adopter and his ancestors. This accords with the saying of the sage Vasistha, "There is no heavenly region for a sonless man."

The Hindus consider, both on worldly and on religious grounds, that a son is essential to perform religious obsequies (*Pind Dan* and *Tarpan*) for the deceased, and therefore adoption in case of the failure of the natural heir is the most cherished privilege. They do not regard adoption as complete unless the adopted boy also gets a right to the property of his adopting father. According to Hindu Law, a son by adoption gets all the rights and privileges of a son by birth.

The East India Company's Government did not recognise any adoption as valid for the succession to the throne unless (a) its previous sanction was obtained, (b) regular *nazar* (succession duty) was paid to the authorities, and (c) adoption was made in conformity with the religious practices and customs. The sanction of the Government was merely a declaration that they had no objection to the adoption, but it did not create any title which did not exist before nor rendered valid one which was previously invalid.³ Adoption not sanctioned by the Government gave the person adopting no right to alienate the Government revenue.⁴ This principle was mostly used in case of guaranteed Thakurs and Jagirdars.

The right of adoption created the right to inherit the private property and personal status of the deceased Hindu ruler of a

2. D. F. Mulla, *Principles of Hindu Law* (1946 Ed.), p. 535.

3. *Selections from the Records of the Bombay Govt.*, No. 28, p. 11.

4. Letter dated 15th April, 1845, from Mr. Hart, the Inam Commissioner. *Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government*, No. 28, New Series.

dependent Indian State, but it did not carry with it the right to succeed to the State and political functions unless the previous sanction of the Company's Government had been obtained. Whenever such adoption was disallowed, the State of the ruler who died without a successor was annexed by the Company and made part of its territories. This, in brief, is the Doctrine of Lapse.

The view that no adoption was valid unless sanctioned by the "Sarkar," i.e. the Company's Government, was held as early as 1820, when the Company made its famous declaration on August 12, 1820, to the above effect.⁵ Further proclamations were issued to this effect on later dates, confirming the Government's stand in this matter.⁶

The Company's Government quoted the precedents from the records of the Maratha Government under the Peshwas, where the Sovereign interfered with adoption, forbade the ceremony, and even cancelled the adoption made without proper authority.⁷ The Government's right to veto an adoption was, in view of the Governor-General in Council, inherent in their right of paramountcy.⁸

As a rule, adoption was refused in all those cases where foul play was suspected, but during the administration of Lord Dalhousie it was nullified even on flimsy grounds.⁹ He held the view that where the right to territory by Lapse could be established, the Government should leave no stone unturned to extend its empire and to confer on the people of that territory "the benefits of British sovereignty, present and prospective."¹⁰

Dalhousie's view was that adoption should not be permitted except for strong political reasons and expediency. The Company's Government under him made the distinction between sovereign and dependent Indian States. For example, Jhansi was not regarded as a sovereign state, because the Ruler of Jhansi

5. *Selections from the Records of the Bombay Govt.*, No. 28, New Series, p. 4.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

9. John Bruce Norton, *The Rebellion in India*, p. 70.

10. Kaye, *History of the Sepoy War*, Vol. I, p. 73.

was a "Subedar" and a subject of the Peshwa at the time of the assumption of paramountcy by the Company.

There was difference between the sovereign Princes and Jagirdars, between those who were in possession of hereditary sovereignty in their own right and those who held grants of land or public revenue by gift from a sovereign or a paramount power. Dalhousie recognized, in the case of Hindu Sovereigns, any failure of male heirs as a sufficient basis for adoption, provided that it was valid according to the Hindu Law. But in the case of dependent principalities his view was different to quote his own words: "With respect to the Chiefs who merely hold lands or enjoy public revenues under grants such as are issued by a sovereign to a subject, the power which made the grant, or that which by conquest or otherwise had succeeded to its rights, is certainly entitled to limit succession according to the limitations of the grant, which in general confirms to its heirs male of the body, and consequently precludes adoption. In such cases, therefore, the power which granted, or the power standing in its place, would have a right to resume on failure of heirs male of the body."¹¹

By applying the Doctrine of Lapse and by invoking the aid of the *Mahakali* (the great goddess of destruction) of Annexation, Lord Dalhousie wanted to change India from congeries of States into an empire, one and indivisible.¹² By continuing this policy he also thought of enriching the public treasury and of consolidating the military strength of the British people in India. He did not really like to reform the administration of the Indian States because it meant only labour without reaping its fruits and also spoiled the chances of annexation. Labouring under the delusion of the superiority of the Company's administration, he thought that the people of the Indian States should not be deprived of the justice of the British rule. Therefore he did not allow any opportunity to slip by to confer this boon on a State.

But Lord Dalhousie forgot that good government is no substi-

11. Minute by Lord Dalhousie, dated 27th February, 1854, *Parliamentary Papers on Jhansi*.

12. *Friend of India*, the chief newspaper organ of Lord Dalhousie, Quoted in *Last Counsels* by John Dickinson, p. 28.

tute for self-government, and that the people of Indian States preferred their own rulers, in spite of their many faults, to the "benevolent" foreign master. Lord Dalhousie's policy was not sound even from the British point of view. Wholesale annexation should have meant the creation of a uniform British India. In the event of such a unity, political consciousness among the masses should have awakened earlier and overthrown the British Empire in India much sooner. The anomaly between the British provinces and the Indian States would have been no more. Moreover, the British Government would not have been able to use the Indian States as the breakwaters of the storm of nationalism and a sheet-anchor of British imperialism in India.

Lord Dalhousie was not very consistent in his application of the Doctrine of Lapse for he was very often guided by expediency. He allowed adoption to Bala Rao, the Chief of Jalaun, and Tej Singh the Chief of Orchha, but refused to recognize adoption in the case of Jhansi.¹³ He recognized, when it suited his purpose, States like Orchha and Datia as independent States, but gave "constructive interpretation" to terms of a treaty when expediency demanded it. To take an instance in 1854, Lord Dalhousie forgot that the ruler of Jhansi gave the British loyal support in 1817 and that the treaty of 1817 between the Ruler of Jhansi and the Company's Government included the words *Johnasheenan* or successors in general as opposed to the term *warrisan* or heirs of the body or collateral heirs, and which precluded him from annexing it. Dalhousie's policy of non-recognition of adoption for the so-called dependent States and recognition in the case of the so-called sovereign States was based on pure expediency.

The act of non-recognition of adoption by the British Resident in an Indian State has been compared to the act of Caligula thus: "When Caligula was invited to the nuptial feast he carried away his friend's wife; when the British Resident is invited to the death-bed of a native Prince, he turns his friend's widow and orphan out of doors and confiscates their inheritance."¹⁴ Dalhousie's Doctrine of Lapse was a veiled method of "peaceful

13. R. R. W. Ellis, Political Assistant for Bundelkhand on Rani Laxmi Bai's Kharita, *Parliamentary papers on Jhansi*.

14. John Dickinson, *Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor*, p. 15.

invasion."¹⁵ It was more dreaded than actual warfare, for it caught the people unawares and hardly gave them any time or occasion to resist.

The Company's Government was playing a diplomatic game. On the one hand it was issuing a series of proclamations announcing its intention to respect the laws, traditions and customs of the Indians, and on the other hand it was striking at the very root of an ancient and long-cherished custom by not recognizing the Doctrine of Adoption. The Doctrine of Lapse, applied on failures of natural heirs, was based on false notions. Since the English Company was only the *de facto* sovereign while Bahadur Shah was still (up to 1858) the *de jure* head of the State, it was evident that the Company was not legally competent to decide any juridical question particularly of a political nature.

Again, the Company's Government won a major part of India with the help of the Indian army. It were the Indians who fought against the Indians and helped Britain to win an empire. The Indian Army had a strong faith in the validity of the ancient traditions and customs, and they were shocked to find that the British flouted them. How the popular fury was roused against the Company's intervention in the matter of adoption can well be judged by the events which followed the annexation of Jhansi. Even a Loyalist like Sir Syed Ahmed Khan admitted that the annexation of Oudh "irritated" the noble men and independent princes of Hindustan.¹⁶ Kaye and Malleeson have rightly suggested that the seizure of the kingdom of Oudh, the annexation of Jhansi, the lands confiscated from the landowners in the North West Province (modern United Provinces) were among the important causes of the Revolt.¹⁷

The policy of annexation was a great breach of faith. It was like killing the goose that laid the golden egg. The annexation of the kingdom of the Bhonsle of Nagpur and the territory of the Raja of Satara naturally produced great alarm in the minds of the remaining Indian rulers.¹⁸ It completely dislodged the

15. Kaye, *History of the Sepoy War*, Vol. I, p. 69.

16. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, *Causes of the Indian Revolt*, p. 5.

17. Kaye and Malleeson, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. V, Book XVII, Chap. I, p. 282.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 289.

faith of the Indians in the British. Baji Rao II's adoption of Dhondu Pant Nana Sahib was not recognized by the British Government. The well-drafted memorial of Nana Sahib to the Court of Directors fell upon deaf ears. He was not granted any pension. The short note that the Court of Directors wrote on his memorial was that the application was "wholly inadmissible." The British felt secure in their power in India and therefore they did not care much for individual justice or equity; they did whatever appealed to them as expedient. Though Nana Sahib's cause was not admitted by the Company's Directors, it produced for the time being a deep impression upon the Indians who felt insulted and aggrieved.

Much of the disturbance at Indore was due to the "bad name of the British Government."¹⁹ The rulers and people lost faith in the Company's Government. Edicts followed edicts by which the thrones crumbled and kings were uncrowned, exiled, or pensioned off. All this produced a fear of insecurity among the rulers and people of Malwa. Captain Fenwick, a contemporary observer at Indore, rightly points out that the policy of annexation contributed to the plots for the overthrow of the British power in Malwa. Bhau Sahib Reshimwale, the Prime Minister of Indore during 1857, styled the annexation policy as the "insatiable thirst of the Mahakali of annexation."²⁰

The policy of annexation stirred the opposition of the public, alienated the rulers from their loyalty to the Company, and united the Hindus and Muslims to fight their common enemy, the English East India Company. There was another general political factor which made the Company's Government unpopular. The Central Government at Calcutta and its Agents at Indore, Gwalior, and Bhopal were official organs of foreign despotism and hence the accompanying evils of unpopular and undemocratic foreign government loomed large on the Indian horizon. In times of peace official despotism might work unhampered, but in times of stress the sting of the system could not pass unfelt. The East India Company's Government in India was highly artificial and bureaucratic.²¹ In addition, the

19. *Pamphlets on India* (R.A.S. Bom. Br.), p. 13.

20. Bhau Sahib's Family Papers.

21. John Dickinson, *Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor*, p. 36.



Shrimant Rajeshree Nana Saheb Peshwa

control exercised from afar by the Court of Directors became naturally ineffective. It has been truly remarked: "History and Political Science alike negative the possibility of a permanent subjection of a vast and populous continent to the direct and centralized rule of a dominant race from afar, represented only by an army of occupation and ever changing body of professional functionaries."²²

The officials of the Central Government were so engrossed in foreign warfare and annexation that they had little time left for an effective control over the Political Agencies and care for the happiness of the people. "Under the pressure of such a state of affairs. Central India was not likely to be the object of excessive care or cost; and the Residents and Political Agents have remained, except as to emoluments, much what they had always been, since the time of Malcolm and Wellesley (of Indore) and quite as unshackled in influence and authority."²³ Such was the state of affairs during the period between 1818 and 1857 which made Colonel H. M. Durand write: "War or the consequences of war—embarrassed finances—have so occupied our rulers, that, provided the Agents of Government could manage to rub on, keeping matters as they found them and could avoid drawing too largely on the time and attention of the Government, the policy of successive Governor-Generals was satisfied." The lack of such central control often led the people to imagine that many of the actions of the Residents and the Political Agents in Malwa were high-handed, which gave rise to dissatisfaction.

Besides the lack of Central Government's effective control over the affairs of Central India, the jurisdiction of the Resident at Indore was considerable and as such could not be effectively controlled by one man. Before April 7, 1854, Residents at Indore (styled as the Agent to the Governor-General for affairs of Malwa and Resident at Indore) and Gwalior dealt directly with the Government of India. Bundelkhand and Baghelkhand were independent charges.²⁴ But the Government of India informed Sir Robert Hamilton in 1854 as follows, "As Government Agent for Central India, the Political affairs of Gwalior, Bundelkhand

22. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

23. *Life of Major-General Sir Henry M. Durand*, Vol. II, pp. 11-12.

24. *Imperial Gazetteer*, (C.I.), p. 25.

and Rewa will be under you in addition to your present charge."²⁵ This addition of the two principalities, which were politically and socially distinct from Malwa, led to political disadvantages and unduly increased the burden of control for the Resident at Indore. The difficulty was further aggravated by the lack of quick and proper means of communication. Moreover, Central India was not one compact territory. Colonel Durand, the officiating Agent to the Governor-General for Central India at the outbreak of the Revolt wrote, "One great embarrassment to me has been that my charge was traversed diagonally (Jhansi to Saugor or the line of the Betwa river) by districts over which I had no control."²⁶

Places like Saugor, Jhansi, Lalitpur, and Jubbulpore divided the Central India Agency into two main blocks—Bundelkhand and Baghelkhand forming one, and Malwa the other. The land that divided these two zones was not under the control of the Agent to the Governor-General for Central India, but under the Commissioner of Saugor and Narmada territories.²⁷ This lack of control over districts wedged in between the two zones of Central India Agency led to delay in disposing of urgent matters and caused much political friction. Besides these difficulties, the Agent to the Governor-General for Central India had also the charge of the Opium Agency, the Thagi Department, and the direct supervision and control over those States of Central India which had Minority Administration such as Dhar, Bhopal, Barwani, Ratlam, Sailana, Jhabua, and others. This further increased the responsibility of the Agent to the Governor-General for Central India.

The result was that the administration of Central India did not improve and the people suffered. Colonel H. M. Durand wrote in 1850, "Central India is, it must be confessed, very much where Sir John Malcolm left it. Thirty years have gone over it,

25. *Foreign Deptt. Political Proceedings*, F. Cons., 7th April, 1854, Nos. 35-38, No. 1437 to Sir R. Hamilton, Resident at Indore, dated 7th April, 1854.

26. Issue Vol. 90. Letter No. 3A, dated July 1857, from H. M. Durand to Secy. Govt. of India.

27. *Foreign Deptt. Secretary Proc.*, Cons. 1858. Letter No. 27A, dated 13th August 1857, from Lt.-Col. Durand, offg. A.G.G. for C.I., to Secretary to Government of India.

with few and partial improvements, and very moderate advance in general prosperity, if any."²⁸ It is rather surprising that the British Agents not only failed to improve the lot of the common people in Malwa but also neglected to pay heed to the timely advice tendered by those persons who could feel the pulse of the common people. The timely warnings of Englishmen like Barrister Dickinson, who had several opportunities to mix with the public, fell upon deaf ears. Dickinson plainly wrote, "They (Indians) seem what they know we expect them to appear, and we do not see their real feelings: we know not how hot the stove may be under its polished surface."²⁹ The Government failed to notice and sympathise with Indian feelings and aspirations, as "there was no real communication between the Governors and the governed."³⁰ The Government's withdrawal from all social intercourse with the people of the country, the absence of any public representative organ, naturally shut the Government from vast sources of public information and freed them from a wholesome sense of public responsibility. The results where disastrous.

An illustration will bear us out. Baba Aptia, Sarsubah of Malwa, was a great revolutionary. He was the Commander of the Body-Guards at Lashkar. There he enjoyed the confidence of Jayaji Rao Sindhia. Baba Aptia united the principal Sardars of Lashkar, who belonged to his own party and entered into an agreement with Nana Sahib Peshwa.³¹ With the rise of Dinkar Rao's pro-British party at Gwalior, Baba Aptia was transferred to Ujjain, as Sarsubah of Malwa. But even from Ujjain, a place far off from Gwalior, he sent his "Tufan Mails" (Express Letters) containing revolutionary schemes to his followers at Gwalior. The plots were so deep-rooted and secret that even the high British officials took a long time to know about

28. *Life of Major-General Sir H. M. Durand*, Vol. II, p. 16.

29. J. Dickinson, *Government of India under a Bureaucracy*, (1852), p. 166.

30. Syed Ahmed Khan, *Causes of the Indian Revolt*, C.S.I. (1873), p. 33.

31. Imperial Records, Foreign Deptt., Secret. Cons., Vol. 345, 28th May 1858. Evidence of Das Baba, one of the brains behind the Revolt of 1857.

these, and not before the rebels progressed far in their plans.³² Even Colonel Durand, as late as September 1857, could not judge the cause of Baba Aptia's secret plots against the British and wrote about him thus: "The conduct of Baba Aptia Sir Soobah of Malwa, whether from lukewarmness, want of power or down-right pusillanimity, has throughout been very unsatisfactory."³³

It is one of the most curious factors in the history of the Revolt in Malwa that neither the East India Company's Government nor their political officials in the Central India Agency could detect earlier the feelings of unrest and the existence of secret plots which were to shake the foundations of the British Empire in India in 1857. As late as the Spring of 1857 Lord Canning, the Governor-General of India, received Maharaja Jayaji Rao Sindhia at Calcutta. He expressed satisfaction with the many improvements then introduced in Gwalior State and gave the Maharaja good assurances of "profound peace" that reigned throughout India.³⁴

Lord Canning himself expressed surprise to the Maharaja Sindhia at the turn of events thus: "Your Highness had hardly returned to the seat of your Government when a storm burst which carried away anarchy, bloodshed and rapine over a great part of Hindustan."³⁵ Similar feelings of security and profound tranquility were expressed in the Annual Tour Reports of the various Political Agents and the Agent to the Governor-General for Central India.³⁶ Holmes writes, "When Durand entered upon his duties (as officiating Agent to the Governor-General for Central India in April 1857) there was not a ripple to break the calm which prevailed in Central India."³⁷ C. L. Showers, Political Agent for the Rajputana States (Mewar), wrote to the Political Agent in Bhopal at Sehore in April 1857 apprehending some fear about the discontent among the sepoys. The Politi-

32. Gwalior Agency File No. 267 of 1854-56. Letter No. 60 of 1854 from P. A. Gwalior to A.G.G., C.I.

33. General No. 973. Letter No. 274 dated 7th September 1857, from H. M. Durand to Secy. to Govt. of India.

34. Old Record File No. 175, Lord Canning's letter to the Sindhia, dated Lucknow the 25th October 1859.

35. *Ibid.*

36. Issue Vol. 86, Annual Tour Reports in C. I. States (1854 to 1856).

37. T. R. Holmes, *A History of Indian Mutiny* (5th Ed., 1904), p. 475.

cal Agent in Bhopal's reply was, "I hope your dreary anticipations of coming evils to India will not be realized. I do not think there is much danger in the direction you point at among the Native Army."³⁸ The British officers in Central India dreamt of peace and security, but they were actually seated on a mine ready to explode. No Indians were appointed to high administrative posts so as to give them an opportunity to offer suggestions to the Company's Government. Nor did the high British officials care to take responsible Indian leaders into their confidence. The result was that the undercurrents of the Revolt remained undetected until the flood actually threatened to wash away the foreign rule.

Let us next take up the political factors which were operative in the individual States and which, in some measure, contributed to the Revolt.

GWALIOR: The courts of some of the rulers in Malwa provided a good chess-board for the play of personalities and for the intrigues of the conflicting court-parties. Major Macpherson, the Political Agent at Gwalior, remarked that the young ruler Jayaji Rao Sindhia was, "the object of endless plots and counterplots."³⁹ Next in importance to the Dewan Dinkar Rao, there stood the three highest civil officers, Baba Aptia Sarsubah of Malwa, Gulam Hussain Sarsubah of Gwalior, and Balaji Sahib Sarsubah of Isagarh. Then there were Sardar Mahurkar, the Commander-in-Chief, Sardar Balwant Rao, Second-in-Command, and Ram Rao, the Agency Vakil. The last but not the least was the low and the most powerful set of favourites and boon companions, like Nana Bapu, a man of low caste and origin, Umarchand, a bankrupt banker, Madho Rao and Hindu Rao *Huzurias* (Court attendants). At Gwalior there was an influential remnant of Dada Khasgiwala's party, a strong anti-Dinkar Rao party, and an influential pro-British party headed by Dinkar Rao and guided by Macpherson. Prior to and during the Revolt, Dewan Dinkar Rao's party was in power. To bring its downfall some of the opposition parties helped the rebels.

Besides these court-parties contending among themselves and representing an influence which is not easy to gauge, there was

38. C. L. Showers, *A Missing Chapter of the Indian Mutiny*, p. 5.

39. File No. 267 of 1854-56, Letter No. 60, dated 13th November 1854.

the enigmatic personality of Baiza Bai.⁴⁰ Married to Daulat Rao Sindhia in 1797, she was present by the side of her husband in the field of Assaye (21st September 1803), and was always regarded as a worthy champion of the cause of Maratha independence and glory. She was Regent at Gwalior during the minority of Jankoji Rao, adopted son of Daulat Rao. In 1833, with the attainment of majority by Jankoji, her Regency ended. After some dispute, she fell into disfavour with the Company's authorities. She was regarded as an "intriguer" and had to stay at Satara, Nasik, Ujjain, and other places. She however exercised a great influence on the public mind. In 1857, on the eve of the Revolt, she was staying at Gwalior. Baiza Bai's aim, in the years of her power and exile, was to revive the Maratha Empire and its glory. During his trial, Sita Ram Bawa, one of the chief rebels and a close associate of Nana Sahib Peshwa, made a confession that Baiza Bai, as far back as 1838, had initiated the conspiracy for the Revolt. Colonel Durand wrote: "The conduct of the agents of Baiza Bai has been such as everywhere to excite suspicion, and public rumour makes no other mention of Baiza Bai's name than the active instigator of opposition to the British Government."⁴¹

Besides Baiza Bai, there was the group of the Deccani Pandits. Several English officials regarded them as dangerous to their rule. The Marathas and the Deccani Pandits, at one time produced shrewd politicians and great diplomats. The British looked with suspicion upon their influence and power. When the Company's authority was fully established, the British tried to crush the strength of this diplomatic class. Before the Revolt of 1857 the Deccani Pandits formed an important party in the courts of the Maratha princes. They were very influential, and were generally supposed by the British officials to represent "an influence for evil." Sir Robert Hamilton wrote, "A reference to the former records of Government will prove that successive Residents and Agents at the courts of Sindhia and Holkar have

40. *Ibid.*

41. Imperial Records, Foreign Deptt. Secret. Cons. 29th Jan. 1858, No. 87/89. General No. 155 A, letter dated 13th August 1857 from Lt. Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I., to the Secy. Govt. of India.



Maharani Baiza Bai

represented what an influence for evil this class of men (Deccani Pandits) have ever exercised, and how impossible it has been to shake them off. The chiefs themselves are quite aware of their power. Holkar has got rid of some, but they are too strong for him; and Sindhia happens to have a very faithful exception in the person of his Dewan. . . . It was not Nana Sahib personally, but it was the clever introduction of the name of the Peshwa, and with its substitution, the revival of the Peshwa's Raj that touched old feelings, and roused hopes and expectations. . . ."⁴² Such was the hostile attitude of the British officers towards the Deccani Pandits. The Pandits, with all their faults, were the torch-bearers of the ideas of "*Swadharma*" and "*Swaraj*." They hated the "Firangis" and wanted to see an end of the foreign rule. They secretly incited the people to revolt against the British.

Besides these factors, the East India Company's policy, from 1818 to 1857, of freeing the Rajput Chiefs from the control of the Sindhia gave offence to him and his people, for it weakened his authority. This policy of alienation was a diplomatic move on the part of the Company, not however without its political repercussions. The settlement in 1817 between the British and the Sindhia "placed almost all the military classes of the Western and the Southern districts of Sindhia's possession in Malwa under British control, in a manner that would enable it (should measures ever provoke such an extreme) to employ them for his destruction."⁴³ This policy of the British towards the Rajput Chiefs under the Sindhia is well described by an important official, Colonel Southerland, the Resident at Gwalior in 1835, thus: "A dexterous use of the services of these chiefs, whose national hatred of the Marathas still disposes them to be devoted to British interests, may, if circumstances so require, enable us to dictate to Malwa even though we have not the aid of a single regiment of the line to support us."⁴⁴

Some of the minor chiefs under the Sindhia were dissatisfied

42. Issue Vol. 103, Gen. No. 864 A, Letter No. 178, dated 24th April 1858, from A.G.C. for C.I. to Secy. to Govt. of India.

43. Malcolm, *Report on the Province of Malwa*, p. 441. (Ed. 1927).

44. I.R.D. Old Record Girassia—Gwalior File No. 69, Letter No. 125, dated 11th June 1835, from Col. J. Southerland, Resident at Gwalior, to John Bax, Esqr., Resident at Indore.

with the East India Company. The following instances will prove the point.

NARWAR (*Parone*). After the death of Madho Singh, ruler of Narwar in 1848, the Company's Government did not recognize the adoption made by the widow of Madho Singh.⁴⁵ After four years (1848 to 1852) of wilfully protracted enquiry, the Resident at Gwalior at last conveyed the decision of the East India Company's Government in declaring Man Singh, who was next of kin to the late Raja Madho Singh, to be the ruler of Narwar. This delay caused great hardship to Man Singh. During this period Man Singh was for a time, due to the intrigues of Taj Singh (Vakil of the dowager Queen) placed in irons.⁴⁶ Man Singh was later on acquitted by a competent tribunal. The Company's officer, R. Shakespeare, Assistant for the Sindhia's Dominions, says, "It is my duty to state that we are compromising our reputation by not settling this case."⁴⁷ Man Singh could not forget the troubles and humiliation he was made to undergo by the Company, and the Revolt offered him a suitable opportunity to give vent to the grudge he nursed in his breast.

Kachi Chiefs—Raja of Raghugarh. The Kachi Chiefs looked upon the preservation of the East India Company's power as the only obstacle to their recovering from the Sindhia all their old possessions.⁴⁸ In 1857 the Raja of Raghugarh wrote a lengthy *Kharita* (letter) to Colonel Durand, the first part of which was full of taunts hurled at the Company's Government for having upheld the Sindhia and Holkar in their acquisition of the territories of the Rajput Chiefs. The Raghugarh Chief claimed land worth twenty-five lakhs held by his ancestors. He threatened the British with his wrath if they did not acknowledge his claims, but held out hopes of his cordial aid if they recognised them.⁴⁹

Raja of Banpur. "Raja Mardan Singh of Banpur had," so

45. Old Record File No. 50, Letter No. 100, dated Gwalior 16-3-1852.

46. *Ibid.*

47. Old Record File No. 50, Letter No. 4, dated 2nd Jan. 1850.

48. Old Record File No. 50, *Report on the Affairs of Gwalior*, dated Gwalior 15th June 1859, para 86.

49. Old Record File No. 43, Letter-book No. 116, Issue Vol. Letter No. I-B, dated 7th July 1859 from R. Shakespeare, A.G.G. for C.I., to Secy. to Govt. of India.

wrote the Agent to the Governor-General at Indore, R. C. Shakespeare, "injuries to be redressed, and no doubt he has had the hope of regaining, on the expected overthrow of our government, the entire kingdom of Chundeyree (Chanderi), the ancient possession of his ancestors, of which . . . his father had been dispossessed by Scindia (Sindhia)."⁵⁰ The Sindhia comes into the picture owing to the active measures he took to chastise some of the Jagirdars under the ruler of Chanderi (Mor Prahlad) who were making repeated depredations upon his territories. The Gwalior army under Captain Baptiste took the fort of Talbehut. Raja Mor Prahlad fled to Jhansi. Negotiations were opened. At first Mor Prahlad was granted Rs. 25,000 a year, but later on in 1831 Colonel Baptiste, with the approval of the British Resident at Gwalior, divided the former Chanderi State and gave roughly two shares to the Sindhia, and one share to Mor Prahlad. He was henceforth styled as the Raja of Banpur, as Banpur was the name of the chief town in Mor Prahlad's share.

Mor Prahlad being deprived of a large part of his State, began, to compensate his loss by taking direct possession of all independent jagirs in his share. This action of Mor Prahlad so much provoked the Thakurs of Pali, Jacklone, Nanakpur and other places that they rose in a body, devastated the country, and then lodged their complaint against Mor Prahlad with the Sindhia. Thereupon the Sindhia decided that Mor Prahlad's remaining one share should again be divided into three parts, two of which were to be given to Mor Prahlad and one to the Thakurs. Mor Prahlad was forced to agree to this fresh distribution, but disturbances again broke out, and a new division was made, which, however, was much the same as the former. In 1843 Mor Prahlad died, leaving the remnant of his kingdom to his son, Mardan Singh.

In 1844, after the battle of Maharajpur, the Sindhia's portion of the Chanderi District was ceded to the British, as a part of security for the payment of the Gwalior contingent maintained by the Company's Government. The British appointed a Deputy Superintendent who was also empowered with criminal

50. Jhansi Narrative, letter dated 29th Nov. 1858 from J. W. Pinkney, Capt. Commr. to the Govt. of India.

jurisdiction in the Banpur State. Thus Mardan Singh's authority received a further setback.

About April 1857, Thakur Jhuhar Singh of Nanakpur died, and according to the orders of the Company's Government the proprietary right over the land of the deceased was taken away by the British instead of the land being returned to the Raja of Banpur to whom it originally belonged. This was another nail in the coffin of the authority of the Banpur Raja. Upon this, Raja Mardan Singh of Banpur sent for the heir of the late Thakur Jhuhar Singh and invested him with ruling powers. He then advised him to collect his relations and retainers and rise in rebellion, as the surest way to induce the British Government to restore his right over the land of his deceased father.

Mardan Singh, the Raja of Banpur, was further irritated with the Company's Government as they refused certain honours to which he considered himself entitled.⁵¹ Thus the Raja of Banpur was bitterly against the British. By the overthrow of the British Government, the Raja of Banpur hoped to regain the entire kingdom of Chanderi, the ancient possession of his ancestors. Hence he and his supporters tried their level best to foment rebellion in that part of the country.

INDORE: Turning to the political factors at Indore, we find that in 1857 the relations of the East India Company's Government with the Holkar State were governed by the treaty of Mandsaur, 1818. By this treaty the Holkar was deprived of a large part of his territory. He was also reduced to a state of vassalage. He was forced to surrender to the Company all his tributary or feudatory rights and all other territorial or other claims over the Rajput States. He had to give up his claims over the four districts (Panch Pahad, Dug, Gangrad, and Ur.), formerly rented by him to Zalim Singh, Raja of Kotah. He had to surrender his districts lying to the east of the Chambal river. He was deprived of all his territory south of the Satpura mountains including Khandesh, Amber, Ellora, and all other possessions in that quarter. In short, he was deprived of his important possessions so that he could not maintain the character of an independent ruler.

In order to ensure the complete dissolution of the Maratha

51. *Ibid.*

Confederacy, it was agreed upon that the Peshwa and his successors could not be permitted to exercise any sovereign right or authority over Malhar Rao Holkar II and his heirs. The Holkar had to recognize his feudatory Amir Khan of Tonk as an independent ruler. He had to agree to confirm (under British guarantee) the grant of territories (now known as Jaora State) on Chafur Khan and his heirs.⁵² It was natural that the loss of these possessions was a constant eye-sore to the Rulers, nobles and people of the Holkar State. The Holkar had also to make other concessions, the full meaning of which was brought home to him and his subjects as the years rolled on.⁵³ He had to alter his whole foreign policy, from that of military supremacy and preponderance to that of subordination and peace. Referring to the State, Sir John Malcolm wrote in 1818: "It was now at our mercy, but still I desired to restore it to a portion of its former dignity and to re-establish it on such a footing as should render it a useful instrument for maintaining the general tranquility. But it was necessary that it should make considerable sacrifices, as well as engage to alter the whole frame and system of policy."⁵⁴

The policy of the East India Company's Government towards the Holkar was very diplomatic. On the one hand, the Holkar was deprived of his vast possessions, his army considerably reduced, his influence over the Rajputs curtailed, and with the creation of a few Muslim States a damper placed upon him, in order to cripple him so that he could no longer become a source of danger to the British supremacy in India. On the other hand, whatever residual power he could claim was to be harnessed to maintain peace in Malwa.

As the first ruler of Jaora State was an "Omrah" (Courtier) of the Holkar and eventually became independent of him through the Company's intervention, a brief observation regarding him

52. (a) Secret. Cons., Feb. 6th, 1818, No. 3, I.R.D. from John Adams to Sir John Malcolm (Br. Pol. Officer in Malwa). (b) Secret. Cons., Jan. 6th, 1818, No. 98, I.R.D. from Sir John Malcolm to John Adams (Secy., Govt. of India). (c) Secret. Cons. 1818, Nos. 4 and 8, Feb. 13th from John Adams to Sir John Malcolm.

53. H. Beveridge, *A Comprehensive Hist. of India*. Vol. III, p. 78.

54. Old Record File No. 188 of 1818 to 1858, *Holkar and Policy in Malwa*.

will be quite appropriate here to illustrate how the Holkar was deprived of his territories and offended.

Up to 1817, Ghafur Khan commanded a wing of Malhar Rao II's army. He colluded with Sir John Malcolm in securing favourable terms for the British in the treaty of Mandsaur (1818). Sir John Malcolm wrote to John Adams, Secretary to the Governor-General, concerning Ghafur Khan's Jagir lands in Jaora thus, "The *Jaidad* he possessed was confirmed to him with some consideration to his connection with Ameer Khan (Ruler of Tonk who helped Sir John Malcolm against the Marathas) but with much more to that influence which he personally enjoyed and exercised at the court of Holkar to promote (pro-British) views in concluding peace."

Ghafur Khan was kept for sometime at the head of a Mohamadan Party in the State of Holkar to serve as a "very useful check upon Hindoo Ministers and officers of that Government."⁵⁵ It was laid down in the treaty of Mandsaur that Ghafur Khan was to maintain a body of good Mohammadan Horse to act with any force which the British might employ in Malwa. Of course, due care was taken by the Company that Ghafur Khan and his successors might not be a danger to the British interests at any time. The Jaora rulers were reminded from time to time that the power which conferred the boon could also withdraw it, if necessary.⁵⁶ The Holkar protested in vain against the grant of suzerain powers to the Jaora rulers, who were once their feudatory Chiefs.

Some of the principles of the East India Company's policy towards the Holkar from 1818 to 1857 were—not to allow the assemblage of troops in his territory more than what was fixed by the treaty, to see that the remonstrance or demands made by the Company's officers were effective,⁵⁷ to watch the internal disorders, to keep an eye on the play of personalities at the court, and to issue warnings when necessary.⁵⁸

55. Secret. Cons., 24th July 1818, No. 344 from John Malcolm to John Adams (I.R.D.)

56. *Ibid.*

57. Old Record File No. 188 of 1818 to 1858 *Holkar and Policy in Malwa*.

58. C. I. State Gazetteer Series, *Indore State*, Vol. II, p. 35. (Pub. 1908).

From 1818 to 1857 the British always took care that the Holkars should renounce their warlike habits and settle down as peaceful rulers under their control. As early as 1818 Malhar Rao Holkar II had to renounce his "tent life" and settle down at Indore which became the capital of the State since then. From 1818 a British Resident was posted at Indore to watch the affairs at the Court of the Holkars. A strong British force was posted at Mhow, 14 miles from Indore. Sir John Malcolm wrote to the Secretary, Government of India, thus: "The force which protected the western line of the Nerbuddah (Narmada river) would protect the person and capital of Holkar."⁵⁹

Between 1818 and 1844 the British Government extended their control over the Holkar to such an extent that, when Maharaja Khande Rao Holkar died unmarried on the 17th February 1844, the Government of India asked the Resident at Indore, "to ascertain whether there is any feeling which can be deemed to partake a national character for the maintenance of the State itself under what must be practically the nominal rule of a Maharaja so found."⁶⁰ Fortunately Sir C. M. Wade, the Agent to the Governor-General for affairs of Malwa and Resident at Indore, was a prudent politician and he replied to the Government of India, thus "although the feelings of the people may not partake of that decidedly national character by which we are accustomed to view them in other countries, yet where there is no actual oppression or misrule urging them on to wish for a change of Government, they have a respect for existing institutions and a pride in their continuance in the family which they have long been in the habit of acknowledging as their head, that would induce them to view any such design on the part of our Government with a strong aversion."⁶¹

On the death of Khande Rao Holkar, after long negotiations, Tukoji Rao Holkar II was installed on the throne, "by the great kindness of the British Government," and the Governor-General took pains to impress upon Tukoji Rao II that he was "nomi-

59. Sec. Cons, 24th July 1818, No. 350 from Sir John Malcolm to John Adams (I.R.D.).

60. Pol. For. Deptt, 2nd March 1844, Letter No. 190 from F. Currie Secy. to Government of India, to Sir C. M. Wade, Resident at Indore.

61. No. 194, Gen. No. 161, Letter No. 23 of 7th Feb., 1844 from Lt. Col. Wade, Resident at Indore, to F. Currie, Secy., Govt. of India.

nated" by the British Government to occupy the *vacant* throne.⁶² The Holkars, who prior to 1817 were independent rulers, were by 1844 reduced to utter helplessness. However, the memory of Maratha glory still remained with them and their people.

BHOPAL: Even on superficial reflection the following points, which very well illustrate the policy of the East India Company towards the Indian States of Malwa, emerge from the perusal of the attempt made by the Political Agent of Bhopal Agency to adjust the territorial relations between the Nawab of Bhopal, Manager of the Vinchur Jagir, Jagirdar of Panch Mahals, officers of Shujalpur and officers of the Sindhia.⁶³

- (i) To make such territorial disbursement of the lands formerly owned by the Pindaris among the different States in Malwa so that, instead of supporting them, the rulers of these states may become their opponents, a policy analogous to that of Henry VIII of England who seized the Catholic monasteries and sold the lands attached to them to the public with a view to making the people oppose the revival of the Catholic Church.
- (ii) To prepare for the necessity, in the case of a war with Holkar, of immediately collecting and employing every means that could be found and used to occupy the positions, attack the troops, and destroy the peace of the Holkar's Government. Some officials were in favour of adopting even a more drastic policy and openly suggested that, if necessary, his rule should be terminated for the same reasons as those employed by the Company against the Raja of Nagpur. This is further corroborated by the creation of Muslim States in Malwa which in times of emergency could be used as bases by the Company to launch an attack on the Holkar.
- (iii) To annex or transfer the lands belonging to the Hindoo Jagirdar of Vinchur in case he did not play a second fiddle to the Company's Government.
- (iv) To post a Political Agent who, by the exercise of his political influence in Bhopal, the Panch Mahals and the

62. Sir Robert Hamilton's Report, For. Deptt. Misc. No. 327, of 1854.

63. I.R.D. File No. 34, C.I.A., Old Records, Bhopal Book, A. No. 1.

neighbouring districts, would be able to fulfil the object of obtaining supplies and to establish an influence that would enable him to obtain the speediest and most correct intelligence and to establish postal communications in every direction.⁶⁴

In spite of these diplomatic moves and precautions taken by the British officials, the subjects of the Bhopal State could not escape being influenced by what was going on in the other parts of India. Sir Robert Hamilton, the Agent to the Governor-General for Central India, wrote to the Secretary, Government of India, that several inhabitants of Bhopal were greatly worked upon by what had been generally passing at Delhi, Lucknow, and Rohilkhand.⁶⁵ The Muslim population of Bhopal had sympathy with Bahadur Shah, the Mughal Emperor and the Hindoos with Nana Sahib, the Peshwa.

Sir Robert Hamilton, noticed several bigots among the chief persons at the court of Bhopal.⁶⁶ Captain Hutchinson, writing about Bhopal affairs, observed that there existed much anti-Christian and anti-British feelings.⁶⁷ Important leaders like Niaz Mohammad Khan, Fouzdar Mohammad Khan, Baqi Mohammad Khan, Tribhuan Lal, and others were much dissatisfied with the prevalent order of things and were ready to welcome any change of Government that might, by chance, put power in their hands. They were individually and generally opposed to the rule of Sikandar Begum, the Regent of Bhopal, and of the few who stood by her side, mostly for the reason that she was under the thumb of the Company's Government.⁶⁸ Several Hindoos and Muslims regarded with disgust her anti-national activities. Such persons took a leading part in the Revolt of 1857. Sir Robert Hamilton, observed that the leading rebels (Adil Mohammad Khan, Fazal Mohammad Khan, Sarfarz Mohammad Khan, Tribhuan Lal), at Rahatgarh were all subjects of Bhopal State or residents within its limits.⁶⁹

64. *Ibid.*

65. Vol. No. 103, letter No. 184, Gen. No. 882, dated 28th Mar. 1858, from A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of India.

66. *Ibid.*

67. File No. 80, letter No. 186 A, dated 17th Aug. 1859 (para 25).

68. *Ibid.*

69. Issue Vol. 91, Letter No. 195, Gen. No. 60, dated Jan. 1858, from Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I., to Secy. Govt. of India.

Several 'Parwanas' or letters written in Persian in July 1857 by Sikandar Begum to Major Richards, the Political Agent in Bhopal, give a very graphic picture of the rebel mentality. Major Richards, wrote to Colonel Durand, that she (Sikandar Begum) repeatedly communicated to him through her Vakil that the city of Bhopal was daily becoming more disturbed owing to the efforts of the Maulvis who were preaching a religious war and with their fanatic followers menacing and threatening her for supporting the English.⁷⁰

In a 'Parwana' dated the 13th Ziqad 1273 Hijari, Sikandar Begum wrote to Major Richards, that the chief reason for anxiety and fear was that no confidence could be placed in the contingents (Indian Sepoys maintained by the British), the Bhopal Forces, the troops of the Jagirdars, and the subjects of the Bhopal State. There was a party of "insurrectionary fanatics" at Bhopal in 1857.⁷¹ This is borne out by another letter conveying an extract from a newspaper dated July, 1857, reporting that Mian Faujdar Mohammad Khan, Bahadur Ali, Tribhuan Lal and others assembled in her capital and talked about the Revolt. Bahadur Ali Khan said to Sikandar Begum's uncle, "this is the time, whatever is to be done is to be done now". One night, Nawab Moiz Mohammad Khan conversed with Saiyuddin, Mansab Ali and others, "this is the time, to do whatever is to be done . . . such . . . time for the cause of religion and worldly interests will never come again."

Rumour added fuel to the fire. At Sikandar Quli Khan's inn, some travellers talked that in no State or Cantonment the British had been allowed to remain by the Indians, and they expressed their surprise as to how those at Sehore were permitted to live. Why did not the leaders of the troops destroy them? Some expressed the hope that it would soon be accomplished. The bazar people talked of the flight of Colonel Durand, and the British officers from Indore and their arrival at Sehore and they believed that as soon as the rebels heard about it, the British officers would be put to death. At Sikandar Hussain's resi-

70. Receipts Vol. 85, Letter No. 1857, from Major W. H. Richards, P.A. in Bhopal, to Lt. Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I., Indore Camp, Hoshangabad, 14th July, 1857 (Para 2).

71. Receipts Vol. 85, Encl. to Letter No. 110 of 1857, translation, of a Robekaree, dated Hoshangabad the 23rd July, 1857.

dence Babar Ali and others conspired to the same effect. They said that, with the blessings of Providence, fine times for disturbance had arrived. The Hindoos were already ready for a revolt. These facts go to show that the thought of the Revolt had taken a deep root in the minds of both Muslims and Hindoos.

DHAR: Let us now survey the situation at Dhar. It (Dhar) was the ancient capital of the famous Parmars of Malwa. It was one of the most important historic places in India. The people of the State remembered with pride the battles fought by their forefathers for freedom and independence. Even in the days of their decline and subordination under the rule of the East India Company they retained their martial spirit. As to the causes of the Revolt at Dhar there are two different versions, one by Sir Robert Hamilton, and the other by Colonel Durand, who during the absence of Sir Robert Hamilton officiated as the Agent to the Governor General in Central India from April to December 1857.

Sir Robert Hamilton wrote :⁷²

- (i) The Indians did not regard the ceremony of adoption as complete as the 'Khilat of Investiture' for the adopted Raja of Dhar was not sent in time, though a formal approval to the adoption was given by the Government on the 28th September, 1857.⁷³
- (ii) There was a break in the official communications between the officiating Agent to the Governor General in Central India and the Dhar Darbar between May 1857 (when the Raja died) and October 1857 when the British forces attacked Dhar. Colonel Durand did not acknowledge the appointment of Ramchandra Rao Bapuji as the Dewan of Dhar from the 22nd July 1857. Ramchandra Rao Bapuji repeatedly tried to contact Colonel Durand but not one of his letters received his attention.⁷⁴
- (iii) In 1853, with the connivance of the Company many of the mercenaries, on account of their insubordination, were removed from the Nizam's dominions and were let loose

72. Issue Vol. 103, Gen. No. 1786, Letter No. 397, Aug. 1858 from Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I., to G. F. Edmonstone, Esqr., Secy. Govt. of India.

73. *Parliamentary Papers relating to Dhar*, p. 15.

74. *Ibid.*

on the soil of Malwa. At this Sir Robert Hamilton, protested but nothing was done. These mercenaries mostly settled at Dhar, Amjhera and Mandsaur and these places subsequently became the centres of rebellion.

- (iv) At Dhar there were two rival parties which equally aspired for Regency during the minority of Anand Rao Puar who ascended the throne at the tender age of twelve. One party was headed by Ram Chandra Rao Bapuji, the Dewan, and the other by Bhim Rao Bhonsle, the maternal uncle of the minor. When Ramchandra Rao Bapuji became the Dewan, Bhim Rao Bhonsle enlisted mercenaries to oppose the Dewan. To counteract this, Ramchandra Rao Bapuji also enlisted a large number of mercenaries. In this race for power the number of mercenaries swelled. On the 31st August 1857 the mercenaries under Bhim Rao Bhonsle occupied the fort of Dhar. Apprehending grave danger, Ramchandra Rao Bapuji reported the matter to Colonel Durand who ordered him to get the fort evacuated. But as the hostile party of the mercenaries came to know that the State treasure was deposited there, they refused to leave the fort. They joined hands with the disgruntled people and made common cause against the British.

The whole trend of Sir Robert's contention was to exonerate the Dhar ruler from the charge of the Revolt and to save the State from being annexed by shifting the burden of the Revolt upon the mercenaries and the inadvertence of Colonel Durand. Colonel Durand categorically denied these contentions of Robert Hamilton asserting that:⁷⁵

- (i) There was no delay in recognising the adoption in the case of Dhar.⁷⁶ At first the Darbar was informed about it through the State Vakil, and next the customary 'Khilat of Investiture' was sent in due course.
- (ii) There was no break in the official communication between the Company's Government and the Dhar Darbar

75. Letter dated Allahabad, 22nd July, 1858, from H. M. Durand to G. F. Edmonstone, Esqr., Secy. Govt. of India (Parliamentary Papers relating to Dhar State).

76. Receipts, Vol. 81, Letter No. 2809, July 3rd, 1857.

from the time of the death of Yeshwant Rao Puar, the Raja of Dhar, on the 23rd May 1857 to the suppression of the Revolt in October 1857. Nor was there an interruption in the British control over the administration of Dhar State.

- (iii) There was little or no connection between the expulsion of the mercenaries from Hyderabad State in 1853 and their subsequent employment at Dhar and the outbreak of the Revolt. Colonel Durand referred to the case of Bhopal where several mercenaries were employed and yet no revolt occurred. Similarly there were mercenaries employed in other States of Malwa prior to 1853.
- (iv) Durand wrote, "There never was a word from Minister (Ramchandra Rao Bapuji) as to the alleged conflict of parties and rival and antagonistic enlistment of the Welyates, nor there was (a word about) dissension among Dhar levies."

According to Colonel Durand, the real cause of the Revolt at Dhar was that the Darbar wanted it and actively participated in it. The Dhar Darbar had in its service several Kokani (Maratha) and other sepoys, and he could not believe how Dhar Fort passed into the hands of the mercenaries unless it was with the Darbar's connivance. Durand wrote that there was inter-communication between Dhar, Mandsaur and Indore rebels. Rani Jijabai, the widow of the late Raja of Dhar, and her brother Bhim Rao Bhonsle were instigators of the rebellion.⁷⁷ In short, Colonel Durand, tried to establish a case against the Dhar Darbar by attempting to prove that the State had declared an open war against the Company's Government. He suggested that the State should be annexed.

The statements of the two officials have to be taken with a grain of salt as it is well-known that the two were rivals in the political field and their dispatches savour of personal jealousy leading them to attack each other. Since these views of the two important British officials are diametrically opposed to each other, it is for us to decide, on the basis of proper sitting of evidence, what the actual political situation at Dhar was on the eve of the Revolt.

77. Receipts, Vol. 81, Letter No. 317, dated Sept. 15th, 1857.

In connection with the first point the real situation at Dhar seems to be as follows:

(i) Raja Yeshwant Rao Puar II of Dhar died on the 23rd May 1857. The Governor-General in Council recognised the adoption of Anand Rao Puar II aged 12 years in his despatch of July 3rd, 1857. Colonel Durand, even according to Sir R. Hamilton, informed Dhar Darbar about it on the 28th September 1857. Now the question arises—why Colonel Durand delayed the despatch of this important letter for about three months (from 3rd July to 28th September 1857)? A part of the delay could be explained on the ground that on the 1st of July 1857 there was an outbreak of the Revolt at Indore and Colonel Durand retreated to Hoshangabad whence he returned to Mhow on the 1st of August. Despite the fact that the distance between Mhow and Dhar is thirty-six miles and ordinarily a despatch should have taken a couple of days to reach Dhar, the subsequent delay (from 1st of August to 28th September) should be attributed to the neglect of the official staff. Such a delay in official correspondence is often noticed and therefore no serious charge against Colonel Durand of deliberately withholding the dispatch could be maintained. Sir R. Hamilton's view that the 'Khilat of Investiture' was not sent to the Raja of Dhar on the 28th September is explained by the fact that the '*Khilat*' in question was not received by Colonel Durand from the Government of India up to that time.

(ii) With reference to this point it may be noted that, though Sir Robert Hamilton's contention is materially true, yet there were reasons why Colonel Durand, did not have frequent communications with Ramchandra Rao Bapuji, the Dewan. Colonel Durand, regarded Ramchandra Rao Bapuji as a rebel leader and hence it was natural for him not to negotiate with him as far as possible. Moreover, technically Ramchandra Rao Bapuji was under Captain A. R. E. Hutchinson, the Political Agent in Bhopawar, and therefore Colonel Durand could not have any direct official intercourse with him.

It cannot however be denied that, if Colonel Durand had acted more tactfully by freely negotiating with Ramchandra Rao Bapuji, he might have won him over to his side and helped the minor ruler of Dhar whom he was bound to protect. But Colonel Durand was one of those misguided and hot-headed

bureaucrats who hated the Indians.

(iii) In this connection, we find that Colonel Durand is taking shelter under legal quibbling. He admitted in several of his despatches that the mercenaries were the strongest opponents of the British, and still he found fault with the Indian Rulers for not controlling them. Durand's motive was to make the Indian Rulers responsible for the revolt of their people against the Company's Government. His citation of the case of Bhopal where there were mercenaries and yet no revolt occurred is *prima facie* opposed to facts, for it should be remembered that some of the arch-rebels were these very mercenaries from Bhopal. If there were disturbances in Malwa, some of which were engineered by these mercenaries, the Company's Government alone had to thank themselves, for it was the Company's connivance or recommendation that brought them to Malwa. Once transplanted into Malwa, they struck a deep root, prospered and gained strength and were powerful enough to paralyse the authority of some of the Indian Rulers in Malwa. This happened at Dhar.

When in the Revolt of 1857 the Company's Government could not control its own paid troops, how could Colonel Durand expect the Dhar Darbar to control these mercenaries? Colonel Durand himself admitted this when he wrote to the Government of India on the 7th September, 1857: "The impotence of every Chief, great and small, to control their levies is a normal feature of the State of armed anarchy which affects the country." It is surprising that, after officially writing such a thing, Colonel Durand charged the Dhar Darbar of not having ousted the mercenaries from the Dhar fort with the help of the Kokani sepoys. He also forgot that the strength of the mercenaries in the Dhar State Forces was 600 while the Kokani sepoys were hardly 200. Moreover, the Dhar State was under the Agency Administration during the period of the Revolt and therefore the British Political Officers were directly responsible for its efficient administration, maintenance and tranquility. Of course, one cannot deny that some of the State officials took advantage of the presence of the mercenaries and incited them to revolt against the British.

(iv) Colonel Durand's charge, that Bapuji failed in his duty of keeping him properly informed, is beside the point, for in

the first place Bapuji could not disclose his weakness to Durand who made no efforts to win his confidence and even refused to acknowledge or answer his letters. In the second place, it was the duty of Colonel Durand to have used the services of the Intelligence Department to keep him well informed of the local affairs. He was appointed to watch and control the affairs of Central India and, if he or his subordinates failed in the attempt, it was a serious neglect of duty and a grave betrayal of the confidence placed in him by the Company's Government.

Had Durand and his subordinates mixed with the people and tried to know their grievances, they could have read the signs of the Revolt earlier and nipped it in the bud. On the other hand, Sir Robert Hamilton, with his tact and experience, his conciliatory policy and good understanding, could on several occasions probe deeper into the causes of the Revolt not only at Dhar but at other places in Malwa. Yet, at times, Sir Robert Hamilton in his over-eagerness to refute the arguments of Colonel Durand exaggerated facts, as when he wrote about Ramchandra Rao Bapuji that he was notorious among the people for his pro-British views. Ramchandra Rao Bapuji was a diplomat. He was neither an open rebel against the British as Durand took him to be, nor so notoriously pro-British as Hamilton thought. Both these British officers failed to judge him correctly.

Having reviewed the political situation in the main States of Malwa which were affected by the Revolt we may now enumerate the various activities of certain communities of Malwa that took a leading part in the Revolt.

THE PINDARIS: Before 1817 Central India was the headquarters of the Pindaris and from there they carried out their expeditions throughout India. Though by 1818 the Company's Government defeated the Pindaris and captured their ring leaders, yet it would be wrong to suppose that with a few sallies from the British armies they were completely annihilated. In 1818 the British considered that the Pindaris ceased to be a source of danger to their rule in India, yet they continued to harass the English as late as the Revolt of 1857. Between 1818 and 1857 the Company's Government adopted the policy of granting liberal political pensions to the Pindari leaders. This method of appeasement was a liability on the public revenues and served no useful purpose for the protection of the British

interests in Malwa. Sir John Malcolm exaggerated his own work and worth, when he wrote in 1821 that the Pindaris were effectively destroyed and even their name was almost forgotten.⁷⁸ A large body of men numbering over 60,000 could not possibly have been rendered ineffective or innocuous within a short space of time. A minute investigation convinces us that the Pindaris and their leaders remained in separate obscure groups up to 1857 when they once again appeared on the scene looking for a suitable opportunity for their depredations.

In 1817 the principal Pindari Camps in Malwa were headed by:

1. Chitu and Rajun.
2. Karim Khan and Namdar Khan.
3. Dost Mohammad and Wasil Mohammad.

Chitu was killed in 1818 by a tiger in the jungle of Kantaphor district of the Holkar State. J. D. Cunningham, Political Agent in Bhopal in 1847, was wrong when he wrote to Sir R. Hamilton, the Resident at Indore, that Chitu had no heirs or at least none of whom any official cognizance was taken.⁷⁹ As a matter of fact, Chitu had a son named Mohammad Punnah who was made a prisoner by the British a day after his father's death.⁸⁰ He was later on released by them. He received some fields for subsistence from the Holkar Government.⁸¹ Thus Chitu's line continued.

Raja Mohammad commonly called Rajun and Karim Khan were granted pension by the Company. Namdar Khan and Muzhur Buksh, who represented Dost Mohammad and Wasil Mohammad, were allowed to reside in Malwa and receive their stipends from the Company under the "understood guarantee of the Nawab of Bhopal for their peaceful conduct."⁸² The pensions granted to these Pindari leaders were life-grants only, but

78. Sir John Malcolm, *Memoirs of C.I.*, Vol. I, p. 376 (1880 Ed.).

79. I.R.D. Bhopal Book B. 26, Issues to Govt. from J. D. Cunningham, Esqr., P.A. in Bhopal, to R. N. C. Hamilton, Esqr., Resident at Indore, No. 21, dated Camp Schore, the 13th Jan. 1847 (File No. 76, L. No. 46 and 46 A.)

80. Malcolm, *Memoirs of C.I.*, Vol. I, p. 364.

81. *Ibid.*, p. 364.

82. I.R.D., J.D. Cunningham's letter No. 21, dated 13th Jan. 1843.

a written assurance was given to the Pindari leaders that if they "conducted themselves as obedient and faithful subjects" of the Company's Government "suitable provision would be made for their families on their own demise."⁸³

In 1825 Rajun who made a representation to the Company's Government was granted a Jagir in the District of Shujalpur which was then under the Company, in lieu of the pecuniary annual stipend of Rs. 3,600. But the Jagir was granted only for life and with the usual diplomatic condition that "on the death of the Chief the circumstances of the family would be favourably considered."

The Pindari Chief Muzur Buksh was granted a political pension of Rs. 8,040 per annum. He died in 1843 leaving behind three minor sons and two grown up nephews. Then the Company's Government got a good opportunity to declare that the successors of Muzur Buksh could lay "no claim on the original grant for the continuance of the whole pension." The Company's Government, however, recognised that the maintenance of the family was incumbent on them. In 1844 the Company's Government reduced the family grant to Rs. 4,800 per annum. A further trap was laid when they asked the two branches of Muzur Buksh's family to draw their pension from the Company's Treasuries, each member being allotted a separate portion. This was done to enable the Government to profit in case of a lapse owing to the death of a pensioner in the family.

The old Pindari Chief Namdar Khan was allowed to cultivate land on a fixed rent in the district of Berchha. His younger brother Shujaat Khan was also granted a village in Berchha. Namdar Khan and Shujaat Khan were granted pensions of Rs. 8,125 and 2,000 per annum, respectively. In May 1846 Namdar Khan died leaving behind him five grown up sons. The Company's Government again got an opportunity to break their promise and declared that the family had no claim to the whole of the stipend. After several representations from the family, the Company's Government assigned to them an annual sum of Rs. 4,320 only, i.e. a little more than half of the original pension. This sum was further divided among the several members of Namdar Khan's family "so as to make the death of any

of these named a profit to 'Government.' The Jagir village of Berchha was given on lease and not rent-free. The village granted to Namdar Khan was assessed by the British at Rs. 601 a year which actually yielded to his sons only "a profit of 150 to 200 rupees but not more."

With respect to Shujaat Khan, the brother of Namdar Khan, who was allowed a separate grant of Rs. 2,000 per annum from the Company's Government, the diplomatic game lay in the fact that the Company did not make any provision for his children in the stipulation.

Between 1818 and 1857 the policy of the Company's Government towards the Pindari leaders was guided by the following principles:

- (i) To grant pensions to the Pindari leaders but to keep the terms for the continuation of the pension dubious and vague,
- (ii) To insert an alluring clause in the grant deed that, in case the Pindari leaders behaved like faithful and obedient servants of the Company's Government, 'suitable' provision would be made for their children.
- (iii) To reduce the amount of pensions at convenient junctures particularly at the death of the head of the family, and
- (iv) To divide the grant among all the members of the family and to stop each grant on the death of that member.

These principles were applied in individual cases as and when opportunity occurred.

Some of the British political officials in Malwa made modifications in the above policy to suit their local needs. The policy enunciated by J. D. Cunningham, Political Agent in Bhopal, towards the Pindari families in 1847 may be summed up thus:

- (i) To limit money pension,
- (ii) To grant a portion of their allowances in land instead of in money so as to convert the Pindari leaders into feudal tenants or "subject landlords." (They were also induced to adopt British methods of revenue management.)
- (iii) To ask them to maintain some horsemen who could be

employed to maintain peace in the districts in which the Pindari leaders lived, and

(iv) Not to give them any criminal jurisdiction.

In spite of liberal allowances paid by the Company's Government the Pindari leaders secretly longed for independence and a return to their former life of adventures. It may have been possible for the descendants of the Pindari leaders to forget the murderers of their forefathers, but it was certainly not possible for them to forgive those who deprived them of their lands and wealth. Even J. D. Cunningham admitted that in 1847 the position of Pindari leaders in Malwa was "uncertain." In the Revolt of 1857 the Pindari leaders took an active part against the British. These facts are very well illustrated by the outrage at Berchha where the Company's officer, Babu Subba Rao, was killed and his office plundered by the Pindaris at the outbreak of the Revolt.

While dealing with the political situation at Dhar, we referred to the part played by the mercenaries in the Revolt. These mercenaries were mostly recruited from the roving bands of the Afghans, Muckranis, Wylaities and such foreigners who according to Colonel Durand were "bound by no ties to the chiefs or people and whose sole object is plunder and violence." During the last days of the Maratha Empire they were employed in large numbers by the various Rajput States of Malwa, to protect them from the inroads of the freebooters. The number of unemployed mercenaries further increased due to the disbandment of forces over and above the treaty limits from all the States of Central India. Gradually the mercenaries spread all over the Central India States and their influence was specially felt at Dhar, Mandsaur, Amjhera, Kukshi, Chikhaldia, Alirajpur, Baria and Jhagua.⁸⁴ To add to the trouble in 1853, when the Rohillas, Wylaities, Pathans and other mercenaries became a nuisance to the Nizam, they were expelled from his territories and with the connivance of the Company they settled down in Malwa.

84. C.I.A. Letter Book No. 14. Letter from Brg. Gen, Sir John Malcolm to J. Adam, Esqr., Secy. to Govt. of India, dated 22nd Sept., 1818, pp. 7-112.

Sir Robert Hamilton, who apprehended trouble wrote, "A great injustice was done to the States in Malwa by expulsion of the 'Rohillas', Wylaities and Pathans from the Hyderabad territory which at the time (1853) was reported by me to Government"⁸⁵ These mercenaries were imbued with a spirit of military adventure⁸⁶ and proved to be Britain's "most obstinate and determined opponents."⁸⁷ They intensely hated the English through whose intervention they lost their jobs, their spoils of war, and their all. We, therefore, find them putting all their weight in line with the Indian rebels who fought to oust the British from their homeland.

THE BHILS: The Bhils had their own grievances. In spite of the British claims to reclaim them from "their lawless habits," they were in 1852 "still unsettled, poverty stricken and despised." The Bhils were mainly grouped under three heads, viz.,

- (i) those who inhabited the hills and jungles,
- (ii) those who were in service under village authorities as trackers and watchmen, and
- (iii) those who lived in the plains and cultivated lands.

- (i) Those who belonged to this class were wild, and avoided intercourse with mankind. They did not even settle together or form a society for themselves. Each preferred his hut in some solitary nook.
- (ii) Those in the second class were a quiet and very hard-working lot. They were well off as they got lands rent-free beside many little perquisites from the villagers.
- (iii) Those in the service class were a steady set and formed good subjects. They generally lived in the villages headed by a Rajput or a Bhilala Patel. They cultivated land and took to the general occupation of the cultivation of opium. This class was chiefly to be met in the

85. Issue Vol. 103, Letter No. 397, from Sir H. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to G. F. Edmonstone, Esqr., Secy. to Govt. of India, dated Aug. 1858.

86. C.I.A. File No. 79 (Afghans, Wylaities, etc.). Circular to Chiefs in C.I., dated Mandsaur, 1st Dec. 1857.

87. File No. 79, Ext. from letter No. 1301 A. 239, dated 5th July 1858 from A.G.G. for C.I. to the Secy. Govt. of India.

Amjhera villages, in most of the Estates, and the Thakurats of Dhar and Jhabua and in all the villages on the banks of the Mahi river. Even among this class there was a peculiarity, that some of them preferred to live in "Bhil-paras" (small colonies of the Bhils) detached from the main village.

The heads of the powerful Bhil clans known as Naiks maintained peace and order in their districts. They received monthly stipends or certain perquisites from their States. In case of misconduct or failure to maintain peace, their stipends were reduced and their perquisites were withheld. To take an example, Bhima Naik used to receive Rs. 38 per mensem from the Barwani State, but due to his misconduct in 1852 this was reduced to Rs. 20 per mensem. Bhima Naik had personal attendants and retainers and commanded 50 bows. His brother Sewa lived in Panch Palla. Umda and Mowassa, cousins of Bhima Naik, used to receive Rs. 25 per mensem each which was subsequently reduced to Rs. 19. These cousins had charge of large districts in the Satpura range to the south and south-east of the town of Barwani. In addition to their monthly stipends, they jointly received large perquisites. They were entitled to levy a small tax on all goods that passed through their districts; they received annually one rupee, one goat, four seers of grain, and 'Zirat' (land belonging to the royal family and cultivated on their behalf) or produce of any one field from each village. These Naiks had considerable authority over their men. Bhima, Umda and Mowassa were among the most influential Naiks. To the west of Barwani there were 7 Naiks who also received their stipends from the Darbar and perquisites from the villages in their districts. They were addicted to 'Mohwa' wine (country liquor) and led a life of plunder and rapine.

The inhabitants below the Ghats of the Vindhya range were mostly Bhils and Bhilalas. But they were in the most miserable state of poverty and ready to avail themselves of any opportunity that suited their predatory habits. According to the then Political Agent in Bhopawar, the poverty of the Bhils in that part of the country was due to the mode of Government which, he considered, was unsuited to that race.

The Bhil districts below the Vindhya Range lacked the fol-

lowing:⁸⁸

- (i) A suitable farming system: firstly, the average Bhil wanted to own a plot by himself and lead an independent life. This was not possible under the existing system of land control. He resented any external or official interference. Secondly, the Bhils were often subjected to much oppression and harassment. Often heavy fines were imposed upon them by the agents of "ephemeral functionaries" who either owned lands or sublet them to their agents.
- (ii) A long term lease: there was a system of short leases of five years given to the farmers. They sometimes leased out lands to the Bhils for a still shorter duration.
- (iii) A stable judicial system or village Panchayat which could check the imposition of heavy fines upon the Bhils: the fines being the profits of the agents, they exacted sums quite out of proportion to the means of the offenders. This made the Bhils resort to thieving and cattle-lifting. Several Patels of those days were of the opinion that if the Bhils were exempted from these fines, all thieving would cease.

During the early part of 1854, cholera took a heavy toll from the Bhil districts and caused several unhappy survivors to abandon their homes. It completely dislocated them. Without employment and without the means of living, except what their bows brought them or what they derived from plunder, there was no permanent source of subsistence for these poor people.⁸⁹ In 1856, there was extreme drought and many heads of cattle died. Thus the poor Bhils suffered heavy losses.

88. (a) Old Records File No. 77, Letter-Book No. 48, letter No. 325, dated the 22nd Nov. 1852, from the Bhil Agent in charge Pol. Duties, Bhopawar, to the Resident at Indore.

(b) Report of the Bhil and Dep. Bhil Agents for 1854-55, 1st Aug. 1856., Nos. 31-45. F.S. (Imperial Records).

(c) For. Deptt., May 1855, Indore, Letter No. 80.

(d) Gen. Admn. Report for 1855-56, 13th Mar. 1857, Nos. 3, Cons. F.C. (I.R.D.).

89. *Ibid.*

The Bhumias (sons of the soil) who formed the local aristocracy of the Vindhya were Bhilalas "claiming Rajput ancestry."⁹⁰ They reclaimed much waste and jungle land and greatly enlarged their arable area. This extension of boundaries often led to revenue disputes. The possessions of the Bhumias were bounded by the lands of some three separate States, each of which advanced claims over them. This conflict of claims caused dissatisfaction among the Bhumias. The British policy was to bring the Bhumias more and more under their control. The States claimed to be the feudal lords of the Bhumias who held villages on prescriptive rights from them. Thus the possessions of the Bhumias became the bone of contention between the States and the Company's Government.

The representatives of the East India Company were under the mistaken belief that the Bhumia Chiefs had almost thrown off all allegiance to their feudal lords. This belief was based on the following grounds:

- (i) The British Agent looked after the interests of the Bhumias and maintained the integrity of their engagements with the Indian States,
- (ii) The anomalous position of some of the Bhumias in holding lands for service simultaneously from the Sindhia, Holkar and Puar (of Dhar) led them to care for no body,
- (iii) An excuse was always advanced by the Bhumia Chiefs for their inability to attend the summons of their State Rulers, without the order of the East India Company's Agent.⁹¹

But the events during the Revolt of 1857 proved that, with a few exceptions, the Bhumias preferred allegiance to their feudal lords to the protection of the East India Company's Government.⁹²

90. C.I. Gazetteer Series, Minor States (Thakurats) *Gazetteer*, p. 5 (Ed. 1912).

91. Old Records File No. 77, letter Book No. 77, letter No. 282, dated 12th Sept. 1857 from Agent to Offg. A.G.G. for C.I.

92. Old Record File No. 77, letter book No. 74, letter No. 53, dated 20th Aug. 1857, from Bhil Agent to Offg. A.G.G. for C.I.

CHAPTER III

THE ECONOMIC, INTELLECTUAL, AND SOCIO-RELIGIOUS FACTORS OF THE REVOLT

THE political factors, though in themselves sufficient to bring about a countrywide upheaval, were not the sole cause of the Revolt. There were also the economic, intellectual, and religious factors which fanned the fire. Let us now turn to examine these in detail. The economic condition of Malwa on the eve of the Revolt is graphically described in the following extract from the writings of Colonel H. M. Durand:

Were we to institute a comparison between the gross revenues of the States in Central India in 1825 and in 1850, it would be surprising how small the improvement is demonstrable. The production of opium has been fostered by the demand for the drug—the high profits realized, and the portability of the article, encouraging the Malwa cultivators; but, highly favourable as is their soil and climate to the culture of some of the most valuable agricultural products, none has met with the like attention and energy as the poppy . . . The want of internal communications, and distance from the sea-board; heavy, vexatious transit duties; a general rule to take from the cultivator as much as can be taken without driving him from the soil; the system of farming whole district on short leases to revenue contractors; the great positive poverty of the people; and the fact that the balance of emigration and immigration is against the countries, which border Provinces under the management and administration of Indian Government and its officers, have all tended to retard the population and general improvement of Central India.”¹

One can easily gather from this extract that the agricultural resources of Malwa were mainly utilised for the cultivation of poppy which brought large profits to the East India Company,

1. “Central India under British Supremacy,” an article written for the *Calcutta Review* in 1850 by Colonel H. M. Durand (afterwards Offg. A.G.G. for C.I.). Sir Henry Durand, *Essays and Minutes*, Vol. II, p. 17.

but starved the cultivator. In 1830 the Government of India authorised the export of Malwa opium to China subject to the payment of duty—the realisation of which was facilitated by the fact that Malwa was surrounded on all sides by British territory.² This trade was profitable to the Company's Government. From 1843 to 1880 there was a continued development in the revenue derived from the opium trade. The pass duty per opium chest was Rs. 125 in 1835 which was steadily raised by the Company's Government so as to reach to Rs. 700 per chest in 1861.³ As the Government realised such an abnormally high duty on opium, the profits of the merchants proportionately and ultimately the cultivators were hard hit. This policy of getting the lion's share out of the opium trade by the Government produced much discontent among the people of Malwa. The business community was adversely affected owing to the private indulgence of the officials of the company and the States in this lucrative trade.

Many social workers have depicted the evils, physical and financial, caused to the people of this country by the local use of opium and its export. Yet the fact remains that, as it was an important source of income to the Government revenue, its cultivation was encouraged.⁴ Apart from all other considerations, the opium trade in Malwa on the eve of the Revolt created a dissatisfied merchant class, a group of State servants indulging in private trade, and a discontented peasant class.⁵

2. *The Imperial Gazetteer of India, The Indian Empire*, Vol. IV (Administrative) New Edition (1907), p. 244 Cf. also *Indian States, Opium Committee Report*, Vol. II (1927-28), pp. 36 and 37.

3. G. G. Todhunter, *Report on Excise Matters in Central India and the Working of the Malwa Opium Agency*.

R. J. Crosthwaite, C.S.I., A.G.G. for C.I. *Royal Commission on Opium*, evidence before the Royal Commission on Opium, Indore; 6th Feb. 1894, *Minutes of Evidence*, Vol. IV. p. 83, Report presented to the House of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.

4. Romesh Dutt, C.I.E., *Economic History of India* (Early Br. Rule) 6th Ed., Preface, p. viii.

H. H. Wilson, *History of British India*, Vol. I, quoted in R. Dutt's *Economic History of India*, p. 385.

5. Biographical Sketch of Rao Ramchandra Rao Bhausahib Reshimwala, First Minister to H. H. Maharaja Tukoji Rao Holkar II of Indore, by Rao Bahadur Vishnu Keshav Kunte, Retd. Minister, Dewas State Senior (Indore 1915), pp. 42 and 43.

Another important commodity was salt. Between 1843 and 1857 there was a considerable increase in salt duty. Before the introduction of the duty, salt could be had at 22 seers for a rupee. After the duty was levied the price increased abnormally, and salt was sold at 7 to 9 seers for a rupee. Sir Robert Hamilton wrote in 1858, "No more obnoxious measure has been introduced by our Government in Bundelkhand than this line of Chowkees (customs posts) within the Native States . . . (Salt) was brought under taxation affecting the price to the consumers to an extent that prevented its use for the cattle or any other purpose by the rural population of friendly states."⁶ The increase in the salt tax was not only resented by the lower classes, but according to Sir Hamilton was also "most annoying" to the Rulers of the Indian States, as salt was not manufactured in their States and the duty levied on it by the Company's Government did not go to their coffers.

W. Keane described the Salt Tax as an "oppressive tax" and as "the greatest temporal curse on the country."⁷ Ramsay MacDonald correctly described it as an exaction and oppression and a survival of the general exploitation of India's poverty by a profit-making Company. As salt was useful both as manure and cattle-feed, the high duty imposed restricted its use by the common people in the development of agriculture, horticulture, and animal husbandry. The obnoxious and irritating incident of the enforcement of this most unpopular duty was the right of search which it gave to any of the subordinates of the Salt Department. This search was most repulsive to the public notions and ideas in India. That the atrocities perpetrated by the officers of the Salt Department were regarded by the public as most outrageous, is proved by the fact that the rebels first wreaked their vengeance upon these very officials. If the taxes like the 'Tailec' and the 'Gabelle' were among the causes of the French Revolution and the Stamp duty the cause of the American War of Independence, the highly increased salt duty would rank among such taxes as one of the most important

6. C.I.A. Records, Issue Register No. 95, Letter No. 136 from Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I., to G. F. Edmonstone, Esqr., Secy. Govt. of India, dated Jhansi, 3rd April 1858.

7. *Report of the Lord's Committee* (1852-53). P. Banerjea, *A History of Indian Taxation*.

causes of the Revolt of 1857.⁸

Similarly there was dissatisfaction in most of the States in Malwa when the authorities of the East India Company persuaded them to abolish transit duty in their territories. The Indian States were "Jealous of all interference in their Sayer or Customs duties." John Dickinson, who was engaged by some of the rulers of Malwa to suggest ways and means whereby the Company's proposal for the abolition of transit duty in the States could be withdrawn, advised the Rulers to present their cases on the following grounds:⁹

- (i) It would involve a heavy personal loss, and
- (ii) It would cripple the administrative machinery by shutting out a major source of State income.

He further added that the Government of the East India Company could afford to abolish transit duty because it simultaneously increased the salt tax which made good their loss, but the Rulers had no such alternative source of income.

The view-point of the Rulers was not sympathetically considered by the Company's Government. The Rulers of Indore and Gwalior were induced to abolish transit duty in their States and other Rulers had to do the same sooner or later. But the whole controversy left a legacy of bitterness. A large number of persons who were engaged in the collection of transit duty or who had hereditary rights to enjoy some fractions thereof, were thrown out of employment or lost their emoluments and thus they also had a grouse against the Company. This manifested itself in the Revolt.

The demonetization of gold currency and the proposed superscription of local coins by the British currency were decidedly important economic factors that incited the Revolt. Before

8. Issue Register No. 95, Letter No. 136 from Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I., to G. F. Edmonstone, Esqr., Secy. Govt. of India, dated Camp Jhansi, 3rd April 1858. C.I.A. Records.

Pramathanath Banerjee, *A History of Indian Taxation*, 1930, p. 277.

9. From John Dickinson, Indian Reform Society Committee's Room, 12 Haymarket, Nov. 10th, 1856, to Capt. R. H. Fenwick, Indore (Letter was recd. at Indore on 10th Dec. 1856). N. B. The original of this letter is with Sardar Reshimwala, Nandlalpura, Indore.

1852 all the important States of Malwa had their own mints. They had gold standard, but the subsidiary coins were of silver and copper. The coins were not debased and their value in exchange depended solely upon the value of the metal used in striking the coins. In other words, their face value was equal to the bullion or content value. As the price of gold was uniform, there was no obstruction in the trade and commerce among the States, and there was free exchange of goods. The Government of India issued a notification, dated the 25th December, 1852, by which it was declared that, on or after the 1st January 1853, "no gold coin will be received on account of payment dues or in any way to be paid to the Government in any public treasury within the territories of the East India Company."¹⁰ The step, inevitable as it was from the Company's point of view, had serious results. Gold coins at once disappeared from circulation. There was an alarming fall in the value of gold, resulting in a panic among those people who had hoarded gold coins and ornaments.¹¹

The situation was further aggravated when, as though the demonetization of gold was not enough to break the camel's back, the company insisted upon putting the last straw in the shape of superscription of the British coinage.¹² The idea of the Government in introducing a uniform currency throughout India for standardisation and regularisation of currency was quite appreciable, but it had inherent difficulties so far as the Indian States were concerned. The prospect of the introduction of the

10. C.I.A. Records, File No. 811, letter No. 123 of 1855 from Political Asstt. for Bundelkhand to Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. (Mint and Coinage).

11. B. E. Dadachanji, *History of Indian Currency and Exchange*.

H. D. Macleod, *Indian Currency*. Report of the Indian Currency Committee (Herschell Committee), 1893. — Quoted in the *History of Indian Currency*.

Radhakamal Mukerjee, *The Economic History of India*, Introduction, p. xxii.

12. File No. 811, Letter No. 123, dated 30th Nov. 1855 from the Pol. Asstt. for Bundelkhand to Sir Robert Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I.

Catalogue of Coins preserved in the British Museum, Journals of Royal Asiatic Society. C.I.A.O. Records.

File No. 811, Letter No. 336. File No. 812, Letter No. 225A; File No. 813, Letter Nos. 93 and No. 188, Mint and Coinage.

British currency to supersede the State currency resulted in dissatisfaction among the States' people, for it threatened one of their cherished and time-honoured privileges of coinage and made the public panicky. Thus we see that the abolition of gold currency and the threatened supplanting of local coinage by the British currency resulted in serious confusion and distrust among the rulers and the masses.

In Northern India the British people abolished, wherever possible, the feudal aristocracy and substituted for it their direct rule. But it was very different in Central India where they made themselves super-feudal landlords and introduced indirect rule. They used the Indian Rulers, who were virtually the feudal lords, as their agents and through them they exported the major portion of necessary agricultural produce from Central India. The capitalist class in Malwa, for the sake of profits, also became the agents of the Company's Government, and unmindful of public welfare helped the Company in exporting the produce. The Bullock Cart Train system was one of the means employed for the transportation of goods and deserves to be noticed.¹³ It was a regular service inaugurated by the Company and the chief source of transporting goods to the sea ports from where they were exported to foreign countries.

The Bullock Cart Train System depleted the stock of bullocks which could have been otherwise used by the agriculturist. The following figures collected for the year 1855-56 show the number of laden bullock-carts that passed via Jhansi will amply prove the point:¹⁴

From Gwalior to Lalitpur	...	2,540
From Tehri to Kalpi	...	20,372
From Datia to Agar	...	28,820
From Isagarh and South West	...	12,285

13. C.I.A. Records, Outward Register No. 86, Letter No. 80, General No. 781, from Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to Cecil Beadon, Esqr., Secy. to Govt. of India, dated Indore Agency. 22nd May 1855.

Annual Report from the Bhil Agent and the Officer in charge of Political duties at Bhopawar.

14. Issue Register No. 86, Letter No. 140, from Sir R. Hamilton A.G.G. for C.I. to the Secy. to the Govt. of India (G. F. Edmonstone, Esqr.), dated Indore Residency, 6th June 1856, paras 47 and 48.

From Sipri to West	...	5,861
From Sipri to Nowgong	...	6,071
From Sipri to Kanpur	...	34,412
From Sipri to Saugor and Lalitpur	...	12,598
TOTAL	...	<hr/> 1,22,959 <hr/>

As these carts were driven by two bullocks, the number of bullocks required should have been 2,45,918. To this we have to add 2,80,000 single-laden bullocks. Thus the total number of bullocks that passed by one station only was 5,25,918 per year. This will help us in forming an idea of the number of bullocks required in the whole of Central India. As the cart-drivers received better wages than the agricultural labourers, there was a dearth of labourers on the fields, for judging from the above figures as many as one lac and fifty thousand people should have been drained away to join work as cart drivers. The resulting loss to agriculture, consequential low production, and the attending appalling poverty of the agriculturists may best be left to the judgment of the readers.

The introduction of Revenue Reforms in some of the States of Malwa produced discontent among many people.¹⁵ An example from Gwalior will enable the readers to judge the facts impartially. Up to 1833 land revenue was collected in Gwalior State by a few Farmer-Generals who held permanent contracts and by some military commanders who employed exclusively the agency of Brahman Pandits. After 1833 the land revenue was collected by a multitude of petty Pandit contractors. This was the prevalent system. One finds that the Farmer-Generals, the military commanders and, above all, the most important class of Deccani Pandits were the chief agencies for revenue collection. The Company's Government, specially during the period of minority administration, introduced a change in the old system by substituting the agency of Government servants in place of hereditary Farmer-Generals for the collection of land revenue. However noble the motive of the Company's Government might be in replacing the old system by the new, it pro-

15. C.I.A., File No. 267 of 1954-56, Gwalior Agency, Letter No. 93 of 1856, from P. A., Gwalior to A.G.G. for C.I., dated 13-12-56.

duced in the country a powerful class of most dissatisfied persons who by the introduction of the revenue reforms lost their hereditary and profitable right of collecting revenue. These persons, as they had a close contact with the cultivators for generations, tried their best to incite the landed class against the Company's Government.

By the end of 1852 Dinkar Rao, the Prime Minister of Gwalior State, proceeded to make a revenue settlement which was paralysed by the opposition of the Deccani Pandits. But he invoked British support and called from North-West Province (now Uttar Pradesh) several trained Kayastha and Mohamadan settlement officers and clerks. He thus broke the official monopoly of his own community—the Deccani Brahmins. Major Macpherson, the Political Agent at Gwalior, writes, "We urged the Regency (at Gwalior) to substitute for the farming system collections by Government servants under the lease-hold village settlement."¹⁶ To face the powerful opposition of the Farmer-Generals, the Deccani Pandits, and other influential persons, the Company's Government offered all possible help to the Regency Council at Gwalior.

In 1853 and 1854 Dinkar Rao made a summary settlement of one-third of the State. The new system led to much discontentment not only among the Deccani Pandits who were dispossessed of their hereditary right but also among the agriculturists. There were also certain other defects.¹⁷ The Government servants sometimes committed excesses, accepted bribes, exacted unauthorised sums, and in general their behaviour towards the agriculturists was characterised by callous indifference and insolence. To add to the difficulties of the peasants the system of remission of the revenue consequent upon the failure of crops was abolished. This hit hard the peasant who was required to pay cash by way of land-revenue even in a lean year when he got nothing from his land.

16. C.I.A. Records, File No. 267 of 1854-56, Letter No. 93 of 1856 (Gwalior Agency), from Major S. Charters Macpherson, P.A., Gwalior, to Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I., dated 13-12-1856 (official abstracts noted on the margin of the paras).

17. *Ibid*, Para 46, C.I.A.O., Gwalior Agency, File No. 267 of 1854-56, Letter No. 43 of 1856, from P. A., Gwalior to A.G.G. for C.I., para. 46.

The Company tried to initiate land survey in the States of Central India. This was not liked by the Rulers who suspected some secret motive underlying the scheme. Lieut. F. J. Burgess Revenue Surveyor General of the Government of India, wrote to his Deputy in June 1855 as follows:

"You are aware of my objection to the proposal of leaving the survey optional with the Chiefs, and the more I have considered the matter, the more I am persuaded of the difficulties that it will entail upon it. Datia . . . has not agreed to the survey, and from others that have agreed—I anticipate every species of passive, if not actual, resistance."¹⁸ The authorities at Orchha, in spite of their consent to have the land survey, did not allow the old trigonometrical stations to be made use of.

The economic situation in Central India just on the eve of the Revolt was growing from bad to worse. The effects of the Industrial Revolution in England (1783-1850) were visible even in the province of Malwa. Steam and machinery challenged the old economic system. The rich were becoming richer and poor poorer. The decline of the cottage industries, local manufactures, local arts and handicrafts was beginning to be felt in Malwa. The introduction of Manchester cloth impoverished the local weavers. It not only brought unemployment in its wake but also rang the death-knell of an important industry in the country. The impact of Western capitalism upon the feudal system of India produced disastrous consequences.

Malwa which in the Mughal times was industrially one of the foremost Subhas, and the land of peace and plenty during the Maratha occupation, presented in 1857 a sordid picture of abject poverty and political debacle. Even a British observer like T. Lowe could not fail to be moved by the utter misery of the people. He writes thus:

It is quite evident that the resources of this country, instead of being developed and improved, have been permitted to lie

18. Imperial Records Deptt., Survey Papers, No. 43 of 1855, from the Dep. Surveyor General to Secy. to Govt. of India, dated Calcutta the 8th June, 1855.

as they did a thousand years ago and decay; that such of the native arts and manufactures as used to raise for India a name and wonder all over the Western world are nearly extinguished in the present day; its tanks and caravan 'serais' are going or gone to rapid ruin; its canals for irrigation are filled up and forgotten; while districts have been deserted by their inhabitants, and the jungle and wild beasts have succeeded them, and deadly malaria closed them . . . deserted or fast shrinking towns, comparative poverty, roads overgrown with shrubs and jungle, and very often total desolation and ruin in the midst of natural wealth—a black spot on the cheek of beauty; ruin, ruin, poverty and natural wealth everywhere, as though a leper had touched the land, and it were hastening to decay.”¹⁹

The change was mostly due to the policy of economic exploitation adopted by the East India Company. It came to trade, but in its lust for power and greed sucked the resources of the country dry.

Historians of the French Revolution have rightly laid much emphasis upon the intellectual causes of the Revolution. Similar causes could be discerned in the Revolt of 1857. Of these intellectual factors, press propaganda may be considered as the most potent. The first press in India was started at Calcutta in 1780 when the first journal “Bengal Gazette” appeared under the able editorship of J. A. Hicky who was later on deported as he tried to brave the might of his own despotic Government.²⁰ This was followed by the first journal in Indian language named “Sama-char Darpan” in 1818. Subsequently a number of other journals like “India Gazette,” “Bengal Harkaru,” “Asiatic Mirror,” “The Morning Post,” and “Indian World” began to appear. From their very inception these organs of the public mind were looked upon—with suspicion by the Company and its attitude towards these was “frankly hostile.” During the period 1780-1835 the newspaper editors and their associates suffered a great deal and sacrificed much at the altar of liberty of speech and freedom

19. Thomas Lowe, *Central India during the Rebellion of 1857 and 1858*, pp. 357 and 358.

20. *The Calcutta Review*, Centenary Number, May 1944, p. 27.

of the press.²¹ They aimed at extending the bounds of human freedom.

At last their noble efforts were crowned with success when Sir Charles Metcalfe, during his temporary Governor-Generalship, passed an Act in 1835 giving full freedom to the Press.²² For this he has been truly called "the liberator of the Indian Press." Metcalfe rightly held the view that "a free press is a blessing in any country." The Indians fully profited by the liberty of the press from 1835 to 1857. They used the press and the platform to win their just political rights and privileges, oppose the foreign missionary activities, refute the criticism of the English Press on Indian social and religious practices, and prepare and organise public opinion in favour of the country's independence which culminated in the Revolt.²³ It appears from a despatch from the Court of Directors of the East India Company that they scented a grave danger at the enactment of the Press Act granting freedom to the Press. They characterised it as being opposed to all previous orders and an uncalled for innovation.²⁴ They were of the opinion that the original procedure of granting licence was better calculated to keep a check upon the misuse of the Press. The Act threw all responsibility upon the Government, for it was not its business to prosecute anyone committing a breach of the Act. The Court of Directors, however, did not veto the Act and it remained in force up to the Revolt when its full consequences were realised by all. The Indian Press from 1835 to 1857 had brought about a great intellectual revolution and had prepared the way for the Indian Revolt. Sir Charles Metcalfe, as early as 1835, wrote: "The real danger of a free press in India is, I think, in its enabling the natives to throw off our yoke."²⁵

Public opinion was much influenced by the newspapers like the "Asiatic Mirror," "The Bengal Journal," "The Samachar Darpan," "The Calcutta Review," "The Hindu Patriot," "The Friend

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-43.

22. Henry Beveridge, *A Comprehensive History of India, Civil, Military and Social*, Vol. III, p. 252.

23. Report on the Newspapers in Central India, 1857 (Unpublished).

24. Dispatch of the Court of Directors, dated 1st Feb., 1836.

25. S. M. Mitra, *The Press in India, 1780-1908*, an article in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, Vol. XLIV, No. 378, Aug. 1908.

of India" (modern "Statesman"), "The Durbin,"²⁶ "The Times of India," "The Samachar Sudarshan," and "The Englishman" (which ceased publication in 1931). Among these we find a group of missionary papers and a group of Indian papers edited by Hindu and Muslim newspapermen. These groups held widely different views. The English Press was often very free in its criticism of the Governmental acts. Especially the Press controlled by the British Party in Opposition was very critical and frank. The papers published in the Indian languages joined hands in exposing the faults of the Company's administration and made much of the high-handedness of the Company's officials. They took the lead in exposing the imperialistic designs of the foreigners and reminded their countrymen of their duty towards the motherland.²⁷

Prior to the Revolt in Malwa, Indore and Gwalior were the two most important centres which had newspapers of their own. At Indore a newspaper was published under the title of "Perfect Moonshine." Its last issue published the events of the 1st July 1857 (the day of the outbreak of the Revolt at Indore).²⁸ There was another newspaper published at Indore called "The Malwa Akhbar" which ceased publication soon after the Revolt. "The Malwa Akhbar" was an official paper, and "The Perfect Moonshine" was a semi-official paper set up with the intention of opposing the views of "The Malwa Akhbar." Gwalior had its own paper named "The Gwalior Akhbar," but most of the news concerning Gwalior State was published in another paper named "The Mofussilite." Both these papers survived the Revolt.²⁹

The following newspapers were some of the most popular ones and helped a great deal in shaping the public opinion in Central India: "The Sialkot Akhbar," "The Noor Mashriqi," "The Persian Akhbar," "The Delhi Akhbar," and "The Ahsan-ul-Akhbar" of Bombay. As these papers were preaching nationalism and were particularly opposed to the foreign yoke, the

26. *Ibid.*

27. Royal Asiatic Society, *Pamphlet on India*, Letter No. 3 (Bombay Branch).

28. Colonel H. M. Durand's Letter, dated 29th Sept., 1857.

29. *Ibid.*

Company's officials often frowned upon them.³⁰ Here is an example. About these newspapers Colonel Durand wrote that they "were thus able to excite the race antipathies of the masses, and fanned their hatred by appeals to every prejudice and passion which could intensify disgust at a foreign race and rule."³¹

The Indian newspapers had a great influence on the middle class and the masses. According to Colonel Durand, they had great influence on "the intelligentsia with national aspirations."³² Many Rulers of the Indian States subscribed to the British newspapers. These sometimes contained articles deprecating oriental despotism, the right of adoption, the organisation of the States' forces, which caused such uneasiness in the minds of the Rulers. These articles often found a place in the Indian newspapers which published their translations in their issues and agitated the public mind by criticising the rulers freely. The British officials found it difficult to deal legally with them.³³

The "hawking publications" also played a significant part in bringing about the Revolt. For a paltry sum of half an anna (now three pies) they provided the public with varied charms such as half a dozen extracts from the religious books; exciting accounts of the campaigns in Sindh, the Punjab, and Afghanistan, a considerable quantity of writings on theology, forms of prayer, and rules of ceremonial practices. They contained passages inculcating patriotism, exciting racial bitterness, and appeal to religious sentiments. These pamphlets attracted the public on account of their cheapness and the wealth and variety of news supplied by them but they were also in tune with the public mind and reflected the spirit of the times.³⁴

At the outbreak of the Revolt, when the Company became alive to the far-reaching effects of a free press, it repealed the Act in June 1857 and put several restrictions on the publicity of news. This produced much bitterness and proved a breed-

30. Major W. H. Richard's letter, dated 5th November, 1857.

31. Minute dated 25th Jan. 1866 by H. M. Durand, C.S.I., Secy. to the Govt. of India in the Forest Deptt.

32. Reply to Govt. of India's Circular Letter, dated 28th Aug. 1857, in Col. H. M. Durand's letter, dated 28th Sep., 1857.

33. Reply to Govt. of India's circular letter dated 28th Aug. 1857 in Col. H. M. Durand's letter dated 29th Sept. 1857.

34. *Ibid.*

ing-ground for baseless rumours which shook public confidence and engendered mistrust. The gagging of the press recoiled on the Company's Government. It created bitterness because it attacked the fundamental rights of the people. The press was aware of the drawbacks of the administration such as red-tapism, delaying tactics, and lack of foresight. By its healthy criticism it did give helpful warning to the Company. With the disappearance of a free press, there was no effective medium which could have been employed by the Government to counteract the rumours, and consequently the people were left free to imagine or say anything against the Company. The people thought the Company was bent upon suppressing truth and therefore they attributed evil motives to whatever the Company did.

Besides newspapers, there were several other means of transmitting news. Much of the local and foreign news was spread to the farthest corners of the country by the bands of wandering *sadhus* and *faquirs*. Often the newsletters were enclosed with the *hundies* (Bills of Exchange) received by many business firms. The *harkaras* (foot-messengers) and *sandni sawars* (camel-messengers), village *chowkidars* (watchmen), and the *pandas* (priests) carrying water of the holy Ganges were, as it were, so many itinerant newspapers. The private letters carried by bullock-cart drivers and the *Banjaras* (travelling businessmen) were also a much utilised source of information in an age which had not witnessed an effective postal system.

All these agencies, in themselves harmless, were utilised by the rebels for the dissemination of ideas against the foreign race and rule. It is true that political and economic causes lay at the root of the Revolt. But we should not ignore the fact that the Press did play an important part in making the people alive to their rights: it ventilated their grievances and thus prepared an intellectual background for the Revolt."³⁵

Next to the press the innovations introduced in the system of education under the Company's Government particularly by the Christian missionaries offended the people. Before the advent of the British, there was an indigenous system of education which was imparted in "Mukhtabs," "Madrasas," and "Pathshalas."

35. *Madras Athenaeum*, quoted in the Royal Asiatic Society (Bombay branch) Pamphlets on India, Letter No. 3.

In villages the temple priests usually conducted open-air classes. The "Mullas" similarly taught the Quran in the mosques. In the cities there were a few institutions run mostly by the rich and the philanthropic people, where the elements of arithmetic, reading, writing, and business correspondence were taught. Such a system of education was thoroughly practical and qualified the student to conduct the business of everyday life. The education imparted in the mosques and the "pathshalas" was religious and strictly in accordance with scriptural principles. It qualified the student to perform various religious rites and brought spiritual benefit to the masses. The Marathas encouraged the study of Persian and Modi both useful as court languages. They also tried to diffuse the notion of nationalism through their ideals of *Swadharma* (one's own duty or religion) and *Swaraj* (independence). We thus find that the system of education was admirably suited to the needs of the country and it worked efficiently.

The Company put an axe at the root of this time-honoured and useful system. They simply wanted people to qualify themselves for filling up posts under them or to act as their camp-followers. They, therefore, laid much stress upon the study of English and the Western method of instruction. It is true that many persons allured by the prospect of lucrative government jobs hastened to profit by the method, but the common people on the whole found it inimical to their religion and social structure. Many schools conducted along Western lines were started by the Christian missionaries whose avowed aim was conversion.³⁶ To this end they zealously preached Christian doctrines and replaced the study of the Hindu and Mohammadan scriptures by the Bible.³⁷ They did not stop at this. The bigotry of some of them resulted in an open criticism of the other faiths. This hurt the religious susceptibilities of the people. The missionaries started girls' schools in the hope that possibly the easily impressionable future mothers would prove more serviceable to the furtherance of their cause.³⁸

The Indian mind was rudely shocked at the introduction of

36. Smith, *The Conversion of India*, p. 2.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 178.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 182.

new ideas in the fields of medicine, astronomy, military science, engineering and philosophy. To take an example: a Military School was started at Indore in 1853 to train the officers and cadets from the Holkar's army on Western scientific principles.³⁹ The institution aimed at reforming what was considered an ancient and imperfect military training. In this attempt to re-organise the Holkar's army, much annoyance and heart-burning was caused to the military officers who worked in accordance with the old orthodox principles. They thought that their experience and training were challenged. They looked down upon the institution as an attempt on the part of the British to curb individual military genius and, under the guise of scientific training, make people give up their ancient heritage. The suspicion with which they looked upon this institution was further increased when, to their great alarm, they discovered that the cadets were required to read English, to dress in European style, and to dine in a common mess.⁴⁰ Though the Company's officials were very much gratified at the results of the school, for it trained cadets useful to them, yet the effect of the school upon the public mind, and particularly the military officers under the Holkar, was very different.

Unfortunately the Company made another experiment which also stirred up the people against it. It is well-known that the Mughals and Marathas carried on their official correspondence in Persian and Modi, respectively. But Arabic and Sanskrit also held a place in the court and public transactions. The Company started separate schools for imparting instruction to the Hindus and the Muslims in English, Hindi, and Urdu, which replaced the old languages like Sanskrit, Modi, Arabic, and Persian. In 1837 Persian ceased to be the court language.⁴¹ The old teachers of Sanskrit and Persian were alarmed at the change in languages, which made them feel that their culture was in danger. The Pandits and Maulvis therefore took up cudgels against the Company. They had great influence over the masses to whom they explained the naked and unblushing truth that the policy of

39. I.R.D. For. Cons. No. 60, dated 7th Sept. 1855, Letter No. 834, dated 1st June 1855, from Sir R. Hamilton to the Secy. Govt. of India (Information supplied to the Hon'ble the Court of Directors.)

40. *Ibid.*

41. Nagir Hasan, *The Mughal and Urdu*, Introduction.

the Company's Government was fraught with dangerous consequences. Most of these Maulvis and Pandits led the life of a recluse and did not attach much importance to worldly gains. It is, therefore, a mistake to suppose, as some English historians have done, that the change in languages was resented by them for it struck at their means of livelihood. The real reason appears to be that these people felt that such a change was an attack on their ancient lore and culture and therefore they protested against it.

It is advocated by some that the greatest gift of England to India has been the English language and literature. We are prepared to concede this point to them to a certain measure. It should be remembered however, that this is only one side of the picture. The introduction of English as the medium of instruction had undoubtedly opened a new vista, yet it was not without its drawbacks. It proved to be a poor substitute for the mother-tongue, particularly in the expression of ideas "that are too deep for tears." It stultified the development of Indian literature. It brought in a foreign outlook and was found to be expensive and therefore unsuited to the pockets of the common people. In the beginning the vast masses of the people were silent and passive spectators to the systematic imposition of these changes in their languages, but the thinking classes of the Pandits and Maulvis always reminded the people of their sacred culture which was gradually being threatened.

It is pointed out that, at the back of the Revolt of 1857, there was "the national reaction of one civilisation under pressure from another of an old order threatened by a new, of Asia invaded by Europe."⁴² Much ink has been spilt to prove that the Revolt of 1857 was due to the "progress of Englishism" over the inherent conservatism and superstition of the Indians.⁴³ Sir John Kaye has defended the English rule in India by emphasising the superiority of English culture over the Indian. According to him, Lord Dalhousie not only attempted to "substitute the strength and justice of British administration" for "the effete tyrannies of the East" but also to extend Great Britain's "Moral rule" and to subject the people of India "to the powers of light

42. R. Coupland, *Britain and India*, p. 34. Dr. Zacharia, *Renascent India*, (Ed. 1933).

43. Kaye, *History of the Sepoy War*, Vol. I, Chap. IV (1880 Ed.)

rather than of darkness" and to extend the "blessings of European civilisation at the sight of which the Brahmans of India stood aghast."⁴⁴

We may add that along with the Brahman, the Maulvi was also not a little perturbed. Orthodoxy stood face to face with modernism. Either it had to crumble before the onslaught of the Western culture which was spreading its tentacles in all directions, injecting the views of effeminacy under the guise of democracy and liberalism; or to hold its own by consolidating its position and taking shelter within the shell of scriptures and ancient traditions. The Revolt was the last attempt made by orthodoxy to shake off its enemy which was insidiously causing it to roll into the mire of utter annihilation. The ideal of "*Swadharma*" was nothing more than a symbol of what for ages had been Indian and the fight for it was the last attempt made by the Brahmans and the Maulvis, who had the support of the populace to put the last ditch fight to save India from the clutches of the foreigners.

We admit that European culture helped Indians considerably in looking down upon such obnoxious social and religious practices as the *sati* system, infanticide, human sacrifices, and many other blind superstitions. But it should be borne in mind that we have to face realities as they are. The people of Malwa were very conservative and for good or bad they wanted to stick to their ancient established practices and customs. The Company's rule unduly interfered with their customs, traditions and culture and therefore they were incited to revolt. The people found in the Western culture not only a challenge to their material conditions of life but also a danger that threatened their home and hearth. It was suspected that the new wave would convert everybody into a "Sahib." This was actually supported by the fact that many of the misguided youths became enthusiastic imitators of Western models in matters of dress, food, taste, etiquette, and even ideas.

The economic, intellectual, and cultural factors of the Revolt were further augmented by socio-religious factors. The social and religious conditions form the warp and woof of the Indian society. Indeed the relation between social and religious insti-

44. *Ibid.*, pp. 185 and 186.

tutions is so intimate, and the two are so inextricably blended, that a change in one cannot but affect the other. We find that many of the reforms introduced by the Company to ameliorate Indian society failed to gain their purpose, because they were found to hurt the religious sentiments of the people. We describe below a few such reforms in order to see how they contributed to the flaring up of the Revolt in Malwa.

- (a) *Legislative Changes.* The passing of Act XV of 1856 gave to the widows the right to remarry, in contravention of the old and established practice of the Hindu society. Other laws were passed by the Company's Government prohibiting the "*sati*" system, infanticide, human sacrifice, slavery, and burning of the witches. The law gave equality of status to people of all castes and creeds. It was declared that all government posts were open to every one alike. Laws were passed authorising converts to claim a share in the ancestral property. These laws, however good, were against the prevalent notions of law and justice in the opinion of the Indian people and hence irritated them.
- (b) *Military Changes.* Restrictions were imposed on keeping long beards and moustaches, the use of '*tilak*' (religious mark) on the forehead, and use of local garments by the Indian sepoys. They were compelled to use socks, long boots, and belts which they detested. They were required to dine in the common mess without any distinction of caste and creed. A new type of cartridges which were greased with the fat of cows and pigs was supplied to them for use. This was revolting to both the Hindus and Mohammadans. The mobilisation of the army across the seas created fresh complications, for the high caste Hindu was deemed to have lost his caste in the eyes of the members of his community as soon as he left the shores of India.
- (c) *The Telegraph and the Railways.* Though the political officers of the East India Company tried to prove that the laying out of the railways and the telegraph were earnestly desired by the public and conferred a boon upon them, yet it was not unknown to some that the extension of the

railway and telegraph lines was due to the anxiety of the British capitalist to invest their surplus money in safer zones of India and to reap high profits therefrom.⁴⁵ The officials themselves wanted the extension of railways and telegraphs as these were very useful for the transport of troops and raw materials and speedy transmission of official messages in times of war. In order to get a popular support to their schemes, they easily secured applications and public resolutions demanding extension of these schemes from their favourites.⁴⁶ The erection of the telegraphic posts and wire-connections gave rise to many superstitious rumours, and the railway being open to all people made the high caste people think that it aimed at levelling all castes.

The main points which led the people to believe that their religion was in danger were the following:

- (i) The cancellation of religious grants and withdrawal of official support from the religious institutions.
- (ii) Official support and patronage to the Christian missionaries, and
- (iii) The alarming rate of conversion to Christianity.

Besides, there were other causes many of which have already been referred to, such as the reform in laws and the army, and the establishment of telegraph and railways. All these were directly or indirectly considered by the Indians as subverting their religion either by interfering with their social customs or being opposed to their sacred books. So confirmed were the rebels in their belief that there was a grave danger to their religion that it is not a surprise to find that many of them fanatically fought with the East India Company. Here are a few extracts from the letters of the rebels which prove the point beyond a doubt.

Adil Mohammad Khan, a rebel leader of Bhopal wrote to

45. Issue Vol. 86, Letter No. 140, dated 6th June 1856, from A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. to Govt. of India.

46. *Ibid.*

Sikandar Begum, "Having waged religious war we have turned out the infidel Christians from Rahatgarh . . . have embraced the cause of religion."⁴⁷

Shaik Ibrahim, a sepoy of the 6th Company Jangi Battalion, Bhopal, wrote to his uncle at Hyderabad Deccan thus, "Because they have suborited (sic. polluted) the Moomhadan (sic. religion) may God blacken their face (? face) and their accursed (ill-fated) countenances never again appear."⁴⁸ The letter which Shaik Ibrahim sent to be read in all the mosques could not have failed to incite the Muslims, for it read thus: "Listen all ye Moomhadans! It is forbidden that you should eat your food with the accursed Christian in your bosom. You will never get such an opportunity again. Send them all to Hell . . ."⁴⁹

Firoz Shah, the Shahzada of Mandsaur and the great rebel leader of Malwa, issued 'Parwanas' (letters) inviting "the Faithful to join him in a war of extermination against the Infidels."⁵⁰ The rebels at Amjhera, Dhar, Indore and at several other places in Malwa raised the cry of religion in danger. The agents of Nana Sahib and Rao Sahib also joined the chorus.

Mir Shahmat Ali (Indian Assistant to the Agent to the Governor-General for Central India), a contemporary observer, wrote thus, "It was reported and believed that the British Government was determined to destroy the religion of the people by the agency of various secret means . . . that Government was steadily bent on overthrowing their caste and converting them all to Christianity . . . every absurd report to the prejudice of the British nation was circulated and readily believed. It was even reported at the time that Government caused animal bones to be mixed up with sugar and "Atta" (flour) which they ordered to be sold to the people within their jurisdiction. Some even went so far as to say that they had seen the process with their own eyes."⁵¹

47. Issue Vol. 91, Letter No. 234, Genl. No. 812, Enc. 1.

48. Receipts. Vol. 85, Letter No. 3474, dated 28-8-1857.

49. *Ibid.*

50. Political Proceedings No. 1351, Fort William, dated 30th Dec. 1859, Narrative of Events in C.I. from May 1857 to 20th June 1858.

51. C.I.A.O. General Records, Mutiny, File No. 1807 of 1858, Letter No. 6 of 1858, from Mir Shahmat Ali, Asstt. to the A.G.G. for C.I., to Sir Robert Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I., dated Camp Dhar, 24th April 1858.

We may not believe now that the Company's Government had a hand in mixing animal bones in flour and sugar in order to pollute the caste of the Hindus. But it is a fact that such rumours were circulated and readily believed by the common people. And it is also true that both the Hindus and Mohamadans hated the English because they ate beef and pork. Sir John Kaye blames the Brahmins for spreading all sorts of false rumour against the Company's Government. He writes, "Brahmanism is the most monstrous system of interference and oppression that the world has ever yet seen, and that it could be maintained only by ignorance and superstition of the grossest kind."⁵² He condemns the Brahmins and extols the Christian missionaries, whom he styles as "Christian Knights, with the great Excalibur (sword of king Arthur) of Truth in their hands."

It is not for us to show that this opinion of Kaye is a gross libel on an ancient community and it is not for us to point out that Hinduism is neither a bundle of old wives' tale nor the "most monstrous system," yet there is one thing that we should not fail to notice, namely, that when a great historian like Kaye, who was a contemporary of the days of the Revolt, held such a view against Hinduism and the Brahmins, it could be safely presumed that there should have been many more such Englishmen who subscribed to similar views. It is also very likely that the Indians were aware of this attitude taken by the English against them, which could not have failed to rouse bitter feelings against such bigoted Englishmen.

These dangers to Indian religions led to a remarkable unity of the Hindus and the Muslims against the Company in the Revolt of 1857. Henry Beveridge writes, "The British rule in India never has been, and it is to be feared, never will be popular. Though far more beneficent than that of preceding conquerors, and of the existing native princes, it is the rule of aliens in blood, in manners, and in religion; and is therefore submitted to as a galling yoke, to be endured so long as there is no hope of being able to shake it off, but not a day longer. Accordingly, when the native army had deluded itself into a belief that it had obtained the mastery, and was in a condition to dictate terms to the Government, revolt sooner or later be-

52. Kaye, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. I, p. 181 (1864 Ed.)

came inevitable, and the only point that remained undetermined was the time. One of the most formidable obstacles in the way was the antipathy between the Hindoos and Mohamedans, the former composing the great bulk of the population, and the latter, while not numerous enough to be formidable, deriving from their superior position as a once dominant class, a far greater degree of influence than was indicated by their numbers. The effect of this antipathy was to keep the two classes of religionists apart, and make it morally impossible for them to enter into a general combination for any common object. The British Government, aware of this security against a united revolt, appear not to have underrated it, and yet from some strange fatality they, without intending it, destroyed this security, and enabled Hindoos and Mohamedans to enter into a mutual league for the complete and final overthrow of our Indian Empire. The cry raised was that their religion was in danger, and that henceforth Christianity alone was to be tolerated."⁵³

Though by the time of the Revolt of 1857 the Company had conquered the whole of India, more by diplomacy than the sword, yet they had not learnt to value the most sensitive side of the Indian temperament and the orthodox religious practices which the Indians valued more than their own lives.

53. Henry Beveridge, *A Comprehensive History of India Civil, Military and Social*, Vol. III, pp. 555 and 556.

CHAPTER IV

THE MILITARY FACTORS OF THE REVOLT IN MALWA

PRIOR to the outbreak of the Revolt of 1857, India witnessed a series of mutinies by the Indian sepoys against their British masters. The following is a list of such incidents:

- (i) The first mutiny of the Bengal Army in 1764,
- (ii) The second mutiny of the Bengal Army in 1764,
- (iii) The mutiny at Hyderabad in 1806,
- (iv) The mutiny at Vellore in 1806,
- (v) The mutiny of the Madras Army in 1809,
- (vi) The mutiny at Barrackpore in 1824,
- (vii) The mutiny at Sikandarabad in 1840,
- (viii) The mutiny of the Madras Troops at Bombay in 1844,
- (ix) The mutiny of the troops in the Punjab in 1849,
- (x) The mutiny at Govindgarh in 1850,
- (xi) The Santhal rebellion, and
- (xii) The mutiny of the Indore Troops and Bhils in Malwa before 1857.

Various factors contributed to bring about the mutinies, but the following causes were prominent.

The sepoys were not given a due share in the prize-money. Retrenchment and half-*bhatta* orders were promulgated. The sepoys were forbidden to put the caste-mark upon their foreheads, use ear-rings, Indian head-dress, or keep long beards and moustaches. They were required to use leather cockades alleged to have been made of the skins of pigs and cows. They were ordered to cross the high seas and fight on foreign lands. They found the Company supporting the Christian missionaries in their attempt to convert the Indians. They witnessed the rapid annexations of various parts of their homeland to the Company's dominions. They bitterly resented the arrogance of the Company's officers. Therefore they rose in mutiny and thought it better to die fighting against tyranny than submit to it.

But there is world of difference in the mutinies prior to 1857

and the Revolt of 1857. The Revolt of 1857 was the climax of the manifestation of an ever-growing discontent in the Indian Army. The former mutinies were mostly abortive attempts to seek redress of local grievances, while the latter was a concerted effort at driving away the Britishers from India. While the former mutinies were restricted to a small area, the latter was almost a country-wide rising. While the only participators in the former were the sepoys, the latter was joined by the civil population and some of the ruling chiefs.

The Revolt of 1857 was a product of several military factors. Among the causes which contributed to the dissatisfaction of the sepoys, we mention some of the important ones:

(A) *Disaffection in the Army.* The disaffection was again the result of various causes some of which may be noticed below:

(i) *Low pay and inadequate privileges and pension.* The remuneration of the sepoys was low and provision for privileges and pension inadequate. The salary that a sepoy got was below the ordinary living wages. There was disparity in the pay of the military functionaries in the various contingents posted in Central India. Brigadier Hill, the Commander of the Gwalior Contingent,¹ wrote that the pay of a Subedar in the Malwa Contingent was not equal to half the amount of pay in the Gwalior Contingent, though the duties were the same and of equal importance.² The Indian sepoy did not enjoy those privileges which were enjoyed by the British soldiers. There was a similar discrimination in the pension system of the two.

(ii) *Defective method of promotion by seniority.* The promotion in the army was made in accordance with seniority. Talent had no scope, since all promotions depended on the length of service. The system, therefore, offered no incentive to better work. The juniors did not care for the quality of work as their future depended on the length of service rather than ability.

1. Issue No. 86, letter No. 71A, from R. Hamilton A.G.G. for C.I. to G. F. Edmonstone, Esqr., Secy., Govt. of India, Camp Guna, 8th Feb. 1856. (Para 1).

2. C.I.A. Records, Issue Register No. 86, Letter No. 22, from R. Hamilton A.G.G. for C.I. to C. F. Edmonstone, Esqr., Secy., Govt. of India, Camp Biaora, 19th Feb. 1856.

But this system did not apply to the English soldiers. Very often a fresh recruit from England was placed in command of regiments composed of senior Indian sepoys. Further, senior posts were reserved for Englishmen, so that it was not an uncommon thing to find fresh recruits from England superseding many senior and experienced Indians. An Indian sepoy at the end of his career could only hope to attain the post of a Jamaradar or Havaladar, while the responsible posts of Captain, Colonel, Major, Commander, and others were beyond his reach.

(iii) *Innovations in messing and dress.* Various innovations were made in the messing system. In place of the individual preparing his own food, the system of common messes was introduced. This system conflicted with the caste prejudices of the sepoys. The sepoys lived in the cantonments generally without their family, but when they returned home their caste people and sometimes even their family refused to dine with them. Similarly innovations were introduced in dress, namely, the use of leather cockade which was alleged to be made of the skin of cows or pigs instead of turbans, the use of long military boots in place of country shoes, and the use of leather belts. Orders were passed forbidding the sepoys to wear the mark of their caste on their forehead, to wear long ear-rings and to preserve the average length of moustaches and beards. Each one of these innovations and orders annoyed the sepoys. The English method of parade was also irritating to them. The court-martial sentences for even minor offences were so humiliating that they often infuriated them.

(iv) *The General service enlistment order.* The General Service Enlistment Order of July 25th, 1856, decreed that all future recruits for the army should give an undertaking to march wherever their services were required either inside India or abroad. It almost debarred the high-caste men from joining the army, as sea voyage meant loss of caste to them. It not only jeopardised the prospects of the high-caste recruits but also annoyed those high-caste soldiers who were in service.

(v) *Instability of service.* In times of peace huge retrenchments were made in the Army. No provision was made to secure any employment for them. Once they were disbanded they had no means of livelihood. It was therefore natural for them to be dissatisfied with this opportunism of the Company.

(vi) *Overcentralisation.* There was such an excessive military centralisation, that even for ordinary things the sanction of the Chief of the Staff of Army Headquarters was needed. Overcentralisation produced grave evils. The sepoys became aware of the fact that their immediate officers could do little good or bad to them. There was lack of sympathy between the British military officials and the Indian sepoys. The British officers knew very little of the life of the Indian sepoys. They saw sepoys only on the parade ground. High military officials issued order after order without caring to notice their effect on the minds of the sepoys.

(vii) *Enfield Rifles and Greased Cartridges.* There has been much talk about the use of the greased cartridges as leading to the Revolt. These cartridges were used in the Enfield Rifles. The cartridge consisted of a piece of lead commonly called the ball—one inch in length and more than a quarter of an inch in diameter, the base of which was concave and its point convex.³ This ball fitted so closely in the barrel chamber of the rifle that the whole force of the powder, when it expended at the concave end, produced a slight expansion and filled the grooves which effectively prevented windage. To counteract this, it was necessary to have that end of the cartridge to lubricate the bore and prevent adhesion of any portion of the lead to the groove. Without greasing the cartridges the rifle could not be effectively used in shooting. When using the cartridge, it was necessary to bite off the end and pour the powder in. As the cartridges were greased with the fat of cows and pigs, it was abhorrent both to the Hindus and the Muslims to bite them.

Sir John Lawrence's view is that the "mutiny" was due to the greased cartridges alone. Colonel Malleison thinks that the question of the greased cartridges was not the cause of the Revolt. It was only an instrument employed by the interested parties to create dissatisfaction among the sepoys.⁴

The Gwalior Darbar's view was that the Indian sepoys were fully predisposed to revolt owing to the religious causes, the dissatisfaction among the people against the British rule, the assurance of easy triumph, the extreme weakness of European

3. Kaye, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. I, p. 36.

4. Kaye and Malleison, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, (1880 Ed.), Vol. III, p. 471.

troops, the confidence of popular support and similar numerous special motives. They, therefore, made the slogan of the greased cartridges their pretext and their watchword.⁵

Though some historians have disputed this fact, the controversy whether the cartridges in question were really greased may now be taken as closed, for there is reliable evidence to show that, as Lieut. General Sir George MacMunn has said, "There is no doubt that the first cartridges did contain material that would be entirely unclean, and there is no doubt that the fears of the sepoys were perfectly genuine."⁶

(viii) "*Bad Faith*". Sir John Kaye rightly remarks that the real cause of the revolt was "bad faith."⁷ The history of the Company's rule in India, in spite of its manifold advantages is a record of "broken promises" and "violated treaties."⁸ Force, not good-will, was the basis of the Government. The Indian sepoys had no natural affection for the British and only served them because of the security of tenure and the guarantee of getting a regular salary.

When the Government was in need of the services of the sepoys as in the First Afghan War, the annexation of Sindh, battle of Maharajpur, and the annexation of the Punjab, it paid them well, but after that their "double bhattas" were cut. Even the veteran Indian sepoys were asked to serve under young and very often inexperienced British officers. Indian sepoys, in spite of their loyalty to Britain, were not promoted to responsible posts. The troops were asked to cross the seas against their caste prejudices. The men of one province were employed to subdue and control the people of the other. In Malwa, prior to the Revolt of 1857, there were troops which were composed of the Sikhs from the Punjab, the Purbias from Northern India, and the Bhils from Nimar.

The unjustifiable annexation of the local abodes of these sepoys by the British made them lose faith in British honesty. At Indore

5. C.I.A.O. Gwalior Residency, File No. 273 of 1858, Major Macpherson's Report, dated the 10th Feb. 1858.

6. Pandit Sunderlal, *Bharat-me-Angrezi Rajya*, Chap. 45.

Ency. Britannica, Vol. XII, p. 243 (14th Ed.)

Lord Roberts, *Forty-one Years in India*, p. 431.

7. Kaye and Malleon, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. III, p. 473. (1880 Ed.)

8. V. D. Savarkar, *War of Indian Independence*, p. 14.

there were several sepoys from Oudh. The effect produced on the minds of these sepoys by the annexation of Oudh was considerable. The annexation of Jhansi, Satara, and Nagpur gave the greatest shock to the Maratha sepoys and rudely shattered their belief in the *bonafides* of the British. The East India Company's policy of financing their British Indian Contingents from the coffers of the Indian States of Malwa, while it kept the states under its control and employed them in the advancement of its imperialistic design, also resulted in ill-feeling and dissatisfaction among the sepoys of the Indian States against the British.

In 1857 the British Indian Contingents within the Central India Agency were the Gwalior Contingent, the United Malwa Contingent, the Bhopal Contingent, and the Malwa Bhil Corps. The Sindhia alone had to contribute 18 lacs per year for the Gwalior Contingent.⁹ The Holkar and the Chiefs of Jaora and Dewas had to contribute Rs. 3,32,570 per year towards the United Malwa Contingent. The Bhopal State had to pay Rs. 2 lacs a year. The contributions of the other Rulers to the Malwa Bhil Corps were Rs. 31,500. While all the expenses of the British Indian Contingents were borne by the Rulers, they had no control over the organisation, equipment and discipline of these troops, which were entirely in the hands of the East India Company's officials.¹⁰ These British Indian Contingents were maintained ostensibly for the maintenance of peace in Malwa but really for strengthening Britain's authority in Malwa at the cost of the poor tax-payers of the Indian States.

By 1857 the people and sepoys fully came to realise the British intentions of making them pay the piper without any right to call the tune. This serious defect of the British policy towards the British Contingent troops can well be judged from the following passage:

That for many years close upon a quarter of million a year has been spent (actually the money came from the pockets of the Indian State people) in maintaining contingents which

9. C.I.A., Issue No. 95, Letter No. 23, from R. N. C. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to G. F. Edmonstone, Esqr., Secy. to Govt. of India, dated 14th Jan. 1858.

10. *Ibid.*

at last on trial proved worthless as soldiers (to protect the British) and only a dangerous addition to the armed anarchy which now prevails over large tracts of country, blighting its prosperity, and demoralising and destroying its people.¹¹ (brackets my own.)

(B) *Nationalisation of the Army.* If the origin of each contingent raised in Malwa is examined it will be found almost without an exception that it was mostly local and presented a no more respectable appearance than the local police.¹² its condition, however, gradually improved so that it came to look more like a regular army resembling the Bengal Army in arms, drill, discipline and organisation. The contingents were brought together in military camps and military drill. This camp life, in which the sepoy of different castes and creeds shared their common joys and sorrows, inevitably brought about a feeling of unity and common brotherhood among them. The army assumed an almost national character owing to the fact that people of different communities and provinces were recruited.

The factor which operated most against the British was the brotherhood or homogeneity of the army. "The army owing to the manner in which it was recruited formed an immense quasi-masonic brotherhood from Peshawar to Calcutta and from the Himalayas to Narbudda."¹³ The result of a common organisation was the nationalisation of the army, though the Company never aimed at it. It was the result of an unconscious process in the historic evolution of the Company's army in India. When one contingent revolted, the others joined it by the law of sympathetic resonance. The soldiers were no longer isolated from one another or ignorant of one another, but had seen, met and lived together and acquired a common feeling.¹⁴

11. C.I.A. Issue Register No. 95, letter No. 74 A, from H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to G. F. Edmonstone, Esqr., Secy., Govt. of India, dated 13-12-1857.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Peel Commission Report* (1859), p. 97, evidence of Major-General W. R. Mansfield, Chief of the Staff of the Indian Army.

14. C.I.A.O. Issue Register No. 95, General No. 322 A, letter No. 74 A, from H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to G. F. Edmonstone, Esqr., Secy., Govt. of India, dated 13-12-1857.

There were also constant intercourse, mutual sympathy and close personal touch among the Company's Contingents, the Indian States' Forces and the civil population. That is why there was a general complaint of the Rulers of Malwa that their troops had joined hands with the rebellious sepoys of the Company's Contingents, and that they were therefore unable to control them. They could not trust their forces to be employed in opposing the rebels. The civil population, being dissatisfied with the economic and socio-religious policy of the Company, also encouraged the sepoys to revolt in its diverse contacts with them in the market place or on festival and public occasions.

On the eve of the Revolt a large number of people from British India were recruited to some of the Indian State troops. To take an example: The Sindhia's troops consisted of the Hindus and Mohammedans who had their brethren in Oudh and Bengal.¹⁵ Major Macpherson wrote that in one of the Sindhia's contingents the Hindu troops from the Company's provinces numbered 1,500 out of 3,000 in the Infantry, and 100 of his 400 artillery men. The Muslim troops from Upper India were 800 out of a total of 1,200 cavalry. These persons recruited from the Company's Provinces were in constant communication with their home people and shared their feelings of Revolt.¹⁶

(C) *Paucity of British Troops and Officers.* If we compare the strength of the Company's Indian Contingents with the body of the English troops in Central India, it cannot be denied that the paucity of British officers and troops, specially on the eve of the Revolt, afforded a suitable opportunity to the Indian sepoys to revolt.

The strength of the United Malwa Contingent (Mehidpur Headquarters) was—Artillery 129, Cavalry 787 and Infantry 640, making a total of 1,556 men. There were 6 guns. With all this army of 1,566 men, 6 guns and a store of magazines and arms, with all equipments and unity of camp life and feelings of brotherhood in the army, there were only about half a dozen British military officers, such as Commandants, Sergeant-Majors and Ad-

15. Gwalior Residency, File No. 273 of 1858. Major Macpherson's Report, dated the 10th Feb. 1858 (Para 15).

16. *Ibid.*

jutants to control them all. This paucity of Englishmen was much lamented by Major G. Timins, Commandant, Malwa Contingent, in his official report to Lieut.-Colonel H. M. Durand.¹⁷

The strength of the Bhopal Contingent (Sehore Headquarters) was Artillery 60, Cavalry 206 and Infantry 600, making a total of 866 men. All these were Indians. With this Contingent there were only six Englishmen. A detachment of this Contingent was posted at Berchha, but there was not a single Englishman in command there.¹⁸

The strength of the Gwalior Contingent (Gwalior Headquarters) was Artillery 24 field guns, Cavalry 1,160 Sabres, and Infantry 6,300. Detachments from this Contingent were posted at Agar, Neemuch, Kotah, Asirgarh and Burhanpur. There were only a few British officers who were to control an overwhelming number of dissatisfied Indian sepoys.¹⁹

The strength of the Malwa Bhil Corps (Indore Headquarters) was 560 men. There were eight companies of 70 men each. The Commandant, Major Stockley, was the only British officer.²⁰

17. Issue No. 103, Letter No. 602, from R. N. C. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy., Govt. of India, dated 22nd Dec. 1858, Report on Military affairs.

C.I.A. File No. 1163, Local Corps. (Central India), General Records, File No. 1772 of 1857, Report dated 11-11-1857.

Outward Register No. 125, General No. 2589, letter No. 433, from R. Shakespeare, A.G.G. for C.I. to Aitchison, Esqr., Secy. to Govt. of India, dated Indore 13th Sept. 1860. Issue No. 235, from A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy., Govt. of India.

18. *Ibid.*

Old Records File No. 82, Malwa Bhil Corps, Letter Book No. 98, from Sir R. N. C. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy., Govt. of India, Letter No. 139, dated 23rd Oct. 1854.

Outward Vol. No. 125, Genl. No. 2589, letter dated 13th Sept. 1860. (C.I.A.)

Issue Vol. No. 235, from A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy., Govt. of India.

19. C.I.A. Outward Register No. 125, Genl. No. 2589, Letter No. 433, from R. Shakespeare, A.G.G. for C.I. to Aitchison, Esqr., Secy. to Govt. of India, dated Indore Residency, 13th Sept. 1860. Issue No. 235, from A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy., Govt. of India.

20. *Ibid.*

The strength of the Regular Troops at Mhow was :

<i>Name</i>	<i>English Officers</i>	<i>Indian Sepoys</i>
23rd Indian Infantry	16	1,179
1st Wing of Cavalry	13	282
One Battery of Artillery	91	98
Total	120	1,559

Thus at Mhow there was one battery of foot artillery and a handful of British military officers.²¹

The events from September 1857 to December 1857 served as an eye-opener to the Company's officers that the Contingent troops were no more dependable than the general army so far as loyalty was concerned. The organisation of army and contingent troops in Central India on the eve of the Revolt was on the same lines as that of Bengal or Oudh. An examination of the organisation of the Indian States' Forces in Malwa will throw much light on the part played by them in the Revolt. We, therefore, give a brief statement of their military organisation.

The total strength of the Indore States Forces amounted to 10,150 men of the three branches (Infantry 6,350, Cavalry 3,300, and Artillery 500) but in addition to these there were the "Chowkidars" (watchmen) and village police whose strength varied continually.²²

The Sindhia's regular army (fighting men drilled and disciplined like Europeans) was limited by the Treaty of 1843 and its subsequent amendments to 3,000 Infantry, 6,000 Cavalry, 36 guns and 360 gunners. In 1856, 'Najib' Force of 2,000 strong

21. Outward Register No. 125, letter No. 433, from A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy., Govt. of India, dated 13-8-1842, Issue No. 235.

H. M. Durand, *Life of Sir Henry Durand*, Vol. 1, p. 204.

Fitzgerald Lee and Radcliffe, *The Indian Mutiny*.

J. Fitzgerald Lee and F. W. Radcliffe, *The Indian Mutiny*, p. 33.

Indore Foreign Office "1857," No. 2462, p. 310.

22. C.I.A. Records, Outward Register No. 125, letter No. 436, dated 7-8-1860, from A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy., Govt. of India. (Enclosed statement showing the strength of H. H. Maharaja Tukoji Rao Holkar's Troops.)

was added to the Sindhia's army.²³ The irregular army (forces fit for rough and ready work such as escorting and pursuing the plunderers) varied from time to time. The average strength stood at 17,540 men.²⁴

The strength of the other States' Forces was near about these figures: Bhopal 6,703, Dhar 1,037, Dewas (Kishanaji Rao Pawar) 821, Dewas (Bapu Sahib) 649, Jaora 800, Jhabua 300, Alirajpur 181, Sailana 176, Sitamau 150, Barwani 73, and Jobat 32.²⁵

The Company's Contingents in Malwa were considered to be the best product of the efforts of the British Commanders. The fine army of the Holkar was the result of constant drill, good discipline and efficient equipment. The Sindhia's army was supposed to be the creation and passion of his life. "His (Jayaji Rao Sindhia's) education had been nearly confined to the use of his horse, lance and gun, whence his tastes were purely and passionately military. He seemed to enjoy no occupation save drilling, dressing, ordering, transforming, feasting, playing with his troops, and the unwearied study of books of evolution (change in disposition of troops) and he grudged no expenditure connected with that amusement."²⁶

But there was one point on which the Britishers grossly erred. The British Commandants at Mhow, Gwalior, and Mehidpur

23. C.I.A. Records, Gwalior Residency, File No. 274 of 1859. Report on Gwalior Affairs by S. Charters Macpherson. (Para 90.)

Outward No. 125, Letter No. 436 to Cecil Beadon, Esqr., Secy., Govt. of India from Sir R. Shakespeare, A.G.G. for C.I., dated Indore Residency, 7th Sept. 1860. (Para 5.)

Gwalior Agency, File No. 619 of 1859, Letter No. 83 from Major S. Charters Macpherson, P.A. Gwalior, to Col. Sir Shakespeare, A.G.G. for C.I., dated Phulbagh, 14th Sept. 1859.

24. Issue Vol. No. 93, Letter No. 1064, Issue No. 93, dated 2nd July 1858, to Col. Durand from R. N. C. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. (C.I.A.) from Camp Sipri.

25. Issue No. 150, Letter No. 33, from A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy., Govt. of India, dated Indore Residency, 17th Aug. 1863. N.B.—the figures quoted are for the year 1863, but as no records of the forces of these States for 1857 are found the above figures may give a good working idea. It is almost sure that the forces of these States did not vary much in 1857 from those quoted above.

26. File No. 267, Gwalior State, Letter No. 93 of 1856, from S. Charters Macpherson, P.A., Gwalior to Sir Robert Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I., dated 13th Dec. 1856. (Para 34.)

were so ignorant of the feelings of their soldiers that they failed to take notice of the early symptoms of the storm until they were overtaken by it. While the British Commandants were busy training their Contingents of irregular and regular armies on Western lines, the Holkar and the Sindhia were each busy training, equipping and modelling a strong regular army on the British lines, but none paid any attention to improve the lot of the sepoys or solve their social and economic difficulties.

(D) *Influence of Court Parties.* No one took care to detect the dependence of the sepoys on the money of the dissatisfied court-parties who, in order to strengthen their position or gain an upper hand, took care to furnish funds to the sepoys. These intriguing court-parties and dissatisfied Rulers instigated the sepoys to Revolt, for they hoped to gain their ends in the event of anarchy following the revolt.

Major Macpherson, the Political Agent at Gwalior wrote, "The ignorant army revolted to a man calculating fully upon their (court-parties) support."²⁷

Major Macpherson is correct in his judgment that the ignorant army revolted to a man under an impression that their chiefs and court-parties along with their servants would support them in achieving their aims. Persons like Bahadur Shah, Nana Sahib, and Saadat Khan encouraged the sepoys to revolt and gave them financial aid. These leaders guided the sepoys to the end and never betrayed their confidence. There were other chiefs and leaders who are alleged to have instigated the sepoys but did not take any active part in the Revolt, e.g. the Rulers of Dhar and Indore.

(E) *Absence of Work.* Sir Robert Hamilton, the Agent to the Governor-General in Central India, opined that an important cause of the mutinous conduct of the army was the absence of work. "All history tells us that the former Native States have fallen owing to the mutinous conduct of their own troops, these troops not have(ing) (sic.) occupation abroad and knowing their own power turned their attention to aggrandisement at home. What brought about the Punjab War but the violence of the

27. Gwalior Residency, File No. 273 of 1858, Major Macpherson's Report, dated the 10th Feb. 1858. (Para 15.)

State troops, the Khalsa soldiers having desired to rule and not to obey? What was the case at Gwalior? The mutinous conduct of their troops rendered the Darbar helpless and we stepped in."²⁸

The absence of work in the army gave the soldiers enough opportunity to think of their rights and privileges and the adverse effect of British policy upon them. In the heyday of the Maratha Empire both the Sindhia and Holkar used their armies to fight against the Mughols and the British. When the British conquered them, these armies were used for the suppression of the landlords. It had ever been the Sindhia's fixed policy to curtail the powers of the landlords and the petty chiefs under him. "The reduction of these chiefs and their warlike clans used to be a great work of Sindhia's army and at first required the services of the Contingent."²⁹ When that work was over and there was nothing to keep the armies engaged at home, they began to realise the effects of foreign yoke and prepared themselves for a fight for their country's freedom.

(F) *Individual Ambition of the Army Officers.* Individual ambition also played an important part in the Revolt of the troops. We take an example to illustrate it. Among the Darbar officers of the Holkar's cavalry there was an officer Saadat Khan who was the nephew of the late Bakshi Hafiz, the Commander of the Holkar's forces.³⁰ Saadat Khan had long been acquainted with Maulvi Abdul Samad who was a Persian teacher in the Indore School and Nawab Warris Mohammad Khan (a relation of the Ruler of Bhopal) who was residing in the Residency Bazar at Indore. Saadat Khan became connected with the Mohammadan party of Indore and became the chief intermediary between the Holkar State Troops and the Company's Indian Con-

28. Issue Vol. 103, Letter No. 178, dated 24-6-1858, from Sir Robert Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I., to G. F. Edmonstone, Secy, to the Govt. of India. (Para 6.)

29. File No. 267 of 1854-56, Letter No. 93 of 1856, dated 13th Dec. 1856, from S. Charters Macpherson, P.A., Gwalior to Sir R. Hamilton Bart. A.G.G. for C.I. (Para 48.)

30. Issue Register No. 95, Genl. No. 58 A, No. of letter 8, from Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to G. F. Edmonstone, Esqr., Secy., Govt. of India, dated 5th Jan. 1858. (Paras 6-9.)

tingents of Indore Residency and Mhow. Nawab Warris Mohammad Khan, from his previous residence at Bhopal, was more or less acquainted with the Indian officers and men of the Bhopal Contingent. They were constantly visiting his house and unlimited communication existed between them. Besides these, there was Sheikh Rahamatulla who commanded the Mehidpur Contingent. He was an active participant in the councils of the rebels, and was in constant communication with the Mhow and Indore troops.³¹ Shahzada Firoz Shah, who claimed to be a descendant of Timur, openly preached a holy war against the Britishers. He attracted a large crowd of rebels who gave much trouble to the local British authorities.

All these rebels claimed to have high connections and were not satisfied with their lot. Thus Saadat Khan was unhappy as a Customs Officer. He wished to be the Bakshi (Commandant) of Holkar's Army to which post he thought he had hereditary claims. Warris Mohammad Khan was a distant member of the Bhopal royal family, and therefore could not tolerate any surveillance which he had to undergo. Similarly Shahzada Firoz Shah once more dreamt of the glory that was Timur's.

(G) *Loss of Strategic Points.* Even in the 19th century, the forts played an important part as the sentinels of the roads which joined one province with another. On the Central India portion of the Agra-Bombay Road there were two more important forts—the Sendhwa Fort on the Khandesh border and the Gwalior Fort on the Northern Border. By 1855 the Company's Government lost control over both these forts. In 1853 when Maharaja Jayaji Rao Sindhia came of age, the Gwalior Fort was made over to him by the British in accordance with the Treaty of Gwalior in 1844.³² The Company's Government transferred the Sendhwa Fort and its surrounding area of 2,000 yards to the Government of the Maharaja Holkar, in consideration of the Maharaja defraying the cost of a bridge over the Gohi river on

31. Issue 95, Letter No. 8, dated 5th Jan. 1858, from A.G.G. for C.I. (Sir Robert Hamilton) to G. F. Edmonstone, Esqr., Secy., Govt. of India.

32. M. B. Grade, *Directory of Forts in Gwalior State*, Pt. I, p. 58.

the Bombay-Agra Road.³³ The rebels of course viewed these changes as a great loss to the Company and thought that it was a God-sent opportunity to check effectively the British communication between Bombay and Agra. When the rebels found the Sindhia and Holkar, loyal to the Company's Government, the first thing they did was to make an attempt to seize the two forts so as to cut off communications and supplies coming to the British from outside Central India.

There was another strategic point known as the Line of the Narmada.³⁴ Since the beginning of Indian history this line of the Narmada was the greatest barrier to the empire-builders in India. It also served as a great block between the revolutionary changes of the empires in Northern India and the more or less stable though secluded empires of Southern India. Colonel Durand repeatedly emphasised upon the Central Government the importance of maintaining the line as an effective barrier against the blazing Bengal, smouldering Bombay, and wavering Madras.

On the eve of the Revolt of 1857 the troops which were stationed by the Company's Government at the strategic posts around the Line of the Narmada were of a rebellious temper. For instance, the troops stationed at Jubbulpore, Mhow, Indore, Sardarpur, and Mandleshwar were the off-shoots of the regular Bengal Army which took a leading part in the Revolt. Moreover the foreign mercenaries, *i.e.* the Afghans, Pathans and Makranis, who were seething with anti-British sentiments were guarding the Line of the Narmada. The Vindhya and the Satpura ranges, with their dense forests and places for hiding, provided the rebels with great temptations to measure their strength against the British.

(H) *Environment*. Some students of history, psychology and sociology have recognised the force of environment in moulding

33. Dispatch from the Hon'ble the Court of Directors dated London 19th Sept. 1855, Dispatch No. 22, to the G.G. in Council, Fort William, Calcutta.

34. C.I.A. Issue Register No. 91, Letters to Govt. of India, Letter No. 149 from H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to G. F. Edmonstone, Esqr., Secy., Govt. of India, dated 8-10-1857. (Para 10.) Issue Vol. 91, Genl. No. 590 A, letter No. 153, dated 8-10-1857, from H. M. Durand to G. F. Edmonstone. (Para 13.)

the temperament of men. The wide plains and the rugged and lofty mountains are supposed to instil in the minds of the local inhabitants a burning love for freedom. If this is true, one may be tempted to say that the physical and geographical features in Malwa contributed not a little towards the life of adventure and virile patriotism among the people of Malwa and more particularly among the sepoys who dedicated their lives to fighting.

(I) *Defective Police System.* The organisation of the police system in the Central India Agency suffered from very grave defects. The Company's Indian Police seldom mixed with the people. It had always been unpopular on account of its overbearing and infatuated attitude towards the public. Its personnel was selected by foreigners from among the strangers to the province. The people were allowed no voice in the matter. In villages the policeman appropriated to himself supreme authority so that the village headman was only his tool.³⁵

At the outbreak of the Revolt, the Police threw in their weight on the side of the rebels lest they should be made the first target of the fury of the mob which was always inimically disposed towards them. At the outbreak of the Revolt in Central India we find that the Bhumia Police and the Civil Police were of no use to the Company.³⁶ The events of the 1st of July 1857 and subsequent dates had proved the inefficacy of the system. "Europeans were murdered in close proximity to the police stations and were also assaulted by men in police uniform. No assistance whatsoever was rendered by the Cantonment Police." The people in the Police Department had no natural affection for the British nor had they any attachment for the local people, as they were not recruited from among the people of Malwa. They welcomed the Revolt as a golden opportunity for amassing money and seizing power.

The Indian States of Central India had, on the contrary, a

35. Issue Vol. 103, Letter No. 178, dated 26th April 1856, from Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to G. F. Edmonstone, Esqr., Secy., Govt. of India.

36. C.I.A. Bhopawar Agency, File No. 1222 of 1857-58, Reduction of the Bhumia Police, Letter No. 53 of 1857, from Major M. G. Cuning, Dep. Bhil Agent, Manpur to Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I., dated Camp Mhow, 20th Aug. 1857.

better system of raising the Police Corps.³⁷ Although the Indian States were also overrun for the time being by the rebels, we find that they fared better. The rural police in the Indian States was a part and parcel of the village system and therefore we find that, while the States were overrun by the rebels, the village policeman was still found to be at his post. He was subordinate to the village headman to whom he was responsible and through whom he was paid. The Indian States' Governments seldom interfered with the working of the village administration, looking only to the heads of the villages as responsible for the police within their own respective limits.

(J) *Rumours and Propaganda.* The Revolt of 1857 was undoubtedly the result of deep-rooted grievances and dissatisfaction among the sepoys and the people, but we cannot ignore the influence of rumours and propaganda in exciting the sepoys and the people to revolt. There were several occasions when rumour overclouded facts, passion eclipsed reason, and the spirit of adventure dominated prudence. Wild rumours were widely though secretly circulated and were quite readily believed in.

On the eve of the Revolt the sepoys and people believed that the 'Firangi Raj' would be soon over and they were eager to give it the parting kick. Englishmen travelling through the Bhopal Agency or Gwalior State found during the days of the Revolt that not only the sepoys but also the villagers were "uncivil", and "the smile of respectful submission" with which they were customarily greeted gave place to angry demonstrations and haughty air. Prophecies like "the star shall fall," and "the centenary of Plassey shall witness the downfall of Britain's rule in India" were freely circulated and commonly believed.³⁸

Mir Shahamat Ali, a resident of Malwa and a contemporary observer, has given a vivid description (in his unpublished re-

37. Issue No. 103, Letter No. 178, dated 26-4-1858, from Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to G. F. Edmonstone, Secy., Govt. of India. (Para 8.)

38. A Narrative of the Escape of the Europeans from Agra where a portion of the Gwalior Contingent mutinied.

(It was written by a Bombay Medical Officer, who was attached to the Gwalior Contingent.) Forwarded with his letter, dated Hoshangabad, 16th July, 1857, to Colonel H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I.

ports) of the influence of rumour in heralding the revolt.³⁹ He writes that the flame of dissatisfaction was kept ablaze by the mis-statements and absurd reports. It was reported and believed that the British Government was determined to destroy the religion of the people by various secret means. Those who had mixed up with the people of Malwa on the eve of the Revolt knew that there had been throughout India for a long time a preconceived notion, incorrect, that the Government was steadily bent on overthrowing their caste and converting them all to Christianity. The greased-cartridges episode lent a gruesome colour to the picture and convinced the people of Malwa of the evil designs of the British.

The rumours were supplemented by press propaganda. The "Malwa Akhbar", a newspaper published from Indore, prior to the Revolt of 1857, also contained news concerning the sepoys, which made them feel insecure. In one issue of this paper it was published that the British officials had decided to decrease the strength of the Indian troops by disbanding 200 sepoys from each Regiment or by limiting the strength of one Indian Regiment to 200.⁴⁰ The money thus saved was to be used for enlisting more British troops. Another issue contained the news that the designs of shoes and caps worn by the Indian sepoys were to be changed.

In fact the whole country was agitated and seethed with discontent and distrust. Nothing was talked of except the tales and exploits of adventures of the olden days. Under such circumstances each State of Malwa depended for protection on its own resources and followed a policy best suited to it. Some thought that the time was ripe for achieving their long-cherished predatory ambition. Others thought of reclaiming old and forgotten rights and avenging old wrongs and insults. Some got ready to fish in troubled waters. Thus each one marked out

39. Letter No. 6 of 1858, dated Dhar, 24th April 1858, from Mir Shahamat Ali, Asstt. A.G.G. for C.I. in Malwa to Sir Robert Hamilton Bart. A.G.G. for C.I.

Mutiny File No. 1807 of 1858, List of persons eminent for (loyalty in Jaora, Ratlam and Sailana during the late disturbances). C.I.A. Records, Historical.

40. *The Malwa Akhbar*, Vols. in Dhar State Museum, Files of 1850, 1852, etc.

a separate policy for his self-aggrandisement and made preparations accordingly. The lower military class looked on the change with favour as it gave them greater chances of securing by blackmail more money from the merchants and wealthy individuals who had to increase their establishments and guards to protect their property.

As the Revolt spread and approached nearer home, the public anxiety increased in proportion. The news of the revolt of sepoys at Mehidpur in the beginning of June, 1857, caused feverish excitement for a time. The rebels spread the rumour that the Maharaja Holkar was siding with them. But the report of Holkar's revolt was soon found to be incorrect and it was known that he was staunch in his friendship and adherence to the Company.⁴¹

The rebels freely used the names of Bahadur Shah, Nana Sahib, the Rani of Jhansi, Baiza Bai and others to foment the spirit of discontent. A unique combination of rumours and facts of political, economic and social importance excited the sepoys and the people to rebellion and we find that by July 1857 the British authority in Malwa was completely flouted.

41. *Ibid.* Mutiny File No. 1807, Letter No. 6 of 1858, dated Dhar 24th April 1858, from Mir Shahamat Ali to Sir R. Hamilton.



His Highness Maharaja Jiwaji Rao Scindia
—Ruler of Gwalior in 1857

CHAPTER V

THE REVOLT AT GWALIOR

THE plan for the Revolt was well laid and boldly executed. The time selected by the rebels for the uprising was the 31st of May 1857—a time most unsuitable for the Europeans as they could not stand the heat.¹ But during the days which had not yet witnessed the wireless and the telephone and other agencies like telegraph or railways, it was not possible for the rebels to rise in revolt simultaneously in the whole of Hindustan. The over-zealous sepoys and people of Meerut—a place which British diplomacy “originally instituted to watch Delhi and the Maratha Frontier”—first rose in revolt on the 10th of May 1857 and the sepoys and people of other places soon followed suit.² The revolt at Gwalior was a logical and inevitable result of the revolt in other parts of India.

Some noteworthy points regarding the outbreak of the revolt at Gwalior are noted below :

- (i) When the sepoys in British India revolted, the spark was also lighted at Gwalior. Major Macpherson, Political Agent in Gwalior, wrote, “The outbreak at Jhansi on the 7th of June (1857) brought the revolt in its most savage form from home to Gwalior.”³ In the conference which took place on the 11th June 1857 between Jayaji Rao Sindhia and Major Macpherson, both the Sindhia and his Dewan pointed out to the British Political Agent that, on account of the proximity and the intimacy between the population of Jhansi and that of Gwalior, the news of the massacre of the Europeans and the amount of treasure seized excited the Gwalior contingent and troops “to the very utmost.” Few disbelieved that the

1. *Ency. Brit.*, Vol. 12, p. 243 (14th Ed.)

2. *Ibid.*

3. File No. 273 of 1858, Major Macpherson's Report, dated the 10th Feb. 1858. (Para 52.)

British Empire in India was gasping in its last hour of existence.

It was not only the revolt of the troops at Jhansi but also at Neemuch, Lalitpur, Hathras, Nasirabad, Cawnpore, Lucknow, Bareilly, Muradabad, Shahjahanpur and other parts and the strong position of the rebels at Delhi that convinced the Gwalior troops that the British rule in India was tottering. This conviction encouraged them to have the satisfaction of bravely playing their part in sounding its death knell. Rumour and propaganda, their own grievances, the deep rooted suspicion they entertained about the imperialistic policy of the British—all these naturally led the sepoys at Gwalior to imitate the rebellious activities of their brethren.

- (ii) The Europeans were aware of the impending storm though they did not know when it would break out.
- (iii) Major Macpherson, the Political Agent, and Brigadier Ramsay, the Commandant of Gwalior Contingent, were both planning the rescue of the Europeans.
- (iv) The Maharaja of Gwalior and his Dewan, Sir Dinkar Rao, were aiding the Europeans in every way.
- (v) The wild rumours were daily rousing the feelings of the rebels and swelling their number.

In the month preceding the actual outbreak of the revolt at Gwalior, there was a constant flow of men from the Gwalior troops to Agra and other places. The following account gives us an idea of the forces from the Gwalior Contingent which were sent out to Northern India, to suppress the revolt there.⁴

13th May 1857: 100 Sabres from 1st Cavalry under Lt. Cockburn and Fourth Battery of Artillery under Capt. Rearson.

15th May 1857: 107 Sabres of 1st Cavalry under Capt. Alexander, 50 more Sabres from Sipri to Agra under Indian Officers. 1st Company of Artillery under Capt. Hawkins and 3rd Company.

4. Receipts 65, Letter No. 3 of 1857, from Major S. Charters Macpherson, P.A., Gwalior to the Secy. to the Govt. of India, Mili. Deptt, Calcutta, dated Gwalior, June 3rd, 1857.

17th May 1857: 70 Sabres of 1st Cavalry under Major Rakes.

19th May 1857: 261 Sabres of 1st Cavalry.

22nd May 1857: 1st Grenadier Regiment of Infantry and 560 Bayonets under Major Hennessy.

Besides these the Sindhia had to send to Agra 300 of his own Bodyguard to attend the Lieutenant Governor,⁵ and his Maratha Troops and "Paiga" of 100 Maratha Horse to Etawah.⁶

The result of all such flow of the forces from Gwalior was that the military position of the Sindhia at Gwalior weakened. As early as the 28th of May, Macpherson wrote, "Sindhia thinks he can spare no more Horse at present, and I think it would be unwise to press it." On the 29th of May, 1857, Macpherson wrote to the Lieut. Governor of Agra, "The Contingent Troops are in so doubtful a state that, at Sindhia's request, I am placing the ladies in his palace and the Residency under his protection. He prays to have his Bodyguard back as indispensable to safety here, because his remaining troops cannot now be at all depended upon."

To add further to the difficulty of the English, Agra newspapers began to publish accounts of the difference of opinion between Major Macpherson and Brigadier Ramsay—the Commander of the Contingent troops at Gwalior. "The false statement in the Gwalior letters of the 'Mofussilite' Extra of the 2nd June 1857 enables the evil disposed to distract the Maharaja's mind by telling him that the Brigadier and I are not in accord, that my acts are different from what I say, that we are dissatisfied with his treatment of the ladies"⁷ Brigadier Ramsay wanted to keep the European ladies in the barracks as he thought that such an action would allay suspicion and restore confidence among the sepoys: it would not lead them to think that their officers were afraid or suspicious about their intentions.

5. Sir S. C. Macpherson, *Memorials of Service in India*, p. 312.

6. Letter dated 25th May 1857 from P. A., Gwalior to Lieut. Governor, Agra.

7. Letter dated 28th May 1857 from P. A., Gwalior to Lieut. Governor, Agra.

8. Letter dated Gwalior 5th June 1857 from S. C. Macpherson, P.A., Gwalior to Lieut. Governor, Agra.

From the middle of May to the middle of June 1857, the cloud of suspense loomed dark on Gwalior. On the 28th of May 1857, the rumour of the impending outbreak of the Revolt made the Europeans actually take shelter in the Sindhia's palace. Major Macpherson noted that the behaviour of the populace at Gwalior was markedly insolent.⁹

Under such circumstances, at last, on the 14th of June 1857 the Revolt broke out in a severe form at Gwalior. At about 1.30 p.m. an unoccupied bungalow in the very centre of the Cantonment was found in flames. The Mess House and the Mess Battery Bungalow, being nearby, caught fire and were reduced to ashes. In this affair Macpherson suspected the hand of an incendiary, but no definite proof was forthcoming.¹⁰ The English, suspecting foul play and dreading further mischief, determined to hand over the magazine and cantonment to the Sindhia. To effect this, a major portion of Gwalior Contingent was ordered to move into the districts. The Political Agent in Gwalior did order the detachment but it seems that, the news having previously leaked out, the troops refused to leave the station. The British Commander and other officers did not think it prudent to press this order any further.

On the night of the 14th June when the customary 9 o'clock gun was fired, there was some noise and disturbance which proved to be a false alarm. But the short lull was broken at the dead of night by the outbreak of the regular Revolt. The whole lot of sepoys came out of their barracks shouting, and began to set fire to the bungalows and shoot the officers and Europeans indiscriminately. In this general melee, 7 officers, 6 sergeants and pensioners, 3 women and 3 children were killed. Some 17 men, 12 women and 14 children escaped to Agra with the help of the Maharaja and a handful of "loyal" soldiers.¹¹

The Sindhia found himself unable to give more than a temporary refuge to the fugitives as his own troops were rebellious, but he supplied them with carriages and a troop of his own

9. Major Macpherson's Report on Gwalior Affairs, dated 10th Feb. 1858, (Para 59), File No. 273 of 1858.

10. C. E. Luard, *Contemporary Newspaper Account of Events during the Mutiny in Central India, 1857-59*, pp. 7 and 8.

Mofussillite, Aug. 19th, 1857.

11. S. C. Macpherson, *Memorials of Service in India*, p. 314.

Bodyguard to escort them across the Chambal on their way to Agra where they eventually arrived in safety.¹²

The history of the Revolt at Gwalior after the departure of Major Macpherson and other Europeans to Agra, is an account of the various demands put forth by the different bands of rebels before the Sindhia, and of his friendly policy towards the British by adopting every means in his power to detain the rebels from crossing the Chambal for Agra until the British Forces could rally and recapture Delhi.

The correspondence in July 1857 between the Gwalior Darbar and Major Macpherson brings to light the important measures adopted for tempting the rebels to be detained at Gwalior. They were given three months' pay and reward in advance. Attempts were made to create difference of opinion among them. Measures were taken that, in case the rebels left for Agra, the neighbouring Thakurs were to plunder their property. Arrangements were also made that, in case of absolute necessity, the boats at Chambal were to be burnt so that the rebels could not cross the river. The other means of transport such as carts and camels were removed from the reach of the rebels. They were also induced to stay on the verbal understanding that they would be fully supported in their designs of destroying the British after the rainy season.¹³

The rebels' force was daily increasing in number as troops from other quarters came pouring into Gwalior. The plan of the rebels of Mhow and Indore was to join hands with the Gwalior insurgents and then jointly march towards Agra. Sindhia's Vakil at Gwalior conveyed to Major Macpherson at Agra that 5 Companies of the 6th Regiment, which was stationed at Lalitpur, were marching towards Gwalior with 1,00,000 rupees from Chanderi. The rebels planned to march to Agra and, with the help of other forces coming from other parts of the country, to go and instal Bahadur Shah on the throne at Delhi.

The British plan at the beginning was to save and collect

12. O. S. Crofton, *Indian Monumental Inscriptions*, List of Inscriptions on Tombs or Monuments in Rajputana and Central India. With Biographical Notes. Compiled with an Historical Introduction.

13. S. C. Macpherson, *Memorials of Service in India*, p. 323.

Letters from the Gwalior Darbar to Major Macpherson and *vice versa* (July to October 1857).

together as many Europeans and soldiers as was possible and after full concentration attack and destroy the rebels.¹⁴ Macpherson wrote to the Sindhia's Vakil, "You see that we have lost from the beginning only 59 men altogether, while we have destroyed thousands of the enemy. I told you that our plan was to save more men, until more came up from Allahabad."

On the 31st July 1857, the Indore rebels came to Morar.¹⁵ Their strength was one Regiment of Mhow 700, Regular Sepoys 400, Sowars 200, and guns of Indore 7. There were besides 1,000 "Ghazis". On the 1st of August there was a meeting between the Mhow and Indore rebels and the officers of the Gwalior Contingent. A rumour prevailed in the town, that the Sindhia had received a communication from the authorities at Agra, desiring him to prevent the advance of the Gwalior rebels in that direction.¹⁶

The Indore, Mhow and Gwalior rebels were busy consulting one another. There were conferences, agreements and disagreements. The Sindhia took the fullest advantage of this vacillating situation and kept them in suspense under the false hope of aiding them to attack the British at the close of the rainy season. A spy deputed by Bhao Sahib Reshimwale, the officiating Minister of Indore, to watch the activities of the rebels reported on the 3rd of August that Saadat Khan, the rebel leader of Indore, went to the Phulbagh Palace at Gwalior escorted by his fellow rebels to have an interview with the Sindhia, but was told that the interview would be possible when Maharaja Sindhia was free. The main idea was to gain time for the British arms to get ready. For a time the Gwalior rebels demanded help from the Sindhia in the form of pay and reward for the Mhow and Indore rebels, but this demand having been refused the Gwalior sepoys took their own pay from the Sindhia's treasury.

14. Letter, dated Agra, 19th July 1857 from S. C. Macpherson, P.A., Gwalior to H. H. Sindhia's Vakil, Gwalior, Letter No. 23.

15. Letter, dated Gwalior, 31st July 1857 from H.H. Sindhia's Vakil to Major S. C. Charters Macpherson, P.A., Gwalior (Agra).

16. Inward No. 80, Receipts of Indore Minister's Letters from July to Dec. 1857 (Translation of the letter of a spy dated Gwalior 1st Aug. 1857).

Receipts, Vol. 65, Letter from S. C. Macpherson to Col. H. M. Durand, dated Agra, 7th Aug. 1857.

From the report dated Gwalior, the 4th August, 1857, it appears that the Agra rebels came to Gwalior and that the Indore rebels could not get the desired interview till then. "The H.H. tried his utmost to prevent the coming of the Agra rebels to Gwalior, but they, without minding his orders arrived . . . The Indore and Mhow mutineers could not see H.H. They tried greatly to procure an interview with Her Highness Baiza Bai, but they could not succeed."¹⁷ The Gwalior rebels further demanded that the Sindhia should arrange conveyance for the rebels to go to Delhi, but His Highness gave no answer and consequently their advance was postponed. It was reported that the Maulvi of Delhi assumed the title of Subah and, attended by 7,000 troops, came to Koel (a district worth ten lacs of rupees) and established his authority over the province.

By the end of August 1857 it appears that there was a difference of opinion between the various sections of the rebels, some favouring the cause of Nana Sahib while others that of the Delhi King. The difference seems to be so great that the Morar rebels, who at first refused to accept their pay unless something was also paid to the Indore rebels, accepted it without any objection. By the end of August, the rebels at Gwalior got the support of a Shahzada who claimed to belong to the line of Timur. This Prince had gone to Mecca three years ago and returned to India with great difficulty. He came to Dholpur. But the appearance of the Shahzada at Gwalior widened the differences among the rebels. Those who favoured the Nana of Bithur refrained from supporting the Shahzada.

Early in September 1857 the Mhow and Indore rebels finally decided to march towards Dholpur, and it seems that in the end they did not get the active support of the Gwalior rebels. The Indore rebels, especially the section of the 'Ghazis,' were anxious to go to Delhi and help Bahadur Shah. The Mhow and Indore rebels, while leaving Gwalior, destroyed the bungalow and property of the British and some wealthy merchants. His Highness the Sindhia prepared his forces for attacking these rebels in case they extended their ravages. This commotion continued for 3 days. On the 5th of September the rebels started for Agra

17. Inward Vol. No. 80, Indore Minister's letters from July to Dec. 1857, Translation of a Marathi news report from a spy with the mutineers.

and arrived at Chambal at 12 o'clock on Monday the 7th September.¹⁸ Eventually the activities of the rebels were directed towards Dholpur. The Indore and Mhow troops demanded from the Rana of Dholpur that he should come to receive the Shahzada who was with them, lend one lac of rupees, and provide a place of rest to the troops. All these demands were turned down by the Raja. Thereupon a quarrel ensued in which 25 men of the Raja were killed and the Kamdar of the Raja was apprehended and his party looted. By the Maratha News Reports, dated Dholpur, 23rd September 1857 and from such other September News Reports, we find that the rebels were making preparations at Dholpur for an attack on Agra.¹⁹ About 500 ladders had been constructed to scale the walls of the fort of Agra. The rebels got an upper hand at Dholpur. The town and fort were in their possession, while the Raja was shut up 6 miles away in a fortress.

By the 1st of October 1857 the Mhow and Indore rebels were ready for a march to Agra. On the Dashera day they hoisted their flags towards the Agra side. They had mounted 9 old guns and were preparing ammunition every day. By the 10th October they reached about 14 miles from Agra where the British troops were awaiting them.²⁰ Their plan was to keep the rebels waiting at Gwalior by all means up to the time the British forces, having established their authority over Delhi, were prepared to fight the rebels at Agra.

18. Substance from a Marathi news report from a spy of the Holkar Govt. with the Mutineers, dated Gwalior 29th Aug. 1857. Inward Vol. No. 80, Indore Minister's letter from July to Dec. 1857.

Ibid., Gwalior, dated 5th September 1857.

Ibid., Gwalior, dated 8th Sept. 1857.

Ibid., Gwalior, dated 11th Sept. 1857.

19. Translation of a Marathi news report from a spy of the Holkar Darbar, dated Gwalior 19th Sept. 1857, Inward Vol. No. 80, Indore Minister's letters from July to Dec. 1857.

Ibid., dated Gwalior 22nd Sept. 1857.

N.B.—(All the letters in the Marathi news report are with translations. All these letters were despatched by the Indore Darbar to the Agent to the Governor-General for C.I.)

20. Enclosure to Offg. Prime Minister, Indore's letter No. 116 of 1857, Translation of a Marathi News Report from a spy, dated Gwalior 1st October 1857.

After the departure of the Mhow and Indore rebels from Gwalior there was a temporary setback in the rebel activities there, yet any talk of the Company's supremacy was a thing of the past. On the 25th of December 1857 there was a memorable meeting between the Sindhia and Major Macpherson at Agra, in which the former prayed that a British force of sufficient strength be sent as soon as possible to re-establish the British supremacy and to assert his authority by punishing every rebel. But the fear of the rebels was still so great that the Sindhia did not advise the return of the British Political Officer to Gwalior till a British force came there.²¹

During the whole period under review, the chief feature was that the agents of Nana Sahib were very busy in Gwalior State moulding public opinion in favour of Nana Sahib Peshwa. Three of the translated "*Khats*" (letters) from Nana Sahib or his agents support this statement.²² Nana Sahib wrote on January 20th, 1858, to Raja Devi Singh Mahendra Bahadur thus: "Destroy the Europeans and all their helpers and come within our dominions. I will support you." The same day Nana Sahib sent a letter to Hindupat Lalji, "The English began to desecrate religion wherefore we are resolved to fight. You are a Rajput and also of our faith. Therefore I have sent Mahadeo Shastry. Having assembled a force, do . . . destroy the *Kafirs* (unbelievers) and send us aid in troops. After the extermination of the *Kafirs* your desires will be accomplished." Nana Sahib, through his agent Mahadeo Shastry, wrote to the Subah of Isagarh, "We are informed of what Mahadeo Shastry said to you. Do win over Sindhia's army to this Government and bring Sindhia's country under our order. The authority will be left to you and you will have Rs. 25,000 in Jagir in perpetuity. You shall also have authority over any portion of Sindhia's army which you may bring under our orders."²³

21. File No. 237 of 1858, Gwalior Report of Major Macpherson, 10th Feb. 1858.

22. File No. 1790 of 1858, Nana Sahib's Plan of Operations in the Gwalior Territory and the Deccan.

23. File No. 1790 of 1858, Nana Sahib's Plan of Operations in the Gwalior Territory and the Deccan, Enclosure to letter No. 14 of 1858, dated 1st April, 1858, from P.A., Gwalior to Secy., Govt. of India, Camp Agra.

Such letters were also sent by Nana Sahib to Moti Singh, Ruler of Rajgarh, Nawab Muqaddam Bakhsh of Piplia, Dewan Sher Singh of Khilchipur, Dewan Hanumant Singh of Narsingarh and a number of Sardars and Generals. Of the numerous activities of the Agents of Nana Sahib, the most important was to win over the troops of the Sindhia. In the opinion of the rebels, the Sindhia was an ally of the English. "Maharaja Sindhia, being united with the English, does not regard the Peshwa. His Raj is great. Seeing his course all the Rajas, great and small being cowed have joined the English. On account of him we can get no opportunity. Wherefore we must first break Sindhia's Palton's horse and gaols and get him into our hands, and then the Peshwa will rule. Whosoever shall effect this shall get Jagir and office. Some persons too in the Lashkar are working out this."²⁴

After the defeat of the rebels at other places, Gwalior became the last camping ground of the rebel activities on a large scale in Central India. The leaders of the rebellion to the south of the Jumna, viz., the Rao Sahib, a member of the Peshwa family, the Nawab of Banda, the Rani of Jhansi and Tatia Topi, after suffering a defeat at Banda on the 19th of April, at Kunch on the 7th of May, and at Deopura on the 23rd of May 1858, reorganised their forces and moved towards Gwalior. Their plan was to win over the Sindhia's troops to their side in addition to those from the British Provinces.²⁵ Tatia Topi himself had been to Gwalior in September 1857 and again went there early in May 1858 to persuade the Gwalior army to join the rebels.


On the 27th of May 1858 a conference of the rebel leaders was held near Gwalior territory to decide their future course of action. The chief persons present were the Rao Sahib, Tatia Topi, Moro Pant (Rao Sahib's Secretary), Ram Rao Govind (Ex-Superintendent of Sindhia's Roads), Lachman Pant Nana (once Sindhia's Vakil at General Sleeman's Office), the Rani of Jhansi and other important rebel leaders. After discussing whe-

24. Letter from Govind Rao Narain, Subah of Isagarh to Dewan Dinkar Rao, dated 17th Rajjab 1274 Hijri i.e., 4th March 1858 (File 1790). Encl. to letter No. 14 of 1st April 1858 to Government of India.

25. File No. 269 of 1858-61. Letter No. 52 from Major S. C. Macpherson, P.A., Gwalior to Sir R. Hamilton, A.G. for C.I., dated 30th Sept. 1858.



Sir Dinkar Rao Rajwade, Prime Minister of
Gwallior State, during the Revolt of 1857.



The Fort of Gwallior — A view of Man Mandir.

ther they should go to Bundelkhand, Gwalior or the Deccan they decided to go to the Deccan via Gwalior.

The rebels came into the Gwalior territory on the 28th of May 1858. On the same day they came to Amil, on the 29th near Deogaon, on the 30th at Sipowlie, and on the 31st May at Gurragaon, eight miles from Gwalior. Moro Pant, Behari Lal, Purshottam Rao and Khemraj from time to time dissuaded the rebel leaders from going to Gwalior, but the Rao Sahib's reply was, "What does the Maharaja mean by thinking to fight with us? We are not here to fight, but to rest a few days, get supplies and money and go to the Deccan. Upon what do you rely? Your Gwalior army is with us and will certainly join us. Depend upon that. We have from Gwalior about hundred letters of invitation and assurance. What can the Maharaja and the Dewan possibly do alone?"²⁶

But Sindhia and Dinkar Rao remained loyal to the British. They also knew that Central India Field Force under Sir Hugh Rose accompanied by Sir Robert Hamilton, Agent to the Governor-General for Central India, and Major Macpherson, Political Agent in Gwalior, was coming to fight with the Gwalior rebels. They knew the strength of the English soldiers with the Central India Field Force and of the military equipment with them. So being confident of British victory, they did not attach much importance to the importunities of the rebel leaders.

The Sindhia, on the 31st of May, decided to face the rebels and at night marched with his troops to fight them. He commanded 8,000 men under him. But the Sindhia did not know that his army was inspired by the ideas of "*Swadharma*" and "*Swaraj*" and that it saw eye to eye with the rebels. After a mock fight the Sindhia's army joined hands with the rebels. The Fort at Gwalior was surrendered by its keeper Baldeo Singh and others "without a thought of defence." Thus the rebels got full control over Gwalior. The Revolt at Gwalior may be a good illustration to prove the theory of popular sovereignty. If the Sindhia opposed his own people, they proved that they had the right to change their Ruler.

The Sindhia accompanied by a few companions, and later on

26. *Ibid*, Report on Gwalior Affairs from 24-5-58 to 26-6-58.

followed by his Dewan, fled to Agra. "Of His Highness pampered favourites and boon companions not one man followed him, while scarcely one followed the Ranis. These men almost without exception, accepted instantly from the rebels, pay, gratuities, rank and office or became perfectly intimate with them."²⁷ The rebel leader Rao Sahib asked Baiza Bai to take charge of Gwalior, but she went to the Narwar Fort to await the re-establishment of the Sindhia's authority. Nana Sahib was declared the Peshwa and Rao Sahib assumed temporary control of Gwalior. He appointed his own trustworthy officers, gave high posts to the Sindhia's favourites, confirmed in their respective offices nearly all the other servants of the Sindhia, rewarded the police and the military by giving them five months' pay and thus distributed over 20% lacs of rupees among the people.

An interesting account of the events between 31st May 1858 to 19th June 1858 is preserved in an unpublished official diary.²⁸ We are giving below some of the relevant account from the diary.

31st May, Monday

The rebels entered their batteries in the villages of Burrigaon and Dowri. His Highness the Maharaja Sindhia detached Baba Purshottam and Khemraj from the troops and sent them to observe and report on the situation. They returned after a reconnoitre and reported that the rebels had actually arrived very near but that they had no guns.

1st June, Tuesday

Early in the morning guns were placed in position and the first shot was fired by the Bodyguard guns according to the Sindhia's order. A Wing of Cavalry, armed with rifles, was ordered to advance and attack the rebels. The rebels encountering heavy fire retreated a little with their guns. The other troops of the artillery also commenced firing, but the

27. *Ibid.*

28. File No. 1261 of 1858. C.I.A. Records—A *Diary of Events at Gwalior* from 31st May 1858 to 19th June 1858.

guns which were placed on two sides began to fire at random. The rebels, however, began to fly. Rao Sahib and the Jhansi Rani admonished the troops thus:

"You always begin to fly when the time to fight comes. Where shall we go if our servants get us beaten? We are determined to die here. Let those who are all so determined come with us, but let those otherwise disposed go away." On this the Bareilly and Banda Nawabs said, "We will die with you." The troops also assured them likewise. They, therefore, divided the troops into three bodies, sent two to the right and left and one to the centre. By a simultaneous attack they soon captured the guns.

The Sindhia's troops were wavering. The Infantry fired one or two random shots. The Bodyguard Battalions fired but took no aim at the rebels. A troop of the Bodyguard Horse charged but their swords had not sharp edges and they returned. After this the rebels advanced to attack and the Sindhia's troops fled. The gunners used their swords and the infantry began to run. Some among them said it was not necessary to fight. The cause was that of religion and on what understanding should they fight? The Maharaja came in person and fired a gun of the 2nd Battery with his own hands. News was brought into the town that the rebels had taken six guns. The rebels advanced further and took Morar and set fire to many bungalows. Sindhia's troops fled before their second attack and he was convinced of their treachery. He knew that it would be fatal to resist any longer and so coming to his palace at Phulbagh he packed for Agra.

The palace sepoy thereafter plundered all the property under their guard. The lines near the garden of the school were also burnt. The General's house was attacked. Some cavalry guards made a feeble resistance, but at last fled. The rebels now entered the town, and orders were received from their ring leader, the Rao Sahib, that no one from the public should be molested. This was, however, only partially obeyed. Some shops were plundered and Nana Sahib was proclaimed as the Peshwa. Arriving at the palace, they found two guns manned by the gunners who threatened to fire at them in case they advanced. They therefore halted. The gunners were later on captured.

Her Highness Baiza Bai accompanied by Chimna Raja,

Narbadi Bai Setolia, Mami Sahiba and others went away to Nayagaon. She was accompanied by very few attendants. The Punniar zamindars did not allow them to enter their boundaries and they were therefore obliged to take shelter at Narwar. About evening the rebel authority was established in the whole town. They sent for Aminchand Bhatia, the banker, and he was required to pay some money as the town was saved from the ravages of plunder. He apparently pleaded his inability to do so. Measures were taken to guard the town at night.

2nd June, Wednesday

This morning Ram Rao Govind and Tatia Topi came to the police station and ordered it to be proclaimed by a beat of drums that anybody who might have plundered any goods must bring the property back to the police station which, being duly claimed and recognised by the owners, shall be returned to them. Another proclamation assured the public that they would not be troubled on any score. The Rao Sahib once again sent for Amin Chand Bhatia and ordered him to disburse pay to the troops, which the banker promised to do. Some men belonging to the Sindhia were called in and said that the Rao Sahib never intended to devastate Gwalior and that his object was to pass the rainy season there. Though an unexpected victory was gained, he did not intend to usurp the throne to which he wished the Sindhia to return. The whole upheaval, quite new in its own way, had happened merely for the sake of religion.

A letter was sent by Rao Sahib, through a personal attendant, to Her Highness Baiza Bai begging of her to return and assuring her that he and his party did not wish to stay long at Gwalior. Tatia Topi ordered all the troops to be assured that they would receive 2 months' pay and 3 months' bonus as a reward. Ranoji Sindhia had gone to Narwar with 150 Bodyguards to escort Baiza Bai, but she ordered him back to join the Maharaja. Ranoji thereupon returned to the village of Kollath and ordered the Cavalrymen to go wherever they liked but not to accompany him. They, therefore, returned to Gwalior. Tatia Topi ordered the bankers to open their shops without fear.

3rd June, Thursday

Baldeo Singh "Killedar" evacuated the Gwalior Fort and the rebels sent 1,000 men with guns to hold it. The Bodyguards were sent for and required to surrender horses and the other Government property they might have and to receive pay. The Rani of Jhansi went to see the palace and, having seen it, returned with others to Phulbagh Palace. Rao Sahib inspected the military camp, the magazine and the state workshop. He encouraged everybody. The old guards on duty at the treasury were replaced by trustworthy men. Gulab Singh of Sukrode was despatched to watch all the Chambal Ghats and not to allow British troops to cross them. This duty he promised to fulfil. The house of John Baptist was plundered. Those people who were afraid that the British would return and massacre them ran away from the town but were plundered by the villagers.

4th June, Friday

Tatia Topi was appointed Commander of all the forces. Ram Rao Govind was appointed to command the Infantry. Thus Moulvis were nominated to the court and the police station. Additional companies were sent to guard the Palace. Khanwilkar's Regiment was still there. A salute of 33 guns was fired from the Fort. The Bodyguards were assured that pay and reward would be issued to them on the following day. The striking of the gongs was resumed by order. The Rani of Jhansi and Rao Sahib were entertained by Ram Rao Govind, the Gwalior Wakil.

5th June, Saturday

The Bodyguards together with Infantry and the band were ordered to attend the Parade, which they did. An officer came and told them that the rebels had orders from Nana Sahib Peshwa to have nothing to do with the Sindhia's Raj; that they would stay there for a few days to punish the British for the sake of religion; that though the Maharaja Sindhia was opposed to them they had mustered for the sake of the "*Deen*"

(Religion); that the "*Deen*" became victorious; and that every one ought to fight against the British for the same cause. Everybody promised obedience. Tatia Topi then came and took the officers with him from Jhansi to the Camp.

Rao Sahib came to the Palace. He took from Amin Chand Bhatia the keys of the "Ganga Jali" (State Treasury) and inspected the Treasury. Some cash was also sent for from his shop. "*Annachetras*" (places for free distribution of food) were ordered to be opened. Rations were ordered for the Sindhia's Bodyguards as usual, which led them to agree to serve the rebels, but some officers who were not owners of immovable property went away to the Maharaja. Tatia Soorvey went away with his family. So did Khanwilkar's troops. The son of Murlidhar Chowdhary got clothes of honour and was ordered to watch all the Ghats and strategic posts. He gave every assurance of fidelity and promised to collect 25,000 troops from districts. He applied for a regiment of Horse and one of Foot and some guns to stop the enemy at Indurkhi Ghats. Bhola Ram, Jamadar of Postal Runners, was ordered to employ two hundred runners and to procure correct intelligence. Amin Chand Bhatia gave a party to Rao Sahib.

6th June, Sunday

Early this morning Rao Sahib came to the palace, attended by Amin Chand Bhatia, the officers and the Nawabs and drew money from the State treasury. He ordered 5 months' pay to be issued to all the troops. He released all the Rajput Thakurs, who were imprisoned by the Sindhia, gave them clothes of honour, and appointed them to watch the several strategic posts. The troops and the Bodyguards were given their pay first.

7th June, Monday

A company and a half of the Bodyguards and the troops carried their families to the villages by permission. Some of the cavalry men refused to receive rewards, but agreed to take their pay. Intelligence was received from Narwar that Baiza Bai's troops were very badly in need of horses and supplies.

Several members of her troops had gone over to the rebels and received 5 months' pay. They also took away horses belonging to her. Money was received from Amin Chand Bhatia and the balance of pay was paid to the troops.

8th June, Tuesday

A deputation came from Her Highness Baiza Bai consisting of Lala Pagnavis, Vitthal Rao Sindhia, Pandurang Baba, and Thakur Ganesh Singh. They were received by Rao Sahib. After negotiations it was settled that Pandurang Baba should be sent to the Maharaja Sindhia to bring his answer.

9th June, Wednesday

Baba Mohankar's house was confiscated as also of Balaji Pant and of other high officials of the Sindhia who oppressed the rebels. Nothing was found at Dewan Dinkar Rao's house, except a candle and some canvas. This house was made over to the Nawab of Banda. The deputies of Her Highness Baiza Bai were told that, if Her Highness wanted to take possession of Gwalior, she must come and do so within a week. After that they would do what they liked.

10th June, Thursday

The Rao Sahib inspected Sindhia's dressing and store rooms. The houses of some other functionaries were confiscated. Rao Sahib Ghatgia came from Narwar on behalf of Baiza Bai. Arms were taken away from this man by the sepoys. The house of Baiza Bai's Kamdar (official assistant) was plundered. Aminchand Bhatia was sending off the members of his family but, it having been represented that he was sending out property worth about Rs. ten lacs with them, he and his family were stopped at the Nana's Garden. Two Christians and some camels laden with supplies were seized while proceeding towards Jhansi.

11th June, Friday

The Bodyguard troops and companies of the Najibs, troops of Artillery, and some cavalry-men were ordered to Indurkhi

Ghat. There was a general parade. All troops were inspected there. All passed a resolution to fight the advancing British troops. They went to Morar together with some Artillery manned by 18 gunners. Magazine was despatched laden on asses and bullocks. The Dewan's banker was required to pay Rs. 25,000. Treasure was discovered in a well belonging to Baba Mohankar. The cavalry under the Nawab of Banda was rewarded.

12th June, Saturday

The Rani of Jhansi went to Morar and saw that the Bodyguards and the gunners had run away. She therefore sent a reprimand to Tatia Topi who went to Morar and found that the troops had actually fled. Other troops were, therefore, sent to Morar. The Rao Sahib celebrated the Dashera in honour of the Holy Ganges (*Ganga Dashera*) in the palace and gave dinner to one thousand Brahmans and paid them "*Dakshina*" (or charity) of Re. 1 each. The rebels came to the palace and remained in the garden. Rs. 50 as reward was offered to anybody bringing intelligence of the British.

13th June, Sunday

People came to pay their respects to the Rao Sahib and told him that the British troops were coming from all sides, that some had come as near as the village of Chuprua, and that the Maharaja's troops could not be depended upon. They told him that the old servants alone were to be dependable. A *darbar* was held in the palace, the Brahmans were fed, and troops sent to watch the strategic posts. Baiza Bai's men obtained permission to go out, but the watchmen at the outposts stopped them until a further order was received. They were told that they would be shot if they came too often. News was received from the villages of Buddha and Mohunna that the British forces were pushing on and that nothing would stop them. Troops were, therefore, despatched against them, but many of them fled. A notice was issued offering Rs. 500 or more as reward to anybody bringing 500 or more men for services.

14th June, Monday

Three men were hanged this morning for communicating news to the British. Their letters had been intercepted. Other people, about 20, were caught on similar charges and maltreated. All the cash and jewels were taken from the State Treasury. Some ammunition was despatched towards Himmatgarh.

15th June, Tuesday

The property in the State Treasury and the shops being already taken, the Rao Sahib went to the store room in the Household Department. The jewels were inspected and a small box said to contain very valuable property was taken away. Horses belonging to the Bodyguards were distributed among the rebel troops. The shops were ordered to be opened under assurances of protection. Two Christian women and a boy, with others, were brought as prisoners. The Rani of Jhansi enquired of them as to who they were and where they resided. After recording their statements, they were sent to the police station. The Rao Sahib, however, ordered them to be released and sent out of the Gwalior limits after giving them something for expenses. The British troops arrived at the village of Suauli. A few men suspected as British spies were punished.

16th June, Wednesday

About 8 a.m. a fight took place between the British troops and the rebel pickets a little ahead of Morar. The Rao Sahib went there to oppose the British. But the Bodyguards and the 4th Battalion fled, which displeased him much. Other troops were ordered to advance, but they refused because their horses had been taken away: nothing could persuade them and they remained at Phulbagh. The treasure was loaded on the elephants at the palace and brought to the two Moulvis at the court. In the afternoon sepoys came running from Naulakha and reported that the Company's troops had occupied Morar.

17th June, Thursday

About 8 a.m. the combatants met at the canal. At noon the Europeans advanced. The Rani of Jhansi was killed on the plains of the camp. The battle lasted till evening in which the rebels fired many volleys and the Europeans went up the hills. The rebels who had gone to Baba Gangadas' Garden returned after having burnt the corpses of the Rani of Jhansi and another woman, Mundar, who had also fallen with her. Firing continued from the guns. Rao Sahib went to the Mama's garden and, returning from there to the town, reported that Nana Sahib had captured Agra and was advancing towards Gwalior. (This news was given currency to encourage the rebels with the prospect of victory.)

18th June, Friday

This morning all the troops fled to the Mama's garden where Rao Sahib had gone on the previous night. The Nawabs of Banda and Bareilly and their officers threw their turbans at the feet of the Rao Sahib and begged of him not to leave Gwalior, but the Rao Sahib told them that as they were in the habit of running away everywhere he could not depend on them. They therefore took a solemn oath to stick to their guns. The Nawab of Bareilly went to the battery on the hill and Rao Sahib to Phulbagh. It was found that only one battery at the Magazine had remained and the rest had fled. Cannonading was kept up from the hills. The bazar was ordered to be opened. Towards the evening a false report was spread that Bala Sahib's troops were advancing via Kalpi and would reach Gwalior in two or three days. One or two spies were killed.

19th June, Saturday

Cannonading commenced early on the hill batteries from both sides. When the balls began to fall on the plain before Phulbagh, Rao Sahib went to Nana Bapoo's house. The fight lasted till noon. After this the troops began to be unsteady and proposed going to Morar by Gangadas' Garden, but

found the roads blocked. They were therefore obliged to return and escape to Moti Jheel. In the afternoon the Europeans captured the magazine and the palace. The British officers gave assurances of protection to the civil population and said that they would place their Maharaja back on the throne. Some of the British troops were encamped on the Phulbagh plain. Anybody who opposed the Europeans was killed.

Such was the end of the rebel activity at Gwalior during those days when the rebels succeeded in overthrowing the authority of the Maharaja Sindhia and the Company's Government.

An account of the rebellious conduct of the Jagirdars under the Sindhia will not be out of place here.

Man Singh, the Raja of Narwar, a Jagirdar of Gwalior, rebelled in July 1857.²⁹ He continued his rebellious activities till March 1858. His troops closed the Bombay-Agra Road between Sipri and Guna.³⁰ He, with about 400 followers, 6 guns and 12 elephants, established himself in his old ruinous jungle fort of Paron.³¹ Thus stationed securely he began to plunder the villages round about. He enlisted sepoys to increase his forces, looted the "dak" and passengers on the road and tried to regain his ancient possessions by taking advantage of the troubled times.³²

Thakur Chhatarsal was a guaranteed Chief of Agra-Barkhera, and held Jagir villages from the Sindhia, Tonk and Kurwai. He was charged with having risen in arms and murdering Bapu Suba Rao, the British Indian Officer at Berchha. He sent a party to occupy some villages in the British pargana. He committed excesses in the surrounding districts and wrote inspiring letters to the Subah of Bhilsa for the overthrow of the Company's Government. This man was really responsible for the rebel

29. Major Macpherson's Report, dated 20th Feb. 1858, Para 94.

30. File No. 1783 of 1858, Letter No. 17 from S. C. Macpherson, P.A., Gwalior to Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I., dated 10th Mar. 1858.

31. Letter No. 54 of 1858 (File 1783) from Major S. C. Macpherson, P.A., Gwalior to Brg. Smith, Commanding Field Force in Gwalior, dated 9th May 1858.

32. Old Records File No. 50 from Major S. C. Macpherson, P.A., Gwalior to Sir R. Shakespeare, A.G.G. for C.I., No. 46, dated Phulbagh, 29th May 1859 (para 6).

activities in his part of the country. Chhatarsal of Agra-Barkhera was perhaps the most influential man between the Parbati and Betwa rivers.³³

The Raja of Raghogarh, another Jagirdar of Gwalior during the revolt, did not supply rations and information about the rebels when called upon to do so by the British.³⁴ It is alleged by the British officers that he had committed plunder. The Raja's people impeded the march of the British forces while in pursuit of the rebels, and stole their gun-bullocks and goods.

33. Old Records File No. 46, Bhopal Letter Book D. No. 32 from P. A. Bhopal to A.G.G. for C.I., No. 132, dated Sehore 1859.

Letter No. 923, dated the 9th Apr. 1860 from Sir R. Shakespeare, A.G.G. for C.I. to Major W. F. Eden, Offg. A.G.G. for States of Rajputana.

Old Records File No. 46, Letter Book No. 107, Letter No. 923, dated 9th Apr. 1860 from Sir R. Shakespeare, A.G.G. for C.I. to Major W. F. Eden, Offg. A.G.G. for States of Rajputana.

34. Old Records No. 43, Letter No. 35 and Letter No. 221 of Letter Book No. 118.

His Highness the Maharaja Holkar and Five of His Principal Counsellors during the Crisis of 1857 A.D.

PRECEPTOR & PRIVATE SECRETARY



RAI UPDISING MOONSTHEE

HOUSE HOLD OFFICER



SIR KASHIRAO DADA SAHEB HOLKAR K.C.S.I.

OFFICIATING MINISTER



RAO RAMCHANDRA MARTAND alias BHAOSAHEB RESHIMWALE

HIS HIGHNESS THE MAHARAJA TOOKOEROO HOLKAR G.C.S.I.



COMMANDER OF THE CAVALRY



BAKSHEE KHOOMANSING C.S.I.

CONFIDENTIAL DARBAR VAKIL



RAO BAHADUR GANESH SITARAM SHASTREE GOLWALKAR

THE REVOLT AT INDORE

WE find unequivocal forebodings of the outbreak in the underground activities of the rebels at Indore. On the 13th of May 1857 a telegram was received at Indore Residency from Agra conveying the news of the outbreak of the Revolt at Meerut and the massacre at Delhi.¹ This news soon spread in the city and served as a signal to the rebels at Indore to strike. On the 14th May, 1857, Colonel Durand, fearing the effects of the outbreak at Meerut and Delhi, despatched an express to Sehore for 2 guns, 2 companies of infantry and 2 troops of cavalry of the Bhopal Contingent.

Colonel Durand even anticipated the outbreak of the Revolt before the Sehore troops could arrive at Indore. So he met the Maharaja Tukoji Rao Holkar II of Indore and requested him to send his troops. The Maharaja promised every assistance, but at the same time frankly stated that his troops were not equal to the British regular troops, that he had but little ammunition, and that he would require at least three hours' notice to enable him to move his troops up to the Residency. On the 16th of May 1857, Durand feared that the sepoys of the 23rd Bengal Army stationed at Mhow would start the Revolt. Therefore Mir Munshi Swarup Narayan was sent post-haste to the Maharaja for his promised aid. The movement of this force caused no slight commotion in the city.

On the 17th of May the despatch of the "Dak" from Mhow to Indore was stopped. It was suspected that the letters sent by the people of Mhow to the Indore inhabitants contained seditious matters and such other information as likely to incite the people. The authorities at the Indore Residency suspected mischief, and directions were issued to the Officer Commanding,

1. File No. 1774 of 1857 Mutiny, Correspondence with the Holkar about the occurrences of 1st of July 1857 at Indore Resy.

Letter No. 192 A of 1858 from Capt. W. R. Shakespeare, Offg. 1st Asstt. A.G.G. for C.I. to Sir Robert Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. dated 16-1-1858.

Bhopal Contingent, to push on with the cavalry to Indore, but the letter was miscarried. An express was sent to Sardarpur to call the Malwa Bhil Corps and its two mounted train-guns.²

On the 20th May, the Detachments of the Bhopal Contingent and the Malwa Bhil Corps arrived at Indore.³ On their arrival, correspondence with Mhow was allowed. But the officers at Mhow were very doubtful as to the effect it would have on their sepoys. Thus the month of May passed in anxiety and suspense. In spite of all the precautions of the authorities, the current of disaffection against the foreigners was fast spreading in and around Indore.

The month of June saw the further intensification of the activities of the rebels. The news of the outbreak of the Revolt at Neemuch was received at Indore on the 6th of June. Neemuch was an important British military station, and the sepoys at Indore and Mhow being in closer touch with their brethren at Neemuch caught the contagion. The mustering of troops at Indore Residency from all quarters lent additional suspicion to the situation. As soon as the news of the Neemuch Revolt reached Indore, 2 guns of the Bhopal Contingent were moved to the west face of the Residency (i.e. towards the direction of Neemuch). The cavalry was posted in the square of the Residency stables, and the infantry in the tents between the Indore Residency Post Office and the stables. The Maharaja was also applied to for troops and he furnished 3 guns (6 Pounders), a company of infantry and 2 troops of cavalry. The infantry and guns were placed near the Opium Godown and the Cavalry in the compound of the Nawab of Jaora.⁴ These military movements gave an opportunity to the interested people to spread all sorts of rumours which caused panic among the civil population.

On the 10th of June, intelligence was received at Indore of the revolt of the United Malwa Contingent at Mehidpur and

2. *Ibid.*

3. G. W. Forrest, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. III, p. 89.

4. File No. 1774 of 1857, Indore Mutiny, Letter No. 192A of 1858 from W. R. Shakespeare, Offg. 1st Asstt. A.G.G. for C.I. to Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. dated 16-1-1858.

the murder of their Commanding Officer and Adjutant.⁵ The success of the rebels at Mehidpur, which was an important military station in the State, encouraged the Indore troops to rise. The Maharaja was certainly much disturbed at the news of the revolt at Mehidpur, and he told Colonel Durand who came to see him in this connection that his own cavalry and the United Malwa Contingent of Mehidpur were as one. He feared that his own troops would now revolt and that he had no confidence in them.⁶

On the 14th June, Colonel Travers of the Bhopal Contingent arrived at Indore and took charge of all the troops. About this time a reinforcement of one company and some cavalry arrived from Sehore. The news of the outbreak of the revolt at Jhansi and Gwalior on the 6th and 14th of June, respectively, was acclaimed by the rebels at Indore as the "fall of the Bastille" was done by the French Revolutionists.

On the 17th of June it was noticed that at night the Maharaja's 3 guns, originally posted at the Opium Godown for the defence of the Residency had been shifted by the rebel sepoys and brought near the Residency square, probably with the intention of opening fire on the Residency. When the British officers proposed to remove these guns to the Residency, the officer in charge of these guns refused to move them from their position, unless his own company of infantry was allowed to accompany them.⁷ This shows that the sepoys from the beginning were bent upon revolt which made them bold enough to disobey the orders of the British officers.

On the 24th of June, a *Faquir* (muslim beggar), who was being suspected of carrying some revolutionary message to the sepoys, was apprehended by Colonel Platt at Mhow and sent to the Indore Jail. On the 27th of June, many more *Faquirs* were noticed among the British troops at Indore.⁸ By the end of June 1857, 300 of the Indore State Cavalry men posted near the Khan river for the protection of the Residency were tactful-

5. Receipts Vol. No. 78, Letter dated 8th July 1857 (Mehidpur letters), from Ramchandra Rao Bhau Sahib, Offg. Minister, Indore Darbar, to Capt. Hungerford, Commanding at Mhow.

6. File No. 1774 of 1857, Indore Mutiny (Vide No. 4 above).

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*

ly removed by Bakshi Khuman Singh, Commandant of Holkar's forces.

By the end of June the preparations for the revolt at Indore were complete. The rebels were only waiting for a suitable opportunity which arrived soon. They got wind of the news that Major Woodburn's column could not come to Mhow, and that the valuable contents of the Indore Residency treasury were soon to be shifted to the Mhow Fort. Important rebel leaders like Saadat Khan, Bans Gopal, Arrarao Singh, Bhagirath, Nawab Warris Muhammad Khan, Maulvi Abdul Samad and others, decided upon the morning of the 1st of July 1857 as the time of the general rising at Indore.⁹ To test the sincerity of the Holkar's troops, it was insisted upon by the sepoys of the British Contingents that the Indore troops should first begin the revolt.


According to the plan, the attack upon the Residency by the rebels commenced at 8.40 a.m.¹⁰ The revolt was first started by the Indore troops. The Indore troops which were sent to protect the Residency, picked up a quarrel with someone and in a body opened fire upon the Residency. The troops who first began the attack consisted of 2 companies of Regular Infantry and had 3 nine pounder guns.¹¹ The rebels moved their guns into position facing the Residency. Colonel Travers appeared on the scene of action and ordered a party of about seventy-five of the Bhopal Contingent Cavalrymen to charge on the rebels. But to his surprise he noticed that out of the whole party only some six men obeyed him.

After some time the rebels took up position in front of the Residency Flag Staff and opened fire upon the Residency with round and grape. Colonel Travers directed his 2 guns and for a time he was successful in checking the attack. He then ordered his artillery to take up position to the left of the rebels and requested Lieut. Colonel Stockley to support his guns

9. Issue Vol. Register No. 95, Letter No. 8, dated 5th Jan. 1858, from Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to the Secy., Govt. of India.

10. File No. 1774 of 1857, Indore Mutiny, Letter No. 65, dated Mhow, 3rd Aug. 1857 from H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to H.H. the Maharaja Tukoji Rao Holkar II.

11. Issue Vol. 95, Letter No. 8, dated 5th Jan. 1858, from A.G.G. for C.I. to the Secy. to the Govt. of India.



Indore Residency 1857

Positions from which the rebels fired at the Residency House on July 1st 1857.

Path of retreat of Col. Durand and his party from Residency House for Sehore on the 1st of July 1857.

Col. Traver's attack on the rebels on the 1st of July 1857.

strongly with the Bhil troops. But Lieut. Colonel Stockley suggested that this movement would expose the Bhil sepoys to the fire of the enemy and so the movement was abandoned.¹²

Early in the action Colonel Travers received information that the Mehidpur Infantry had turned against the British and had threatened to fire upon the Infantry of the Bhopal Contingent if they took an active part in the protection of the Residency. Not a man of the Mehidpur Infantry turned up to help the British, and only a dozen out of the Bhopal Infantry Contingent opened fire for the British. Only Colonel Travers' cavalry was loyal to the British, but there too the Mohammadan Cavalry appeared to be afraid of the Sikhs and the Sikhs of the Mohammadans and both were afraid of a volley from any of the mutinous infantry. The disorder was so complete that Colonel Travers could not hold them under his command in any formation.¹³ All control was gone and chaotic panic ensued.

The organisation of the rebels was so complete and successful that it was impossible for Colonel Travers to withstand the onslaught of the rebels. The guiding spirits of this organisation were Saadat Khan and Bans Gopal. Saadat Khan was seen on the morning of the 1st day of July riding a red charger moving from position to position, now ordering the gunners to open fire, and the next moment leading the charge at the head of a strong body of men. Bans Gopal was also seen taking an active part in the revolt. In Bakshi Khuman Singh's diary we find a detailed account of the activities of both these leaders. An entry in the diary of the Indore Darbar's newswriter relates that Saadat Khan arriving at the Palace on the 1st of July reported that he had been to the Residency and that a shot fired by him had hit a Sahib.¹⁴ This fact is also corroborated by an entry in the diary of Bakshi Khuman Singh.

It is averred in the "Biographical Sketch of Ramchandra Rao

12. File No. 1774 of 1857, Letter dated Sehore 5th July 1857, from Lieut.-Colonel Travers, Commandant, Bhopal Contingent to Col. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I.

13. File No. 1774 of 1857 (Correspondence with Holkars on the occurrences of the 1st of July), Letter dated Camp Sehore, 5th July 1857, from Col. Travers to Col. Durand.

14. Issue Vol. No. 243, Letter No. 72G. of 204 of 1874, dated 6th Aug. 1874, from A.G.G. for C.I. to the Secy., Govt. of India (Para 4).

Reshimwale" that, "within an hour of the attack on the Residency, Saadat Khan rode in great haste to the palace and cried for reinforcements."¹⁵ The Maharaja got him arrested and detained him in the Palace, but subsequently released him on the same day on his promising to exert his influence to bring the rebels under control and stop the revolt. It is surprising to note that Colonel Durand charged the Maharaja with being in league with the rebel leader.

The other rebel leader was Mohammad Ali.¹⁶ He has been officially described as one of the principal leaders. He took an active part in opening gunfire on the Residency. Warris Mohammad Khan was also the "chief instigator" of the revolt and acted as a rebel leader throughout.¹⁷ The official records hold Adil Mohammad Khan responsible for leading the rebels on the 1st of July at Indore. This mistake was subsequently noticed and corrected. It was found that Warris Mohammad Khan, and not Adil Mohammad Khan, was the chief leader. In this attack of the 1st of July on the Residency 28 persons are reported to have been killed by the rebels, of whom only 2 were Europeans and the rest Anglo-Indians.¹⁸

One may pursue with some interest the course of events on the 1st of July as narrated by the sufferers themselves. W. Noorish, an engineer, who was supervising the construction of the new barracks near the Residency, heard the gun fire and saw all the labourers running in panic to the bazar side.¹⁹ He took his horse and with Martin and Ross MacMahon fled from the spot. The rebels pursued them to the Deoguradia side. MacMahon was killed and Noorish was captured and brought before His Highness by the rebels, who ordered him to be escorted into his palace and gave him protection.

15. V. K. Kunte, *Biographical Sketch of Rao Ramchandra Rao Bhau Sahib Reshimwale*, pp. 49 & 50.

16. Issue Vol. 147, Letter No. 26 of 1862, from R. J. Meade, A.G.G. for C.I. to Col. H. M. Durand C. B. Secy. to the Govt. of India, dated 10th July 1862, Indore Resy.

17. Issue Vol. No. 142, Encl. to No. 860, dated 26th Sept. 1861, from R. C. Shakespeare, A.G.G. for C.I. to Offg. Secy., Govt. of India.

18. John Dickinson, *Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor*, p. 117.

19. Receipts Vol. No. 78, Letter dated Mhow the 13th Aug. 1857, from W. Noorish to Lt. Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I.

James M. Knapp, Central India Agency Surgeon, was at the Residency Hospital when he heard the firing on the eventful morning of the 1st of July.²⁰ He left the hospital on foot and near the hospital gate, where the Indore and Bombay-Agra Road meet, he met 3 Sikh sowars of the Bhopal Contingent sitting idly in front of their barracks. When he asked them about the disturbance, they only replied, "O nothing, only a row between the towns people and the sepoys." Dr. Knapp went on towards his bungalow and noticed many of the Bhopal *sowars* who were conspicuous by their red coats, and who were dotted in two's and three's over the parade ground, to the number of about forty or fifty. He reached his bungalow when the 3 guns of the rebels had just been aimed at the Residency. On reaching his house he found that his faithful servant had conveyed his wife and his two guests to the Residency. He snatched his medicine chest and rushed to the Residency to join the party.

There he found that the Bhopal Contingent guns were posted between the Residency and the small bungalows in the compound. The guns were placed by some of the Bhopal gunners. Colonel Travers and Captain Maginac tried to lead an attack on the rebels, but most of their own sepoys deserted them. On the return of these officers and the report of the treachery of their own troops, the Bhil Corps was ordered to the upper storey of the Residency and to defend the gates, but most of them were panic-stricken and paralysed.²¹ Colonel Durand had sent a *sowar* to Mhow asking Colonel Platt to send the European Battery immediately. He also sent Jamadar Jiva Singh to the Holkar to ascertain whether the rebels had acted under his orders. But the Jamadar stayed at his home and did not stir out till the rebels had left for Delhi.²²

Finding that the European Battery from Mhow would take time to come, and that the strength of the rebels was assuming an alarming proportion, and that his own troops had joined the rebels, Colonel Durand decided to retreat to a safer zone, via

20. Receipts Vol. No. 78, Letter dated 28th Dec. 1857, to Sir R. Hamilton, from James M. Knapp, C.I. Agency Surgeon.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Memo. of the Aids and Services, rendered by the Govt. of Indore, to the Br. authorities during the Mutiny of 1857-58, p. 126.

Simrol Ghat. All the Europeans in the Residency were accordingly assembled at the rear of the upper storey of the Residency, the Bhopal guns were recalled from their position, and the retreat began at 10.30 a.m.²³ Of these retreating persons some ladies seated on the ammunition wagons and some in two or three bullock-carts, the Sikhs forming the advance guard and the Bhils bringing up the rear. J.M. Knapp adds, "Firing was going on in the front of the Residency while we were escaping at the back."²⁴

The party proceeded towards the Simrol Ghat. Heavy firing was heard from time to time which was believed by the retreating party to come from the direction of Mhow. It was feared that there was a simultaneous rising at that place also. It was also then believed that the first portion of the road to Mhow was in the hands of the rebels. But the chief reason why Colonel Durand's orders to retreat to Mhow were not followed was that the cavalry could not be induced to move in that direction. When the party proceeded within three or four miles of the Simrol Ghat, some villagers came up with the information that four Indore guns were taken in advance the day before and had occupied the Simrol Pass.²⁵

Under such circumstances the sowars of the Bhopal Contingent insisted upon returning to Sehore. Knapp, who was now a member of the retreating party, writes, "as we were actually prisoners in their hands we were compelled to alter our route and direct our steps towards that place."²⁶ Colonel Durand and his party, consisting of seventeen officers, eight ladies and two children, escorted by some troops of the Bhopal Contingent,

23. File No. 1775, Letter No. 65, dated Mhow 3rd Aug. 1857, from Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to H.H. Maharaja Tukoji Rao Holkar II.

24. Receipts Vol. 78, letter dated Indore 28-12-1857, from J. M. Knapp, C. I. Agency Surgeon to Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I.

Life of Sir H. M. Durand, Vol. I, pp. 216 & 17. Letter No. 81, dated Indore Resy., Camp Mhow the 5th Aug. 1857, from H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to H.H. the Maharaja Holkar, (File No. 1774 of 1857).

25. For. Deptt. Secret Proceedings Serial No. 679, Letter No. 9 B/D, Hoshangabad, 9th July 1857 from Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy., Government of India.

26. Receipts Vol. No. 78, Letter dated 28th Dec. 1857 from W. Noorish to Lt. Col. H. M. Durand.

retreated towards Sehore on the 1st of July 1857.²⁷ Charles Thomas, Assistant Surgeon, who was one of the members of the retreating party writes,

After having retired a very short distance from the Residency, the mutineers did not molest us²⁸

The description of this retreat as a "good soldierly retreat in the face of overwhelming masses" by Kaye and Malleon is hardly correct, for there were no "overwhelming masses" to oppose Durand's retreat.²⁹

Colonel Durand and his party, without any casualty, reached Ashta on the 3rd and Sehore on the 4th of July 1857.³⁰ Before he reached Sehore, the Indore State Vakil was dismissed by the Political Agent in Bhopal on the 3rd of July, 1857, from Sehore and was commanded to leave the place before 12 o'clock.³¹ Colonel Durand and his party left Sehore for Hoshangabad. Major Richards, Political Agent in Bhopal, residing at Sehore, also left Sehore for Hoshangabad on the 9th of July 1857. He was prevailed upon by the Begum of Bhopal to do so for she firmly believed that their stay at Sehore would certainly lead to the invasion of her State by the rebels from outside or make her own subjects rise in revolt. Colonel Durand and Major Richards with their parties managed to escape to Hoshangabad and arrived there on the 9th and 14th of July, 1857, respectively.

The news of Colonel Durand's retreat spread like wild fire and served as a signal for several other British officials in Malwa to flee from their posts. This created an impression on the public mind that the authority of the Company's Government had ended. Owing to the absence of the Company's Agent from

27. Dickinson, *Last Counsels*, p. 94.

Kunte, *Biographical Sketch of Bhau Sahib* p. 49

28. File No. 1774 of 1857, Letter dated 22nd Jan. 1858, from Charles Thomson, M.D., A.S. Bhopal Agency, to Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I.

29. Dickinson, *Last Counsels*, pp. 94-95.

30. File No. 1774 of 1857, Indore Mutiny, dated Sehore, 5th July 1857, from Lt.-Col. Travers, Commanding Bhopal Contingent to Col. Durand, A.G.G. for C.I. (Offg.)

31. Receipts Vol. No. 78, Translation of a petition from Ramlal Naib Vakil at Sehore, addressed to the Holkar Govt., dated 6th July 1857.

Indore, the activities of the Holkar were liable to be misunderstood. Colonel Durand cast a lurid light on them. He cunningly threw the whole blame of his retreat on the Maharaja, while we find Sir Robert Hamilton justly taking a sympathetic view about him. No controversy could have arisen if some responsible officer of the Company had stayed at Indore and personally watched the affairs of the Holkar's Court. It has already been said that the retreat created a sort of gap between the Maharaja and the Company's Government. It is not up to us to suggest that the wiser course for Colonel Durand would have been to retreat to Mhow and await reinforcements rather than blame the Maharaja.³²

On the evacuation of the Residency the rebels plundered the Residency treasury. Even the Bhopal Contingent Guards, who were especially posted there to protect the treasury, joined in the loot. Window panes were broken. The other European houses and public buildings met with the same fate. Thus on the 1st of July, 1857, the rebels successfully established their authority at Indore Residency and not a vestige of the British supremacy was left. The European sufferers themselves lamented, and some of the later pro-British observers testified, that the measures taken to protect the Residency were inadequate.

After the news of the retreat of Colonel Durand and his party, His Highness, realising the gravity of the situation, hastily summoned a Council at the Indore Palace, and it was agreed there that Bhau Sahib Reshimwale should be directed to cope with the situation created by the rebels. The Maharaja then gave him the designation and powers of officiating Minister, Indore Darbar, and formally entrusted him with the task of handling the rebels.³³ But Reshimwale, like Dinkar Rao, proved abso-

32. Receipts Vol. 85, Letter dated 14th July 1857 (para 4), from Major W. H. Rickards, P. A., Bhopal to Col. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I., Indore.

Parwanah, dated 11th Ziqad 1273 Hijri, and Parwanah, dated 13th Ziqad 1273 Hijri, from H. H. Sikandar Begum to Bhopal Vakil at Sehore (Encl. to letter No. 110 of 1857) from Major W. H. Rickards, P.A. in Bhopal to Col. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I., dated 27th July 1857.

33. V. K. Kunte, *A Biographical Sketch of Bhau Sahib Reshimwale*, pp. 50-52.



Rao Ramchandra Bhau Reshimwale, Minister.



Bakshi Khuman Singh
Commander of Holkar's Forces

lutely, pro-British. He decided that a deputation consisting of himself, Bakshi Khuman Singh and Gunesh Shastri Vakil, should wait on Colonel Platt, commanding at Mhow, to assure him of the Maharaja's loyalty, to explain the unfortunate events, and to seek his advice. The deputation could not reach Mhow as it was stopped by a picket of cavalry under a British officer from Mhow.³⁴ A pencil note from Gunesh Shastri was, however, forwarded by the officer to Colonel Platt. The deputation, after waiting for a reply for over two hours, returned to Indore the same evening and reported the events to the Maharaja.

At about 11 p.m. on the same evening the boom of guns was heard in the direction of Mhow where the 23rd Regiment, Bengal Indian Infantry and a wing of First Regiment of Bengal Light Cavalry had revolted and killed Colonel Platt, Adjutant Fagan, Major Harris and others.³⁵ For the first three days of July 1857, there was rebel raj at Indore. The rebels paraded on the streets and military salutes were offered by them to their leader Saadat Khan who was now addressed as "Nawab Saadat Khan."³⁶ Once again the Indore rebels, conjointly with the Mhow rebels, plundered the Residency treasury to the extent of nine lacs of rupees in cash.³⁷ They killed those who opposed them. They were also joined by hundreds of opportunists to plunder the rich people.

The rebels forcibly carried away carriages from the town and some were supplied to them by the Indore Darbar "in order to have them marched" out of Indore. The rebels left Indore for Gwalior and Agra at 3 a.m. on the 4th of July 1857. They overthrew the Company's authority at Indore and took away with them cash and kind amounting to about 9 lacs of rupees and all the guns, elephants and carriages that they could carry from the Residency. The rebel forces consisted of 23rd Mhow Regiment

34. Memo. of the Aids and Services rendered by the Govt. of Indore to the Br. Authorities during the Mutiny of 1857-58.

35. *Ibid.*

36. Issue Vol. No. 248, Letter No. 72 G. of 1874, dated Indore, 6th Aug. 1874 from H. D. Daly, A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy., Govt of India.

37. Letter No. 248, dated Mhow 8th July 1857 from T. Hungerford (Commandant at Mhow) to Secy. Govt. of Bombay. G. W. Forrest, *Selections from Letters, Dispatches and other State Papers preserved in the Mily. Deptt. of the Govt. of India. 1857-58. Vol. IV, Appendix D. LXIV.*

Native Infantry, 3 troops of Cavalry and 7 guns and 2 Companies of Foot, and 1 Rissalah of Holkar's Troops, with Nawab Warris Mohammad of Bhopal, Saadat Khan, and Bhagirath at their head and several other followers from the civil population, making a total of some thousands.³⁸

Shortly after their start from Indore, there arose a dispute between some of the Indore Troops and the Mhow Forces, on the question of share in the plundered treasury. On July 7th, 1857, Colonel Hungerford, Commanding Officer at Mhow, wrote to the Maharaja of Indore, "A sahookar has just brought me intelligence that your troops which misbehaved have returned to Indore, that they are much enraged with the mutineers from Mhow, and have either gone or are going on the road to Dewas, for the purpose of attacking them and recovering the treasure which has been carried off from Indore."³⁹

Various columns (attacking, pursuing and re-inforcing ones) were sent by the Indore Darbar to overtake the rebels, but all failed to overtake them,⁴⁰ because they were not sufficiently strong and also because of their inward sympathy with the rebels.⁴¹ The Mhow and Indore rebels marching through Dewas, Maksi, Shajapur, crossed the Lakhandra and Kalisind rivers after covering a distance of 112 miles in 9 days (in the month of July) and reached Biaora on the morning of the 12th of July, 1857. The same day at about 4 p.m. Subahdar Major Lal Mohammad of 23rd Indian Infantry with 200 foot and 40 horses first went to the Fort of Biaora and realised a sum of Rs. 20,000 from the Rajgarh authorities within half an hour.⁴² Then he came to the house of Jan Ali Khan, the Superintendent of Raj-

38. Translation of a Persian communication from Munshi Jan Ali Khan, Asstt. at Berchha, dated 24th Jan. 1858, File No. 1774.

39. Letter dated Mhow, 7th July 1857, from T. Hungerford, Commanding at Mhow to Maharaja Holkar of Indore. "Selections from Letters, Dispatches, 1857-58," Vol. IV by G. W. Forrest.

40. Letter No. 7 of 1857, dated 8th July 1857, from Ramchandra Rao, Offg. Minister, Indore Darbar, to Capt. Hungerford, Commanding at Mhow (Memo. of Aids and Services rendered by the Govt. of Indore.)

41. Letter No. 31 of 1857, dated Indore Palace 22nd July 1857, from Ramchandra Rao, Offg. Minister, Indore Darbar, to Capt. A. R. E. Hutchinson, I/C Agency, Mhow (Memo. of Aids and Services rendered by the Govt. of Indore.)

42. Translation of a Persian communication from Munshi Jan Ali Khan, dated 24-1-1858, File No. 1774.

garh residing at Biaora and charged him with sheltering the Europeans and taking measures to arrest the rebels. He took Jan Ali Khan to the encamping ground, put him under arrest, and demanded a ransom of 5 lacs of rupees. On the 13th of July 1857 the rebels plundered the house of Jan Ali Khan got property worth Rs. 5,000 and arrested his son. They burnt all the bungalows on the roads, cut and took away the telegraph wires, carried away the Government "dak" horses, plundered the officers and servants on road duty, and set free the prisoners from jails.⁴³

On the 14th of July 1857 the rebels put Jan Ali Khan and his son on a gun carriage and moved onwards to Gwalior. Jan Ali Khan narrates that there was a panchayat system of administration among the rebels.⁴⁴ All persons were treated on terms of equality. If anything was to be done, each Company sent one or two members to represent it in a panchayat and whatever was decided was done forthwith. By the 16th of July 1857 the rebels came to Guma. The Cantonment was plundered.⁴⁵ The rebels halted for 2 days. The bungalows at Guma were reduced to ashes and the telegraph wires destroyed. The Contingent Cavalry at Guma, excepting only two, fled to Bajrangarh. The rebels pursued them up to Bajrangarh to rob them of their horses and property, but the Kamdar of that place had kept 300 cavalry, 500 foot and some guns to face the rebels. The rebels waited there till evening and then returned. They also quarrelled with the Raja of Raghugarh, but he had kept in his fort 4 guns and a body of 400 men ready to oppose them. He even made the rebels pay for the provisions supplied to them.⁴⁶

43. Translation of news from a spy of the Indore State following the track of the mutineers, dated 12th to 14th July 1857 (Encl. to Letter No. 25 of 1857). From Ramchandra Rao, Offg. Minister, Indore Darbar, to Capt. Hutchinson, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I., Mhow, dated Indore Palace 18th July 1857.

44. File No. 1774, Translation of Munshi Jan Ali Khan's persian communication.

45. Abs. Translation of a statement by Laxman Maratha, son of Sivaji, residing at Dhulia, dated 10th Nov. 1857, Issue Vol. 93, Encl. to No. 935, dated 28th Nov. 1857, from Col. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. C.I. to Offg. Minister, Indore Darbar.

46. Inward Vol. 80, translation of a letter from a spy of the Indore State, following the rebels, dated Bajrangarh, 18th July 1857.

Passing through Piplia, Badrawas and Kolaras, they reached Sipri. Here four bungalows were burnt. Sher Khan Jamadar looted the magazine which was under the custody of the Kamasdar of Sipri. Here Saadat Khan met a spy of Indore and inquired of him about Indore affairs. On the 30th of July, the Mhow and Indore rebels reached Morar,⁴⁷ and on the 1st of August, 1857, they encamped at Gwalior.⁴⁸ The rebels hoped to join hands with the Gwalior rebels, then march jointly to Agra and next to Delhi to serve under Bahadur Shah, the Emperor at Delhi. Thus ended the march begun on the 4th of July, 1857.

The rebels throughout aimed at exterminating the English and destroying their property and places of importance. They adopted the methods of destroying the postal and telegraphic communications, burning Government bungalows, capturing the officers and servants who helped the English and amassing as much treasure as possible. The rebels left no stone unturned to oust the foreigners root and branch. Very often they resorted to acts of violence as a sure means of gaining their object—which was not to allow the British to gain a footing once again, to maintain communication, and take advantage of resources available to them. It was, therefore, very necessary for them to destroy or take possession of their property.

A NOTE ON THE ALLEGATIONS MADE AGAINST THE MAHARAJA HOLKAR

Many British authorities have held the view that the Maharaja had, directly or indirectly, a hand in the Revolt. Colonel Durand held him responsible for the hostile acts of his troops who participated in the Revolt and also for not coming to his succour in the hour of trial.⁴⁹ He could not believe that the Holkar troops were acting without the Holkar's orders. The suspicion was

47. Letter from H. H. Sindhia's Vakil to Maj. S. Charters Macpherson, P.A., Gwalior (Camp Agra), Letter dated Gwalior 31st July 1857 (Appendix to Maj. Macpherson's Report dated 10th July 1858).

48. Translation of a letter from a spy with the mutineers, dated Gwalior 1st Aug. 1857, Inward Vol. 80.

49. C.I.A. File No. 1774 of 1857, correspondence with Holkars about the occurrences of 1st July 1857 at Indore Resy. Letter No. 65, from Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to H. H. the Maharaja Tukoji Rao Holkar, dated 3rd Aug. 1857.



Tukoji Rao Holkar II of Indore
Ruler of Indore in 1857

later strengthened by the fact that the troops taking part in the revolt returned to their services with impunity, and unfortunately the day selected for the removal of 2 guns to Maheshwar from Indore via Simrol Ghat happened to be the day of the outbreak of the revolt. It was also alleged that he had helped the rebels by supplying them with rations and carts.

Lord Elphinstone thought that the appointment of Saadat Khan as the Commander of the Holkar's Forces, was an unfortunate, if not a suspicious, circumstance.⁵⁰ Two letters were intercepted which talked about the destruction of the red ants by the black ants. These were written by the Holkar's family priest. The rebels of the 27th Regiment at Kolhapur confessed that the Holkar had instigated them to revolt. It was also alleged that he was secretly casting guns and making other preparations for war. It was further reported that the Holkar was collecting information about the position and strength of the Company's troops through his spies. It was also asserted that the Holkar had promised his help to the adopted son of the ex-Rajah of Satara in his attempt to seize power.

The Holkar's replies to these charges were that he was absolutely loyal to the Company.⁵¹ He could not be held responsible for the hostile acts of his troops, or for not punishing them for their atrocities, as they were completely beyond his control. He asserted that he did come out with help on the noon of the 1st of July, 1857, but long before that the Britishers had left Indore. Replying to the charge concerning the removal of the guns, he pointed out that they were removed with the previous consent of the Company's Government. He also declared that he was forced to supply the rebels with provisions and carts. As the rebels were masters of the situation, he was obliged to temporise with them. Thus alone Indore escaped the rule of the rebels and the Holkar was in a position to recall the British to Malwa.⁵²

50. Demi-official unpublished letter, written at Bombay in 1885. T. R. Holmes, *History of the Indian Mutiny* (5th Ed.), pp. 620-21.

51. Letter, dated Palace Indore the 11th Aug. 1857, from H. H. Tukoji Rao Holkar to Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I.

"Memo. of the Aids and Services rendered by the Govt. of Indore to the Br. authorities during the Mutiny of 1857-58," pp. 126-129.

52. Issue Vol. 103, Letter No. 178, dated 26th April, 1858. *Report on the Several Members of Holkar's Darbar.*

In defending the Holkar against the charges levelled by Lord Elphinstone and others, it may be said that actually the Commander of the Holkar State Forces was Khuman Singh and that Saadat Khan was chosen by the rebels as their Commander.⁵³ The two letters were not sent by the Holkar and, though enigmatic, they did not contain any seditious matter. It appears that the statement of some of the sepoys of the 27th Regiment at Kolhapur and the ex-Raja of Satara were mere fabrications actuated by jealousy, as there seems to be no direct evidence about the Holkar instigating them. The charge of casting guns appears to be based upon false and malicious rumour. It is surprising that no British official, who lived in close touch with the Holkar, ever wrote about this. While it may be admitted that the Holkar was collecting secret information, this was possibly done in the interest of the British. Many important movements of the troops were duly reported by the Holkar to the proper British authorities.⁵⁴

Some historians have charged the Holkar with inaction and sitting upon the fence.⁵⁵ This on the whole appears to be true. The Holkar acted as the watcher of events. If he had actively sided with the rebels, who wanted him to be their leader, the issue of the revolt should have been very different. Possibly India should have been free of foreign domination long ago if the Sindhia and Holkar had assumed the leadership of the rebels.

53. C.I.A. Issue Vol. No. 248, Letter No. 22 G. 204 of 1874, from H. D. Daly, A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy., Govt. of India.

54. *Memo. of the Aids and Services.*

M. W. Burway, *Life of Tukoji Rao II*, pp. 171 and 172.

55. Kaye and Malleson, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. V. p. 42.

CHAPTER VII

THE REVOLT AT DHAR, AMJHERA, MANDSAUR AND BHOPAL

THE events which occurred in the bigger States of Malwa like Gwalior and Indore had their repercussions in the smaller States. We may mention here the events that took place during the Revolt in States like Dhar, Amjhera, Mandsaur, and Bhopal.

DHAR

On the evening of the 22nd May 1857, Jaswant Rao Pawar, the Raja of Dhar, had a sudden attack of cholera. Apprehending that his end was near, he immediately adopted his half-brother Anand Rao Bala Sahib aged 13 years. He died at dawn the next day, leaving his State in the hands of this minor boy and two helpless widows. The elder widow Draupadibai styled herself as the Regent and wanted to appoint her brother Sardar Bhim Rao as the Dewan, but in deference to the wishes of Bapu Sahib Pawar (Haibat Rao Bapu Sahib Pawar, Raja of Dewas State Junior) reluctantly gave her assent to the appointment of Ramchandra Bapuji alias Baba Sahib as the Dewan.¹ The people of Dhar were in a state of suspense both in regard to the adoption of Anand Rao and the appointment of Bapuji, as final confirmatory letters from the Company's Government were not received until October 1857. The suspense gave rise to many wild and baseless rumours which resulted in some sort of distrust in the mind of the Company's authorities who began to suspect that the Dhar Darbar, particularly the younger Rani Jayee Bai and Bhim Rao Bhonsle, were hatching some plot.

The Dhar Darbar was divided into two parties, one being led by the Dewas and the other by the Regent Rani's brother Sardar Bhim Rao. To strengthen themselves both parties began to enlist more and more foreign mercenaries, regardless of any pos-

1. Rao Bahadur V. Kunte, *Biographical Sketch of Rao Ramchandra Rao Bhau Sahib Reshimwale*, pp. 69-71.

sible consequences to the State.² The mercenaries soon realised their strength and, uniting together, took possession of the fort of Dhar on the 31st August, 1857. The Minister grew alarmed and reported the matter to Colonel Durand who asked him to exert all force in ousting the insurgents from the place. But the Minister was alive to the seriousness of the situation and also conscious of his own inability to oppose the mercenaries. He, therefore, connived at the occupation and reported to Colonel Durand that he had carried out his orders. Diplomatic as he was, he justified his report by asking his party to leave the fort, but the other rebels were still in possession of it. They were too strong to acknowledge any control.

The immediate cause of the insurrection at Dhar seems to be the order of the Bhil Agent, Captain Hutchinson, to arrest a *faqir* of Amjhera at the Dhar Fort. The Makranis made capital out of it and raised the cry of religion in danger. Their leader was Gul Khan who had a great influence over a host of foreign mercenaries numbering over 600. The whole of the State treasure was in the fort and, therefore, the Wylaitis determined not to leave it.³

The strength of foreign mercenaries increased as many of the local adventurers joined their group. From July to October these rebels had almost a free hand at Dhar. When they established themselves in the fort on August 31, 1857, they made every endeavour and even used coercion to induce Anandrao Pawar and the Regent to come to the fort, but they could not succeed. The Regent, on the other hand, made frantic appeals to the British Resident to help her, but as no help was received she was compelled to enter into an agreement with the mercenaries on the 2nd September 1857.⁴ It became essential for her to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the rebels. When foreign mercenary leaders like Gul Khan, Badshah Khan, Saadat Khan and Rasul Khan came before the "Gadi" (throne) and on oath declared that they would not interfere in the work of the East India

2 Letter No. 293, dated 5th July 1858, from Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.C. for C.I. to Secy., Govt. of India, Parliamentary papers relating to Dhar, p. 15.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Letter dated 1st May 1858, from Draupadibai Sahib Pawar to Lord Canning, G.C. of India (Dhar State Records).

Company's Government, that they would neither enlist Pathans nor join them⁵ and that those who would disobey these instructions would be dismissed, the Dhar Darbar pardoned them and made peace with them.⁶ They, however, continued to remain in possession of the Fort.

A settlement was also arrived at with the Pathans. Those of them who were employed on guard duty since long were retained. At all other places the Maratha and Purbiah sepoys were posted. Other Pathan sepoys and their three Jamadars were removed from the fort and brought to the town.⁷ But in spite of all these precautions the mercenaries managed to fish in the troubled waters. They plundered Sardarpur on the 19th September 1857. Thereupon the Dhar Vakil requested the British to punish them.⁸ He wrote, "The budmashes are encroaching day by day: you will be kind enough therefore to chastise these disloyal sepoys and restore the State to tranquility."

By October 1857 the foreign mercenaries became very powerful.⁹ Guns were posted, ammunition was collected, provision was stored, the town of Dhar was at their mercy, and their number had swollen from 800 to about 1,500.¹⁰ They plundered Government Daks, harassed Government servants, and looted neighbouring places. They paralysed the authority of the State and opposed the British. Sir Robert Hamilton wrote that the conduct of the Wylaitis and the Pathans throughout Malwa became most violent and rebellious after the revolt broke out. They were foremost at Dhar, Amjhera and Mandsaur. They took the lead in subsequent outrages, and wherever they stood up they proved to be the most obstinate and determined opponents of the British rule.¹¹

5. *Ibid.*

6. Barnisi No. 10, letter dated 3rd Sept. 1857, from Dhar Darbar to Dhar Vakil staying with Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. (Dhar State Records).

7. Barnisi No. 16, Letter dated 22nd Sept. 1857, from Dhar Darbar to Dhar Vakil (Dhar State Records).

8. Letter No. 80, dated 12th Oct. 1857, from Raghunath Narayan, Vakil, Dhar State to Capt. Hutchinson, Agent and P. Asstt. to A.G.G. for C.I.

9. Letter dated 12th Oct. 1857, from Raghunath Narayan, Vakil, Dhar State to Capt. Hutchinson, P. Asstt. and Bhil Agent. 10. *Ibid.*

11. Letter No. 293, dated 5th July 1858, from Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy., Govt. of India (Parliamentary Papers on Dhar), p. 15.

That the Dhar Darbar, on the whole, was loyal to the Company's Government, is proved by the fact that even before the revolt broke out the Dhar Darbar sent fifty of their own sepoys for protection of the British Cantonment at Bhopawar.¹² In the beginning of July at the outbreak of the Revolt at Indore and Mhow, the Dhar Darbar sent their Vakil to persuade the Pathans not to attack the Bhopawar Agency.¹³ The Darbar sent a Palanquin to fetch Captain Hutchinson and his party to Mhow,¹⁴ sent five elephants to the help of the British army coming from the Deccan for the suppression of the Revolt in Malwa,¹⁵ timely informed the Company's authorities at Mhow when the Pathans captured the Dhar fort¹⁶ and also when they were off to Sardarpur,¹⁷ invited the Company's Forces for the suppression of the Revolt at Dhar and neighbouring parts, supplied all provisions to the British force,¹⁸ issued orders to all their subordinates to render every help to the British, and handed the plan of the Dhar Fort to the British military officers.

During the revolt some of the Bhils of the Dhar districts burnt the Dak bungalow at Gujri and plundered Manpur villages and the Daks on the Bombay-Agra Road. At first it was thought by the British that the Dhar State was responsible for these and similar acts, but it was later on found that it was powerless to check these developments. The Dhar Darbar, during the revolt safeguarded the postal communication and protected the telegraph wires in the Dhar territory.

12. Letter dated 19th May 1857, from A. R. E. Hutchinson (P.A.) to H. H. Yeshwant Rao Paur, Raja of Dhar, written from Camp Bhopawar.

13. Letter dated Jhabua 8th July 1857, from A. R. E. Hutchinson to Raghunath Narayan, Vakil of Dhar.


14. Letter dated 6th July 1857, from Capt. A.R.E. Hutchinson, to Raghunath Narayan, Vakil of Dhar.

15. Letter dated 10th August 1857, from Dharam Narayan Munshi to Govind Rao, Vakil of Dhar State, written from Camp Mhow.

16. Letter dated Sept. 1857, from the Dhar Darbar to the Dhar Vakil, Govind Rao, staying with Offg. A.G.G. for C.I.

17. *Ibid.*

18. Letter dated Mhow 12th Oct. 1857, from Raghunath Narayan, Vakil, Dhar State, to Capt. A.R.E. Hutchinson, Agent and P. Asstt. to A.G.G. for C.I.



**Raja Bakhtawar Singhji of Amjhera. He was executed by the British on
Falgun Shudha Dwadashi, Samvat 1914 (1857)**

AMJHERA

Raja Ram Singh, son of Raja Maldeo Rathor of Jodhpur, founded the Amjhera State in the 16th century. During the 18th century the Amjhera Chief became a vassal of the Sindhia. In 1818, through the mediation of Sir John Malcolm, the Amjhera chief agreed to pay to Daulat Rao Sindhia an annual tribute of Rs. 35,000 under the guarantee of the Company, on condition that the Sindhia would not send any troops into Amjhera State or interfere in its internal administration. Thus the Amjhera Chiefs enjoyed virtual independence. During the revolt Raja Bakhtawar Singh was the ruler. He was noble, brave, frank and just.

When the revolt broke out, he was the first ruler in Malwa to translate into action the idea that the Company's rule was to be brought to speedy end. Accordingly we find that the Amjhera Raja took a decided stand against the English and revolted. The Amjhera Vakil at Bhopawar Agency left the place at 4 p.m. on the 2nd July without taking leave from Captain Hutchinson, the Political Agent.¹⁹ On the morning of the 3rd of July 1857, Gulab Rai, the Dewas of Amjhera, arrived at Bhopawar with a body of armed mercenaries. They were followed by Thakur Bhawani Singh of Sandla with two guns. They put the Government servants under custody and removed the whole of the Government record, some of which they tore up and burnt. The British flag was torn and removed.²⁰ Captain Hutchinson and his party were chased for almost 17 miles from Bhopawar by a party of the cavalry sent under Mohanlal of Amjhera. On their return, the cavalrymen plundered the post office, the dispensary, and the Agency House at Bhopawar. The property was carried off on elephants and carts to Amjhera. The extinction of the British power was joyfully proclaimed. The British later on complained that "on the return next day of the party to Amjhera, the Raja expressed no disapprobation; on the contrary he

19. Bhopawar Agency File No. 580, Letter dated 17th July 1857, from Hutchinson, Bhil Agent and P. Asstt, to A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy., Govt. of India.

20. Bhopawar Agency File No. 728, Letter No. 299. Gen. No. 1155, dated 25th Dec. 1857, from Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of India.

was delighted at acquisition of the property and the success of the mission.²¹

On the morning of the 11th July 1857 Captain Hutchinson and his party, escorted by Bakshi Khuman Singh, Commander of the Holkar's forces, and his troops returned to Bhopawar on their way to Mhow. At the suggestion of Captain Hungerford, Bakshi Khuman Singh demanded an explanation from Bakhtawar Singh, the Raja of Amjhera. The Raja was persuaded to return the guns, a quantity of ammunition, accoutrements of the Nazibs, clothings of the Bhil Corps, and all private property that was plundered from Bhopawar. The Raja threw the blame of plunder and devastation of British property on his officials Gulab Rai the Dewan, Bashirullah Khan the Chief Secretary, and Chimam Rao the Vakil of Amjhera. The Raja pleaded that these officials had exceeded his orders. Captain Hutchinson demanded their surrender, which the Raja acceded to.²² This was possibly done under pressure from the Holkar's Commander Bakshi Khuman Singh.

Bakshi Khuman Singh's diary reveals that during July 1857 there was a great excitement among the civil population. His party apprehended trouble and did not venture to pass through Amjhera: it had to take another route for Mhow. The rebels even tried to excite the Holkar's forces. Bakshi Khuman Singh wrote that the Mohammadans at Amjhera sent a letter to Nawab Dilsher Khan of the Holkar's troops and desired him to kill at once all the Europeans that accompanied him. They also informed him that they were coming to his assistance.²³

MANDSAUR

About the middle of August 1857 a wandering Haji, who styled himself as a Shahzada of Delhi dynasty descendant of the imperial house of Timur, appeared at Khachrod. He raised the flag of religion and waged a crusade. The "*Kamasdar*" (revenue

21. *Ibid.*

22. Bhopawar Agency File No. 580, Letter dated 22nd July 1857, from Capt. Hutchinson to Col. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I.

23. File No. 580 of 1857, Bhopawar Agency, Capt. Hutchinson's Report dated 22nd July 1857 and Bakshi Khuman Singh's Report dated 18th July 1857.

officer) of Mandsaur with a small force marched against him and easily quelled the disturbance. The Shahzada took refuge in a lonely religious place where he was visited by thousands of devotees.²⁴

About 9 a.m. on the 26th August 1857, the Shahzada came to the "Dargah" (mausoleum) of Dudan Saiyid at Mandsaur with four or five attendants.²⁵ When a police officer heard of this, he went there with twenty-five or thirty attendants and desired him to go away as he had orders from the Sindhia's Government not to allow strangers to remain in the town. The Shahzada refused to go back. This led to a dispute. The revenue officer came with fifty or hundred sowars. The Shahzada made the signal and two or three hundred mercenaries who had been thrown out of employment, appeared. Hundreds of other supporters of the Shahzada also appeared on the scene. High words passed and swords were drawn. In the fight that ensued the district officer was killed and the revenue officer and the police officers were imprisoned. After this successful fight the rebels took the Shahzada to the palace, placed him on the throne, unfurled the royal standard and proclaimed him the Ruler.

The Shahzada sent for big merchants, gave them assurance of safety and protection and they presented "nazaras."²⁶ All the records and documents found in the palace were torn and burnt. The officials were confined.²⁷ Under the banner of the Shahzada the number of the rebels swelled by leaps and bounds to 20,000 men within two months.²⁸ From Mandsaur several rebel pickets were sent into the neighbouring States. Some 500 Me-watis from Mandsaur attacked Nahargarh, took possession of it and plundered some of the houses.²⁹ 100 mercenaries with some

24. Lieut. General C. L. Showers, *A Missing Chapter of the Indian Mutiny*, pp. 89-90.

25. Inward Vol. 80, News Report from Mandsaur, dated 26th Aug 1857, from Offg. Minister Indore Darbar to Offg. A.G.G. for C.I.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*

28. H. M. Durand, *Sir Henry Durand—Life and Letters*, p. 225. (According to Forrest, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. III, p. 121, the rebel force rose to 17 or 18 thousand in a month's time.)

29. Inward Vol. 80, Letter dated 25th Sept. 1857, forwarded by Offg. Minister Indore to Offg. A.G.G. for C.I.

horsemen were sent to establish their outpost at Khachrod.³⁰ About 400 mercenaries marched from Mandsaur towards Sitamau and came within four miles of the town. There they remained for three days, but returned for want of provisions.³¹ A party of 500 mercenaries from Mandsaur went to Jiran and plundered it.³² Thus Mandsaur remained a great centre of rebellion.³³ The rebels at Mandsaur subverted the authority of the Maharaja Sindhia in that district, who could not despatch sufficient troops to suppress the revolt as he was much hard pressed at Gwalior by the Indore and Gwalior rebels.³⁴

Baba Aptia, district officer of Malwa at Ujjain, complained that his detachment was defeated by the Mandsaur insurgents.³⁵ The Rajas of Sitamau, Sailana, and Ratlam and the Nawab of Jaora were most anxious about the movements of the Mandsaur rebels as they were a source of constant danger to their States. The Mandsaur rebels even pressed the British forces at Neemuch. They were also in constant communication with the rebels at Dhar, Amjhera, Sardarpur and Khachrod. From August to November 1857 the Mandsaur rebels created the most critical situation for the British authorities in Central India and for the preservation of "the Line of the Narmada."³⁶ The rebels systematically cut off the British communication to the South. They not only closed the Company's postal system, but also caught and killed the Company's private carriers.³⁷

In November 1857 Colonel Durand wrote about Mandsaur affairs thus, "It is extremely difficult to convey by words the state of affairs both in the city and the neighbouring districts.

30. Inward Vol. 80, Letter dated Khachrod 7th Oct. 1857, forwarded by Offg. Minister Indore to Offg. A.G.G. for C.I.

31. Letter dated 23rd Oct. 1857.

32. Letter dated 1st Nov. 1857.

33. Despatch No. 397 of Aug. 1858, from Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to Govt. of India, Parliamentary Papers relating to Dhar.

34. Issue Vol. 91, Letter No. 178, dated 15th Oct. 1857, from Col. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. to Govt. of India.

35. Inward Vol. No. 80, Report from Holkar's spy, dated 7th Oct. 1857.

36. Issue Vol. 91, Letter No. 257, dated 27th Nov. 1857, from Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy., Govt. of India.

Letter No. 268, dated 30th Nov. 1857.

37. C. L. Showers, *A Missing Chapter of the Indian Mutiny*, pp. 93 and 94.

Sindhia's authorities are powerless and their influence gone, and the present conjuncture is very much analogous to the state of affairs when our power first became supreme in Malwa and the country had to be braced up and recovered from the Pindaree and Mahratta wars and troubles."³⁸

The revolt at Mandsaur and the neighbouring places was swift in developing, because within a couple of months thousands of people flocked under the rebel standard. On the 26th of August 1857 the Shahzada came to Mandsaur with 4 or 5 attendants and in a couple of days the strength rose to hundreds and then to thousands. If we believe the estimate of Kaye and Malleeson, in September 1857 the number of rebels under the Shahzada shot up to fifteen thousand men and by November his strength was over 20,000 men.³⁹

BHOPAL

Bhopal was one of the Muslim States in Central India. During the Revolt, Sikandar Begum was the Regent there and she wholeheartedly helped the British. She had previously warned the English people stationed within her territory about the designs of her people and persuaded them to leave Bhopal till normal conditions could be restored. Though no Europeans were killed at Bhopal, yet a large number of rebel leaders like Warris Mohammad Khan, Adil Mohammad Khan, Sarfaraz Khan, and Fazal Mohammad Khan, belonged to Bhopal. They pressed Sikandar Begum to fight against the English, but with her feminine qualities of head and heart she tactfully handled the situation in such a manner that though at times the situation became critical no open revolt at Bhopal occurred.⁴⁰

38. Issue Vol. 91, Letter No. 257, dated 27th Nov. 1857, from Col. Durrand to G. F. Edmonstone, Secy. to Govt. of India.

39. Kaye and Malleeson, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. V, p. 45.

40. Bhopal File of 1857-58 (C.I.A.O. Records).

CHAPTER VIII

THE REVOLT AT THE BRITISH MILITARY STATIONS IN MALWA

WHEN the British Government established their supremacy in Malwa in 1818, they adopted the policy of maintaining permanent military stations at strategical points. The places selected were mostly those which were suitable from the point of view of strategy, communications, and climate. Places like Mehidpur, Sardarpur, Mhow, Neemuch, Sehore, Sipri, Guna, Agar and Mandleshwar were the key-points in Malwa. It was a triumph for the secret organisation of the rebels that the Revolt first occurred at these very places which were meant by the British to keep the Rulers and people of Malwa in check.

MEHIDPUR

The military post at Mehidpur in Malwa was of great importance. This is supported by the testimony of Sir C. M. Wade, Resident at Indore, who considered that the position of Mehidpur in Malwa was most central for guarding and internal security of Malwa. It afforded a suitable check on the wild tribes and the surrounding Chiefs.¹

The Indore Revolt affected even the remotest parts of Malwa, and Mehidpur fell within its range. In the beginning of July 1857, some danger was apprehended from the mustering of the foreign mercenaries such as the Afghans and Muckranis. The wild reports of the intended murders and plunders that reached the ears of the British officers, the paucity of British officers, and the absence of British soldiers, led Major Timins, the Commander of the Mehidpur Contingent, to leave the station for Neemuch on the 5th of July 1857, with his small band of European officers.

When Captain S. C. Showers, officiating Political Agent at

1. Letter-Book No. 50, Letter No. 845, dated 17th Aug. 1841, from Sir C. M. Wade, Resident at Indore to T. H. Madlock, Esqr., Secy. to Govt. of India.

Mewar (Rajputana), heard of the retreat of Major Timins, he felt that the occupation of Mehidpur was very desirable to stem the rebel tide.² He, therefore, promised reinforcements to Lieut. Mills and persuaded Major Timins to return to Mehidpur, which he immediately did.³ But the cloud of suspicion and distrust cast a shadow upon the minds of the people at Mehidpur. It was known that they were making secret preparations. It was suspected by the Company's officers that the local Amin was instigating the mercenaries to give a blow to the Company's authority.⁴

In the meantime Firoz Shah, the Shahzada of Mandsaur, went to Mehidpur early in September and is reported to have appointed one Mirza, who was the son of a former Subedar of Mehidpur, as the head of the rebels.⁵ The preparations were complete by the beginning of November 1857 and we find that these facts were not unknown to others. The Nawab of Jaora warned the Commanding Officer of the Malwa Contingent of the impending outbreak and strongly advised him to arrange for speedy reinforcements.⁶ But for this "loyal" act and timely warning of the Nawab, the Company's Contingent at Mehidpur would have suffered heavily.

Major G. Timins reviewed the rebel position on the eve of the outbreak⁷ and reported that the Wylaities stationed at Alote and Agar round about Mehidpur were all bent upon mis-

2. Receipts No. 75, Letters from Rao Ramchandra Rao, Offg. Minister, Indore Darbar, to Capt. Hungerford, Commdt. at Mhow. (especially letter dated 8th July 1857).

3. Receipts Vol. 66, Letter dated Mewar Agency, Neemuch, 19th Aug. 1857, from Capt. S. C. Showers, Offg. P. A. in Mewar, to Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I.

4. Receipts Vol. 78, Letter dated the 8th July 1857, from Bhao Rao Ramchandra Rao, Offg. Minister, Indore Darbar, to Capt. Hutchinson, Commdt. at Mhow.

5. Inward Vol. 80, Letter No. 73, dated Indore Palace 1st Sept. 1857, from Rao Ramchandra Rao, Offg. Minister, Indore Darbar to Col. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. News from the Vakil of Mehidpur.

6. Receipts Vol. 72, Letter dated Jaora 6th Nov. 1857, from Ghaus Mohammad Khan, Nawab of Jaora to the Commdt., Malwa Contingent, Mehidpur.

7. Issue Register 93, Letter No. 751, dated 28th Oct. 1857, from Col. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to Rao Ramchandra Rao, Offg. Minister, Indore Darbar.

chief.⁸ In addition to these troublesome neighbours, there was a large force of Wylaities and Mewatis assembled at the Sindhia's town of Oneil about ten miles south of Mehidpur. The rebel leader Hira Singh, who was referred to by the Nawab of Jaora in his secret letters to the British officers, encouraged the rebels to make an attack upon the Cantonment. Baba Aptia, the Sindhia's Sir-Subah at Ujjain, cunningly advised Major Timins to attack the rebels at Oneil and thus offered a chance to the rebels to occupy Mehidpur easily. But Major Timins scent-ed danger and remained at Mehidpur.⁹ The station was attack-ed on the morning of Sunday the 8th of November, 1857, at half-past seven by numerous parties of Wylaities, Mewatis and several people of Mehidpur.¹⁰

The rebels numbered about two thousand, though it was not possible to assess their number exactly because many of them lay in ambush. The chief body of the rebels came from the direction of Oneil. They were said to be fugitives from Dhar. Some rebels came from Ujjain while others from Khachrod side. While the Company's troops were engaged in repelling the many-sided attack of the rebels, the bungalows were set on fire by the town people themselves. The rebels took shelter behind the thatched bungalows, and the British guns opened fire with grape and shells on them. The rebels finding that, while the British front was well defended by an array of guns, the left flank was vulnerable, launched an attack. The Wylaities fired into the British Battery from the Centre and the left front.

Before the Company's guns could be put into action the rebels took advantage of the weakness of the Company's forces and came down pouring upon them from all directions. In this attack Lieutenant Mills was fatally wounded. Lieutenant Dy-

8. Receipts Vol. 72, Letter No. 397 of 1857, from Major G. Timins, Commdt., Malwa Contingent to Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I., Letter dated Mehidpur the 7th Nov. 1857

9. Receipts Vol. 72, Letter dated 7th Nov. 1857, from Maj. Timins, Commdt. at Mehidpur to Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I., Letter No. 397.

10. Report of the attack on Mehidpur by Maj. Timins, the Commdt. of the Mehidpur Contingent, dated Camp Barnagar, 11th Nov. 1857. (File No. 1772 of 1857).

sart exhorted the infantry to charge at the rebels, but few paid any heed to his orders. Some of his men only fired blank ammunition. The execution of the artillery was not good. The detachment of Company's troops commanded to dislodge the groups of the rebels did not obey orders.¹¹

After the first charge the Company's sepoy's did not return to reload or defend their guns. The rebels thereupon seized the guns of the Company. The best of the gunners were cut or shot down and these very guns were employed to belch out fire and smoke at the Company's infantry lines. Major Timins once again tried to encourage the infantry, but his efforts were in vain. He was, therefore, obliged to run away towards Barnagar accompanied by Lieut. Dysart and a party of about thirty-five cavalrymen.¹² At this juncture the remaining troops joined the rebels.

This success of the rebels at Melhidpur produced a great sensation in many parts of the country. "This news has caused no little excitement at Indore" wrote W. R. Shakespeare, the officiating Assistant to the Agent to the Governor-General for Central India.¹³ Thus the rebels were completely successful at Melhidpur and the Company's administration came to an end.

SARDARPUR

As usual the infection of the rebellious feelings spread to the Cantonment of Sardarpur.¹⁴ But the local men were not prepared without the aid of the foreign mercenaries of Dhar and Amjhera to start an armed rebellion. However, such an opportunity came to them on the 10th of October 1857, and then they revolted openly. At 6 a.m. the Wylaities began burning the bungalows at Bhopawar and started plundering the station.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*

13. Issue Vol. 93, Letter No. 846, dated Camp Mhow 12th Nov. 1857, from W. R. Shakespeare, Offg. Asstt. A.G.G. for C.I. to Brg. Stuart, Commdg. Deccan Field Force.

14. "Report of Subedar Gouptar of M. B. C., Sardarpur."

"Report of Lieut.-Colonel Stockley. Commdg. Officer, Malwa Bhil Corps."

"Narrative of the Two Sepoys."

Receipts Vol. 73, Letters from Commdg. Officer, M. B. C. to Offg. A.G.G. for C.I., Oct. 1857.

The Subedar of the Bhil Corps sounded the bugle for mustering the forces, but no more than 130 men fully armed and equipped rallied. The ammunition was limited. Small pickets at four points were posted to guard the lines. At 8 o'clock the Wylaities came in the direction of the Lines. A small party of about 50 Bhil sepoys went forward to meet them and fired at them.

For a while the Wylaities retreated into the sugarcane field nearby, but with the help of the Bhopawar gun which the rebels could by that time bring to their aid they attacked the lines and the town. At the same time a body of rebels came out of the town of Rajgarh, and following the course of the Mahi river came and attacked the cantonment of Sardarpur. The Bhil sepoys were soon without ammunition and so they could not oppose the well-equipped Wylaities. The Bhils then began to fight with swords and daggers, which however could not be effective against the guns of the rebels. It was now about 11 o'clock and the Bhil sepoys after a three hour fight, being outnumbered and without ammunition, thought of a retreat by the north side of the cantonment down the hills. Some people have alleged that the Bhil Corps left Sardarpur without putting up any fight, but the documents prove otherwise.

After the Bhil Sepoys retreated from Sardarpur, the rebels from Rajgarh and Bhopawar were the sole masters of the station, and therefore they plundered as much as they could and burnt and destroyed what they could not take with them.

MHOW

Let us turn to Mhow, another of the important military stations. It is said, "Mhow remained throughout the Mutiny the only station in Central India which was never abandoned."¹⁵ The following will prove whether this is true or not.

15. Mrs. O. S. Crofton, *Indian Monumental Inscriptions. List of Inscriptions on Tombs or Monuments in Rajputana and Central India, with Biographical notes compiled with an Historical Introduction.*

Charles Ball, *History of the Indian Mutiny.*

G. Forrest, *Selections from the letters, despatches and other State papers preserved in the Milly. Deptt. of the Govt. of India, 1857-58, Vol. IV, App. D.*

It is important to note that the aim of the rebels was not to capture the Mhow Fort where they knew there was no treasure. They merely aimed at burning and plundering the bungalows and the city of Mhow, and then to go and join the Indore rebels as was previously planned by them in order to plunder the Indore Residency treasury, and then to march to Gwalior, Agra and Delhi. They might have done well to change their plans, having known that there was a good stock of ammunition and a strong force of British officials there.

When the news of the Meerut and Delhi mutinies reached Mhow, Captain Hungerford requested the Commanding Officer, Colonel Platt, to permit him to place a British guard at the fort gateway, as he thought that the fort contained many heavy guns, much ammunition and valuable stores of various kinds, which falling into the hands of the rebels would strengthen them. Colonel Platt considered that the change of guards would show a want of confidence in his own men and, therefore, did not permit it, but the heavy guns were ordered to be dismounted and disabled.

When the news of the Neemuch Revolt reached Mhow, Captain Hungerford again wrote to the Commanding Officer, Mhow Fort, on the 6th June requesting him to take precautionary measures in respect of the artillery so that it could not be easily seized upon by the rebels, and to keep it in such a place where it could be properly manned, whenever and wherever necessary.¹⁶ The request was accepted.

From the 6th of June to the 30th of June the Mhow Artillery was parked in front of the barracks and men and horses were kept ready for short notice. Colonel Platt posted guards of the 23rd Indian Infantry before the bungalows of the European families. On the morning of the 1st of July the boom of guns was heard in the direction of Indore. Then a note from Colonel Durand asking for reinforcement and later on Colonel Travers' note informing of their retreat from Indore was received by Colonel Hungerford. The ladies and children were housed into the fortified square of the fort on the same evening.

At about 10.15 p.m. on the same day several officers of the

16. Report of Capt. Hungerford, the Commdt. at Mhow, to the Secy. to the Govt. of Bengal, dated Mhow Fort, 17th July 1857.

23rd Indian Infantry were sitting together talking in front of the lines of the Grenadier Company, when a shot was heard from the cavalry lines on the left followed by several others. Immediately afterwards the fusillade commenced in the rear of the lines of the 23rd Indian Infantry, and was rapidly taken up from the right to the left all along the lines of huts. The men were evidently firing on their officers who, supposing the lines were attacked by Holkar's troops, went towards their respective cavalry lines and the quarter-guard to summon the men to repel the attack.

Finding that they could do nothing because the parade ground was literally whistling with bullets fired from the lines the officers made their escape to the Fort. There they found Colonel Platt who ordered Captain Fagan, his Adjutant, to accompany him and the two rode down together to the lines of the 23rd Indian Infantry. They were killed there. The same fate overtook Major Harris who was waylaid by the rebels. These were the only three Europeans who fell victims to the rebels at Mhow.¹⁷

NEEMUCH

Neemuch was the Company's military cantonment and the troops lodged there were the 72nd Regiment of Indian Infantry, the 7th Regiment of the Gwalior Contingent, and a wing of the 1st Bengal Cavalry. Like the sepoy of other stations, they were also maddened with the spirit of revolt. After many days of anxiety for the English, on the 3rd of June at 10 a.m. the sepoy rose in open revolt and plundered the station.¹⁸ No officers lost their lives, and through the help of some loyal Indians they managed to escape to Udaipur. The rebel sepoy, after plundering the bungalows, the Treasury, and the rich people of the town, left for Agra and Delhi to serve under the Delhi Emperor as was done by the other rebel bands from other quarters.¹⁹

17. Letter from B. M. Cooper to Offg. Adjutant General, Bengal Army, dated Mhow, 9th July 1857.

18. John Kaye, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. III, p. 169.

19. *Ibid.*



**Her Highness Sikandar Begum.
Ruler of Bhopal in 1857**

SEHORE

Sehore was another military cantonment with the headquarters of the Political Agent in Bhopal. On the 3rd July 1857 Colonel Durand and his retreating party from Indore reached there, but Sikandar Begum, the ruler of Bhopal, advised all of them to leave Sehore as the troops stationed there were watching for a suitable opportunity to revolt. Colonel Durand with his party left Sehore. On the 9th of July Major Richards, the Political Agent, with twenty Europeans, also left Sehore. After that the Contingent troops took possession of the Cantonment. They plundered the bungalows, the post office and the Sehore church.²⁰ From July to November 1857 the rebels had an upper hand at Sehore and the neighbouring places.

While leaving Sehore, Major Richards handed over the charge of the station for the time being to the officers of Sikandar Begam of Bhopal, but for all practical purposes her authority was set at naught. To take an example, when Sikandar Begam ordered the Sehore troops to march against Shujaat Khan Pindara, the rebel leader who killed the chief officer and plundered the Company's treasury at Berchha, they refused to obey the orders. On the 6th of August 1857 the Risaldar of Sehore Cavalry openly raised the standard of revolt and seized the Company's guns. The Sehore rebels, joined by the plundering Grasis and Pindaris, ultimately made their way to Kanpur and gallantly fought under the banner of Nana Sahib.

SIPRI

From about the middle of May 1857 the ~~tone~~ feelings of the sepoys seemed to be slowly changing, but no ~~overact~~ of revolt was displayed until the arrival from Agar of the 3rd battery of Artillery when a house belonging to Major Raikes was burnt. The sepoys raised the disputed questions of loss of caste, Christianisation, mixing of bone dust in flour and sugar, and the supply of greased cartridges. When the sepoys were asked to go to ~~suppress~~ the revolt at Jhansi they refused to obey the

20. I.R.D. Records 1351/F.C. Sup, Narrative of Events in Central India.

orders. The news of the revolt at Gwalior further intensified the feelings of the rebels.

On the morning of the 18th June 1857 when the guard escorting the pay of the regiment from Gwalior came to Sipri and narrated the events of the revolt at Gwalior, the regiments at Sipri determined to revolt that same night. But by the plan of Captain Rayle, which was mainly possible owing to the reliable and timely information he got from his confidential and trustworthy sepoys, all the Europeans of the station were duly informed of the impending outbreak and they all assembled and taking with them the pay of the Guna Contingent some started for Guna²¹ and a few for Agra.²² After that the rebels at Sipri had a free hand to plunder. Subsequently they joined the Gwalior rebels.

GUNA

At Guna nothing remarkable happened except that, during the Revolt a house called the Residency and the building adjacent to it were burnt and destroyed.²³ The general effect of the revolt of some of the Jagirdars and people of most of the important military stations was that the whole of Central India and the Bombay-Agra Road from Guna to Gwalior were in the most disturbed condition until the suppression of the Revolt.

AGAR

The 5th Infantry Regiment of the Gwalior Contingent was stationed there. When they received emissaries from the Indore rebels, they revolted on the morning of the 4th of July 1857. They shot the Adjutant and two other Europeans. On

21. Receipts Vol. 78, Report regarding the Mutiny of the 3rd Infantry Regiment, Gwalior Contingent at Sipri, submitted by Capt. B.W. Ryale, late 2nd in Command, 3rd Infantry Regiment to Secy., Govt. of India, dated Jubbulpore, 15th Nov. 1857.

22. C. E. Luard, *Contemporary Newspaper Account of Events During the Mutiny in Central India*, 1857-59, pp. 34-36.

23. Old Records File No. 110, Gwalior Letter-Book, Letter No. 33, dated 13th Mar. 1860, from Capt. H.O. Mayne, Asstt. P.A. in C.I., Guna, to Capt. W.S. Eliphant, E.E. Gwalior.

hearing the news of the revolt, Captain Carler, the Commanding officer, and all other Europeans escaped to Hoshangabad and the rebels fully established their authority in Agar.²⁴

MANDLESHWAR

The year 1857 opened in Nimar with a wide circulation of chapaties. Severe cholera raged in the town. During April and May 1857 the peasants protested that they would not cultivate their land unless the Company's Government cancelled certain vexatious rules of forest conservancy. Captain R. H. Keatinge, Officiating Political Agent in Nimar, seeing general difficulties for the Company in India tried to pacify the local quarrels in a spirit of compromise and suspended the operation of forest conservancy laws for one year.

The outbreak of the revolt at Neemuch and other places excited the people of Nimar considerably. Captain Keatinge removed the treasure to Dhargaon, a safe place, appointed a general place of rendezvous, ordered a detachment of Bhil Corps and cavalry and infantry to be ready for service in case of a disturbance, and kept carriages ready for a swift retreat in case of emergency.

When the news of the outbreak of the revolt of the 1st Hyderabad Cavalry at Aurangabad and its march towards Delhi via Barhanpur and Nimar reached Captain Keatinge, he tried to raise new forces but none of the men was eager to take service under the Company.

The news of the outbreak of the revolt at Indore on the 1st of July 1857 led the Europeans living at Mandleshwar to suspect that they would be attacked by the Holkar's troops from Maheshwar, situated only five miles from there, and so they left the place for the Asirgarh Fort. The charge of Mandleshwar was left in the hands of an officer of the Company named S. Naher who very tactfully handled the situation till the arrival of the British forces under Brigadier Stuart.²⁵

24. I.R.D. Records 1351/F. C. Sup. Letter No. 80, dated 5th Sept. 1857, from Col. Durand to the Secy., Govt. of India.

25. I.R.D. Records, Narrative of Events in the District of Nimar, Letter No. 157, dated Mandleshwar, 25th May 1858, from Capt. R. H. Keatinge, Offg. P.A., Nimar to Sir R. Hamilton, A.C.G. for C.I.

Thus during the period of the revolt no Government treasure was plundered in Nimar and the life or property of no European was seized. Yet the Europeans had to pass through a period of much excitement and the fear of imminent danger. They escaped to Asirgarh Fort for safety and that probably saved them.

THE REVOLT IN THE DEPUTY BHIL AGENCY

MANPUR was the headquarters of the Deputy Bhil Agency. When we go to visit the Vindhya Ranges near Manpur in a dense jungle, we come across the Sitlamata Caves where marble tablets remind us of the revolt at Manpur, and where the Political Agent along with a number of Europeans was kept hidden for a number of days by a band of faithful Bhils. The historic tablets on the caves begin with the words, "When the Bengal Troops in Mhow mutinied in 1857, the Deputy Bhil Agent was taken to these caves for safety."¹ The names of the "faithful" Bhils are inscribed and the tablets end with the words, "These tablets were placed here by the orders of the British Government so that their gallantry and faithfulness may not pass out of remembrance."²

Lieutenant W. Gordon Cumming was the Deputy Bhil Agent at Manpur and therefore we turn to him for a first hand information of the Manpur Revolt. On the morning of the 1st of July 1857 the firing of the Indore guns was so distinctly heard at Manpur that it was thought that the revolt had broken out at Mhow. Cumming writes, "I sent for the Indore Vakil and desired him to send someone and find out what was going on. He said he would go himself and return at once. He went but did not return to Manpur. On sending his own cavalymen, Cumming got information about the revolt. Almost all the men who could be depended upon were armed with weapons. The uncertain feelings and the wavering nature of the people are well described in Cumming's unpublished report, "These men as well as my own police were all much excited. No one knew if he could trust his neighbour. My own bearer had armed himself with my regimental sword and went about among the men

1. Inscription on the Manpur caves in the Vindhya Ranges.

2. *Ibid*.

3. Letter No. A of 1857, dated Mhow 7th Aug. 1857, from Lieut. W. Gordon Cumming, Dep. Bhil Agent, Manpur, to Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.C.G. for C.I.

telling them to take care that I did not escape in case of a disturbance."⁴

At about midnight of the 1st of July 1857 a few faithful people reported to Lieutenant Cumming of the impending outbreak of the revolt at Manpur, and safely escorted him to the Caves and saved him from the rebels. The Deputy Bhil Agent passed some of the most critical days of the revolt in these caves, and from there kept himself in close touch with the activities of the rebels in the surrounding places.

The guard of the Bhopal Contingent stationed at Manpur left the place and so also the Najib sepoys, but not before plundering the Company's treasury.⁵ The people under the Manpur Ghats intercepted the dak and the communication during those days. The revenue officers of Gujri and Dharampuri detained the coachman and did not let the Company's servants carry the mail. There was a great fall in the value of the Company's rupee. In many villages in the Dhar State a discount of two annas was demanded on the Company's rupee, especially at Gujri, Dhamnod and Thikri.

In the report of Lieutenant Cumming we come across many incidents concerning the revolt. He relates, "At Julwania a man named Lala sent by the Barwani Raja did his best to create a disturbance telling the road police to strip off their uniforms, stopping the daks, and saying that the British raj was at an end. The Dhar Vakil sent anonymous notes round to all the Bhumias calling them to Dhar on the 1st" (of July, 1857).⁶ Lieutenant Cumming who with Captain Elliot and family travelled from Manpur to Dhulia on the 20th of July, 1857, writes, "The road seemed quite deserted, we had hardly met or passed a single traveller."⁷ Even greater dangers awaited them in the interior in the Bhil districts where the Bhils were armed and anarchy was the order of the day.

The Bhil insurrection was outwardly a predatory rising in

4. *Ibid.*

5. I.R.D. Records 1351/F.S. Sup. Letter No. 32, dated 15-8-1857.

6. Receipts Vol. 74, Dept. Bhil Agency, Letters from Feb. to Dec. 1857, Report No. A of 1857 from Lieut. W. Gordon Cumming, Dept. Bhil Agent to Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I., dated Camp Mhow, 7th Aug. 1857.

7. *Ibid.*

which the rebel bands took to plunder and loot. They plundered the rich but helped the poor. The Bhils, with only their bows and arrows, became a constant danger to the safety of the road. With their thorough knowledge of the wild tracks they could traverse long distances and hide in inaccessible places. Brave, sensitive and nursed in predatory life they became a source of grave trouble to the Company. They roamed about in small bands and ravaged territories as far as Khandesh. The Raja of Barwani also acknowledged the plunder of the villages by the Bhils, but confessed his utter inability to restrain their excesses.⁸ In this he was not to be blamed, for other and more powerful chiefs exhibited a similar failing.⁹

During the revolt the Bhils had quite a free time. One successful raid of theirs used to inspire confidence among them. The part of the Bombay-Agra Road lying in the Bhil districts became the centre of their activities. The chief among these Bhil bands was under Bhima Naik who succeeded in striking terror into the hearts of the people. He was one of those rebel leaders who let it out according to convenience at times that he was fighting for Barwani, and at others for the Holkar State, and under one pretext or another he kept alive his exploits. As early as August 1857 we hear about the complaints made by the Holkar Government against this man.

A Hindi report from the Kamasdar of Brahmangaon, dated the 18th August, 1857, points out that "this day about sunrise Bhima Naik of Burwani Ilaqa, (Barwani State) with some 500 to 700 men came to Mauza Datwara . . . and plundered it from that time till about 10 or 11 o'clock."¹⁰ From a report of the same official, dated the 5th September 1857, we find that Bhima Naik of Barwani State was committing "great depredations in that part of the country."¹¹ During the revolt Bhima Naik was com-

8. Receipts Vol. 77, Letter No. 256 of 1857, from Lieut. Hutchinson, Bhil Agent and P. Asstt. to Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I., Camp Mhow, dated 10th Aug. 1857.

9. File No. 133, Pt. I of 1859-61, Bhopawar Agency, Letter No. 77 of 1859, from Capt. Hutchinson, Bhil Agent and P. Asstt. to Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I.

10. Inward Vol. No. 80, Letter No. 56 of 1857, from Rao Ramchandra Rao, Offg. Minister, Indore State, to Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I., Camp Mhow, dated Indore Palace, 15th Aug. 1857.

11. *Ibid.*

mitting depredations in the Holkar State, Barwani State and the Khandesh district. He was also plundering on the high road to Bombay.

Bhima Naik's letter to Vahiutdar of Barodh, dated Bhabra 27th September, 1857, will itself show the manifold activities of this rebel leader, "I did not go to plunder Mauza Datwara of my own accord, as you suspect. I was ordered by Maharaja Jaswant Singh, the Raja of Barwani, Bhoothgeer Bawa and Dowlatsing Mama that I should go and plunder the country within my reach, except Barwani, and further directed that I should take possession of and plunder Mauza Datwara because he said the village belonged to Barwani. Fifty rupees and a dress of honour were then given to me with instructions to perform the required services. But the Raja did not afterwards support me in the undertaking and therefore I have now determined to make aggressions upon his own territories. He now prefers complaints against me to you and himself wishes to stand aloof."¹² He also holds out a threat, "I have to add that you are not justified in preferring any complaints against me, because I am an old servant of the Raja and acted under his orders. You can claim compensation from the Raja and not from me. I shall encroach upon your districts or else you should make some arrangements for my pay."¹³

It is evident that he alternately plundered and rebelled against the Holkar, Barwani and the British, as it suited his convenience. This much is certain that in the Bhil districts he was, with others of his party, the full master of the vast tract that lies between the Vindhya and the Satpura Ranges extending as far as Khandesh territory of the Company. The depredations of the Naiks were a long series of exploitations and kept burning the rampant anarchy.

Two great movements kept alive and inflamed the revolt in the Bhil districts—the depredations of the Bhil Naiks like the Bhima Naik, and the passage of Tatia Topi through the Bhil districts. The passage of the great rebel leader through the Nimar districts was a swift and short one, yet it had a lasting and far-reaching influence not only on the history of Central

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

India but also on the public mind: its romantic tales and inspired fictions which are narrated by the old folk at the fire-side till today. The rebel activities at Khargone, Nimar and Bhil districts have been reported by two most reliable eye witnesses—Bakshi Khuman Singh, the Commandant of the Holkar's Forces, and Lieutenant Colonel Nawab Dilsher Khan, in their joint vernacular unpublished report dated the 6th January 1859 to the Government of Maharaja Holkar.¹⁴ We reproduce a summary of the report.

The rebel army entered Khargone on the 21st November 1858. They encamped in a circular form near the river and thus surrounded the "Garhi" (fortress). They posted pickets at important places in the town. In the night the rebels captured the "Garhi" and the Holkar State Forces encamped therein. Lieutenant Colonel Nawab Dilsher Khan was arrested by the rebels. The rebels demanded an explanation why the other rebels were killed by the Government forces and why such cruel massacres were resorted to. Tatia Topi himself twice demanded the reasons for the severity of the punishment inflicted on the rebels. He also wanted to know why Nana Jagtap and others were hanged at Khargone. Tatia Topi at first decided to take revenge and hang Nawab Dilsher Khan on the very spot where Nana Jagtap was hanged, but after consideration and taking into account the views of some of the town-fellows (of Nawab Dilsher Khan), who were with the rebels, he spared his life. Tatia Topi even offered him a good job if he chose to serve the rebels. The rebels, after capturing the horses and two guns from the "Garhi," imprisoned the Holkar's Forces there. The next day (22nd November 1858) in the noon they left Khargone and encamped at Une.¹⁵

From Une the rebels reached Rajpur via Julwania on the 25th November 1858. On the way they cut the telegraph wires. Captain Hutchinson wrote that the rebels captured the important post of Rajpur on the 25th November 1857 and imprisoned Devi Singh, the Thanedar of Rajpur. The rebels under Tatia Topi occupied Barwani on the 25th November in the afternoon

14. Indore Darbar Vernacular File No. 144, Report of Lieut.-Col. Nawab Dilsher Khan, giving an account of the Mutineers, Report dated 6th Jan. 1859.

15. *Ibid.*

and the Raja fled to the hills.

The Raja of Barwani reported on the 20th November 1858 facts about the rebel activities.¹⁶ He wrote that on the afternoon of the 25th November 1858 a party of about five or six hundred rebels came, captured him, brought him to the rebel camp, kept him there till midnight, and enquired from him about the tracks through the hills and the fords of the river Narmada. The Raja told them that there were no tracks in the hills, and that for three months no one had crossed the Narmada on foot. They then released him at midnight. He returned to his palace and tried to send the news to the camp of the British, but at that hour no man of the village was prepared to go. However, he sent papers through two peons, but they were arrested by the rebels. The next day they intended to plunder the town, but in the meantime they heard that the British Troops were advancing from Rajpur. They left Barwani and crossed the river at Bhilkherra fort. Some nine or ten men of the rebels were killed by the troops stationed at Chickalda, while the rest plundered the village. The sowars of Bhopawar (who were formerly on duty at the Thana of Barwani) guided them. On the morning of the 26th Captain Helbert arrived with his forces and halted at Bhilkherra. On the other bank of the river was the rebel camp. On the 28th the Company's troops crossed the Narmada. The rebels marched to Alirajpur via Kukshi and took away some of the Raja's horses.

The Raja of Alirajpur reported that on Saturday the 27th November the rebels under Tatia Topi numbering about 15,000 marching from Barwani and Chickalda halted at Manpur.¹⁷ They plundered the inhabitants and also took away the horses of the Raja, which were at that thana and also the horses of the merchants. At 10 o'clock in the night, as soon as report reached him from the thanedar, he immediately despatched two notes through Hulkaras (messengers), one to Major Wallace and the other to Captain Hutchinson, but the Hulkaras were arrested by the rebels. The Raja tried his utmost to prevent the rebels from advancing, but their forces were overwhelming and they came

16. Mutiny File No. 1776, Translation of a report from the Raja of Barwani, dated 29th Nov. 1858.

17. Mutiny File No. 1776. Translation of a vernacular report dated Dec. 1858 (Kartik Soodei 12th), from the Raja of Alirajpur.

to Alirajpur on the 28th and took possession of the town. On the second day they seized five horses of the Durbar and some horses and ponies from the inhabitants and looted about Rs. 40,000. When they left Alirajpur, they burnt the Dak Bungalow and 'Chowkis' (police stations).

The Raja had neither magazine nor forces, but only some sepoys. The Bhil inhabitants deserted him on account of the fear of the rebels. He had sent Jamadar Baldev Singh and some Sowars to collect them, but the sowars were detained by the rebels. From the Jhabua report it is found that the rebels on the 9th of December 1858 were at Timri village near Dohad. They plundered that town and started from Kushalgarh. The rebels next plundered Banswara on the 10th December 1858. Then they marched towards Partabgarh and, after deluding the British forces at the various passes, reached Partabgarh on the 24th December 1858. Thence they proceeded to the Holkar's districts of Zirapur and Machalpur where they divided themselves into three divisions and disappeared into the jungles.

Wherever the rebels were moving, the British Forces were hotly pursuing them, till at last the pursuit of these rebels was "abandoned at 2 p.m. on the 29th (December 1858) the enemy flying through the jungles. . . ."¹⁸ Their final suppression was left to other columns. It is surprising that, though encircled all round by the British columns, the rebels successfully plundered several places and foiled the British attempt to capture them for a long time.

Throughout these marches of the rebels from Khargone to Partabgarh, Lieutenant Colonel Nawab Dilsher Khan was with the rebels. Getting a suitable opportunity near Mandsaur he escaped from the rebel camp and came to Jaora and from there returned to his master, the Holkar Maharaja. He submitted a report to the Holkar Government which is a very important record giving us a glimpse into the rebel life of that time.¹⁹ We here briefly note some of his interesting observations. The total number of the rebel forces both infantry and cavalry was about 10,000. They had no big field guns with them, but the gunners

18. Mutiny File No. 1776.

19. Indore Darbar's Vernacular File No. 144. Translation of vernacular report, dated 6th Jan. 1859, from Lieut.-Col. Dilsher Khan.

were with them. They worked as cavalry men and numbered about 1,500 to 2,000. The rebels were fully dressed. They used various types of shot guns such as Chakmat and Batekdar. Those who had no guns kept pistols. There were among the rebels 500 to 1,000 women. They were also equipped with fetters and chains, a lot of goods, spare bridles and all necessary parts and military equipage.

When the rebels had leisure, they were very jovial. When attacked, they took shelter in the jungles. At that time they did not carry with them any luggage, but kept sufficient coins on their person. As regards their food, when they came across a village or town some of them ate ghee and sugar preparations and some fed themselves on millet. No one remained hungry. At some places they purchased things and foodstuffs, but at other places they depended on plunder.²⁰

The chief ringleader of the rebels was Rao Sahib, Tatia Topi was his chief Dewan or Adviser. The principal officers were Nawab Rahmat Ali Khan Kamuniwala, Sattar Khan Jaorawala, Raghopant, Damodar pant, Basrao Shastri, and Lalpuriwala Baba. There were a number of generals in the rebel force. Among a host of other names are those of Ashraf Ali Khan and Rahim Ali Khan. There was some unity among the rebel generals. But there was some difference of view regarding the main object of advance—Rao Sahib wanted to go to the North while Tatia Topi wished to proceed to the South.

The details of the advance march were kept strictly secret. Only Tatia Topi and Rao Sahib knew the plans. They seldom tried to face the Company's Forces, but always aimed at marching ahead of them. If forced to retreat, they used to fire a few shots and then march 24 to 40 miles a day. Tatia Topi became a will-o'-the-wisp for the English troops. He did lose some battles, but he never lost the heart to fight against the English. He principally followed the tactics of tiring out the enemy.

Thus we see that the second important movement that kindled the flame of the revolt in the Bhil Agency had many interesting features. The revolt at this place formed an important landmark in the history of the Revolt in Malwa. Before we conclude our account of the outbreak of the Revolt in Malwa and pass

on to its ruthless suppression, let us briefly review the phenomenal changes in the mob mentality and public opinion during those eventful days.

History is not only a narration of dry facts but also a delineation of psychological forces that work behind the screen.' It gives us a clear insight into the environments of the time. Official reports are not the dry-bones of history at all. If they are properly utilised by the critical historian who breathes forth spirit into them, they can be turned into flesh and blood. Mir Shahamat Ali, the Indian Assistant to the Agent to the Governor-General for Central India, "the only Political officer in that quarter," wrote a report during the Revolt which gives us, besides many other things, an insight into the psychology of the public mind of the time.²¹

He wrote that the first news of the "Sepoy Mutiny" in Upper Hindustan was received with indifference, but as the "Mutiny" spread and approached nearer home the public anxiety increased in proportion. The outbreak at Mehidpur was least expected in the beginning of June 1857. However, when it occurred it caused feverish excitement. But when the rebels had left the place and country, order prevailed as before. It was, however, completely upset in July 1857 on the occurrences of the Revolt at Indore—the centre of the British authority in Malwa. The shock was strongly felt throughout the several districts and for some days universal anarchy prevailed.

All the while it was known that the Holkar had revolted and therefore no one who was connected with the Company was safe. Even the peons employed in the districts were compelled to retire and seek safety in concealing their badges. The report of the Holkar's revolt was soon after found to be incorrect, and when it was known that he was as staunch in his friendship and adherence to the Company as ever, open violence and hostility began to subside.²²

Similarly there was a great psychological change in the minds of the people in other parts of Malwa and practically the whole country around, when the people were under the impression

21. C.I.A.O. Records File No. 1807 of 1858, Letter No. 6 of 1858, Report from Mir Shahamat Ali, Indian Asstt. A.G.G. for C.I. to Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I., dated Camp Dhar, the 24th Apr. 1858.

22. *Ibid.*

that the "Firangi" Raj (the rule of the English) was over. The respect and regard with which the English were formerly treated completely gave place to contempt and hostility. At many places the travelling parties of the English people themselves noticed and reported the change. To cite an instance, a European officer of the Bombay Medical Service attached to the Gwalior Contingent stationed at Agra, escaping with the European party to Sehore, wrote, "every villager was uncivil and the smile of the respectful submission with which the European officer was wont to be greeted was displaced by an angry scowl and a haughty air towards the despicable Feringee whose 'Raj' was at an end." Authority forgets the dying king. But as soon as the persons found the clouds of the revolt scattering and the position of the British improving there was a turn in the attitude of a number of persons from the remotest corners of the country who were available to help the British in the re-establishment of their supremacy.²³

According to Jan Ali Khan, the flame of dissatisfaction continued to be fanned by mis-statements and absurd reports. It was reported and believed that the Company's Government was determined to destroy the religion of the people by various secret means.²⁴ Those who had mixed up with the people knew that there had been since long a preconceived notion, however incorrect, throughout India that the Government was steadily bent on attacking their caste and converting all of them to Christianity. The cartridge question and the occurrence of the "Mutiny" in consequence thoroughly convinced the ordinary villagers about the evil designs of the foreigners. Every report to the prejudice of the British nation was circulated and readily believed. The extent of annoyance and the hatred of the people at the time towards the English may therefore be easily conceived. In short the mass of credulous men believed that the "Mutiny" was a manifestation of the vengeance of heaven upon the Company. Therefore they considered its rule to have ended.²⁵

Such were the vagaries of public opinion when Colonel Durand returned to Mhow with a column of the Bombay Force. Those who had imagined that the Company had no more troops

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*

to bring forth began to be cautious in the expression of their opinion. However, it had great effect on the mind of wavering parties. But the staunch rebels remained unyielding and uncompromising towards the English. They preferred to fight and die for their "Deen" (Religion) and "Watan" (Homeland). Like Horatius they would have said,

How can man die better
Than facing fearful odds,
For the ashes of his fathers,
And the temples of his Gods?

So they gave a tough fight to the English forces to the last.

CHAPTER X


SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT IN SOUTHERN AND WESTERN MALWA

THE Revolt had spread in Central India so widely that a "reconquest" of a greater part of Central India became necessary. The measures adopted were very severe and crushing.

Colonel H. M. Durand and his party, who had retreated to Hoshangabad at the outbreak of the Revolt at Indore on the 1st of July 1857, left Hoshangabad for Aurangabad on the 14th July to hasten the march of Major Woodburn's column for the suppression of the Revolt in Malwa. In Colonel Durand's own words, his aim was "to preserve the line of Narmada by inducing Major General Woodburn to advance without delay from Aurangabad to Mhow, to save Central India from the armed anarchy which must prevail if Major Woodburn's column did not advance . . . to resume my position at Mhow or at Indore . . . to return to Mhow or Indore with the power of at once coercing Holkar's troops . . . to maintain the same respect for the British Government from the Native States under my charge as before the Indore and Mhow Insurrectionary Mutinies . . . to personally influence Major Woodburn to know the precise value of Asseergurh (Fort), to judge how the detachment of the Gwalior Contingents at Asseergurh etc. should be treated; to watch the disposition of the Native troops; to become acquainted with the officer in command and those under him in the camp; to personally observe the state of public feeling. . . ."¹

Colonel Durand supported by Major Woodburn's Column, which was commanded by Major Stuart due to the illness of Major Woodburn arrived on the 1st of August 1857 at Simrol, and then marched to Mhow. The total strength of this force amounted to about 700 Europeans and 1,200 Indian troops of

1. Issue Vol. 91, Letter No. 149, dated 8th Oct. 1857, from Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to G. F. Edmonstone, Esqr. Secy. to Govt. of India.




Sketch map of Malwa showing

Col. Durand's retreat to Hoshangabad and his return march with Western Malwa column.

The march of the rebels from Indore to Gwalior then to Agra.

The route of Western Malwa column for the suppression of mutiny in Western Malwa.

From July first to December 15, 1857



**Colonel H. M. Durand. He was officiating A. G. G. in Central India
from the 5th of April 1857 to the 15th of Dec. 1857**

all arms.² Another British Force under Major Orr came to Mhow via Akbarpur (modern Khalghat). It consisted of 300 Nizam's Cavalry and one Company of 19th Bombay Indian Infantry.³ Thus at Mhow the two British forces assembled from two different directions.

Rao Ramchandra Rao Reshimwale, the officiating Minister of the Indore Darbar, apprehended a rise of the Indore troops on the Id Festival. But the news of the arrival of British troops probably awed the populace and the Indore troops, and the Id festival passed off quietly at Indore.⁴ Partly due to the rainy season and partly due to personal reasons (death of baby Durand and Mrs. H. M. Durand)⁵ Colonel Durand made a halt (which later on became a subject of severe criticism) at Mhow up to 20th October 1857.⁶ Here Colonel Durand rearranged all the British forces, and sent a few pickets to watch the rebel movements.

On the 20th of October 1857 Colonel Durand with a military force of 1,401 men of which 518 were Europeans marched via Gujri to Dhar.⁷ At Mhow Durand left 239 men of whom 89 were Europeans. Durand's object in attacking Dhar was, to quote his own words, "to sweep back upon Dhar the various bands of Valayatees, Makranis, etc. said to be spread from Nalcha to the Betwa Road, to prevent the enterprise being attempted against Mandleshwar, and to place the columns as effectively as to be able to intercept any endeavour on the part of the Musalman insurgents of Dhar and Amjhera effecting a junction with the dissatisfied Holkar troops with whom they are doubtless in communications."⁸ While Durand himself marched

2. For. Deptt. Secret Proceedings 1858, Cons. 29th Jan. 1858, Nos. 87-89, Genl. No. 155 A, Letter No. 27 A of 1857, from Lt.-Col. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to G. F. Edmonstone, Secy. Govt. of India.

3. Receipts Vol. 78, Letter No. 7, dated 11th July 1857, from A. Elliot, Asstt. Genl. Supdt. and Jt. Magistrate, Mhow to Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I.

4. Issue Vol. 91, Letter No. 149, dated 8th Oct. 1857, from Col. H. M. Durand to Secy. Govt. of India.

5. H. M. Durand, *Sir Henry Durand, Life and Letters*, p. 228.

6. Dickinson, *Dhar Not Restored*, pp. 41-47.

7. For. Deptt. Secret Proceedings, Vol. I, 29th Jan. 1858, Secret letter No. 12 (Imperial Records Deptt.)

8. File No. 1774, Letter No. 193, dated 19th Oct. 1857, from Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. to Govt. of India.

to Dhar, he sent separate detachments to suppress the Revolt at Amjhara, Ujjain and Mandleshwar, to guard the Bhils, to intercept the retreat of the rebels towards Mandsaur, to guard the Line of the Narmada, to protect the Bombay-Agra Road, to gather provisions from the adjoining Indian States, and to destroy the rebels. It was the success of these detachments that made Durand's victorious march possible. The Hyderabad Contingent was employed to maintain the Line of the Narmada and was consequently brought into action on either bank.⁹ Major Orr with his detachment was to help Captain Wood to disperse the rebels wherever found in the Nimar district.¹⁰ This plan secured Nimar district south of the Narmada, covered the Asirgarh line of communication, and reinforced the small force left at Mhow.¹¹ Major Robertson with a strong detachment was posted at Manpur to deny access to the Dhar and Amjhara rebels to the Bombay-Agra Road, to guard Mandleshwar from their threatened march against that place, and also to prevent their junction with the Satwas insurgents.¹² The Forces of Indore,¹³ Ratlam, and Jaora were kept ready to intercept the march of the rebels from within and without Malwa.¹⁴

The British column arrived before Dhar on the 22nd October 1857. The rebels were so confident of their success that they arrayed themselves outside the fort to attack the Company's troops. So they boldly marched against them. They were supported by gunfire from the Fort. On their right they had five or six field guns, but on their left there seemed to be no artillery. After a serious struggle the rebels made a successful retreat into the town and the Fort, with a loss of three of their field guns which

9. Issue Vol. 93, Letter No. 696, dated 17th Oct. 1857, from Col. Durand to Major W. A. Orr, Commanding Field Force, Hyderabad Contingent.

10. *Ibid.*

11. Issue Vol. 93, Letter No. 699, dated 19th Oct. 1857, from H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to H. L. Anderson, Esqr., Secy. Govt. of Bombay.


12. *Ibid.*

13. Issue Vol. 93, Letter No. 714, dated 21st Oct. 1857, from Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to Rao Ramchandra Rao, Offg. Minister, Indore Darbar.

14. File No. 1774, Letter No. 193, dated 19th Oct. 1857, from Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of India.



The Fort of Dhar



Picture shows the place where breach in the Dhar Fort was effected by British Guns in 1857

were captured in a charge made by His Majesty's 14th Dragoons and a Detachment of the 1st Nizam's Cavalry.¹⁵

On the 23rd the siege ordinance was expected, but it did not arrive until the 24th owing to the difficulties on the road and the fatigue of the battle. Eight Howitzers and eight Mortars were put into Battery on the night of the 24th and at day-break of the 25th the town and a ridge near the Fort for the establishment of Breaching Battery were occupied. The fire from the Howitzer Battery, and from the Enfield Rifles on the ridge was directed to silence the Fort Guns.¹⁶ When on the 25th the British forces entered the town, some unknown rebels fired three or four rounds on the British soldiers. Thereupon the British soldiers took a terrible revenge on the town-people.¹⁷ They dragged the civilians from their houses, killed them and looted their property. Ladies were chastised and dishonoured. All the inhabitants were panic-stricken and terrified. The Howitzer and Mortar Battery continued to shell the fort. The rebels were seriously disposed to defend the Fort as long as they could, but they were short of ammunition.

On the morning of the 26th October the young Chief of Dhar paid a visit to Colonel Durand who informed the Diwan thus, "though the British Government would not vest on the boy sitting beside me the evils resulting from the mischievous conduct of those entrusted with the administration in his name, it would hold those advisers and the State responsible for all that had taken place."¹⁸

The Fort of Dhar was besieged from the 24th to the 30th October. The rebels tried to secure provisions and aid from outside in spite of the bombardment. When on the 30th they found a breach in the fort wall, they hoisted a white flag—possibly a pair of "pyjamas,"¹⁹ desiring to know the terms for surrender. The rebels "declined to submit to any other than the

15. Issue Vol. 91, Letter No. 203, dated 26th Oct. 1857, from Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Government of India.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Dhar State Barnisi No. 25, Letter dated 26th Oct. 1857, from Dhar Darbar to Capt. Hutchinson, P.A. Bhopawar.

18. Issue Vol. 91, Letter No. 203, dated 26th Oct. 1857, from Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of India.

19. Sylvester, *Recollections of Campaign in Malwa and C.I.*, p. 28.

Raja of Dhar," while the British demanded "unconditional surrender." Negotiations broke down and fighting was resumed. The British batteries opened fire, but as no immediate effect was produced Colonel Durand sent a message to the Dhar Darbar requiring the presence of such as might be well acquainted with the localities of the Fort and could point out the weak parts of the fortifications. When the informer (sent by the Dhar Darbar) told Colonel Durand that the Eastern side of the fort was a weak spot,²⁰ the guns were directed towards that side and a breach was effected.²¹ But for this betrayal the situation for the rebels would not have become hopeless. After the breach, the rebels escaped from the fort by an underground passage. The British forces entered the Fort of Dhar on the night of the 31st October 1857. After plundering the town and the Fort, they sent the treasure to Mhow Fort under an English escort. On the 3rd November 1857, Colonel Durand placed Captain Hutchinson in charge of the Dhar State pending final orders from the Governor-General. Diwan Ramchandra Rao Bapuji and other suspected rebel leaders were imprisoned and sent to Mandleshwar jail to await their trial.²²

As usual Colonel Durand fixed the guilt of his own inefficient control and management of minority administration on the head of the Dhar Darbar. In his defence he wrote, "The State of Dhar has failed to observe its treaty engagements and it had neither secretly nor openly proved the friend or ally of the British Government at this juncture. Its troops and subjects have met and opposed in the open field the forces of the British Government, and when beaten in the field the Dhar Troops have held out in the Fort of Dhar as long as they could and only evacuated the place and fled on the eve of the assault.

20. Dhar State Mutiny Record, Letter from Dhar Darbar to A.G.G. for C.I.

21. *Manuscript of H. H. Anand Rao III's Life*, p. 7. History Office and Museum, Dhar.

The Breach made by the British in the Fort wall and the entrance of the passage through which the mutineers fled is noticeable even today. Confiscation and Restoration of Dhar State are fully discussed by J. Dickinson in his books, *Dhar not Restored* and *Sequence to Dhar not Restored*.

22. Issue Vol. 93, Letter No. 6A, dated 3rd Nov. 1857, from Col. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to A.R.E. Hutchinson, Bhil Agent and Pol. Asstt.

You will learn from the accompanying copies from the intercepted letters furnished by the Nawab of Jaora that the leaders of the Dhar troops were in communication with the Mandsaur insurgents and pressed the so styled Shahzada to relieve the besieged in the Fort of Dhar by the rapid advance of the reinforcement of 4,000 men and ten guns."²³ The reader will have once more noticed what role was played by the Nawab of Jaora and probably the Begum of Bhopal who later on received the Jagir of Berchha for her "loyal" services to the British.

After Dhar was captured, Colonel Durand sent a detachment under Captain Hutchinson to suppress the Revolt at Amjhera and capture the fort of Lal Garh. The stronghold of the Amjhera rebels was seven miles south-west of Amjhera. The place was almost inaccessible, as the road for the last four miles lay through a dense jungle. Captain Hutchinson and his party encountered great difficulty in a narrow gorge, about 300 yards from the Fort, which was defended by a stone wall.²⁴ The passage onwards was impossible for guns. A steep ascent of about 200 yards brought the British forces to the gate of the Fort. The rebels thought it wise to retreat into the interior. So when Captain Hutchinson occupied the Fort he found not more than 20 occupants who surrendered to him. In the Fort were found four guns and a quantity of ammunition with which the south west bastion and other parts of the Fort were destroyed. The British troops found no treasure either in the Fort or in the houses, as the rebels had either removed it or hid it in the dense jungle.²⁵ Disappointed at not finding loot, after destroying the inner parts of the Fort, the British forces "piled the gateway with wood and straw and had the satisfaction of seeing the gates in flames."²⁶ Thus the British forces gave vent to their anger on the abandoned stronghold of Amjhera rebels. The Raja of Amjhera was captured on the 11th November 1857 in the jungles near Lal Garh Fort through the treachery of some

23. Issue Vol. 93, Letter No. 6 A, dated Camp Dhar 3rd Nov. 1857, from Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.C. for C.I. to Lieut. A. R. Hutchinson, Bhil Agent and P. Asstt.

24. Receipts Vol. 77, Letter No. 341 of 1857, from Capt. Hutchinson to Col. Durand, Offg. A.G.C. for C.I.

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*

of his own followers.²⁷ He was brought to Mhow under the guard of the Hyderabad Contingent Cavalry.²⁸ After the so-called trial he was hanged at Indore on the 10th February 1858.²⁹

Colonel Durand remained at Dhar up to the 7th November.³⁰ During this period his troops took a terrible revenge on the people of Dhar. Several persons lost their lives and property. At 5 o'clock on the morning of the 8th November, the British force marched from Dhar to Mandsaur. The march was through territories of friendly rulers of Jaora and Gwalior who regarded the British as harbingers of peace and tranquillity.

The capture of the Fort of Dhar by the Company gave a set-back to the rebel cause in that part of the country including Ratlam and the neighbouring States.³¹ On the 11th November 1857 Captain Keatinge, Political Assistant at Nimar, arrived at Ratlam to enlist the co-operation of the Ratlam, Sailana and Jaora troops in the advance of the British forces against Mandsaur.³² The rebels tried to divert the march of the British troops by renewing Revolt at Mehidpur. The plan was partly successful and Captain Keatinge was compelled to go there. After a tough fight Major Orr's forces defeated the Mehidpur rebels at Rawal due to their superiority in number and better equipment of arms.³³ Mir Shahmat Ali (Indian Assistant to Agent to the Governor-General for Central India) was given the charge of the Indian forces and the allied troops, and he marched with them to help the British forces at Mandsaur.

The Ratlam troops were commanded by the Thakurs of Pancher and Namli, that of Sailana by Maharaja Chandan Singh, while the Jaora troops were commanded by the Nawab in

27. Issue Vol. 93, Letter No. 26 A, dated 13th Nov. 1857, from Lt. Hutchinson to Lt. Stockley, Commdt. at Mhow.

28. *Family Papers of Vinayak Rao Mandloi of Amjhera*.

29. Issue Vol. 95, Letter No. 328A, dated 14th Feb, 1858, from A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of India.

30. Holmes, *History of Indian Mutiny*, p. 436.

31. File No. 1807, Letter No. 6, dated 24th Apr. 1858, from Mir Shahmat Ali, Indian Asstt. to A.G.G. for C.I. to Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I.

32. *Ibid.*

33. Forrest, *History of Indian Mutiny*, Vol. III, pp. 129-30.

person.³⁴ The allied Forces were instructed to remain six miles behind the British Field Force and to prevent the escape of the rebels. These Indian troops were of considerable help to the British troops not only in intercepting the rebel supplies but also in capturing and killing them in hundreds. They also kept the roads open which greatly facilitated transport of supplies to the British Camp at the time they were most needed. Thus the rebels had to bear the brunt of the blows not only of the English troops but also of the Indian States' forces.

The British Forces, accompanied by Colonel H. M. Durand commanded by Brigadier Stuart, Commanding Malwa Field Force, reinforced by the troops of Major Orr, Commandant of Hyderabad Field Force and supported in the rear by the Allied Forces of the Indian States of Ratlam, Sailana, Jaora and Sitamau, encamped four miles south of Mandsaur on the 21st November 1857.³⁵ They were screened from the view of the town by a range of low hills. The elevated positions were occupied by the British advance guard which was strengthened for the occasion by guns and additional troops. The advance guards of the rebel forces were arrayed in the plains in front of the village of Khilchipura. The British also occupied a village called Hoonanencee on their left front as an advanced post. It was held by a small party of Infantry and Cavalry of the Hyderabad Contingent.

At noon the garrison of the Mandsaur rebels was reinforced by the arrival of 700 rebels from Neemuch. The whole of this force was mustered by the Shahzada on the arrival of the British troops. In the afternoon the rebels came out in a strong body, attacked the British outpost at the village of Hoonanencee and simultaneously threatened the right flank of the British army. As the opposition was severe, the party of the Hyderabad Contingent retreated. The rebel attack being severe it became too difficult for them to retain the possession of the village.³⁶

Then all the British troops moved out from both the advanced Guard's position and from the camp to meet the rebels.

34. File No. 1807, Letter No. 6, dated 24th Apr. 1858.

35. Issue Vol. 91, Letter No. 251, Gen. No. 887, dated Mandsaur, the 25th Nov. 1857, from H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to G.F. Edmonstone Esqr., Secy. Government of India.

36. *Ibid.*

After a tough fight they forced the rebels back upon Mandsaur with considerable loss. At sunset the British troops returned to their camps.

On the morning of the 22nd November, 1857, the British forces advanced with the aim of driving the rebels from Khilchipura in case the rebels attempted to hold the right bank of the river which ran from the south and round the east side of the town and the fort of Mandsaur. The rebels, however, made a tactical blunder in leaving the right bank of the river without opposing the British forces. They only restricted their activities to a harmless fire of round shot from the fort and the suburbs, when the British forces crossed the river at Bakri ford or Bahir Ghat with a view to filing round Khilchipura. This operation was effected without opposition from the rebels. The result was that the British force encamped in front of the town and about two hundred yards from its suburbs.³⁷

Some cavalry which was sent to the ridge north-east of the battle-field reported that a body of rebel cavalry was in the front, and called for reinforcement. Major Gall with a squadron of H.M. 14th Dragoons made a charge against the rebel leader Hira Singh and his horsemen. At first the rebels had an upper hand and killed a good number of English soldiers. But in the end the tables were turned and the main rebel body took refuge in a village about twelve miles from Mandsaur. The British Cavalry, seeing a large number of rebel flags in the village and suspecting serious opposition, returned to the Camp. Knowing that 700 of the rebels had come to Mandsaur from Neemuch on the 21st and that the remaining rebel force at Neemuch was to follow with their artillery to help Mandsaur rebels, the British column moved on the 23rd November about three miles north of Mandsaur to intercept the approaching rebel forces.³⁸

When the British column reached its first halting place, the rebel standards were seen coming over the high ground near Guraria village. The rebel forces made that place the centre of their position, and occupied with their five guns a small ridge to the south-east of the village. The rebels took cover under natural objects like the trees, the stream, the standing 'jowar'

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Ibid.*

crop and other trees of the jungle. They were successful for a time in screening their men from the British troops. But the British officers could judge their position as the rebels carried several long and big flags which were visible from a distance.

Action commenced with the exchange of artillery fire, in which the British guns both due to their numbers and superior practice had a decided advantage. The rebels fought bravely but were overpowered by the strategic moves of the British troops. The British troops advanced and as the rebel position was approached, the British right wing came forward and at long last captured the rebel guns. The rebels were driven in upon their centre and right. When they retreated, they were pursued by the British Cavalry which cut down many of the fugitives. However, a strong body of rebels shut themselves in a village having a fortress which they held tenaciously. The British suffered heavy losses. In the end the British heavy guns finally shelled the fortification and burnt the place.³⁹ Even Kaye admiring the pluck and determination of the rebels admitted that they stuck to the last brick at that place.

While the British force was engaged in fighting the Neemuch rebels, the Mandsaur rebels attacked the British troops in the rear. But the British commander strengthened the British rear which successfully checked the rebels and after a sharp contest forced them to retreat into the town of Mandsaur. Early in the morning of the 25th November 1857, the British forces received the information that, during the night of the 24th, the rebels had evacuated Mandsaur and were scattered throughout the country in various directions.

Mandsaur was the centre of rebel activities and its fall meant a death-blow to the rebel cause in Malwa. Neemuch was easily relieved. The Shahazada and the broken remnants of his bands were compelled to seek refuge in the wild country in the Jhalrapatan districts. The Indian rulers of these places attacked and killed several rebels. Thus Western Malwa cleared of the rebel activities.⁴⁰ In these battles some 1,500 rebels are reported

39. Kaye, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. V, p. 55.

40. Issue Vol. 91, Letter No. 268 Genl. No. 749, dated 30th Nov. 1857. Issue Vol. 95, Letter No. 283, Genl. No. 1001, dated 10th Dec. 1857, from H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to G. F. Edmonstone, Esqr., Secy. Govt. of India.

to have been killed and about 1,000 wounded.

After making over the political charge of Western Malwa to Captain Keatinge⁴¹ and the temporary military charge to Major Orr,⁴² Colonel Durand with the British Forces marched back to Indore via Ujjain. According to Rao Sahib Reshimwale, the most potent factor during those days was the arrival of Colonel Durand. His unconcealed sentiments of irreconcilable animosity towards the Holkar had tended to spread out a bed of gunpowder which only needed one spark to explode. There were public rumours that Durand wanted to arrest the Ruler and punish the rebels in an exemplary manner. Reshimwale, the Indore Darbar's Minister, was of the opinion that, if Colonel Durand took one step precipitately or used the least harshness towards the Ruler, it would be utterly out of his power to check the havoc and devastation that would result.⁴³

At Indore on the 14th of December 1857, Colonel Durand demanded from the Maharaja Tukoji Rao Holkar II punishment for the troops of Indore, who had taken part in the attack upon the Residency on the 1st of July 1857. He demanded "retributive justice" against the rebels. He disarmed Holkar's Regular Cavalry and the Maharaja soon disarmed the Infantry the same evening. After disarming the Holkar's troops and severely punishing many rebels, Colonel Durand⁴⁴ handed over the charge of the Central India Agency on the 16th December 1857 to his successor Sir Robert Hamilton.

The rebel sepoys of Indore were punished. 900 of them were disarmed. 174 cavalry men and 95 infantry men were imprisoned for life. Of the Bajranj Palton 990 were disarmed and brought to trial before a commission. Of the cavalry 392 were disarmed and brought to trial. Besides these 21 persons were blown away by guns, 11 persons were shot dead, 61 persons were imprisoned with hard labour for 14 years, and some for

41. Issue Vol. 93, Letter No. 40A, dated 28th Nov. 1857, from H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to Capt. Keatinge.

42. Letter No. 46A, dated 28th Nov. 1857, from H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to Brg. Stuart, Commanding Malwa Field Force.

43. Bhau Sahib Reshimwale's view as quoted in the manuscript of Golwelkar's life, p. 68.

44. Inward Vol. 80, Letter dated 14th Dec. 1857, from H. H. Maharaja Tukoji Rao Holkar II to Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I.



Sir Robert Hamilton
Permanent A.G.G. at Indore Residency in 1857.

returning from victory over traitors.”⁴⁷

The rebels at Indore were not so much afraid of the British troops, as they were adversely affected by the desire of their Ruler to prove himself to be the most loyal ally of the British. When the Holkar expressed satisfaction on his rebel troops being disarmed through British help, Colonel Durand, “quietly but firmly impressed upon him that something further was yet required—the punishment of the guilty, whether soldiers or citizens”⁴⁸ to serve as a proof of the Holkar’s loyalty to the British. History is a testimony to the fact that Holkar had to pay dearly for being styled as a faithful ally of the British. In spite of the fact that the Holkar’s troops remained inactive and mere watchers of events, when the rebels were fighting tough battles at Dhar and Mandsaur their fate in later days was worse than that of the Mandsaur rebels, who died a warrior’s death and were regarded by the common people as martyrs while those of Indore State troops who remained sitting upon the fence were either blown away by the guns or otherwise severely punished.

To conclude we may say that Colonel Durand’s march for the suppression of the Revolt in Southern and Western Malwa was on the whole successful. The rebel forces, in spite of their determined resistance, were unsuccessful in resisting the re-establishment of the Company’s authority in Central India.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT IN EASTERN AND
NORTHERN MALWA

THE history of the suppression of the Revolt in the Eastern and Northern Malwa is mainly an account of the campaign undertaken by Sir Robert Hamilton and Sir Hugh Rose with the Central India Field Force. The campaign started from Mhow and ended at Gwalior and it took about six months to accomplish it. The Company's Government especially selected Sir Robert Hamilton for the purpose as his long stay in Central India as Agent to the Governor-General well equipped him to take advantage of "the peculiarities which constituted either a bond or division between the several districts."¹ Sir Robert Hamilton knew Tukoji Rao Holkar II from his early childhood and wielded great influence over him. He also exerted considerable influence over the other chiefs and Rulers of Malwa. Sir Hugh Rose was a first rate Military commander of Continental fame and had won laurels in Egypt, Constantinople, and the Crimea.

The following was the Government's plan² of operation against the rebels: Two columns were to be formed at Mhow or Indore, each consisting of two European Infantry and one Cavalry Regiment with at least four troops of batteries and as large a body of reliable Indian troops as could be had besides heavy artillery for siege purposes. One column was to move by the Bombay-Agra road towards Gwalior to open British communications along that important line. This column was to proceed from Indore to Dewas, Sarangpur and Biora where the plundered telegraph station was to be re-established. From Biora the column was to advance to Raghugarh, Bajrangarh and Guna. On this portion of the march some possible obstruction from the chief of Raghugarh was apprehended. This column

1. Kaye, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. V, p. 90.

2. This Plan was drawn by Sir R. Hamilton and was approved by the G.G., the C-in-Chief and the Governor of Bombay.

Outward Vol. 94, letter No. 1197, dated 30th Dec. 1857, from Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to Maj. Gen. Sir Hugh Rose, Commanding, Central India Field Force.

was to halt at Sipri.

The second column was to move from Indore to Sehore, where after meeting Brigadier Stuart's column, the two forces were to march upon Bhilsa, Rahatgarh and Saugor. To this column a siege train was to be attached. The next objective was Jhansi. Before attacking the strong fort of Jhansi a junction of the two columns was to be effected. Further operation was to be determined after Jhansi was captured. From the 18th December 1857 to 6th January 1858,³ both Sir Robert Hamilton and Sir Hugh Rose spent their time in making preparations, collecting equipments, securing means of transport, arranging for the siege-train and getting provisions. The "loyal" Indian Rulers also placed all their resources at their disposal.

All the military forces under the Agent to the Governor-General for Central India were placed under Sir Hugh Rose from the 18th December 1857, as also the forces under Major Orr, Captain Hare and Captain Spied.⁴ Twenty-three elephants from different States (13 from Indore, 3 from Dhar, 2 from Dewas and 5 which were seized at Dhar) were procured for the transport of military goods, besides a large number of camels and bullock.⁵ Arrangements were made to re-establish telegraph lines between Indore and Biora.⁶

In order that the British position and power at Indore might be kept secure, Captain Hutchinson was kept in-charge of the duties at Indore.⁷ His escort was one company of European troops with two guns and a wing of Indian Cavalry.⁸ Sir H. Rose with his Central India Field Force and accompanied by Sir R. Hamilton marched from Mhow on the 6th January, 1858.

3. Outward Vol. 94, Letter No. 1068, dated 18th Dec. 1857, from Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to Sir H. Rose, Commanding, C.I. Field Force.

4. Issue Vol. 93, Letter Nos. 1070 to 1073, from A.G.G. for C.I. to Commanding Officers.

5. Outward Vol. 94, Letter No. 1090, dated 21st Dec. 1857, from Sir R. Hamilton to Sir H. Rose.

6. Letter No. 1170, dated 29th Dec. 1857, from Sir R. Hamilton to Sir H. Rose.

7. Issue Vol. 95, Letter No. 10, from Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of India.

8. Outward Vol. 94, Letter No. 1197, dated 30th Dec. 1857, from Sir Hamilton to Sir H. Rose.

and reached Sehore on the 8th. At Sehore a court martial was held for the so-called trial of the rebels of the late Bhopal contingent. After a summary trial⁹ and without being afforded means for proper defence they were disposed of as follows:

Military	Executed	Retained	Deserted	For trial	Dismissed	Trans- ported	Total
Artillery	195	228	205	46	274	—	848
Infantry	159	40	96	34	233	4	566
Cavalry	—	130	9	68	9	14	230

The worth of these so-called trials can very well be judged from the remark of the Governor-General on one of the trials held by the authorities of Central India Agency. The Governor-General wrote that he did not see the grounds of distinction between those who were shot and those who were sentenced to transportation for life.¹⁰ The official number seems to be much below the public estimate in regard to the persons executed or otherwise seriously punished by the British. There is an old man at Sehore named Azmatullah, more than seventy years of age, who points out the place where over 200 rebels were executed and buried. Azmatullah's father was in the Company's service at the time of the Revolt at Indore. There is another man at Sehore named Thakur Balbhadra Singh who tells stories about the Revolt.

Sir Hugh Rose with his force left Sehore on the 16th January for Rahatgarh. The rebels at first resisted Sir Hugh Rose's troops. But in the end the fort of Rahatgarh was besieged. The Raja of Banpur came with his forces to relieve the rebels, but his troops were defeated by the Company's forces. After a serious contest which lasted for one week, the rebels inside the fort were exhausted and they escaped from the fort on the night of the 28th January, 1858. Rahatgarh was found to be so strong by the British observers as to make it tenable by a few resolute

9. Secret Proceedings 26th Mar. 1858, Vol. 580, (I.R.D.) Letter No. 249, dated 31st Jan. 1858, from Sir H. Rose to H. L. Anderson, Esqr., Secy. to Govt. of Bombay.

10. Letter No. 318, dated 22nd Jan. 1858. Despatch to the Secret Committee, Enclosure No. 9. Letter to A.G.G. for C.I.

defenders against numbers greatly superior.

It was a good fortune of the British that the rebels did not offer further resistance and retreated in great haste.¹¹ Many fugitives were caught while attempting to escape and the Nawab Fazal Mohammad Khan,¹² the chief leader and the principal insurgent, was brought as a prisoner. At Sir R. Hamilton's suggestion, he was at once hanged over the gateway of the Fort along with Nawab Kamdar Khan¹³ Pindara, another of the leaders.¹⁴ The way in which the rebel leaders were hanged without trial by the British is an example of their sense of justice and fair play.

The Raja of Banpur, being reinforced, further attacked the British forces near the village of Barodia. The rebels fought valiantly, but Sir 'H. Rose managed to force his passage across the river. He had to fight at every step before he could gain the passage.¹⁵ Sir Hugh Rose then marched towards Saugor. He reached there on the 3rd February 1858. The place was easily occupied. About 25 miles from Saugor was a strong Fort of Garhakota, on the bank of the river Sonar. The fort was garrisoned and after a heavy bombardment it was occupied on the 10th of February 1858. The fort was captured by the British without any loss of life as the rebels had fled from it to Shahagarh in the night. The rebels seemed to be panic-stricken and their flight was "mysteriously favourable" to the English.¹⁶

The English destroyed the western part of the Fort so as to make it unserviceable for the rebels in future against British attacks. On their return march, the British carried away a large quantity of supplies from the Fort. One of the consequences of the British success at Garhakota was the evacuation of

11. Kaye, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. V. p. 98.

12. He was a relative of Sikandar Begam, the Regent of Bhopal. He failed to usurp Her Highness's power. Later on he became the chief leader of the rebels.

13. He was the son of Namdar Khan Pindara. After the Pindari War he was granted a pension and permitted to settle at Berchha. His pension and village were confiscated as he took part in the Revolt.

14. *Ibid.* Issue Vol. 95, Letter No. 34, dated 30th Jan. 1858.

15. Kaye, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. V., p. 98.

16. For. Deptt. Secret Proceedings, 26th Mar. 1858, Vol. 580, I.R.D. 675/Gen. No. 318 A. Letter No. 52, from R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of India.

Shahagarh by the rebels. The districts of Shahagarh Raja were confiscated by the British on the pretext that the Ruler had taken part in the Revolt.¹⁷

From 17th to 27th February the Central India Field Force under Sir Hugh Rose halted at Saugor. The reason put forward for this delay was the necessity to collect supplies before making any further advance. Both Sir Hugh Rose and Sir Hamilton later on realised that the long stay at Saugor was taken advantage of by the rebels in capturing several new localities in the valley of Betwa river. They also threatened to capture Orchha. They crippled British resources and successfully intercepted their supplies.¹⁸ But the British had the advantage of the "loyal" support from several of the Rulers like those of Bhopal, Gwalior, Orchha, Shahagarh and Hirapur. They, therefore, were successful in getting supplies through these Indian Rulers and their loyal agents. The British troops were accompanied by an unusually large number of camp followers who were mostly Indians. The estimated number of persons to be fed daily was 10,000 men exclusive of Major Orr's Force.¹⁹

At long last on the 27th February the British Forces left Saugor. On the 28th they shelled the Fort of Barodia and captured it. On the 3rd of March the forces passed through the pass of Madanpur (Malthon). This pass, despite its advantageous natural position, was further efficiently fortified by the rebels. Sir Hugh Rose found it difficult to capture it by direct attack. And therefore he decided to take it by a stratagem. He feigned an attack in front while the bulk of his army gained the table-land above the hills by a flank movement through the pass of Madanpur. The rebels rose to the occasion and they quickly occupied the key points from where they heavily fired at the British Forces and for a considerable time checked their advance. Sir Hugh Rose ordered the guns to be taken back. The firing by the rebels was so severe and galling that Sir Rose's horse was shot under him. Kaye says, "bullets fell like hail storms, and the number of killed and wounded

17. Letter No. 366 A, dated 19th Feb. 1858, from Sir Hamilton to Sir H. Rose.

18. Outward Vol. 94, Letter No. 375 A, dated 20th Feb. 1858, from Sir R. Hamilton to Sir H. Rose.

19. *Ibid.*

increased every moment."²⁰

The British had to halt for sometime near the pass of Madanpur until the guns of the Hyderabad Contingent came to their rescue and opened fire on the rebels. Then the European Infantry mustered courage to charge at the rebels. They were successful in the attempt and the pass and town of Madanpur were at last occupied by the British. The British Cavalry was sent to pursue the rebels who soon disappeared in the jungles. The final victory of the British had a great influence as it overawed the rebels who did not offer further resistance; it allowed a safe passage towards Jhansi to the British Forces; it secured the fortress of Tal Bahat on the heights above the tank of the same name; and it secured the line of the Bina and the Betwa for the British.

Now we turn to the history of the first Brigade under C. S. Stuart who left Mhow on the 10th January 1858, and passed through Dewas, Biora, Raghugarh and Guna. It appeared before the famous fort of Chanderi on the 5th of March 1858. There was a narrow pass between the two hills near Chanderi, but the rebels, to the surprise of Major Stuart, did not offer any resistance at that strategic point. The rebels however offered a determined resistance when the British troops came within a mile of the fort. The British had the advantage of superior artillery and Major Stuart used it to his advantage. The British guns made a breach in the fort on the 16th March. They were also reinforced by the troops under Captain Keatinge. On the 17th March Major Stuart being reinforced tried to storm the fort. The rebels managed to escape in large numbers, but their big guns and supplies fell into the British hands. The fall of Chanderi weakened the cause of the rebels to a great extent, since it was regarded as an old strategic post with a historical glamour about it—"If you want to see a town whose houses are palaces, visit Chanderi."²¹

After the capture of Chanderi the next important post was Jhansi, which was the main-stay of the rebel power in Central India. It was a place where the brave and gallant Rani of Jhansi ruled. Its fort was massive and strong and its people were

20. Kaye, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. V., p. 102.

21. *Ibid.* p. 104.

determined to fight against the British to the end. The British people also regarded it as a symbol of the tyrannies of the rebels towards their fellowmen (the Britishers) and they were anxiously looking for the day of revenge. Hence the fight at Jhansi was important both for the rebels and the British.

Sir Hugh Rose with his forces and those of Major Stuart advanced on Jhansi and besieged it on the 21st March 1858. Jhansi was captured by the British troops on the 4th April 1858. The history of this area is not a subject of this monograph; yet we may make a rapid survey of some important events at Jhansi. The Rani of Jhansi cleared the jungle, removed the supplies, arranged the pickets at strategic points, laboured hard to repair the fort, encouraged the people to fight to the last, employed women, sent secret messengers to the enemy's camps, and tried her level best to fight the battle for the cause of *Swadharma* and *Swaraj*.

The British forces besieged Jhansi for 17 days and made many attempts to storm and capture it. For several days the people of Jhansi did not take off their clothes, unbridle their horses, or sleep comfortably. At last on the first of April 1858, a strong rebel force under Tatia Topi, and accompanied by Mardan Singh of Banpur, the Raja of Shahagarh and Nawab Adil Mohammad Khan (a subject of the Bhopal State) arrived at Burwa Saugor with the aim of relieving the fort of Jhansi or enabling the besieged to effect their escape.²²

As the day dawned (on the 1st April 1858) the rebels under Tatia Topi occupied a very strong position at Betwa and immediately opened a severe fire from their heavy guns on the British forces. The position of Sir Hugh Rose became very critical. However, courageously he faced the rebels with the British cavalry and horse artillery. The rebel forces which in the beginning fought with courage and determination lost heart due to the confusion in command and loose organisation.²³ Tatia Topi decided too early to make a retreat. It is correct that he managed the retreat very well by setting fire to the jungle and escaping from the sight of the British forces under the cover of

22. Issue Vol. 95, Letter No. 135, Gen. No. 674 A, dated Camp Jhansi 1st Apr. 1858, from Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. to Government of India.

23. *Ibid*.

smoke and fire, yet the retreat was too early. The battle of Betwa was a turning point in the history of the rebel activities at Jhansi. The British troops not only killed thousands of the rebels during the retreat but also captured a large quantity of ammunition and a number of big guns which were subsequently employed for the bombardment of Jhansi. Thus it was an irony of fate that Tatia Topi who came to relieve Jhansi partly contributed to its early fall.

The victorious army of Sir Hugh Rose poured heavy fire on the Jhansi Fort and town on the 2nd and 3rd of April 1858. The Rani of Jhansi and her people offered a very stiff resistance and proved beyond doubt their courage. There are very few examples in history of such dogged and determined opposition to the foreigners. However the superiority of the British troops in arms and ammunition made it difficult for the Rani of Jhansi to hold the fort any longer. Personally the Rani of Jhansi was determined to die fighting on the spot, but the advice of her councillors prevailed over her valour and she was persuaded to leave the fort on the night of the 4th April 1858. She hoped that her presence at Kalpi would be a deciding factor in persuading Tatia Topi to give her further aid.

Accompanied by her adopted boy and a few trusted followers, she quitted the fort by the Khanderi Gate and successfully eluded the British pickets.²⁴ After her departure Sir Hugh Rose occupied the fort of Jhansi as well as the town.²⁵ The revenge taken was out of all proportions to the crime of the rebels. For days together general slaughter, plunder and devastation continued. It is needless to go into the details of these horrible deeds, but it is a fact that the horrors perpetrated by Timur Lang and Changez Khan possibly pale into insignificance before the acts committed by the British troops in suppressing the Revolt at Jhansi. Martial law reigned supreme for several days and Sir Hugh Rose halted at Jhansi for nearly 19 days after the capture of the place.²⁶ During this period he was successful in striking terror in the hearts of the innocent common people.

24. Issue Vol. 95, Letter No. 139, Gen. No. 694 B, dated 6th April, 1858, from R.N.C. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. to Govt. of India.

25. *Ibid.*

26. G. Bhatt, *Majha Pravas* (in Marathi) Chapter on Jhansi Massacre, Part V, p. 97.



Rani Laxmi Bai of Jhansi.

Fort of Jhansi

The great fortress of Jhansi, built on an elevation rising out of the plains, defied the attack of the British forces for many days. The siege began on 22 March 1858 and in spite of the superior artillery of the British force they could not occupy it until 4 April. The defenders resisted gallantly. Among them were many women and children



After the Rani of Jhansi had left for Kalpi she tried her best to organise an army with the help of Nana Sahib and Tatia Topi. The rebel forces mustered at Kunch and Sir Hugh Rose advanced from Jhansi to attack them. The rebels offered severe resistance but in the end were defeated. The defeat somewhat undermined the morale of the rebel forces. Sir Hugh Rose next advanced to fight the rebels at Kalpi. It is remarkable that though the rebels were defeated at several places, they gathered again and faced the British. Much credit for this is due to the Rani of Jhansi who by her magnetic personality turned the despair of the rebels into confidence. The sepoys who forsook their camps returned to fight and to exterminate the English from their land. The rebels prepared a plan for attack which has been praised even by several British Generals. Taking advantage of the natural factors the rebels attacked the British troops with great energy and confidence. In the beginning they successfully overpowered the British troops but at the critical moment Sir Hugh Rose called for reinforcements and these, specially the camel corps, did a great service to the British cause. In the end the rebels were forced to evacuate Kalpi. During these days the rebel leaders underwent severe hardships. The Rani of Jhansi on some occasions slept under a tree. The English troops too suffered great hardships but the prompt and profuse help in men, money and supplies from the various "loyal" Rulers of the Indian States relieved their suffering to a considerable extent.

The capture of Kalpi put an end to Sir Hugh Rose's and Sir Robert Hamilton's plan of operation for the suppression of the Revolt in Central India. Within 5 months (January to May 1858) the important centres of the rebels' activities in Central India were captured and a way was prepared for the re-establishment of the British authority in India. While we admire the achievement of the British commanders and troops, we should not lose sight of the speedy methods adopted by the rebel leaders in occupying new positions in place of the lost ones. If the rebels lost at Betwa and Jhansi, they went to Kunch and Kalpi and when they were defeated there, they mustered all their strength and with lightning speed went and occupied Gwalior. The plan for the capture of Gwalior owed its origin possibly to the Rani of Jhansi. The

aim was to appeal to the Gwalior troops on grounds of religion and national feeling, to take possession of Gwalior and then to decide their future courses of action. The plan was acted upon as soon as it was conceived. The messengers from the rebel leaders went and worked among the Sindhia's troops and gradually won them over to the cause of the rebels. On the 30th of May 1858 the Sindhia was informed that several emissaries were tampering with his troops. He also heard to his great surprise that the rebel leaders like the Rani of Jhansi, Rao Sahib, and Tatia Topi with their strong rebel force estimated at 7,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry and 12 guns had occupied Morar.

The Maharaja Sindhia decided to fight with the rebels and on the 1st of June 1858, he marched forward towards Morar, with 6,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, 600 bodyguards and 8 guns. He arranged his troops but the rebels advanced to counteract the Sindhia's tactical moves. The rebel forces were fired upon by the Sindhia's guns. They, however, closed their flanks and made a determined assault. They were successful in capturing the Sindhia's guns. Several persons from Sindhia's army joined hands with the rebels and the Sindhia had therefore to leave Gwalior. The rebels triumphantly entered Gwalior and ruled there for over 20 days with all the wisdom that they could command. During this short period, the administrative system established by the rebels at Gwalior suffered from some serious drawbacks in matters of defence which resulted in their ultimate failure.

The British officers soon realised the gravity of the situation and made an all out effort to oust the rebels from Gwalior. Sir Hugh Rose resumed the command of the Central India Field Force and without losing a day he marched to Gwalior with all available forces.²⁷ He called the Agra Troops, the Rajputana Troops, the Northern Bombay²⁸ Troops in addition to his own for an attack on Gwalior. The details of the movement of the various British columns are as follows:

Firstly, Sir Hugh Rose with all his troops marched from Kalpi on the 6th of June 1858 towards Gwalior. Secondly, Brigadier Stuart with his column marched to Gwalior via Jalaun. Both

27. Maj. Gen. Sir O. T. Burne, *Clyde and Strathnairn*, pp. 141 and 142.

28. Inns, *Sepoy Revolt*, p. 300.

these forces met at the Fort of Indurkhi on the Kali-Sind river.²⁹ Thirdly, Colonel Riddell's force with a large supply of siege guns, mortars and ammunitions marched from Agra towards Gwalior. Fourthly, Brigadier Smith's force marched from Chanderi towards Gwalior. Fifthly, several contingents of the Central India Field Force and the Hyderabad Contingent were ordered to march towards Gwalior. Sixthly, Major Orr marched from Jhansi to Panihar 12 miles from Gwalior. Thus Gwalior was surrounded on all sides by strong British forces who guarded all the highroads and ways issuing from and leading to Gwalior.³⁰

If on the one hand we find the British officers marching from all directions, on the other hand we look with admiring eyes at the able Rani of Jhansi trying her best to persuade Rao Sahib and Tatia Topi to leave their amusements of feasting and dancing, and to be ready for defence against the anticipated British attack. Sir H. Rose's plan was to encircle Gwalior as far as practicable, to attack its weakest point, to keep some Reserve Troops and to pursue the rebels in their flight in case of their defeat. Sir Hugh Rose found out that the weakest the most suitable point for attack on Gwalior was the Eastern one where there were rows of high hills. It had an advantage as, once the highest of the hills were captured, attacks could be launched along the slope till the Company's forces would march into Lashkar. From there it would have been easy to storm and capture it and to drive a wedge between the rebel troops.

Brigadier Smith's force was ordered to march from Sipri to Kota-ki-Sarai (about seven miles to the east of Gwalior). Sir Hugh Rose and his troops with that of Brigadier Stuart's column were to capture Morar Cantonment. To complete the encirclement of Gwalior from the South-east and North, Colonel Riddle's forces were ordered to march towards the Gwalior Residency, seven miles to the north of Gwalior. All these columns were to direct a simultaneous attack on Gwalior from all directions.³¹ On the 16th June Sir Hugh Rose's forces arrived at Bahadurpur,

29. Letter dated 13th Oct. 1858, from Sir H. Rose to Maj. Gen. William Mansfield, Chief of the Staff of the Army in India, *Military papers*.

30. *Ibid.*

31. Letter dated 13th Oct. 1858, from Sir H. Rose, Commanding, Field Forces, South of the Narbada to Maj-Gen. Sir William Mansfield, Chief of the Staff of the Army in India.

Inns, *Sepoys Revolt*, pp. 298-300.

about five miles from Morar Cantonment. But the rebels were not inactive. The rebel troops occupied a strong position before the Morar Cantonment facing the British Troops.

At Morar the rebels had posted eight guns, two Regiments and about one thousand horse to oppose the British advance. The rebels moved two guns supported by one Regiment across the Parade ground, from its left to the right of the Cantonment. The large bodies of their Cavalry were drawn up on the Parade ground in front of the lines. Sir H. Rose determined to advance at once and capture the Cantonment. The prospect of taking possession of the big bungalows before they were set on fire by the rebels induced the British troops to make a desperate attempt. When the rebel Cavalry appeared in great forces beyond the Cantonment, several rounds were fired from the British Horse Battery which forced them to retreat towards Lashkar. The damage done to the buildings and materials at Morar by the rebels was not considerable as the British advance was swift.

The British Forces were throughout guided by the Sindhia's agents who showed them the way and the weak points of the rebels.³² They carried all information about the movement of the rebels to the British. The agents being Indians it was difficult for the rebels to detect them. But the rebels successfully withdrew their batteries and crossed the bridge leading to Gwalior before the English could cut off their retreat. Many skirmishes followed in which the English lost some of their renowned soldiers, while fire from the English guns killed several rebels. The capture of Morar on the 16th June 1858 by the Company's forces was a serious loss to the rebels. "It was the first defeat which the combined forces of the Kalpi and Gwalior rebels had sustained."³³ A huge quantity of supplies which the rebels stored at Morar fell into the British hands. The rebels retreated so hurriedly that they had not sufficient time left to burn the bungalows which were soon turned to good account by the British for the protection of their troops. The British soldiers slaughtered several of the rebels.


On the 16th June 1858 Brigadier Smith with the force from Guna joined the Hyderabad force under Major Orr and proceed-

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*



Rani Laxmi Bai of Jhansi and Tatya Tope on horse back



ed to meet the Central India Field Force at Antri. On the 17th June, Brigadier Smith advanced to Kota-ki-Sarai.³⁴ Major Orr moved off to a position on the Sipri road. The rebels appeared in great force when Brigadier Smith reached his encamping ground and forced him into action. The final result of the operation was that the British captured 4 guns and the heights. Tatia Topi and Rao Sahib were present in this battle. The Rani of Jhansi who had proceeded to oppose the advance of the Agra column returned from there to help Tatia Topi and Rao Sahib. She joined in the battle of Kota-ki-Sarai. Between Gwalior and Kota-ki-Sarai the rebels under the Rani of Jhansi occupied the heights. The plan of the Rani was to fight the British from the heights. Brigadier Smith proceeded a little ahead of Kota-ki-Sarai to take a strategic position, at a time when he found that the rebels were determined to attack him.

About 1500 yards from Kota-ki-Sarai the guns of the rebels were in position and their line ran all under the hills across the road to Gwalior. As soon as the British reconnoitring party came within four to five hundred yards the rebel guns opened such a heavy fire that Brigadier Smith and his forces had to retire. Then the British Horse Artillery was ordered to advance and that produced the desired result. Afterwards the Infantry was sent forward to pursue the rebels as far as practicable. The rebels soon gathered courage and began to make "threatening movements".

The most vital force behind the rebel movement was the Rani of Jhansi. She organised the rebels, encouraged the sepoys and took upon herself the task of defending the eastern gate of Gwalior. On several occasions the Rani charged hard on the English army and cut down many of the English soldiers. She fought so well that on the 17th June 1857, she forced Brigadier Smith's forces to retire.

The next day Brigadier Smith being reinforced was better prepared to face the rebels. Sir Hugh Rose personally helped him in that day's attack. The Rani of Jhansi was also prepared to fight to the end. Dressed in male attire, accompanied by two faithful female attendants, and acting as the commander of the

34. Letter No. 25, dated Camp Gwalior 25th June 1858, from Brigadier M. W. Smith, Commanding Brigade, Rajputana Field Force to the Commanding Officer, C. I. Field Force.

rebel forces, she breathed a new martial spirit into the rebel forces. But the superiority of the English in arms and ammunition, in number and organisation, turned the scales in their favour. In that day's life and death struggle, the Rani of Jhansi was killed fighting bravely for her country's freedom.³⁵ Her new horse did not jump over the brook and she was overtaken by the English horsemen. One fellow hit her on the head from behind and though the brave Rani killed him the wound was fatal. She was burnt by her followers in the garden of Ganga Das Baba.

Manu Bai (Laxmi Bai) spent her childhood under her father Moropant's care. Her girlhood and youth were blighted by the death of her son and her husband Gungadhar Rao, and her mature womanhood slipped past under warfare against the foreigners. No person demands more admiration and sympathy in the history of the Revolt than the Rani of Jhansi. That the Rani of Jhansi should die violently was in keeping with the violent changes of her life. She had a burning hatred for oppression and had an inborn passion for justice. She may aptly be termed as the Joan of Arc of India. Her one mission was to rid her motherland of the Englishmen. She hated the "organised brigandage" of Dalhousie's rule and tried to relieve the miseries of her people. For her dauntless courage and selflessness she ranks among the most outstanding and inspiring personalities of Indian history.

35. Letter dated Camp Morar 25th June 1858, from Lt.-Col. T. N. Hicks, Commanding Artillery, C.I.F. Force to Brig. M. W. Smith, Commanding Rajputana Field Force. "Mili. Papers." Vol. III, Gwalior.




Chhattari of Rani Lakshmi Bai

TATYA TOPE

TATYA'S MARATHON RACE

21 JUNE 1858 — 8 APRIL 1859

SCALE OF MILES



Map showing the Route of the Rebels under Tatya Tope.
After the Battle of Gwalior, June 20, 1858, to this final Dispersion in March 1859.

CHAPTER XII

SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT AND THE AFTERMATH

AFTER the defeat of the rebels at Gwalior in June 1858 and the retreat of Tatia Topi near Rajgarh, in September 1858, various isolated bands of rebels hovered in and around the Bhopal Agency.¹ The future operations of the rebels were based on the following principles. Firstly, they planned not to occupy themselves in any pitched battle with the English army. Secondly, they adopted guerilla tactics, which caused much annoyance to the British. Thirdly, to carry on the struggle, they aimed at levying contributions of provisions, arms and money from the Indian States.

The rebel leader Adil Muhammad Khan, with his force of about 500 Muckranis, Wylaities and others, after passing through the villages of Nekayan Pura and entering through Tehri jungle occupied early in September 1858, the fort of Bussul (Serongj) situated on a hill, and therefore inaccessible to guns. Other important rebels like Adil Muhammad Khan (the nephew of Adil Muhammad Khan who was wounded in the battle of Gwalior by a sword-cut in the back), Sarfaraz Muhammad Khan and Rao Kumar Singh Pindarah were also at Bussul with Adil Muhammad Khan.²

On the 24th November 1858 the position of the rebel bands and the British troops was as follows:³ Man Singh of Narwar with about 100 men was at Arrora Khatra, 20 miles N.W. from Berchha, Nazar Muhammad Khan with some 500 men was in the hills and jungles near Ugrod. Adil Muhammad Khan with Baba Sahib Pundit and Rao Sahib with about 1600 rebels were at the villages of Moujuri and Ponia of Gwalior and of Bhiwah of Muhammadgarh. Captain Mayne with his Horse was at Ber-

1. V. D. Savarkar, *The Indian War of Independence*, p. 523.

2. File No. 1817, Intelligence from Acting Asstt. in Charge of Berchha, dated 6th Sept. 1858.

3. File No. 1817, Letter dated 24th Nov. 1858, from W. H. Richards, P. A. Bhopal to R. Shakespeare with Brig. Smith's force.

chha, Colonel Hope with 2 guns and about 280 men was at Bhopal, and Brigadier Lockhart with 2 guns and the rest of his Brigade was at Sehore. Tatia Topi was in Nimar with British troops closing upon him. Captain Karr of the South Maratha Horse wrote to say that the Banda Nawab with his retinue had surrendered and arrived in the British camp under a guard of 13th Bombay Infantry on the 15th November 1858. On the 23rd February 1859 a party of nearly 1000 rebels encamped close to Berchha, under the leadership of Adil Muhammad Khan and Bhunweji.⁴ On the night of the 21st April, 1859, Adil Muhammad Khan with his followers passed from the Narbada towards the Bhilsa territory.⁵ On the 29th April, 1859, the Naib Bakhshi of Bhopal with a body of about 100 horse and foot encountered the rebels under Adil Muhammad Khan and Amanat Khan. The rebels were defeated with a loss of 19 killed and many wounded. A considerable amount of plunder was taken from them,⁶ but the leaders escaped and soon got reinforced. On the 15th May 1859, Adil Muhammad Khan, Amanat Khan⁷ and Surferaz Khan⁸ captured the fort of Pipria under Bhilsa.⁹ On the 18th May 1859, a British detachment accompanied the Subah of Isagarh from Seronj to Sanchi and from that place attacked Adil Muhammad Khan. Some of his followers were killed or captured, but Adil Muhammad Khan managed to escape.¹⁰ The fort of Pinpria was evacuated by the rebels.¹¹ Pandit Gungadhar, sent to Agra-Barkhera to attack the Jagir of Chhattersal, was defeated by

4. File No. 1817, Letter No. 53, dated 28th Feb. 1859, from Maj. W. H. Richards, P. A. Bhopal to A.G.G. for C.I.

5. File No. 1817, Official Memo No. 263, dated 24th April, 1859. G. Cumming, Offg. P. A. Bhopal (Intelligence from the Patel of Goruckpur 10 miles North East of Umedpura in Bhopal).

6. File No. 1817, Letter No. 286, dated 2nd May 1859, from G. Cumming, Offg. P. A. Bhopal to A.G.G. for C.I.

7. Previously he was in the service of the Begum of Bhopal, File No. 1817, Letter No. 243, from A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. to Govt. of India.

8. He was present in the attack of Berchha, File No. 1817, Letter No. 243, from A.G. for C.I. to Secy. to Govt. of India.

9. File No. 1817, Letter No. 358, dated 18th May 1859, from Hutchinson, P.A. Bhopal to A.G.G. for C.I.

10. File No. 1817, Memo No. 362, dated 20th May 1859, from P. A. Bhopal to A.G.G. for C.I.

11. File No. 1817, Letter No. 125, dated 31st May 1859, from P.A. Bhopal to A.G.G. for C.I.



Shri Ramchandra Dhondopant (Tatya Tope)

Chhatarsal with the loss of some men killed and several wounded. The pandit returned.¹² Chhatarsal attacked some villages like Gokulpur, Shaherkhera, Chirarie, plundered the property, burnt the huts and carried away the cattle.¹³ In May 1859 another rebel leader named Dungal Singh, the Jagirdar of Bhilkhara under Isagarh district of the Sindhia, who was a rebel for the last 10 months, became a source of danger in the neighbourhood of Sironj.¹⁴ Both Chhatarsal and Dungal Singh were very watchful and seldom stayed for a day in one place.¹⁵ In June 1859, a large number of rebels were still abroad in the Bhilsa district.¹⁶

By the last week of June 1859 serious efforts were made by the British forces to attack parties of rebels under Adil Muhammad Khan. Getting reliable information that the rebels under Adil Muhammad Khan were at the village of Gunapura about 22 miles from Bhilsa, Lieutenant Bruce with his force marched at 8 a.m. on the 22nd June 1859, ready for a surprise attack, Lieutenant Bruce arrived at Gunapura at 4 p.m. that very day and found the village on the range of hills surrounded by a dense jungle. Gunapura at first appeared uninhabited but on further advance, the British force was threatened by a party of rebels who appeared on the hill above the village. Because of the dense jungle Lieutenant Bruce thought it unwise to pursue the rebels too far and hence he recalled his sepoys. On obtaining information that about 1,000 rebels under Bukshi Amanat Khan had encamped two miles east of Gunapura, Lieutenant Bruce proceeded to that place only to find that the rebels had left the place an hour before. Provision was collected from the houses. Then they were burnt. In the night Lieutenant Bruce encamped at Gunapura and after patrolling in the night his forces returned to Bhilsa at 11 a.m. on the 23rd of June after marching 50 miles

12. Memo No. 362, dated 20th May 1859.

13. File No. 1817, Memo of Intelligence dated 29th May 1859, from P.A. Bhopal to A.G.G. for C.I.

14. File No. 1817, Letter No. 122, dated 30th May 1859, from P. A. Bhopal to A.G.G. for C.I.

15. Memo dated 29th May 1859 (C.I.A.O. Records.)

16. File No. 1817, Letter No. 1488, dated 6th June 1859, from A.G.G. for C.I. to Maj. Gen. Sir Michael.

in 27 hours.¹⁷

Lieutenant F. Roome, Commanding Basoda Field Force, sent a copy of British terms to Adil Muhammad Khan and Bukshi Amanat Khan.¹⁸ Adil Muhammad Khan ordered that the hands of the British messengers should be cut off. But by jumping off their horses and running into the jungle they managed to escape.¹⁹ Lieutenant Roome marched at 1 p.m. on the 23rd June 1859, and attacked Adil Muhammad Khan on the hills above Gunapura and killed over 100 of his men. There the English discovered pits of grain sufficient for a year's supply which along with the village they burnt and destroyed.²⁰

However, the hilly tract of the country and thick forests between the Betwa river and the Saugor frontier provided the rebels with suitable places to hide and the defects in the arrangement of the three divisions of the British army²¹ further secured the position of the rebels. The three divisions of the British forces were under three different Commanders and there was no united attempt for a simultaneous attack on the rebels.

The co-operation of the Rahatgarh Detachment would have been most valuable for the suppression of the rebels; but it belonged to the Saugor division and was under a different Command. The rebels took advantage of the territorial jurisdictions for we find that the post where Malwa, Gwalior and Saugor Divisions met, was overrun by the rebels under Adil Muhammad Khan.²² Similarly where the jurisdictions of the Malwa and the Gwalior Divisions met, the rebels under Firoz Shah and Rao Sahib infested the country. Sironj and Bursud were under General Napier's Division while Basoda was under General Michel.

The rebels threatened the security of the Bombay Agra Road from their neighbouring haunts.²³ There are numerous 'Memos

17. File No. 1817, Letter dated 23rd June 1859, from Lieut. Bruce Commanding at Bhilsa to P. A. Bhopal.

18. File No. 1817, Letter dated 25th June 1859, from Lieut. F. Roome, Commanding Basoda Field Force to P. A. Bhopal.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*

21. File No. 1817. Letter No. 329, dated July 1st, 1859, from A.G.C. for C.I. to Secy. to Govt. of India.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*

of Intelligence' giving an account of the innumerable acts of plunder and rapine by the rebels.²⁴ At 5 p.m. on the 7th July 1859, Lieutenant Bruce heard that Adil Muhammad Khan with 500 followers was at Chatira, 28 miles from Bhilsa. On reaching there on the morning of the 8th July he found the rebels dispersed in the dense jungles above. Lieutenant Bruce ordered the villages Chatira and Rampura (at a distance of one mile from each other) to be burnt. It appears that Lieutenant Bruce sought solace in burning undefended and deserted villages to make up for his fruitless marches. He returned via Gunapura to Bhilsa after marching 55 miles in 24 hours.²⁵

About the middle of 1859 many reports were received indicating that Rao Sahib and many of his followers were concealed in the Narsingarh State. The Narsingarh State Vakil was duly reporting the activities of the rebels so far as it came to the knowledge of the State authorities. The rebels also plundered the Narsingarh Raja's villages.²⁶ A squadron of Beatson's Horse surprised, on the 14th July 1859, a party of rebels numbering some 500 men under Ram Rao, an agent of Rao Sahib, near the village of Gungoni in the Narsingarh district and killed 35, taking 11 prisoners. The rebels were armed with Percussion Muskets, and many of them were Sepoys and Wylaitis.

On the 19th July 1859 the rebel leader Sarfaraz Khan came to a village half a mile from Muhammadgarh and was there attacked by Nawab Asaf Ali Khan of Basoda.²⁷ Sarfaraz Khan possibly to avoid arrest died the next day from the effects of self-administered poison.²⁸

On the 16th July, 1859, the rebels under Adil Muhammad Khan were attacked by the Naib Bukshi of Ambapani. A lot of booty

24. File No. 1817.

25. File No. 1817, Letter dated 9th July 1859, from Lieut. Bruce, Commanding at Bhilsa to P.A. Bhopal.

26. File No. 1817, Memo of Intelligence No. 612, dated 16th July 1859, and Letter No. 163, dated 16th July 1859, from P. A. Bhopal to A.G.C. for C.I.

27. File No. 1817, Memo No. 624, dated 20th July 1859, from Lt. Bruce, Commanding at Bhilsa.

28. File No. 1817, Letter No. 169, dated 25th July 1859, from P.A. Bhopal to A.G.C. for C.I.

was captured.²⁹ On the 11th August, 1859, Captain Roome wrote from Garispur that in spite of every precaution the rebels were closing round him. Adil Muhammad Khan pretended to entreat for terms and it was through this trick that they escaped.³⁰ Captain Roome at once started in pursuit. At the end of September, 1859, the whole of the remnants of Adil Muhammad and Amanat Khan's men surrendered to Captain Roome. At this event Captain Roome wrote, "I can now safely report that there is not a single rebel in the whole district."³¹ (Bhilsa). Captain Roome attributed this success to a great measure to the energetic proceedings of Jamadar Ramlal who was sent out in Command of a party of the 10th Regiment Indian Infantry disguised as rebels and they created such an alarm among the followers of Adil Muhammad Khan and Amanat Khan that they thought it prudent to surrender to the British through the Nawab of Muhammadgarh and Basoda. Amanat Khan went towards Datia to take refuge in the fort of Sobra where his brother was already staying. Adil Muhammad Khan was hiding at Jahlone, eight miles from Lalitpur.³²

On the 14th October, 1859, the Agent to the Governor-General in Central India authorised the Political Agent, Bhopal, to pay a reward of two thousand rupees to any man who could effect the arrest of Adil Muhammad Khan.³³ From September to November, 1859, small bands of rebels, haunted Berchha district and Khilchipur State.³⁴ But the number of the rebel bands and their strength gradually dwindled into insignificance. The Government was also in a position to proclaim and enforce strict laws and regulations. On the 28th November 1858 the Agent to the

29. File No. 1817, Letter No. 166, dated 20th July 1859, from P.A. Bhopal to A.G.G. for C.I.

30. File No. 1817, Memo No. 710, dated 13th Aug. 1859, from R.E. Hutchinson, P.A. Bhopal.

31. File No. 1817, Letter No. 220, dated 5th Oct. 1859, from P.A. Bhopal to A.G.G. for C.I.

32. *Ibid.*

33. File No. 1817, Letter No. 433 A, dated 14th Oct. 1859, from A.G.G. for C.I. to P.A. Bhopal.

34. File No. 1817, Letter No. 254, dated 16th Nov. 1859, from P.A. Bhopal to A.G.G. for C.I.

File No. 1817, Letter No. 253, dated 14th Nov. 1859, from P.A. Bhopal to A.G.G. for C.I.

Governor-General in Central India asked the Political Agent of Bhopal to notify that any Zamindar, either of Berchha or of any village in Indian States, who allowed food to be given from his village to the rebels would assuredly be transported beyond the seas.³⁵ On the 5th December, 1859, the Political Agent in Bhopal was in a position to proclaim that the condition of rebel bands was so deplorable that the assistance of troops was hardly required for their destruction, and that from this date if any of the villages were plundered it would be owing to the carelessness and apathy of the villagers themselves and that they would be held responsible for the same.³⁶

The remnants of the rebel groups took revenge on the spies and informers of the British. Munshi Banwarilal who came from Agar to Khilchipur State disguised as a 'Byragi' beggar to obtain intelligence of the rebels was³⁷ caught by the rebels and was said to have been murdered.³⁸ Similarly Chiman Singh Patel of Babukhera near Sindhora being suspected to be a spy of the British was apprehended by the rebels who burnt his village and made an attempt on his life.³⁹

As late as 17th March, 1860, the Agent to the Governor-General for Central India (while reporting his suspicion of Adil Muhammad Khan and Rao Sahib⁴⁰ being concealed in the Jhalawar jungles) wrote thus, "only very lately the agents of the Rao Sahib have endeavoured to tamper with Holkar's troops and have secreted ammunition in the vicinity of Indore, with a view to effect a rising which was to have taken place, had not the plot been discovered."⁴¹

35. File No. 1817, Letter No. 639 A, dated 28th Nov. 1859, from A.G.G. for C.I. to P. A. Bhopal

36. File No. 1817, Letter No. 261, dated 5th Dec. 1859, from P.A. Bhopal to A.G.G. for C.I.

37. File No. 1817, Letter dated 9th Nov. 1859, from the Khilchipur Vakil, to P.A. Bhopal.

38. File No. 1817, Letter No. 253 of 1859, from P.A. Bhopal to A.G.G. for C.I.

39. File No. 1817, Letter No. 1 of 1860, from P. A. Bhopal to A.G.G. for C.I. and Memo from Lt. Wood.

40. Rao Sahib was caught and hanged at Cawnpore by the British on 20th Aug. 1862.

41. File No. 1817, Letter No. 663, dated 17th Mar. 1860, from Col. R. Shakespeare, A.G.G. for C.I. to Maj. W. F. Eden, Offg. A.G.G. for Rajputana.

By the end of 1860 important rebel leaders like Nana Sahib, Firoz Shah, Mulluh Khan 'Toota' and others were fugitives in their motherland while the foreigners ruled there. The rebel leaders cheerfully underwent all hardships and privations inspired by the slender hope that they would see the day when their country is free from the yoke of the foreigners.

THE AFTERMATH

Events, great or small leave behind a trail of effects. The Revolt of 1857 in Central India and its subsequent suppression led to far-reaching changes in political, economic, religious and military spheres. It also influenced the life and thought of the people of Malwa. Let us briefly mention a few of these effects.

Political effects

Several European writers have taken pains to prove that the end of the East India Company's rule in India in 1858, and the assumption of the reigns of the government by the British Crown were "a change of form rather than of substance."⁴² They also claim that the Revolt was a blessing in disguise. They tell us that the Indians derived more benefits under the British Crown than they could have under any other ruler. The British also learnt to improve their administration and modify their policy towards the Indian rulers and the landed aristocracy.⁴³ The Doctrine of Lapse and the Policy of Annexation had to be given up and the rulers of the Indian States were supported and maintained as breakwaters of the storms of revolts and revolutions. The famous Proclamation of Queen Victoria in 1858 assured the rulers that their territories would not be annexed in future. Their right of Adoption was also recognised. Some of the rulers (of Central India) like Jayaji Rao Sindhia of Gwalior, and Sikandar Begam of Bhopal were granted territorial rewards for they helped the foreigners to maintain their rule over the Indians.

Since 1773 the British Crown was tightening its control over the affairs of the East India Company and the Revolt of 1857 gave it a very good opportunity and also an excuse to bring the Company's rule to an end. A rich possession like that of India

42. Ramsay Muir, *The Making of British India*, p. 381.

43. Coupland, *The Indian Problem 1833 to 1935*, Pt. I, p. 21.

could not be allowed to be ruled by a body of merchants for a very long time. The policy of the East India Company's Government in the first half of the 19th century was to annex as many Indian States as possible and extend their territorial empire. The Revolt of 1857 taught the British a lesson. They changed their policy and tactics to rule India. After 1858 the Crown's policy was to preserve monarchy and feudalism in India and to join hands with the native aristocratic forces to counteract the movements for liberty and democracy, as far as practicable.

Some Indian rulers rejoiced at the restoration of the British rule in India in 1858, but it did not prove itself to be in their ultimate interest. The British Government, as soon as it found its power again secure, gradually began to tighten its "indirect rule" over the Indian States and began to give "constructive interpretations" to the treaties. Paramountcy always remained with the British Government and final authority in important matters always rested with it. Maharaja Jayaji Rao Sindhia who remained "most loyal" to the British in later years found that he could not even dispense with the services of his own minister Sir Dinkar Rao without the consent of the British Government. He found great difficulty in getting back the possession of his own fort at Gwalior from the British Government who retained it for a long time after the Revolt was over.⁴⁴ He found that the Amjhera State which was given to him as a territorial reward for his "most loyal" services during the Revolt was already earmarked for his ministers to be given to them in Jagirs for their "loyal" services during the Revolt.⁴⁵

Jayaji Rao Sindhia found towards the fag-end of his life that the influence of the British Resident at his court was very overbearing and irritating. It is said that he repented at the end of his career for having supported the British against his own

44. *The Native States of India and their Armies*, — an Article published in P.S.S. Quarterly, Vol. I, p. 4, Apr. 1879, as reproduced in *Select Writings of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. G. Ranade, on Indian State*, p. 38.

45. Old Record File No. 119, Letter No. 321, dated 17th July 1858, from A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of India.

Letter No. 29, dated Gwalior 27th Mar. 1859, from P.A. Gwalior to A.G.G. for C.I.

countrymen, but then it was too late.⁴⁶ Similarly Maharaja Tukoji Rao Holkar II experienced to his great mortification that in the Jubbulpore Darbar he was not given any territorial reward, and when he personally pressed for it before the Viceroy he was informed that his conduct on the day of the outbreak of the Revolt at Indore was not such as either to evince the gratitude or admiration of the British Government. The Holkar sent several representations to the successive Viceroys for getting the territorial reward but to no purpose, and in the end his deputation to England which was sent to plead his case before the Secretary of State for India was not even granted an interview. The policy of the British Government towards the Holkar after the Revolt of 1857 was very ambiguous and subtle. At times it gave him robes of honour, conferred titles and publicly spoke guarded words of praise for his "loyalty" to the British during the Revolt, but on the other hand on matters of high policy, or on questions of territorial reward, or military affairs it retained suspicions against him for a long time.⁴⁷ The British authorities were also displeased with Tukoji Rao Holkar II for his help to the Dhar ruler to get his State restored from the Parliament against the wishes of the Indian Government.

The political effects of the Revolt of 1857 on the Dhar State were of considerable importance. Pending the final orders of the Government of India, the State was annexed to the British territory on the 3rd November, 1857, by Colonel Durand, Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Central India. The Government of India confirmed the decision of Colonel Durand and in February 1858 a public announcement was made proclaiming the annexation of the State. This question became a leading case, and a burning topic before all the States of India to test the practical worth of Queen Victoria's Proclamation. To fight out this case Maharaja Tukoji Rao Holkar II and his Minister Bhau Sahib Reshimwale secured the services of barrister John Dickinson. Lakhs of rupees were spent and the

46. *The Native States of India and their Armies*, — an Article published in P.S.S. Quarterly Vol. I, p. 4. Apr. 1879, as reproduced in *Select Writings of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. G. Ranade, on Indian States*, p. 38.

47. *Ibid.*

case was taken to the British Parliament. There was a great agitation in the Indian public.

The important points which led the British Parliament to change the decision of the Indian Government were:⁴⁸ The ruler of Dhar was a minor at the time of the outbreak of the Revolt. The British themselves were responsible for the Minority Administration. The foreign mercenaries were very powerful and possibly dominated the Dhar State during those critical days. The British themselves were responsible for inviting those foreign mercenaries from the Nizam's borders into Malwa in 1853. The British troops under Major Stuart and Col. Durand helped by the State while attacking the rebels in the Dhar Fort and outside. The British did not declare any war on Dhar nor did the State do so. Lastly as far as possible the State helped the British with men and supplies for the suppression of the Revolt in Central India.

Notwithstanding these arguments, the Parliament decided the question of the Dhar State on the grounds of "expediency." In 1860 it decided that the State should be restored to the ruler on his attaining majority. It was thought that this act would pacify public agitation in India and would restore confidence in British promises. As the restoration of Dhar State was an example of the new policy announced by Queen Victoria, it marked the beginning of a new era in the relationship between the British Government and the Indian States. However the Dhar State was deprived of its Berchha District which was handed over to Bhopal as a reward for "loyalty" towards the British during the Revolt. The British stood to lose nothing in this transaction of robbing Peter to pay Paul. They took away Berchha District from the Dhar State and gave it to Bhopal which proved a source of constant eye-sore to the rulers of Dhar for all times.

The greatest loss was suffered by the Amjhera State ruler, who was hanged by the British and his State was annexed and handed over to the Sindhia. Through the treachery of some of

48. For Dep'tt. Despatch No. 18 of 16th Dec. 1859, from Lord Canning, G.G. of India to Sir Charles Wood, Secy. of State for India.

Letter No. 293 of 5th July 1858 for Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to G.F. Edmonstone, Esqr., Secy. to Govt. of India.

Parliamentary Papers relating to Dhar.

the Indians the Raja of Amjhera was captured by the British on the 11th November 1857. During his trial, the Raja made no effort to defend himself nor did he assert his own fidelity or that of his ancestors towards the British.⁴⁹ Inspired by patriotism he maintained a dignified attitude to the end. The whole evidence in the so-called trial was taken orally. In the trial the functions of policeman, prosecutor and judge were centred in one authority. In that trial which was against the canons of English jurisprudence, Raja Bakhtawar Singh was declared to be guilty and was hanged at Indore on 10th February 1858.⁵⁰ As his child was innocent the Amjhera Raj Sisodini pleaded that her infant son Raghunath Singh should be recognised as the ruler of Amjhera.⁵¹

But all appeals to reason or mercy were in vain, and the Amjhera Raj was confiscated and handed over to the Sindhia to be given in Jagirs to those employees who had rendered loyal services to the British.⁵² Sir Dinkar Rao got annual Jagir of Rs. 30,000/- and Madhav Rao Phalkia, Balwant Rao, and Baba Mohargir of Rs. 15,000/- each. The whole transaction was handled so tactfully that the Sindhia's power did not increase, his loyal servants who helped the British were duly rewarded and Amjhera State was liquidated. In 1860 Gulab Kuwar Bai, the mother of Bakhtawar Singh, pleaded for mercy stating that her son was hanged, all her property plundered and the State of Amjhera which once belonged to her son was handed over to the Sindhia. But the British Government turned a deaf ear to all such pleadings. The condition of the descendants of Raja Bakhtawar Singh declined and they had to face utter poverty.⁵³

49. File No. 728, Letter No. 299, dated 25th Dec. 1857, from A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of India.

50. Letter No. 328A, dated 14th Feb. 1858, from A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of India.

51. Application dated 1858, from Rani Sisodini to Captain Hutchinson, Indore.

52. Old Record File No. 119, Letter No. 321, dated 17th July 1858, from A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of India.

Letter No. 29, dated Gwalior 27th March 1859, from P.A. Gwalior to A.G.G. for C.I.

53. Family Papers of the descendants of the Raja of Amjhera. Copies of some of these papers were secured from Mr. Bhalerao Ex-Naib Subah of Sardarpur.

Their miserable condition did elicit much public sympathy and help at a later stage, but at first the people were afraid of helping them because of incurring British displeasure.

After the Revolt the British Government supported and helped in all possible ways the Muslim States of Bhopal and Jaora. The Jaora Nawab who was a feudatory of the Holkars was at once recognised as an independent ruler directly under the British protection. In the political settlement of Malwa after the Revolt of 1857 the British Government took care to maintain a balance between the rulers of the Maratha, Rajput and Mohammadan States. They kept all the three apart and used the one against the other whenever necessary. The plan of division did not stop there. Every effort was made to create friction between the Marathas themselves. The confiscated houses (at Benares) belonging to the Rani of Jhansi and the Nana of Bithur were handed over to the Sindhia.⁵⁴ The Maratha public did not like that the Sindhia should take the property of the Rani of Jhansi and Nana Sahib as a reward from the British for his 'loyalty' to them during the Revolt of 1857.

The military strength of the rulers of Malwa was also reduced on the ground that they should curtail their military expenses as far as possible to enable the rulers to spend more on the peaceful vocations of life.⁵⁵ The rulers were not allowed to construct new forts or repair the old ones without the previous permission of the British Government. The arms and ammunition supplied to the troops of the States of Malwa were often out of date and old.

Even to the "loyal" rulers of Malwa the treatment given was not always equal. Some of the Thakurs and Jagirdars who revolted against their own rulers were again restored to power as they helped the British in one way or the other during the Revolt. To take an illustration Mansingh, the Thakur of Narwar, revolted against the Sindhia and wanted to regain some of his old possessions from him during the troubled times of the Revolt. But he rendered to the British Government "a signal

54. File No. 1775 of 1857-68, Letter No. 564, dated 13th Feb. 1860, from the Secy. to the Govt. of India to the A.G.G. for C.I.

55. *Select Writings of M. G. Ranade on Indian States*, p. 15 — Articles published in P.S.S. Quarterly London, Vol. I, 4th April, 1879, under the heading—*The Native States of India and their Armies*.

service" in betraying the great rebel leader Tatia Topi while he was sleeping under his protection as his friend and guest.⁵⁶ Mansingh was restored to his Jagir and property under the very nose of the Sindhia.

Wherever it did not suit the British interest they even allowed a rebel Raja to go unpunished. The British had several proofs or at least serious reasons to doubt that the Rajput rulers of Rajgarh and Narsingarh sheltered the rebels and the great ring-leaders like Tatia Topi, Rao Sahib, Firoz Shah etc., were privately helped by them.⁵⁷ They also took indirect part in the Revolt by helping the rebels with money, provisions and men. But the British Government did not press for any detailed investigation of the charges against these rulers as they thought that the guilt being established they would have to annex the States and hand them over to the Holkar as they did to the Sindhia in the case of Amjhera. According to the old treaties, the Maratha States of Central India had claims over the Rajput States of Malwa as they ruled over all of them once during the hey-day of the Maratha power.

The political effect of the Revolt was that the British Government began to treat the States with great diplomacy and tact. Their policy towards each State of Malwa was guided by treaty, conventions, usage, "constructive interpretations" and expediency.

Economic Effects

Turning to the economic effects of the Revolt in Central India, we find that for a long time the poor people of Malwa suffered greatly. During the critical days of the Revolt, trade suffered, shops were looted, markets were burnt, and business centres were seriously affected. When the British troops entered Central India to suppress the Revolt they went to some of the most important markets of Malwa and killed several artisans and traders and looted their property. Dhar, Mandasor, Ujjain, Indore, and Ratlam all suffered from the ravages of the British troops. On their march the British troops often shot the farmers and villagers taking them for rebels. At places the whole

56. V. D. Savarkar, *The War of Indian Independence*, 1857, p. 538.

57. File No. 921 of 1860, Narsingarh Case. File No. 993 of 1858, Rajgarh Case.

village or the granaries were burnt.⁵⁸ The villagers were so much terrified that they left their fields at the very sight of an Englishman. The result of all this was that agriculture and trade suffered.

But the British also made an effort to revive trade and commerce as soon as possible as it suited their commercial interests. The opium trade was very profitable to them and therefore they encouraged the trade of opium in Malwa. They took care to increase gradually the duty on opium. The British Government later on introduced the policy of free trade, uniformity of British coinage, and that of supporting the European merchants. Sir Hari Singh Gour has rightly written, "the commercial exploitation of India has continued in spite of the camouflage of transfer of rights from the East India Company to the Crown."⁵⁹ The British authorities used the landlords and Indian capitalists as middlemen and earned large profits from the poor cultivators. After the Revolt the British protected these middlemen and thus continued to exploit the common man for about a century.

However the British Government adopted a policy of economic development in Malwa to suit their own imperialistic interests. They increased the railway lines in the fertile districts of Malwa for taking away the raw materials from the place. They also could send arms and soldiers to these places by means of the railways in times of danger. The transport difficulties, long delay and heavy expenses involved in the transportation of goods, material and troops from one place to another in Malwa during the Revolt taught the British Government a lesson that the development of railway lines would make a small army in India more powerful than a large one.⁶⁰

Religious effects

The religious effects of the Revolt were that the British

58. File No. 1817, Letter dated 25th June 1859 from Lt. F. Roome, Commanding Basoda Field Force to P.A. Bhopal. E. Thompson, *The other side of the Medal*.

59. A *Geographical Analysis of World Peace and Freedom in India*,—an Article by Sir Hari Singh Gour, pub. in "The Twentieth Century," Mar. 1946, p. 153.

60. *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. CXLVI, 3rd Series, p. 1715.

Government began to be more tolerant towards the religious practices of the Indians and gave them freedom of conscience. However they rightly insisted that evil practices like the Sati system, infanticide and witchcraft should be put to an end. If before the Revolt of 1857 the British people actively took part in the propaganda for religious changes and reforms they at least gave up that open criticism of Hindu or Mohammadan faith. The Revolt taught the British people not to meddle with others' religion. The work of the Christian missionaries underwent a change. While open adverse propaganda against the Hindu and Muslim faiths slackened, the underground Christian Missionary activity quietly developed. The famous tourist Captain Passingham wrote in 1881, "The Presbyterians are doing their accustomed good work in Calcutta, Central India and Rajputana, where some striking conversions have taken place."⁶¹

The effects of the Revolt of 1857 upon the organisation and management of the military forces of the British Government in India were far-reaching. Before 1857 the army, on account of recruitment on the basis of individual merit and the common life in the barracks, unconsciously tended to develop on national lines. Colonel Durand pointed out that the various Contingents in Malwa appeared to have become offshoots of the Bengal army and to have developed a sense of national solidarity.⁶² But after the Mutiny the British changed their policy. The army, recruited and posted in various British military stations in Malwa, was raised on tribal, provincial, caste, "martial" and "non-martial" lines and on such other distinctions which suited their political needs and interests. The Purbhias who took a leading part in the Revolt even at Indore and other places in Malwa were discouraged from the army posts. The Europeans employed some of them as gardeners only.

As a result of the Revolt in Malwa, thousands of the sepoys, and people lost their lives. The British Troops under Sir Hugh Rose disbanded one Indian troop after another and shot several of the sepoys. At Sehore, Indore, Jhansi, Gwalior, Dhar and Mandasor, thousands of sepoys were shot after the Revolt. Only the most trusted sepoys were retained. The Malwa Bhil Corps which existed at the time of the Revolt at Indore was disband-

61. Captain Passingham, *Missionary Tours in India and Ceylon*, p. 134.

62. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, *India Divided*, p. 91.

ed and in its place a completely new army was raised. There was also a plan at Indore Residency to raise a Christian troop but this plan was dropped. After the Revolt the strength of the British troops in Malwa was increased and that of the Indian troops was decreased.⁶³

The British Government introduced disarmament in Malwa. Colonel Sykes wrote, "This disarmament was taking place not only among our own subjects (British Provinces), but was being attempted among the populations of the independent States of Gwalior, of Guicowar and the Rajput States. . . ."⁶⁴ Disarmament was meant to emasculate the people and to render the martial races innocuous.

The importance of the Revolt remains unaffected, even if it is proved that the rebels had no constructive programme and noble ideals to attract the teeming millions, and that it had been brought about by forces aiming at the revival of reactionary institutions, like those of monarchy and feudalism. To the Indians the Revolt remained a bitter memory. The ferocity with which the martial law was administered and the rebels hunted down, the fate of Tatia Topi and of the Rani of Jhansi, and the extremely ruthless methods employed by the Englishmen not only brought about a social estrangement between the two races but made the British appear the common adversary against whom the Indians were inspired to combine.

The unsuccessful rebellion led to a revival of religious nationalism. In the growing national desire for self-respect the idea of an Indo-European civilisation disappeared, and the British were held in greater contempt. While the North witnessed a 'back to the Vedas' movement, the Maratha Brahmins who had unsuccessfully tried to revive the Peshwaship during the Revolt went on playing upon the strong historical feelings of the Deccan Hindus. It was mainly due to that traditional sentiment which was an evident offshoot of that Great Revolt of 1857 that Tilak's political activities and the Shivaji cult along with the nationalist movement of Western India could find a sound basis and an exceedingly important background to inspire the Indians to unite together.

63. Andre Maurois, *History of England*, p. 466.

64. Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. CLIX. 3 Series, 1860, p. 216.

The history of India is a history of a long procession of passive sufferers. We do not know of any such other popular upheaval in the face of unexampled torture and tyranny. The average Indian had always been indifferent to politics and the political consciousness had always remained subjected to a sense of localised patriotism. The petty rivalries in India never allowed the Indians to rise above their bickerings and fight for a common cause. We have had, of course, a few Prataps and Shivajis and even a War of Independence in Maharashtra but personalities and events of this type could seldom assume an all-India character and the Revolt of 1857 was the first great upheaval when the various elements of Indian population gathered together and responded to a common cry against a foreign ruler. All the artisans and manufacturers who lost their trade due to the effects of the Industrial Revolution, the dethroned rulers who were deprived of their ancient possessions under the vicious Doctrine of Lapse, the feudal landlords and zamindars whose lands were confiscated by the company, the priestly class attached to charitable institutions were seized, the sepoys who were dissatisfied, and the people who were convinced that Britain was a giant but with the feet of clay, joined in the Revolt.

Thus the Revolt was neither a localised affair nor can it be dismissed as an unhappy incident. It was a great upheaval caused by a deep-seated disorder and the reaction of India against the too rapid introduction of Western ideas. The Revolt, though it failed to fulfil its aim, did not cease to influence the destiny of the race which could not have remained blind to the unparalleled atrocities meted out to persons who had given a lead to an exceedingly passive and indifferent population. The credit of transforming rebels into martyrs undoubtedly goes to the British officials who in their endeavour to restore the rule of law sometimes practised inhuman cruelty. The very names of Tatia Topi and Maharani Laxmi Bai became inspiring symbols, and the stories about them spread slowly from one "bazar" to another and formed a subject for talk in every village and household. They became the characters of numerous novels and poems and the ghosts of Tatia and Laxmi became more potent dangers to British imperialism than when they were alive.

CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF THE REVOLT

THE Revolt of 1857 started prematurely. The Sikhs and Gurkhas actively fought for the British. Southern India did not rise in Revolt. The generalship among the rebels was not very efficient. The regional and the religious disunity showed itself in the absence of any coordination among the rebel leaders. The ruling princes and the aristocracy were terrified as they apprehended seizure of their lands and property. The withdrawal of British authority from any area was followed immediately by the revival of old feuds and the unrestrained activities of the criminal tribes. The elements of disunity and rivalry predominated. The rebels had no constructive programme attractive enough to enlist national support. Monarchy and feudalism still remained in the forefront. The common man did not worry much whether Bahadur Shah, Nana Sahib or any foreign company or person was their ruler as long as their life and property was safe.

The India of 1857 was divided into a congeries of Indian States and British Provinces, and presented varying aspects in different parts. The situation in Bombay Presidency was quite different from that of North West Province (modern Uttar Pradesh) and the conditions in Hyderabad State differed from those in Gwalior or Indore. If a few rulers revolted against the British, there were several others who secretly or even openly helped the foreigners. The rebels thus had to fight on two fronts.

At the beginning of the Revolt, the position of the rebels in the different important States and military stations in Central India was strong. They were successful at Mhow, Indore, Dhar, Amjhera, Gwalior, Mehidpur, Guna, Mandasor, Sardarpur, and Sehore. They established their rule in several places for some time. To take an example, at Gwalior, the rebels established their own Government for about twenty days (from 1st to 20th of June 1858). They had their own police, courts of Justice and other departments. They assumed sovereign power. At

Mandasor, Dhar and Amjhera the rebels similarly established their own rule from the beginning of July 1857. But the success of the rebels, however brilliant, was short-lived.

The Revolt started at Meerut on the 10th of May 1857 and the rebels gained an upper hand in Malwa by July 1857. From that time to June 1858 the rebels retained their control on one part or the other in Malwa. The Revolt at Dhar, Amjhera and Mandasor was suppressed by November 1857. The History of the march of Malwa Field Force under Major Stuart and Colonel Durand is the account of the suppression of the Revolt in Southern and Western parts of Malwa. Thereafter the march of Central India Field Force under Sir Hugh Rose and Sir R. Hamilton from December 1857 to July 1858 contributed to the suppression of the Revolt in Eastern and Northern Malwa. The United British Forces under capable Generals attacked rebel forces in different States of Malwa at different times, and defeated them separately.

While the major parts of Northern India and Central India were in open Revolt, Southern India, the Punjab, Nepal, Assam, Sind, the major parts of Rajputana and Bengal remained not only neutral but also actively helped the British in suppressing the Revolt. The outbreak of the Revolt was premature at some places. Not only the number of persons, who were sitting on the fence and watching the turn of events was very large, but the traitors to the cause of freedom were also many. For their immediate gain several people forgot the ultimate good of their country. The Revolt which began with the cry of "Swadharma" and "Swaraj" proved abortive for the time being because it did not find general support and many people did not rise to the occasion. Mutual jealousies and personal rivalries gained an upper hand even in those critical days.

Besides these general causes which led to the failure of the Revolt, there was a lamentable lack of a concerted plan among the rebel leaders. Nana Sahib, Rao Sahib, Firoz Shah, the Rani of Jhansi, the Nawab of Banda, and Bahadur Shah failed to follow a common plan of action during the latter part of the Revolt. There was no sustained unity of purpose.

Nana Sahib's plan of operations was to get possession of Gwalior and to secure political control over Northern India as a prelude to the revival of the Peshwa's authority in the Dec-

can. His method was "to break the Morar Pultons" from their allegiance to the Sindhia. And, therefore, Nana Sahib sent his agents including Tatia Topi to tamper with the loyalty of the Sindhia's troops.¹ Madhavrao Shastri, one of the chief agents of Nana Sahib, said, "Maharaja Sindhia being united with the English does not regard the Peshwa. His Raj is great. Seeing his course all the Rajas, great and small, being cowed, have joined the English. On account of him we get no opportunity. Wherefore we must first break with the Sindhia's pultons, horses and gaols and get him into our hands, and then the Peshwa will rule."² His plan in the Nimar district was to enkindle a popular Revolt among the Bhils, and to come to Mandleshwar to help them on his way to the Deccan. Many of the letters which were sent to the people at Mandleshwar and in Nimar were intercepted by the British who duly prepared themselves to foil his plans.³

The rebel leader Rao Sahib had secret plans to become the Peshwa. He even openly assumed that title in a letter which he addressed to the Rani of Orchha. He writes, "What is the reason of your neglect? Use foresight and look well to the consequences. Take the chance. Pay homage to the orders of the Peshwa (Rao Sahib). Else you will not be saved. What has become of those who have denounced the obeying of our orders? Jhalrapatan, Rajghur and Esagarh have been laid waste; all the inhabitants excepting women and children under twelve years of age were put to the sword. The same fate awaits those who neglect obeying our orders."⁴ Similarly during the march of the rebels through Nimar in the latter half of November 1858, there was difference in the main aim of advance between Rao Sahib who wanted to go to the North and the rebel Gene-

1. Mutiny File No. 1790 of 1858, "Nana Sahib's Plan of operations in the Gwalior Territory and the Deccan." Enclosure to letter dated 4th Mar. 1858 from Govindrao Narayan Subah of Isagarh to Diwan Dinkar Rao.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Issue Vol. 95, Letter No. 124, Genl. No. 615 B, dated 26th Mar. 1858, from A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of India

4. Mutiny File No. 1817, Abstract translation of a letter from Peshwa (Rao Sahib) dated Lalitpur 13th October 1858, forwarded to A.G.G. for C.I. by the Mukhtar of Orchha.

ral, Tatia Topi, who wanted to proceed to the South.⁵

The plan of Firoz Shah, the Shahazada of Mandasor was to subjugate the rulers of Western Malwa. His "Parwana" from Mandasor to the Nawab of Jaora gives an insight into his plan. "You have been since long putting off your attendance here, but now I must tell you in plain terms that if you are willing to come to me you must make haste and let it be impressed upon your mind that you will be the most deserving of my favour and consideration. While on the contrary, that is in case of your refusing to attend, I will myself be soon there and then obedience and supplication on your part will do you no good."⁶ The Shahazada of Mandasor dreamt of reviving the glory of the House of Timur to which he traced his ancestry, while the Maratha leaders wished for the Peshwa regime to return in its pristine glory.

The aim of the rebel leaders of Indore, Nawab Waris Muhammad Khan and Saadat Khan, was to join their Emperor Bahadur Shah at Delhi. They marched with their rebel troops from Indore to Gwalior and had meetings with the rebel officers of the Gwalior Contingent.⁷ The plans of the Mohammadan and Hindu rebels at Gwalior differed. They had divided themselves into two parties, the Hindus wished to join the Nana Sahib of Bithur while the Mohammadans aimed at going to Delhi!

This lack of unity among the rebel leaders brought about their early defeat. The Indore and Mhow rebels separately marched from Gwalior towards Delhi via Agra and they were defeated

5. Indore Darbar's Vernacular File No. 144, Nawab Dilsher Khan's Report.

6. Issue Vol. 91, Genl. No. 708, Letter No. 95, dated 19th October 1857, from Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of India.

Enclosure—Translation of a letter from Firoz Shah Bahadur Ghazi to the Chief of Jaora.

After the failure of the Revolt, Firoz Shah wandered in the jungles of India up to 1864 and then he went to Arabia where he was seen up to 1866.

7. Inward Vol. 80, Letter dated 1st August 1857, from Indore State Spy with the rebels at Gwalior to Indore Minister.

8. Inward Vol. 80, translation of a Marathi news report from a spy of Indore Darbar with the rebels at Gwalior.

by the British troops near Agra on the 10th October 1857.⁹ The Morar rebels, who on the 16th October 1857, marched to Cawnpore to meet Nana Sahib, were also separately defeated by the British.

When the British army under Colonel Durand and Major Stuart besieged Dhar in the last week of October 1857, there were two rival parties in the Fort of Dhar which naturally weakened the rebel strength and led to their defeat and expulsion. This can be gathered from the letter of Sir Robert Hamilton who writes, "When the Fort (of Dhar) was invested by Brigadier Stuart there were two separate parties in the Fort, one of the Wylaitis which had been plundering the Cantonments west of Dhar, the other of the Makranees, who were then not against the (Company's) Government."¹⁰

There were also conflicts in the personal interest of the rebel leaders. Gul Khan the rebel leader at Dhar, Bhima and Khwaja Naik, the leaders of the predatory bands of the Bhils, had their personal aims of aggrandisement and plunder. They tried their best to fish in the troubled waters. The rebel sepoys used to carry plundered money on their persons and often they cared more for it than for their arms. Jan Ali Khan, the Superintendent of Rajgarh in his detention camp with the Mhow and Indore Rebels, observed that in a dispute in which a sepoy was killed 8,000 rupees in cash were found on his person.¹¹

The rebels lacked military genius. There are several instances of bad generalship. On the 19th of November 1857 the rebels allowed the British forces under Colonel Durand and Major Stuart to cross the Chambal river without opposition. "They (the rebels) neglected what was most vital to their success the defence of the great natural barrier" (of the Chambal river).¹² The result was that the British forces appeared before Mandasor on the 21st November and defeated the rebels. The rebels of Mhow and Indore lost their most precious time at

9. Letter dated 2nd November 1857, from Major S. C. Macpherson to Secy. Govt. of India.

10. Issue Vol. 103, Genl. No. 1876. Letter No. 397, Para 33, from Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of India.

11. File No.1774 of 1857, Communication from Jan Ali Khan Asstt. At Berchha, dated 24th Jan. 1856.

12. Forrest, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. III. p. 131.

Gwalior where they reached on the 1st of August 1857 and waited there with the Gwalior rebels up to 5th September 1857.¹³ By that time the British had regained Delhi and mustered their troops at Agra to defeat the Mhow and Indore rebels when they reached near Agra on the 10th October 1857.¹⁴

According to Sir Hugh Rose, Tatia Topi's character was a singular anomaly. He gave proof of a great moral courage in undertaking the execution of the daring and important plans which he formed, but his nerves failed him in a combat which was to decide their success. Tatia Topi planned successfully to overthrow the Sindhia's power. But as it happened in the battles of Kunch and Betwa, his retreat from the battle of Gwalior was too early to be excusable and too precipitate to be dignified.¹⁵

Similarly Tatia Topi was too hasty in his passage through Nimar. From 17th November to 28th November 1858, he with his forces numbering about 15,000 passed through Khandwa,¹⁶ Khargone, Rajpur, Barwani, Kukshi and Alirajpur. Even with such a big force Tatia Topi did not attempt to fight against any British detachment. When Tatia Topi heard of the arrival of a British detachment at Julwania he crossed the Bombay Agra Road following the course of the Khan river near Khurampura. When he heard of the arrival of the British troops from Rajpur he left Barwani and crossed the Narbada. When he was followed by Brigadier Parke beyond Chikalda, he proceeded with his troops to Alirajpur.¹⁷ Thus during the whole of Tatia Topi's march through Nimar he never made any serious attempt to intercept the British detachments, to face them or to cut their supply line. These evasions told upon the morale of the army which was itching to fight, but which instead was merely made to march.

The rebels were badly equipped. They had no efficient and

13. Inward Vol. 80, Substance of a Marathi news report dated 5th September from a spy of the Holkar Govt. with the mutineers.

14. Letter dated 2nd November 1857, from Major Macpherson P.A. Gwalior to Secy. Govt. of India.

15. Forrest, *Military Despatches*, Vol. IV, p. 150.

16. File No. 1776. Translation of a vernacular report from the Raja of Alirajpur.

17. For. Deptt. letter No. 560, Genl. No. 2670, dated 30th Nov. 1858. from Sir R. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of India.

constant source of supply of suitable arms and ammunition. The rebels at Dhar Fort were in want of ammunition even within four days of the siege by the British forces. As early as the 26th of October, Colonel Durand noticed that the rebels in the Dhar Fort made no attempt to reply to the British firing. He was right in judging that the rebels were short of ammunition and had reserved what they had for emergency.¹⁸ He took advantage of this shortage and assaulted the fort with redoubled energy, confident of success. The Shahazada of Mandasor in his letter to Nawab of Jaora "did not feel well of for ammunition, both powder and lead being prominent among his demands."¹⁹ The rebels in their march from Khandwa to Alirajpur from 17th to 28th November 1858 had no big field guns with them.²⁰

The conduct of the rebels towards the civil population was not above reproach. Some rebels were actuated by higher ideals but several of them indulged in objectionable acts and showed lack of sympathy for the populace. The behaviour of the rebels on their march from Indore to Gwalior was deplorable. They, at times, indulged in gambling, licentiousness and other immoral acts. They plundered several villages which came in their way. The telegraph wires and poles, Guest Houses and Post Offices were burnt. Their conduct towards women was at times bad but they did not cut or maim them, nor did they kidnap them as the Wylaitis did.²¹ They plundered the travellers on the way.²² They often did not pay for their purchases to the traders. The rebels plundered marriage parties, carried away cattle, looted the wealthy merchants, burnt villages and robbed mail carts. They beat the townspeople and destroyed the property even of the doctors.²³ At Biaora they extorted four hundred rupees from the villagers. Saadat Khan and other rebels took solemn oath on the Quoran and "Ganga Tulsi" that they would not molest the villagers, nevertheless they ill-treated the

18. Issue Vol. 91, Letter No. 203, dated 26th Oct. 1857, from Colonel H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.C. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of India.

19. Issue Vol. 91, Letter No. 195, Genl. No. 70 F, dated 19th Oct. 1857, from Offg. A.G.C. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of India.

20. Indore Darbar's Vernacular File No. 144 of 1858, Nawab Dilsher Khan's Report, dated 9th January, 1859.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Inward Vol. 80, Indore Darbar's spy report dated 18th July 1857.

23. Inward Vol. 80, Indore Darbar's spy report dated 24th July 1857.

civil officers and greatly damaged the place.²⁴

Similarly the conduct of the rebels under Tatia Topi on their march through Nimar was bad. At places they purchased things and foodstuffs but at most places they depended on plunder.²⁵ The march of the rebels from Khandwa to Alirajpur was marked by plunder and rapine. Horses, ponies, carriages, ornaments, gold "mohurs" and all valuables with the civil population were robbed and many things which could not be carried away were burnt.

In the latter days of the Revolt the rebels were a perfect rabble nearly starving and with very few horses. The country traversed by them was littered with their tatters and rags.²⁶ The result of all such deplorable activities of the rebels was that the civil population in Malwa began actively to help the British for restoration of peace and order. The rebels were weakened in strength due to personal animosity mostly roused by selfishness.

There were several persons who due to inertia remained standing on the fence. Their neutrality also weakened the rebels. But the greatest loss that the rebels suffered was from those Indians who actively supported the British. Among those were most of the rulers of the Indian States and influential persons with vested interests. Every help given by the Indian rulers to the British meant a nail in the coffin of the success of the rebels, and unfortunately innumerable such nails were struck. The British regarded the Indian State rulers as breakwaters of the storm of the Revolt and as the strongest pillars of their Empire. Sir Robert Hamilton wrote, thus: "What has really foiled them (the rebels) is the personal fidelity of Holkar, Sindhia and the Begum of Bhopal. Had any one of them declared for the Peshwa our difficulties would have been beyond conception, the smaller Thakoors and the rural class would have instantly joined the landlord and their sovereign and every vil-

24. Inward Vol. 80, Indore Darbar's spy report dated 12th and 13th July 1857.

25. Indore Darbar's Vernacular File No. 144, Nawab Dilsher Khan's Report, dated 6th Jan. 1859.

26. Mutiny File No. 1817, letter No. 123, dated 30th May 1859, from Capt. A. R. E. Hutchinson, P.A. at Bhopal to Brigadier General Sir R. Shakespeare.

lage would have been openly hostile."²⁷

Lord Canning thus expressed his thankfulness to the Sindhia: "From the first you never forgot the ties which bind you to the British Government."²⁸ The Sindhia from the outbreak of the Revolt at Gwalior saved the English people at Gwalior; rendered all military help to the British Government, at Agra and other places; detained, by all false promises, the Indore and Gwalior rebels at Gwalior until the fall of Delhi and the arrival of the British troops to suppress them; throughout opposed the rebels; actively helped the British forces in suppression of the rebels at Gwalior and the neighbouring places; and did all that could possibly be done to preserve the British Empire in India.²⁹ The Sindhia tried his level best to arrest Nana Sahib³⁰ who escaped the doom by taking refuge³¹ in Nepal. Throughout the period of the Revolt Jayaji Rao Sindhia remained under the influence of Major Macpherson, the Political Agent at Gwalior. Dewan Sir Dinkar Rao led the Sindhia more and more towards anti-national activities.³² To take an example Dinkar Rao wrote to Major Macpherson thus: "If you can stretch a hand to me

27. File No. 1775, Rewards to the Native Chiefs in Central India for the services during the Mutiny 1858-68. Letter No. 178, dated 26th Apr. 1868. Genl. No. 864 A, from Sir R. N. C. Hamilton, A. G. G. for C.I., to G. F. Edmonstone, Esqr., Secy. to the Govt. of India (Para 5).

28. Old Records File No. 175, Lord Canning's letter to Sindhia, dated Lucknow the 25th Oct. 1859, from Lord Canning the Viceroy of India to Maharaja Gwalior.

29. Abstract from "Report of the Gwalior Affairs", dated 20th Feb. 1858 to 15th June 1859—Samuel Charters Macpherson, P.A. Gwalior. (Files 273, 274 and 269 of the Gwalior Residency, Gwalior State A1858-59).

30. Issue No. 248, Letter No. 73, p. 287 of 1874, from H. D. Daly, A.G.G. for C.I., to the Secy. to the Govt. of India, (dated 20th Nov. 1874).

31. Genl. File No. 1018, Miscellaneous Letter No. 73 of 1867, dated Asstt. P.A.'s Office Miraj, 8th Feb. 1867, from F. J. Oldfield, Asstt. P.A. Kolhapur and Southern Mahratha country, to Col. G.S.A. Anderson, P.A., Kolhapur and S. Mahratha country.

32. Letters of Sir Dinkar Rao, Receipts Vol. 65, (Letter dated 9th Sept. 1857, to Major Macpherson by Sir Dinkar Rao and many other such letters in the Vol. Receipts 65).

Article in "Sayhadri" June 1938, under the title "Dinkar Rao and his Repentance."

it would be well. I have the claims of a 'Hum-wattan' fellow citizen . . . The Darbar are endeavouring to break up their (rebels') unanimity. God's will, will be known hereafter."

Even Her Highness Baiza Bai whose name was used by the rebels to inspire the masses with the spirit of Revolt did not join the rebel camp. The aim of the rebel General Tatia Topi was to 'get Her Highness' person into his power, for no more severe blow has his party received than the flight of Baiza Bai, whose name has been freely used by the leaders of the rebel faction to stimulate and keep together these adherents whose continued absence is taken by the troops as an evidence of their falsehood and that Her Highness is not with them as they were led to suppose."³³ Even Rao Sahib's personal letters to Baiza Bai were ineffective. On 1st June 1857 he wrote to her, "I came here and inquired about yourself and Jeeajee Raw. You both left the place before my coming in. This was not right. Whatever was to happen has happened. Pray come back with Chimna Raja."³⁴ Not receiving any reply from Baiza Bai, Rao Sahib wrote another letter on 3rd June 1858 thus: "I do not approve of your leaving the station and you returned no answer to my former letter. You should not do this. Raji Jamadar is sent to you. You should return to your post. It was not my intention to take Gwalior. I wished to see you and go on. Pray come back and entertain no fear."³⁵

Thus we find that Jayaji Rao Sindhia, Sir Dinkar Rao and Baiza Bai wholeheartedly helped the British. This was a great factor in the ultimate failure of the Revolt at Gwalior. It completely disheartened the rebels and left them in the lurch without a strong support from the rulers on whose support and leadership they had at first calculated for their success.

Next to Gwalior, the other Maratha State of Great influence was Indore. If the failure of the Revolt in Northern Malwa is due to the Sindhia's joining the British, the failure of the Revolt at Indore and Southern and Western Malwa is due to Maharaja Tukoji Rao II's indecisive attitude. His name alone acted

33. Issue 103, Letter No. 249, Genl. No. 1137A, dated 11th June 1858, from Sir R. Hamilton A.G.C. for C.I. to the Secy., Govt. of India.

34. Translation of letters from Pandurang Shadashiva Peshwa to Her Highness the Baiza Bai (Issue Vol. 103).

35. *Ibid.*

like a spell at the time both for the good and evil. When it was known that the Holkar had revolted, no one connected with the English was safe. Even the peons employed in the districts were compelled to retire and seek safety in concealing their badges. The report of the Holkar having revolted was soon found out to be incorrect and immediately the open violence and hostility towards the English began to subside.³⁶

According to Sir Robert Hamilton from the first Maharaja Holkar³⁷ evinced steadfast loyalty to the British Government and the greatest anxiety for all its subjects within his territories. On the fatal 1st of July 1857 he gave shelter within his palace to every Britisher. Being left entirely to himself without any counsel from the British Agent to the Governor-General he rendered every assistance to the British people at Mhow. The Maharaja sent them provisions when the rebels were busy cutting their supplies. Similarly when the Maharaja heard that the British Political Agent at Bhopawar and the family of Colonel Stockley, the Commanding Officer of the Malwa Bhil Corps at Sardarpur, had been driven out from their stations by the rebellious troops of the Amjhera Raja, he at once addressed a strong letter to the Raja of Amjhera warning him that if any injury befell any British subject his troops would at once destroy the town of Amjhera and hold the Raja answerable for the deed. He also sent the troops to escort the Europeans to the Fort of Mhow. Similarly when Colonel Durand went to attack the rebels at Dhar and Mandasor, Maharaja Holkar kept his own rebellious troops under control and thus saved the British troops from a rear attack. The temporising game of the Maharaja's Government towards the rebels kept them in great suspense and inaction until the British troops finished the work of suppression of the Revolt at Mandasor and found suitable time to suppress the rebellion at Indore.³⁸

To the Central India Field Force the Maharaja supplied

36. File No. 1807 of 1858, Letter No. 6, dated Camp Dhar 24th Apr. 1858, from Mir Shahmet Ali, Indian Asstt. A.G.G. to C.I., to Sir Robert Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I.

37. issue Vol. 103, Supreme Government, Letter No. 178, Genl. No. 864A, dated 26th Apr. 1858, from Sir Robert Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I., to G. F. Edmonstone, Esqr., Secy. Govt. of India (Paras 10-11).

38. *Ibid.*

about the rebel activities in the Holkar's possessions and the neighbouring countries. He also helped the British troops to attack the rebels. He advanced at the head of his own troops to cooperate with Brigadier Stuart's forces at Mandasor.⁴⁷

The Nawab of Jaora gave secret⁴⁸ information about the rebels during the military operations in Western Malwa; forwarded⁴⁹ supplies to the Mhow Column; personally remained loyal and very helpful to the British;⁵⁰ placed his carriages at the disposal of Major G. Timmins;⁵¹ and helped in forwarding the British Mail bags. The Mandasor rebels got a great set back due to the opposition of the Western Malwa Chiefs to their cause. The rulers of Ratlam, Sitamau and Sailana helped the British Government.⁵² The Ratlam ruler gave aid to the Europeans. He collected about 4,000 troops to fight against the rebels.⁵³ The ruler, his family and some other nobles helped the British Force under Major Stuart with men, money and food for the suppression of the rebels at Mandasor.⁵⁴ The Sailana State too furnished troops against the Mandasor rebels and made all possible exertions to defeat the rebels. Raja Raj Singh of Sitamau also supplied men, money and provisions to the British to suppress⁵⁵ the rebels at Mandasor and Western Malwa. The great leader of the rebels, Dhokal Singh, who bravely fought against the British in Western Malwa, was defeated and killed by the Raja of Sitamau and his troops. Raja Gopal Singh of Jhabua even at great risk to himself received and sheltered the Euro-

47. Old Records File No. 94 (P), Letter-Book No. 119. Letters to Govt. of India, Dec. 1859 to Apr. 1860. Letter No. 57, dated 25th Feb. 1860, from Sir R. Shakespeare, A.G.G. for C.I., to the Secy. Govt. of India.

48. Col. Durand's letter dated Mhow, 18th Dec. 1857. (Jaora File).

49. *Ibid.* Dated Allahabad 13th Sept. 1858.

50. Capt. Shower's letter dated Neemuch 14th July 1859. (Jaora File.)

51. Major Timmin's letter dated Mehidpur 17th July 1857. (Jaora File.)

52. File No. 1775 of 1858-68, Letter No. 564, dated Camp Lahore, the 13th Feb. 1860, from Secy. Govt. of India to the A.G.G. for C.I.

53. Receipts Vol. 78, Letter No. 372 of 1857, dated Ratlam 19th July 1857, from G.G. Stedman, Esqr., Asstt. Opium Agent, Ratlam, to Col. H.M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I.

54. File No. 1807 of 1858, Letter No. 6, dated Dhar 24th Apr. 1858, from Mir Shahamat Ali, Indian Asstt. to A.G.G. for C.K., to Sir Robert Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I.

55. Issue Vol. 103, Letter No. 324, dated 19th July 1858, from A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of India

pean fugitives from Bhopawar and safely escorted them to Mhow Fort.⁵⁶

Another important cause of the failure of the Revolt in Central India—Malwa was the efficiency, discipline and diplomacy shown by several British officers during the Revolt. In Central India Colonel Durand, Major Macpherson, Captain Hutchinson and Sir Robert Hamilton tactfully handled the situation. Sir Robert Hamilton watched with unremitting vigilance the rulers of the States in Central India. He won over to his side the wavering rulers, kept in awe those who tried to throw off their allegiance to the British Government, watched⁵⁷ the intriguers and by all and every possible means tried to maintain the authority of his Government. He pacified the rulers and infused confidence in them. His policy of reconciliation specially towards the Holkar was a stroke of statesmanship.

It was Colonel Durand who, at great risk of official displeasure, changed the route of Colonel Woodburn's Column and diverted it to suppress the Revolt in Malwa. It was he who brought about the fall of the Fort of Dhar; of the Amjhera rebels; of the rebels at Mehidpur and of the rebel forces under the Shahazada of Mandasor.

Major Macpherson managed by his tact to keep the Sindhia on the side of the British. His tact saved Gwalior from the rebels. He constantly guided affairs at Gwalior from the Agra Fort. "He contrived by management . . . to prevent the Gwalior Contingent, after they had revolted, from joining the other insurgents during the two or three most perilous months of the year; and to him was much to be attributed the maintenance of tranquillity in that part of India at a period when insurrection and attack might have proved most injurious."⁵⁸

Among the military officers Major General Sir Hugh Rose, Major Stuart and Major Orr by their military tactics, their hard work, their sense of discipline, their strategy etc., proved them-

56. File No. 1776 of 1857-58. Letter No. 564, dated Camp Lahore 13th Feb. 1860, from Secy. Govt. of India to A.G.G. for C.I.

57. *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. CLIII, 11th Mar. 1859—19th Apr. 1859, Earl of Derby's View and the Resolution passed by the Parliament, pp. 1697 and 1698.

58. Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol., 153, p. 1757, (Third Series), Indore Foreign Office.

selves superior to any of the Commanders of the rebels. The British East India Company had vast resources of the British Empire at its back to suppress the Revolt. To meet the exigencies of time the British Parliament sent large body of troops to India, and supplied the best available arms, ammunition and war materials. The other Dominions under the British also helped the English. With all the mighty resources of the British Empire and the experienced Generals and soldiers that England could produce at that time, it was no difficult task for them to suppress the Indian Revolt, which at that time suffered from several drawbacks like the want of suitable arms, efficient organisation and sound financial support.

The Government machinery of the British was well organised. There was an organised system which at least stood the test of time. Such was not the case with the rebels who began with the aim of ending the then existing governmental machinery and, out of its ashes, creating a new government. So the task of the rebels was naturally difficult. The individual rebel leaders such as Nana Sahib, the Shahazada of Mandasor, Saadat Khan, the Rani of Jhansi etc., were not bound together by a properly organised administration as were the British Governor-General, the Governors, the Agents to the Governor-General, and the Political Agents.

The position of the British was sounder than that of the rebels in several ways. Considering as a whole, the unity in Political and Military command achieved by the British was in sharp contrast with the disunity among the rebels. The British system of Government allowed to a great extent free criticism of its measures by its English Officers. The outstanding example of this is the frank criticism⁵⁹ by Colonel Durand of the acts of his superior officers.

The British Government tactfully followed the policy of humouring the Indian rulers and of openly proclaiming that they were on their side with a view to win over the inhabitants. If by mistake any British officers annoyed some of the rulers, the mistake was soon remedied by his successor. We find a good

59. Issue Vol. 91, Letter No. 153, Genl. No. 590A, dated 8th Oct. 1857, from Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Government of India

illustration of this in the affairs of Colonel Durand and Sir Robert Hamilton.⁶⁰

On the 25th December 1857 Sir Robert Hamilton wrote to the Government of Bombay that His Highness the Sindhia had been steadfast and faithful, Her Highness Baiza Bai had never left the palace at Gwalior to join the rebels, and in like manner the Holkar had never quitted Indore since the Revolt began. "They have all exerted themselves in a manner to deserve well of our Government."⁶¹ The result of this policy was that the Holkar, the Sindhia and other rulers gave voluntary and active help to the Central India Field Force and exerted their authority for the early restoration of the British rule in Malwa.

The British Government remained not only tactful but watchful and had an effective and efficient system of espionage. Letters written in Latin, French and Code languages were freely exchanged between the British officers and even when they were intercepted by the rebels they could not profit by it because of their inability to decipher them. But it does not mean that the rebels had no organisation, no generals, no espionage system and no diplomacy. The rebels had started their own mint, workshops, factories for the manufacturing of arms and ammunition. But they had to work under several limitations. At times the rebels performed such marvellous feats that even the British were wonderstruck. Even the best of the British Generals failed for a long time to overtake Tatia Topi during his surprisingly rapid marches. At times a handful of rebels used to face the British troops and defeat them. On some occasions even the British Generals like Major General Sir Hugh Rose praised the feats of the rebels. But they lacked really first rate Generals and organisers of the calibre of General Washington or the Duke of Wellington. The rebels also did not receive that active support from all the people of India which they deserved in view of their worthy cause to fight for India's freedom.

The rebels failed for the time being in achieving their aim and had to pay dearly for it as thousands of them were later on

60. Issue Vol. 93, Letter No. 1088, dated 21st Dec. 1857, from Sir R.N.C. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to Major W.A. Richards, P.A. in Bhopal.

61. Issue Vol. 93, Letter No. 1125, dated 25th Dec. 1857, from Sir R.N.C. Hamilton, A.G.G. for C.I. to Secy. Govt. of Bombay.

massacred by the British troops. Some people believe that the Revolt was bound to fail as it was a feudal uprising which had as its objective the preservation of mediaeval and out of date institutions of monarchy and landlordism, and that it was not a people's war; that it had not the support of the masses, i.e., peasants, labourers etc. There is some truth in the statement but there is a great need for caution. The people of Malwa in 1857 were quite different in their outlook from the people of today. It will be a mistake, therefore, to apply modern standard.

The Revolt failed because the people were not united. Personal rivalries and mutual jealousies were not subordinated to the higher aim of patriotism. The number of persons who did not actively help the rebels was great, but the number of Indians who joined hands with the British was still greater. The rebels were weakened and defeated by their own brethren.

THE NATURE OF THE REVOLT

HISTORIANS have expressed various views regarding the nature of the outbreak in 1857. We propose to enumerate and examine these with the object of enabling the reader to judge for himself whether the facts warrant the events with reference to Central India to be considered as a mutiny, revolution, or revolt.

Sir H. S. Cunningham considers that it was a mutiny which took its rise in a military panic.¹ The Earl of Granville asserts that it was a general insurrection but mainly confined to the army.² Sir John Kaye calls it a sepoy war or the Indian mutiny.³

Indian writers like V. D. Savarkar⁴ and Pandit Sunderlal⁵ have declared that the events of 1857 amounted to an Indian war of independence; that the so-called Indian mutiny was a planned and organised political and military rising which aimed at destroying for good the Company's power in India.

Benjamin Disraeli depicted it as a national revolt. He was opposed to the view that it was a mere military mutiny. He added that it was a reflection, upon sepoys, of the discontent felt by Indian rulers at the unjust treatment which other Indian rulers had met at the hands of the Company's Government.⁶ J. B. Norton holds the view that the rebellion was widespread and contagious. It showed signs of combination and had a common origin.⁷

If we pool the various views into a synthetic whole, it would appear that the events could be described as:

- (i) A mutiny or an insurrection;
- (ii) A revolution or a war of independence;
- (iii) A partial revolt or a revolt.

1. Sir H. S. Cunningham, *Earl Canning*, p. 13.

2. Quoted from Charles Ball, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, p. 619.

3. Kaye, *History of the Sepoy War*.

4. V. D. Savarkar, *The Indian War of Independence*.

5. Pandit Sunderlal, *Bharat Men Angrezi Rajya*, p. 1381.

6. Charles Ball, *The History of the Indian Mutiny*, p. 623.

7. J. B. Norton, *The Rebellion in India and How to Prevent Another*, p. 18.

Let us examine these heads and try and see under which the events of 1857 in Central India properly fall.

Mutiny, according to "A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles," means an open revolt against constituted authority, especially the revolt on the part of a disciplined body of soldiers or a section of it against its officers. It means a behaviour subversive of discipline and amounting to mutinous conduct.⁸

It appears that in 1857 a large number of the sepoys of the Malwa Contingent, the Bhopal Contingent, the Gwalior Contingent, the Malwa Bhil Corps and such other military contingents were openly hostile to their English officers. There is no controversy on this point. The point at issue is whether others (particularly the civil population), besides the sepoys, joined in the mutiny. In Malwa, at any rate, several members of the civil population (including some rulers like the Raja of Amjhera, the Raja of Narwar, the Raja of Banpur, and others) did revolt against the rule of the foreigners. And, therefore, in a stricter sense the events in Malwa cannot be described as a mutiny.

There is also a wider sense of the term. Mutiny does not mean the revolt of the sepoys against their officers alone; the word has also been used to refer to a struggle between (i) the Church authorities and the Church people; (ii) a Prime Minister and his followers; and (iii) a Government and its subjects. We give here some classical examples to illustrate the various uses of the term:

(i) These *mutineers* in Church matters must have their mouths bunged with ice, not arguments.⁹

(ii) Sir Robert Peel found that, with the Press at his back, he could defy even his own *mutinous* followers to turn him out of office.¹⁰ and

(iii) Learning doth make the minds of men ... pliant to Government; whereas ignorance makes them ... mutinous.¹¹

Shakespeare uses the word in a very wide sense when he says, 'Tis a blushing shame fac'd spirit (i.e. conscience), that *mutinies*

8. James Murray, *A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles*, LL.D., Vol. VI., p. 801.

9. *Ibid.* 1589. Pappe. W. Hatchet A. IV.

10. *Ibid.* 1882. Peabody, *English Journalism*, XXIII, p. 178.

11. *Ibid.* 1605. Racon. Adv. Learn. I. II. 8.

in a man's bosom;¹² or when he writes, The spirit of my Father, which I thinke is within mee, begins to *mutinie* against this servitude.¹³

In view of this usage of the term, it may not be a misnomer to speak of the events in Malwa as a mutiny. For we find that the spirit of the sepoys, of the civil population and of some of the rulers began to militate against the foreign yoke. With the discontent of the sepoys there was a "secret collusion or combination on the part of the country at large."¹⁴ The popular cry was to oust the "Feringhis" or foreigners. The rebels proclaimed in 1857 at several places in Malwa:

The Creation is God's,
The Country is the King's,
Authority belongs to the Paramount Soldiery.

*Khalk-e-Khuda,
MulK-e-Badshah,
Hukm-e-Sipah.*¹⁵

But the critical historian should use the term in the narrower sense in order to be able to draw a line of demarcation between mutiny and revolt, in the interest of the proper use of scientific terminology, and in line with the dictionary usage which rests upon the common consensus of opinion among experts.

In July 1857 the British authority in Malwa was completely paralysed. Colonel Durand, with the help of troops under Major Stuart, had to reconquer Malwa. Sir Robert Hamilton, with the help of troops under Sir Hugh Rose, had to re-establish British authority and administration there. If it were a mutiny of a few sepoys, such large scale preparations and bloody battles as were fought at Dhar and Mandasor would not have been necessary.

The manifestos issued during the revolt show that circumstances were such that the common men were made to unite under a firm conviction that the English would no longer retain any footing in India.¹⁶ The merchants felt that the Govern-

12. *Ibid.* 1594, Shaks. *Rich.* III, I. iv. 142.

13. *Ibid.* 1600 Shaks. *A.Y.L.* I, i, 24.

14. Shower's, *A Missing Chapter of the Indian Mutiny*, p. 1.

15. *Ibid.* *The Malwa Insurrection*, Chap. XI, p. 93.

Ashoka Mehta, 1857 *The Great Rebellion*, p. 40.

16. Charles Ball, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. II, p. 631.

ment had monopolised the trade of all fine and valuable merchandise.¹⁷ The public servants felt for their low pay and status, while exorbitant salaries and status were freely bestowed on Englishmen.¹⁸ The artisans felt that, under the Company's rule, they had been reduced to beggary.¹⁹ The Pandits and maulvis considered that the English were the enemies of their religion and culture.²⁰ The litigants thought that the newly imposed stamp paper duty and the costly legal system were great impediments in the way of dispensing justice and a sinister reversal of the ancient traditions of India.²¹ The judicial decisions by village panchayats were very cheap, but the decisions of the British law courts entailed heavy cost. Even the man of the soil was stirred when he was told that his religion was in danger due to the efforts of the Christian missionaries. The rulers of Indian States were much disturbed owing to the non-recognition of adoption and the Doctrine of Lapse. In short, the Revolt of 1857 was the result of popular discontent. British historians admitted that the Revolt of 1857 shook the very foundation of the British Empire in India and this itself is an evidence to prove that it was not a mere sepoy mutiny.

To call it a "mutiny", in the narrower and historical sense, will be wrong in view of the following facts. At Indore on the 1st of July not only the sepoys but also the civil population rose up against the British. Similar was the case at Mhow, Mehidpur, Sardarpur, and other places. The revolt was so sudden and universal that within two hours of its outbreak Colonel Durrand, the officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Central India, had to leave Indore with all the Europeans. At Amjhera the civil population rose in revolt and attacked the neighbouring British station of Sardarpur. The Political Agent, Captain Hutchinson, had to escape with other Europeans to Jhabua. At Dhar the civil population revolted and captured the fort of Dhar with the help of the mercenaries. At Mandasor the rebel leader was not a sepoy but Firoz Shah, the descendant from the line of Taimur Lung. He had over 15,000 followers under his ban-

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.* p. 632.

19. *Ibid.* p. 632.

20. *Ibid.* p. 634.

21. *Ibid.* p. 635.

ner. Certainly all were not sepoys.

When Colonel Durand and Major Stuart, Sir R. Hamilton and Sir H. Rose fought bloody battles in Central India, they were fighting not only against their own ex-sepoys but also against several members of the civil population. Similarly when the British were successful in suppressing the revolt, they punished not only the sepoys but several civilians also. The trials and court-martials held at Indore, Gwalior, Sehore, Sardarpur, and several other places reveal that there were several members from the civil population who were either executed or imprisoned for long terms for their part in the revolt.

During his historic march through Nimar, Tatia Topi could elude the cordon of the British troops from all sides, because many members of the civil population used to furnish him with information about the exact position taken by the Company's troops. The rebel forces were actively aided by all sorts of people. Also the Bhils of Malwa and Nimar, who revolted against the British, were certainly not the ex-sepoys of the British.

If to style the Revolt of 1857 as a mere "mutiny" of the sepoys is the result of British imperialistic tactics and propaganda, to call it a successful revolution or a link in the chain of wars of Indian independence appears to be an extreme reaction against that sinister British propaganda and partly the result of excessive national zeal. The critical historian should avoid the Scylla and Charybdis of the rabid opponent and the ardent patriot.

The outbreak of 1857 cannot be termed a revolution, though on a superficial view we may find the ingredients of revolution present in it. Revolution means a complete overthrow of established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it.²² It means a forceful substitution of a new ruler or a new form of Government for an older one. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England and the French Revolution of 1789 are famous historical examples. Revolution is grounded on deep-rooted causes and is motivated by an all pervading principle: there is in it a singleness of purpose and method. Now it does appear that in Malwa:

22. James Murray, *A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles*, Vol. VI, p. 801.

vitute under the Company's rule. The halo of independence was still within its ken. The people of Malwa longed to be free. "The urge to freedom, to independence, has always been there and the refusal to submit to alien dominion."²⁶ Moreover, "the great difference between the state of Bengal and that of Northern and Central India in the middle of the century (19th) is brought out by the fact that while in Bengal the new intelligentsia (chiefly Hindu) had been influenced by English thought and literature and looked to England for political and constitutional reform, the other areas were seething with the spirit of revolt."²⁷ In several parts of Central India, (especially at Gwalior, Indore, Dhar, Mandasor, and Amjhera) the upheaval was severe enough to be termed as a great Revolt.

Historian T. R. Holmes on the one hand writes, "History and commonsense alike show that a rebellion, properly so-called, can never take place without provocation."²⁸ On the other hand he also writes, "It (Company's rule) was confessedly superior to any that had preceded it: the poor and the unwarlike knew that it had ameliorated their lot; and its sins had not been grave enough to provoke deliberate rebellion."²⁹ With due respect to the great historian, we beg to differ from his views. The high-handed policy of annexation, the mischievous distortion of the Doctrine of Adoption, the policy of "divide and rule," the greased cartridges, the official support to the Christian missionaries, the rapid changes in the laws and customs of the people, and the economic exploitation of the masses, were sufficient causes for provocation. With all the much-advertised diversities of race, religion, and rank among the Indians, there was enough provocation for both Hindus and Muslims to join hands during the Revolt of 1857.

Historian H. Beveridge had truly admitted that by some "strange fatality" Hindus and Mohammadans entered into a "mutual league"³⁰ for the complete overthrow of the Company's Empire in India. In Malwa both the Hindu and the Muslim

26. J. L. Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, p. 155 (1st Ed. March 1946).

27. *Ibid.*, p. 378.

28. T. R. Holmes, *A History of the Indian Mutiny*, p. 556 (5th Ed.)

29. *Ibid.*, p. 557.

30. H. Beveridge, *A Comprehensive History of India, Civil, Military and Social*, Vol. III, p. 555-56.

communities supplied leaders to the rebels. Leaders like Saadat Khan and Bans Gopal fought together at Indore against the British forces. Rao Sahib and the Nawab of Banda both conferred together for the capture of Gwalior. In the rebel camps both the Hindus and Muslims fought side by side against the Company. The Maratha Sardars trusted the Makranis even in their most confidential matters. The Makranis also were true to their salt. Saadat Khan's fidelity towards his master Tukoji Rao II is said to be exemplary. He chose to lay down his life rather than betray his master.

It is difficult to agree with Holmes that the sepoys were ripe for "mutiny" from 'purely selfish causes,'³¹ or that 'the relaxation of discipline had encouraged them to twist into a grievance anything that started their imaginations or offended their caprices.'³² There were neither imaginary grievances nor caprices which brought about the "Mutiny," but there were deep-rooted causes which inflamed the Revolt. It is humorous to read Holmes' explanation that some of the sepoys, like schoolboys, joined in the "mutiny" to find a vent for their inborn love for mischiefs.³³ There is a world of difference between the petty mischiefs of the boys against their teachers and the mutiny of the sepoys against the Government. The former is the result of mere playful activity and has neither deep-rooted causes nor a well-defined goal, but the latter cannot be explained so simply as it involves a life and death struggle, besides being based on deep causes, and is throughout guided by a definite ideology.

It is further difficult to believe with Holmes that, "before the greased cartridge story got abroad, they (the sepoys) formed no definite plot for a general mutiny."³⁴ The "mutiny" was not like a bolt from the blue: its causes were deep-rooted. It may be quite true that the Company's Government may not have been aware of the plot for a general revolt, but it is a fact that before the great drama of the revolt was acted the stage was set and the main characters were selected to play their part. The "mutiny" was a result of an organised effort, though the organi-

31. T. R. Holmes, *A History of the Indian Mutiny*, p. 558.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*, p. 559

34. *Ibid.*

sation may have been defective and though the over-excited sepoys and people in some parts overshot their mark in their excess of enthusiasm to overthrow the foreign rule. The mistake was that, instead of the revolt breaking out simultaneously at all places, it started at Meerut a little too early. In some parts of Malwa, too, it broke out prematurely. At Gwalior, Neemuch, Mehidpur, and other places it started earlier. At places like Indore and Mhow it broke out after the appointed day i.e., the 31st May 1857.

Some of the British historians may write of the righteousness of Dalhousie's administration and in contrast depict "the bad-mashes of India" who had "welcomed the first symptom of governmental weakness as a signal for gratifying their selfish instincts."³⁵ But the fact remains that the political, economic and other factors left no option to the Indians but to revolt against their foreign masters.³⁶ Even admitting their claim that the Company's rule was based on the "best intentions" in which there was resolute assertion of the majesty of the law, it is difficult to admit that much of the discontent felt against the British during the revolt was the inevitable result of measures which, though rightly taken by them on behalf of the suffering many, had offended the tyrannical few. The "mutiny" in its nature was not merely a rising of the "tyrannical few"³⁷ but was a great revolt.³⁸ Many grievances were rankling in the hearts of the people. The mine was ready to explode and only a match was needed to light it. The Indians had no natural sympathy with the Englishmen who were alien in blood, language, religion and manners. The sepoys, common men and even women, appealed to their Indian rulers "to attack the hated foreigners."³⁹ John Dickinson, writing about the Dhar State, says that the revolt was in opposition to the Company's rule and so was a national movement.⁴⁰ The masses in 1857 lived in a stormy atmosphere in which the consensus of public opinion was for driving the foreigners away.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 560.

36. Bhulabhai Desai, *Two Historic Trials in the Red Fort*.

37. T. R. Holmes, *A History of the Indian Mutiny*, p. 560.

38. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*.

39. John Dickinson, *Dhar not Restored*, p. 17.

40. *Ibid.*

We are aware that several Indian rulers, some businessmen and a number of persons of the middle class sheltered the Europeans, supplied them provisions and gave out secrets of the rebels' fortifications and strategic positions. Several persons including kings, ministers, and generals under the temptation of getting rewards in cash, kind or land betrayed their fellowmen and won temporary positions of material advantage. Such instances go to prove why the revolt failed, but do not destroy the theory that the events of 1857 amounted to a revolt.

The British historians have generally styled the common people who revolted as "the very lowest of the rabble," "the wretched drags of the people,"⁴¹ "the budmashes of India,"⁴² "persons floating upon the surface of the society without occupation or profession," "delinquents dissatisfied for less of political power."⁴³ But the Indians regard such persons as martyrs, patriots and nationalists. If we cast a glance at the warlike exploits of the Rani of Jhansi, Tatia Topi, the smile with which thé Raja of Amjhera and Saadat Khan mounted the scaffold, we shall find an irrefutable mass of evidence proving even to the casual observer beyond the shadow of doubt that several of the rebels were actuated by lofty ideals.

There is much truth in the story of Alexander and the robber, which points out the moral that the difference between them was one of degree only. The Americans, who revolted against the authority of Great Britain and achieved success under George Washington, have been styled by the historians as champions of nationalism, democracy and liberty. Their struggle is known as the War of American Independence. But through a strange irony of Fate our Indian Patriots and liberators are spitefully despised as plunderers and criminals. However, we must not forget that the Revolt of 1857 was a sincere attempt on the part of those rebels, Hindus, Muslims, Rulers and others who wanted to free India from bondage. Some leaders may have had personal axes to grind in kindling the revolt, but the general current was to free the country from the yoke of the foreigners. The gallant Tatia Topi, at the time of his court

41. R. T. R. Campbell, *Pamphlets on India*, p. 9.

42. R. T. Holmes, *History of Indian Mutiny*, p. 560.

43. R. T. R. Campbell, *Pamphlets on India*, p. 32.

martial, said that he fought to serve his master and his country and therefore he committed no crime. The Rani of Jhansi sacrificed her life fighting gallantly against the British troops. Saadat Khan of Indore preferred to go to the scaffold, but did not utter a single word implicating his master. Bakhtawar Singh, the Raja of Amjhera, chose to suffer death rather than beg pardon of the British.

If the Revolt of 1857 presents a sombre picture of unjustifiable massacre of some Englishmen, women and children of the rebels failing to achieve their freedom due to lack of concerted plan or the 'treachery of friends and power of the enemy,' it also has its brighter side. We find illustrations of the fidelity of several persons who stood shoulder to shoulder with their leaders and fought to the end, and in being richly rewarded by the approbation of their conscience in fighting for a cause which was a righteous one. The rebels derived for more inward pleasure and maintained a much more outward dignity than those "loyalists" who betrayed their brethren and comfortably enjoyed jagirs and pensions by selling their motherland to a handful of foreigners. It was the Nizam's troops under Brigadier Stuart that stormed Dhar. It was the Sindhia and Sikandar Begam's supply of provisions which helped Sir Hugh Rose to feed his troops and horses and to defeat the rebels in Central India. It were the Rulers of Bhopal and Jaora who acted as fifth columnists and supplied all the news of the rebels at Indore and Mandasor to the British. It was the jury consisting of the "Vakils" (State Representatives) of Gwalior, Indore, Bhopal, and other places that found the rebel leader Raja Bakhtawar Singh of Amjhera and his officers guilty of rebellion and was instrumental in sending them to the gallows.

The revolt did not spread to the south of the Narbada. The Punjab, Sind, Kashmir, Nepal and other places brought in actively the rival parties into the rebel fold for some time, but the question—"who were to be the rulers" after the British were defeated?—sowed the seeds of dissension among the rebels. The dethroned kings, the feudal landlords and the capitalist class could not tolerate the rule of the army or the common people. The Jagirdars, Nawabs and Rajas preferred the rule of a third party (the British) to the rule of the common men. In the Revolt of 1857, several Indian rulers and landed aristocracy could

not rise above the narrow selfish interests of their own and their families. They could not shake off their parochialism for patriotism, temporary materialism for higher spiritualism, and the interests of their caste or clan for the freedom of India. The intelligentsia of India, nurtured in the Western system of education, was dazzled by the flood light of Western learning and supported the British. Like Laincourt on the eve of the French Revolution, a historian speaking of the events of 1857 cannot declare, "Not a revolt, Sire, but a revolution." It will be an exaggeration to call the Revolt of 1857 the Peasants War, a Social Struggle, or a War of Independence, but we have to admit that the germs of all these existed there. The Revolt of 1857 presents a curious mixture of several tendencies and movements.

The Revolt was the result of a long and tragic exploitation of the Indians by the Westerners, of gradual conversion to Western conceptions of the channels of Indian national thought, of the legitimate demands of the Indians for justice and freedom, and of the equitable demands made by the Indian sepoys and the people. The outbreak was the first striking manifestation in modern times of India's determination to free herself from the foreign yoke, but it had its serious shortcomings and it temporarily failed, and hence we have to be content with calling it a revolt, rather than a revolution or a war of independence.

C.I.A. RECORD OFFICE

MUTINY PAPERS: (FILES, MANUSCRIPTS)

(Files containing very important letters are marked with an asterisk)*

S. No.	File Nos.	Title
1.	1772*	Attack made upon Mehidpur by the Wylaitis, 1857.
2. (a)	1773	Complaint against the 'Moghias' of 'Mauza' Delchi (Indore) for ploughing land within the limits of Karodia, 1901.
(b)	1774**	Correspondence with Holkar about the occurrences of the 1st of July, 1857, at the Indore Residency.
3.	1775**	Rewards to Indian Chiefs in C.I. for services during the Mutiny, 1858-1866.
4.	1776**	Papers regarding Mutiny in 1857. (Miscellaneous 1858).
5.	1777	Queen's Proclamation of November 1858. Amnesty Certificate and Act for the better Government of India. Chapter CVI. of 2nd August 1858.
6.	1778	Proceedings against certain sepoys in Appa Baba's service. Rewards to Messrs. C. & M. Alexander for rendering good services during the Mutiny 1858.
7.	1779	Conduct of Colonel Balkison, Commandant of the Holkar's Infantry. His trial 1858.
8.	1780	Confiscation by the Collector of Agra of the 'Zamindari' rights of the village of Rota, 1858.
9	1781	Succour money claimed by Major Macpherson, P.A. Gwalior, for loss sustained during the Mutiny.

S. No.	File Nos.	Title
10.	1782	Conduct of the Rani of Chhatarpur and her officials during the Rebellion 1858.
11.	1783*	Mutinous Conduct of the Narwar Raja, 1858.
12.	1784	Claims for Compensation for losses by the Mutiny within the C.I. Agency are to be addressed to M/s. Grant and Langden, Agra, 1858.
13.	1785	Trial of nine rebels, 1858.
14.	1786	List of prisoners tried under Act XIV of 1857-58.
15.	1787	Roll of claimants for the medal for service during the Mutiny, 1858.
16.	1788*	Movements of Birjor Singh and other rebel chiefs upon Sindhia's eastern frontier.
17.	1789	List of persons eminent for disloyalty in districts under the Bhopawar Agency, during the late disturbances, 1858.
18.	1790*	Nana Sahib's plan of operations in Gwalior territory and the Deccan, 1858.
19.	1791	Execution of Jamadar Imam Khan at Shahjahanpur, 1858.
20.	1792	Assistance rendered by Sirimant Zamindar of Satanwara to two sergeants, 1858.
21.	1793**	Statements in connection with Mutiny of Jhansi taken in 1858.
22.	1794	Lieut. Dysart will take charge of the prisoners at Mandleshwar and Asirgarh, 1858.
23.	1795	Lts. Bordie and Hunt were killed by the men of the Cavalry Regiment, United Malwa Contingent at Malhargarh, 1858.
24.	1796*	Correspondence from Mr. Herbert to Sir R. Hamilton, Bart,

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>File Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
		regarding the trial and punishment of Mutineers, 1858.
25.	1797	Bundelkhand Levies, 1858.
26.	1798	Cooperation of the Indian States against the rebels at Mau Ranipur, 1858.
27.	1799*	Proceedings in matter of the Nalchha Kamasdar, with remarks on the conduct of Sardar Muhammad throughout the disturbances, 1858.
28.	1800***	Daily Report of intelligence regarding the number, position etc., of rebels, 1858.
29.	1801*	Wylaiti fugitives, 1858.
30.	1802	Movement of troops on Agra-Barkhera, 1858.
31.	1803	Conduct of Jamadar Akbar Ali of His Highness Holkar's Cavalry, 1858.
32.	1804**	Papers connected with Rao Sahib and Madho Rao, lately captured at Sholapur, 1858.
33.	1805	Movements of Rao Sahib Gatge, alias Joti Rao of Gatge family, 1858.
34.	1806**	Conduct of Baba Aptia, 1858.
35.	1807*	List of persons rewarded for loyalty at Jaora, Ratlam and Sailana during the late disturbances, 1858.
36.	1808	Trial of Khairatikhan, late peon attached to the Bhopawar Agency for having joined the rebels at Dhar and fought against the British Government, 1858.
37.	1809	Different punishment awarded to the followers of Kedar Rao Vagia, 1858.
38.	1810	Protection and harbour afforded to the marauding bands of plunderers by the petty chiefs of

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>File Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
		Kothi (in Malwa Agency) and Jaso (in Bundelkhan Agency) etc., 1858.
39.	1811	Measures adopted for ascertaining the practicability of raising recruits in Budelkhand, through the aid of Indian Chiefs, 1858.
40.	1812	Execution of 12 rebels, 1858.
41.	1813	Details of services rendered by Jamadar Maula Bux Khan after the outbreak at Indore, 1858.
42.	1814	Tilok Singh and other rebels, 1858.
43.	1815	Return of savings or additions to the revenues of Government in consequence of pensions or confiscations of rent free lands for rebellion, 1858.
44.	1816	Certificate granted to Muhammad Ali Bohra for service in the Mutiny, 1858.
45.	1817***	Intelligence of rebels' engagements and movements of troops, 1858.
46.	1818	Claim of Seth Ganeshdas Nathmal on certain men of the late Malwa contingent, 1858.
47.	1819	Pandit Dwarka Narayan's Jagir, 1858.
48.	1820	Reward to the members of the C.I. Agency establishment for services during the C.I. Field Force, 1858-68.
49.	1821	Lt. Dysart soliciting on his own part and that of his Indian officers and men that the regiment may be employed on active service.
50.	1822	Application from the Raja of Charkhari for the surrender of Thujor Singh, 1858.
51.	1823	Execution of Risaldar Karimkhan at Shahjahanpur, 1858.

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>File Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
52.	1824	Reward of Rs. 3,000 for the arrest, or one of Rs. 1,500 for the destruction of the rebel leader Despat, 1858 .
53.	1825*	Tatia Topi's movements, 1858.
54.	1826	Engagement between the Char-khari troops and the rebels at Ajmer, 1858.
55.	1827	Return of prisoners tried for rebellion by Ratlam Darbar, 1858.
56.	1828*	Depositions taken at Meerut by Major G. W. Williams Superintendent of Cantonment Police, N.W.P., 1858.
57.	1829	Presentation of 'Khilat' to Bansdeo Bhao and Major Tekaram for their gallant deference of the Fort of Chanderi, 1859.
58.	1830	Jagir granted to Pandit Prem Narayan preceptor to the Raja of Tehri (Orchha) for services in the Mutiny, 1859-63.
59.	1831	Conduct of the 8th Bombay Infantry at Baroda during the Mutiny, 1859.
60.	1832	Statement of Balu Bhaiya regarding the passage of Tatia Topi through Bundhelkhand.
61.	1833	Thakur Chhatarsal of Agra-Barkhera, 1859.
62.	1834	Attack made upon the rebels under Farzand Ali, 1859.
63.	1835	Employment of Bapuji Sakharam to watch movements of Rao Sahib, 1859.
64.	1836	Information required by the Revenue Commissioner for Alienations if certain Sardars had taken part in the rising of 1857-58, 1859.
	1837	Presentation of 'Khilat' to Thakur Baldeo Singh for services

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>File Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
		rendered during the Mutiny, 1859.
66.	1838	Orders regarding the trial of prisoners charged with Mutiny and the murder of their officers taken in the present operations in Bundelkhand, 1859.
67.	1839	Rebellious conduct of Akil Mohammad and Chauka Raja; alleged shelter given to them by Sindhia's villages near Bagrodh and Teonda, 1859.
68.	1840	Movement of Sindhia's forces for the capture of Daulat Singh, 1859.
69.	1841	Enquiries regarding the armies of Raja of Shahagarh, 1859.
70.	1842	Capture of Jawahir Singh, 1859.
71.	1843	Movement of troops to act against Barjor Singh and Daulat Singh, 1859.
72.	1844	Major Macpherson's (P.A. Gwalior) claim to medal, 1859.
73.	1845	Reward to Jamadar Charubhuj for the services in the Mutiny, 1859.
74.	1846	Reward to Samrath and his son for assisting Sergeants Callow and Jerois in the escape, 1859.
75.	1847	Mutineer sepoy of Kotah Contingent, named Regunath Singh, who voluntarily surrendered himself to No. 4 Column, 1859.
76.	1848	Operations against Farzand Ali by Colonel Whistler and the escape of Farzand Ali, 1859.
77.	1849	Escape of Ramnath Singh Despat and Farzand Ali from Geri, 1859.
78.	1850	Khilat to Risaldar Isri Prasad, 1859.
79.	1851	Movement of Baba Diwakar and other Mutineers.

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>File Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
80.	1852	Reports showing the extent to which amnesty has been taken advantage of by deserters, mutineers etc., 1859
81.	1853	Surrender of Darjit Singh and other rebels, 1859.
82.	1854*	Condensed narrative of events in districts under the charge of P.A. Bundelkhand since the commencement of the disturbances at Meerut in May 1857, 1859.
83.	1855	Medal to Raj Niranjan, Medical Officer in charge of the Gwalior Agency, 1859.
84.	1856	Rebels under Devi Singh of Dougra, 1860.
85.	1857	Property plundered by rebels; afterwards retaken from them and claimed by original owners, 1860.
86.	1858	Khilat of Rs. 1,000 to Bans Copal, the Jagirdar of Nowgong and Rs. 500 to his servant, Lalla Dowak, 1860.
87.	1859	Petition and statement of the case of Pamma Kheri Thakurs, 1860.
88.	1860	Surrender of Zarawar Singh, 1860.
89.	1861***	Indore State, Mutiny: One File:— (i) Conferment of Khilat of Rs. 20,000 on Holkar for services rendered in Mutiny. (ii) Permission to adopt successor on failure of direct heir to Holkar State. (iii) Remission of a portion of Holkar's contribution to late United Malwa Contingent for extra levies employed during the Mutiny by Holkar and Dewas Chiefs.

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>File Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
		(iv) Proposal to reimpose service in lieu of money payment for Contingents, 1860-1864.
90.	1862.	Body of rebels was surprised by Jamadar Mytab Singh 1st Regiment, C.I. Horse, on 5th October, 1860.
91.	1863**	Spirited conduct of the Raja of Sitamau in attacking a body of rebels that had taken shelter in his districts, 1860.
92.	1864*	Attack by a small body of Sindhia's troops under Daffedar Dinkar Rao upon a body of rebels in the Sitamau district, 1860.
93.	1865	Applications from Munshi Muhammad Masud, of Charkhari, for some reward for loyalty, 1860-61.
94.	1866	Proposed grant of pensions to Mrs. Berty and Mrs. Rozario, widows of two Christians, slain during the Mutiny, 1860.
95.	1867	Proclamation for the apprehension of Criminals from Jhansi, 1860.
96.	1868	Trial papers of rebel prisoners, 1860.
97.	1869	Trial of Rampur rebels and the terms offered to them by Dr. Straitton, 1860.
98.	1870	Measures adopted for the capture of rebel leader Mukund Singh, 1860.
99.	1871	Capture of Gajraj Singh, 1860.
100.	1872	Arrest of Chhattar Singh, a notorious Jhansi rebel, 1860-61.
101.	1873	Enquiry regarding rebels concerned in the outbreak at Naggar Parker, 1860.
102.	1874	Disposal of Jahangir Khan of Oudh, 1860.

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>File Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
103.	1875	Trial of Kakapherkia and his servants on charge of rebellion, 1860-62.
104.	1876	Arrest by Jagirdar of Gerowli, of Aman Singh, a brother of rebel leader Desput, 1860.
105.	1877	Claim of one Gazi Khan, Indian Merchant of Gwalior, soliciting from the Government of India reward for good services during Mutiny, 1860.
106.	1878	Arrest of Ajit Singh, late 17th Bengal Native Infantry and Ratan Singh, late Sindhia's 1st Infantry, and surrender of six others, 1860.
107.	1879	Reward to Lala Rajnarayan for services rendered during the Mutiny at Gwalior, 1860.
108. (a)	1880	Memorial of Lala Rajnarayan, soliciting reward for services rendered during the Mutiny at Gwalior, 1860.
(b)	1881	Rebels under Mulla Khan, 1860.
109.	1882*	Capture and death of Khawaja Naik, 1860.
110.	1883	Capture of one Gopal Rao Pandit 1860-62.
111.	1884	Khilat to Munshi Ganeshilal, Superintendent of Jinji and Sardar Subah Singh, 1860.
112.	1885	Grant of fifty 'bighas' of arable land rent-free as 'Inam' to Chiman Singh for services during the Mutiny, 1860.
113.	1886	Capture of Issuree Singh by Lieut. Cadell 1860. Reward for capture of mutineers by late 'Thanadar' of Fatehpur, 1860.
114.	1887	Arrest of Kharram Khan and the surrender of five other persons, 1860.

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>File Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
115.	1888	Trial of 29 persons accused of being connected in the Mutiny of 1857-58.
116.	1889	Enquiry about Ramchandra Appaji Ruplag, 1860.
117.	1890	Return of all Contingent and other troops in Central India under the control of His Excellency the G.C. in Council, 1860.
118.	1891	Geroi picket at Salhet being accused of consorting with rebels, 1860.
119.	1892	2 'Sowars' of the late Malwa Contingent Cavalry who did good services during the Mutiny, 1860.
120.	1893	Reward to Ramzan Khan, Naib Shrestedar of Kirwi, for his good services during the Mutiny, 1860
121.	1894	Petition from R. Radha Krishna soliciting reward for services rendered during the Mutiny, 1861.
122.	1895	Claim of Major Raikes for compensation for loss of property during the Mutiny, 1861.
123.	1896	Certain servants of Seroli Jagirdar called for by the Hamirpur Magistrate as being implicated with the Ranipur rebels in a murder, 1861.
124.	1897	Death of Gulab Singh and the capture of Sukma Rana and 3 other plunderers, 1861.
125.	1898	Arrest of 11 men and surrender of 9 others.
126.	1899	Jagir village granted to Pandit Dharma Narayan, Rai Bahadur, for services in the Mutiny, 1861-1862.
127.	1900*	Trial of Shaik Rahimtulah, late Subadar Major, United Malwa

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>File Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
		Contingent on charge of being a leader in rebellion, 1861.
128.	1901	Capture of certain Naiks of Das-san, 1862.
129.	1902	Petition from Baji Rao soliciting some employment in lieu of services rendered during the Mutiny, 1862-63.
130.	1903*	Bhim Rao (Rao Sahib's capture) 1862.
131.	1904	Register for rent free grants since the 1st May 1857, 1857, 1862-63.
132.	1905	Income-tax on cash rewards paid for arrest of rebels, 1862.
133.	1906	Petition from Appaji Lachhman of Jhansi claiming remuneration for services rendered in the Mutiny, 1863.
134.	1907	Proceedings of Phiroz Shah, rebel, 1863.
135.	1908	Identification of Raghunath Das bin Durgadas, alleged to be Jarokin Singh a leader in rebellion, 1863.
136.	1909	Some rebel and mutineer prisoners in Nagod Jail, 1863.
137.	1910	Claim of Rewa Agency officers to the Central India Clasp etc., 1864.
138.	1911	Petition from Saiyad Nizamuddin bringing to notice his services in the Mutiny and asking that some provision be made for his support, 1865.
139.	1912	Presentation to Mr. J. S. Thornton of the Mutiny medal and C.I. clasp, 1865.
140.	1913	Petition from one Hari Kishan praying for reward for services in the Mutiny, 1866.
141.	1914	Mutiny medal to 'Sowar' Didar Singh C.I. Horse, 1866.

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>File Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
142.	1915	Presentation of Mutiny medals to, Sheo Gulam Missar and Chiman of Bhopal Political Agency, 1866.
143.	1916	Mutiny medals to the heirs of the men of the late Mehidpur Contingent, 1867.
144.	1917	Mutiny medals to 3 men of the United Malwa Contingent, 1867.
145.	1918*	Treasonable overtures made to the Maharaja of Charkhari and the Begum of Bhopal by one Nur Ali of Shahjahanpur, 1868.
146.	1919	Illegal seizure of 150 bullock-loads of salt from the Gwalior territory as prize of War, 1858.
147.	1920*	Grant of lands to Indian Chiefs etc., as reward, 1868.
148.	1921	Application from J. Miller for Mutiny medal for service on the Esufzai Frontier, 1868.
149.	1922	Application from Rai Prem Narayan regarding his village, 1868.
150.	1923*	Movements upon Dhar and Ujjain, 1858.
151.	1924	Claim preferred by Pestonji Rustomji for the Indian Mutiny medal, 1868.
152.	1925	Mutiny medal to 'Sowar' Gulab Khan of the Bhopal Contingent, 1869.
153.	1926	Measures to be adopted to ensure the capture of Barjone Singh, 1868.
154.	1927	Maulvi Ahmedullah Khan, a Wahabi, 1870-71.
155.	1928	Maulvi Ismael's case, 1870.
156.	1929*	Laikat Ali passing through Bhopal, 1871.
157.	1930	Suspicion about Madras Sepoys, 1872.
158.	1931**	Trial of notorious rebel Saadat Khan, sentenced to death, 1874.

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>File Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
159.	1932	Movements of the outlawed Moplah priest Saiyed Fazil, 1875-76.
160.	1933	Petition from Rup Ratan, late Kotwal of Indore Residency praying for some recognition of his services rendered during the Mutiny and his claims against the Gwalior State, 1877-1900.
161.	1934	Petition from Ram Bhat, son of Jey Singh Jat asking for suitable maintenance for services rendered during the Mutiny, 1884.
162.	1935	Information regarding one Beni Madho Singh, Talukdar of Oudh, a prominent leader of rebels in 1857, 1866.
163.	1936	Application from Maulvi Mohammad Sadruddin for a reward in recognition of his services, especially in the Mutiny, 1887.
164.	1937	Claim of Sardar Karam Singh to reward for services rendered during the Mutiny, 1888.
165.	1938	Application from Alla Bux, son of Madar Bux Kherati, for Mutiny reward, 1890.
166.	1939	Application from Govind Rao Narayan, a descendant of the late Raja of Jalaun for permission to spend a portion of the year at Gwalior, 1887.
167.	1940	Claim of Thakur Harbilas Singh of Jara, Gwalior for Mutiny reward, 1893-1901.
168.	1941	Case of Saiyed Abdul Karim, son of Sayed Abdul Fahim, 1895.
169.	1942	Copy of certain correspondence required by Ramchandra Rao of Kirwi, 1896 .
170.	1943	Petition from Chunnilal, Vakil of Piplia, for pecuniary aid, 1899.

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>File Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
171.	1944	Claim of Pandit Sukdeo Prasad to inherit 2 villages in the Bhopal State, granted to his father, Munshi Bhawani Prasad, 1901.

LETTER-BOOKS AND REGISTERS (RECEIPTS AND ISSUES OR INWARD AND OUTWARD)

*(Numbers containing very important Letters are marked
with an asterisk*)*

(Outward or Issues)

S. No.	Nos.	Title
1.	77	Sipri letters from January to December, 1850
2.	78	Indore Residency and C. I. Agency letters from 1850-56.
3.	79	Indore Residency letters to Gwalior Agency from January to December, 1851.
4.	80	Letters from A.G.G. Sindhia's Dominions to Assistant for Sindhia's Dominions, 1850-51.
5.	81	Letters from Assistant for Affairs of Sindhia's Dominions, 1851.
6.	82	Indore Residency letters to Gwalior Agency from January to December, 1852.
7.	83	Indore Residency letters from 1852-54.
8.	84	Miscellaneous letters (from Indore Residency and C. I. Agency) from 3rd April, 1852 to 30th July, 1855.
9.	85	Abstract of Government of India and Miscellaneous letters from January to December, 1854.
10.	86*	Letters from C. I. Agency to Government of India from 1854-1855.
11.	87	Letters to Mehidpur Agency from 1855-56.
12.	88	Letters to Government of India from 1st October, 1855 to 11th June, 1856.

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
13.	89	Abstract of letters to Government of India, P.A.'s and other Officers from January to December, 1856.
14.	90*	Letters to Government of India and all officers from 3rd June to 10th October, 1857.
15.	91*	Letters to Government of India from 1st August to 30th November 1857. Also Miscellaneous letters of July, 1857.
16.	92	Abstract of letters to Government of India, P.A.'s and other officers, from August to December, 1857.
17.	93**	Miscellaneous letters from 10th October 1857 to 16th August 1858.
18.	94**	Letters to Commanding Officer, C.I. Field Force, from Dec. 1857, to June 1858.
19.	95**	Letters to Govt. of India from 30th Nov. 1857 to 26th April 1858.
20.	96**	Miscellaneous telegrams from 16th Dec. 1857 to 12th April 1859.
21.	97	Abstract of Govt. of India and Miscellaneous letters from Jan. to June, 1858.
22.	98	Abstract of Govt. of India and Miscellaneous letters from July to Dec., 1858.
23.	99	Letters to P.A.'s etc., from Jan. to June 1858.
24.	100	Abstract of Miscellaneous letters from 1858-59.
25.	101	Letters to Commanding officers, Malwa Bhil Corps, 1858-60.
26.	102	Miscellaneous letters from 17th Aug. 1858 to 16th Mar. 1859.
27.	103*	Letters to Govt. of India from

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
		26th Apr. 1858 to 10th March 1859.
28.	104	Letters to Engineers etc. from 2nd Jan. 1858 to 11th Nov. 1859.
29.	105	Letters to Bombay Govt. from 2nd Jan. 1858 to 29th June 1860.
30.	106	Letters to Bhil Agency from 2nd Jan. 1858 to 27th Aug. 1860.
31.	107	Miscellaneous letters from 1858-1860.
32.	108	Letters to Gwalior Agency from 1st July 1858 to 4th Aug. 1860.
33.	109	Letters to Engineers from 2nd June 1858 to 1st June 1861.
34.	110	Letters to Nimar Agency from 1858-61.
35.	111	Letters to Bundelkhand Agency from 5th July 1858 to 30th Mar. 1861.
36.	112	Letters to Postal Deptt. from 1858-63.
37.	113	Letters to Govt. N. W. Provinces, C.P., Punjab, etc., 1858-64.
38.	114	Letters to Telegraph and Postal Deptt. from 1st Jun. 1858 to 29th Jul. 1868.
39.	115	Abstract of Govt. of India and Miscellaneous letters from Jan. to Dec. 1859.
40.	116	Letters to Govt. of India, etc., P.A.'s and others from 7th Jul. to 11th Oct. 1859.
41.	117	Letters to Govt. of India, Bombay etc. P.A.'s and others from 11th Oct. to 31st Dec. 1859.
42.	118	Letters to Govt. of India from 11th Mar. to 3rd Dec. 1859.
43.	119	Letters to Govt. of India from Dec. 1859 to Apr. 1860.
44.	120	Miscellaneous letters from 17th Mar. 1859 to 4th Apr. 1860.

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
45.	121	Abstract of Camp letters to Govt. of India and others from July 1859 to Feb. 1860.
46.	122	Letters to Commanding Officer, Bhopal Battalion, 1859-73.
47.	123	Abstract of Govt. of India and Miscellaneous letters from Jan. to Dec. 1860.
48.	124	Letters to Govt. of India, P.A.'s and others from 1st Jan. to 13th Feb. 1860.
49.	125**	Letters to Govt. of India from 23rd Apr. to 13th Sept. 1860.
50.	126	Letters to Gwalior Agency from 1860 to May 1861.
51.	127	Miscellaneous letters from 5th Apr. 1860 to 23rd Oct. 1861.
52.	128	Letters to Govt. of India from 14th Sept. 1860 to 31st May 1861.
53.	129	Abstract of letters to Govt. of India and others from 23rd Oct. 1860 to 23rd Feb. 1861.
54.	130	Letters to Govt. of Bombay etc. P.A.'s and others from 18th Oct. 1860 to 26th Feb. 1862.
55.	131	Letters to Govt. of India from 22nd October 1860 to 30th Oct. 1862.
56.	132	Miscellaneous letters from 3rd Jul. 1860 to 27th Apr. 1863.
57.	133	Letters to Guna Agency etc. from 3rd Jul. 1860 to 20th Jul. 1863.
58.	134	Letters to Judges, Magistrates and Collectors from 5th July 1860 to 18th Aug. 1863.
59.	135	Letters to Bhopal Agency from 26th Oct. 1860 to 28th Aug. 1863.
60.	136	Letters to Bombay Govt. from 4th Jan. 1860 to 25th July 1864.

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
61.	137	Letters to Supdt. of Dhar from 15th Aug. 1860 to 29th Sept. 1864.
62.	138	Letters to Western Malwa Agency etc. from 10th May 1860 to 16th June 1865.
63.	139	Letters to Bhil Agency from 27th Aug. 1860 to 4th June 1866.
64.	140	Abstract of letters to Govt. of India, Bombay etc., and P.A. and others 1861.
65.	141	Letters to Bundelkhand Agency from 1st Apr. 1861 to 30th June 1862.
66.	142**	Letters to Govt. of India from 1st June 1861 to 16th Apr. 1862.
67.	143	Letters to Nimar Agency from 22nd Mar. 1861 to 10th Aug. 1862.
68.	144	Miscellaneous letters from 25th Oct. 1861 to 5th June 1863.
69.	145	Miscellaneous letters (to Engineers) from 1861-64.
70.	146	Circular letters to P.A.'s and others from 14th Dec. 1861 to 27th Dec. 1867.
71.	147**	Letters to Govt. of India from 16th Apr. 1862 to 30th Sept. 1862.
72.	148	Abstract of letters to Govt. of India, P.A.'s and others 1862-63.
73.	149	Letters to P. A.'s etc. from 22nd Feb. 1862 to 28th Feb. 1863.
74.	150**	Letters to Govt. of India from 1st Oct. 1862 to 31st Aug. 1863.
75.	151	Letters to Gwalior Agency from 4th Jan. 1862 to 9th Jun. 1864.
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76.	153	Camp letters to all Political Officers etc. from 1862-65.
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<i>S. No.</i>	<i>Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
77.	157	Letters to P.A.'s etc. from 2nd Mar. 1863 to 21st Dec. 1864.
78.	158	Miscellaneous letters from 9th July to 22nd June 1864.
79.	159	Letters to Govt. of India from 4th Sept. 1863 to 31st Mar. 1864.
80.	160	Miscellaneous letters from 1863 to Jun. 1865.
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81.	162	Abstract of letters to Govt. of India, P.A.'s and others, 1864.
82.	163	Letters to Govt. of India from 1st Apr. to 30th Aug. 1864.
83.	164	Letters to Govt. of India from 1st Sept. to 24th Dec. 1864.
84.	165	Miscellaneous letters from 22nd Jun. 1864 to 9th Oct. 1865.
85.	166	Camp letters to P.A.'s etc. from 28th Dec. 1864 to 13th March 1865.
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86.	173	Letters to Govt. of India, 1865.
87.	174	Abstract of letters to Govt. of India, Bombay, etc. and P.A.'s and others 1865.
—	—	—
88.	177	Letters to Govt. of India and N. W. Provinces, from 19th Jan. 1865 to 12th Nov. 1866.
89.	178	Letters to P.A.'s etc. from 9th Dec. 1865 to 26th Feb. 1866.
90.	179	Miscellaneous letters from 1st of July 1865 to 28th Feb. 1867.
91.	180	Letters to Malwa Agency and C.I. Horse, from 16th June 1865 to 7th Oct. 1868.
92.	181	Miscellaneous letters from 13th Oct. 1865 to 30th May 1868.
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93.	188	Letters to Govt. of India.

S. No.	Nos.	Title
—	—	—
94.	192	Letters to Govt. of India.
—	—	—
95.	195	Letters to Govt. of India.
—	—	—
96.	224***	Letters to Govt. of India.
—	—	—
97.	246***	Letters to Govt. of India.
—	—	—
98.	248***	Letters to Govt. of India.

(Inward or receipts)

S. No.	Nos.	Title
1.	40	Mehidpur letters from 1849-50.
2.	41	Letters from Govt. of India to the Indore Residency from Jan. to Dec. 1850.
3.	42	Bhopawar letters from Jan. to Dec. 1850.
4.	43	Letters from Asstt. for Affairs of Sindhia's Dominions, 1850.
5.	44	Mehidpur letters from Jan. to Dec. 1851.
6.	45	Gwalior letters from Mar. to June 1851.
7.	46	Gwalior letters from Jul. to Dec. 1851.
8.	47	Miscellaneous letters from Aug. to Dec. 1851.
9.	48	Bhil Agency letters from Jan. to Nov. 1852.
10.	49	Gwalior letters from Jan. to Dec. 1852.
11.	50	Miscellaneous letters from Jan. to Dec. 1852.
12.	51	Mehidpur letters from February to Dec. 1852.

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
13.	52	Gwalior Agency letters from July to December 1852.
14.	53	Mehidpur Agency letters from Jan. to Dec. 1853.
15.	54	Miscellaneous letters to Indore Residency from July to December 1853.
16.	55	Miscellaneous letters from Jan. to Dec. 1854.
17.	56	Bhopal Agency letters from Jan. to Dec. 1854.
18.	57	Bhil Agency letters from Feb. to Dec. 1854.
19.	58	Miscellaneous letters from Jul. to Dec. 1854.
20.	59	Abstract of Govt. and Miscellaneous letters from 1856-58.
21.	60**	Letters from Bhil Agency etc. from Jan. to Jun. 1857.
22.	61	Miscellaneous letters from Jan. to Jun. 1857.
23.	62	Govt. of India's letters from Jan. to Jun. 1857.
24.	63	Bundelkhand Agency letters from Jan. to Dec. 1857.
25.	64**	Bombay Govt. letters from Jan. to Dec. 1857.
26.	65***	Gwalior Agency letters from Jan. to Dec. 1857.
27.	66	Miscellaneous letters from Jan. to Dec. 1857.
28.	67	Miscellaneous letters from Jan. to Dec. 1857.
29.	68	Letters from N. W. Provinces, Govt. etc., from Jan. to Dec. 1857.
30.	69	Engineers' letters from Jan. to Dec. 1857.
31.	70*	Nimar letters from Jan. to Dec. 1857.
32.	71**	Gwalior letters from Jan. to Dec. 1857.

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
33.	72**	Letters from Commanding Malwa Contingent, from Jan. to Dec. 1857.
34.	73**	Letters from Commanding Officer, Malwa Bhil Corps, Jan. to Dec. 1857.
35.	74**	Dep. Bhil Agency letters from Feb. to Dec. 1857.
36.	75	Miscellaneous letters from Mar. to June 1857.
37.	76**	Govt. of India letters from July to Dec. 1857.
38.	77	Bhil Agency letters from July to Dec. 1857.
39.	78**	Miscellaneous letters from July to Dec. 1857.
40.	79	Miscellaneous letters from July to Dec. 1857.
41.	80***	Indore Minister's letters from July to Dec. 1857.
42.	81**	Abstract of Govt. of India and Miscellaneous letters from July to Dec. 1857.
43.	82	Abstract of Govt. of India and Miscellaneous letters from 28th Sept. 1857 to 26th June 1858.
44.	83	Abstract of Govt. of India and Miscellaneous letters from Jan. to May 1858.
45.	84	Abstract of Govt. of India and Miscellaneous letters.
46.	85***	Bhopal Agency letters from Jan. to Dec. 1859.
47.	86	Abstract of Govt. and Miscellaneous letters from May to Dec. 1859.
48.	87	Abstract of Govt. and Miscellaneous letters from 26th Dec. 1859 to June 1860.
49.	88	Abstract of Govt. of India and Miscellaneous letters from June to Dec. 1860.

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
50.	89	Abstract of Miscellaneous letters from Dec. 1860 to Feb. 1861.
51.	90	Abstract of Govt. of India and Miscellaneous letters from Jan. to June 1861.
52.	91	Abstract of Govt. of India and Miscellaneous letters from July to Dec. 1861.
53.	92	Abstract of Govt. of India and Miscellaneous letters from July to Dec. 1862.
54.	93	Abstract of Govt. of India and Miscellaneous letters from July to Dec. 1862.
55.	94	Abstract of Miscellaneous letters received in Camp from 1862 to 1863.
56.	95	Abstract of Govt. of India and Miscellaneous letters from Jan. to June 1863.
57.	96	Abstract of Govt. of India and Miscellaneous letters from July to Dec. 1863.
58.	97	Abstract of Govt. of India and Miscellaneous letters from Jan. to June 1864.
59.	98	Abstract of Govt. of India and Miscellaneous letters from July to Dec. 1864.
60.	99	Abstract of Govt. of India and Miscellaneous letters from Jan. to June 1865.
61.	100	Abstract of Govt. of India and Miscellaneous letters from July to Dec. 1865.

(N.B.—Receipts or Inward Volumes from Numbers 89 to 100 are not very useful for details. But they are helpful for fixing up some dates.)

***Fragmentary Letter - Books (Miscellaneous Collection
of Papers belonging to)***

<i>Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
46.	Letters of 1847-51.
47.	Letters of 1848.
48.	Letters of 1849.
49.	Letters of 1850.
50.	Letters of 1850-55.
51.	Letters of 1851.
52.	Letters of 1851-56.
53.	Letters of 1852.
54.	Letters of 1853. (4 Files).
55.	Letters of 1853-54.
56.	Letters of 1854. (4 Files).
57.	Letters of 1854-55.
58.	Letters of 1855.
59.	Letters of 1855-56.
60.	Letters of 1856.
61.	Letters of 1857.
62.	Letters of 1858.
63.	Letters of 1861.
64.	Letter without dates.

THE OLD RECORD FILES

*(Files containing important letters are marked with
an asterisk*)*

<i>Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
46.*	Agra — Barkhera.
149.	Alirajpur and Baria.
119.*	Amjhera.
83.	Bagh and Bakaner (Kali Baori).
129.	Bagli.
96.*	Barwani.
169.*	Bhil Agent. Darbar Vakils with.
77.**	Bhil Settlement.
36.*	Chanderi.
29.*	Chanderi. and Tehri, (Orchha).
173.**	Contingent and Subsidiary Forces in C.I.
78.	Dewas.
95.***	Dhar.
87.*	Gwalior Administration and Treaty of 1844.
32.*	Gwalior Contingent.
104.	Gwalior State Vakils at Resi- dency.
188.****	Holkar, and Policy in Malwa.
5.	Holkar's Army.
5-B.***	History: Holkar State principal events — 1857-62.
194.	British Troops at Indore.
<u>365-D</u>	Historical Records of Indore Residency.
5	
69-A.	Indore: Girassias.
208.	Indore: Residency House.
94.*	Jaora.
125.*	Jhabua.
24.	Jhansi Affairs.

<i>Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
68.	Jobat.
51.	Khilchipur.
61-A.	Lalgarh.
66.	Muhammadgarh.
82.**	Malwa Bhil Corps.
130.	Manpur.
187-A.	Mathwar.
80.*	Mhow Cantonment.
71.	Narsingarh.
114-A.	Narwar.
13.	Neemuch.
59.	Gond: Chiefs in Nimar.
145.	Oneil.
43.**	Raghogarh.
196-A.	Rajgarh. (Bhumiat.).
45.**	Rajgarh State.
127.	Ratlam.
175.	Sindhia: Lord Canning's letter to.
157.	Sindhia: Maharaja Jayaji Rao.
54.	Sindhia's Troops: Attack by — On Kunch and Bhind.
79.*	Sitamau.
173.**	Subsidiary and Contingent Forces in C.I.

VERNACULAR FILES : (MUTINY PERIOD)

(Files containing important letters are marked with an asterisk)*

No.		Title
124	$\frac{82}{1857}$	Despatch of 'Sowars' to Nimach for suppression of rebellion raised by the Forces.
123	$\frac{94^{**}}{1857}$	Rebellion of Indore State Troops in conjunction with British Forces in the Indore Residency.
125	$\frac{100^*}{1857}$	Explanation offered by the Indore Darbar Vakil at Manpur for his sudden departure, without information on the day, the Mutiny broke out at Indore.
131	$\frac{36^*}{1858}$	Despatch of guns by the Indore Darbar at Mhow at the request of the Bhil Agent.
135	$\frac{75}{1858}$	Nominal Roll of Indore Darbar Officials and services rendered by each during the Mutiny.
144	$\frac{5^{**}}{1859}$	Report of Nawab Dilsher Khan, giving an account of the Mutineers.
149	$\frac{58}{1859}$	Expression by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, his satisfaction at the loyal attitude of the Maharaja Holkar during the Mutiny.
150	$\frac{70}{1859}$	Expression of Satisfaction by Govt. of India on assistance rendered by Bakshi Khuman Singh of the Indore Darbar Army.
170	$\frac{59}{1860}$	Present of a sword of the Indore Darbar to the son of Colonel (Hungerford) for his good services during the Mutiny.
171	$\frac{77}{1860}$	Indore Darbar's recommendation for not confiscating the arms

Nos.

Title

- of Dilsher Khan at Farukkabad in view of his loyal services, to Government.
- 179 $\frac{143}{1860}$ Restoration of the house etc., of Sarfaraz Khan Dafadar of the Indore Darbar Cavalry Jhajarpur (?) (Bulandshar Dist.) for his loyal services etc.
- 218 $\frac{77}{1863}$ Indore Darbar's request for payments of Rs. 306,992/- on account of expenditure incurred on forces kept during the Mutiny.

VERNACULAR FILES (GENERAL)

- 22 $\frac{3}{1846}$ Orders of H. E. the Viceroy in connection with the Lahore Mutiny and the attacks by Lahore forces on British District.
- 45 A $\frac{134}{1857}$ Crown versus P. Naroo Deo, Dewas Vakil, Charge of Conspiracy and abetment of illegal gratification.
- 48 $\frac{155}{1857}$ C.I.A. 'Rubkar' together with vernacular translations of 2 Proclamations from H. E. regarding the arrest of certain rebels and mutineers.
- 51 $\frac{539}{1857}$ Discovery of communications of Mutineers from the Palace of Baba Sahib and Balwant Raghoji at Kalpi.
- 53 $\frac{547^*}{1857}$ Statement of rebels serving at Maharaja Holkar's Battalions during 1857.
- 53 A $\frac{135}{1857}$ Dewas States versus Lalji Amarji, Charge of Dacoity and conspiracy.
- 54 $\frac{\quad}{1858}$ Discovery of letters from and to certain persons of position calling out for help to fight against the Christians from the house occupied by the Rani of Jhansi.

Nos.

Title

56 $\frac{21 \text{ A}}{1858}$

C.I. Agency Rubkar prohibiting the rebels of Kotah from coming into Malwa, Communications of orders to that effect to Gwalior, Sitamau, Jhalrapatan and Indore States.

56 A $\frac{229^*}{1858}$

List of persons accused and convicted of Mutiny and disobedience etc.

57 $\frac{67}{1858}$

Kharita from Maharaja Holkar and other Chiefs of Malwa in connection with the Victory of Lucknow and their desire to visit the Viceroy.

58 $\frac{\quad}{1858}$

Translation of letters from Tatia Topi to Chiefs and Thakurs urging them to participate in the Mutiny.

59 $\frac{120}{1858}$

Letters from the Chiefs relating to the Conquest of Kalpi.

62 $\frac{154}{1858}$

C.I.A. 'Robkar' being a proclamation of pardon to the followers of rebels with certain reservations.

62 $\frac{182}{1858}$

C.I.A. 'Robkar' regarding the arrest of Tatia and Rao Sahib, nephew of Nana Sahib Peshwa.

61 $\frac{187}{1858}$

Deputation of Capt. Hutchinson on a search for the rebels and instructions to Vakils of States to send their 'Motamids'.

65 $\frac{202}{1858}$

C.I.A. 'Robkar' desiring all 'Tankedars' to exterminate rebels from their 'Ilaqas'.

66 $\frac{214}{1858}$

Letters from Dewan Balchand and Maharaja of Patiala regarding despatch of British army to Gwalior and consequent disappearance of the rebels.

68 $\frac{301^*}{1858}$

Prayer for pardon by Rao Sahib, Baba Sahib, Bala Sahib, Firoz Shah, Mosin Ali Khan, Nazim of the Nawab of Farrukhabad,

<i>Nos.</i>		<i>Title</i>
		Imamali Khan, Risaldar and other rebels.
69	$\frac{306}{1858}$	Copy of a 'Sanad' granted by the Secretary, Government of India, to Kashiram, Nazir of C.I.A. Office.
70	$\frac{307}{1858}$	Grant of a 'Sanad' by the Government of India to Pandit Dharam Narayan, Mir Munshi, C.I.A. Office, for good services.
76 A	$\frac{16}{1859}$	Crown versus P. Balkishen etc., Charge of Collecting 'Sowars' etc. for the Forces of Nana Peshwa.
77 A	$\frac{64 A}{1859}$	Case against Mohsin Ali Khan, Mutineer (Nazim of the State of Farrukhabad).
78	$\frac{50}{1859}$	Deputation of Lieut. Napier on search of rebels.
79	$\frac{50 A}{1859}$	Application from Tahsildar of Shahgarh furnishing information about the rebels.
81	$\frac{74}{1859}$	Execution of agreement by 'Ilaqedars' for not giving help to the rebel leaders, Makund Singh, Farzand Ali etc.
85	$\frac{82}{1860}$	Grant of reward of Rs. 300/-, a sword and a 'Sanad' to Sobhag Singh for his loyal services during the Mutiny.

POLITICAL AGENCIES FILES (MUTINY PERIOD)

(Files containing important letters are marked with an asterisk*)

Nos.		Title
269	<u>Bhopawar</u> 1857	Affairs of Dhar State Mutiny.
268	* <u>Bhopawar</u> 1857-60	Correspondence regarding the insurrection at Dhar in 1857 and subsequent trial of the ring leaders.
1749	* <u>Bhopawar</u> 1857-60	Printed Papers relating to the Restoration of Dhar State.
580	<u>Bhopal</u> 1857-60	Escape of Col. Hutchinson from Sardarpur, 1857. Shelter afforded by Jhabua ruler and reward to the latter.
132	* <u>Bhopawar</u> 1858	Administration of Barwani Chiefship.
71	* <u>Bhopawar</u> 1858-61	Bhina Naik.
1222	<u>Bhopawar</u> 1857-65	Reduction of the Bhumia Police
140	<u>Bhopawar</u> 1860	Raid by the Bhil Naiks of Barwani on the Khandesh Frontiers.
133	* <u>Bhopawar</u> 1859-61	Barwani.
142	<u>Bhopawar</u> 1862-66	Barwani.
1260	<u>Gwalior</u> 1858-89	Transfer of Amjhera to Sindhia
356	<u>Gwalior</u> 1859-60	H.H. Sindhia's Army.
267	** <u>Gwalior</u> 1854-56	Report on State of Affairs at Gwalior.

<i>Nos.</i>		<i>Title</i>
273	<u>** Gwalior</u> 1858	Report on State of Affairs at Gwalior.
274	<u>** Gwalior</u> 1858	Report on State of Affairs at Gwalior.
269	<u>** Gwalior</u> 1859-61	Report on State of Affairs at Gwalior.
87 A	<u>188</u> 1860	(Rajgarh State):— Mutiny attempted in the State of Rajgarh.
55	<u>21</u> 1858	(Miscellaneous):— Prohibition for making and sale of ammunition in C.I.
69	Bhopal Agency:	Agency. Treasonable letters written by Mian Sikandar Khan of Bhopal. 1858.
921**	Bhopal	(Miscellaneous):— Conduct of Raja of Narsingarh in sheltering proclaimed rebels, such as Firozshah etc., Deputation of Col. Mac. Mullin to Narsingarh, 1860.
97*	(Malwa Agency)	The Nawab of Jaora, 1857.
98	(Malwa Agency)	Bestowal of a 'Khilat' to Khan Jahan Khan, nephew of Nawab of Jaora for services during Mutiny, 1859.
712	(Malwa Agency)	Ratlam affairs, 1857-64.
1170	(Malwa Agency)	Khilat to Raja of Sitaman, 1860.
72*	(Bhopawar Agency)	Correspondence regarding Bhima Naik, 1859.
135*	(Bhopawar Agency)	Unsettled state of Barwani State.
728**	(Bhopawar Agency)	Capture and trial of Raja of Amjhera and his servants for attacking and plundering the Bhopawar Agency, 1857-59.
734.	(Miscellaneous)	Rising of Bhils.

<i>Nos.</i>	<i>Title</i>
79* (Administration)	Prohibition against the entertainment of Afghans, Wylaities and other foreign mercenaries by Indian Chiefs, 1857-82.
288. (Area etc.)	States and Districts under A.G.G. 1856.
614. (Arms).	Location and disposition of Troops in C.I., 1859.
1588* (Banda)	Banda narrative (Mutiny, 1859).
552 and 554.* (Jhansi).	Jhansi correspondence 1853-54.
1016* (Miscellaneous)	Names etc. of several States in C.I. 1861.
1018 and 1019** (Miscellaneous)	Nana Sahib etc.

MUTINY PAPERS ABOUT C.I. IN THE NATIONAL
ARCHIVES OF INDIA, NEW DELHI

(Very important letters are marked with an asterisk)*

Central India

Mr. R.N.C. Hamilton acquitted of all charges.
Despatch to Court of Directors (C.D.) No. 11, dated 6th
Apr., 1850.

- * Minute by Governor-General (G.G.) on the Agency in C.I.
7th April 1854/Nos. 35-38/F.C.
- ** Report of A.G.G. C.I.'s Annual Tour for 1855-56. 18th Jul.
1856/Nos. 22-27/F.C.
- ** Report of the Bhil and Deputy Bhil Agents for 1854-55.
1st Aug. 1856/Nos. 31-45/F.C.
- ** Copy of General Administration Report for 1855-56. 13th
March 1857/Nos. 3/Cons. F.C.
Copies of all Acts bearing on the Mutiny in India to A.G.G.
in C.I.
11th Sept. 1857/44-46./F.C.
- * Report that on the 1st of Jul. Offg. A.G.G. C.I. was attacked.
25th Sep. 1857. 312. / S.C.
Apprehended Mutiny of Holkar's Troops on 1st Aug. 1857.
25th Sep. 1857 / 318 / S.C.
Narrative of events of A.G.G. C.I. called for.
12th Sep. 1857 / 319-22 / S.C. -
Operations of Deccan F.F. under Brg. Stuart /
25th Sept. 1857 / 329-31 / S.C.
- ** Panna Vakil's Report on the massacre at Jhansi.
25th Sep. 1857 / 343-45 / S.C.
Regarding Shahzada's arrival at Jaora.
Receipt of letter No. 3006 / 2nd Oct. 1857.
57 / F.C.
A.G.G. C.I. forwards Indore Kharita, / 30th Oct. 1857 /
251-53. /
News from Bhopal up to 2nd Aug./30th Oct. 1857 /
254-55 / S.C.
- * Narrative of events in C.I. F.C. 31st Dec. 1858 /
Nos. 3144/50. /

Letters regarding Shahzada. / 30th Oct. 1857.
/283-95. / S.C.

News Report from Bhopal Agency up to 26th Aug. 1857/
30th Oct. 1857 / 331-33 / S.C.

- * Report on Gwalior Mutineers. / 30th Oct. 1857. / 334/S.C.
- * Bhima Naik / 30th Oct. 1857 / 353-353B / S.C.
- * Dhar Mackranis. / 30th Oct. 1857 / 350-51 / S.C.
- * Macpherson's letter dated 1st Jul. for Gwalior Mutiny. /
30th Oct. 1857 / 354 / S.C.
- * Intercepted letters by P.A. Nimar / 30th Oct. 1857 /
353-56/S.C.

Correspondence relating to a movement of force on Amjhe-
ra. / 30th Oct. 1857. / 366-68. / S.C.

Strength of Mandasor Insurgents. / 30th Oct. 1857/375/
S.C.

News letters from Sehore / 30th Oct. 1857 / 378-79.

- * Brg. Ramsey's Report on Gwalior Mutiny. / 30th Oct.
1857 / 395-97 / S.C.
- * Macpherson's Report. / 30th Oct. 1857. / 398. /
S.C. Spy reports about Indore rebels. / 30th Oct. 1857/
427-33/S.C.

Spy Reports about Indore rebels / 30th Oct. 1857
334-35 (335?) S.C.

- * Observations on Indian publications by A.G.G. C.I./
13th Nov. 1857/49/F.C.

- * Large Section of Marathas hostile to British.

27th Nov. 1857 / 198-200 / S.C.

Outrages of Dhar and Amjhera Wylaitis. / 27th Nov. /
1857. 205-210. / S.C.

Enquiry regarding Dinkar Jayaram's position at Indore.
27th Nov. 1857. / 252-54 / S.C.

Proceedings of Mhow and Indore Mutineers. / 27th Nov.
1857/549-50. / S.C.

Misrepresentation in "Friend of India" brought to notice by
A.G.G. C.I. / 18th Dec. 1857/100-102/F.C.

Comment regarding Newspapers in Bhopawar. /
18th Dec. 1857 / 130-33 / F.C.

- ** Durand's Narrative on "Line of Narbudda" (Narbada).
/ 18th Dec. 1857. / 121-26/S.C.

Report on Experimental Bullock-train transport in C.I. satis-

factory, Political Despatch to Court of Directors No. 19. Dated 21st Mar. 1857.

Topographical Survey of C.I. Political Despatch of Court of Directors No. 29. Dated 19th Sept. 1857.

Narrative of A.G.G. C.I.'s Tour in 1854-55.

Political Despatch from Court of Directors No. 29. Dated 19th Aug. 1857.

Measures for the safety of C.I. Despatch to Secret Committee No. 26 of 1857.

Communication to H. H. Gwalior regarding Gwalior and Sipri Mutineers. Despatch to Secret Committee No. 37 of 1857.

Communication to H. H. Sindhia regarding Morar and Sipri Mutiny. Despatch to Secret Committee No. 41 of 1857.

- * Residency attacked by H. S. Withdrawal of Resident. Despatch to Secret Committee No. 48 of 1857.

Mutiny of 5th Infantry, Agar.

Despatch to Secret Committee No. 48 of 1857.

Particulars of Jhansi massacre.

Despatch to Secret Committee. No. 59 of 1857.

Measures freeing C.I. from Shahzada.

Despatch to Secret Committee No. 62 of 1857.

Operation of Deccan Field Force from 29th June to 15th July 1857.

Despatch to Secret Committee No. 62 of 1857.

- * Narrative of Mutiny of the 7th Infantry, Gwalior Contingent and Measures taken at Mhow for Shahzadas' supposed Insurrection.

Despatch to Secret Committee No. 65 of 1857.

Report from Bhimgir Baba of the Wylaites outrages at Bhopawar.

Despatch to Secret Committee No. 76 of 1857.

- * Dhar and Amjhera Wylaitis.

Despatch to Secret Committee No. 76 of 1857.

Discovery of Intrigues by Parties at Indore etc.

Despatch to Secret Committee No. 77 of 1857.

Proceedings against Bhils.

Despatch to Secret Committee No. 77 of 1857.

Promised Report on the conduct of Baiza Bai etc.

Despatch to Secret Committee. No. 81 of 1857.

- An Account of the Mutiny of C.I. (measures for tranquillity in C.I.) 29th Jan. 1858. / 87-89 / S.C.
- 'Luxman Toolgaram's Malicious charge against Holkar. 29th Jan. 1858. / 111-12. / S.C.
- Deccan F.F. under Maj. Stuart. 29th Jan. 1858. 120-21 / S.C.
- * Report of Operations of Malwa F.F. before Mandasor. 29th Jan. 1858. / 164-69. / S.C.
- Parwans of Shahzada found at Jamud. 29th. Jan. 1858. / 173-75. / S.C.
- Disarmament of Holkar's Army. 29th Jan. 1858. 188-90 / S.C.
- Disarmament of Holkar's Army. 26th Feb. 1858. 87-92 / S.C.
- * Punishment of persons connected with attack on Indore Residency. 26th Feb. 1858. / 87-92 / S.C.
- Disposal of Leaders at the outrage at Indore Residency. 26th Feb. 1858. / 308-309 / S.C.
- Sir H. Rose At Gurrakotta. 26th Feb. 1858. / 31 / S.C.
- * 1st of July at Indore : An account. 26th Mar. 1858. 43-48 / S.C.
- Movement of Sir H. Rose's Col. after Saugor. 26th Mar. 1858 / 52-54 / S.C.
- Copy of A.G.G. C.I.'s letter. Dated 12th Dec. 1857 and reply / 16th Apr. 1858. 89-90 / F.C.
- News of Jhansi / 140-41. / S.C. 30th Apr. 1858.
- News of Jhansi / 142-43. / S.C. 30th Apr. 1858.
- News of Jhansi / 144-47. / S.C. 30th Apr. 1858.
- Report of the defeat of the rebels and investment of Jhansi. / 264-67 / 30th Apr. 1858.
- Report on Jhansi / 322. / 30th Apr. 1858.
- Disposal of ring leaders at Indore / 28th May 1858. / 94-96 / S.C.
- Movement of Sir H. Rose. / 28th May 1858 / 110-17 / S.C.
- Report of the strength of the rebels in C.I. / 28th May 1858. / 122-24 / S.C.
- Intelligence of rebels movements / 28th May 1858 / 125-28 / S.C.
- Intelligence of rebels movements / 28th May 1858 / 132-33 / S.C.
- Rout of rebels near Jhansi / 28th May 1858 / 151-55 / S.C.
- Intelligence from Jhansi / 28th May 1858 / 175-76 / S.C.

- Report on occupation of Jhansi / 28th May 1858 / 197-76/ S.C.
- Report on occupation of Jhansi / 28th May 1858 / 197-98/ S.C.
- Intelligence of movements of rebels / 25th May 1858 / 208-209 / S.C.
- Intelligence of movements of rebels / 25th May 1858 / 211-12/S.C.
- Regarding Nana's plans being known to C.I. Chiefs. 28th May 1858 / 231-32 / S.C.
- ** Inquiry about Baiza Bai. / 28th May 1858 / 344-48 / S.C.
- Intelligence of movements of Tatia Topi. / 25th June 1858/ 76-77/S.C.
- Intelligence of movement of rebels. / 25th June 1858/78-79 / S.C.
- * Report on the Mutiny at Indore by Col. Durand / 30th July 1858 / 29-30 / S.C. and / 31-32 / S.C.
- * Sir Robert Hamilton's Report on the Mutiny at Indore, dated 30th July 1858/33/S.C.
- * Inquiry regarding Pandurang Sadashiv Peshwa (Rao Sahib). 27th Aug. 1858 / 75-78 / S. C.
- Report on capture of Gwalior / 27th Aug. 1858. / 78-81 / S.C.
- Arrest by the Dewas Authorities of certain individuals enlisted by a person calling himself a servant of the Peshwa and the dispersion of some rebels assembled at Tajpur. / 17th Sept. 1858 / 96-98 / S.C.
- Intelligence from P.A., Bhopal dated 30th Aug. 1858 / 15th Oct. 1858 / 220-21 / F.C. (S.C.?)
- Letters found in Rao Sahib's house at Gwalior / 26th Mar. 1858 / 27-29 / S.C.
- ** On State of Affairs in C.I. / 18th Dec. 1858 / 838-44 / S.C.
- Discontinuance of Daily Report of position and movement of Troops ordered / 31st Dec. 1858 / 116-19/F.C.
- Affairs of C.I. / Despatch from S.S. No. 17. Dated 8th Dec. 1858.
- Collection of evidence as to the conduct of Jhansi Rani. G.G.'s Despatch to Secret Committee No. 10 of 1858.
- Views of A.G.G. C.I. for restoration of order in C.I. G.G.'s

Despatch to Secret Committee No. 10 of 1858.

Operations of Malwa F.F. near Mandasor. Despatch to Secret Committee, No. 12 of 1858.

Instructions regarding the reduction of Jhansi. G.G.'s Despatch to Secret Committee No. 14 of 1858.

List of sufferers in Jhansi massacre. G.G.'s Despatch to Secret Committee No. 19 of 1858.

Sindhia's defeat and flight to Agra. G.G.'s Despatch to Secret Committee No. 21 of 1858.

Report on C. I. Affairs etc. •

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Recent movements of rebels in C.I.

13th May 1859 / 254-/255/F.C.

- * Despatches addressed by A.G.G. C.I. to Sir H. Rose / 30th Dec. 1859 / 269-74 / F.C. Sup.
- * Report on events at Jhansi in June 1857 / 30th Dec. 1859 / 280-88 / F.C. Sup.
- *** Narrative of events in C.I. during the Mutiny from May 1857 to June 1858 / 30th Dec. 1859 / 1351 / F.C. Sup.
- ** Narrative of Operations against the rebels / 30th Dec. 1859 / 1607-34 / F.C. Sup.
- * Capture and trial of Tatia Topi, Nos. 118-120; Nos. 157-68. For. Deptt. — Secret Branch.

B H O P A L

- *** Kharita from Begum regarding territorial concessions. / 31st July 1857 / 154-56 / S.C.
- * Bhopal Affairs. / 25th Sep. 1857 / 312 / S.C.
- ** Communications for increase of territories. Despatch to Secret Committee. No. 48 of 1857.
Mutiny in Bhopal: Secret Committee Despatches, 1857. Nos. 59 and 65.
Conduct of Bhopal during Mutiny. / 29th Jan. 1858 / 87 / 89/F.C.
- ** Execution of Sepoy Ibrahim Khan / 26th Feb. 1858 / 93-94 / F.C. Despatch to Secret Committee No. 16 of 1858.

DHAR

Objection raised by the authorities of Dhar regarding the free transit of grain for the use of Government through Indian States / 4th Jan. 1850 / 120-22 / F.C.

**Responsibility of Dhar Darbar during the Mutiny at Dhar. 27th November 1857. / 283-90 / S.C.

*Observation on the Insurrection at Dhar and attachment of that State. Political Despatch from Court of Directors. No. 25 dated 22nd June 1858.

DURAND

Appointed Offg. A.G.G. C.I. / 24th Apr. 1857 / 372 / F.C.

Charge of C.I. Agency made over to Sir Robert Hamilton. 15th Dec. 1857. / 62-64 / F.C.

HAMILTON

Availed himself of leave on 3rd Apr. 1857, from Indore, charge of C.I. Agency retaken from Col. Durand, 15th Dec. 1857.

* Services of Hamilton during Mutiny.
Political Despatch from S.S. No. 25 dated 1st Jun. 1859.

HOLKAR AND INDORE

- * Intercepted Letters showing the intrigues of the members of the Court against the British. 27th Nov. 1857 / 276-78 / S.C.
- * Authentic Account of the occurrences of the 1st of July 1857 at Indore / 26th March 1858 / 43-48 / S.C.
- * Attack on the Residency at Indore and subsequent events. Political Despatch to S.S. No. 149, dated 8th Sep. 1859.

LOCAL CORPS

(Local Corps Papers relating to Central India)

Political Despatch to Court of Directors	No. 53 dated 16-7-53.
—do—	No. 21 dt. 2-6-1856
—do—	No. 2 dt. 8-1-1857
—do—	No. 18 dt. 21-3-1857
—do—	No. 42 dt. 5-6-1857
—do—	No. 50 dt. 20-8-1857
—do—	No. 1 dt. 8-1-1858
—do—	No. 9 dt. 22-2-1858
—do—	No. 31 dt. 28-4-1858
—do—	No. 39 dt. 3-7-1858
—do—	No. 50 dt. 8-9-1858

Narrative of events from the outbreak of disturbances to the restoration of authority in C.I.

Despatch to S.S. No. 125, dated 16th July 1859.

* S.S.'s Despatch regarding the case of Ramchandra Rao Bapuji late Dewan of Dhar State.
Jan. 1862. No. 9 Pol B.

* Observations on Dhar Insurrection and attachment of that State. Political Despatch from C.D. No. 25, dated 22nd June 1858.

SECRET COMMITTEE

Bombay Despatch to Secret Com. No. 153 of 1857 Army Revolt.

—do—	171	
—do—	221	
—do—	240	—do—

GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S DESPATCH TO SECRET COMMITTEE

No. 2 of 1858	Papers connected with the Revolt of Indian army.
No. 5	—do—

No. 15 of 1858	Action between Tatia Topi and Sir H. Rose.
No. 34 of 1858	Gwalior Affairs.
No. 26 A „	Gwalior Affairs.
No. 26 „	Gwalior Affairs.
No. 28 „	Further Papers regarding Revolt of Indian Army.
No. 38 „	Revolt of Indian Army.
No. 39 „	Gwalior Affairs.
No. 44 „	Gwalior Affairs.
No. 45 „	Papers regarding the Revolt of Indian Army.
No. 46 „	Gwalior Affairs.
No. 47 „	Papers regarding Revolt of Indian Army.
No. 51 „	Gwalior Affairs.

Despatch to Secret Committee No. 48 of 1857 Army Revolt.

—do—	55	—do—
—do—	59	—do—
—do—	62	—do—
—do—	65	—do—
—do—	68	—do—
—do—	70	—do—
—do—	76	—do—
—do—	81	—do—
—do—	5 of 1858	—do—
—do—	6 „	—do—
—do—	12 „	—do—
—do—	16 „	—do—
—do—	23 „	—do—

(SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (S.S.))

Bom. Govt. Secret Desp. to S.S. No. 4 of 1858. Operations in C.I.

—do—	20	—do—
—do—	27	—do—
—do—	5 of 1859	—do—
—do—	15	—do—
—do—	22	—do—
—do—	31	—do—

G.G.'s Pol. Desp. to S.S. No. 4	1858	Army Revolt
—do—	7 1858	—do—
—do—	12 „	—do—
—do—	15 „	—do—
—do—	21 „	Battle of Jhansi.
—do—	4 1859	Army Revolt.
—do—	14 „	—do—
—do—	19 „	—do—
—do—	29 „	Dhar Affairs
—do—	36 „	—do—
—do—	60 „	Army Revolt.
—do—	68 „	—do—
—do—	80 „	—do—
—do—	88 „	—do—
—do—	100 „	—do—
—do—	109 „	—do—
—do—	137 „	—do—
—do—	140 „	—do—
—do—	147 „	—do—
—do—	149 „	Attack on Indore
—do—	161 „	Residency etc.
—do—	177 „	Army Revolt.
—do—	218 „	Army Revolt.
		Bhopal
		Succession

Pol. Desp. from S.S. to G.G. No. 6 of 1859 & Reply to Mutiny

		Despatch
—do—	8 „	Dhar restoration
		proposed.
—do—	52 „	Dhar restoration.

****Narrative of events in C.I. from May 1857 to 20th of June 1858/1351. F.C. Sup.

Political Proceedings: (Fort William, Dated 30th Dec. 1859).

*** Narrative of events in the district of Nimar in 1857-58. No. 157, dated 25th May 1858. (From Capt. Keatinge, Offg. P.A. Western Malwa, in temporary charge of Nimar, to Sir R. Hamilton, Bart. A.G.G. C.I.)

*** Narrative of events attending the outbreak of disturbances and restoration of authority in the division of Jhansi in 1857-58 / dated 20th Nov. 1858. (From J. W. Pinkney, Capt. Commissioner, Jhansi Division.)

*** C.I. Agency Records. i b d l.

STATE RECORDS

'Mutiny Papers' are scanty in several States of Central India, yet a State like Dhar which was directly affected by the Revolt has many important papers. The voluminous 'Bahis' or Diaries of State Vakils, stationed at various Political Agencies, are very valuable.

Barnisi Bahi 1857. Letters addressed by the Dhar Darbar to their Vakil, Raghunath Narayan, stationed with the Political Agent at Bhopawar.

Barnisi Bahi No. 10, 1857. Letters from the Dhar Darbar to their Vakil Govind Vishwas Rao, stationed with the A.G.G. for C.I.

Barnisi Bahi No. 13 of 1857 Ibid.

Barnisi Bahi No. 16 of 1857 Ibid.

Barnisi Bahi No. 23 of 1857 Ibid.

Barnisi Bahi No. 25 of 1857 Letters from the Dhar Darbar to the Political Agent at Bhopawar.

Barnisi Bahi No. 66 of 1857. Letters from the Dhar Darbar to the A.G.G. for C.I.

Receipt Volumes

Letters received from the British Political Officers and the Rulers of the other States by the Dhar Darbar.

Kaifiyats. No. 1 to 18 of 1857

Kaifiyat from Bapuji Abaji Deshpande regarding the outbreak of the Revolt at Dhar.

Kaifiyat from Ganpat Raoji of Dhar.

Kaifiyat from Sultan Pinjara of Dhar.

These Kaifiyats give us an account of the Revolt at Dhar by the above eye-witnesses.

Malwa Akhbar. In Dhar State Records Office there are copies of Malwa Akhbar published prior to the outbreak of the Revolt which give an account of the outbreak. *Manuscript of H. H. The Maharaja Anand Rao Puar III's life.*

Miscellaneous Papers.

An account of the Revolt at Dhar by Draupadi Bai Sahiba Puar.

Letter dated 1st May 1858 from Draupadi Bai Sahiba Puar to Rt. Hon'ble Lord Canning the Governor-General of India. *Manuscript of the report* relating to the "Foundation of the

Dhar State" and its conduct towards the British Government from 1818 to its annexation in February 1858.

Letter dated Camp Bhopawar 19th May 1857, from A.R.E. Hutchinson, Political Agent at Bhopawar, to His Highness Yashwant Rao Puar of Dhar.

Letter dated 6th July 1857, from Captain A.R.E. Hutchinson, to Raghunath Narayan Vakil of Dhar State.

Agreement between the Dhar Darbar and the Pathans, dated 10th August 1857.

Letter No. 80, dated 12th October 1857, from Captain A.R.E. Hutchinson to the A.G.C., for C.I.

Circular No. 135, dated Kartik Suddi 6th Hijree year 1265, from His Highness Anand Rao Puar to the Kamasdars of Dhar State.

RECORDS IN PRIVATE POSSESSION

1. Family papers of Bhao Sahib Rao Ramchandra Rao Reshimwale (first officiating Prime Minister of Indore State during the Revolt) now in possession of his descendant Sardar Barrister Reshimwale, Indore.

2. Family Papers of the Mutiny Period with Bhaskar Ramchandra Rao Bhalerao, Ex-Naib Suba of Sardarpur.

3. Manuscript of the life of Golvelkar (better known as Pandit Waman Ganesh Shastri—the Indore Darbar's Vakil at Indore Residency during the Revolt).

4. Bakshi Khuman Singh (Commander of Holkar's Forces during the Revolt): 'Roznamcha' or Daily Diary.

There are many such papers in private possession. But these are to be read with caution. I have found in Family Records of the Mutiny Period many exaggerated facts with a natural tendency to overestimate individual's work and worth.

PRINTED PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Portions from Records of Military Department have been printed in "Selections from the Letters, Despatches and other State Papers preserved in the Military Department of the Government of India, 1857-58." (Vol. IV). Edited by G. W. Forrest.

2. 'Collection of the official Narratives of the Mutiny fur-

nished by the Magistrates or Commissioners of various localities.' 1858.

3. The Calcutta Gazette 1857-59.

4. Sir William Muir: 'Records of the Intelligence Department' N.W. Province, 2 Vols. (1902 Publication.)

5. Bombay Government: 'Selections from Records' — No. XXVIII.

6. (i) 'Parliamentary Papers' as

(a) East India: (Annexation of Jhansi) Papers; dated East India House, London. 26th July 1855.

(b) Parliamentary Papers relating to East India: Dhar (dated India Office 14th February 1861).

(ii) 'Parliamentary Debates', representing various shades of views and opinion are helpful in forming an impartial judgment.

Hansard's: 'Parliamentary debates': Third Series (London):—

Vol. CXLVII of 1857.

Vol. CXLVIII of 1857.

Vol. CXLIX of 1858.

Vol. CLII of 1859.

Vol. CLIII of 1859, etc.

7. "Memorandum of the Aids and Services rendered by the Government of Indore, to the British Authorities during the Mutiny of 1857-58."

SECONDARY SOURCES

A. Special Works

1. Thomas Lowe, '*Central India during the Rebellion of 1857 and 1858*' (Pub. 1860).

2. John Henry Sylvester, '*Recollections of the Campaigns in Malwa and Central India under Major General Sir H. Rose, G.C.B.*' (Pub. 1860).

3. Mrs. H. Duberly, '*Campaigning Experiences in Rajputana and Central India, during the suppression of the Mutiny, 1857-58*' (Pub. 1859).

4. General Sir Julius Raines, '*The Campaign in Central India 1857*' (The 95th Derbyshire Regiment in Central India). (Pub. 1900).

5. Captain Hungerford, '*Report of the Occurrences at Mhow during and subsequent to the Mutiny of Native Troops at that Station in July 1857*' (Printed in 1858).

6. General Travers, '*The Evacuation of Indore.*' (Pub. 1876).

7. Lieutenant-General Charles Lionel Showers, '*A Missing Chapter of the Indian Mutiny*' (Pub. 1888).

8. Mrs. O. S. Crofton, '*Indian Monumental Inscriptions. List of Inscriptions on Tombs or Monuments in Rajputana and Central India. With Biographical Notes. Compiled with an historical introduction*' (Pub. 1934).

9. Munshi Karim Ali Khan, '*Tareekh-e-Mahwa*'.

B. Works useful for particular State or Group of States.

1. Major Evan Bell, '*Letters to Mr. H. M. Durand*' (Pub. 1884).

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NAMES OF PERSONS

- | | |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| ABDUL SAMAD MANLIR | 213, 214, 216 |
| 124 | Baiza Bai |
| Abul Fazal | 6, 32, 98, 105, 110, 111, 112, |
| 8 | 114, 115, 116, 222, 229 |
| Achyut Rao | Baji Rao II |
| 13 | 26 |
| Adil Mohammad Khan | Bakhtawarsingh |
| 41, 76, 126, 145, 187, 195, 196, | 141, 142, 206, 236, 242 |
| 197, 198, 199, 200, 201 | Bakshi Hafiz |
| Alexander | 92 |
| 11, 15, 100, 241 | Bakshi Khuman Singh |
| Amanat Khan | 124, 125, 131, 142, 161, 224 |
| 196, 197, 198, 200 | Bala Rao |
| Amirchand Bhatia | 24 |
| 112, 114, 115 | Balaji Pant |
| Amir Khan | 115 |
| 3, 37, 38 | Balaji Sahib |
| Anand Rao Bala Sahib | 31, 118 |
| 13, 44, 46, 137, 138 | Balbhadra Singh |
| Anand Rao (Dewas) | 183 |
| 13 | Baldev Singh |
| Arthur | 109, 113, 163 |
| 78 | Balwant Rao |
| Arrarao Singh | 31, 206 |
| 124 | Balwant Singh |
| Asaf Ali Khan | 14 |
| 199 | Banda Nawab |
| Ashraf Ali Khan | 196 |
| 164 | Baus Gopal |
| Azmatullah | 124, 125, 239 |
| 183 | Banwari Lal |
| | 201 |
| BABA APTE | Bapoo Sindhia |
| 29, 30, 31, 144, 148 | 15 |
| Baba Gangadas | Bapu Sahib |
| 118 | 90 |
| Baba Mohankar | Bapu Sahib Pawar |
| 115, 116 | 137 |
| Baba Mohargir | Baptiste Capt. |
| 206 | 35 |
| Baba Sahib | Baqui Mohammad Khan |
| 137 | 12, 41 |
| Baba Sahib Pundit | Barodia |
| 195 | 184, 185 |
| Babar Ali | |
| 43 | Bashirullah Khan |
| Babu Suba Rao | 142 |
| 52, 119 | Basrao Shastri |
| Badshah Khan | 164 |
| 138 | Beaston |
| Bahadur Ali | 199 |
| 42 | Benjamin Disraeli |
| Bahadur Shah | 231 |
| 25, 41, 91, 98, 103, 105, 134, | |

Bhaginath Rao
71, 124, 132
Bhairo Singh
14
Bhatkhera
14
Bhau Sahib Reshimwala
26, 104, 130, 204, 224
Bhawani Singh
141
Bhim Rao Bhonsle
44, 45, 137
Bhim Naik
54, 159, 160, 217
Bhola Ram
114
Bhoodhgeer Bawa
160
Bhonsle
25
Bhunweji
196
Biharilal
109
Borthwick Capt.
13
Bruce Lt.
197, 199
Buckle
237

CALIGULE

24
Canning Lord
221, 224
Carier Capt.
155
Chandan Singh
174
Changez Khan
188
Charles Aitchison
6
Charles Metcalfe
67
Charles Thomas
129
Chattarsal
119, 120, 196, 197
Chiman Rao
142
Chiman Singh Patel
201
Chiman Raja
111, 222
Chitu
49

C. L. Showers
30
C. M. Wade
18, 39, 146
Coekburn Lt.
100
Cumming Lt.
158
Cunningham Lord
30, 231

DADA KHASGIWALA

7, 31
Dalhousie
2, 20, 22, 23, 24, 73, 194, 240
Damodar Pant
164
Dastagir
12
Daulat Rao Sindhia
5, 6, 15, 31, 32, 140
Devi Singh
107, 161
Dhokal Singh
226
Dhondu Pant Nana Sahib
26
Dickinson
29, 60
Dilsher Khan
142, 161, 163
Dinkar Rao
8, 10, 29, 31, 64, 100, 109,
115, 130, 203, 206, 221,
222, 224, 237
Dost Mohammad
49
Dowlat Singh
160
Draupadi Bai
137
Dudan Saiyad
143
Dule Singh
15
Dungal Singh
197
Durand Col.
18, 27, 28, 30, 32, 34, 42, 43,
44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 52, 57,
69, 88, 94, 121, 123, 126,
127, 128, 129, 130, 134,
138, 144, 151, 153, 166,
168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173,
174, 175, 178, 179, 180,
204, 205, 210, 214, 217,
219, 223, 227, 228, 229,
233, 234, 235

Dysart Lt.
148, 149

EARL OF GRANVILLE
231

East India Company

1, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25,
26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,
36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 43, 44,
47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 56,
57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63,
64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70,
71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78,
79, 80, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87,
89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 98,
107, 119, 129, 130, 131,
135, 137, 138-39, 140, 141,
144, 147, 148, 149, 153,
155, 158, 159, 160, 162,
164, 165, 166, 170, 174,
179, 180, 181, 183, 191,
192, 202, 203, 209, 217,
228, 231, 234, 235, 236,
238, 239, 240

Ellenborough Lord
7, 10

Elliot Capt.
158

Elphinston Lord
135, 136, 224

FAGAR ADJUTANT

131, 152

Fazal Mohammad Khan

41, 145, 184

Fenwick Capt.

26

Firoz Shah

77, 93, 147, 198, 202, 208,

214, 216, 234, 236, 237

F. J. Burgess

65

Fouzdar Mohammad Khan

41

F. Roome Lt.

198, 200

GALL MAJOR

176

Ganesh Singh Thakur

115

Ganesh Shastri

131

Gangadas Baba

194

Gangadhar Rao

194

George Macmunn
84

Gerald Wellesley

18, 27

Ghafur Khan

8, 13, 37, 38

Ghans Mohammad Khan

13

Gopal Singh

16, 226

G. Titmus Major

88

Gulabkuwar Bai

206

Gulab Singh

113

Gulab Rai

141, 142

Gulam Hussain

31

Gul Khan

138, 217

Gungadhar Pandit

196

G. Washington

241

HAIBAT RAO

15

Hanumant Singh

108

Hanwant Singh

14

Harc Capt.

182

Hari Rao Holkar

9, 10

Hari Singh Gour

209

Harris Major

131, 152

Hawkins Capt.

100

H. Beveridge

78, 238

Helbert Capt.

162

Henry VIII

40

Hennessy Major

101

Hill Brigadier

81

Hindupat Lalji

107

Hindu Rao

31

Hira Singh

148, 176

Holkar

5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 32, 33,
34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 56,
72, 85, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94,
98, 124, 127, 130, 132, 134,
135, 136, 142, 152, 155, 160,
161, 163, 165, 168, 169, 178,
179, 180, 201, 204, 208, 220,
223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 229

Hope Col.

196

Horatins

167

H. S. Cunningham

231

Huge Rose

109, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185,
187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192,
193, 210, 214, 218, 227, 229,
233, 235, 242

Hungerford

132, 142, 151

Hutchinson Capt.

41, 46, 138, 140, 141, 142,
161, 162, 172, 173, 182,
224, 227, 234

JAHANGIR MOHAMMAD KHAN

11, 12

J. A. Hicky

66

James M. Knapp

127, 128

Jan Ali Khan

13, 132, 133, 166, 217

Jankoji Rao Sindhia

6, 32

Jaswant Rao Holkar

9

Jaswant Rao Pawar

137

Jaswant Singh

16, 160

Jayaji Rao (Sindhia)

3, 7, 8, 29, 30, 31, 90, 93, 99,
202, 203, 221, 222, 237

Jayee Bai

137

J. B. Norton

231

J. D. Cunningham

49, 51, 52

Jeeaji Raw

222

Jija Bai Rani

45

Jhuhar Singh

36

Jiva Singh Jamdar

127

Joan of Arc

194

John Adamns

38

John Baptist

113

John Baz

18

John Clark

10

John Dickinson

60, 204, 240

John Lawrence

83

John Malcolm

13, 15, 16, 17, 26, 27, 28, 37,
38, 39, 49, 140

KAMIDAR KHAN NAWAB

184

Karim Khan

49

Karr Capt.

196

Kaye

25, 73, 78, 84, 129, 145, 177,
179, 185, 231

Keshari Bai

9

Khande Rao

9, 10, 39

Khanwilkar

113, 114

Khemraj

109, 110

Khuman Singh

136

Khwaja Naik

217

Kishanaji Rao Pawar

90

Krishna Kumar

9

LACHMAN PANT NANA

108

Laincount

243

Lata

158

Lala Paguavis

115

Lal Mohammad Subhdar Major

132

- Lalpuriwala Baba
 164
 Laxman Singh
 14, 15
 Laxmi Bai
 194, 212
 Lockhart Brigadier
 196

 MACPHERSON MAJOR
 8, 31, 64, 87, 91, 99, 100, 101,
 102, 103, 104, 107, 109, 221,
 227
 Madho Rao
 31
 Madho Singh
 34
 Madhav Rao Phalkie
 206
 Madhav Rao Shastri
 215
 Maginac Capt.
 127
 Mahadaji Sindhia
 57
 Mahadeo Shastri
 107
 Mahakali
 23, 26
 Mahenkar
 31
 Maldeo Raja
 141
 Malhar Rao Holkar II
 8, 9, 37, 38, 39
 Malhar Rao Holkar I
 9
 Malleson
 25, 83, 129, 145, 179
 Mama Sahib
 7, 118
 Mami Sahiba
 112
 Mansab Ali
 42
 Mansingh
 34, 119, 195, 207, 208, 237
 Manu Bai
 194
 Mardan Singh
 34, 35, 36, 187
 Martand Rao
 9
 Martin
 126
 Maulvi Abdul Samad
 92

 Mayne Capt.
 195
 Mian Fauzdar Mohammad
 Khan
 12, 42
 Michel Gen
 198
 Mir Shahamasali
 77, 165, 174
 Mir Munshi Swarup Narayan
 121
 Mills Lient
 147, 148
 Mohan Lal
 141
 Mohammad Ali
 126
 Mohammad Punnah
 49
 Moiz Mohammad Khan
 52
 Moropant
 108, 109, 194
 Morprahlad
 35
 Moti Singh
 108
 Mowassa
 54
 Mugat Rao
 6
 Muhammadgarh
 199, 200
 Mulluh Khan "Toota"
 202
 Mundar
 118
 Munir Mohammad Khan
 111
 Muquddam Baksh
 108
 Murlidhar Chowdhery
 114
 Murari Rao
 13
 Muzaffar Makrani
 16
 Muzhar Buksh
 49, 50

 NAHAR SINGH
 18, 105, 155, 237
 Naib Bakshi
 196, 199
 Namdar Khan
 49, 50, 51
 Nana Bapu
 31, 118

Nana Jagtap

161

Nana Sahib

29, 32, 33, 41, 77, 91, 98, 105,
107, 108, 110, 111, 113, 118,
153, 189, 202, 207, 213, 214,
215, 216, 217, 221, 228, 236,
237

Napier Gen.

198

Narbada Bai Setolia

112

Nazar Mohammad Khan

111, 195

Niaz Md Khan

41

Nizam

43, 52, 117, 169, 205, 242

ORR MAJOR

169, 170, 174, 175, 178, 182,
185, 191, 192, 193, 227

PANDURANG BABA

115

Parke Brigadier

218

Passingham Capt.

210

Paul

205

P. E. Roberts

5

Peshwa Baji Rao II

5

Peter

205

Platt Col.

123, 127, 131, 151, 152

Prabat Singh

14

Purshottam Rao

109, 110

QUDSIA BEGUM

11, 12

RAGHOPANT

164

Raghunath Singh

206

Rahim Ali Khan

164

Rahmat Ali Khan Kamuniwale

164

R. H. Keatinge Capt.

155, 174, 178, 186

Raj Singh

15, 226

Raja Mohammad

49

Raji Jamadar

222

Rajun

49, 50

Rakes Major

101, 153

Ramchandra Rao Bapuji

13, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 125,
137, 172

Ramchandra Rao Puar II

12, 13

Ramchandra Rao Reshimwale

125, 169, 178, 237

Ramlal Jamadar

200

Ram Rao

31, 199

Ram Rao Govind

108, 112, 113

Ramsay Macdonald

59, 100, 101

Ram Singh Raja

141

Ranoji Sindhia

112

Raokumar Singh

195

Rao Sahib

108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113,
114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 164,
190, 191, 193, 195, 198,
199, 201, 208, 214, 215,
222, 239

Rasul Khan

138

R. Shakespeare

34, 35

Ratan Singh

15

Ravaji Phanse

10

Rawat Moti Singh

14

Rayle Capt.

154

Rearson Capt.

100

Richards Major

42, 129, 153

Riddell Col.

191

Robutson Major

170

- Robert Hamilton
 10, 15, 18, 27, 32, 41, 43, 44,
 48, 48, 49, 53, 59, 91, 109,
 130, 139, 178, 179, 181,
 182, 184, 185, 189, 214,
 217, 220, 223, 224, 227,
 229, 233, 235
 Robert Peel
 232
 Ross Macmohan
 126

 SAADAT KHAN
 91, 92, 93, 104, 124, 125, 126,
 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 138,
 216, 219, 226, 228, 237, 239,
 241, 242
 Saiyuddin
 42
 Sarfaraz Khan
 41, 145, 195, 196, 199
 Sathmal
 9
 Sattar Khan Jaorawale
 164
 S. C. Showers
 146
 Sewa
 54
 Shah Jahan Begum
 3, 12
 Shahamat Ali
 96
 Shaik Ibrahim
 77
 Shakespeare
 197, 232
 Sheik Rahamatullah
 93
 Sher Khan
 134
 Sher Singh
 108
 Shivaji
 7, 211
 Shujaat Khan Pindara
 50, 51, 153
 Sikandar Begum
 11, 12, 41, 42, 77, 145, 153,
 202, 225, 242
 Sikandar Hussain
 42
 Sikandar Quli Khan
 42
 Sindhia
 2, 5, 7, 11, 12, 15, 17, 30, 32,
 33, 34, 35, 49, 56, 85, 87,
 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 100, 101,
 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108,
 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114,
 115, 119, 136, 141, 143, 144,
 145, 148, 190, 192, 197, 205,
 206, 207, 208, 215, 218, 220,
 221, 222, 224, 227, 229, 242
 Sita Ram Bawa
 32
 Sleeman Gen.
 108
 Smith Brigadier
 191, 192, 193
 S. Nahar
 155
 Sobhag Singh
 14
 Southerland Col.
 33
 Spied Capt.
 182
 Steward Major
 6, 125
 Stockley Major
 88, 124, 223
 Stuart Brigadier
 155, 168, 175, 182, 186, 187,
 190, 205, 214, 217, 226, 227,
 233, 235, 242
 Sunderlal Pandit
 231
 Syed Ahmed Khan
 25
 Sykes Col.
 211

 TAJ SINGH
 34
 Takhat Singh
 15
 Tara Bai
 7
 Tatia Jogh
 9
 Tatia Soor Vey
 114
 Tatia Topi
 108, 112, 113, 114, 116, 160,
 161, 162, 164, 187, 188, 189,
 190, 191, 193, 195, 196, 208,
 211, 212, 215, 216, 218, 220,
 222, 229, 235, 237, 241
 Tejsingh
 24
 Thornton
 10
 Tilak
 211

T. Lowe

65

Timmins Major

88, 146, 147, 148, 149, 226

Timur Lung

93, 105, 142, 188, 216, 234

Travers Col.

123, 124, 125, 127, 151

T. R. Holmes

30, 238, 239

Tribhuanlal

41, 42

Tukoji Rao (Holkar) II

3, 10, 11, 39, 121, 178, 181,
204, 222, 239

UMARCHAND

31

Umda

54

Umed Singh

10

VASISTHA

21

V. D. Savarkar

231, 236

Victoria Queen

202, 204, 205

Vithal Rao Sindhia

115

WALLACE MAJOR

162

Warris Mohammad Khan

92, 93, 124, 126, 132, 145, 216

Washington

229, 241

Wasil Mohammad

49

W. B. Martin

17, 18

Wellington

229

W. Gordon Cumming

157, 158

Wilkuison

4

William Beutick

2, 6

W. Keane

59

W. Noorish

126

Woodburn Major

124, 168, 227

Wood Capt.

170

W. R. Shakespeare

149

YESHWANT RAO PAUR II

13, 45, 46

ZALINI SINGH

36

NAMES OF PLACES

AFGHANISTAN

69

Agar

62, 88, 146, 147, 153, 155,

Agra

6, 7, 94, 100, 101, 102, 103,

104, 105, 106, 107, 110, 111,

118, 121, 131, 134, 150, 152,

154, 166, 190, 191, 193, 216,

217, 218, 221, 227

Agra-Barkhera

119, 120, 196

Ajmer

5

Akbarpur

169

Alirajpur

16, 52, 90, 162, 163, 218, 219,
220

Alote

147

Allahabad

104

Ambapani

199

Amber

36

Amil

109

Amjhera

16, 17, 44, 52, 54, 77, 137, 138,

139, 141, 142, 144, 149, 169,

170, 173, 203, 205, 206, 208,

213, 214, 223, 227, 232, 234,

236, 238, 241, 242

Antri

193

- Arrora Khatra
 195
 Ashta
 129
 Asia
 73
 Asirgarh
 5, 88, 155, 156, 168, 170
 Assam
 214
 Assaye
 32
 Aurangabad
 155, 168

 BABUKHERA
 201
 Badnawar
 12
 Badrawas
 134
 Baghelkhand
 3, 27, 28
 Bahadurpur
 191
 Bahir Ghat
 176
 Bajranggarh
 133, 181
 Bakri
 176
 Banda
 108, 111, 115, 116, 118, 214,
 236, 239
 Banpur
 34, 35, 36, 183, 184, 187, 232
 Banswara
 12, 163
 Bareilly
 100, 111, 118
 Barhanpur (Burhanpur)
 88, 155
 Baria
 52
 Barkhera
 9
 Barnagar
 149
 Barodh
 160
 Barodia
 184, 185
 Barrackpore
 80
 Barwani
 16, 28, 54, 90, 158, 159, 160,
 161, 162, 218

 Basoda
 198, 199, 200
 Begu
 9
 Benares
 207
 Bengal
 80, 86, 87, 89, 94, 121, 131,
 152, 157, 210, 214, 238
 Berchha
 12, 50, 51, 52, 88, 119, 153,
 173, 195, 196, 200, 201, 205
 Betwa (River)
 28, 120, 185, 186, 187, 188,
 189, 198
 Betwa Road
 169, 218
 Bhilkhera
 197
 Bhilkhera fort
 162
 Bhilsa
 182, 196, 197, 199, 200
 Bhiwah
 195
 Bhopal
 3, 11, 12, 14, 17, 26, 28, 30,
 31, 40, 41, 42, 45, 47, 49,
 51, 76, 77, 85, 88, 90, 92,
 93, 96, 121, 122, 123, 124,
 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132,
 137, 145, 153, 158, 173, 183,
 185, 187, 195, 196, 200, 201,
 202, 205, 207, 220, 225, 232,
 242
 Bhopawar
 46, 54, 140, 141, 142, 149, 150,
 162, 223, 227
 Biora (Biora)
 132, 133, 181, 182, 186, 219
 Bina
 186
 Bithur
 105, 207, 216
 Bombay
 6, 68, 80, 94, 160, 166, 196,
 213, 224, 229
 Bombay-Agra Road
 4, 93, 94, 119, 127, 140, 154,
 159, 170, 181, 198, 218
 Brahmangaon
 159
 Buddha
 116
 Bundelkhand
 3, 27, 28, 59, 109
 Burragaon
 110

Bursud

198

Burwa

187

Bussul fort

195

CALCUTTA

26, 30, 66, 86, 210

Cawnpur

100, 217

Central India

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 15, 17, 18,

26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 41, 43,

- 48, 52, 57, 62, 63, 65, 68,

77, 81, 85, 87, 89, 90, 91,

93, 94, 95, 108, 109, 127,

144, 145, 149, 154, 160-61,

165, 168, 174, 178, 179, 180,

181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 189,

190, 191, 193, 200, 201, 202,

204, 205, 208, 210, 213, 214,

223, 227, 229, 231, 232, 234,

235, 237, 238, 242

Chambal River

7, 36, 103, 106, 113, 217

Chanderi Fort (Chundeyree)

35, 36, 103, 186, 191

Chikhalda

52, 162, 218

China

4, 58

Chirarie

197

Chupura

116

Constantinople

181

4, 26, 27, 67

Crimea

Count of Directors

181

DATIA

62, 65, 200

Deccan

109

Delhi

5, 6, 41, 99, 100, 103, 105, 106,

121, 127, 134, 151, 152, 155,

216, 218, 221

Deogaon

109

Deoguradie

126

Deopura

108

Dewas

13, 14, 15, 16, 85, 90, 132,

137, 141, 181, 182, 186

Dhamnod

158

Dhar

12, 13, 28, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,

48, 52, 54, 77, 90, 91, 137,

138, 139, 140, 144, 148, 149,

158, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173,

174, 180, 182, 204, 205, 208,

210, 213, 214, 217, 219, 223,

227, 233, 234, 238, 240, 242

Dharampuri

158

Dhargaan

155

Dholpur

105, 106

Dhulia

158

Dohad

163

Dowri

110

Dug

36

EGYPT

181

Ellora

36

England

18, 40, 65, 73, 204, 228, 235,

237, 238

Esagarh

215

Etawah

101

Europe

73

GANGES

116

Gangrad

38

Garhakote

184

Garispur

200

Ghatira

199

Gohi River

93

Gokulpur

197

Govindgarh

80

- Guicowar
211
- Gujri
149, 158, 169
- Guna
119, 133, 146, 154, 181, 186,
192, 213
- Gunapura
197, 198, 199
- Gungoni
199
- Guraria
176
- Gurragaon
109
- Gwalior
2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 14, 26, 27,
29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,
60, 62, 63, 64, 68, 81, 83,
85, 88, 91, 92, 93, 96, 99,
100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105,
106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112,
113, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120,
123, 131, 134, 137, 144, 150,
152, 154, 165, 168, 174, 181,
185, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193,
195, 198, 202, 203, 210, 211,
213, 214, 216, 218, 219, 221,
222, 223, 224, 227, 229, 232,
235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240,
242
- HATHRAS
100
- Himalayas
86
- Himmatgarh
117
- Hirapur
185
- Holkar State
8, 9, 17, 18, 36, 37, 38, 72, 159,
160, 161
- Hoonnanena
175
- Hoshangabad
46, 129, 155, 168, 236
- Hyderabad
45, 53, 77, 80, 155, 170, 174,
175, 186, 191, 192, 213, 236
- INDORE
2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 14, 17, 26, 27,
28, 35, 36, 39, 42, 45, 46, 49,
60, 68, 72, 77, 80, 84, 88, 89,
91, 92, 93, 94, 97, 103, 104,
105, 106, 107, 121, 122, 123,
124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129,
130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 137,
140, 144, 146, 149, 150, 151,
153, 155, 157, 165, 168, 169,
170, 174, 178, 179, 180, 181,
182, 183, 201, 204, 206, 208,
210, 211, 213, 216, 217, 218,
219, 221, 222, 223, 224, 229,
234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239,
240, 242
- Indore-Khandwa Road
3
- Indurkhi Ghats
114, 115, 191
- Isagarh
31, 62, 107, 196, 197
- Islam Nagar
11, 12
- JACKLONE
35
- Jalaun
24, 190, 200
- Jaora
3, 11, 13, 37, 38, 85, 90, 122,
144, 147, 148, 163, 170, 173,
174, 175, 207, 216, 219, 225,
226, 242
- Jhabua
16, 28, 52, 54, 90, 163, 226,
234
- Jhalawar
201
- Jhalrapatan
177, 215
- Jhansi (Rani of Jhansi)
22, 24, 25, 28, 35, 62, 85, 98,
99, 100, 108, 111, 113, 114,
115, 116, 117, 118, 123, 182,
186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191,
193, 194, 207, 210, 211, 214,
228, 236, 241, 242
- Jiran
144
- Jobat
90
- Jodhpur
15, 140
- Jubbulpur
28, 94, 204
- Julwania
158, 161, 218
- Jumna
108
- KALISIND RIVER
132, 191
- Kalpi
62, 118, 188, 189, 190, 192

- Rajghur
 215
 Rajpur
 161, 162, 218
 Rajputana
 5, 190, 210, 214
 Rampura
 9, 199
 Ratlam
 14, 28, 144, 170, 174, 175, 208,
 226
 Rawal
 174
 Rewa
 28
 Rohilkhand
 41

 SAILANA
 14, 15, 28, 90, 144, 174, 175,
 226
 Sanchi
 196
 Sandha
 141
 Sarangpur
 181
 Sardarpur
 17, 94, 122, 139, 140, 144, 146,
 149, 150, 213, 223, 234, 235
 Satara
 25, 32, 85, 135, 136
 Satpura Mt. Range
 36, 54, 94, 160
 Saugor
 28, 63, 182, 184, 185, 187, 198
 Sehore
 11, 30, 42, 88, 121, 123, 128,
 129, 146, 153, 166, 182, 183,
 196, 210, 213, 225, 235
 Sehore School
 4
 Sendhwa
 93
 Seronj
 195, 196, 197, 198
 Shahagarh
 184, 185, 187
 Shaherkhera
 197
 Shajapur
 132
 Shahjahanpur
 100
 Shujalpur
 40, 50
 Sikandarabad
 80

 Simrol Ghat
 3, 12, 128, 135, 168
 Sind
 2, 69, 84, 214, 242
 Sindhia State
 17
 Sindhora
 201
 Sipowlie
 109
 Sipri
 63, 100, 119, 134, 146, 154,
 182, 191, 193
 Sitamau
 15, 17, 90, 144, 175, 226
 Sitlamata caves
 157
 Sobra (fort)
 200
 Sonar River
 184
 Southern India
 94
 Suauli
 117
 Sukrode
 113

 TAL BAHAT
 35, 186
 Tehri
 62, 195 (Tehri Jungle)
 Timri
 163
 Thikri
 158
 Tonk
 8, 37, 38, 119

 UDAIPUR
 9, 152
 Ugrod
 195
 Ujjain
 29, 32, 144, 148, 170, 178, 208
 Uni
 161
 Ur
 36

 VELLORE
 80
 Vinchur
 11, 40
 Vindhya Range
 54, 56, 94, 157, 160

 ZIRAPUR
 163

ERRATA

<i>Page</i>	<i>Para</i>	<i>Correction</i>
15	2	Inverted commas after <i>Fort</i>
23	2	Full-stop after <i>different</i>
23	2	<i>T</i> capital in <i>to</i>
23	2	Inverted commas after <i>body</i>
27	2	Replace <i>for</i> by <i>of</i> after <i>care</i>
29	1	Replace <i>where</i> by <i>were</i> after <i>results</i>
52	3	Replace <i>Jhagua</i> by <i>Jhabua</i>
53	3	Replace <i>beside</i> by <i>besides</i>
62	3	Add <i>ing</i> after <i>show</i>
65	3	Add <i>the</i> before <i>poor</i>
65	4	Inverted commas before <i>It</i>
78	1	add <i>the</i> before <i>Sword</i>
78	1	<i>K</i> Capital of <i>king</i>
83	1	write <i>orders</i> after <i>orders</i> instead of <i>order</i> after <i>order</i>
97	1	use <i>though</i> before <i>incorrect</i>
108	1	drop <i>too</i> after <i>persons</i> and use it after <i>lashkar</i>
110	1	after <i>Highness</i> <i>apostrophe s</i>
113	2	delete <i>Thus</i>
141	2	write <i>brought to a speedy end</i> instead of <i>brought to speedy end</i>
141	2	read <i>Diwan</i> instead of <i>Dewas</i>
142	2	separate proper nouns from designations by commas as <i>Gulab Rai</i> , <i>The Dewan</i> etc.
150	4	delete the sentence beginning <i>The following</i>
151	4	read <i>Kept ready for action at short notice</i> instead of <i>Kept ready for short notice</i>
155	2	delete <i>severe cholera</i> etc.
163	2	read <i>started for Kushalgarh</i> instead of <i>from Kushalgarh</i>
175	4	delete <i>From</i> in the last line
177	4	add <i>was</i> after <i>Western Malwa</i>
196	1	<i>Pipria</i> instead of <i>Pipria</i>
200	1	replace <i>To</i> after <i>This Success</i> by <i>in</i>
220	3	read <i>Sitting On the Fence</i> instead of <i>Standing On the Fence</i>
222	2	put inverted commas before the quotation beginning <i>Get Her Highness'</i> etc.
222	3	put small <i>g</i> in the word <i>Great</i>
223	2	read <i>from the beginning</i> instead of <i>From the First</i>
230	1	<i>Standards</i> instead of <i>Standard</i>

ERRATA

Page No.		<i>Read</i>
241	2nd Para	<i>Loss for less</i>
241	3rd „	<i>patriots for Patriots</i>
242	2nd „	<i>far for for</i>
248	17th line	<i>defence for deference</i>
249	24th line	<i>Chaturbuj for Charubuj</i>
250	28th line	<i>Zorawer for Zarawar</i>
267		(between serial No. 58, 59 and 60)
268	Last line	<i>Letters for letter</i>
271	1st line	<i>Neemuch for Nimach</i>
271	14th line	<i>to for at</i>
273	3rd line	<i>Put full stop after Malwa</i>