

# SCHOOLS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT

by  
SWAMI PRAJNANANANDA, D.LITT.(HON.)



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**SCHOOLS OF  
INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT**

## BY THE SAME AUTHOR

### *Philosophy :*

Philosophy of Progress and Perfection  
Philosophical Ideas of Swami Abhedananda  
Thoughts on Yoga, Upanishad and Gita  
Philosophy of World and Reality  
Introduction to Theory of Knowledge

### *Music : English :*

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Historical Development of Indian Music  
Historical Study of Indian Music  
History of Indian Music, Vol. I and II  
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### *Bengali :*

Bharatiya Sangiter Itihasa, Vol. I and II  
Raga-O-Rupa, Vol. I and II  
Padavali-Kirtaner Itihasa, Vol. I  
Sangite Rabindra-Pratibhar Dan  
Natya-Sangiter Rupayan  
Bani-O-Vichara, etc.



Dedicated to  
MY MASTER  
SWAMI ABHEDANANDA

The Direct Disciple of Sri Ramakrishna Paramahansa  
and Spiritual Brother of Swami Vivekananda.

## PREFACE

'Philosophy', says Prof. Joad "is a record of the soul's adventure in the cosmos. Some find enjoyment in the pursuit of mental and spiritual adventure; these are philosophers". "Many philosophers have set themselves to examine the features of the familiar world—time, space, change, substance, or the law of cause and effect—and have sought to reveal the contradictions to which the examination gives rise". Regarding philosophy and philosophy, Prof. DeWulf says: "Philosophy is simply a survey of the world as a whole. The philosopher is thus the man who views the world from the top of a lookout and sets himself to learn its structure; philosophy is a synthetic and general knowledge of things. It is not concerned with this or that compartments of existence, but with all beings existent or possible, the real without restriction. It is not a particular but a general science. General science or philosophy constitutes the second stage of knowledge. It is human wisdom (*sapientia*), science *par excellence theoretical*, second, *practical*, and third, *poetical*. This three-fold division of philosophy into speculative, practical, and poetical, says DeWulf, is based upon man's different contacts with the totality of the real, or, as it was put then, with the universal order. The practical philosophy further includes in its field, mathematics, metaphysics, logic, religion, ethics, politics, and other things, which are speculative or theoretical and practical. *Mathematics* studies quantity as regards its logical implications. *Metaphysics* enters deepest of all into reality and deals with what is beyond matter, motion, and mind. *Logic* sets up a scheme of all that we know, of the method of constructing the science. *Religion* helps philosophy to search deep into the recess of reality and spiritual feeling. *Ethics* studies the realm of our acts, and there is nothing in human life that cannot become the material of duty. *Politics* is concerned with the realm of social institutions, and there is nothing which has not its social side, since

man is made to live in society (Cf. *Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages*).

Philosophy both Indian and Western, has a relation to poetry, religion, metaphysics, logic, and epistemology. Philosophy is specially associated with poetry and religion. The great religions of the world express, in general, the efforts of the human spirit to grasp the nature of the universe, to understand man's true place in it, to realize the kind of conduct and the general attitude of thought and feeling that befits that place, and to find the most suitable means for the cultivation of such modes of thought, feeling and action. The knowledge that is summed up in creeds is often vague, figurative, and imperfect. Its value is rather in what it suggests than in what it definitely conveys. But it is one of the means by which men gain an outlook on life, by which they can feel that they are citizens of the universe, not aliens or outlaws in the world in which they have to carry on their being. The higher kinds of poetry also serve a similar purpose. They do not, like religion, crystalize their insight into definite creeds, or apply it directly to the guidance of conduct. But they also try, in their own special way, to enable us to see life steadily and see it whole, in its complex relations to the universe that we inhabit. They may, then, be said to aim at the same kind of insight as that which philosophy seeks to gain. But philosophy pursues this kind of insight in a different way. The suggestions both of poetry and of religion are commonly described by the term *inspiration*. . . .

Philosophy is also connected with psychology. The consideration of psychology is specially valuable as an indication of the distinction between a particular science and philosophy. Psychology has a definite subject-matter, just as physics and mathematics have. In each case there are some problems involved that bear upon the general structure of the universe. In mathematics there are the problems of space and of the general significance of number and quantity. In physics there are the problems of matter and energy. In psychology there are the general problems of the relations between mind and body, the nature and validity of various forms of cognition, the significance of

activity and feeling. Philosophy is certainly in some respects the most difficult of all subjects to deal with in an adequate way; for it is nothing if not complete, and yet it can hardly be completed without a considerable degree of completion in many other subjects as well.

Philosophy, thus conceived, has the insight of the philosophers of the East and the West into the general structure of the universe and the significance and highest ideal of human life, and it can properly be appreciated in relation to the whole way of thinking of these individuals. There are no absolute boundaries in human knowledge, but innumerable methods are open to the domain of philosophy to explore the central truths of the universe and the human life. Man's attempts are the medium through which these truths are revealed to man (Cf. Mackenzie: *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*).

Now we find that all philosophy consists in a rational study of all or some of the problems arising from our attempts to explain the universal order of things by their ultimate causes or principles. We define philosophy or the materials of philosophy and give their names for identifications. And it is true that *defining* is a different function from *naming*. "To define", says Prof. DeWulf, "strictly speaking, we must penetrate, as it were, to the depths of the reality, and circumscribe its sphere of being (definer). *Naming* is simply attaching a name to a thing known in any way whatever." In fact, to *define* is to tell what the thing is, and what accordingly distinguishes it from every other thing. So real definition is all the more perfect the more deeply it penetrates the nature of the thing to be known.

In philosophy, or in the field of scholastic philosophy, we follow some *method* which is said to be the way followed in order to arrive at an end. This method in philosophy works in two ways, *inventive* or *constructive*, and *synthetic* or *deductive*. Science helps much to generalise and systematise the thoughts and ideas which are intrinsic materials or ingredients of philosophy, general or speculative. Now what is science? The scientists like Eddington, Jeans, Max Plank, Whitehead, Crother, Heisenburg and

others have forwarded various definitions and forms of sciences, and they are also eager to establish a link between philosophy and science, and it has been discussed in the first chapter of the book Prof. DeWulf forwards that science "is not a mere collection of theories about some special object, a simple juxtaposition of fragments of knowledge, an encyclopaedia upon a given subject. It is, strictly speaking, a systematized body or knowledge, whose various parts or elements hold or having together, harmonize and fit into one another like the cogs and wheels of a piece of machinery. It is only on condition of such harmony that the manifold conclusions of a science can be reduced to *unity*, and thus establish order in the mind" (vide *On Introduction to Scholastic Philosophy*).

While discussing the problem and scope of philosophy of religion, Prof. Edward says about philosophy and science: "Philosophy has, however, for its subject-matter the *whole* of experience, and seeks to apprehend its ultimate meaning, validity, and ground. It is not simply the sum of all the sciences regarded as another science. It seeks to transcend the particular sciences by contemplating the universe from the point of view of the totality of interests or the inclusive experience. Science is abstract, analytic, and is governed by a selective interest; philosophy is concrete, synthetic, comprehensive, and seeks an insight into the meaning of the whole" (Vide *The Philosophy of Religion*).

Besides these definitions of philosophy, let us forward in this connection some definitions of philosophy as advanced by Prof. William Hamilton in his *Lectures on Metaphysics* which was published in book form after his death. William Hamilton has forwarded eight definitions which were mostly given by Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle. Among these definitions, the fourth is: "Philosophy is a resembling of the Deity in so far as that is competent to man", and the seventh one discloses: "philosophy is the medicine of souls", and from these two definitions we can infer that philosophy helps to equip a man to know the Deity or God, and thus it cures the disease of non-knowledge. "Philosophy thus", says William Hamil-

ton, "as the knowledge of effects in their causes, necessarily tends, not towards plurality of ultimate or first causes, but towards one alone. This first cause,—the Creator, it can indeed never reach, as an object of immediate knowledge; but, as the convergence towards unity in the ascending series is manifest, . . . Whatever we know, or endeavour to know, God or the world, mind or matter, the distant or the near, we know, and can know only in so far as we possess a faculty of knowing in general; and we can only exercise that faculty under the laws which control and limit its operations. . . ." Thus it is seen that Harbert Spencer, and the Spencerian School have forwarded similar views what cannot be known by the senses and be understood by the intellect, and, therefore, the ultimate truth remains unknown and unknowable for ever and ever. But Vedanta philosophy seems to be loftier than Spencerian and even Kantian system which formulates like Herbert Spencer, that thing-in-itself or the Absolute is unknown and unknowable. Swami Abhedananda says in this connection: "The Vedanta philosophy is loftier than the Kantian system, as Kant believes that the absolute Truth or Thing-in-Itself cannot be known by senses and intellect, and so it remains unknown and unknowable for ever and ever. This is an exact echo of the Spencerian view which is untenable according to Vedanta philosophy. The Vedanta philosophy of India says that the absolute Brahman is not approachable by the senses and intellect, but is approachable and realized by deeper intuition. However, Vedanta advocates that in *aparokshanubhuti* or direct super-sensual knowledge, the Absolute is known or felt as all-knowledge and all-consciousness.

Prof Hugh Miller of the California University has also criticised like Swami Abhedananda the Spencerian as well as the Kantian views. Prof. Hugh Miller says that Herbert Spencer "prefaces his system with a call to agnosticism, warning us not to pursue knowledge of the 'Absolute', which is beyond human comprehension. We are limited to knowledge of phenomena and their uniformities. Similarly, "how do we know that the regulative organizing principles of the mind give us knowledge of reality when

we apply them circumspectly, in actual experience? We cannot know, Kant replies. The *world* that appears to us in perception, and that is described by empirical science, is a *phenomenal* world. It is something we ourselves construct; and since we can never know the relation of our knowledge to that *noumenal reality* which is reality-in-itself" (Cf. *An Historical Introduction to Modern Philosophy*).

In the similar way, Dr. Edward Caird has criticised Spencer and Kant. Dr. Caird has rather challenged Kant and has said: "To say that we cannot know the Absolute is, by implication, to affirm that there *is* an Absolute, and this proves that the Absolute has been present to the mind, not as a nothing, but as a something" (Cf. *Philosophy and Religion*).

Swami Abhedananda has argued that the phenomenal nature of the ego which Kant realized as the source of truth and the forms of intuition and vagary of thought have been replaced with phenomena. The Vedanta philosophy is more sublime than the philosophy of Kant, because it has recognised the identity of the objective reality, which Kant did not. There have been many systems of philosophy in Europe, which denied the existence of the phenomenal world as presented to us, but none except the Vedanta philosophy has ventured to deny the existence of the apparent ego, as known to us, and in this respect Vedanta has its unique position in the history of the philosophy of the world (Cf. *Philosophy and Religion*, Chapter II).

Swami Abhedananda has divided philosophy into two, *general* and *real*. The Swami says that communication with God and divine things is one which transcends the methods and processes of logic, brings the consciousness into immediate converse with its object, and conveys to us an inexplicable, yet absolute assurance of their reality. Not by arguments, inductive or deductive, do we attain to a belief in the existence and character of God, not in the formal definitions and dogmas, of theology can we find the adequate expression of our spiritual conviction. We believe in God because we *know* Him, though we can

neither prove nor define Him. We feel and realize spiritual truth, though in terms and propositions we cannot express" (Cf. *Philosophy and Religion*).

Swami Abhedananda has said about an aspect of true philosophy which is not discursive and descriptive only but it generalizes the facts of philosophy and gives the final results or conclusions of them. Swami Abhedananda says: "True philosophy performs three functions: *First*, it corresponds with the final results arrived at by the different branches of science and, taking up these results, makes wider generalization. *Second*, it must go into the realm of knowledge, and trace its source; where do we get this knowledge, know this thing and that thing, sense cannot trace it beyond the realm of our senses. This is the function of philosophy; when it performs this function, it is called *Darshana*, sometimes called metaphysics. . . . True philosophy also performs a *third* function: it must lead the individual mind beyond the realm of the phenomenal, or knowable, and it must raise up the soul from the dark abyss of selfishness, ignorance, and self-delusion, and must make it realize its divine and absolute nature" (Cf. *Philosophy and Religion*).

Philosophy is a system, and this system has been interpreted by different Masters of different thoughts. So philosophy speaks, in truth, the ways of thought and its appreciation in different manners, and these different manners gave rise to different schools which is no other than different viewpoints. In this book, I have discussed the philosophical ideas that prevailed in the Rigvedic and the Brahman ages, and then have dealt with the philosophical ideas contained in the *Upanishad* and the *Bhagavad Gita*. The discourses on the six systems of philosophy have been discussed as usual, dealing with short notes on the Hindu system of Nyaya where necessary.

The Buddhist logic has also been discussed in a short compass. The foundations of Buddhist logic is found in the Pali Tripitakas, and it is said that in the life-time of Gautama Buddha, Buddhism developed into a systematic Sangha. "In Buddhism, the dialectical approach reached such a climax that some Buddhist scholars regarded dialectic-



tics as an integral portion of the Abhidhamma (Cf. Bu-Ston: *History of Buddhism*, translated by Dr. E. Obermiller). . . . Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that though Buddha aimed at preaching the way to Nirvana through self-realization, it became necessary to learn the dialectical method of discussion which is purely empirical in character."

In fact, seeds of Buddhist logic lie in Acharya Dinnaga's *Pramana-samucchaya*. Dinnaga was admitted to the Order by Nagadatta of the Vatsiputriya sect, and attained erudition in the Tripitaka of the Hinayana. Afterwards he became a disciple of Acharya Vasubandhu with whom he systematically studied all the Pithakas of the Mahayana. Afterwards, he was invited to the Nalanda University where he defeated his opponents and won them over to the doctrine of the Buddha. Lama Taranath has disclosed these facts about Dinnaga.

According to Bu-ston, Dharmakirti played an important role in the field of Buddhist logic by compiling his book on logic, *Nyayavindu*. There are also commentaries on *Nyayavindu*. The views of Dharmakirti have been criticised by Vyomasiva, Shalikanatha, Jayanta, Vachaspati Misra, Akalanka and others. Prof. Stcherbatsky has classified the commentaries on Buddhist logic into three schools. The first school was initiated by Devendrabuddhi. The second school consist of those commentaries that have analysed the views of Dharmakirti purely on philosophical basis. This school was initiated by Dharmottara, who composed commentaries on the *Pramana-samucchaya* and the *Nyayavindu*. The third school was headed by Prajñakaragupta, who composed a commentary called *Pramana-vartika-alamkara* on the *Pramana-vartika* including the *Svarthanumana*.

Prof. Stcherbatsky says: "Under Buddhist logic we understand a system of logic and epistemology created in India in the VI-VIIIth century A.D. by two great lustres of Buddhist science, the Masters Dinnaga and Dharmakirti. The very insufficiently known Buddhist logical literature which prepared their creation and the enormous

literature of commentaries which followed it in all northern Buddhist countries must be referred to the same class of writings. It contains, first of all, a doctrine on the forms of syllogism and for that reason alone deserves the name of logic. A theory on the essence of judgment, on the import of names and on inference is a natural corollary of the theory of syllogism just as it is in India and Europe.

"But the logic of the Buddhists contains more. It contains also a theory of sense perception, or, more precisely, a theory on the partly pure sensation in the whole content of our knowledge, a theory on the reliability of our knowledge and on the reality of the external world as cognized by us in sensations and images. These problems are usually treated under the heading of epistemology. Therefore we may be justified in calling the Buddhist system a system of epistemological logic. It starts with a theory of sensation as the most indubitable voucher for the existence of an external world. It then proceeds to a theory of a co-ordination between that external world and the representation of it as constructed by our understanding in images and concepts. Next comes a theory of judgment, of inference and of syllogism. Finally a theory on the art of conducting philosophic disputations in public is appended. It thus embraces the whole area of human knowledge, beginning with rudimentary sensation and ending with the complicated apparatus of a public debate.

"The Buddhists themselves call this their science a doctrine of logical reasons or a doctrine of the sources of right knowledge or, simply, an investigation of right knowledge. It is a doctrine of truth and error" (Cf. *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I).

I have discussed, in short, the *Advaitavada* of the non-dualistic Vedanta of Sankara and the *Vijnanavada* of the Yogachara school and *Shunyavada* of the Madhyamika school of Buddhism, and have seen that sometimes they sing the same song in their final analysis, and yet they differ. Dr. T. R. V. Murti has discussed this interesting point very intelligently in his book, "*The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*". He says: "In the Madhyamika, Vijnanavada and Vedanta systems, the Absolute is non-

conceptual and non-empirical; it is realised in a transcendent non-dual experience, variously called by them *prajna-paramita*, *lokottara-jnana* and *aparokshanubhuti* respectively. All emphasise the inapplicability of empirical determinations to the Absolute, and employ the language of negation. They are agreed on the *formal* aspect of the absolute. The Vedanta and Vijñanavada, however, identify the absolute with something that is experienced in some form even empirically—the Vedanta with Pure Being (*sannatratra*) which is *atman* (substance) and the Vijñanavada with Consciousness (willing). Taking these as real, they try to remove the wrong ascriptions which make the absolute appear as a limited empirical thing. When, however, the *Atman* or *Vijnana* is absolute, it is a misuse of words to continue to call it by such terms; for there is no *other* from which it could be distinguished. They are also reduced to the *Madhyamika* position of the Absolute as the utterly inexpressible. Words can only be used metaphorically to characterise or rather to indicate it.

“There is, however, this difference that the Vedanta and Vijñanavada, owing to their identification of the real with *Atman* or *Vijnana*, are seemingly more able to provide a bridge between the world of appearance and the Absolute. The transition seems easier. . . .

“The Vedanta and Vijñanavada characterisation of the *Madhyamika* as *Sunyavada* is worthy of consideration, as it brings out difference. Both Vedanta and Vijñanavada analyse illusion and show that the illusory appears on a real ground (*adhisthana*) but for which illusion itself would not be possible. The world-illusion too is thus a superimposition of *Brahman* or *Vijnana*. It is not true to say, as is done by Vedanta and Vijñanavada, that the *Madhyamika* conceives illusion to occur without any underlying ground (*niradhisthana-bhrama*). . . .

“The case is, however, different with the-Vedanta and Vijñanavada. *Brahman* is no doubt devoid of determinations; it cannot be made an object of thought as a particular thing is. But it is self-evident (*svayamprakasa*) and because of this anything becomes evident; it implicitly, invariably and unconditionally, illumines things. In a

slightly different manner Vijnanavada shows that the object is dependent on consciousness, and not *vice versa*. Vijnana is self-conscious (*svasamvedya*) and is creative of the object. Factually the Madhyamika Absolute too is immanent, but epistemologically it is not shown to be such" (Vide *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, Chapter IX).

I have discussed the cult and philosophy of Tantra, both Hindu and Buddhist, along with the development of Tibetan Tantra. Elsewhere I have written an Introduction to Tantric Cult in Bengali as a Preface, namely *Tantratattva-Nirdeshika*, to the book, *Tantratattva*, written by the great Savant, Pt. Sivachandra Vidyarnava, the second edition of which has been published by the Navabharat Publisher, Calcutta. Besides, in the discussion on Tantra philosophy, I have dealt with the philosophical thoughts on philosophy of Vadarayana-Vyasa, the composer of the *Vedantasutras*, on which different stalwart figures like Sankara, Ramanuja, Madhva, Nimbarka, Srikantha and others have written commentaries. I have tried to show that Vadarayana-Vyasa possesses an original view on Vedanta philosophy.

Besides, I have discussed, in short, the Saiva philosophy, Veera-Saiva philosophy and Yogavasistha philosophy, and in the last, I have dealt with the central philosophy of Sri Ramakrishna Paramahansa, the latest Incarnation of God. Sri Ramakrishna differs somehow or other from the philosophical dealings of Sri Sankara, though their ultimate conclusion does not differ from each other.

I offer my sense of gratitude to Shri Amiya Kumar Mazumdar, Member, Indian National Commission for Co-operation with UNESCO; Member, Public Service Commission, West Bengal; formerly, Deputy Director of Public Instruction, West Bengal, and General Secretary, Indian Philosophical Congress, for writing a beautiful 'Foreword' to this book.

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## FOREWORD

It is a privilege to be called upon to write a Foreword to any of the works of Swami Prajnanananda, an eminent thinker and author whose works on Philosophy, Music and other humanistic subjects have been widely acclaimed as of lasting value by competent scholars of India and abroad. In the present work entitled *SCHOOLS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT* the author has made a comprehensive survey of the different systems of Indian Philosophy. The author has not only given expository and critical analyses of the heterodox and orthodox schools of Hindu Philosophy, but has also presented, wherever necessary, Western parallels with a view to bringing home to the reader his own point of view. The most striking contributions of the author are to be found in his critical exposition of the philosophical tendencies in the *Rik-Veda*, religion and philosophy of the *Brahmana* period, the central thoughts of the *Upanishads*, relation of *Sannyasa* to *Tyaga*, distinction between *Brahmavada* and *Mayavada*, definitions of *Vyapti*, distinction between the nature of liberation according to *Samkhya* and that according to *Vedanta*, validity of the *Veda* in regard to *Dharma*, *Khyativada*, etc.

In expounding Sankara's theory of validity, the author has taken great care in elucidating the views expressed in the *Panchapadika-Vivarana*, *Bhamati*, *Vartika* and other commentaries. As the author rightly points out: "Sankara is really a *brahmavadin*, because his doctrine of Advaita Vedanta philosophy is *brahmavada*, and not *mayavada*. *Maya* is to Sankara a negative fact, and not a positive one, and all through his commentaries on the *Brahmasutra*, the *Upanishad*, and the *Bhagavad-Gita*, and in many of his independent works, Sankara's utmost attempt is to prove the unreality of the changing world and the absolute reality of the Brahman." In analysing Sankara's doctrine of *Maya* the author has, with remarkable ability, introduced Kant's doctrine of phenomenalism and has pointed out how the post-Sankarite Vedantists view the doctrine of *Maya*. The

author has taken great pains to explain in what sense Brahman can be said to be the material cause of the world. He has also, in this connection, drawn a sharp contrast between the views expressed in the *Bhamati* and those in the *Vivarana*. A short section with the caption *The Bhamati School* will certainly stimulate further thinking in the mind of any reader who happens to lay his hands on this critical work of lasting value. In expounding the pure non-dualistic Vedanta, the author has shown the same kind of ability as in his exposition of the Advaita school. The author's critical exposition of the Tantra school is strikingly original and stimulating. Much valuable materials on the Tantra school of thought, which were hitherto unknown to the ordinary students of Hindu Philosophy, have been marshalled into a coherent system in this work. In expounding the relation of the Tantra school of thought to Advaita Vedanta and Buddhism the author has shown remarkable insight. He has given sufficient reasons to show in what sense the condemnation of *vamachara*, as a tantric practice, is unjust and unfair. The distinction between *vamachara* and *dakshinachara* has been carefully brought out and their implications have been analysed in detail. The author has drawn attention of his readers to the main theme of the Tantra school of thought in the following words: "Siva has been described in Tantra as the *prakasha* or pure illumination or shining intelligence (*shuddha-chaitanya*) and Sakti as *vimarsha* or the inherent and dynamic thought and activity. So when Siva is *sat*, Sakti is *sati*. when Siva is *chit*, Sakti is *chidrupini*, when Siva is *ananda*, Sakti is *anandarupini* and when Siva is *Brahman*, Sakti is *Brahmamayi*. In Tantra, Sakti is known as the consummation of *jnana*, *ichchha*, and *kriya* or it is said to be the act or movement of thinking, feeling, and willing in one aspect or in one concept. These three acts or movements are manifested in Sakti, whereas they are unmanifested in Siva. So Siva is known as the *para-bindu* or *karma-bindu*, and Sakti is known as the *apara-bindu* or *karya-bindu*. In fact, from the *karana-bindu* evolves the *karya-bindu*, the *élan* or vital force. The *karya-bindu* is also known as *kriya-bindu*, i.e. when the formless indeter-

minate Siva transforms Himself into the dynamic form of Sakti, He is known as *kriyo-bindu* or Activity. In fact, Siva assumes the form of Sakti and Sakti goes into its original form, Siva". There is yet another strikingly original exposition given by the author when he points out that Srikantha's philosophy is partly similar to that of Ramanuja and partly to that of Tantra. It may be safely stated, without any fear of contradiction, that the main tantric tenets of the Saiva-Siddhanta and Vira-Saiva school are not widely known to the scholars of Northern India. The author has done a significant service by giving a critical exposition of the Saiva-Siddhanta school, drawing upon original materials.

In the recent past attempts were made by competent scholars to expound the teachings of Sri Ramakrishna. Many have, however, stumbled on certain sayings of Sri Ramakrishna on account of their apparent contradictions. It is indeed difficult to expound the philosophy of Sri Ramakrishna for the simple reason that he had no 'philosophy' in the conventional sense of the term. It goes to the credit of the present author to have given his readers a well-knit and systematic exposition of the teachings of Sri Ramakrishna. As the author has rightly pointed out, "Sri Ramakrishna has not asked us to synthesise all the different *isms* (*vadas*) and spiritual practices (*sadhana*) into one, but has instructed all to follow any one of the *alternative* spiritual *sadhanas* to reach the ultimate goal". Again, in dealing with the vexed question as to how the Impersonal God is related to the Personal, the author says: "One who has truly attained *Brahmajnana*, realizes that Brahman, the Absolute, alone is real and the world is unreal and that all names and forms are like unreal dreams. What the Brahman is cannot be described by words, nor can one even say that He is personal". The author's analysis of Sri Ramakrishna's use of the words *jnana* and *vijnana* is masterly and thought-provoking. Sri Ramakrishna's cryptic statement that the absolute Brahman and the Divine Mother of the universe are one and the same has been carefully analysed and the implications deduced by the author stand out in bold relief.



Philosophical ideas differ qualitatively from scientific ideas in that while in the latter there is always addition of new facts or replacement of old theories by new ones, philosophical ideas are as old as the hills. Nevertheless, philosophical ideas grow in course of time and assume new meanings, finer shades and nuances. In the present work the author has re-interpreted many old ideas of philosophy and his expositions have been exceedingly stimulating. The author richly deserves our hearty congratulations.

AMIYA KUMAR MAZUMDAR

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## CHAPTER I

### PHILOSOPHY, PHILOSOPHER, AND SPIRIT OF PHILOSOPHY

*What is Philosophy :*

Philosophy is a coherent system of thoughts, backed by logic or reason and arguments, and manifests itself as a cream or essence. The work of philosophy is to saturate the mind first, then the spirit, and then it makes this spirit an integral feeling, or an immediate divine experience.

Philosophy in India is not an intellectual pursuit for pleasure, but a spiritual striving for direct experience of the Absolute; nay, it is an integral feeling, an immediate awareness, of the absolute Brahman. Philosophy in India is love for wisdom or knowledge, and is to live the life of the Brahman. It is diving deep into the fathomless ocean of the Brahman. The schools of philosophy signify different methods of realizing the one and the same universal Being, which animates and saturates the phenomenal universe with its sentient and insentient objects. So, when we will discuss different schools of philosophy, we will discuss and analyse different ways for realizing the ultimate reality of the universe, which is the *summum bonum* of human life.

Indian philosophy, says Dr. S. K. Maitra, in spite of various forms which it assumed in different ages, has got its distinctive note, which we may call its spirit, which clearly distinguishes it from Western philosophy. However, Indian philosophy has its characteristic note, and has a voice of its own. Indian philosophy is said to be the quest for values and those values are summed up in *paramapurushartha*. It has two distinctive features, theoretical and practical. Swami Abhedananda says: "Of the tree of knowledge, philosophy is the flower, and religion is the fruit. Philosophy is the theoretical side of religion, and religion is philosophy in practice." Therefore two aspects of philosophy in India sing the same universal song

of the transcendental Reality ; or it can be said that one aspect, theory, is complementary to the other aspect, practice. So Indian philosophy maintains both the aspects of theory and practice, which lead the seekers of Truth to one and the same goal, which is no other than the realization of the absolute Brahman.

From very ancient time people of India sought for tranquil peace and happiness in every walk of life, social, cultural, and spiritual, and for that purpose they had to face not only hundreds and thousands of faults and failures, but also hundreds and thousands of crowning triumphs. They lived the life of pomp and luxury and at the same time foresook those enjoyments for getting into the kingdom of perennial silence and tranquil peace. The pious King Janaka of Mithila was a great politician and at the same time was a man of realization. He was Kshatriya by caste and yet many Brahmin savants and sages used to flock to him to take lessons in spiritual *sadhana*. He lived the life of a king, but at the same time he did not remain attached to pomp and luxury, because he realized the transcendental Brahman which is the goal of human life. Buddha was the son of a king of the Sakya clan, but he renounced his hearth and home for attaining the highest goal of life. Sri Rama Chandra was the son of a Kshatriya King, Dasaratha, of the Ikshaku clan. He also renounced his princely life to uphold the vow of his revered father. In this way, innumerable examples can be cited to show the trend of spiritual heritage of the Indian people. We also remember in this connection the famous saying of Maitreyi, the wife of Yajnavalkya: "*tenaham namrita syam kimaham tena kuryam*", i.e. 'what is the utility of that which cannot give me the *amritam* or immortal treasure of Brahman-knowledge, the *summum bonum* of the human life?' This prime achievement of the immediate awareness or *aparokshanubhuti* of the absolute Brahman as well as of perfect freedom and peace is the keynote and spirit of Indian philosophy.

It has already been said that philosophy, in India, is not a mere speculative or intellectual pursuit of pleasure, but it is a direct God-intuition (*Isvaranubhuti*), or it is to

see God face to face. Therefore philosophy in India means to see God, to get a *darshana* of God the Absolute, and to have a direct experience of the Brahman or *Atman* which transcends the categories of time, space, and causation, known as nescience (*ajnana* or *maya*). *Maya* in the determinate Brahman can be said to be a hiding principle that covers the self-shining light of the Brahman-knowledge, and when this covering of *maya* is removed by right or correct knowledge, the Brahman is revealed to a man. Advaita Vedanta says that the business of Indian philosophy is to remove the covering of darkness of *maya*. The knowledge of the Brahman is a self-accomplished fact (*vastutantratvat*), so only removal of ignorance or nescience is necessary. The spirit of Indian philosophy is, therefore, to sing the divine song of removal i.e. correction of error or falsity, and that song helps to recognize the real existence or being of the individual souls. In fact, the spirit of Indian philosophy reminds them who live in the den of delusion, to strike up the fetters of false knowledge (*mithya-pratyaya*) and to realize their real essence and permanent transcendental existence (*nitya paramarthika-satta*).

In the East as well as in the West, various thoughts evolved, and different men of intellect and intuition said about the highest criterion of truth (*parama-purushartha*) in different ways. Besides, there lies a fundamental difference between definitions and prime values of philosophies of the two regions of the globe, the East and the West. Dr. S. K. Maitra says: "We may put this characteristic difference between the Indian and the Western view of philosophy also in the following way: Philosophy is no doubt love of knowledge (from *philos*—love and *sophia*—knowledge), but the knowledge that philosophy cares for is not the knowledge of facts but the knowledge of values, especially the supreme value, namely salvation."

The word *philosophy* came into English from the Greek language. It is a combination of the Greek words which means 'to love' and 'wisdom', and, therefore, its literal meaning is the 'loving of wisdom'. Therefore the philosopher is one who ardently loves wisdom. But, in Indian sense, the word *philosophy* means *darshana* or 'to

see God.' So the Western intellectual perception differs from the Indian intuitive spiritual perception. The American philosopher Dr. Robinson is of the opinion that tradition attributes the origin of the Greek word for philosopher to Pythagoras who preferred to call himself one who loves wisdom, instead of a sage or wise. He says, "Note that the possession of wisdom does not make a person a philosopher but rather the possession of a passion, an ardent longing for wisdom. Socrates, the first martyr to philosophy, claimed that the highest wisdom is to know that you know nothing. No true philosopher boasts of having wisdom. Every true philosopher humbly seeks and passionately loves it."<sup>1</sup>

### *Philosophy and Philosopher :*

Dr. Robinson says that to a philosopher, wisdom is not the same as knowledge. Facts may be known in prodigious numbers without the knower of them loving wisdom. Indeed the person who possesses encyclopaedic information, may actually have a genuine contempt for those who love and seek wisdom. The philosopher is not content with a mere knowledge of facts, but he desires to integrate, and evaluate facts, and to probe beneath the obvious to the deeper orderliness behind the immediately given facts. "Insight into the hidden depths of reality, perspective on human life, and nature in their entirety, in the words of Plato, to be a spectator of time and existence—these are the philosopher's objectives."<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Robinson is of the opinion that philosophers assumed that the love of wisdom is a natural endowment of the human being. Potentially every man is a philosopher, because in the depths of his being there is an intense longing to fathom the mysteries of existence. As we will presently learn, this inner yearning expresses itself in various ways prior to any actual study of philosophy as a technical branch of human culture. Consequently every human being, in so far as he has ever been or is a lover of

<sup>1</sup> Vide, *An Introduction to Living Philosophy* (New York, 1934), p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

wisdom, has, to that extent, a *philosophy of life*.

Dr. Robinson has further said that many philosophers never get behind the purely critical attitude. They become so enamoured by this task of examining popular beliefs, with the idea of rejecting them, that they reach the one moving dubiety that there is no well grounded belief, and gradually they land in scepticism. But yet scepticism in the complete and thorough-going form of doubting absolutely everything is really the starting point of technical philosophy. And we know that technical philosophy differs from everyman's philosophy in the first place by being critical, because it assumes that the belief and principles as advanced by the everyman's philosophy must be systematically checked and examined. And it has been said before that by this critical attitude philosophy encourages doubt or a motivated doubt which forces to land in scepticism like David Hume in the West and Yogachari Buddhists in the East.

It should be remembered that philosophy is an endless quest and an age-long search for the hidden depth of reality. It is a sustained deep penetration into the core of truth that lies hidden for an ordinary man. No single school, no single *ism* or opinion, much less any single philosopher, however great, has a monopoly on all of its wisdom and all of its knowledge. "It cannot be confined within the peanut shells of technical terms. It cannot be exhausted by any finite mind nor by any group of minds. It bursts all bounds. *Sub specie aeternitatis*—to see all things from the view point of the eternal—this was Spinoza's absorbing ambition. If this be judged too difficult, encouragement may be found in another of his (Spinoza's) sayings: '*All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare*'.<sup>3</sup>"

Now it can be asked as to how philosophy or philosophical method can be approached. However, it is seen that there are different types of philosophy, but every type of philosophy has been developed methodically, reasonably, and scientifically. Dr. Robinson says that the best approach to an understanding of each type of philosophy

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 37-38.



is through an understanding of its basic method or methods of reasoning. The thinkers who have made the most valuable contribution to each type of philosophy, whether Indian or Western, have been those who have deliberately pursued their investigations by means of characteristic methods. And it is a fact that they have employed essentially the same method, or methods, which really justifies grouping philosophers together as representatives of one type. For such thinkers frequently differ considerably from one another in their development of specific doctrines and theories.<sup>4</sup>

Now the question naturally arises as to whether there are any general principles which underlie any and every type of philosophy. We know that each individual philosopher always employs such a set of basic categories. But is there a set that every philosopher, regardless of the type of philosophy he represents, must acknowledge? Is there a set of common universal postulates on which all philosophy rests? To this, says Dr. Robinson, it must be frankly admitted that there are extreme relativists and adamant sceptics who deny that there is a common set of principles as the basis of all philosophising. But that is not correct. It is true that it is extremely difficult for any philosopher to separate the basic presuppositions of all philosophical reflection whatsoever from those of the type of philosophy he holds. This is evidenced by the fact that a philosopher dislikes being labelled as belonging to one type rather than to another. Calling a thinker as idealist, a realist, or a pragmatist, or any other philosophic name, is often as much of an insult as waving a red flag in the face of a bull. However, to be a philosopher at all, one must at least make the assumption that there is such a thing as philosophy to which one is justified in devoting his energies, as well as in developing a reasonable and sound philosophy or philosophical system.

Prof. Hocking has forwarded three reasonable solutions to the crying need of formulating the basic presuppositions of the philosophic enterprise. He has said: (1) The

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

philosopher must assume that there are particular meanings in the world, (2) every philosopher must accept the competency of human beings, with their reason and other equipment, to grasp particular meanings and the meaning of the whole, or some of it, and (3) it is worthwhile to know the meanings of things and that we as thinkers are under a kind of obligation to enquire after them.

Now it should be remembered that a great philosopher wants to be independent in his thinking. He likes to have a reader who reserves judgement. He wants his statements examined and criticised. He goes himself to the bottom of truth which he intends to explain. He is known as a seer of truth, and truth saturates his nerves and blood of the body, and so he thinks truth, speaks truth, and moves with truth. His philosophy becomes, therefore, living and immediate.

It has been already said that Indian philosophy means *darshana* or an ecstatic vision of the highest value and truth. Therefore it is neither merely a chew of the intellectual pieces of the *shastras*, nor only the grasping of the raw materials of philosophy and logic. Advaita Vedanta says that we will have to study Vedanta which means to go into the core of the Vedantic thoughts. Vedanta teaches us to realize the inner essence of the Brahman and also to live the life of the highest ideal of Vedanta. So the intuitive thinkers of Indian philosophical thoughts repeatedly advised people to have direct knowledge or immediate experience of the highest truth which means realization of the Absolute. "But although philosophy is called *darshana*", says Dr. Maitra, "this does not mean that it eschews reason. This is one characteristic difference between Indian philosophy and Western philosophy. The West has gone wholly either for intuition or for reason. When it accepted the standpoint of intuition, as in the Middle Ages, it banned reason entirely. When, as in the Modern Age, it has given prominence to reason, it shows contempt for intuition. In our country (in India) philosophy has a different tale to tell. There has never been a conflict between intuition and reason, but philosophy has always given its due place to each of them."

### *Different Schools of Philosophy :*

Different schools of philosophy say about the highest achievement of life in different ways, and yet there is a practical unanimity among those schools, in looking upon the nature of the ultimate Reality as that which is revealed by direct intuition, and that is why philosophy is called *darshana*.<sup>5</sup> It cannot, however, be denied that all philosophies as well as the philosophers of both the East and the West are unanimous about achieving the highest value of philosophy. But yet their conceptions and interpretations of the ultimate value differ from one another. So doubt creeps in the minds of many people about the real standard and genuineness of the highest achievement. As a result there arose many commentators who explained or interpreted many problems and explanations of both philosophy and ultimate reality in different ways. But, it should be remembered that in spite of those different viewpoints and interpretations of different commentators the real spirit of philosophy is not affected, because although their definitions of prime object and standpoints of philosophy differ, their goal of attaining freedom from the bondage of ignorance is one and the same. The *Upanishad* says: "*tarati shokam atmavit*", i.e. 'those who realize the *Atman*, go beyond all pains and sufferings' The *Sankhya* says: "*atha trividha-dukhsatyanta-nivrittiratya-purusharthah*", i.e. the utter extinction of three kinds of affliction, *adhyatmika*, *adhidaivika*, and *adhibhautika* mean *purushartha* or highest achievement i.e. salvation. The *Mimansa* says: "*shressadhanameva dharma*", i.e. virtue is only the instrument of prosperity. The *Patanjaladarshana* says: "*purushartha-shunyanam gunanam pratiprasavah kaivalyam svarupa-pratistha va chiti-sakhriti*", i.e. he, who has attained to *tattvajnana*, transcends the categories of intellect etc. and he is never involved in any desire etc., or *mukti* (emancipation) means to realize the real essence (*svarupa*) of the *Purusha* or God (*purusha-vishesah Isvarah*). The *Vaishesika* says: "*dravyaguna-karma-samanya-vishesa-*

<sup>5</sup> Vide, Dr. S. K. Maitra: *The Spirit of Indian Philosophy* (1947), p. 10.

*samavayanam padarthanam sadharma-vaidharmabhyam tattvajnanam nis' shreyasa hetuh*", i.e. the highest attainment of knowledge of the Reality (*tattvajnana*) comes from the analysis of the positive and negative characters of substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and inherence. The *Nyaya* philosophy says: "*pramana-prameya-samshayaprayojana-drishhtanta-siddhanta . . . tattvajnananni shreyasadhigamah*" (1.1), and "*du'kha-janma-pravrittidosha-mithyajnanamutta-rottarapaye tadanantarapayapavargah*" (1.2), i.e. when *tattvajnana* or knowledge about the ultimate Reality manifests by the analysis of *pramana* etc. and sixteen substance (*padartha*), then the utter extinction of affliction, birth, desire, and false knowledge is possible. Vedanta philosophy says: "*anartha-hetoh prahanaya-atmaikatva-avidya-pratipattaye sarve vedanta arabhyante*", i.e. the utility of Vedanta philosophy is to remove nescience and also to identify the individual soul with the Brahman, and this is the teaching of Vedanta. Buddhist philosophy also prescribes Nirvana for going beyond all *tanhas* or *trishnas* (desires). Besides, there are different interpreters of the six systems of philosophy: *Sankhya*, *Patanjala*, *Nyaya*, *Vaishesika*, *Purva-Mimansa*, and they have forwarded many reasons and arguments about the highest achievement of life. But those different definitions or interpretations of the ultimate goal of human life do not affect the real spirit of one and the same Indian philosophy, because all definitions are meant for highest value which directs men to their ultimate goal.

### *Philosophy and Science :*

Dr. I. Levine of the University of Exeter is of the opinion that 'as men's interests and experiences widened, and their knowledge of the world increased, they tended to concentrate more and more on special aspects of the universe, and found they could obtain more immediately useful results by this means. Philosophy thus came to be split up into a number of separate parts. As the separate parts made progress it came to acquire the status of an

<sup>6</sup> Vide, *Philosophy* (London), pp. 10-12.

independent 'science', a word which thus stood for exact, systematic knowledge about some one aspect of philosophy.'

In fact, he says, philosophy is general and science is specialized. 'Philosophy, however, unlike any one of the sciences, tries to remain general and comprehensive in aim. . . . The task of the philosopher is to see everything in perspective. As Plato has put it, the philosopher is the spectator of all time and all existence.' Science studies facts, and its constant aim is to discover the pattern of things and to reveal the order, regularity, or even law of nature. Philosophy, on the other hand, also accumulates facts, but does not stop at these accumulations of facts or statistical records, but examines the bases of science itself. Philosophy, in short, tries to get the foundation of scientific method itself, to discover the limits of human knowledge, and to distinguish fact and fiction, truth and opinion, certainty and probability. 'Philosophy, therefore, can hardly be a completed body of knowledge. It is rather a continuous development, for each increase in scientific knowledge and each generation's discoveries provide the philosopher with new material for analysis, reflection, and criticism.'

Sir James Jeans has said that the philosophy of any period is always largely interwoven with the science of the period, so that any fundamental change in science must produce reactions in philosophy. There is an inter-relation between physics and philosophy, as both of them had their beginnings in those dim ages in which man was first differentiating himself from his brute ancestry, acquiring new emotional and mental characteristics which were henceforth to be his distinguishing marks. "Foremost among these were an intellectual curiosity out of which philosophy has grown, and a practical curiosity which was ultimately to develop into science."

Sir J. Jeans has further said that 'in whatever ways we define science and philosophy, their territories are contiguous; wherever science leaves off—and in many

<sup>7</sup> Vide, *Physics and Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1943), p. 3.

places its boundary is ill-defined—there philosophy begins. Just as there are many departments of science, so there are many departments of philosophy. Contiguous to the department of physics on the science side of the boundary lies the department of metaphysics on the philosophical side—that department of philosophy which lies ‘beyond physics’. Indeed from the beginning of recorded history, down to the end of the seventh century—from the times of Thales, Epicurus, Heraclitus and Aristotle down to those of Descartes and Leibnitz—the great names in philosophy were often great names in science as well.<sup>8</sup>

While explaining appearance and reality, Sir J. Jeans has said that the doctrine of materialism asserted that their space, time, and material world comprised the whole of reality, but, in truth, it is not so. It can be said to be the whole of appearance, but not the whole world of reality. We may picture the whole world of reality as a deep-flowing stream; the world of appearance is its surface, below which we cannot see. So we find that there is a dualism of appearance and reality, which pervades the history of philosophy, dating back to Plato. Sir Jeans has mentioned the famous parable in which Plato depicts mankind as chained in a cave in such a way that they can look only on the wall which forms the back of the cave; they cannot see the busy life outside, but only the shadows—the appearances—which objects moving in sunshine cast on the walls of the cave. For the captives in the cave, the shadows constitute the whole world of appearance—the phenomenal world—which the world of reality lies for ever beyond their ken.<sup>9</sup> Now the walls of the cave in which we are imprisoned, are space and time, and the shadows of reality which we see projected on the walls by the sunshine outside, are the material particles, while the reality outside the cave which produces the shadows, is outside space and time. Many philosophers regard the world of space and time illusory, but modern physics does not confirm this view. Sir James Jeans is of

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, p. 17.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, p. 193.

the opinion that the new quantum theory has shown that we must probe the deeper substratum of reality before we can understand the world of appearance, even to the extent of predicting the results of experiments. This is the theory of materialism or realism. Then came the idealism or mentalism, which divides the world of phenomena into mind and matter.

Prof. W. Heisenberg has also forwarded the same argument as well as opinion. While explaining the development of philosophical ideas since Descartes in comparison with the new situation in quantum theory, he has forwarded the same parable of the captives and the cave given by Plato in *The Republic* (Book VII).<sup>10</sup> Prof. Heisenberg has said that "in the first centuries of Greek culture, the strongest impulse had come from the immediate reality of the world in which we live and which we perceive by our senses. This reality was full of life, and there was no good reason to stress the distinction between matter and mind, or between body and soul. But in the philosophy of Plato, one sees that another reality begins to become stranger."<sup>11</sup>

In the age of Plato, the eyes of the philosophers, says Prof. Heisenberg, were directed towards the human soul and its relation to God, to the problems of ethics, and to the interpretation of the revolution, but not to the outer world. "The great development of natural science since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was preceded and accompanied by a development of philosophical ideas which were closely connected with the fundamental concepts of science."<sup>12</sup> Profs. Max Planck, A. N. Whitehead, C.M.E. Joad, Errol E. Harris, and other eminent scientists and scientist-philosophers have admitted that the philosophers should try to make a balance with the scientific temper of the age. Prof. E. E. Harris has said: "The

<sup>10</sup> Vide, (a) *The Republic of Plato* (Everyman's Library Series, pp. 207-208).

(b) *Physics and Philosophy* (George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, 1971), pp. 71-72.

<sup>11</sup> Vide, *Physics and Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1943), p. 71.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*, p. 72.

desires of philosophers that their discipline should rank as science, is not a new, or is exclusively a twentieth century aspiration. Descartes, less self-consciously perhaps than the moderns, and Kant, with more humility, were influenced by the same ambition. . . . There can be no doubt whatever that the temper of the age is scientific, and no question but that every serious philosopher must, in these days, take account of science, its methods and achievements and what it discovers of the world we live in"<sup>13</sup> Sir Arthur Eddington has further forwarded a reasonable solution regarding the philosophic trend of modern scientific thought which differs from different times, and yet it is a fact that both the philosophers and scientists must follow the rational track of modern scientific age. The contention of Prof. Eddington is this that we may certainly expect great changes, and by that time many things will appear in a new aspect, and that is one of the difficulties in the relations of science and philosophy. It is a fact that our eyes once opened, we may pass on to a yet newer outlook on the world, but we can never go back to the old outlook. So, he says, if "the scheme of philosophy which we now rear on the scientific advances of Einstein, Bohr, Rutherford, and others, is doomed to fall in the next thirty years, it is not to be laid to their charge that we have gone astray. Like the systems of Euclid, of Ptolemy, of Newton, which have served their turn, so the systems of Einstein and Heisenberg may give way to some fuller realizations of the world. But, in each evolution of scientific thought, new words are set to the old music, and that which has gone before, is not destroyed but refocussed. Amid all our faulty attempts at expression the kernel of scientific truth steadily grows, and of this truth it may be said: the more it changes, the more it remains the same thing."<sup>14</sup> However, the world is changing all the time with the advancement of the scientific researches, and so philosophy which must follow science, must change its outlook to come with the

<sup>13</sup> Vide, *The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science* (George Allen Unwin Ltd., London, 1965), pp. 19-20.

<sup>14</sup> Vide, *The Nature of the Physical World* (Everyman's Library Series, 1938), pp. 337-339.



age that marches onwards.

Now the Plato's parable of the captives and the cave, which has been mentioned by Profs. Jeans, Heisenberg, and many other scientists is rather a challenge against materialism or naive realism from the side of mentalism or idealism. Plato maintained that the forms possessed a higher degree of reality than the material objects, and so he represented knowledge as a kind of conversion of the soul from darkness to light, i.e. journey from the nescience to knowledge, or to Divine consciousness.

Plato believed that most men live all their lives underground, seeing nothing but echoes. The philosopher alone has made their ways to the light of the day or sunshine above. Plato's disciple Socrates also went on to describe the soul's journey from changing and fleeting aspects of the world to permanent and unchanging reality. In India, the philosophical ideas are saturated with the spiritual fervour from very ancient time. The philosophers of India of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are also eager to establish a bond of friendship and harmony between philosophy and science, so as to make their investigations and conclusions in accord with both of them.

Now, in this connection, we would like to quote some portions from the thoughtful article, *The Concept of Philosophy* by Dr. Kalidas Bhattacharyya, appeared in the '*Bases of Indian Culture*'.<sup>15</sup> Dr. Bhattacharyya is of the opinion that the basic structure that philosophy seeks, is to be understood as non-empirical, as opposed to the empirical structure that sciences like Physics and Chemistry seek. So we can expect a compromise or rather a harmony, between science and philosophy, but we must also remember that the attempts and workings of science and philosophy are somewhat different. He has said that scientific entities "are either discovered through careful analysis, or admitted as useful hypotheses about agents, collocations or behaviours. None of the philosophical entities, however, are of the nature of hypothesis; they are either dis-

<sup>15</sup> The article appeared in *The Bases of Indian Culture* (the Commemoration Volume of Swami Abhedananda', published by the Ramakrishna Vedanta Math, Calcutta, 1971), pp. 21-37.

covered through a type of analysis (helped, it may be, by suggestions and analogies, and by pseudo inferences) or deduced through formal inference from the philosophical entities already discovered. . . .”

He has further said: “A sizeable part of what is called ‘scientific structure’, is of the nature of hypothesis and so requires verification as being in whatever way relevant to empirical phenomena. But nothing like this is called for in philosophy. Philosophy has no need of hypothesis. Constituents of the basic structure are. . . . revealed *a priori*, though, it may be, in empirical contexts—and, since as revealed, they are revealed as autonomous, they are in no need of proving their relevance for sense-experience. . . . In science, on the other hand, as it is commonly understood, the criterion of final acceptance is not merely *order* (which it shares in common with philosophy) but also the evidence of sense-experience to which all scientific hypothesis have necessarily or pre-scriptively to be referred.” And Dr. Bhattacharyya has concluded: “Science starts with definite empirical gestalts and breaks these up into different parts to study the rules of their combination, and when this is done, it applies these rules to construct conceptually higher and higher gestalts or smaller and smaller parts, but never take a highest gestalt or a smallest part, except sometimes in light-speculative vein. For philosophy, on the other hand, the *world as a whole* is a positive entity, the counterpart of the *a priori* structure that it discovers, a counterpart, however, which is not independent of the structure but just its *a priori* function, the structure either positioning it *a priori*, or negating itself *a priori*.” But, yet, in spite of all the arguments, for and against, we will try to march towards a synthetic whole so as to bring science and philosophy to a common ground or platform for shaking hands with a spirit of love and friendship.

### *Spirit of Indian Philosophy :*

The spirit of Indian philosophy is to make a friendly relationship with religion. Swami Abhedananda says: “In India, religion and philosophy are one. Religion is the practical side of philosophy and the latter is the rational

side of religion. They are inseparably connected.”<sup>16</sup> “In the West”, says Dr. Maitra, “things are different. Religion there usurps most of the functions of philosophy. It pretends to be as objective and impersonal as the latter. It (religion) sets out to give, not inner realization, but creeds and dogmas which have no relation to a man’s personal realization.”<sup>17</sup> In India, religion does its function in a quite different way. But “Vedanta philosophy”, says Swami Abhedananda, “teaches that religion does not mean a belief in this creed, or in that dogma, but teaches that religion is the science of the soul. Indian philosophy further teaches the secret of work (*karmayoga*), the secret of devotion (*bhaktiyoga*), the secret of concentration and meditation (*rajayoga*) as well as the secret of speculative thoughts and highest wisdom (*jnanayoga*). For that purpose, Indian philosophy recognizes three main doctrines, dualism, qualified non-dualism, and non-dualism or monism, and considers them as *alternative* paths to the attainment of God-realization. Indian philosophy embraces the naive, neo, and critical realisms, subjective, objective, and absolute idealisms, phenomenism, existentialism, and transcendentalism or spiritualism, because it believes that all such *isms* or doctrines are but so many paths leading to the same goal. Moreover, Indian philosophy does not recognize caste, creed, and sex distinctions of the soul of man, as it holds that soul of man, nay, soul of all living beings, is the divine *Atman*. Indian philosophy is not again built on any particular person, or special revelation, rather it includes all the ethical laws discovered by all the great Prophets and religious teachers of the world. Indian philosophy also admits the theory of evolution which is the expression of change from one homogeneous mass into a heterogeneous variety. Indian philosophy interprets the theory of sin as nothing but an error or mistake which arises from ignorance that veils the true nature of our soul as well as the harmony that exists between God and the universe. Indian philosophy does not believe in the existence

<sup>16</sup> Vide, *Philosophy and Religion* (Calcutta, 1951), p. 63.

<sup>17</sup> Vide, *The Spirit of Indian Philosophy* (1947), p. 11.

of a devil which is the mother of superstition but it says that this superstition or wrong knowledge (*ayathartha-jnana*) can be removed or dispelled by the light of true and correct knowledge (*yathartha-jnana*). In fact, the spirit of Indian philosophy harmonizes all favourable and unfavourable conditions, and adverse views and doctrines of all philosophies and religions of the world. Further, it has no quarrel with any school, sect, creed, and faith, rather its outlook is universal, unifying and ever synthetic.

Also it has been said by Dr. Ruth Reyna that Indian philosophy has a synthetic approach to the various aspects of experience and reality. "Metaphysics, religion, ethics, epistemology, psychology, and axiology, are not cut off one from the other, but are treated in their natural unity as aspects of a single comprehensive reality. The all-embracing, synthetic tradition evidenced in the spirit and method of Indian philosophy may be traced to the Rigveda where the seers realized that true religion embraces all religions, for 'God is one but men call Him by many names'. This unity, this oneness, then, is the keynote of Indian philosophy."<sup>18</sup> There are contradictions or contradictory lines and arguments in Indian philosophy we know, but yet the chief aim of Indian thought "is to unveil and integrate into consciousness what is hidden by the forces of life—not to explore and describe the outer world, but to discover and set forth the basis upon which the inner and the outer world may be understood."

In fact, the spirit of Indian philosophy is tuned with the eternal song of the Absolute. Indian philosophy never indulges in mere book knowledge and intellectual pleasure and scholarship, but it inspires the seekers of Truth to dive deep into the fathomless ocean of the absolute Reality, which is known as Immortality and divine immediate experience which shines above the walking phantoms of hopes and pleasures of the phenomenal world.

It is true that the life of a man is not only full of sorrows and sufferings, but is also full of bliss and happi-

<sup>18</sup> Vide, *The Bases of Indian Culture* (published as the Commemoration Volume of Swami Abhedananda', by the Ramakrishna Vedanta Math, Calcutta, 1971), p. 38.

ness. It is a combination of light and shade. So the real mystics and philosophers call this phenomenal world a ground of opposites, light and shade, freedom and bondage. Duality is the abiding essence of this world of relativity, so the learned and the wise savants are never deluded by the temporal charm of this shadowy world. Ordinary men take the unreal as the real and error as the truth, and thus they make themselves entangled in the mess of delusion and are charmed by the outward show of the manifold universe. So men of realization or supermen are born from time to time to lead the people for coming out of the encircling gloom, holding in their hands the beacon light of immortal wisdom.

### *Ideas of Philosophy in Different Periods :*

The religio-speculative thoughts and ideas evolved in different periods in India and those periods can roughly be divided into four periods, the Vedic period, the Epic period, the *Sutra* period and the Scholastic period. The Vedic period covers the age of the settlement of the Aryans and the gradual expansion and the spread of the Aryan culture and civilization. We discern in this period successive strata of thoughts, signified by the *mantras* of the hymns, the *Brahmanas* and the *Upanishads*. The Epic period extends over the development between the early *Upanishads* and the system of speculative thoughts. The *Ramayana*, the *Mahabharata*, the *Harivamsha*, and different *Puranas* supplied different thoughts which enriched the domain of Indian philosophy. The *Bhagavad Gita* is the precious product of this Epic age. This book is an extract of the *Upanishads*. The religious and philosophical systems of Buddhism, Jainism, Saivism, Bhagavatism, Vaishnavism, etc. belong to this second period, i.e. to this Epic period. The *Sutra* period begins with the philosophical thoughts and ideas of the *Samkhya* of Kapila, the *Nyaya-Vaisheshika* of Gautama and Kanada, *Purva* and *Uttara Mimamsas* of Jaimini and Vadarayana. The Scholastic period contains the thoughts of Kumarilla, Sankara, Madhva, Ramanuja, Nimvarka, Bhaskara, Baladeva Vidya-bhushana, Vijnana-bhikshu, and others.

In the Vedic period, we find the texts of the Vedas (Rik, Yajus, and Sama) classified in a systematic order. The *Atharvaveda* came last. Each Veda consists of three parts, the *mantras*, the *Brahmanas*, and the *Samhitas*. The *Brahmanas* consist of the precepts and religious duties. The *Upanishads* and the *Aranyakas* are meant for them who retire from the household duties and live in the sacred forests and observe the religious practices. The *Aranyakas*, therefore, form the transition between the ritual of the *Brahmanas* and the philosophy of the *Upanishads*. The *Upanishads* are the collection of truths realized in the ecstatic vision of the Vedic seers.

Polytheism and monotheism and monism evolved in the days of the Vedic hymns. Many gods and goddesses (deities) were conceived in the Vedic age, and scepticism was also there in the air. So various doubts arose besides the belief of the pluralistic pantheon. However, the anthropomorphic ideas were gradually replaced by the reflective thoughts. The logical minds gradually enquired about a supreme Being which was both personal and impersonal, and finally the seekers of Truth struggled hard to find out the one amidst the many. That One was regarded as "the soul of the world, the source of all nature, the eternal energy." Disputes or oppositions between the speculative or philosophic faith of the few and the fancied superstition of the multitude were gradually reconciled. The orthodox beliefs were compromised with the heterodox beliefs. Intellectual discipline was subsidiary to holiness of life, and the mystic thoughts and ideas of the *Upanishadic* period gradually developed into a growing idealistic or spiritualistic philosophy, 'with the dogmas of a settled theology'. Man's spiritual quest and insight found their play in two ways, objective and subjective—"the wonders of the world without and the stress of the human soul." Specially in the *upanishadic* period, the seekers of Truth engaged themselves in the problems of the nature of Reality, intellect and intuition and also of that of creation of the world. The seers were also interested in the mystery of the individual self and its relation to the higher Self, and also in the problems of evil and suffering, *karma*, *para-*

*loka*, and *moksha* (work, after-world, and salvation). Dr. Radhakrishnan says: "There was a change in Indian thought after the Vedic period. Due to the asceticism of the *Atharvaveda*, the mystic tendency increased. During the period of the hymns of the *Rig Veda*, there was a sort of selfish abandonment to pleasure. The spiritual instinct of the human soul asserted itself, and, in the period of the *Upanishads*, the protest against the tyranny of the senses was heard in clear tones. . . . The *Upanishads* require us to work but disinterestedly." The disinterested love for work further led to the path of renunciation and also to the path of concentration and meditation, which finally took men to the highest region of emancipation or *mukti*. In the language of Professor Gough, it can be said: "The Indian sages, as the *Upanishads* speak of them, seek for participation in divine life, not by pure feeling, high thought, and strenuous endeavour, not by unceasing effort to learn the true and do the right, but by the crushing out of every feeling and every thought, by vacuity, apathy, inaction, and ecstasy."

To conclude, deep penetration into the core of the universe was sought for in the *upanishadic* period, and the spiritual atmosphere divinized the material world with the sublime and other-worldly idea of God as well as with the supersensible transcending Brahman which is the be-all and end-all of the human life.

## CHAPTER II

### RELIGIOUS TENDENCIES IN THE PRIMITIVE AND PREHISTORIC TIMES

#### *Primitive Time :*

In the primitive period, there was no hard and fast rule for controlling and conducting the daily lives of the primitive peoples, but the simple minds would choose or select very simple methods of their works and activities, and they would rather enjoy family life according to their very simple choice, needs, and environments. Between heaven and earth, they would recognise only the Sun, the Sky, and the Fire. They had respect for the Sun and the Fire for their domestic as well as religious uses. They had simple songs and dances, which used to be presented to their Nature-gods. They used to worship the Sun, the Moon, the Fire, the Stars, the Trees, the Mountains, and the Earth, and also the departed Spirits. Their religious faith and offerings were very simple and crude, and they used to pay their respect to those gods for fear as well as for love with mixed feelings of joy and sorrow.<sup>1</sup>

#### *Prehistoric Time :*

In the prehistoric time, we come in contact with more developed and cultural society, and the peoples of that time were more acute in sense, taste, and feeling. In the prehistoric cities of Mohenjo-daro, Harappa, Chanhudaro, etc. we meet with the *Panis* or merchant class of people, who were more intelligent in understanding the duties, both domestic and religious,—worldly and other-worldly. Dr. Laxman-svarup and others are of the opinion that Rig-vedic culture and civilization had penetrated the air and atmosphere of the prehistoric society, but most of the scholars do not admit this view, and they believe that culture and civilization of the two times, prehistoric and

<sup>1</sup> Vide, E. B. Tylor: *Primitive Culture*, Vol. II (1913), pp. 362-422.



Vedic, were quite different from each other. Sir John Marshall showed strong reasons for believing that there are no grounds for identifying the authors of the civilization with the Indo-Aryans of the Vedic literature. Rai Bahadur Rama Prasad Chanda has said: "Nothing as yet discovered affords any indication that the builders of the prehistoric cities at Harappa and Mohenjo-daro were akin to the Rigvedic Aryans. On the other hand, the civilization of those builders appears to be of a non-Vedic type." So Rai Bahadur Chanda proposes to identify the authors of this (prehistoric) civilization with the *Panis* described by Yaska Muni in one place as 'merchants' and in another place as 'demons'. Further, he has said that the Vedic Arya had no place in his social system for trade and traders, so the conclusion is not difficult that the much maligned *Panis* were the representatives of an earlier commercial civilization. While dealing with the *Pre-Aryan Elements in Indian Culture*, Prof. Atul K. Sur has written: "That the pre-Aryan peoples of the Indus Valley not only worshipped the Mother Goddess, but like the ancient peoples of Western Asia and the modern Hindus, paid their devotion also to a male cosmic deity is evident from the representation of a three-faced male deity depicted on a seal recovered from Mohenjo-daro."<sup>2</sup> Rai Bahadur R. P. Chanda has mentioned the fact as: "He (Yogi) is seated on throne with chest, neck and head quite erect and feet crossing each other. His arms are outstretched, his hands with thumbs to front resting on his knees. The posture is pervaded by the spirit of concentration as the later *paryanka* (cross-legged) *asana*. On two sides of the figures evidently indicating the four cardinal points are engraved four animals, elephant, tiger, rhinoceros, and buffalo. Below the throne are two deers standing with heads turned backward."<sup>3</sup>

There is no doubt that the figure of the Yogi is the prototype of Siva. Prof. Sur said: "We recognize here the germs of at least three fundamental concepts connected

<sup>2</sup> Vide, *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. X, March, 1934, No. 1, p. 18.

<sup>3</sup> Vide, *Modern Review*, August, 1932, pp. 158-159.

with the later Siva, namely, that he is (i) Yogishvara or Mahayogi, (ii) Pashupati, and (iii) Trimukha." The feature of the Yogi reminds one of the Vedic Rudra, whose cult in later time was replaced by that of Siva. In the Rigveda, Rudra is described as wearing golden ornaments. (It is to mention that the Yogi as depicted in the seal, excavated from the mounds of Mohenjo-daro, wears some ornament on arms and possibly on neck too, which the official archaeologists have missed to mention). Now it seems, says Prof. Sur, that Rudra in the Rigveda "was an Aryanised form of the pre-Aryan proto-Siva. This supposition to a certain extent finds support in the fact that the word Rudra in Sanskrit meaning 'red' is identical with the Dravidian word for 'red' Siva. Rudra, it must be noted, was a very important deity in the Rigveda. Only three hymns have been given to him, and he has been identified with Agni. In the study of Vedic religion, it should always be borne in mind that the cult of Agni has the most predominant place in Vedic ritualism."<sup>4</sup>

In the prehistoric culture of Mohenjo-daro, we also find the remains of the worship of the Mother Goddess, which is taken as the representation of Sakti of the Tantra cult. Bherumal Mihirchand has said in this connection that the most enlightening relics, though very few in number, are, however, those of religion. "They constitute the only authentic and contemporary evidence of pre-Aryan religion and show how firmly established was the cult of the Mother Goddess, or the Goddess of Earth, the most catholic of all goddesses, be her name *Amba*, *Durga*, or *Devi Mata* in India, and *Ishtar*, *Isu* or *Aphrodite* in Asia Minor. She is the prototype of the power *Prakriti*, Nature, or the original source of the material world, as distinguished from *Purusha* (or *Siva*)."<sup>5</sup> Dr. Krishnasvami Iyer has also discussed this question of Mother-worship in different ancient countries in pre-historic time.

Prof. A. K. Sur has further discussed in this connection that it is well-known that feminine deities occupy a very prominent place in modern Hinduism, but yet they played a very

<sup>4</sup> Vide, *The Historical Quarterly*, Vol. X, March, 1934, pp. 18-19.

<sup>5</sup> Vide, *Mohenjo-daro* (Karachi, 1933), p. 70.

significant role in the religion of the Rigvedic Aryans, and it is also a historical fact that a nude figure of the Mother goddess is depicted in a seal, discovered from the mounds of the prehistoric Mohenjo-daro. The Mother Goddess of the prehistoric city may be the representation of the spirit of fertility of the vegetable kingdom. And in the Rigvedic India, we find the conception as well as the worship of the Mother Earth, which is sometimes connected with the Sky or Varuna, as we find mention of the word *Dyaus-Prithivi*. The Mother Earth of the Rigvedic India can be taken as the replica or representation of the Mother Goddess, Sakti, or Durga, found in the seal of Mohenjo-daro. Mr. Vats has also discussed about the similar culture found in the excavation of Harappa.

Besides Siva-Sakti worship, we find the seals, excavated from the dead mounds of those prehistoric cities, Mohenjo-daro and others, show abundant evidence of the cult of a Tree-Goddess, the patron of vegetation. "She stands, receiving sacrifice, in the branches of a *pipal* tree, the tree of life, or of knowledge, which is still sacred and still entitled to offerings of flowers, etc. The seal shows the sacrifice of a goat to this Tree of Life." It seems that human and animal sacrifices were adopted from the primitive people by the peoples of the prehistoric time. Mr. K. N. Dikshit of the Archaeological Department has pointed out that a terracotta tablet from Mohenjo-daro bears clear evidence of tree-worship. On either side of the tablet is impressed "a scene consisting of six or seven human figures standing above and a goat-drawn vehicle driven by a man below. These persons are probably approaching a tree in the right hand corner in the bifurcated branches of which is to be seen a human figure, probably the presiding deity of the tree."

Animal-worship was also prevalent in those prehistoric cities. The figures on the seals discovered and the terracotta, faience, and stone figurines form an interesting study. The animal almost commonly depicted is a strange one-horned beast like an antelope or zebra except for the horn. He is apparently the mythical unicorn. "In the ancient world the unicorn was traditionally believed to be

an Indian animal and Vishnu's title as *Ekashringa* (having only one horn) may conceivably embody some memory of this prehistoric beast."<sup>6</sup> Some scholars are of the opinion that *Ekashringa* is the symbol of the Sun, and it reminds us of the Vedic Sun-worship. It is also a fact that sacred tree-worship, animal-worship, water-worship were also in practice in the Rigvedic period.

<sup>6</sup>This statement is of Sir John Marshall. Vide, B. Mahirchand: *Mohenjo-daro*, (Karachi, 1933), p. 75.

### CHAPTER III

#### PHILOSOPHICAL TENDENCIES IN THE RIGVEDIC TIME

Regarding philosophical tendencies in the Rigvedic time, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan says that we have the impassioned utterances of primitive but poetic souls who simply contemplated the beauties of the sky and the wonders of the earth, and eased their musical souls to compose the sacred hymns. "The genuine philosophical impulse, the desire to know and understand the world for its own sake, showed itself only at the end of this period of storm and stress. . . . The impulse of philosophy finds its first expression in mythology and religion. In them, we find the answers to the questions of ultimate existence, believed by the people in general. . . . Cosmological speculations took place of mythical assumptions. The permanent elements of the world are deified, and thus cosmology becomes confused with religion."<sup>1</sup>

The Vedic Aryans and the Iranians descended from the same stock and exhibit great affinities and resemblance which will be discussed later. From the Sky and the Earth, the ideas of Father and Mother evolved, and most of the ideas of Varuna, Mitra, Usha, Fire, Dyaus were gradually anthropomorphised and deified from which first polytheism, then spiritual monotheism, and at last monistic tendency of philosophy materialised. Many gods or deities were conceived and worshipped in the first period of evolution of the Rigvedic ideas, and so it was possible of arising the polytheistic idea. Gradually the evolution of monotheistic idea was inevitable with the true conception of one god or God. Men gradually came to know that there is some supreme and unlimited being who is the greatest of all. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan has written that with the growing

<sup>1</sup> Vide, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (Indian Ed., London, 1940), pp. 71-72.

insight into the workings of the world and the nature of godhead, the many gods tended to melt into one. The perception of unity realized in the idea of Rita worked in support of monotheism, whereas the varied phenomena of nature demand many gods, and from the conception and worship of many gods, the idea of polytheism evolved. But, in the Rigveda, we come across the hymns like: "*ekam sad vipra vahudha vadanti*", i.e. 'Truth is one, but it is interpreted by many seers in different ways' etc. Now the realization of that one Truth brings the idea of spiritual monism, which is now preached by the non-dualistic Vedanta. However, in the Rigveda, we find the philosophical ideas of these three *isms*, polytheism, monotheism, and purely monism.

In the Rigveda, we find two main tribes, *Devas* and *Asuras*, who were somewhat antagonistic to each other for their religious faiths. Some are of the opinion that both the Aryans and Iranians were included in the same Aryan stock, and the Iranians left the *Saptasindu* or Punjab for their religious difference with the Aryans who were more or less orthodox. Gradually the difference of the Aryans and Iranians was so great that the Aryans claimed themselves as the *Devas*, whereas the Iranians were known as the *Asuras*. The etymological meaning of the word *Asura* is powerful, and this word at first used to be applied to the *Devas* to denote their power for good. Dr. A. C. Das has said that in the early *mandalas* of the Rigveda, Indra, Varuna, Mitra or Mithra, Savitri, Marutas, Rudra, Agni and other *Devas* have been addressed as *Asuras*, and even the powerful kings and priests received that epithet of *Asuras* or *Danavas*. The early application of the word *Asura* to the *Devas* was, however, retained by a branch of the Aryans who continued to call their deities *Asuras*. But references are found in the Rigveda that both the branches, Aryans and Iranians, worshipped the bright powers, viz., Varuna, Mitra, Agni, Vayu, and others, and hated the powers of evil or *Danavas*.

Prof. Hillebrandt is of the opinion that whatever excites the imagination and awakens fear or joy, and whatever moves the spirit in dream or waking hours, will or at

least can become the starting for a god or demon. So we can consider the characteristics of gods or demons according to their happy or unhappy natures and experiences. In fact, Vedic or Rigvedic gods have varying degrees of personification, extending all the way from faith or *shraddha*. Besides, the gods of the Rigveda are all to be found somewhere within these various stages. Indra, Agni, and Soma are at the Zenith, and Varuna has just passed the Zenith. Visvavant and Trita are distinctly waning gods. Prajapati, the chief god of the Brahmanas, is just appearing above the horizon. Vishnu and Rudra (or Siva) have not yet reached the Zenith of their influence.<sup>2</sup>

Varuna and Mitra seem to be two of the earliest deities of the Aryan stock. Varuna was the Sky, and was conceived in the early Vedic time as *Kshiroda-samudra* or 'Ocean of milk'. In the Indian astronomy, we find that the Vedic literature have called the Milky Way or Galaxy (*chhayapatha*) as *Kshiroda-sagara*, *sindhavah*, *sindhunam* or *samudra* (ocean). The Milky Way is also known as *Niharika*. In the *Nirukta*; Yaska called *Niharika* as 'अन्तरीक्ष्योपरि स्पन्दनशीलाःआपा' i.e. 'water (or ocean) that plays on the sky'. So the Milky Way, constituted out of innumerable blazing stars, is also known as water or ocean—'*Kshiroda-samudra*'. Similarly the following currents of the river Ganga has also been conceived as the Milky Way or *chhayapath*: 'दिबि द्वायापथो यस्तु अनूनक्षत्रमण्डलम् \*\*\* त्रिपथगा तु सा' i.e. Ganga flows in the higher region or *svarga*, in the underworld or *patala*, and in the human world (*martya*). Like Varuna or Sky, Ganga has been conceived as the Milky Way or Galaxy, which has divided the limitless vast sky into two in the Indian astronomy.

Mitra was the Sun, and as he was beneficial and helpful to all the creatures of the world, he was known as Mitra or universal friend. Varuna was the first Vedic deity, and then came Mitra as the second one, and they were afterwards conceived as the Sun floating in the Sky. But ordinarily Varuna was known as the deity presiding

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Dr. H. D. Griswold: *The Religion of the Rigveda* (Indian Ed., Delhi, 1971), pp. 86-87.

over night, and Mitra was the deity presiding over day, and, consequently, Varuna was known as Night with thousand eyes sparkling in the darkness in the shape of bright stars and planets, and Mitra or Sun was known as bright Day. In Indian astronomy, Mitra is known as *Anuradha-nakshatra* or Scorpionis, who is one of the Adityas. There was another ancient Vedic deity known as Agni or Fire, the Sun on Earth.

Now, how those three ancient Rigvedic deities, Varuna or Sky, Mitra or Sun and Agni or Fire came into existence, it must be explained. We have already said that most of the scholars admit that Varuna was the first Vedic deity and then originated the deity Mitra or Sun. But gradually those two deities were conceived as the twin gods, Mitra-Varuna. Varuna as the Sky is the base of Mitra or Mithra, the Sun, and Mitra shines in the bosom of Varuna. In the antique days of the Rigveda, the people recognised first the deity Sun, as it used to shine every day ahead in the Sky, keep warm, and infuse life in all living beings, including vegetables, herbs, creepers, etc. It has already been said that Sun was known as the universal friend or Mitra, as it was the cause of lives of all the living and non-living beings. The nomadic peoples of the primitive days imagined that the Sun or Mitra used to rise in the eastern sky after taking rest in cave underneath the earth, and it again used to go in the evening for taking rest in the sleeping cave. Prof. Sayace has described the beliefs of the most ancient peoples of Babylon and Assyria that the Sun used to take rest in every night in the cave underneath the earth. Though Varuna or Sky was known to the Rigvedic peoples as the first evolved god, Mitra or Sun was recognised along with Varuna or Sky, and Agni or Fire conceived as the deity on the earth as a replica of the Sun, i.e. *prithivista-Surya*, yet Agni or Fire was recognised as the mouth of the god—‘अग्ने नयतीति अग्निः ।’ Agni is said to have seven tongues, and they are *kali*, *karali*, *manojaba*, *sulohita*, *sudhumravarna*, *sphulingini*, *visvarupi*, and *lelayamana*. It is said that Tantra has derived the goddesses Kali and Karali perhaps from the names of the tongues of Fire. Rai Bahadur Ramaprasad Chanda has said: “Kali and



Karali, two names of Durga, occur in the *Mundaka-Upanishad* (1.2.4), among names of the seven tongues.<sup>3</sup> But we do not know how far this suggestion is justified, as, in the *Sankhyana-Grihyasutra* (11.15.14), the name Bhadrakali occurs, and Manu has also mentioned about Bhadrakali as the deity (III.89). Besides, in different Tantra literature, Kali, Mahakali, Bhadrakali, Shyamakali and other names of Kali or Sakti have been mentioned. Agni in the *Puranas* is said to have three spouses, *Svaha*, *Svadha* and *Vashat-kara*. In the Vedic period, Agni was invoked in different sacrificial alters. From the *Puranas* we know twenty-eight names of sacrificial fire, and they are *pavaka*, *maruta*, *shobhana*, *surya*, *agni*, *vashanara*, *dhriti*, *hutashana*, *jathara*, etc. Yaska has mentioned three names of Agni, which are *agni*, *jataveda* and *vashanara*. Three primary oblations, in the Vedic sacrifice, were also conceived as *bhu*h to Agni, *bhuvah* to Vayu, and *svah* to Sun. The word Deva has been derived from *dipiyanti* i.e. that which shines. The term *Devata* has been derived by the grammarians:

‘देव’ दुर्गति’ क्रीडा च तन्बन्ति देवता ।’

Primarily Devas were three: ‘तिस्र एव देवता इति नैरुक्ताः’ i.e. in the *Nirukta*, Yaska has said that Agni, Vayu, Surya were the principal deities who resided in the *bhur*, *bhuvah*, and *svah*. The ancient Rigvedic Aryans used to worship all these three principal deities as the Devas or bright spirits. But another powerful Deva, under the name of Indra, was revealed to the Rigvedic Aryans who gave Indra the first place among all the Devas, not only on account of his all-pervading power, but also for the beneficent deeds that he performed for the good of the world and of mankind. Hence, with the Rigvedic Aryans, Indra became the first and foremost of the Devas (Rk. 1.102.9). He was regarded as the god who used to pervade the sky, the east, and middle region or *antariksha*. While commenting on the same *sukta*, Sayana has said that the three *Tejas* are the Sun in the Sky, the Fire on the Earth, and Lightning in middle region (*antariksha*) and RV. 1.163.1 has confirmed this fact.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Vide, *Indo-Aryan Races* (2nd Ed., Calcutta, 1969), p. 65.

<sup>4</sup> Vide, Dr. A. C. Das: *Rigvedic India* (1927), p. 153.

Shaunaka has said in the *Brihaddevata* that there are deities, Indra, Surya or Sun, Moon, Wind, Fire and others. Indra is praised with Pushan, Vishnu, and Varuna, as well as with Soma, Vayu, Agni. Then Mitra or Surya is frequently praised with Varuna, Soma, Rudra, and Pushan, and Pushan with Vayu.

Now Mitra or Sun was recognized as the prominent god after Varuna, and the bright and blazing Fire on the earth got the same rank which the Sun enjoyed. Fire was introduced as the *Purohita* or Priest of the sacrifice (RV. 1.1.2), through whom alone the Devas could be approached. The darkness of the night covered the light of the bright Sun and imprisoned him, as it were, in his gloomy cave. Indra had to wage a daily fight with the power of darkness, and release the Sun and the Dawn or Usha from his grasp. We have mentioned before that the ancient Babylonians believed that the Sun or Mitra used to go to take rest in the cave in the evening and used to rise again in the eastern sky in the morning. This rise and sinking of the Sun in the two horizons of the sky signify life and death of the vital force of the human world, upon which the Sun travels. Some of the scholars are of the opinion that the Babylonians and the Assyrians bear unmistakable evidence of the influence of Vedic and Dravidian civilization and religion, and so we find many similar beliefs regarding the gods and demons as are described in the Rigveda.

In his book, *The Mysteries of Mithra*, Franz Cumont has elaborately discussed about the Sun-worship among different nations of the world. Similarly J. M. Robertson has made a comparative study of *Mithraism*.

In his book, *The Mysteries of Mithra*, Franz Cumont has said that in that unknown epoch where the ancestors of the Persians were still united with those of the Hindus (perhaps in the Rigvedic period), they were already worshippers of Mithra or Mitra, who was no other than Sun. "The hymns of the Vedas celebrated his (Mithra's) name, as did those of the Avesta. . . . the Vedic Mitra and Iranian Mithra have preserved so many traits of resemblance that it is impossible to entertain any doubt concerning their common origin. Both religions saw in him a god of

light, invoked together with Heaven, bearing in the one case the name of Varuna and in the other that of Ahura; in ethics he was recognized as the protector of truth, the antagonist of falsehood and error.”<sup>5</sup>

Further Cumont has written: “Mitra-Varuna, and the five other Adityas celebrated by the Vedas, likewise Mithra-Ahura and the Amshaspands, who, according to the Avestan conception, surround the creator, are on the theory nothing but the sun, the moon, and the planets, the worship of which was adopted by the Indo-Iranians ‘from the neighbouring people, their superiors in the knowledge of the starry firmament’, who could be none other than the Accadian or Semitic inhabitants of Babylonia.” Dr. Oldenberg has also discussed this matter in the *Religion of the Veda*.<sup>6</sup>

In the Avesta of the Persians, we find that Mithra is the genius of the celestial light. The Avesta says that Mithra or Sun appears before sunrise on the rocky summits of the mountains and traverses during day in his chariot drawn by four horses. Cumont says: “In general, the picture that the Avesta offers us of the old Aryan deity, is, as we have already said, similar to that which the Vedas have drawn in less marked outlines, and it hence follows that Mazdaism left its main primitive foundation unaltered.” Mithra or Sun thus was adapted in the theological system of Zoroastrianism. Several times he is invoked in company with Ahura: ‘the two gods form a pair, for the light of Heaven and Heaven itself.’

J. M. Robertson has mentioned that the ritual of the Avesta is perfectly clear on the subject. “We sacrifice unto Mithra and Ahura, the two great, imperishable, holy gods; and unto the stars, and the moon, and the sun, with the trees that yield up bardsma” (burned on the altar). . . . “So may Mithra and Ahura, the two great gods, come to us for help. We sacrifice unto the bright, undying, shining, swift horsed sun.”

Since in Persian, his name (Mihra) actually means sun,

<sup>5</sup> Vide, *The Mysteries of Mithra* (1910), pp. 1-2.

<sup>6</sup> Vide, p. 165. Vide also Upton Sinclair: *The Secret of Jesus* (1962), p. 140.

he (sun) can never be dissociated from it, and as the same word also means 'the friend', the light being the friend of man, and seems to connote love or amity, a moral distinction inevitably attaches to him in a stage of human thought in which names have an incalculable significance.<sup>7</sup> J. M. Robertson has suggested that Mithraism was as hospitable to mystic meaning as Osirianism. Mithra slaying the bull should have meant the rays of the sun penetrating the earth, and so creating life for mundane creatures, as the dog feeds on the blood of the slain bull. Further, the significance of the bull expresses one of those signs of the Zodiac through which the sun passed in his annual course. The Mithraic cultus also connects symbolically with an Assyrian cultus for older. In Persia, says Robertson, the sign Aries, the ram, was known as the lamb, and in the Mithraic mysteries at the Christian era, it was a lamb that was slain. Further it can be said that the image of the slaying of the bull, whatever its original bearing, came to be associated specially with the idea of sacrifice and purification, or purification by the blood of bulls and rams must have reacted on Mithraism or cult of sun. Now it can be said that all the solar festivals and ceremonies and customs bear the testimony to the fact of the Rigvedic Sun-worship,<sup>8</sup> which most of the Eastern and Western scholars admit.

The Sun-worship was widely adopted in the Pauranic age and in the Tantric age. It is also found surviving among the uneducated village peoples. In the Rigveda, we find an allusion of wedding of Sun, Vivasvata, with Sarapyu, daughter of Tastha. In the Epic age, we find also an allusion of Sun and Sanga. In the Pal, Gupta and Sen periods, many stone images of Sun-god have been discovered, and it is found that by the side of all the stone-images of the Sun-god, his Saktis like *Mahashbeta*, *Shhaya*, *Nigshubha*, *Suvarchana*, *Usha* and *Pratyusha* are standing. In post-Gupta period also, in Bengal, many stone images of the Sun-god have been discovered, and from them it is proved that the Sun-worship was widely

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Mithraism in '*Religious Systems of the World*', (1901), p. 198.

<sup>8</sup> Vide, Prof. Tylor: *Primitive Culture*, Vol. II (1913), pp. 285-298.

adopted all over the world. In greater Bengal too, the images of the Sun-god were profusely found.

It should be further mentioned in this connection that Rigvedic tradition is preserved even to this day, as we find the Sun-worship is observed today in the folk religious culture in the name of *Itu-puja*, as the name *Itu* has been derived from Mitra or Mithra, the Sun (Mitra-Mita-Mitu-Itu). We perform the worship of the goddess Durga, who is no other than the replica or representation of the Sun. Rai Bahadur R. P. Chanda has mentioned in the *Indo-Aryan Races* that in the *Taittiriya-Aranyaka* X. 18, Ambika or Durga has become the spouse of Rudra, just in later times. In the same *Aranyaka* X.1, we find an invocation of Durga Devi, who is there styled Vairochani, daughter of the Sun or Fire, and X.1.7, among verses addressed to Agni, we meet with two more names of Durga (here called Durgi), viz., Katyani and Kanyakumari." Further it should be mentioned that the divine attendants of Devi Durga, Lakshmi, Sarasvati, Kartika and Ganesha are the solar deities, and even the lion, the seat of Devi Durga, is no other than the Sun. Besides, it is a fact that Durga is known as the Midday Sun (*madhyahna-Surya*), Sarasvati, as the Morning Sun (*pratah-Surya*) and Lakshmi is known as the Evening Sun (*sayam-Surya*). Even the *Kula* trees like *Ashoka*, *Bakula*, *Bel*, *Amra*, *Ashattha*, etc. were known as the seats of the Sun in very ancient days. Specially the Bel-tree used to be considered as the seat of the Sun, and the Bel-fruit used to be conceived as the Sun itself. And even to this day, before the day of Durgapuja i.e. in the *sasthithi*, the Bel-tree with its fruits are worshipped as the symbol of Devi Durga. In the Durgapuja, the leaves of those sacred *kula*-trees are used. This sacred custom is traditionally followed from the Rigvedic time, and it should be noted that Durga, Kali, Jagaddhatri, Ganesh, Kartika and others are the solar deities, and from the worship of them it is understood that the most ancient Rigvedic Sun-worship and Fire-worship are surviving even to this day. So the philosophical ideas of the Rigvedic time have saturated all the ages in India. Dr. Keith has elaborately discussed about the religious customs and practices

of the later Vedic peoples in the *Brahmanas* of the Rigveda.<sup>9</sup>

While dealing with Animism, Edward B. Tylor has mentioned in his book, *Primitive Culture*, about different conceptions of the deities in ancient times. The conceptions of different deities were materialised among all the ancient nations of the world. So comparing the ideas of the Vedic Aryans with those of other ancient nations, Prof. Tylor says that in the first stage, the Sanskrit *Dyu* (*Dyaus*), the bright sky, is taken in a sense so direct that it expresses the idea of day, and the storms are spoken of as going about in it; while Greek and Latin rival this distinctness in such terms as 'in the open air', 'well-skied, calm', 'under the cold sky'. In the second stage, Dyaus-pitar, Heaven-father, stands in the Veda as consort of Prithivi-matar, Earth-mother, ranked high or highest among the bright gods. To the Greek he is the Heaven-father, Zeus the All-seer, the cloud-compeller, King of Gods and Men. For good and for evil, Zeus the sky and Zeus the god are wedded together in the Greek mind. The same Aryan Heaven-father is Jupiter in that original name and nature which he bore in Rome long before they arrayed him in the borrowed garments of Greek myth, and adapted him to the ideas of classic philosophy.

The Rain-god is most often the Heaven-god exercising a special function. The place of the Thunder-god in polytheistic religion is similar to that of the Rain-god in many cases even to entire coincidence. In Peru, a mighty and far-worshipped deity was Catequil, the Thunder-god, child of the Heaven-god, who sets free the Indian race from out of the ground by turning it up with his golden spade. In Africa, we may contrast the Zulu, who perceives in thunder and lightning, the direct action of Heaven or Heaven's lord, with the Yoruba, who assigns them not to Olorun the Lord of Heaven, but to a lower deity, Shango the Thunder-god, whom they call also Dzakuta the Stone-caster. Prof. Tylor has also shown the similarity of ideas of the deities which were prevalent

<sup>9</sup> Vide, *Rigveda-Brahmanas* (Indian Ed., published by Messrs Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi).

among the Ossetes, of the Caucasus, among the Turanian or Tatar race, the European branch, etc.

Prof. Tylor has further said that the Hindu Thunder-god is the Heaven-god Indra. Indra is the very patron-deity of the invading Aryan race in India. In the Greek religion, Zeus is himself Zeus Kerauneios, the wielder of the thunderbolt, and thunders from the cloud-capped tops of Ida or Olympus. In like manner, the Jupiter Capitolinus of Rome is himself Jupiter Tonans. In the Vedic hymns, the storm-gods, the Maruts, bore along with the fury of the boisterous winds, with the rain-clouds distribute showers over the earth. Aeolus with the winds imprisoned in his cave has the office of the Red Indian Spirit of the Winds, and of the Polynesian Mouni. In the similar way, Prof. Tylor has described among different ancient nations the Sun-worship, Fire-worship, Moon-worship, etc. He says: "Thus, in tracing the development of Nature-worship, it appears that though Fire, Air, Earth, and Water are not yet among the lower races systematized into a quaternion of elements, their adoration, with that of Sun and Moon, shows already arising in primitive culture the familiar types of the great divinities, who received their further development in the higher Polytheism."<sup>10</sup> There were also god of agriculture, god of dead, divine ancestor, good and evil deities, supreme deity, etc.

<sup>10</sup> Vide, E. B. Tylor: *Primitive Culture*, Vol, II (London, 1913), pp. 247-303.

## CHAPTER IV

### RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE BRAHMANA PERIOD

The *Aitareya-Brahman* says that Varuna and Mitra or Mithra, along with Agni, were the principal deities of the Rigvedic time, but, in the *Brahmana* period, we find Agni as the lowest and Vishnu as the highest, and between them are all the other deities. Really Vishnu was the Sun, known as Mitra or Mithra, and from the Sun or Surya, Vishnu, Vishnu-Narayana or Vishnu-Vasudeva evolved, as the divine conception of the deity, Durga or Uma-Haimavati, or Mahishamardini evolved from the Sun.

In the *Brahmana* period, different kinds of sacrifices like Soma, Rajasuya, etc. were in practice, and cakes (*puro-dasha*), Som-juice, butter, etc. used to be poured on the tongues of the blazing fire as oblations. Dr. A. B. Keith has written: "All the deities are Agni; all the deities are Vishnu; Agni and Vishnu are the terminal forms of sacrifice." From this it is understood that Agni and Vishnu, the representations of the Sun, were the two main deities, and all other deities were mainly conceived in the image of Agni, which was no other than the Sun on the earth. Different *mantras* and Vedic songs used to be chanted and sung in praise of the presiding deities of the sacrifices. The *mantras* were composed of different metres or syllables. "That for Agni is on eight potsherd; the Gayatri has eight syllables; the metre of Agni is the Gayatri. That Vishnu is on three potsherd, for thrice did Vishnu stride across this." It has already been said that Vishnu is no other than Sun, and as the Sun travels in the Sky (*Akasha*, or Varuna, or Ocean of Milk) making three strides or divisions, so *mantras* used to be consecrated to him thrice in a day. In the *Sandhya-vidhi*, Gayatri (or Savitri) is conceived even to this day as Brahmani in the morning, Vaishnavi in the midday, and Rudrani in the evening. These are the three manifested forms of the Sun or Mitra. In the Indian mythology, we





Asuras who were antagonistic with each other. This fact reminds us the antagonistic ideas of the Veda and Avesta, of the Hindus and the Persians. We think that the Vedic and the Avestan ideas also penetrated the strata of the *Brahmana* period.

In the third stratum of the *Brahmana* period, we find the appearance of the deities Asvins, Brahmanaspati, Brihaspati and others, along with Agni, Prajapati, and others. Regarding Brahmanaspati, and Brihaspati, Dr. Keith has said: "Brihaspati is the holy power; verily thus with the holy power he heals him. . . . 'The great one hath established the two great ones, when born' is addressed to Brahmanaspati; Brihaspati is the holy power; verily thus with the holy power he heals him." The *Samans* or Vedic songs (*samaganas*) used to be sung by the priests as well as by the wives, and the unmarried girls used to dance around the sacrificial fire or alter playing the *Picchora* and *Audumvara Veenas*. The *Samans* were designated with the particular names like *Brihat*, *Rathantra*, and those *samans* were composed of different metres, like *tritubha*, *gayatri*, *jagati*, etc. Dr. Keith has further said: "The *Rathantra* Vasistha hath brought; Bharadvaja hath fetched the *Brihat* of Agni (he says); verily thus he makes him possessed of the *Brihat* and the *Rathantra*." There we also find the deities, Mitra and Varuna, along with Ashvins, Aditi, Sindhu, Earth and Sky. Besides, we find the gods like Indra with the Rudras, and Varuna with the Adityas, and Brihaspati with the All-gods. These gods were invoked in the Upanishads in the *Brahmana* period. In the *Upanishads* we also find the Devas and the Asuras strove for the desired world. "They made this (earth) an iron (citadel), the atmosphere one of silver, and the sky one of gold; thus they made these world as citadels."

In the Soma sacrifice, the animals were slaughtered and offered. The animals used to be tied to the posts of Khadira. "The post is a thunderbolt; it should be made of eight corners; the bolt is eight-cornered." The posts were made up of Palasha. Songs were sung, composed of different metres. The victims were mainly offered to Agni and Soma. Besides the animal-sacrifice, human-sacrifice was also in practice.

"The gods slew man as the victim. When he had been slain his sap went out; it entered the horse, therefore the horse became fit for the sacrifice. . . ." Those sacrifices of the animals and the human beings were handed down from the primitive and prehistoric times, and they were also observed in the Rigvedic time.<sup>1</sup> Religion and philosophy were, therefore, interwoven with different sacred sacrifices, in which different gods were invoked and different boons were asked for worldly pleasures and pleasures of the higher regions (*svargas*). Now, though in the Upanishadic period, those *svargas* were condemned, yet in the *Brahmana* period, they were desirable, and were asked for temporal happiness.

It is essential to mention in this connection that the Vedic period was mainly divided into four, *Chhanda*, *Mantra*, *Brahmana* and *Sutra*, and the one period presupposes the other consecutive periods. (1) The *Sutra* period forms the connecting link between the Vedic and the later Sanskrit. (2) After the *Sutra* period, the *Brahmana* period began, differing from compositions and styles of both the *Sutra* and the *Mantra* periods. The *Aranyakas* were prior to the *Brahmanas*. The *Aranayakas* were so called because they had to be read in the forest, as the *Aranyeggyaganas* were sun in forest. In several instances the *Aranyakas* formed the part of the *Brahmanas*. The philosophical chapters of the *Aranyakas* were known under the name of the *Upanishads*, which were purely the philosophical portions, and those philosophical portions were no other than the abstract truths realized in the ecstatic vision of the *Rishis*, or men of the spiritual quest and intuition. There were many recensions (*shakhas*) of the Vedas, *Brahmanas* and *Upanishads*—'sarvah shakhah prithak prithak.' (3) The *Mantra* period can be known as posterior to the *Brahmana* period. (4) The *Chhanda* period came in the last.

Religion and philosophy evolved, as has been said before, with the conceptions of different deities in different

<sup>1</sup> I am indebted to Dr. Arthur Barriedale Keith, as I have taken many materials and have quoted passages from his monumental book, *Rigved-Brahmanas* (Indian edition) published by Motilal Banarasidass (Delhi, 1971).

periods. Hymns were conceived, and the Brahmins (priests) used to form the ideas of the deities or Devatas, their invocations and boons, and their applications in the sacrifices and also in their wordly lives. In the Rigvedic and also in the Brahmanic conceptions of the deities or the *Vishve-Devas*, we have seen that Varuna, Indra, Mitra, Agni, Vayu and Marutas, Ushas, and others were conceived not only for the purpose of material or worldly help, but also for unworldly help, so as to make the guidance of their life and also to get the shining light for dispelling the darkness of ignorance. In the Rigveda, we find such a hymn: "Among you, O gods, there is none that is small, none that is young, you are all great indeed" (RV. 1.27.13). Though here we find 'the great' and 'the small' designations ascribed to the gods, yet this is only an attempt to find the most comprehensive and universal expression-cum-conception of the gods, and that means all gods are represented as supreme and absolute.<sup>2</sup> And we have said before that this universal idea helps to materialize the monistic conception in the Rigvedic age. The Rigvedic *mantras* also support this view by saying: '*ekam sad vipra vahudha vadanti*', i.e. 'truth is one, but it is interpreted in different ways by different seers', and 'the One who breathes the breathless breath', etc. Prof. Max Müller has said: "Let us consider but a single point. We have accustomed ourselves to regard a belief in the unity of God as one of the last stages to which the Greek mind ascended from the depths of a Polytheistic faith. . . . By what right do we mark all hymns (of Rigveda) as modern in which the idea of one God breaks through the clouds of a polytheistic phraseology? The belief in a Supreme God, in a God above all gods, may in the abstract seem later than the belief in many gods. . . . Whereas the Semitic nations relapsed from time to time into polytheism, the Aryans of India seem to have relapsed into monotheism. In both cases, these changes were not the result of a gradual and regular progress, but of individual impulses and peculiar influences." And to this, Prof. Max Müller further says: "I do

<sup>2</sup> Vide, F. Max Müller: *A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature* (Indian Ed., 1968, Varanasi), pp. 487-488.

not think, therefore, that the mere occurrence of monotheistic ideas, and of other large philosophical conceptions, is sufficient to stamp any class of hymns as of modern date. A decided preponderance of such ideas, coupled with other indications in the character of the language, might make us hesitate before we used such as witnesses for the *Chhandas* period. But there is a monotheism that precedes the polytheism of the Veda, and even in the invocations of their innumerable gods the remembrance of a God, one and infinite, breaks through the mist of an idolatrous phraseology, like the blue sky that is hidden by passing clouds.”<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, p. 512

## CHAPTER V

### CENTRAL THOUGHTS OF THE UPANISHADS

The *Upanishads* are the cream of the Vedas and Vedānta. They are known as the *rahasya-vidya* and that means the *Upanishads* disclose the mystery of the soul and thus help men to realize the absolute Brahman which is the *summum bonum* of human life. The *Isha-Upanishad* teaches that this universe and everything in it are covered by the Brahman—'*Isha-vasyamidam sarvam yatkincha jagatyamjagat.*' So men should not seek any shelter other than the Brahman. The Brahman is either known as *para*—the impersonal and indeterminate Absolute, or *apara*—the personal determinate *Isvara*. The indeterminate Brahman is transcendent (*vishvottirna*), and the determinate Brahman is immanent (*visvagata*). So it is understood that the one and the same Brahman is both transcendent and immanent, indeterminate and determinate.

The *Upanishads* also speak of *maya* or *Prakriti* (*Avyakrita*)<sup>1</sup> and *Mayin* or *Purusha*. Through the inscrutable power of *maya*, the one and transcendent Brahman appears as manifold. The *Mayin* or determinate Brahman projects the world and its creatures from within; nay, it projects and then enters into the world and assumes the forms of the world and its creatures. But this aspect of the determinate Brahman i.e. Brahman with attributes (*gunas*) and adjuncts (*upadhis*) is not the *para*-Brahman which is unattached (*asanga*), pure (*shuddha*), untained (*niranjana*), sinless (*apanaiddha*), and desireless (*viraja*) Brahman, it is the absolute Brahman which is known as the witness (*sakshin*) and higher consciousness (*prajna*). In fact, the *Upanishads* admit the existence of both the determinate (*saguna*) and formed (*murta*) Brahman and the indeterminate (*nirguna*) and formless (*amurta*) Brahman. The

<sup>1</sup> *Prakriti* of Sankhya is *svatantra*, whereas *Prakriti* or *Avyakrita* of Vedānta is *paratantra*

Brahman assumes the forms of *Vishva* (*jagrat*), *Taijasa* (*svapna*), and *Prajna* (*susupti*) and at the same time it transcends these three phases or conditions of consciousness and shines as *Turiya* or the Fourth Principle, (*chaturtham*), where there remains no creation or creature, no bondage (*bandha*) or freedom (*mukti*), but there remains only undescribable existence (*sat*) and divine feeling or experience (*anubhuti*).

The *Upanishads* hold the doctrine of idealistic or rather spiritualistic monism, which enunciates one infinite, eternal, omnipresent, and omniscient pure spirit known as the Brahman or as the ultimate reality. The monotheism that teaches one reality but manifests in diverse ways, gives birth to monism, and monism or spiritualistic monism of the *Upanishads* is somewhat different from monism or non-dualistic thoughts of Vedanta. Monism of the *Upanishads* holds both the immanent and the transcendent aspects of the Brahman, whereas the monism of Advaita Vedanta holds that the immanent aspect of the Brahman is real from the phenomenal standpoint (*vyavaharika-drishhti*), whereas it is unreal from the transcendental viewpoint (*paramarthika-drishhti*). However, Vedanta says that non-temporal, non-spatial and non-causal absolute Brahman is only real.

The first verse of the *Isha-Upanishad* discloses the whole teachings of all other seventeen *mantras* of it. The first *mantra* says: '*Isha vasyamidam sarvam. . .*' etc., i.e. 'All this—whatsoever moves on the earth—should be covered or saturated by *Isvara*, the universal all-pervading consciousness. Protect your Self through that detachment (*tyaga*). Do not covet anybody's wealth, or do not covet; for whose is wealth?' The eighth verse describes about the transcending nature of *Isvara* or the *Atman*. It says that *Isvara*, or the *Atman*, is all-pervasive, pure, bodiless, sinless, transcendent, and self-existing. 'The face of the Truth (i.e. Brahman in the solar orb) is concealed with a golden vessel—'*hiranmayena patrena*'. Do thou, O Sun, open it so as to be seen by me who am by nature truthful.' Here the physical sun has been identified with the inner spiritual Sun, the shining *Atman*, and it is true that

darkness of nescience which covers the face of pure consciousness or Truth, is removed or replaced by the shining rays of the spiritual Sun, the ever-effulgent *Atman*. By the side of the Sun, the Fire is also invoked to lead men towards the realization of the *Atman*. The sun shines in the sky, whereas the fire shines in the universe, both are the shining principles, so men who live in the den or delusion, must turn their eyes towards the shining and leading light of the sun, or of the fire.

The *Kena-Upanishad* raises the question as to how men of the world live and have their being in the world. This question is known as *jijnasa* motivated by the will or desire to know the truth. In the *Vedantasutra*, we come across with the question: '*athato Brahmajijnasa*' i.e. the question for knowing the Brahman, and this question is the vital thing or medium through which the prime essence of everything and every being of the universe is known or realized.

The *Kena-Upanishad* says that, that universal truth cannot be known by the material things like word, eyes, ears, and mind, as it is beyond the words and mind—*avangmanaso'gocharam*. So the *Upanishad* has related an allusion of the powers of the senses, which failed to appreciate the Divine power of Haimavati Durga. In the eighth verse of the fourth chapter, the *Upanishad* has said: concentration, cessation from sense objects, rites etc. are the legs of the truth, the Vedas are its limbs, and truth its abode or *ayatanam*, and, therefore, the ninth verse says: 'Any one, who knows this thus, having dispelled sin, remains firmly seated in the boundless blissful, and highest Brahman.' That is when men remove their sin or darkness of nescience, they realize the Truth the Brahman.

The *Katha Upanishad* forwards an allusion of Yama and Nachiketa. Yama conquered the cycle of birth and death by attaining the knowledge of the immortal blissful Brahman, and Nachiketa went to the *Yamaloka* for asking boons (*varams*) by which he can dispell the darkness of ignorance, and can attain the ever-shining Brahman-knowledge. Yama, the Ruler of Death, told Nachiketa about the preferable and the pleasurable—*shreya* and



*preya*. Yama said that the man of intelligence, having considered them, separates these two. The intelligent one selects *shreya*, and rejects *preya*, because *shreya* offers blessings of the supreme knowledge, whereas *preya* binds men to the pleasures of the contingent world. Yama further said to Nachiketa that the *Atman* is neither born, nor does it die. It did not originate from anything, nor did anything originate from it. It is birthless, eternal, immortal, and ancient (*purana*). It is not injured when the frame of the body dies, or is killed. Yama said: 'Know the *Atman* as the master of the chariot, and the body as the chariot. Know the intellect as the charioteer, and the mind as verily the bridle. Know the senses as horses, and the objects as the ways. The discriminating (*viveki*) people call that *Atman* the real enjoyer, and it enjoys everything of the world, being associated with the body, senses, and mind.' It should be noted that the sense-objects are higher than the senses, the mind is higher than the sense-objects, the intellect is higher than the mind, and the great *Atman* is higher than the intellect. Again the unmanifested or *avyakta* is higher than the great soul or *mahat*, the *Purusha* is higher than the unmanifested, and there is nothing higher than the *Purusha*, because He is the culmination (*kastha*) and the highest goal (*para-gati*)—'*sa kastha sa para-gatih*'. Now, this supreme One is not known to all, as He is hidden in all beings (*gudhatma*).

The *Katha-Upanishad* instructs us to shut off the doors of the outgoing senses so as to appreciate the inner and supreme Essence, the *Atman*. The self-existent Lord made the face of the senses outward, so they go and enjoy the outer things and not the inner Self. But these things are known to the discriminating men, who desire immortality and turn their eyes away and see the indwelling *Atman*. The discriminating men know that the *Purusha* or *Atman* of the size of a thumb (*angustha-matra* *purushah*) resides in the body (in the heart), and that *Purusha* is like the light without smoke (without *avidya*), and He exists all the time, present, past, and future. Regarding this *Purusha*, the *Katha-Upanishad* says: "As fire, though one, having entered the world, assumes separate forms in res-

pect of different shapes, similarly, the *Purusha* or *Atman* who exists inside all beings, though one, assumes a form in respect of each shape or form, and yet He is outside.' From this it is understood that the *Atman* or *Brahman* is immanent as well as transcendent. The *Atman* is the substratum as well as the cause, and everything—sun, moon, stars and all satellites seem bright and effulgent, borrowing the light of the self-effulgent *Atman*—'*tasya bhasa sarva-midam vibhati*'.

The Canto III is very important, as the first verse determines the prime cause of the world-appearance. It says: '*urdhamulo' chadhashakha*' etc. i.e. 'this is the beginningless peepul tree that has its roots above and branches down. That upward root is pure, that is Brahman, and is immortal.' The similar verse occurs also in the *Gita*. From this it is understood that First Cause always exists above, and the world-appearance, the effect, exists downward. In the *Brahmasutra*, Vyasa determined the Brahman as the prime cause of the world—'*yanmadyasya yatah*'. The Brahman is transcendent, and is above all dualities. This Brahman saturates all that shine as the appearance, and, in essence, it is non-different from the appearance.

In the *Aitareya-Upanishad*, the first verse begins with: "In the beginning this was but the absolute Self alone. There was nothing else whatsoever that winked. He thought: 'Let me create the world'." From this it is understood that before creation or manifestation there existed only one and unique Reality, and the manifold manifestation evolved from that one Reality, and that means the Reality (Brahman) is the cause of the world. Now he, who realizes that one Reality as the cause and substratum (*karana* and *adhara*) of the manifold world, is free from the chain of delusion, as Vamadeva was free after divine realization.

The *Mundaka-Upanishad* begins with the verse: 'Om Brahman, the creator and the protector of the universe, was the first among the gods to manifest Himself.' But how did the universe emerge? To this the *Mundaka-Upanishad* says: 'As a spider spreads and withdraws the thread, as on the earth grow the herbs and the trees, as from the

living man issues out hair on the head and body, so, out of the Immutable does the universe emerge here in this phenomenal creation or projection.' From it we understand that the universe emerged from the one Reality, and that Reality is both material cause and efficient cause of the world-appearance.

The *Upanishad* further instructs us as to how we will meditate upon the Reality. It says to meditate on the Self thus with the help of OM. Patanjali also said about OM as the symbol or dicloser: '*tasya vachakah pranavah.*' OM or Pranava is known as the determinate Brahman, and this Pranava (*vachaka*) discloses the mystery of the indeterminate Brahman. Really OM, or any other symbol, *vaidika* or *tantrika*, are taken as the means to attain the divine realization.

The third *Mundaka* describes about the nature of both Jiva and Brahman. It says:

द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया  
समानं बृक्षं परिषस्वजाते ।  
तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं सगद्वत्त  
नश्चत्रनगो अभिवाकशीति ॥

'Two birds that are ever associated and have similar names, cling to the same tree. Of course, the one eats the fruit of divergent tastes, and the other looks on without eating.' The similar verse occurs in the *Shvetashvatara-Upanishad*, IV.6.

The verse of the *Mundaka* III.1.2. sings the same song. Jiva or the individual soul works and desires to enjoy the result of that work, but God, or the realised soul, disinterestedly work for the good of the human society, and does not desire to get the result. This verse teaches us to do work in the world of duties, and tells us not to hanker after the result. Because the will or desire of getting result of work drags down to the den of delusion, which means bondage or *samsara*. The *Mundanka* says that Truth wins and not untruth. The Truth is not attained through study, nor through the intellect, nor through much hearing, but it is attained by the cessation of the

desires. It says, '*yamevaisha vrinute tena labhyah, tasyaisha atma vivrunute tanum svam*' i.e. 'by the very fact that the aspirant seeks for this Truth or *Atman*, does It become attainable; of him this *Atman* reveals its own undying nature.' The lines reveal the truth that the Reality is self-revealing, and it is not revealed by any religious practice, or by any other thing. When darkness of ignorance is removed, the *Atman* reveals itself.

The *Mandukya-Upanishad* explains the true significance of the universal and mystic word OM. It is divided into four parts, Virata, Hiranyagarbha, Isvara, and Turiya, which can be compared to the states, waking (*jagrata*), dream (*svapna*), deep sleep (*susupti*), and the ever-waking state of higher consciousness (*turiya*). There are the universal state (*samasthi* or *samanya*), and in an individual way, the division of the word, OM is Vishva, which is *vahis-prajna*, *Taijasa*, which is *antahprajna*, and *Prajna*, which is *ghanaprajna*, and the fourth and transcending state (i.e. stateless state) is the Turiya, which is common to both divisions. From this statement it is clear that—

1. *Vishva* experiences the external things and is all-pervading;
2. *Taijasa* experiences the internal things; and
3. *Prajna* is the man of consciousness.

But the fourth one is the real and all-inclusive Brahman, and the seventh verse clarifies the position. The seventh verse says: 'They consider the Fourth or Turiya (Transcending Reality) to be that which is not conscious of the internal world, nor conscious of the external world, nor conscious of both the worlds, nor a mass of consciousness, nor simple consciousness, nor unconsciousness, which is seen beyond empirical dealings, beyond the grasp of the organs of action, . . . which is unchanging, auspicious, and non-dual. That is the Self or *Atman*, and that is known and realized.

Then the *karikas* of Gaudapada begin. Those *karikas* have thrown sufficient light on various questions and problems of philosophy. The *karikas* 83-84 prove that the real Truth or Brahman is devoid of four alternative theories—'*chatushkotirvinirmuktam*.' Some are of the

opinion that the *karikas* and the statements of Gaudapada are influenced by the Buddhistic thoughts i.e. by the thoughts of the Yogachara Buddhists, and the late MM. Vidhusekhar Sastri has forwarded ample references from the Bauddha philosophies to prove that the *karikas* of Gaudapada are influenced by the Buddhistic thoughts. But many scholars, as well as Sankara himself, have refuted this view. Sankara has said that in most places of the *karikas* the word 'Buddha' signifies the 'man of wisdom'. As for example, '*sada buddhaih prakirtitam*' (88th *karika*), which means 'for ever declared by the wise'.

In the *Chhandogya-Upanishad*, we find the transformation of matter into pure consciousness or *chaitanya*. In the dialogue between Sanat Kumara and Narada, it has been stated that the sun that shines in the sky is a material something in the outer world, but it shines as the *Atman* in the hearts of all living beings—'*hridaya-pundra rike*', and the sun that shines in the material sky, is the representation of the inner self-effulgent Sun, the *Atman*. So we meditate on the outer material sun as the seat of Narayana or the Vasudeva-Narayana, who creates, preserves, and destroys the manifold world. The *Chhandogya-Upanishad* has shown us the path from the matter to the spirit, from the unreality to the Reality, which saturates the world, as well as transcends the world, made up of the impermanent categories of time, space, and causation. As for example, in eleventh part of the third chapter of the *Chhandogya-Upanishad*, it has been said:

(i) 'अथ तत उध उदेत नैबोदेत' . . . i.e. therefore the sun will not rise, as it has finished his work of nourishment for the living beings.

(ii) 'यद्वै तद् ब्रह्मेतीदं बाब तद् योहयं बहिर्या पुरुषादाकाशः . . .'

(iii) 'स योहयमन्तःपुरुष आकाशो सो वै सोयन्तःपुरुष आकाशः ।'

(iv) 'अव बाब स योहयमन्तर्हृदय-आकाशस्तदेतत् पूर्णमप्रवर्ति . . . य एव वेद ।'

That is, 'the outside ethereal space is no other than the ethereal space that shines in the heart of every being, so he who knows the ethereal space (*akasha*) in the

hearts of living beings, knows everything, and he becomes the whole and deathless'. Again while the *Upanishad* is describing the *madhu-vidya*, it sees the sun or *aditya* as *deva-madhu*, and the ethereal space is the base or ground of the *madhuchakra* :

‘असौ वा आदित्यो देवमधु । तस्य द्यौरेव तिरश्चीनबंशोक्षहन्तरिक्षमपूषो मरीच्यः पुत्राः ।’

Besides, in the first part of the eighth chapter of the *Chhandogya*, we find the mention of the *daharakasha* or *hridaya-pundarika* :

‘अथ यदिदं नस्मिन् ब्रह्मपुरे दहरं पुण्डरीकं वेत्स्य (गृह्यत् स्थानं), दहरोहस्मिन्नन्तराकाशस्मिन् यदन्तस्तदन्वेष्टव्यः तद्वाचं विजिज्ञासितव्यमिति ।’

There we find the sun and the moon which exist in the ethereal space, lie in the heart of all living beings.

The *Brihadaranyaka-Upapnishad* relates that the supreme Brahman has but two forms, gross and subtle, mortal and immortal, limited and unlimited, defined and undefined: “*dvevava brahmano rupe murtam chaiva-murtam cha, martyam chamritam cha, sthitam cha yaccha saccha tyaccha*” (II.3.1). The *Upanishad* says that all forms and all manifestations are pervaded by the limitless Brahman and nothing is devoid of essence and existence of the absolute Brahman. The *Isha-Upanishad* has already declared: “*Om, isha vasvamidam sarvam, yatkimcha jagatyam jagat . . .*”, etc. i.e. ‘all this whatsoever moves on the earth is covered (or saturated) by the Lord and so it can be said that all the sentient and insentient beings and objects of the world are non-different from the all-consciousness secondless Brahman.’ Again from the conversation between Maitreyi and Yajnavalkya, we find the essence of all the *Upanishads*. Yajnavalkya said to Maitreyi: “The Self (or the Brahman) should be realized, should be heard of, reflected on, and should be meditated upon. By the realization of the Self or Brahman, my dear, through hearing, reflection, and meditation, all this is known” (II.4.5.). Besides, all the *Upanishads* are of the opinion that by the knowledge of one, knowledge of all is attained: “*ekasmin vijñate sarva-vijñatam bhabati*”. Therefore, by the one transcendent Brahman-consciousness,

all consciousness, pertaining to all beings and objects of the world, are attained. And the real contention of these words lies in the fact that when one attains to the supreme Brahman-knowledge, he directly feels, or is immediately awarded that everything of the world is non-different from the Brahman and the Brahman lies in every being and object. It has been mentioned before that the section V, of the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* has mentioned about *madhukanda*, and there it says that Yajnavalkya had two wives, Matreyi and Katyayani. Matreyi desired to know and to realize the Brahman, but Katyayani was worldly-minded. Maitreyi asked Yajnavalkya about the nature of the Brahman. Yajnavalkya said that after attaining universal Godconsciousness, one is never involved in any particular limited consciousness. Maitreyi was puzzled to this question of one undivided consciousness, so Yajnavalkya made it clear by saying: "Because when there is duality as it were, then one sees something, one smells something, one tastes something, . . . one knows something. But when to the knower of the Brahman everything has become the Self, then what should see and through what, should one taste and through what. . . etc. This Self is That which has been described as 'not this, not this'—*neti, neiti*. It is imperceptible, for it is never perceived. It is undecaying, for it never decays. . . . Through what Matreyi, should one know the Knower? So you have got the instruction, Matreyi. This much indeed is immortality, my dear. . . ."

Again in the 4.4.6 *mantra*, we find that one who has conquered desires, never transmigrates, and he is merged in the Brahman—'*brahmaiva san brahmyapyeti*'. . . . Really the act of merging in the Brahman is no other than realization of the Brahman which is one without the second. In the 4.4.7 *mantra*, the *Brihadaranyaka* has said: "When all the desires that dwell in his heart (mind) are gone, then he having been mortal, becomes immortal, and attains the Brahman in this very body."

It should be mentioned that there are more than a hundred *Upanishads*, but Sankara and other spiritual teachers wrote commentaries upon only ten principal *Upanishads* like *Isha*, *Kena*, *Katha*, *Mundaka*, *Mandukya*,

*Shvetashvatara*, *Aitareya*, *Taittiriya*, *Chhandogaya*, and *Brihadaranyaka*. The teachers differed from one another in their opinions, but their differences of opinions did not affect the meanings and real purports of the *Upanishads*, because all of them were of the same opinion about the highest criterion of truth which was accepted by them, and all of them agreed that the ultimate goal of human beings is to go beyond nescience, to go beyond the ties of sufferings of the world, and to attain to eternal peace and immortality.



## CHAPTER VI

### ESSENCE OF THE BHAGAVAD GITA

The *Bhagavad Gita* forms a part of the *bhismaparva* of the *Mahabharata* (300 B.C.). It is the extract or essence of all the *Upanishads*. It is the gospel of eternal peace and silence. It is the song of the Supreme Exalted One, as Rudolf Otto says. Its proclaimer (*vakta*) is the Lord, Sri Krishna, and Arjuna is the only listener (*shrota*). It is proclaimed in the battlefield of Kurukshetra which was known as the *dharmkshetra*. Dr. Rudolf Otto said: "The *Bhagavad Gita* occupies the exalted position as that of *The New Testament*, and especially *The Gospel of St. John* holds in the religious world of the West." Esoterically the *Bhagavad Gita* is a sublime eternal message of universal love and brotherhood and freedom for all irrespective of caste, creed, and colour. Sri Krishna is the *Paramatman*, and Arjuna is the *jivatman*. It is the duty of the *jivatman* to know his own real existence and essence, and also to realize that he is not the *jivatman*, but is the *Paramatman*; not an individual soul, but is the absolute Brahman.

The *Bhagavad Gita* begins first with Dhritarashtra and Sanjaya, and then with Sri Krishna and Arjuna. Sanjaya is the relator of the historical happenings of the war between the Kaurava and the Pandava, as well as of the result of the war. Whether the divine dialogue begun between Sri Krishna and Arjuna amidst the dreadful activities of the war in the distant past, that does not matter, but the narration of the war proves that everyone in the world of work (*samsara*) appears like Arjuna amidst the various puzzling and perplexing activities of the world, and so he seeks advice and help from his *viveka* or shining discriminating faculty, so as to get rid of the difficulties of the activities of the world.

The second Chapter, '*Sankhyayoga*' forms the best and important part of the *Bhagavad Gita*. The *Sankhya*-

*yoga* does not mean the religious practice as advanced by Kapila, the author of the *Sankhyadarshana*. *Sankhya* or *sankhyayoga*, which is often used in the *Bhagavad Gita*, can be known as *jnanayoga* or discriminative process. The word *Sankhya*, therefore, connotes the idea of 'knowledge' or *jnananishtha*. Sri Krishna, as a preceptor, advised Arjuna that your concern is with action or work only, and never with results: '*Karmanye vadhikaraste ma phalesu kadachana*', because desire for result binds men—'*phale saktah nibadhyate*'. Besides, thought of the sense-objects is the source of evil, as when a man thinks of objects, attachment for them arises. From attachment arises desire, from desires arises wrath, from wrath arises delusion, from delusion comes failure of memory, from failure of memory arises loss of conscience, and from loss of conscience he is ruined—'*smritibhramsat pranasycati*.' He attains peace and tranquility, who controls his self, and approaches objects with senses devoid of love and hatred. Further it is a fact that sense-restraint conduces to steady knowledge, because the mind which yields to the roving senses, carries away man's knowledge, as the wind carries away a ship on water. So, we should bear in mind that 'there is no wisdom or *buddhi* to the unsteady, no meditation to the unsteady, to the unmeditative no peace, and to the peaceless, how can there be happiness?' In the last of the second Chapter, i.e. in the 69th verse, Sri Krishna said: 'What is night to all beings, therein the self-controlled one is awake. Where all ordinary beings are awake, that is the night of the sage who sees.' While commenting on this verse, Sankara said that the supreme Reality appears as night to all beings who are in ignorance. The night is by nature *tamasic*, and, as such, causes confusion of things. The Reality is attained only to a man of steady knowledge. The self-restrained Yogis who have subdued the senses and have shaken off the sleep of ignorance (*avidya*), is fully awake. When all ordinary beings, who sleep in the night of ignorance, are deluded, the men of discrimination and knowledge, who have realized the *Atman*, are awake, which means the wise ones are enlightened and blissful all the time. It can be asked as

to how that enlightening and blissful state can be attained. To this Sri Krishna said in the 70th verse that 'he attains peaceful state, into whom all desires enter as waters enter the vast ocean, which, filled from all sides, remains unaltered, but not he who desires objects—'no *kama-kami*.'

Sri Krishna discussed about *karmayoga*, where *pravritti* and *nivritti*—attachment and detachment have beautifully been discussed. Sri Krishna said about renunciation of action to those who hold *Sankhya* aspect of wisdom. But it is true that desire creates a trap in which man is entangled. Sri Krishna said: "As fire is surrounded by smoke, as a mirror is covered by dust, as the foetus is enclosed in the womb, so desire covers the wisdom." Desire is no other than nescience, because it creates the impression that instigates a man to make or create desire again. The selfishness is again followed by desire, so desire must be controlled, or it must be transformed and turned towards meditation and Godconsciousness. Arjuna also asked the question as to how to restrain the senses which are the means of doing action and of reaping the results. At the root of action as well as of result desires play an important role, so desire must be controlled first and then the senses will be restrained.

After *karmayoga*, Sri Krishna explained the essence of *jnanayoga* or devotion to knowledge (*vichara*). There Arjuna asked as to what is action and what is inaction, because the question even deludes the wise. Action pertains to the physical body, but man falsely attributes it to the *Atman* which is all the time actionless and balanced. Similarly the unwise falsely imputes to the *Atman* the cessation of work which really pertains to the body and the senses. The unwise are always in delusion or false knowledge for ascertaining what is right and wrong—real and unreal. So to remove the false knowledge we will have to take shelter under wisdom or knowledge, which really determines right and wrong, and guides the ignorant to the path of conscience and light.

Then the *Bhagavad Gita* deals with *Sannyasa-yoga* or practice of renunciation. Sometimes perplexion comes in the path of ascertaining the truth whether performance

of action, or practice of renunciation, leads men to the path of righteousness and salvation, and which of them are better. To this, Sri Krishna said: "Listen, as a man also has realized the *Atman* restores to neither *karmayoga*, nor *karma-sannyasa*, it is not right to speak of them as alike leading to the highest bliss, or of the superiority of his *karmayoga* and *karma-sannyasa*. Sri Krishna replied to this question that though renunciation and unselfish action both lead to the same goal, the highest bliss, yet of the two, *yoga* through action i.e. *karmayoga* is esteemed more than renunciation of action." Now, what do we mean by *karmayoga*? *Karmayoga* means the performance of action without seeking its result.

Sri Krishna, therefore, explained *dhyānayoga* or practice of meditation, *vijñānayoga* or method of realization of the *Atman* by means of concentration and meditation and *abhyāsayoga* or practice of spiritual *sādhana*. These are the means for crossing the ocean of *samsara*. In the *Gita* as well as in the *Upanishad*, the *samsara*, or the world, has been compared with the *Aśvattha* tree having its root above and branches below, whose leaves are the metres. He who knows it, knows the Vedas. Sankara quoted the sayings of the *Purana* where it has been said that the root from which the eternal tree of the Brahman has sprung, is the undifferentiated consciousness or *Avyakta*, which means the Unmanifested (*Avyakrita*). Its trunk is intellect or *buddhi*, the sense-appertures are its hollows, the great elements are its boughs, the sense-objects are its leaves and branches, merit and demerit (*dharma* and *adharma*). Its fair blossoms are pleasures and pains, and its fruits afford livelihood to all living creatures. This is the resort of the Brahman, the highest Self, and that highest Self is the essence of that Tree of Brahman. Having cut asunder and split the Tree with the mighty sword of knowledge, the wise attain the bliss eternal.<sup>1</sup>

It should be noted that the *Bhagavad Gita* has spoken of the delusive world (*samsara*) as a tree rooted above. The *mahat*, the *ahamkara* (egoism), the *tanmatras*

<sup>1</sup> It has also been explain in the previous Chapter.

(elemental essences) etc. are its branches as it were, and these extend downwards, whence the tree is said to have its branches below. The tree of *samsara* is known as *Asvatha*, because it does not abide the same even till tomorrow, because it undergoes change and destruction every moment. Again Sri Krishna said: "Below and above are its branches spread, nourished by the *gunas*, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, the sense-objects are its buds, and below, in the world of man, stretch forth the roots ending in action." So cut the tree of *samsara* or manifold desires, and seek the higher goal, emancipation from the bondage of nescience.

Then what is the right path to that goal? Sri Krishna said that be free from pride and delusion, conquer the evil of attachment and love, and attain the indwelling Self, the Brahman. When the selfish desires, or ego-centric ideas are completely turned away, when a man will be free from the pairs of opposites known as pleasure and pain, then he will reach that eternal goal.

The *Bhagavad Gita* has distinguished *sannyasa* and *tyaga*. Generally men make mistakes by thinking that *sannyasa* or renunciation and *tyaga* or abandonment are one and the same thing. But that is not correct. Let us quote the beautiful explanations about words *sannyasa* and *tyaga* from the chapter LV of the *Bhagavad Gita* as explained by Swami Abhedananda. The Swami said: "*Sannyasa* is the same word from which Sannyasin is derived, and the Sannyasins are the ones who have renounced the world i.e. world of desires or *maya*. The word *tyaga* means abandonment. In many places these two words have been used in the third, fourth and fifth Chapters, and in other Chapters, you will find that injunctions have been given to perform the works of daily life, and not to seek the results, i.e. to abandon and renounce the results of work, etc."<sup>2</sup> Sri Krishna said,

कामगानां कर्मणां नासं सन्न्यासं कवयो विदुः ।

सर्वकर्मफलत्यागं प्राहुस्त्यागं विचक्षणाः ॥

<sup>2</sup> Vide, *Bhagavad Gita, the Divine Message*, Pt. II, pp. 855-56.

The abandonment of desired or interested works and the abandonment of fruits of works being intended to be expressed by the two words, the meaning of the words *sannyasa* and *tyaga* is in any way one and the same, so far as the general idea is concerned, namely, abandonment. They are not so distinct in meaning as the words jar and cloth. Therefore *sannyasa* connotes the idea of abandonment of desires (*vasanas*), and *tyaga*, the idea of abandonment of results of works (*karmaphalatya*). Abandonment of results of works means the fruits of works which are dedicated to God in the spirit of worship, and Swami Abhedananda said that the *Bhagavad Gita* enjoins a life of dedication of all actions to God, the *Purushottama*. The *Purushottama* is above *Kshara* and *Akshara*, and *Purushottama* is the personal God who is determinate and with form. So the *Purushottama* of the *Gita* is different from the indeterminate and formless Brahman of Advaita Vedanta. The *Purushottama* may be called the *saguna*-Brahman who has conquered the sway of *maya*, but resides with *maya* which is known as *Mahamaya*, the Divine Energy. Swami Abhedananda further said: "The *Bhagavad Gita* teaches theism, but does not ignore monism. It regards God as the supreme and perfect Man or *Purushottama*, which is known as the trans-empirical Supreme Principle that transcends both *Kshara* and *Akshara*. The *Kshara* is the infinite mobile spirit which is manifested in the incorporate body of the conscious embodied souls, whereas *Akshara* or *Akshara-Purusha* is the infinite immobile static Spirit which transcends *Kshara* or infinite mobile spirit. In fact, God as *Purushottama*, the Supreme Principle, goes beyond both, but is not an abstract universal principle, but is the concrete and determinate spirit, the embodiment of consciousness existence and bliss (*Sacchidananda*)".<sup>3</sup>

The *Bhagavad Gita* admits both the determinate Brahman and the indeterminate Brahman.<sup>4</sup> It admits the the grace of God, the *Purushottama*, and this grace, said

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, p. 1010.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p. 1011.

Swami Abhedananda, comes from God as a *reward* for pure and dedicated mind. In the eighteenth chapter, Sri Krishna said, 'मत्प्रसादात् . . .' (18.56, 18.58, 18.62). This *prasada* is grace, and this grace comes from dedication or self-surrender. Sri Krishna further said: (a) 'मयि सन्तस्य मत्परः' (18.57), (b) 'मामेव शरणं गच्छ सर्वभावेन' (18.61) and (c) 'सर्वधर्मान् परित्यज्य मामेकं शरणं ब्रज' (18.66), and without this *sharana* or relaxation or attitude of self-surrender, grace (*kripa*) does not come. Swami Abhedananda reminded: "The grace is universal and does not mean predestination, as Christianity thinks. Grace is a state of relaxation, and it comes under certain conditions. Anything that is spiritually uplifting and ennobling, anything that brings right knowledge to the soul, comes from that all-powerful infinite source, and that is grace".<sup>5</sup> The *Bhagavad Gita* says that we are the children of God and by our birthright we possess grace of God. And we have seen that when Arjuna dedicated himself to Sri Krishna, the Universal Soul, by saying: '*shishyas-teham shadhi mam tam prapannam*', then Sri Krishna blessed Arjuna, and this *blessing* is no other than God's {livine grace

The *Gita* admits three kinds of *mukti*, *jivanmukti* i.e. emancipation from the bondage of ignorance in this very life, *videhamukti* or emancipation after the dissolution of the material body, and *kramamukti* or emancipation through gradual steps. In the *Shvetashvatara-Upanishad* 1.10.611, the acts of meditation (*dhyana*) and knowledge (*jnana*) have been discriminated as *dhyana* prescribes *kramamukti* and *jnana*, *jivanmukti*. In fact, the *Bhagavad Gita* has synthesised all the practices of spiritual *sadhana*, Rajayoga, Karmayoga, Bhaktiyoga, and Jnanayoga, and it admits that an aspirant may choose any one of the practices and he will reach the goal, provided he is sincere and selfless, and dedicates his sense of egoism at the feet of the All-merciful God. The *Gita* believes also in personal God, so it advises all to dedicate everything to God (*sharana-gati*), and assures that God will take the dedicated ones to the temple of everlasting Bliss.

<sup>5</sup> Vide, *Bhagavad Gita, the Divine Message*, Pt. II, p. 1000.

## CHAPTER VII

### MATERIALISTIC IDEAS OF THE CHARVAKAS

The prime truth of the Indian philosophy is one and the same, though its interpretations and methods of teaching differ. Different teachings of Truth and different schools with different viewpoints evolved to suit different tastes and temperaments of different thinkers and truth-seekers, and this is inevitable in the world of differences and change. All the schools can be divided into two main heads, materialistic and idealistic or spiritualistic. The aim of the materialistic schools is to reduce everything to matter, whereas that of the idealistic or spiritualistic is to reduce everything to idea or spirit. But the most rationalistic and liberal philosophy of India, I mean the non-dualistic Vedanta philosophy, says that matter and spirit are the two extreme points of one neutral Reality which knows no difference between them, but reduces both matter and spirit to an undivided homogeneous whole which can be said to be the Divine consciousness in the form of experience or *anupalabdhi* of the integral Brahman-knowledge. While discussing spirit and matter, Swami Abhedananda has advanced this synthetic view in his book *Self-Knowledge* (Chapted I).

Spirit and matter are the two extreme principles that constitute the stuff as well as the history of the human world. It is the law of Nature that when matter or material manifestation is predominant in the human society, men devote themselves in material pleasure and prosperity, and when spirit or spiritual manifestation is predominant, they develop their ideas of intellectual and spiritual knowledge for attaining absolute freedom and peace. The speculative thoughts and ideas that give birth to the materials of religion and philosophy, evolve when spiritual content is predominant in the human society. There evolved also some reactionary thoughts in the domain of Indian philosophy with the advent of the materialist



Charvakas or Lokayatas of the Charvaka school. It is said that Brihaspati was the main propagator of the doctrine of the Charvakas or Lokayata. The word 'Charvaka' was derived from *charu-vak* or 'sweet word.' Some are of the opinion that the doctrine of the Charvakas evolved from *Yadrichhavada* or the doctrine of the undisciplined inatter which is very popular among common men. The thoughts of the Charvakas (*charvakadarshana*) are also known as the *Lokayatadarshana* which is founded upon the *svabhavavada*.'

The thoughts of the Charvakas are very ancient. We get references in the names of the Charvakas, Brihaspati, and other sceptics, such as *Charvaka-vachanani*, *Brihaspati-vachanani*, *Lokayatamatam*, etc. The *Lokayatikavada* has been discussed in the *Mahabharata* (vide *shantiparvan* and *rajadharmaparvan*, 38,39). In the *Ramayana*, *Javali* has been described as the upholder of the *charvakamata*. The doctrine of the Charvakas is also found in the *Rig-veda* and also in some of the *Upanishads*. From the discussions in Sadananda Yati's *Vedantasara* it is understood that the doctrine of the Charvakas existed in the ancient Indian society, and the Charvakas misinterpreted the texts of the *Upanishads*.

The Charvakas hold that perceptual knowledge is only valid, and discard all other knowledge. The Hindu thought commonly admits five elements: earth, water, fire, air, and ether. As the Charvakas admit only perceptual knowledge (*pratyaksha-pramana*), they reject ether or *akasha* which is not perceived by gross senses. For the same reason, the Charvakas deny the afterlife (*paraloka*), the existence of the soul as a surviving entity after death and also a conscious spiritual principle, because they say that the all-conscious soul or *Atman* is no other than a property of the physical aggregate of the material body, so it disappears when the aggregate disintegrates. This aggregate is compared to the intoxicating quality that arises by the mingling of certain ingredients. Pleasure, pain, suffering, etc. are the attributes (*gunas*) of the material body, so when the body is influenced by those attributes, the condition of the body also changes.

The Charvakas do not admit the existence of God, the Creator of the universe. They say that world as creation evolved naturally as an organic reaction, as the power of intoxication naturally grows in liquor. They do not admit any supernatural power, and, consequently, they reject special kind of emancipation (*moksha*) other than the death of the physical body. The views of the Charvakas are attractive and easily acceptable to the common people, because their motto is: 'eat, drink, and be merry'. Sankara, Kumarila Bhatta, Jayanta Bhatta, Shalikanath, Prabhachandra, Madhvacharya, Gunaratna, and other writers and commentators have criticised the materialistic view of the Charvakas

As the Charvakas have not admitted causation and its universality, so all necessary connections between cause and effect have been discarded. They say that there is only accidental conjunction of an antecedent and a consequence, and cannot ensure invariable relation or *vyapti*, which is the ground of inference (*anumana*). The Charvakas have denied the authority of the Vedas (*veda-pramanya*) as well as the Vedic injunctions (*vedavidhi*). They say that as the Vedas are vitiated by falsehood, contradiction, and tautology, so they cannot be accepted. Besides, the Vedas and other *Shastras* have been written by the opportunist-seeker Brahmins, and the Brahmins use them in their self-interest, so injunctions are meaningless jargons. The religious rites and Vedic sacrifices are also the inventions of the selfish Brahmins, so they are not helpful for the common people. Any oblation offered in the blazing fire of the sacrifice, or any food offered at the *shraddha* ceremony in the hope that it will satisfy the departed souls, are all meaningless, because there is no existence of the soul after death, and, therefore, the place of the departed ones is also rejected. The sceptic Charvakas say that there is no existence of any consciousness, as it is apprehended only by self-awareness. So the Charvaka philosophy is severely criticized not only by the orthodox systems, but also by the Buddhists, the Jains, the Naiyayikas, the Mimamsakas, and the Vedantists. Swami Abhedananda is of the opinion that the reactionary thoughts of the agnostic or

sceptic Charvakas prove that in ancient time and specially in the Epic period, absolute materialistic thoughts evolved as a reaction of some idealistic movement, and this kind of reactionary movement is necessary for the rectification as well as for the re-enforcement and revival of the society. Swami Vivekananda has also supported this view of reactionary movement. In the modern society, we also find such sceptic and materialistic ideas among the people.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE NYAYA SCHOOL

Gautama is said to have devised the laws and principles of Indian logic for the first time, and his system is called the Nyaya philosophy. Gautama has used the word *anvikshiki* as the *hetuvidya* i.e. the science of reasoning. In the *Ramayana*, the *Mahabharata*, and the *Nitishastra* of Manu, and the *Arthashastra* of Kautilya, the word *anvikshiki* occurs in the sense of epistemological thought and logic. The word *anvikshiki* has also been used as a *darshana*, or philosophy, or *vadavidya*, or art or science of debate. However, Gautama or Gotama may be said to be the founder of a scientific system of reasoning and debate, which he himself has called the *anvikshiki-vidya*. MM. S. C. Vidyabhushana has said that we get two names of Gautama, one is Medhatithi-Gautama (550 B.C.), who was contemporary of Buddha Sakyamuni and the other is Akshapada-Gautama who flourished in the first century A.D., and it is said that Akshapada-Gautama is the founder of the present system of *Nyayadarshana*. There is a difference of opinion regarding the date of Akshapada-Gautama, as some scholars ascribe his date to the first century A.D., and some to 200 B.C., and others to 300 B.C. But it is generally believed that Gautama or Akshapada-Gautama flourished in the first century A.D.

It is a fact that Gautama has expounded both the systems of *Tarkavidya* or science of reasoning and debate and the *Vadavidya* or science of discussion, and thereby he has opened a new vista of intellectual life and insight in the domain of Indian philosophy. He has built an epitome of his *Tarkavidya* with not less than sixteen topics-cum-categories like *pramana*, *prameya*, *samanya*, *prayojana*, *drishtanta*, *siddhanta*, *avayava*, *tarka*, *nirnaya*, *vada*, *jalpa*, *vitanda*, *hetvabhasa*, *chhala*, *jati*, and *nigrahashtana*. It has already been said that Gautama's system of logic is known as the *Nyayashastra* or *Nyayasutras*. Vatsya-

yana calls it the *Nyayavidya*. Jayanta Bhatta designates it as the *Anvikshiki* or *Tarkavidya*. However, the *Nyaya-sutras* "are primarily concerned with epistemology and logic, and secondarily with ontology, psychology, ethics, and theology." Many savants have written commentaries and glossaries upon the *Nyayasutras* of Gautama, and many of them have even differed from Gautama in many respects and have thrown new light upon some topics. The Buddhist and Jaina thinkers have also developed this science of reasoning and debate along with their thoughts on philosophy proper. Gangesha and others have further established a modern school of Nyaya which is known as the *Navya-Nyaya*.

Gautama's real contention of the entire *Tarkashastra* lies in the fact that reasoning (*tarka*) in harmony with perception (*pratyaksha*) and Vedic testimony (*vedavakya* or *aptavakya*) furnishes the knowledge of Reality which leads to *moksha* or liberation. There is a methodology or systematic method in the system of Nyaya, and that methodology consists of enunciation (*uddesha*), definition (*lakshana*), and examination (*pariksha*). A subject is first enunciated, then defined, and finally examined by valid reasoning. Enunciation, division, and definition are the basis of examination which help to prove one's view and to refute rival views about the nature of an object.

The viewpoint of Nyaya philosophy is realistic. It does neither negate the phenomenal reality of anything like the non-dualistic Vedanta, nor does it try to prove that ideas (thoughts or *vijnanas*) are only real, and the outward manifestations or representations are unreal. It admits four means of knowledge, perception, inference, comparison, and testimony (*pratyaksha*, *anumana*, *upamana*, and *shabda*). *Pramana* is the instrument or means by which we gain different kinds of valid knowledge, or it can be said that *pramana* is the collection of conditions, and it is the immediate antecedent of the production of valid knowledge. The self is the knower or *pramata* or *jnata*, and an object to be known is *prameya* or *jneya*, and the means or instrument by which the knower knows an object is *pramana* or *jnana*. The valid knowledge obtained from

*pramana*, is *prama* or *pramiti* which constitutes the reality. *Pramata* and *prameya*—the knower and the object to be known are the common causes of all kinds of valid knowledge. Vatsyayana, Prashastapada, Uddyatakara, Prabha-kara, Vachaspati Mishra, Varadaraja, Udayana, Gangesha, Vishvanatha and others define valid knowledge and invalid knowledge from the standpoints of the Nyaya philosophy and Vaisheshika philosophy in different ways. But all are of the same opinion regarding the real nature of the object and its right apprehension. Some of them exclude recollection (*smriti*) from right apprehension, because they say that recollection is produced by an impression of an object. Gangesha and Vishvanatha define valid knowledge or *prama* as the knowledge of the generic character of an object as abiding in it (*'tadvisheshyatve sati tatprakarakam jnanam prama'*). The definition of valid knowledge, as forwarded by Udayana, is similar to Varadaraja. Regarding perception or an immediate apprehension of an object, Prashastapada has said in his commentary that perception is called *pratyaksha*, because it arises in relation to this or that sense (*aksham prati*). These '*akshas*' or sense-organs are six, namely smell, taste, sight, touch, hearing, and the internal organ (*manas*). But there exist two moments in perception and five predicables including different factors. Prashastapada says that perception or direct cognition of an object is at first bare intuition of unrelated things and then from a contact of mind and self that object is perceived or cognised with its five qualifications: genus, species, substance, quality, and movement. The perception of the Yogis is somewhat different. Dr. H. N. Randle has elaborately discussed this subject in his book, *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*.<sup>1</sup> The Nyaya philosophy has divided perception (*pratyaksha*) into two, determinate (*savikalpa*) and indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*). Determinate perception reveals things as being endowed with all characteristics, qualities, and names, just as we find in all over concrete experience and indeterminate perception that reveal things with their characteristics and

<sup>1</sup> Vide, pp. 97-118.

universals. But at this stage there remains no association of name, so it is more or less indistinct. Again it is a fact that indeterminate perception is regarded as the first stage in the process of perception, and at the second stage it joins the other conditions of perception in producing the determinate perception. Regarding indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpa pratyaksha*) Vachaspati, Sridhara, Gangesha, Vishvanath and others are more or less of the same opinion, because, according to them, indeterminate perception means knowledge or cognition of mere prediction (*guna* or *vishesana*) without any association of the subject or the thing to which the predict refers.

It is true that perception or immediate knowledge originates from the contact of the senses with the object, and that contact is of six kinds: (1) *samyoga*, i.e. contact of the sense with the thing or *dravya*; (2) *samyukta-samavaya*, i.e. contact with the qualities or *gunas*; (3) *samyukta-samaveta-samavaya*, i.e. contact with the qualities in the generic character as universals of those qualities which inhere in the genus in the *samavaya* relation, (4) *samavaya*, (5) *samaveta-samavaya*, and (6) *samyukata-visheshana*, i.e. the qualifying contact that makes possible to perceive negation or *abhava*.

The later Nyaya philosophy admits three other kinds of contact of a transcendental nature, known as *samanyalakshana*, *jnana-lakshana*, and *yogaja*. The transcendental perception is called *alaukika-sannikarsha*, and *yogaja-sannikarsha* can be called *pratibhavana-jnana* or *manasa-pratyaksha*. Vedanta says that this kind of *manasa-pratyaksha* happens in inference (*anumana*) only.

Next to direct perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumana*) is the second means of proof or *pramana*. Inference is a mediate knowledge of an object derived through the knowledge of a mark (*linga*), which is associated with it, or by virtue of the relation of invariable concomitance (*vyapti*) between them, and this depends upon the perception (*pratyaksha*) of a mark and the recollection (*smriti*) or invariable concomitance. The process is like this: "First, there is the perception of a mark (*linga*), reason (*hetu*) or probans (e.g. smoke) in a subject or *paksha* (e.g. a hill).

Secondly, there is the recollection of invariable concomitance of the reason with a predicate probandum (*sadhya*) or inferable object (e.g. fire). Thirdly, there is the inference of the existence of an unperceived object or predicate (e.g. fire) in the subject (*paksha*, e.g. the hill).<sup>2</sup> The Nyaya philosophy says that inference is of two kinds, inference for oneself (*svarthanumana*) and inference for others (*pararthanumana*). The first kind of inference is a psychological one, while the second kind is a demonstrative one convincing others. In the first kind of inference (*svarthanumana*), a man perceives smoke on a hill and guesses that fire may exist there. Then he remembers the invariable concomitance (*vyapti*) of smoke with fire: 'Whatever is smoking, is fiery', and from this he infers that hill has fire, whereas the second inference, *parathanumana*, consists of five members (*avayavas*): (1) The hill is fiery (*pratijna*), (2) because it is smoking (*hetu*); (3) what is smoky, is fiery, for example, a kitchen (*udaharana*); (4) the hill is fiery (*nigamana*). The Naiyayikas admit three kinds of terms in *pararthanumana* e.g. (a) The *paksha* is the subject, in which the *sadhya* or predicate is doubted; (b) The *sadhya* is the object that is inferred in the subject; (c) The *hetu* is the mark or sign (*linga*) which indicates the presence of the inferable object or predicate (*sadhya*). So *paksha*, *sadhya*, and *hetu*, these three correspond to the minor term, the major term, and the middle term. The Naiyayikas further admit five characteristics of *hetu* (reason) and *linga* (mark), and they are: *Pakshadharmatva*, *sapakshasattva*, *vipakshasattva*, *abaddhitavishayatva*, and *asat-pratipakshatva*. They say that these are the five characteristics of a valid reasoning. Some ancient Naiyayikas admit five more members of *pararthanumana* or demonstrative inference and they are: *jijnasa*, *samshaya*, *shakyaprapatti*, *prayojana*, and *samshaya-vyudasa*. Varadaraja and Gangesha reject them as unnecessary.

There are differences of opinion regarding the numbers or kinds of inference. As for example, Gautama admits

<sup>2</sup> Vide, Dr. J. N. Sinha: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 483.



three kinds of inference in his *Nyayasutra*, and they are: *purvavat*, *sheshavat*, and *samanyato drishta*. Uddyotakara rejects the terms or names of the inferences as adopted by Gautama, and names them *anvayi*, *vyatireki*, and *anvaya-vyatireki* for various reasons. Varadaraja admits Uddyotakara's contention. Gangesha makes some changes in those names, and says that they should be, *kevalanvayavi*, *kevala-vyatireki*, and *anvaya-vyatireki*. In fact, Gangesha admits the numbers and names of the inferences as mentioned by Uddyotakara and Varadaraja.

The Naiyayikas informally admit some fallacies or faulty reasons (*hetvabhasa*). Gautama admits five kinds of fallacies and they are, *savyabhichara*, *viruddha*, *prakarana-sama*, *sadhyasama*, and *atitakala* or *badhita*. Regarding the first fallacy, Uddyotakara and others differ from Gautama, as Uddyotakara admits sixteen kinds of *savyabhichara* fallacies. To make it explicit, let us deal with some of these aspects of logic as expounded by Dinnaga Dharmakirti, Bhasarvajna, and Varadaraja, and we think they will help us to understand the system of logic as expounded by Gautama.

The theories of perception and inference have been efficiently dealt with by Acharya Dinnaga, in the *Nyaya-pravesha*, *Hetuchakravritti*, *Almbanapariksha*, *Trikala-pariksha*, etc. Similarly after Shavara Swami (about 550 A.D.) Dharmapala (about 500-635 A.D.) and Acharya Shilahadra (635 A.D.). Acharya Dharmakirti (about 635-650 A.D.) also have elaborated the theories of perception and inference in his *Pramanavartika-karika*, *Uramanavinischaya*, *Nyayavindu*, etc. In Chapter I of the *Nyayavindu*, Dharmakirti like Dinnaga, has explained the theory of perception (*pratyaksha*) as knowledge derived through senses. It has been described as that which is free from preconception (*kalpana*) and devoid of error (*bhranti*). He says that perception is of four kinds: (1) perception by the five senses, (2) perception by the mind, (3) self-consciousness, and (4) knowledge of a contemplative self. Perception becomes *sva-lakshana*, while an object of perception is like itself, and *samanya-lakshana* is possible, while an object of inference is like any one. In Chapter II, he

has dealt with the problem of inference (*anumana*). He says that inference is of two kinds, *svarthanumana* and *pararthanumana*. *Svarthanumana* or inference for one's own self is defined as the knowledge of the inferable derived through the reason, or the middle term bearing its three forms or characteristics, and the *pararthanumana* or inference for the sake of others is defined as the declaration of the three-formed middle term in words, i.e. words with a view to producing a conviction in others.<sup>3</sup>

Dharmakirti has followed the systems of Dinnaga, but yet he has differed from Dinnaga and criticized him on some points of fallacy of the opposition of the middle term to the major term. Regarding the implied contradiction (*ista-vighatakrit-viruddha*) as explained in the *Nyaya-pravesha* by Dinnaga, Dharmakirti differs in his *Nyaya-vindu* and rejects Dinnaga's viewpoint by postulating that this implied second contradiction is included in the first kind. Besides, Dharmakirti also rejects Dinnaga's non-erroneous contradiction (*viruddha-vyabhichari*) on the ground that it does not arise in connection with reference and is not based on the scriptures. Moreover, in opposition to Dinnaga, Dharmakirti says that 'example' is not a part of a syllogism, as it is included in the middle term. As for example, the hill is fiery, because it is smoky like a kitchen. Bha-sarvajna was the first renowned Brahmanic writer. His book, *Nyayasara*, has been quoted by the Jaina sages like Gunaratna (1409 A.D.) and Rajashekhara (1348 A.D.).

Bha-sarvajna has reduced sixteen categories of Gautama into one, which is known as *pramana* and is defined by him as a means of right knowledge, freed from doubt and error. He has said that *pramana* is of three kinds, perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumana*), and verbal testimony (*agama*) and has rejected Gautama's *pramana* of comparison (*unamana*). Perception is the means of direct knowledge which is either contemplative (*yogipratyaksha*) or ordinary (*a-yogi pratyaksha*). Perception is possible when

<sup>3</sup> Cf. MM. Vidyabhushana: *History of Indian Logic*, (1921), pp. 309-315.

there happens an intercourse (*sannikarsha*) of the senses with the objects, and that intercourse is of six kinds. Perception, according to Bha-sarvajna, may be divided into determinate (*savikalpaka*) and indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*), and Gautama admits this division. Regarding inference (*anumana*) Bha-sarvajna says that it is also a means of valid knowledge through inseparable connection (*avinabhava-sambandha*) with another thing which lies beyond the range of the senses. This inseparable connection happens by means of invariable concomitance (*vyapti*).

This invariable concomitance is of two kinds: affirmative (*anvayi*) and negative (*vyatireki*). 'Wherever there is smoke there is fire' is an example of affirmative invariable concomitance (*anvayi-vyapti*), as the smoke, the middle term, is in all cases accompanied by fire, the major term; and 'whenever there is no fire, there is no smoke' is an example of the negative concomitance (*vyatireki-vyapti*), as the absence of fire is in all cases accompanied by the absence of smoke. Besides, inference is of two kinds, inference for one's self (*svathanumana*) and inference for the sake of others (*parathanumana*) and these have been explained before. Here we find that Bha-sarvajna's division and definition of inference do not contradict those of Gautama's and of most of the noted Brahmanic and Buddhist logicians. Bha-sarvajna says that demonstration of inference consists of a syllogism of five parts, a proposition, a reason, and an example, an application, and a conclusion. Among these parts, reason may be exclusively affirmative (*kevalanvayi*) or exclusively negative (*kevala-vyatireki*) or affirmative-negative (*anvaya-vyatireki*). Bha-sarvajna has explained these alternative aspects of reason, along with fallacies of reason (*hetvabhasa*) like *asiddha* (unproved), *viruddha* (contradiction), *anaikantika* (uncertain), *anadhyavasita* or *anupasamhari* (nontried or non-conclusive), *kalatrayapadisto* or *badhita* (mistimed or incompatible), *prakarana-sama* (balancing the controversy) and *viruddha-vyabhichari* (non-erroneous contradiction).

Varadaraja was a great logician after Bha-sarvajna, and in his *Tarkikaraksha*, we find how the system of Nyaya philosophy has absorbed the Vaisheshika categories. MM.

Satish Chandra Vidyabhushana says: "Varadaraja, who deals with all the sixteen categories of Nyaya, includes in the second category, viz. *prameya*, not only the twelve objects of Nyaya, such as *Atman* etc. but also the six categories of the Vaisheshika, such as *dravya* etc. Keshava Mishra, on the other hand, brings the six categories of the Vaisheshika under *artha*, which is one of the twelve objects included in the second Nyaya category, *prameya*."

In the *Tarkikaraksha*, Varadaraja, like Gautama, has mentioned fourteen categories (*padartha*) instead of sixteen, and they are: *pramana*, *prameya*, *pramata*, *samshaya*, *prayojana*, *drishtanta*, *siddhanta*, *avayava*, *tarka*, *niranaya*, *vada*, *jalpa*, *vitanda*, and *hetvabhasa*. Varadaraja admits two means of valid knowledge (*pramana*) which are perception (*pratyaksha*) and inference (*anumana*). He condemns the definition of *pramana* as forwarded by the Buddhist logicians, and has said that we can test the validity of our knowledge only of a thing that exists in the present time and not that which is not non-correspondent with our practical activity. Inference, according to him, is the knowledge of a thing derived through its invariable concomitance (*vyapti*) with other things. He has adopted the syllogism of three parts as has been adopted by the Mimanmsakas and has condemned the syllogism of two parts adopted by the Saugaras or Buddhists.<sup>4</sup>

Gautama has admitted comparison (*upamana*) as the third means of valid knowledge. The knowledge of a hitherto unknown thing by virtue of its similarity (*sadrisya*) to a known thing is comparison. The perception of an unfamiliar object which is not perceived before, contains five factors. But the knowledge of resemblance or similarity involves testimony (*shabda-pramana*) and direct perception (*pratyaksha-pramana*). "The cow in the forest is like a cow in the village" is testimony (*shabda-pramana*) and 'this animal has a similarity (*sadrisya*) with a cow is perception. Now, when a man goes to a forest where a cow-like animal exists and hears from the forester that this cow-

<sup>4</sup> Vide. MM. S. C. Vidyabhushana: *A History of Indian Logic* (1921), pp. 357-377.

like animal (*gavaya*) is the cow, then he comes to know that the wild animal (*gavaya*) is similar to the cow of the village and from the knowledge of this similarity (*sadrisya*) he identifies the wild animal as a cow. Here the perception of similarity aided by the recollection of the forester's statement produces the knowledge of the relation between a name (*vichara*) and an unknown object (*vachya*), and the knowledge of the relation of a name (cow) to an object (animal, cow) is *upamiti*. It should be remembered that comparison entirely depends upon perceived similarity of an unknown object with a well-known object which indicates the relation of an unknown object with a particular name, and so comparison does not depend upon the quantity of similarity, perfect, great, or slight. Gangesha, Vishvanatha, and others are of the same opinion. Uddyotakara and Vachaspati Mishra admit two kinds of comparison, *sadharana-upamana* and *vaidharma-upamana*. Varadaraja admits one more *upamana* which is known as *dharmamatra-upamana*, i.e. comparison based on certain qualities.

The Naiyayikas admit testimony or *shabda* as the fourth *pramana*. Testimony is the right knowledge derived from the utterances of infallible and truthful person (*aptavakya*). The sayings of the seers of Truth and the words of the Vedas can be taken as *aptavakyas* and, therefore, they are considered as *shabda-pramana*. The ancient Naiyayikas divide testimony into two classes, testimony about perceptible objects and testimony of imperceptible objects. But the modern Naiyayikas divide testimony into secular (*laukika*) and scriptural (*vaidika*). Now, there are some controversies regarding verbal expressions, words or sentences which generate sounds and give an idea or ideas of a particular form or forms.

Bha-sarvajna has also explained the nature of verbal testimony in his *Tarkikaraksha*. He says that the verbal testimony is a reliable assertion of knowledge, acquired through indicatory signs. It is of two kinds: (1) according as the assertion refers to matter open to our senses, (2) according as the assertion refers to matter beyond our senses. Bha-sarvajna says that all other means of right knowledge are included in these three above-mentioned means. As

for example, presumption (*arthapatti*), probability (*sambhavana*) are included in the category of inference and rumour (*aitihya*) and muscular movement (*chesta*) are included in verbal testimony, and negation (*abhava*) in any of the three according to circumstances.

The Naiyayikas further admit the existence and utility of the world (*jagat*), causality (*karana*), species (*jati*), and substance (*dravya* or *vastu*). According to *Nyaya* philosophy, there are three kinds of cause—material, non-inherent, and efficient. The causal relation is reciprocal, so the same cause produces the same effect, and *vice-versa*. There is existence of self, and it is a substance which possesses pleasures, pain, desires, volition, etc. The self is an object of mental apprehension (*manasa-pratyaksha*). The self is unique in each individual and so there is an infinite number of selves (*jivatmas* or *jivas*). Like the self, there is existence of God (*Ishvara*) and liberation (*moksha*). God is recognised as the author of the Vedas, moral laws and positive command of God, and they are known as the *categorical imperatives* demanding fulfilment by the human will. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant has also admitted the moral law which is known as 'categorical imperative.'<sup>5</sup> Liberation is no other than the cessation of merit and demerit as well as of pain and rebirth. Body and mind are causes of pain and rebirth, so release or *moksha* is attained by the detachment of the body and the mind from the self. The Shaiva Naiyayikas maintain that release or liberation consists in the experience of eternal happiness. But some Naiyayikas like Vatsyayana and Udayana criticize this kind of liberation, because they say that as eternal happiness is not real, being contradicted by appropriate non-perception, so the assumption of eternal happiness in liberation or *mukti* is irrational. But most of the Naiyavikas are of the opinion that immediate intuition of the higher Self destroys false knowledge, pain, and rebirth and brings *moksha* unto men.

<sup>5</sup> Vide, Prof. Patton: *Categorical Imperative*.

## NYAYA SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC

Indian Logic (the word 'Logic' is not synonymous with the Indian 'Nyaya' and so the term 'Nyaya' is not exactly identical with the English term 'Logic') is developed and has been defined in different ages in different forms and methods. It can be said to be a science which determines or ascertains valid knowledge (*pramana*) either by means of the six senses, or by means of the five members or limits of the syllogism. In almost all the systems of philosophy, science of debate on valid knowledge and its determination have found place, and the Hindus, the Jainas, and the Buddhists have developed this science in a very beautiful way. Roughly three periods can be marked in the development and classification of science of Indian *Nyaya*, ancient (from 650 B.C. to 100 A.D.), mediaeval (upto 1200 A.D.), and modern from 1300 to 1900 A.D. as has been suggested by MM. Satish Chandra Vidyabhushana in the Introduction of his monumental work, *A History of Indian Logic* (1921). MM. Vidyabhushana says that the standard texts for each of these periods were the *Nyayasutras* by Acharya Akshapada Gautama, the *Pramanasamucchaya* by Acharya Dinnaga and the *Tattvachintamani* by Pandit Gangesha Upadhyaya respectively. Many commentaries and many new texts on the *Nyayadarshana* were written with many new and novel methods and interpretations upon those standard works, and they added valuable treasures of thought in the domain of Indian logic. On the standard work of the ancient school of Indian logic, the *Nyayasutra* of Acharya Akshapada Gautama, Vatsyayana, Udyotakara, Vachaspati Mishra, Udayanacharya, Vardhamana, Shrikanta, and others wrote commentaries. On the standard work of the mediaeval school of Indian logic, Dinnaga and his followers Dharmakirti, Devendrabodhi, Shakyabodhi, Ravi Gupta, Jnanendrabodhi, and others wrote many books and commentaries, and on the modern school of of Indian logic, the standard work the *Tattvachintamani* by Pandit Gangesha Upadhyaya, Vardhamana Upadhyaya, Pakshadhara Mishra, Vachaspati Mishra, Raghunath Shiromoni, Mathuranath Shiromoni, Jagadisha

Tarkalankara, Gadadhara Bhattacharya, and others wrote commentaries. The *Brahmana-samuchhaya* is the work of the mediaeval school of logic. Besides, there were many sub-commentaries and glossaries on those three standard works on Indian logic.

All the texts on Indian Logic may be divided into three groups according to three sects, Hindu, Jaina, and Buddhists, as we find that many reputed and talented writers of those three faiths or religions contributed various works on Indian epistemology and logic. Now to give a clear idea of the works on epistemology and logic in different periods by the Hindu or Brahmanic, Jaina, and Buddhist logicians, let us quote MM. S. C. Vidyabhushana, when he says: "Ancient logic was called *anviksiki*, or the science of debate, but with the introduction of syllogism or proper reasoning it came to be called *Nyaya* from the first century A.D. The *Nyayashastra* in its earliest age flourished in Mithila with Gautama, but it attained its high development in Prabhasa with Akshapada. The mediaeval logic from the fourth century A.D. was called *Pramanashastra*, inasmuch as it dealt with *pramana*, the means of valid knowledge, i.e. perception and inference. Ujjaini in Malwa and Valabhi in Gujarat were the seats of activity of Jaina logicians of the *Shvetambara* sect. The *Digambaras* flourished principally in Pataliputra and Dravida (including Karnata) about the eighth century A.D.

## BUDDHIST LOGIC

The Buddhist logicians flourished mainly in the universities of Kanchipura, Nalanda (*vide* Appendix C), Odantapuri, Shridhanyakataka, Kashmira, and Vikramashila (*vide* Appendix E). The Bengal Buddhist Logic attained its highest development during the reigns of the Kings of the Pala dynasty (*vide* Appendix C). While mentioning the studies in Nalanda University Prof. H. D. Sankalia says: "The subject next to Theology was Philosophy which always went together with Logic. Though it was not compulsory, exigencies of those times, when debates and discussions were very frequent, almost made it



compulsory for the students. This science called *Hetu-vidya* in Sanskrit. \*\* \*\* Different schools of thought, Buddhist, Jain, Samkhya and others, had their own systems of Logic. And a student learning at Nalanda had to go through all the systems. For he was expected to defend the Buddhist systems against others. and this he could not do well unless he knew the principles of other systems.

"Hitherto, upto about 400 A.D., Logic was mixed up with Philosophy and Religion. With the advent of Dinnaga in the field, Logic came into prominence. Dinnaga was one of the greatest pandits of Nalanda." Dinnaga belonged to the Idealist school of Asanga and Vasubandhu. I-Tsing wrote that Dharmakirti "made a further improvement in Logic (after Jina or Dinnaga). The 'improvement' referred to by I-Tsing appears to be the complete formulation of the *Trairupa* theory. In his *Nyayabindu*, Dharmakirti said: "*anumanam dvidha svartham parartham cha . . .*". But Prof. Sankalia writes: "But if arguments that were advanced against Dinnaga's claim to be the author of *Trairupa* theory, were to be repeated against Dharmakirti also, it would be difficult to say what 'further improvement' Dharmakirti made in the then existing Logic." Patrakasari severely criticised the *Trairupa* or *Trilakshana* theory. Patrakasari argued that the fallacy of *Anaikantika* will follow if we argue with Dharmakirti that inference is right which is characterised by Identity, Causality, and Non-perception. But this argument of Patrakasari was also criticised by other pandits of that time. However there lies long arguments for and against different theories. And it is a fact that in the University of Nalanda different subjects along with Tantric Buddhism were studied.<sup>6</sup>

The University of Vikramsila was also a famous seat of study of *Hetuvidya* (Logic) and *Shabdavidya* (Grammar) along with other different subjects. Prof. J. N. Samaddar has said: "Next to Tantras, there were studied Grammar, Metaphysics and Logic. The last subject (Logic)

<sup>6</sup> (a) Vide, Prof. H. D. Sankalia: *The University of Nalanda* (1934), pp. 72-85.

(b) Vide, also J. N. Samaddar: *The Glories of Magadha* (1924), p. 1113.

which was studied assiduously and extensively at the Nalanda University was also cultivated (at Vikramsila University), and some of the greatest scholars at Vikramsila distinguished themselves in this subject. The fact that the *Dvara-Pandits* or gate-keepers, were eminent logicians goes to prove that Logic was evidently a popular subject".<sup>7</sup> He further says: "So far there is apparently complete coincidence between this aspect of Hegel's dialectic and Dinnaga's theory." Professor Stcherbatsky has also given five parallel examples by roughly summarizing the mutual positions of Kant, Hegel, and Dinnaga regarding the three faculties of the senses, the understanding, and the reason.<sup>8</sup>

### FOREIGN INFLUENCE ON INDIAN LOGIC

Some scholars headed by MM. Satish Chandra Vidyabhushana and Professor Stcherbatsky are of the opinion that Hindu logic is more or less indebted to Greek Logic. MM. S. C. Vidyabhushana says that of all the nations of the world, the Hindus and the Greeks appear to have developed systems of logic to a large extent independently of each other. The rudimentary stage of Hindu logic can be traced to as early as in the sixth century A.D. and Greek Logic assumed a definite form in the fourth century B.C. "But so far as the five limited syllogisms of Hindu logic are concerned the Hindu logician may have been indebted in some way or other to the Greek". In the Appendix B of his book *A History of Indian Logic* (1921), MM. Vidyabhushana has discussed the influence of Aristotle on the development of the syllogism in Indian logic. He has shown in a comparative manner the syllogisms of Indian logic, i.e. those of Akshapada Gautama, Nagarjuna, Maitreya, Vasubandhu, Dinnaga, Dharmakirti, Uddyotakara, and others are indebted to those of the Greek philosopher, Aristotle. He is of the opinion that migrations of the logical theories of Aristotle from Alexandria to India happened from 175 B.C. to 600 A.D., and "it will appear

<sup>7</sup> Vide, Prof. Samaddar: *The Glories of Magadha* (1924), p. 125.

<sup>8</sup> Vide, *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 482-486.

that Aristotle's works migrated into India during three distinct periods"<sup>9</sup> But this estimation should be carefully examined.

Regarding the Hindu thoughts on epistemology and logic, it can be said that in the *Manusmriti*, the word *anvikshiki*, which means the *atmavidya*, is found. In Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, the word *anvikshiki* has been used to mean a distinct branch of study of *Trayi*, i.e. *Rik*, *Yajus*, and *Sama*.

Gautama has used the word *anvikshiki* as *hetuvidya* or *hetushastra*, i.e. science of reasoning. In the *Ramayana*, and the *Mahabharata*, the word *anvikshiki* has been used in the sense of a science of reasoning. Gautama has used the word *anvikshiki* as *darshana*, or philosophy and *vadavidya*, or the art or science of debate. However, Gautama or Gotama can be said to be the founder of a scientific system of reasoning and debate which he has designated *anvikshiki*.

### NAVYA-NYAYA IN MITHILA AND NAVADVIPA

Three centres of culture of Indian Logic or *Nyaya-shastra* were famous in Bihar, Mithila, and Nadia (now in West Bengal), and the Royal Universities of Vikramshila (about 800-1200 A.D.), Mithila (about 1175-1575 A.D.), and Nadia (about 1575-1920 A.D.) were the cultural centres. MM. Satish Chandra Vidyabhushana says that Mithila was the principal seat of Hindu learning in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries and was the resort of a large number of the students who flocked there from all parts of India to study specially Indian Logic or Nyaya philosophy. Pandit Dinesh Chandra Shastri writes in his *Bangalir Svarasvata-Avadana* (Bengali) that from 1350 to 1550 A.D., Mithila was recognized as a seat of culture of the *Navya-Nyaya*. From the commentaries on the *Navya-Nyaya*, written by Pandit Narahari, Vasudeva Mishra, and Padmanabha, we come to know that upto the sixteenth century, Mithila was a great seat of debate on

<sup>9</sup> Vide, *A History of Indian Logic* (1921), pp.511-512.

Navya-Nyaya, and at the end of the sixteenth century Navadvipa became famous for the culture of Navya-Nyaya, and Haridas Nyayalamkara, Krishnadasa Sarvabhauma, Bhavananda Siddhantavagisha, Mathuranath Tarkavagisha, and Gadhadhara Bhattacharya (Shiromani)—all these erudite scholars (Pandits) maintained the glory of that culture. Some are of the opinion that the University of Nadia or Navadvipa was greatly indebted to the University of Mithila for its culture of Navya-Nyaya. It is also said that Pandit Vasudeva Sarvabhauma studied Navya-Nyaya from Pandit Pakshadhara Mishra in Mithila and after learning by rote the four parts of the *Tattva-Chintamani* and the *Karika* of the *Nyaya-kusumanjali* introduced the culture of Navya-Nyaya for the first time in Navadvipa. But we think that it is a mere current story (*prabada*) and it has no historical foundation. Similarly, this has been said about Pandit Raghunath Bhattacharya (Shiromani). Pandit Dinesh Chandra Shastri says that Raghunath never went to Mithila for his study. But it is a historical fact that from the time of Maharaja Lakshmana Sena (1106-1138 A.D.), Nadia was recognized as the seat of culture of *Smriti*, *Mimamsa*, and *Nyaya*. MM. Vidya-bhushana says that Maharaja Lakshmana Sena raised Nadia to the status of a cultural town, and his Prime Minister, Pandit Halayudha and other court-Pandits like Pashupati, the elder brother of Halayudha, Kavi Dhoyi, Kavi Jayadeva, and others enriched Nadia, i.e. Navadvipa with the culture of various subjects of literature, logic, and philosophy. Afterwards the study of *Navya-Nyaya* was introduced to Varanasi from Navadvipa.

Navya-Nyaya is a unique product of the shining intellect and intuition of the Maithili and Bengali Pandits, and its charming and novel literary constructions and language (*peribhasha*) along with the methods of reasoning and arguments attracted the minds of the scholars of both the East and the West.

Navya-Nyaya flourished perhaps after the time of Udayanacharya (10th century A.D.) and specially at the time of Gangeshopadhaya, who wrote *Tattachintamani*. Pakshadhara Mishra, Raghunath Siromani, Mathuranath

Tarkavagisha, Jagadisha Tarkalankar, Gadadhara Bhattacharya and others paved the way of development of Navya-Nyaya. The dialectics and techniques of Navya-Nyaya are absolutely new and novel. It sharpens the faculty of understanding and intellect for entering into the core of epistemology and knowledge of things or subjects. The Navya-Nyaya techniques of *avacchedaka* and *avachedakatva*, *sambandha*, *prati-yogitvam* or *pratییogita*, *vishayata* and *vishayita*, *prakarata* and *prakarita*, *vishesyasata*, *vishayita*, *kolita*, *sadhyata*, etc. are means for solving the problems of languages and ideas and of knowledge. Dr. D. C. Guha says that 'the super-excellence of the technique of Navya-Nyaya is clearly borne out by the fact that the whole of India spontaneously accepted this technique as the instrument par excellence to give expression to any subtle idea that might have occurred in the mind of the scholar of any branch of Sanskrit study'.

Bengal has contributed a unique treasure in the domain of Indian epistemology. A new school of Nyaya was founded by Gangesha. Gangesha has given a new light on Nyaya by composing his unique book, *Tattvachintamani*. He has efficiently proved his acute philosophical insight and shining intellect especially by his discussions on *Pramanyavada* or *Jnaptivada*, *Vyaptipanchaka*, *Ishvaranumana*, etc. He has mainly dealt with the problems of perception, inference, comparison, and testimony, but his treatment on inference (*anumana*) is excellent and most comprehensive. In the *pratyakshakhanda* of the *Tattvachintamani*, Gangesha has dealt with four sources of true or valid knowledge (*pramanas*). It is found that Gangesha's *pramanyavada* has three subdivisions: "the first deals with the knowledge (*Jnapti*) of truth, the second with the origin (*utpatti*) of truth, and the third with the definition (*lakshana*) of truth."

The word '*pramanya*' means "either the property of being instrumental in bringing about true knowledge (*paramakaranatva*), or simply the truth of a knowledge (*pramata*).” The word '*pramanya*' is used in two senses, *svatah* and *paratah*. Regahunath Shiromani in his *Didhiti* has thrown sufficient light on the *pramanyavada* of

Gangesha and has distinguished the words, *svatah* and *paratah* as *svasmat* (from oneself) and *svakiyat* (from what is one's own). Now regarding these two means of valid knowledge, there are controversies among the schools of Mimamsa, Vedanta, Sankhya, Vaisheshika, etc. Gangesha has raised many questions for and against the revealing nature of the knowledge of truth, and has said that truth of the primary knowledge is apprehended either by itself (*svatah*) or by inference (*anuvyavasaya*), but there are many favourable and unfavourable arguments for those two methods of knowledge. Udayana has also discussed these two means of revealing in his *Nyayakasumanjali*, but Gangesha's formulation differs a little from that of Udayana. In fact, both the theories are correct, or are concerned with actual truth, though their notions of truth somewhat differ. Gangesha says: "On the *paratah* theory, truth is apprehended only after the knowledge is known. On the *svatah* theory, knowledge is apprehended as possessing truth (*paratah pakshe jnata. . . jnanasya grahat*), but there are many arguments against these two means of knowledge of truth.<sup>10</sup>

## FIVE DEFINITIONS OF VYAPTI

In the *Vyaptipanchaka*, Gangesha has forwarded five kinds of definition of *vyapti* in favour of an inferential knowledge. The word *vyapti* means universal relation or invariable concomitance between the middle term and the major term in an inference. (1) The first definition of *vyapti* is non-existence, in the middle term, of objects having a substratum in which the major term does not exist: "*sadhyabhavavadavrittivam*". As for example, 'the hill is fiery, as it has smoke'. (2) The second definition is the negation, in the middle term, of existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, which (the non-existence of the major term) exists in a substratum which is different from the substratum of the major term,

<sup>10</sup> MM. Gangesha: *Tattvachintamani*, *pramanyavada* and Dr. J. N. Mohanti: *Gangesha's Theory of Truth*, 1966.

determining invariable concomitance: "*sadhyavadbhinna-sadhyabhava-vadavrittivam*". (3) The third provisional definition is, an invariable concomitance is the non-existence, with the middle term, of the mutual negation whose counterpositive is the substratum of the major term: "*sadhyavat-pratīyogikamyonya bhavasamana-dhikaranyam*". (4) The fourth definition is formulated according to both Raghunath and Mathuranath. It explains that the invariable concomitance is the existence, in the middle term, of the counterpositiveness of the negation which exists in all the substrata of the non-existence: "*sakala-sadhyabhavavannisthabhava pratīyogitvam*", i.e. when the middle term is negated in all the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, we have *vyapti*. (5) The fifth definition explains that invariable concomitance is the non-existence (in the middle term) as determined by the difference of the substratum of the major term: '*sadhyavadanyavrittivam*', i.e. when the existence pertaining to the objects, which are different from the substratum of the major term, is negated in the middle term. But these five definitions of *vyapti* do not apply to the *kevalanvyayi vyapti*: '*vrittimadatyantabhavapratīyogitvam*' which means that when an absolute negation is possible it has a counter positive-ness, the *kevalanvyayi* is purely affirmative, because there is nothing that is not nameable.<sup>11</sup> Gangesha holds a different view from that of the old school of *Nyaya* and has forwarded new definitions of *vyapti* to get the correct inferential knowledge of truth. He has also dealt with the proofs for the existence of God in *Ishvaranumana* exhaustively and has solved many ontological problems of the nature and definition of a cause, the unreality of causal power of *shakti*, the nature of the self, and its release (*mukti*), the nature of God, etc.

Further *anumana*, *vyapti*, *vyaptigrahopaya*, *tarka*, *upadhi*, *samanya-lakshna-pratīyasatti*, *paramarsha*, etc. are regarded as the means of knowledge according to Gangesha. Gangesha in his work, *Ishvaranumana*, has elaborately dealt

<sup>11</sup> Vide, *The Five Provisional Definitions of Vyapti (vyaptipanchaka)* in Gangesha, by Tara Shankar Bhattacharya.

with the causal argument for the existence of God. He has also discussed the cosmological arguments and refutes anti-theistic arguments. Gangesha says that "one bodiless agent, endued with eternal knowledge, desire, and will to create, is the efficient cause of gross earth etc., as effects, and he is God".<sup>12</sup>

It is to note that the study of *Navya-Nyaya* and its novel terminologies are helpful for studying and clear understanding of the books like *Advaitasiddhi*, of Madhusudan Sarasvati, *Khandankhandakhadya* of Sriharsa, *Nyaya-kusumanjali* of Udayana, etc. Dr. D. C. Guha has written a book explaining the terminologies of the *Navya-Nyaya*, which will help much the students of neo-works on *Nyaya* and Vedanta.

<sup>12</sup> Vide, Dr. J. N. Sinha: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 763.



## CHAPTER IX

### THE VAISHESIKA SCHOOL

The metaphysical system of thought, contributed by Kanada, is known as the *Vaisheshikasutra*. The word *vishesa* is derived from *vishesa* or particularity of the eternal substance. Prashastapada, Shridhara, Udayana, and other savants also contributed a systematic thought on the Vaishe-sika philosophy. Dr. Radhakrishnan says: "The Vaishe-sika is essentially a philosophy of distinctions, since it does not tolerate any attempt at dissipating the independence of selves and objects in a supposed more perfect individuality. Its standpoint is more scientific than speculative, more analytic than synthetic."

Kanada is an upholder of the doctrine of *paratah-pramanya*, as knowledge, according to him, is not valid in itself, so his theory or doctrine is opposed to that of the Mimansakas who admit the self-validity *svatah-pramanya* of knowledge. Kanada says that valid knowledge (*prama* or *vidya*) is that which apprehends an object, as it is not in its real nature. He is of the opinion that validity of knowledge (*prama*) is produced by quality (*guna*) of its causes, whereas invalidity of knowledge (*aprama*) is produced by *dosha* of its causes. So, according to Kanada, qualities and defects of causes of knowledge produce validity and invalidity of knowledge. Or it can be said that *pravritti-samarthya* or successful activity and *pravritti-asamartha* or unsuccessful activity are the causes of validity and invalidity of knowledge. Besides, Kanada says that knowledge is a quality (*guna*) of the self, and it is in the nature of manifestation. Knowledge manifests an object which is either mental or physical. Therefore knowledge is valid (*prama* or *vidya*) or invalid (*aprama* or *avidya*) in its nature. In valid knowledge, an object is apprehended in its real or true nature, whereas, in invalid knowledge, an object is apprehended as different from it. Invalid knowledge is recognised as doubt (*samshaya*), illu-

sion (*viparyaya*), indefinite perception (*anadhyasaya*), and dream (*svapna*). (a) Doubt or an indefinite knowledge (*samshaya*) is apperceived as internal (*antara*) or external (*vahya*). The mind oscillates between *samkalpa* and *vikalpa* and so definite knowledge is not obtained. (b) Illusion (*viparyaya*) is a knowledge of an object which is not real in its nature, so it appears as an error. (c) Indefinite perception (*anadhyavasaya*) is either perceptual or inferential. (d) Dream (*svapna*) is a mental perception of the imbedded or acquired impressions of the mind.

Similarly valid knowledge, according to the Vaishe-shika philosophy, is of four kinds: perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumana*), recollection or remembrance (*smriti*), and intuitive knowledge (*arsha-jnana*). (1) Perception (*pratyaksha*) is either external or internal. It is either determinate (*savikalpa*) or indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*). Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, etc. are internal perception, as they are caused with the conjunction of self and mind. Perception involves three principles: self (*pramata*), knowledge (*pramiti*), and objects (*pramana*). The yogic perception, according to the Vaisheshika philosophy, is subtle, and it originates out of trance or concentrated attention of the mind; (2) Inference (*anumana*) is the knowledge derived from the mark (*linga*), from which the existence of the probandum (*sadhya*) is inferred as its effects, or cause, or conjunct, antagonist, or inherent. Kanada admits *vyapti* or invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum and its necessity for inference. He also mentions three kinds of fallacy of reason (*hetva-bhasas*) which are *aprasiddha*, *asan*, and *samdigdha*. Prashastapada somewhat differs in this respect from Kanada, and says that those fallacies are contradictory, unspoken, and inconclusive reasons. Jayanaravana, Sankaramishra, and Chandrakanta differ from Kanada and Prashastapada in this method of interpretation and in naming the fallacies.<sup>1</sup> (3) Recollection or remembrance (*smriti*) is produced by the interaction of self and mind, and, in this process, self is the

<sup>1</sup> Vide, D: J. N. Sinha: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 290.

inherent cause (*samavayi-karana*) and interaction or conjunction (of self with mind) is the non-inherent (*asamavayi-karana*). But subconscious impression or *saṃskāra* is the efficient cause (*nimitta-karana*) of remembrance. (4) Intuitive knowledge (*arsha-jñāna*) is the inner knowledge of the Yogis, and is an immediate knowledge of the real nature of the objects, present, past, and future.

The Vaiśeṣika philosophy admits six kinds of category (*padārtha*). The word *padārtha* signifies that the categories are objects of valid knowledge—‘*pramitiṣṭhayaḥ padārtha abhidheya*’. The categories (*padārtha*) are: substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), generality (*sāmānya*), particularly (*viśeṣa*), and inherence (*samavaya*). Like other Naiyayikas, Kanada does not admit negation or non-existence (*abhava*) as a category. Prāśastapāda has supported this view of Kanada. Udayana also supports Kanada and says that as the nature of negation (*abhava*) is indicated by the categories of existence (*bhava*), so it cannot be admitted as an extra category.

A substance (*dravya*) is an entity, possessing qualities (*guṇa*) and action (*karma*). It is the material cause of an effect. But it should be remembered that at the first moment of production a substance is devoid of qualities, and so for its genus (*dravyatva*) the next moment is required. Substance are both eternal and non-eternal. The non-eternal substance are composed of parts. Combination of parts means production, and separation of parts means destruction, so combination and separation are the determining factors of manifestation. Substances that are incorporeal and subtle, are eternal, such as space, time, ether, and soul. Mind is atomic and eternal. The Buddhist Vijñānavādin Santarakṣita refutes this category of Kanada, because permanent things, according to him, cannot exist being momentary (*kṣhanika*). Kanada does not believe in the impermanence of things or substances, so he refutes the *vijñānavāda* of the Buddhists and admits the existence of permanent substance. (2) Quality (*guṇa*) is an entity that inheres in a substance. Prāśastapāda defines quality (*guṇa*) as an entity which is related to the genus of the quality (*guṇatva*) abiding in a substance and

is devoid of quality (*guna*) and action (*karma*). (3) Action or motion (*karma*) also inheres in substance which is devoid of a quality (4) Community (*jati*) and particularity (*vishesa*) are inter-related ones, and so they depend on intellect to indicate or prove their existence (*satta*). Prashastapada treats community (*jati*) as the cause of assimilation. Shridhara calls it the cause of knowledge of common character, possessed of many individuals. Udayana designates it as an essential and common character of many individuals.<sup>2</sup> (5) Particularity (*vishesa*) is the ultimate distinguishing feature of an eternal substance. It depends on intellect for its existence. (6) Inherence (*samavaya*) is the relation between material cause and its effect. Prasastapada and Shridhara describe it as the relation between two inseparable entities which are of the nature of a substance and its contents. Inherence (*samavaya*) is eternal (*ananta*), though its relations are transient (*anitya*). It is neither a temporal relation nor is produced by any cause. Shivaditya treats it as an eternal relation. It is not perceptible and, therefore, it has no distinct perceptual cognition. He says that it is different from identity and conjunction. It is also different or separate from substance, quality, action, community, and particularity.

Kanada admits the existence of the elements of earth, water, fire, and air. According to him, earth and water are alike eternal and non-eternal which is not accepted by the Vedantists who consider those qualities as contradictory. Kanada says that the atoms of earth and water are eternal, whereas the composite earthen and watery material made up of different atoms of earth and water are non-eternal. Such are the conditions of fire and air. The Vaishesika philosophy also admits the reality of ether, time, space, souls, and mind. Kanada also admits the reality of different qualities like colour, taste, smell, touch, number (*sankhya*), magnitude (*parimana*), distinction (*prithaktva*), conjunction (*samyoga*), disjunction (*vibhaga*), remoteness (*paratva*), gravity (*gurutva*), fluidity (*dravatva*), faculty (*samskara*), etc. It also recognises the utility of *dharma*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Dr. Sinha: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 321-322.

Kanada explains *dharmā* as what enables man to acquire prosperity (*abhyudaya*) and highest good (*nishshreyasa*). He says that by the knowledge of the real characteristics of substance (*dravya*), quality (*guna*), genus (*samavaya*), particularity (*vishesa*), and inherence (*samavaya*) man gets the highest good or freedom (*nishshreyasa*) or *mukti*.

Now, it can be asked as to how the Vaisheshika philosophy explains the process of creation of the cosmos? Though Kanada has not directly or clearly referred to God or the supreme soul in the *Vaisheshikasutra*, yet he has mentioned the authority of the Vedas, which are the utterances of him or then: '*tadvachanad amnayaya pramanyam*'. Here the word 'him' may refer to God, the supreme soul, and the word 'them' may refer to the seers of the supernatural perception of the sages (*arsha-jnana*), and it is probable that in the *sutra*: "*tadvachanad*" etc. he has meant the seers, and not God. But later authors like Udayana, Sridhara, Vyoashiva, Padmanabha Mishra, Sankara Mishra, and others are in favour of the existence of God, because they say that God being the all-powerful supreme soul, he can produce or destroy everything of the universe.

The Vaisheshika philosophy has admitted the existence of the atoms (*anu* or *paramanu*) which are infra-sensible and minute. The Naiyayikas and the Vaisheshikas say: "*paramanuh paramasukshma adiravayavah svayam niravayavah atindriyo nitya iti naiyayika-vaisheshikanam siddhantah*." That is, atoms themselves are formless infra-sensible, and permanent, and they are very small like the floating minute particles of matter that are seen in the rays of the sun, and the Naiyayikas say that the size of the atoms are  $\frac{1}{16}$ th part of those minute particles of matter: '*jala-surya-marichistham sukshman yad drishyate rajah, tasya shashthatamo bhagah paramanuh sa vachyate*.' So the atoms (*paramanu*) can be defined as: "*murtatve sati niravayavatvam-paramanutvam*." Now, though the atoms (*anu* or *paramanu*) are formless (*niravayava*), yet the triads (*trasarenu*) are possessed of form (*savayavah*). Now, what do we mean by the word, '*trasarenu*' or triads? A *trasarenu* or triad is a combination of three dvads (*tribhirdvyanukairekam tryanukamarabhyate*), and similarly a *dyanuka* or

dyad is the combination of two *anus* or atoms (*dyabhyam-paramanubhyamekam dvyanukamarabhyate*). Now the triads are the remotest visible molecules. But like *anus* or atoms and *dyanus* (dyads), the triads (*trasarenu*) also lack gross magnitude (*mahatva*). But the Vaishesika philosophy states that when a compound of gross magnitude is produced, enjoyment of the embodied self becomes possible. Prashastapada is of the opinion that motion tending to the formation of gross bodies starts at first in aerial atoms and gross air is produced through air-dyads and air-triads. Thereafter through these respective course of dyads and triads the air, the water, the earth and the fire—these four elements are produced in due order in gross forms. God then desires to create and His willing brings this cosmos into existence. Motion tending to creative conjunction is produced in all through God's will (*Ishvarechha*) so that dyads and triads may be created out of them, resulting in the creation of the cosmos. Udayana says that during cosmic rest four types of atoms (air, water, earth, and fire) lie inactive being insentient, and so the world order (*srishti*) demands the need of an intelligent guidance for setting a motion of conjunction in the atoms, and this conscious and intelligent principle through whose guidance atoms are made active is God.<sup>3</sup>

But it should be remembered that Kanada himself has not mentioned the name of God or God's will directly and so many authors starting from Shridhara have opposed the act of creation of the world-process by God's will. Again some are of the opinion that destiny (*adrishta*) of the individual proves the existence of God or God's will at the time of creation. Prabhakara admits this view, but the Naiyayikas oppose it.

<sup>3</sup> Vide, Dr. Gopika Mohon Bhattacharyya: *Studies in Nyaya-Vaishesika Theism*, 1961, pp. 125-129.

## CHAPTER X

### THE SANKHYA SCHOOL

The Sankhya system advocates the ontological dualism of the main principles, *Purusha* and *Prakriti*. The word 'Sankhya' is derived from the word '*sankhya*', which means discriminative and right knowledge as well as number. Right knowledge means the knowledge of the separation of the *Purusha* from the *Prakriti*. The word Sankhya has been used both in the *Gita* and the *Mahabharata* in the sense of philosophy or right knowledge—'*samyak khyati* or *jana*.' The Sankhya and the Yoga form a complete system of thought, whereas the Sankhya is theoretical, and the Yoga is practical, so one is said to be complementary to or the counterpart of the other. But as the Sankhya denies the existence of God and Yoga admits the existence and importance of God, the intelligent Principle, they have been divided into two systems of thought. The Sankhya maintains the dualism between the *Purusha* and the *Prakriti*.

It is believed that Muni Kapila was the author of two treatises, *Sankhyapravachanasutra* and *Tattvasamasa*, but there is no genuine proof in this regard. Kapila was neither agnostic nor sceptic, because he did not believe in God, the Creator, and yet he believed in the validity of the Veda. However, the *Sankhyakarika* of Ishvarakrishna is available. It is said that Kapila's *Pravachanasutra* was lost, and Ishvarakrishna wrote the *Karika*, based upon the *Pravachanasutra*. But this view is not accepted by many scholars. Ishvarakrishna was the disciple of Panchasikha, who is believed to be a disciple of Asuri, and Asuri was a direct disciple of Kapila.

It is also a fact that the authorship of the original *Sankhyasutra* is unanimously ascribed to Kapila, and the *Svetasvatara-Upanishad* says: "*sankhyasya vakta Kapilah*" etc. (vide V. 2). Vijñānabhikṣu says that many works on the Sankhya theory were lost in course of time and only a portion of them has come down to us. The *Bhagavata*

admits this fact. In the last verse of Ishvarakrishna's *Sankhyakarika*, it has been said that all the subjects and problems of the Sankhya doctrine have been treated in seventy verses, and those subjects were included in the entire *Shastitantra*. But most of the scholars do not admit the genuineness of the *Shastitantra* and they say that the last verse of the *Sankhyakarika* is interpolated. Vachaspati Mishra is also of the same opinion.

"In the case of the Sankhya-sutra", says Dr. Rajendralal Mitra, "though it is usually attributed to Kapila, one of the mind-born sons of Brahma, we find it refers to an 'ancient teacher' and to 'venerable preceptors'. Sanandana and Panchashikha are cited by name. Kapila is then said to have taught his doctrine to Asuri, who is described as a brother and a pupil of the teacher. Asuri imparts it to Panchashikha, who is, according to the Pauranikas, again a brother. This Panchashikha, again, according to the Mahabharata, lived in the time of Janaka, and taught the Sankhya doctrine to the king of Mithila. Had Kapila written the Sutra, he would never have described in it his younger brother and pupil as an Acharya." Prof. Colebrooke is of the opinion that the text of the Sankhya philosophy, from which the sect of Buddha seems to have borrowed its doctrines, is not the work of Kapila himself, though regularly ascribed to him; but it purports to be composed by Ishvarakrishna, and he is stated to have received the doctrine mediately from Kapila, through successive teachers, after its publication by Panchashikha who had been himself instructed by Asuri, the pupil of Kapila. Prof. Cowell has supported this view of Prof. Colebrooke.

However, it is found that the Sankhya thoughts are very ancient. In the *Ramayana*, *Mahabharata*, *Hari-vamsha*, and many *Puranas*, the Sankhya doctrines have been discussed and mentioned. It is quite right that the *Sankhyapravachanasutra* was written in the fourteenth century A.D., but the *Sankhyakarika* which is ascribed to Ishvarakrishna, was written probably in the second century A.D.

<sup>1</sup> Vide, 'Preface' to the *Yoga Aphorisms of Patanjali* (Calcutta, 1883), pp. XIX-XX.



Sankara has also discussed the Sankhya doctrine in the commentary on the *Brahmasutra*, and has refuted them in his commentaries on the *Tarkapada* (or *Yuktipada*), which forms the second chapter of the *Brahmasutra* of Vadarayana Vyasa. Sankara has also refuted the doctrines of Nyaya, Vaishesika, Mimamsa, and the Buddhist philosophy. Sankara appeared in the eighth century A.D. Therefore the Sankhya doctrine was prevalent long before the advent of Sankara.

Dr. Radhakrishnan says that the *Sankhya-pravachana-sutra*, attributed to Kapila, has six chapters, of which the first three are devoted to an exposition of the Sankhya principles, the fourth gives some illustrative stories, the fifth refutes vital views, and the sixth winds up with a recapitulation. The *Pravachanasutra* deals with the theories and principles of causation, *Prakriti*, *gunas* or qualities, evolution, space and time, *Purusha*, *jiva*, *buddhi* or intellect, different factors and sources of knowledge, validity and invalidity of knowledge, error, three kinds of pain: *bandha* or bondage, *moksha* or liberation, the means of liberation, future life, etc. From the metaphysical standpoint, it can be said that the Sankhya philosophy advocates *satkaryavada*, which means the effect pre-exists in the cause. Vedanta also maintains this theory of *satkaryavada* in a different way. We find that the Sankhya philosophy holds that the effect (*karya*) and the cause (*karana*) are equally real, but Advaita Vedanta does not admit it, as it maintains that the effect is an unreal appearance (*vivarta*) of the real cause, and so, says Vedanta, the Sankhya advocates *parinamavada*, whereas Advaita Vedanta upholds *vivartavada*, both of which are different forms of *satkaryavada*.

It has already been said that the Sankhya philosophy admits the theory of *satkaryavada*, though some philosophers accuse the Sankhya by calling it the upholder of the *parinamavada*. The Sankhya forwards five arguments in favour of the doctrine of *satkaryavada*: (1) If the effect does not pre-exist in the cause, it will be reduced to non-entity or void like the castle in the air; (2) The effect is only a manifestation of its material cause, because it is invariably connected with the *upadhana*; (3) The effect, before its manifesta-

tion, is implicit in its material cause; (4) The effect, before its manifestation, is potentially contained in its material cause, and manifestation is only an actualization of the potential; and (5) The effect is the essence of its material cause and as such identical with it. The effect, cloth, is contained in its cause, the thread.<sup>2</sup> In fact, the doctrine of *satkarya* expounds that production is evolution of the effect which already exists in the cause.

The Sankhya philosophy holds that matter is itself dead and inert (*jada*), and when it is infused with the Spirit, it becomes dynamic and begins to work. It says that a thing does not come out of nothingness or void, as everything comes out of something. According to the Sankhya, destruction of the phenomenal world means the world of appearance goes back to its causal state. There are four prime principles, *Purusha*, *Prakriti*, *Vikriti*, and *Prakriti-Vikriti*, but intelligent *Purusha* transcends the principles of *Prakriti-Vikriti*. Twenty five elements (*pancha-vimshati tattvas*) are the inherent categories of evolution of the world. The Sankhya does not admit the existence as well as utility and importance of God, the Creator, as it says: '*ishvarasiddhe*'. It does not believe in God because it says that as *Purusha* and *Prakriti*, being conjoined together, create the world-order. It has been said that *Prakriti* is inert and inactive, but when she contaminates or comes in contact with the all-intelligent and self-shining *Purusha*, she is energised and dynamic and then she creates the world order with the help of the *Purusha*.

The *Prakriti* of the Sankhya is in itself independent (*svatantra*) of the *Purusha*, but when the *gunas* are disturbed and break the equilibrium of the *gunas* then *Prakriti* comes in contact with the *Purusha*, because the Sankhya says that the *Prakriti* without the help of the *Purusha*, is blind, and similarly the *Purusha* without the *Prakriti*, is lame for creating the world-process (*pangcandhavat*). If the *Prakriti* and the *Purusha* remain separate from each other, there happens no evolution. So contact is necessary between

<sup>2</sup> Vide, Dr. Chandradhar Sharma: *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy* (Indian edition), p. 152.

them for enjoyment (*bhoga*) as well as for the evolution of the categories and the world-process. The world-process also proves the existence of both the *Prakriti* and the *Purusha*. The Sankhya philosophy has advanced some proofs in favour of the existence of the *Prakriti* and the *Purusha*. (a) Five proofs for the existence of the *Prakriti* are: (1) All things are limited, dependent, conditional and finite. Logically we have to proceed from the finite to infinite, from the limited to the unlimited, but it is true that the finite and the limited cannot be the cause of the world-process, but the *Prakriti*, which is infinite and unlimited, is the cause for source of this process; (2) All worldly things possess certain common characteristics by which they are capable of producing pleasure and pain, and there must be a common source, composed of three *gunas*, and that is the *Prakriti* which causes the evolution of the worldly things; (3) All effects arise from the activity of the potent causes, and that cause is the *Prakriti*; (4) The effect is the explicit state, whereas the cause is the implicit state of the world-process. The effects, therefore, point to the world-cause, the *Prakriti*, and (5) The unity of the world-process points to a single cause, and this world-cause is the *Prakriti*.

Similarly the Sankhya forwards five proofs in favour of the existence of the *Purusha*, which contaminates the *Prakriti* during enjoyment and evolution, and those five proofs are: (1) Evolution of the world-process is purposive. The *Prakriti* with three *gunas* evolve themselves to serve the purpose of the *Purusha*, who is all-intelligence and witness; (2) All objects are composed of three *gunas*, and, therefore, they presuppose the existence of the *Purusha*, who is, in himself, beyond all *gunas*; (3) All knowledge necessarily presupposes the existence of the self or *Purusha*, who is the ground of all knowledge; (4) As the non-intelligent *Prakriti* is insentient in herself, she cannot experience her products, so she needs some intelligent something or someone other than her, and that extra-principle is the *Purusha*; and (5) The desire for freedom and emancipation from the sufferings as well as from the bondage of the world implies the existence of a person who is required,

and that person is the *Purusha*. This proof is religious or mystical.<sup>3</sup>

The Sankhya says that evolution of the world-process is meant for serving the purpose of the *Purusha*, and the *Prakriti*, along with her *gunas*, mind, intellect, ego, and subtle body, is constantly serving the *Purusha* for his enjoyment, and emancipation happens when the *Purusha* comes to know the fact of his contamination with the *Prakriti*.

It has already been said that the stuff of the *Prakriti* is constituted out of three *gunas*. But the *Prakriti* in herself is in the state of equilibrium (*samyavastha*), and when she comes in contact with the *Purusha*, that state is disturbed (*gunakshobha*), and then evolution of the world-process begins. And it has been said before that the Sankhya does not believe in God, the Creator, because it says that as the contamination of the *Prakriti* with the *Purusha* causes the act of evolution, so no other extra-principle does not require to be admitted for evolution or creation. But Patanjali does not accept this view of Kapila.

Now, the Sankhya says that the qualities and disturbance of them and their balance are the instrumental cause of evolution of the world-process. According to the system of Sankhya both the qualities (*gunas*) and the souls (*Purushas*) are the ultimate constituents and are eternal, but while the souls are changeless and self-intelligent ones, the qualities are regarded as changing or dynamic and inert. The qualities and the souls ceaselessly undergo changes, but changes take place in these ultimate constituents in two ways, which are known as *svarupa-parinama* and *virupa-parinama*. *Svarupa-parinama* takes place in the state of equilibrium of the three *gunas* when they exert equal influences without creating any form of commotion. "In this stage *sattva* changes into *sattva*, *rajas* into *rajas* and *tamas* into *tamas*. This state of equilibrium is absolutely indeterminate, undifferentiated, and indefinite and is called *Prakriti*. *Virupa-parinama* means

<sup>3</sup> Vide, Dr. Chandradhar Sharma: *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy* (Indian edition, 1964), pp. 153, 156.

the process of forming unequal aggregation of the *gunas* through their mutual interaction and interdependence. Hence, when *virupa-parinama* takes place, the *gunas* begin to manifest their various characteristics and the phenomenal production comes into being."<sup>4</sup> But Vyasa, Vachaspati Mishra, and some other commentators differ from this kind of evolution as advanced by the Sankhya.

Some of the scholars try to prove the existence of God in the pre-classical Sankhya. They say that the pre-classical Sankhya was theistic in all stages of its growth, and they believe that the classical Sankhya has lost much ground by dropping God from its fold.<sup>5</sup> To this Dr. Anima Sengupta has rightly suggested that this kind of statement or belief is open to *criticism*. She says that just as the Brahman of Advaita Vedanta is supposed to be related to (causal) *maya* from the beginningless past, in the same manner, there is *anadi sristyopoyogi* (eternal possibility for evolution) relation between *Purusha* and *Prakriti* is beginningless and it is this *vivekagraha* which is the real creative force of *Prakriti*. The mere relation between the two all-pervading principles is not the real motivating force behind creation. Since *vivekagraha* or non-discrimination is beginningless, creation (evolution) is also beginningless. Judged from this point of view, there should be no difficulty in understading the emergence of the world from Nature even in the absence of God."<sup>6</sup> She further says. "According to Sankhya, *Purusha* and *Prakriti*, being all-pervading, are always related. *Prakriti* which is the cause of the world, is a *Prakriti* permeated with consciousness (*chetanavishista*). So long as there is *vivekagraha* or non-discrimination, there is no distinction between *Purusha* and *Prakriti*. Hence there is no separation between the conscious principle and the unconscious principle. *Chetana-vishista Prakriti* is a mixed category in which *aviveka* is working as a creative force. Therefore, there can be teleo-

<sup>4</sup> *The Evolution of the Sankhya School of Thoughts*, p. 20.

<sup>5</sup> Vide, Dr. K. B. Ramakrishna Rao: *Theism of Pre-classical Sankhya* (University of Mysore).

<sup>6</sup> Vide, Prabuddha Bharata (75th Anniversary Number, July 1970), p. 365.

logical evolution from such a *Prakriti*”,<sup>7</sup> and so it is useless to admit an extra-principle like God.

The theory of evolution, as advanced by the Sankhya, is more scientific and logical, and this theory has also been adopted by Vedanta and other philosophies. It is an undeniable fact that the nucleus of the theory of evolution is found in the Vedas and the *Upanishads*. The *Taittiriya-Upanishad* has dealt with the theory of evolution in a very beautiful way. It says: “*tasmad va etasmatatmana akasah sanibhutah/ akasadvayuh/ vayoragnih/ agnerapah/adbhyuh prithivi/ prithivya osadhayah/ osadhebhyo annam/ annat purusha*” (II.1.1.). That is ‘from that Brahman, which is the Self, was produced space (or ether); from space (or ether) emerged air. From air was born fire; from fire was created water; from water sprang up earth, from earth were born the herbs, from the herbs was produced food, and from food was born man. That man, such as he is, is a product of the essence of foods.’ But, the theory of evolution as explained by the Sankhya is more systematic, rational, and scientific.<sup>8</sup>

*Mahat* is the first product of the process of evolution of the *Prakriti*, so the *Prakriti* is the first cause of the evolution of *Virkriti*, or it can be said that the *Prakriti* is transformed into *mahat* or *buddhi* or the cosmic intellect. *Mahat* is transformed into the eleven sense-organs (*indriya*) and the five *tanmatras* or subtle essences of sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell. Then the five subtle essences are transformed into five gross elements: ether, air, fire or light, water, and earth. These are twenty-four principles (*chaturvimshati-tattva*) and the *Purusha* is the twentyfifth *tattva*. Vijnana-bhiksu follows the system of thought of Kapila, but he has given different account of the theory of evolution, as, according to him, the *Prakriti* is modified into *mahat*, *mahat* into *ahamkara*, *ahamkara* into eleven sense-organs and five subtle *tanmatras* (essences), and the five subtle *tanmatras* into five gross elements. Now, *ahamkara* in its *sattvika* aspect evolves into *mana*, *ahamkara* in its *rajas* aspect

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> This *Mahat* of the Sankhya is different from *Avyakta* or *Avyakrita* of Advaita Vedanta.

evolves into ten sense-organs, the five organs of knowledge and five organs of sections (*pancha-jnanendriya* and *pancha-karmendriya*), and *ahamkara* in its *tamas* aspect evolves into five *tanmatras*.

The Sankhya recognizes three kinds of valid knowledge: perception, inference, and verbal or scriptural testimony. Perception (*pratyaksha*), according to Sankhya, is a cognition or mode of *buddhi* that assumes the form of an object. Ishvarakrishna, Vachaspati Mishra and others differ from this definition to some extent. Ishvarakrishna defines perception as a determinate knowledge, or a cognition of an object due to its intercourse (*samyoga* or *sannikarsha*), and indeterminate perception is a simple apprehension of an object free from all association of name, class, and the like which are remembered owing to revival of disposition by similarity and other conditions. This indeterminate perception may be called a presentative-representative process, as it involves the double functions of perception (*pratyaksha*) and recollection (*smriti*). Vijnanabhikshu, Aniruddha, Vachaspati and Ishvarakrishna differ from one another in respect to perception (*pratyaksha*). Vachaspati admits the process of perception of the sense-organs, with internal and external.

Vijnanabhikshu holds that both determinate and indeterminate perceptions are given by only the external sense-organs. Aniruddha defines both the perceptions, direct and immediate, as indeterminate in a relation perception. Ishvarakrishna is of the same opinion with Aniruddha, but he differs a little in respect of the presentative process.

Regarding inference (*anumana*), there are also differences of opinion among Kapila, Ishvarakrishna and Vachaspati. The Sankhya defines inference "as the knowledge of the major term derived from the knowledge of invariable concomitance between it and the middle term. Invariable concomitance is the uniform accompaniment of the middle term and the major term. It is pervasion (*vyapti*).<sup>9</sup> In this process of inferential knowledge, Kapila

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Dr. J. N. Sinha: *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 64.

recognizes five members of syllogism: statement (*pratiṇa*), reason (*hetu*), example (*drishta*), application (*upanaya*), and conclusion (*nigamana*) like those of the Nyaya philosophy. Ishvarakrishna defines inference as the knowledge which precedes the knowledge of sign (*linga*), and the signate (*lingin*) or of the *vyāpya* and *vyāpaka*, whereas Vachaspati Mishra defines inference as knowledge, based on knowledge of the relations of the middle, major and minor terms to one another. Aniruddha admits six kinds of inference and they are: *anvayin* (by agreement), *vyatireken* (by difference), *anvayai-vyatireken* (by agreement and difference), *purvavat* (from cause to effect), *shesha-vat* (from effect to cause) and *samanyatodrishta* (based on non-causal concomitance).

It has already been said that verbal or scriptural testimony is another source of valid knowledge. The Sankhya "does not recognize secular testimony as an independent source of valid knowledge, since it depends on the perception and inference, and so the self-revealed Vedas are the source of valid knowledge. He (Kapila) has discarded comparison (*upamana*), presumption (*arthapati*), inclusion (*sambhya*), tradition (*aitihya*), and negation (*abhava*), as they are included either in the process of perception, or in that of inference".

The Sankhya says that desire or enquiry, or asking for freedom (*moksha*), is an essential thing, and this desire or enquiry for *moksha* (*moksha-jijnasa*) arises from the three kinds of suffering, *adhyatmika*, *adhibhautika*, and *adhidaivika* ('*dukhkhatrayabhighatat jijnasa*'). The suffering caused by men, beasts, birds, and other animals (*adhibhautika*), and suffering caused by supernatural agencies, planets, ghosts, and other elements (*adhidaivika*) are the causes of bondage, so cessation of this three-fold pain brings liberation or freedom (*parama-purushartha*), known as *moksha*. This freedom is an inherent nature of the *Purusha*, but yet he falls in the chain of bondage coming in contact with the *Prakriti* and its *Vikriti*. This *moksha* is somewhat akin to self-attained *mukti* (*brahmajnana*) of non-dualistic Vedanta, though it differs in the fact that in the Vedantic *mukti*, there is no absorption in anything,



but there remains only the Brahman-knowledge as one without the second; whereas in the Sankhyan *mukti*, the liberated soul remains as one of the *prakritilina-Purushas*, as liberated souls or *Purushas* are many. This *vahu-Purushavada* has been refuted by Vedanta.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Swami Abhedananda has beautifully discussed the theories of Sankhya in his lecture, *Cosmic Evolution and Its Purpose* (published by the Ramakrishna Vedanta Math, Calcutta).

## CHAPTER XI

### THE YOGA SCHOOL

The Yoga system of Patanjali is known as the theistic Sankhya, as it believes in the existence of God and admits the validity of the Vedas. In fact, Patanjali has filled a gap which was created by the Sankhya philosophy. Such also happened in the West in case of Immanuel Kant who roused David Hume from his dogmatic slumber. Hume did not believe in a definite principle of God, and said that the ideas and thoughts of the human beings are loose, and are flying like the clouds in the sky, and there is no link between one idea with the other or others. Kant appeared and removed the sceptic idea of Hume. He discovered a linking principle and established a faith in an existence of God, known as the most intelligent Being of 'Greater Intelligence' who used to play the role of binding together one idea with the others.

It should be remembered that *Patanjala-darshana* is not only a system of philosophy, but is also a system of psychology, as it deals with the mind and its various functions. The Sankhya system has admitted a motive force behind the assimilation and dissimilation (*raga* and *biraga*) of the *gunas* in case of evolution of the world and its creatures. But that motive force was indefinite and vague, whereas Patanjali clearly asserts a definite cause and purpose as well as a definite motive force which is called by him as God, who is the most intelligent dynamic force and also the Being. Patanjali has, therefore, refuted the blind tendency of insentient and independent (*svatantra*) *Prakriti* regarding the act of evolution of the universe. Patanjali's objection to Kapila's argument is that how can the insentient (*jada*) *Prakriti* remove her own barriers and lend herself to the evolutionary process? So an intelligent Being must be accepted for helping the course of evolution in such a way that this system of order and harmony may be obtained or maintained, and Patanjali has called

this intelligent Being, God (*'purusha-visheshah Ishvarah*). God as a self-complete *Purusha* transcends the contingencies of nescience, all adjuncts, all passions, and all kinds of earthly attraction and enjoyment. The Yoga system of Patanjali admits also the reality and importance of twenty-five principles (*panchavimsha tattvas*) of the Sankhya, together with the principle of God, in total twenty-six principles. It also accepts the metaphysics of the Sankhya while explaining liberation (*mukti*) and bondage (*bandhan*). Patanjali lays stress on the practice of Yoga as a means of discriminative knowledge (*vivekakhyati*) which is a special feature of the Yoga system, and says that for the non-discrimination (*aviveka*) between *Purusha* and *Prakriti* bondage (*bandhan*) of the soul happens, and upon their proper discrimination (*viveka*) liberation (*mukti* or *moksha*) comes to a man, i.e. to *Purusha*.

Now it can be asked as to what is the metaphysical problem of the Yoga school? The system of Yoga lays stress upon substance (*dharmin*) and mode (*dharma*), because until and unless their real characteristics are known, we will not be able to determine whether they are different from each other or are identical. While explaining substance and mode, as advanced by the Yoga school, Vyasa says in his commentary that substance (*dravya*) is an aggregate of generic and specific qualities (*samanya-visheshasamudaya*), and the modes are the abiding qualities of the substance, and the peculiarity of these two things is that quality changes, but substance does not change. To this, the Buddhists have some objections, so they hold that there is no permanent substance apart from the modes, and as there is nothing permanent and everything is subject to change so both substance and mode are changing and are, therefore, momentary. But the Yoga school does not accept this view of the Buddhists. It holds that there is identity in difference (*bhedabheda*) between substance and its modes or qualities, because a substance is partly different from and partly identical with its modes. Regarding it, Vyasa says that *dharmin* and *dharma* are relative terms, and quality is merely the nature of the substance, and there happen changes in the substance which are manifested by

the qualities: '*dharmīnasechabhinnabhinnarūpataya sarvatanagamabe*'. As for example, a jar is produced from earth, so earth (*nṛitika*) is a *dharmīn* in relation to its product, the jar, and the jar is a *dharma*, and, therefore, there remains a close relation between a *dharmīn* and a *dharma*—a substance and a quality.

Again, an object is a complex product of atoms, i.e. it is a whole composed of parts and a whole in relation to its parts. The Yoga school admits that *avayavin* and *avayava* are partly identical and partly different. Vyasa says in his commentary that the whole produces a single cognition and so it is a single entity, and, therefore, the whole is not a mere aggregate of parts, as the Buddhists hold, but the whole, in reality, exists in each part in its entirety, and it is the common quality (*sadharana-dharma*) of its constituent subtle parts<sup>1</sup>

However, the Yoga school advocates the theory of *satkāryavāda* or *parīnamavāda*, and it holds that evolution is a manifestation (*avīrbhava*), and destruction is envelopment (*tīrobhava*), and there is no evolution of a non-existent thing, i.e. a non-existent thing is not evolved. It also holds that the causal power in the form of an unmanifested condition is turned into an effect, and *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* are the ultimate material causes of all effects. Merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) are their effects (i.e. the effects of the *gunas*), and they are the modifications (effects or *vrīttis*) of the mind (*chitta*), which is also an effect or evolution of the *gunas*, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. The effects are the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*), and God is the efficient cause (*nīmitta-kāraṇa*). God disturbs the state of equilibrium (*samīyavastha*) of the *gunas*, and so the world-process starts. In the *Śvetāshvatara Upanishad*, it has been said,

अस्मिन् हंसो भ्राम्यते ब्रह्मचक्रे  
पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारम्भ मत्वा \* \* (1.6).

<sup>1</sup> Cf. D. J. N. Sinha: *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 107-108.

In the commentary, Sankara has raised the question as to why a being thinks himself separate from the Brahman. There he has pointed out: 'मनो मूलं कारणं यस्याः संसारसरितस्ताम् ।'

मनोविजिम्भृतं सर्वं यत्किञ्चित् सचराचरम् ।' The *Yogavashista-Ramayana* also says: 'मनोहि जगतां कर्ता' i.e. the mind is the cause of the world-manifestation. Sankara has also admitted it by saying: 'चराचरं भाति मनोबिलासम्' i.e. the world-appearance is seen due to the manifestations or modifications of the *chitta* or mind. Patanjali has said that if we wish to get rid of the worldly bondage, we will have to control (*nirodha*) or restrain the mind, and controlling or restraining the mind means the transformation of the mind, or to bring the scattered mind into its simplest form. In the second aphorism, Patanjali has said: 'योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः,' i.e. 'Yoga means to restrain the modifications of the mind'. Yoga means *samadhi* i.e. when the modifications of the mind calm down, the mind is concentrated and is one-pointed, and that state of one-pointedness leads to *kaivalya*. Now, "one-pointed (*ekagra*) is that kind of mind in which true knowledge of the nature of reality is brought before the mind, and thereby the afflictions due to nescience or false knowledge are attenuated and the mind thus becomes favourable for attaining the *nirodha* or restrained state. All these come under the *samprajnata samadhi*."<sup>2</sup>

Now, "ordinarily our minds", writes Dr. S. N. Dasgupta, "are engaged only in perception, inference, etc.—all those are mental states which we all naturally possess. These ordinary mental states are full of *rajas* and *tamas*. When the process of our ordinary mental states is arrested, the mind flows with an abundance of *sattva* in the *samprajnata-samadhi*, lastly when even the *samprajnata* state is arrested, all possible states become arrested thereby."<sup>3</sup> So it is true that the state of arrest of the mind does not mean 'absence of all things' or *abhava*, but then the mind shines at that time as pure consciousness after-rectification or transformation. After the definition of Yoga or *samadhi* (1.2), Patan-

<sup>2</sup> Vide, Dr. S. N. Dasgupta: 'The Study of Patanjali' (Calcutta University, 1920), p. 98.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, p. 98.

jali has said about the real status of the Seer or *Atman* in the *asamprajnata* state of *samadhi*. He has said, तदा द्रष्टुः स्वरूपे ह्यवस्थानम् ॥१॥३ 'In the *asamprajnata-samadhi*, the all-intelligence *Purusha* or *Atman* shines in his own independent form.' In fact, the pure consciousness (*chit* or *chit-sukti*) is the real nature of the *Purusha* or *Atman*. It shines as all-consciousness, having no other object other than it. All modifications of the mind are then silenced being transformed into pure consciousness. Vyasa calls it '*svarupa-pratistha*.' The first three aphorisms are the cream or essence of the entire *Yogadarshana* of Patanjali.

Now, what is a *vritti*? In the glossary it has been said: 'विषयसम्बन्धाच्चित्तस्य या परिणतिः सा वृत्तिः', i.e. when *chitta* or mind comes in contact with an object, it covers the object and appears as the object, and this change or changed form of the mind is known as *vritti* or modification. Or it can be said that *vritti* or modifications are created out of the *samskaras* or impressions of the mind: 'संस्कारा वृत्तिभिः क्रियन्ते, संस्कारैश्च वृत्तयः एव वृत्तिसंस्कारचक्रमनिशभा बर्तन्ते' i.e. 'there is a circulation from *vrittis* to *samskaras* and from them again to the *vrittis*'. Dr. S. D. Dasgupta puts it beautifully: "Another important fact which must be taken note of is the relation of the actual states of the mind called the *vrittis* with the latest states called *samskaras*—the potency. When a particular mental state passes away into another it is not altogether lost, but is preserved in the mind in a latent form as *samskaras*, which always are trying to manifest themselves in the actual form. The *vrittis* or actual states thus are at once generating the *samskaras*, and they also are always tending to manifest themselves and actually generating similar *vrittis* or actual states". The Yogi knows that attachment or *raga* to sensual enjoyments is temporary, so they turn their attachment of the mind to the permanent reality which is the *Atman*. They adopt the practice of Yoga or *samadhi* and restrain i.e. calm down the onrush of the mind to get into the kingdom of permanent calmness or *samadhi*. Vyasa has further said: 'तासां निरोधः ब्रह्मकारणं लब्धः योगः' i.e. *nirodha* means the mind loses its separate existence in the ocean of cause, the *Atman*.

Patanjali has said that the mind is constituted out of

three elements of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, and it is manifested in five different levels of mental life, which are known as *kshipta* (restless), *mughdha* (stupid), *vikshipta* (distracted), *ekagra* (concentrated), and *niruddha* (completely restrained or controlled). The state of *ekagra* or concentration, he says, is the state of calmness and peace. The *niruddha* state of the mind is like the state of *asamprajnatasamadhi* i.e. complete rest of the mind and its simultaneous transformation into pure consciousness and calmness. The practice of *astanga-yoga-marga* i.e. eight steps of yogic practices is the means for communion with the absolute principle, and this communion is known as the yogic *moksha*. To make it more explicit, Patanjali says that before attaining to different kinds of *samadhi* or absorptive contemplation, one should practise *abhyasa* (steadfast method of practice) and *vairagya* (detachment). He says: "*abhyasa-vairagya-bhyan tannirodah*" i.e. the mind should entirely be controlled by the methods of steadfast practice and detachment. We have discussed before that the word '*nirodha*' means suppression or control of the mind, and the Yoga system of Patanjali admits the method of suppression (*nirodha*) of the mind, which means that the mind should be reduced into its simplest form. But the Advaita Vedantists do not admit this process of suppression of the mind, they believe that by the practice of spiritual discipline and detachment, the mind can be transformed into its own nature, which is no other than the pure intelligence (*suddha-chaitanya*) Swami Abhedananda says that the word *nirodha* generally connotes the idea of killing, but 'you cannot kill the mind, you can only reduce the mind into its simplest form, you can only transform the mind into pure intelligence.' Sri Aurobindo also holds the same view. So suppression of the mind, according to Yoga psychology, suggests the idea of transformation.

In the *Bhagavad-Gita*, Sri Krishna has also advised us to adopt the methods of *abhyasa* and *vairagya*: '*abhyasena tu kaunteya vairaguena cha grihyate*'. The Yoga psychology states like the *Katha-Upanishad* that the natural tendency of the mind (*manas*) is to go outwards ('*paranchi khani*') and the method of spiritual disciplines brings that

flow of mind, inwards. In fact, the stream of mind flows in two directions: it flows for good with discriminative knowledge and detachment and it flows for evil with attachment. The Yoga psychology teaches the method of complete suspension of the flow of mind.

We find that the first aphorism begins with: “अथ योगानुशासनम्” In the commentary, Vyasa says: योगः समाधिः । स च चित्तस्य धर्मः ।\*\* चित्त शब्देन अन्तःकरणं बुद्धिसुपलक्षयति । न हि कूटस्थनिर्गतचित्तिशक्तिविरिणामिनी ज्ञानधर्मः । भवितुर्महति ।’ That is, ‘*samadhi* is the natural state of the *chitta* or mind. We have already discussed that Yoga means *samadhi* in the *Patanjala-darshana*, whereas in Vedanta, it means self-knowledge or knowledge of the Brahman. *Chitta* is not the permanent consciousness, but it is a part of another manifestation of the internal organ, *antahkarana*. We have seen before that the root *Yuj*, from which the word Yoga is derived, means ‘to join’ and ‘to meditate’. Now, what is the true significance of the verb ‘to join’? ‘To join’ means to commune the individual soul with the universal Soul, i.e. the *Jivatman* with the *Paramatman*, or the *jiva* with the Brahman. In truth, we have forgotten our real heritage, so we erroneously think that the individual soul (*jiva*) is different from the universal Soul (Brahman). The practice of Yoga helps to restore that forgotten consciousness of identity or non-difference. Similarly, when the root word *yuj* of Yoga suggests the idea of verb to meditate, it means to attentively think or meditate upon the idea or knowledge of identity of *jiva* and Brahman.

Dr. S. N. Dasgupta has elaborately discussed it in his book, *Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought*.<sup>4</sup> He has said that the word Yoga occurs in the Rigveda in various senses, such as *yoking* or harnessing, achieving the unachieved, connection and the like. “The word *yuga* in the sense of yoke is used in many places in the Rigveda and the Brahmanas, and this word with its derivative *yujya* (carrier of the yoga, the animal) is quite familiar to use in the later Sanskrit literature. This represents a very old word of Aryan stock which can be traced

<sup>4</sup> Published by the Calcutta University in 1930.



in such words as the German *joch*, Anglo-Saxon *geoc*, *iuc*, *ioc*, Latin *iugum*. The word 'yoga' however became gradually rarer and rarer in its original meaning, as it began more often to be used in the sense of yoking the senses."<sup>5</sup> The word Yoga occurred also in different *Upanishads* like *Chhandogya*, *Brihadaranyaka*, *Taittiriya*, and there we find that the word Yoga has been used in the sense of *tapah* or austerity and meditative abstractions productive of mighty achievements. *Tapas* and *brahmacharya* are highly praised in the Atharveda (XI.5.1) and also in the *Taittiriya-Upanishad* (III.10.11.3), where it is found that Rishi Bharadvaj had practised *brahmacharya* or religious austerities during three lives or incarnations. So Dr. S. N. Dasgupta has said: "It is probable that the root *yujir* in the sense of connection as given in Panini's list of roots is a root-form derived later from the noun form 'yoga' (*yoking*), or that 'Yoga' also was originally formed from *yujir yoge*, but as Yoga had taken a technical meaning in Panini's time, he made a confusion and invented a new fanciful root *yuja* in the sense of concentration. In Panini, we find that the word *yoga* had already attained its technical meaning, for he distinguishes between the root *yuj* in the sense of concentration (*samadhi*) and *yujir* in the sense of joining or connecting." Further he says: "The fact that here is no verbal use of the root *yuj* in the sense of concentration (vide *Mahabhasya* III.2.87) goes a great way to show that the root in *yuj samadhan*', was only an imaginary analysis of a root-form which had no use as a verb and was only found in the noun and adjective forms of *yuga*, *yugya*, *yoga*, and *yogin*."<sup>6</sup>

Many scholars have admitted that *Yoga* means 'to join' and also 'to meditate'. Dr. Rajendralala Mitra has accepted both the meaning of *Yoga* 'to join' and 'to meditate'. In the 'Preface' of the book, *Yoga Aphorism of Patanjali* (published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1883), he has written: "The work (*Patanjaladarshana*) opens with a definition of the term *Yoga*. It is derived from the

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

root *yuj*,<sup>7</sup> which means both 'to join and 'to meditate'. Therefore, while explaining the root meaning of Yoga as meditation, he has said that meditation as a means to commune with the Divinity was known long before the date of the Sankhya philosophy of Kapila. "In the Rig-veda, the Gayatri enjoins the meditation of the divine light which vivifies the solar luminary as the most sacred act of devotion, and that meditation occurs in endless forms in the rituals of all subsequent acts and systems. The meditation is called *dhyana*, the word used in the Gayatri being the verb *dhimahi* 'may we meditate'."<sup>8</sup> But *dhyana* is not accomplished without the help of *dharana* or concentration or steadfastness. The abstraction necessarily implies some amount of asceticism and austerity, which is known in the Vedas *tapas*, and *tapasya* originated from the word *tapas*. And it has been discussed before that from *tapas* or *tapasya* came the idea of *brahmacharya* or austerity, and this austerity is essential in the practice of Yoga, and so when Patanjali has prescribed eight kinds of disciplines (*astanga-yoga*), he has mentioned the names of *yama*, *niyama*, *asana*, etc.

As regards Yoga, says Dr. R. L. Mitra, the doctrine is described to be as old as Brahma, and the text-book to be the work of Patanjali, who, says the commentator, compiled the rules in the form of an institute for the use of intelligent people anxious to study them'. However, Vachaspati Mishra and Vijnana Bhikshu, the two great commentators on the *Vyasa-bhasyam*, agree in holding that Patanjali was not the founder of the Yoga, but rather its editor. We know that Gautama Buddha himself practised yoga under the Bodhi tree in the bank of Niranjana. He observed a severe penance of practising Yoga and attained *bodhi* or *Nirvana*. In the *Yoga-Upanishads* as *Shandilya*, *Yogatattva*, *Dhyanavindu*, *Hamsa*, *Amritananda*, *Varaha*, *Mandala-Brahmana*, *Nadavindu* and *Yogakundali* etc., we find that Yoga practices had undergone various changes in different schools. In the *Yogatattva-Upanishad*, we find four kinds

<sup>7</sup> But we have discussed before that Dr. S. N. Dasgupta has objected to this root *yuj*.

<sup>8</sup> Vide, 'Preface' to *Yoga Aphorism of Patanjali* (Calcutta, 1883), p. XII.

of Yoga as *mantrayoga*, *layayoga*, *hathayoga* and *rajayoga*. Besides, in the *Gita*, we find Yogas as *rajayoga*, *jnanayoga*, *bhaktiyoga* and *karmayoga*, which have been acknowledged by Sri Ramakrishna Paramahansa and his disciples, Swamis Vivekananda, Abedananda, and others.

Patanjali recognizes three kinds of valid knowledge (*pramana*), perception, inference, and testimony (*pratyaksha*, *anumana*, and *shabda*). Patanjali defines perception as a mental state or mode that apprehends a real object, possessing generic and specific qualities. Vachaspati Mishra makes this definition of Patanjali more explicit. Vachaspati Mishra says that perception, according to Yoga philosophy, is a valid knowledge which apprehends a real object, and does not mistake one for another like a delusive apprehension. Besides, perception apprehends an external object directly, and the form of cognition derived from the perception, 'corresponds to the external object, because *buddhi* or intellect goes out to it and is modified into its form.' And perception apprehends both generality and particularity characterising an object.

Patanjali has prescribed eight kinds of disciplines, namely, restraint of mind and body (*yama*), cultivation of good habits (*niyama*), systematic postures of sitting (*asana*), restraint or control of breath (*pranayama*), withdrawal of the senses from the undesired objects (*pratyahara*), holding up of the mind on desired object or concentration (*dharana*), and mind's absorption in the object of concentration (*samadhi*). Patanjali, like the author of the *Yogavashishtha*, says that mind is the cause of world-creation as well as of all kinds of bondage.

The Yoga psychology of Patanjali also defines different kinds of *samadhi* or complete absorption in the higher consciousness. The highest kind of *samadhi* is divided into two, *samprajnata* and *asamprajnata*. The *samprajnata samadhi* is of six kinds, *savitarka*, *nirvitarka*, *savichara*, *nirvichara*, *anadanugata*, and *asmitanugata*. The commentator Vyasa sums up all kinds of *samprajnata-samadhi* into three classes, *grahya-samadhi* or concentration on external objects, gross and subtle, *grahna-samadhi* or concentration on the sense-

organs, and *grahritri-samadhi* or concentration on the self. Vachaspati Mishra and Vijnana Bhikshu both differ somewhat from Patanjali and Vyasa.

Here it should be remembered that *savichara*, *nirvichara*, *saivitarka* and *nirvitarka samadhis* are called *sabija-samadhi*, because these states of absorptive concentration contain suppressed seeds (*bijas*) of modification which cause bondage. Only the superconscious absorption or *asamprajnata-samadhi* is known as *nirbija-samadhi*, because it is an objectless and nescienceless state, which removes the seeds of *rasana* and dispells the darkness of *avidya* or nescience. The *asamprajnata* state of absorption is really the *niralambana* (objectless) *samadhi*, according to Yoga, where complete suspension or transformation of the modes of mind is possible. Patanjali holds that the disembodied (*videha*) souls as well as the persons whose minds are merged into the *Prakriti* for want of *avidya*, attain to *asamprajnata-samadhi*, and they are released for ever and ever.

Now, what is the proof for the existence of God? Patanjali says that the law of continuity proves God's existence. Vyasa says that the law of continuity to power (*sakti*) and lordship (*aishvarya*) are the proof for existence of God. There are, we know, different degrees of power and lordship, and God is the highest embodiment of power, and has unsurpassed lordship. The Yoga school admits the authority of the Vedas or *Shruti*. God, according to Patanjali, is a particular Divine Self (*Purusha-Vishesha Ishvara*), and this Self transcends all the phenomenal actions and their results as well as all afflictions and troubles. Patanjali has refuted the theory of the manifold emancipated souls or *Vahu-Purushas*, and says that God is the one highest Principle, and when men prepare their minds to receive the divine enlightenment of that Principle after following the eight-fold path of the *Yoga-sadhana* like *yama*, *niyama*, *asana*, *pranayama*, *dhyana*, etc. God confers upon them the everlasting blessing of *moksha* and then they attain Godconsciousness or superconsciousness by entering into *nirvikalpa-samadhi*. The Yoga school believes that repeated practice of devotion removes obstacles (*kashaya*) like diseases, laziness of mind and body, doubt, desire for

psychic powers (*vibhuti*), etc. The grace (*kripa*) of God is also recognized in the Yoga school. It has been said that when a *sadhaka* enters into blissful state of *samadhi*, he cuts asunder the knots of bondage by religious practice backed by the grace of God.

The Yoga school of Patanjali has introduced *Om* or *Pranava* as a medium of concentration upon God, or for appreciating the indeterminate (*nirguna*) Brahman. Patanjali says "*tasya vachakah pranavah*", i.e. 'the *Pranava* (*OM*) is the conveyer or revealer (*vachaka*) of God, or of the indeterminate Brahman'. *Pranava* is the foundation of the theory of *Sphota* (*sphotavada*), because, in the *Mahabhashya*, Patanjali<sup>9</sup> has expounded the *Shabda-Brahmavada*, and the *Sphota* is the representation of the indefinable causal sound, the substratum or receptacle of all sounds in the universe. In fact, Patanjali of the Yoga school has made easy the Yoga *sadhana* for the *sadhakas* after introducing into his system an universal symbol (*pratika*) like *Om* or *Pranava*. The *Om* or *Pranava* is the norm or matrix of all kinds of sounds, as the symbol (*pratika*) conveys the real idea of God, or the indeterminate Brahman, and thus the *sadhakas* attain to Divine communion or realization by means of *samadhi*. We have explained that Patanjali has laid stress upon the habit of continuous practice of Yoga which means steadfastness (*abhyasa*) and detachment (*vairagya*).

<sup>9</sup> Most scholars are of the opinion that Patanjali of the Yoga system (*Patanjaladarshana*) and Patanjali of the *Mahabhashya* (of the Paniniya grammar) are different persons.

## CHAPTER XII

### THE JAINA SCHOOL

It is said that Rishabha was the founder of Jainism. Vardhamana was the last Tirthankara, and the Jaina scriptures were really founded on his writings. The philosophical works of the Jainas were first written in Prakrit, and they were then translated into Sanskrit. Vardhamana was known as Jina, the spiritual conquerer, or Mahavira, the Great Hero. We know that he was the real founder of Jainism, but he reformed the creed of Parshvanatha who lived 250 years before him. Vardhamana was credited to establish the organized order of the Jainas.

Jainism is mainly divided into two sects, Shvetambara and Digambara. The Shvetambaras use the white dress, while the Digambaras are nude. These two sects differ only in their customs, religious faiths, and spiritual practices, but their ultimate aim is to attain *moksha* or salvation. The Shvetambaras consider the *Tattvarthadhigamasutra* as their canonical work. This *Sutra* was written by Umasvami in 135-219 A.D. The Digambaras also regard this as the authentic work, as it contains all the fundamental principles of Jainism. Besides this *Sutra*, there are many original works and commentaries of the Jainas.

Like the Sankhya philosophy, the Jaina philosophy does not admit the existence of God as the Creator. It believes in dualism of spirit and matter—*jiva* and *ajiva*, which can be compared with dualism of *Purusha* and *Prakriti* of the Sankhya philosophy. From the original works of the Jainas we find that the Jaina philosophy has adopted in its system seven substances like *jiva*, *ajiva*, *ashrava*, *samvara*, *nirjara*, *bandha*, and *moksha*. Jainism is atheistic in its faith and recognizes the existence of infinite souls like earth-souls, water-souls, air-souls, fire-souls, plant-souls, animal-souls, human-souls, etc. The Jainas believe that the permanent substance alone is true and all other things being changing, are delusion of the

senses. The sense-qualities are temporal and changeable, so the Jaina philosophy believes in the doctrine of relative pluralism (*anekantavada*). It also admits the doctrine of judgments (*syadvada*) as well as the doctrine of seventold predictions (*saptabhanginaya*). The Jaina logic states: "Judgments are true in some sense and false in another", and it is known as the doctrine of judgments (*syadvada*).<sup>1</sup> According to *syadvada*, all affirmations are indefinite in some sense. This doctrine holds that all objects are multi-form (*anekanta*), and from their many-sided nature it follows that all judgments are relative or conditional. That is, the judgments are true under certain conditions, but are false under certain other conditions, so no judgment is absolutely true or false for the Jainas. This doctrine of relative pluralism is called the doctrine of relative judgments.

It has been said that the Jaina epistemology admits the doctrine of *saptabhanginaya*. The sevenfold judgments of the *saptabhanginaya* is that there "are seven different ways of making judgments about a substance or an attribute as follows: (1) perhaps S is (*syat asti*), (2) perhaps S is not (*syat nasti*), (3) perhaps S is and is not (*syat asti nasti*), (4) perhaps S is describable (*syat asti vyaktavyam*), (5) perhaps S is and is indescribable (*syat asti avyaktavyam*), (6) perhaps S is not and is indescribable (*syat nasti avyaktavyam*), and (7) perhaps S is, is not, and is indescribable (*syat asti nasti avyaktam*). Sankara and Ramanuja have criticized the *saptabhanginaya*, because, according to them, contradictory attributes like existence and non-existence, hotness and coldness, cannot exist at the same time. But the Jaina epistemology states that a real thing is not a pure identity, devoid of all differences, because a real thing is complex in nature. The thing is real, because it is a unity-in-difference, and it comprehends and reconciles

<sup>1</sup> For detailed knowledge of the *syadvada* vide (a) *Syadvadamanjari* by Millisena edited by A. B. Dhruva, (Poona 1933); (b) *Syadvadamuktavati* by Yasasvatsagar, and edited by A. Upadhaya, (Bombay, 1969); (c) Vide also *Tattvarthadhigama-sutra* with *Bhasya* by Umasvami, and edited by K. Chandra Siddhantasastri (Bombay, 1932) and (d) *Tattvarthasutram* by Umasvami, and edited by A. S. Sastri (Mysore).

differences in itself. The contention of the Jaina epistemology is that the contradictory things can co-exist in the same thing in different parts. Now to clarify the doctrine of the sevenfold judgments (*saptabhanginaya*), it can be said: "The first is an affirmative judgment (*vidhi*). The second is a negative judgment (*nishedha*). The third is an affirmative judgment and a negative judgment in succession. The fourth is simultaneous affirmative judgment and negative judgment. The fifth is an affirmative judgment and negative judgment. The sixth is a negative judgment, combined with simultaneous affirmative judgment and negative judgment. The seventh is successive affirmative judgment and negative judgment, combined with simultaneous affirmative and negative judgment."<sup>2</sup>

*Anekantavada* holds that a real thing consists of an infinite number of qualities (*guna*) and modes (*anantadharatmaka*), and it is apprehended by valid knowledge (Cf. *Sadadarshana-samuchchaya*). The successive modes are the modifications. All objects of knowledge are manifold (*anekanta*). A substance is no other than an aggregate of atoms, and it exists as an aggregate of atoms, not in the sense of *atma*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *desha*, and *kala*. The world is, therefore, a system of inter-relations, and this can be said to be the doctrine of relative pluralism or *anekantavada*. This doctrine naturally leads to the doctrine of *nayas* which is known as a peculiar feature of the Jaina epistemology. Though *pramana* and *naya* are regarded as different methods of knowing the reality, yet they enrich our knowledge of real things in this world of experience. The Jaina epistemology states that a *pramana* is the valid knowledge of the multiform (*anekanta*) object, and *naya* is also a valid knowledge of one part, aspect, quality, or mode, of a multiform object (*anekadharmapratipatti*). Therefore, *naya* is a part of *pramana*, and *naya* is also a partial valid knowledge of the whole.

Jainas divide *nayas* into two, *dravyanaya* and *pariya-*

<sup>2</sup> Vide, Dr. J. N. Sinha: *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 206-207.



*yanaya*. *Dravyanaya* considers a thing as a *dravya* or substance, in which infinite qualities and modes are unified, and *paryayanaya* considers a thing as conglomeration of qualities and modes, and ignores its substantial aspect. *Dravyanayas* are divided again into three: *naigamanaya*, *samgrahanaya*, and *vyavaharanaya*. *Paryayanayas* are again divided into four: *rijustra*, *sabda*, *samabhirudha*, and *evambhuta*. These are further divided into different kinds."

Regarding epistemology and logic, the Jaina philosophy admits two kinds of valid knowledge, immediate knowledge (*pratyaksha*) and mediate knowledge (*paroksha*). The immediate knowledge or perception (*pratyaksha*) is a distinct knowledge. It is of two kinds, empirical and transcendental. Empirical knowledge is immediate, practical, and uncontradicted, whereas transcendental knowledge depends on 'mere proximity of the self', and it does not depend on any sense-organ and condition. Umasvami describes five kinds of sense-organ, and they are organ of smell, organ of vision, organ of touch, organ of taste, and organ of hearing. The sense-organs are of two kinds, physical and psychical. The Jaina epistemology does not admit indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpa-pratyaksha*), and it states that determinate perception or cognition is also a valid knowledge.

The sense-perception has further four stages, and they are *avagraha*, *iha*, *avaya*, and *dharma*. *Avagraha* is the first impression of an object, and it is of two kinds, *vyanjana* and *artha*. The first one is an implicit or unmanifested (*avyakta*) apprehension of an object, whereas the second one is an explicit or manifested (*vyakta*) apprehension of an object. *Iha* is an enquiry into knowledge of particular features. *Avaya* is a right determination of an object "which is the cause of its recollection (*smriti*) in future". Transcendental perception depends entirely upon the self alone, and it is either incomplete (*vikala*) or complete (*sakala*). These are further divided into different kinds. Mediate (*paroksha*) knowledge or perception is indistinct. It is of five kinds, and they are *smriti*, *pratyabhijnana*,

*tarka*, *anumana*, and *agama*. *Tarka* or deduction is a knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyapti*). *Vyapti* is of two kinds, *anvaya-vyapti* and *vyatireka-vyapti*. Like the Hindu Naiyayikas, the Jaina logicians have dealt elaborately upon the theory of induction or inference (*anumana*). *Agama* is a knowledge of objects derived from the genuine words of reliable (*apta*) persons. It is also of two kinds, *laukika* (*sadharana*) and *lokottara* (*asadharana*).

The Jaina philosophy admits the existence of the soul (*Atman*), and it says that soul is not derived from matter, but is an immaterial substance. It transmigrates from one body to another. *Karma* being a kind of subtle matter, enters into the soul and causes its bondage. The Jaina system of thought does not admit the existence of God, the Creator, as it believes that the world-process is self-existent and eternal. The soul possesses different qualities, and the qualities of divinity (*devatva*) and purity (*pavitrata*) are inherent in the human soul. The soul cannot avoid the net of *karma*, but when the veil of *karma* is removed, the soul shines forth in its innate glory and attains bliss and eternal happiness.

The Jaina philosophy admits four kinds of *karma*, and they are *ayus-karma*, *nama-karma*, *gotra-karma*, and *antaraya-karma*. The infra-atomic particles of matter are known as *dravya-karmas*. The *dravya-karmas* flow into the soul and stick to it. *Karma* is a kind of subtle matter and is connected with the material body through some subtle mediums. Now good and bad *karmas* bring good and bad results, for which men are happy or unhappy. The state of liberation (*mukti*) is no other than avoidance of pain and sorrow, and after *mukti* come infinite knowledge (*ananta-jnana*) and infinite perception (*ananta-darshana*). From the epistemological standpoint, liberation is the attainment of valid knowledge which is of the nature of transcendental knowledge. But to attain this transcendental knowledge, the soul must pass through fourteen stages of evolution. The Jainas observe complete moral disciplines for attaining the passionless tranquil state of liberation (*mukti*).

## THE JAINA LOGIC

It is said that the Jaina school of logic, i.e. the mediaeval school of Indian logic covered the period of nearly eight hundred years, from 400 A.D. to 1200 A.D. The matter as well as method of the Jaina school of logic differ in many respects from both the Brahmanic or Hindu logic and the Buddhist logic. The Jaina school of logic is concerned with only one category which is known as *pramana* or the means of valid knowledge. *Prameya* or the object of knowledge is not recognized by the Jaina school, because it states that as *prameya* is concerned with the problems of birth, death, soul, etc., so they are useless in the works of logic. Inference (*anumana*) as a means of valid knowledge has been treated elaborately by the Jaina logicians.

We find in the history that Indrabhuti Gautama, one of the first and foremost disciples of Tirthankara Mahavira or Vardhamana and the leader of the Jaina assembly, collected the teachings of his Master and presented them as the canonical scripture. MM. Vidyabhushana is of the opinion that both Indrabhuti Gautama and Shudharma Svami were the compilers of the Jaina canonical scriptures. These scriptures were written in *Ardha-magadhi* or Prakrit. They were divided into fortyfive *siddhantas* or *agamas*, and were classified as eleven *angas* and twelve *upangas*. Some say that the *angas* were twelve in number and they were called the *drishtivada* or the presented views, and they were written in Sanskrit. The *drishtivada* consisted of five parts and its first part dealt with the system of logic.

Generally fortyfive Prakrit scriptures of the Jainas are found. Among them the *Bhagavatisutra*, the *Sthanangasutra*, the *Prajnapanasutra*, etc. have dealt with the method of comprehending things from particular viewpoints which are called *naya*. The *Bhagavatisutra* and the *Sthanangasutra* are known as the *angas*, and the *Prajnapanasutra* as an *upanga*. These *Sutras* have given a complete classification of valid knowledge which is called *pramana* or *jnana*, or *hetu*. In the *Sthanangasutra*, the word *hetu* has been used both in the sense of reason and synonym for *pramana*,

which has been stated as *pratyaksha*, *anumana*, *upamana*, and *agama*. Here we find that when *hetu* is identical with *pramana*, it appears similar in nature with the *pramana* or valid knowledge, as expounded by Akshapada Gautama in his *Nyayasutras*. But in the *Sthanangasutra*, *hetu* has been used in the sense of *anumana* or inference which has been classified into four types.

In the Jaina scripture, the *Sutra-kritanga*, we find the mention of the Prakrit works, *vitarka*, *tarka*, *paksha*, and *chala* conveying the senses of speculation, reason or debate, party, and quibble. The *Sthanangasutra* has mentioned four kinds of examples of a debate like *jnata*, etc., six kinds of expedients in a debate, which are *asakkaitta*, *ussakkaitta*, etc., and ten kinds of defects of a debate, which are *tajjata-dosha*, *matibhangadosha*, *prashastridosha*, etc. It is found that numerous technical terms of logic have been coined by the Jaina logicians, and 'great subtleties have been introduced into the definition of terms, in the theory of syllogism etc.' The works on logic were written in different times or in different stages of development of the epistemological and logical thoughts and ideas. The early writers on Jaina logic were Bhadrabahu and Umasvati. The Shvetambara sect recognizes Bhadrabahu (433 B.C.—357 B.C.), who wrote the commentary *Dashavaikalika-niryukti*. The Digambara sect recognizes two Bhadrabahus, senior and junior. In the *Dashavaikalika-niryukti*, Bhadrabahu mentioned about a syllogism of ten parts, *pratijna*, *pratijna-vibhakti*, *hetu*, *hetu-vibhakti*, *vipaksha*, *pratishedha-dishtanta*, *ashankha*, *ashankha-pratishedha*, and *nigamana*. It may be mentioned that what Bhadrabahu aimed in this work, was to illustrate certain principles of Jaina religion, but his syllogism of *dashavayava-vakya* created a systematic order of reasoning, which turned into a system of logic. His *Sutrakriyanga-niryukti* is an explanation of *syadvada*, i.e. the theory of assertion of possibilities. This theory is also known as *saptabhanginaya* or seven fold parallogism. The *syadvada* has already been discussed while dealing with Jaina school of philosophy.

MM. Vidvabhushana has presented it in his book, *A History of Indian Logic* (pp. 11.7.68) thus: "The *syadvada*

is set forth as follows:

- (1) May be, it is,
- (2) May be, it is not,
- (3) May be, it is, and it is not,
- (4) May be, it is indescribable,
- (5) May be, it is, and yet is indescribable,
- (6) May be, it is not, and it is also indescribable,
- (7) May be, it is and it is not, and it is also indescribable."

Thus we find the seven fold paralogism in the theory of *syad*, and for this reason it is called the *saptabhāṅginaya*. The Jaina philosophy of Umasvati or Nagaravachaka admits seven categories instead of sevenfold *nayas*, and they are, *jiva*, *ajiva*, *ashrava*, *kandha*, *saṃvara*, *nirjara*, and *moksha*. Another Umasvati composed the *Tattvarthadhigamasutra* with the commentary by himself, and this *Sutra* said that these seven categories can be comprehended only by *pramāṇa* and *naya* for determining the nature of valid knowledge and also the method of knowing things from particular standpoints. This *Sutra* drew a mark of demarcation between the meanings and the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). According to this *Sutra*, *pramāṇa* is of two kinds, *parokṣa* or indirect knowledge and *pratyakṣa* or direct knowledge. This *Sutra* included inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), testimony (*āgama*), presumption (*arthapatti*), probability (*sabhava*), and negation (*abhava*) in the category of indirect knowledge. Regarding *naya* or mood of statements, *Tattvarthadhigamasutra* said that it is of five kinds, *naigama* (non-analytical), *saṃgraha* (collective), *vyavahara* (practical), *riṇisutra* (immediate), and *śabdā* (verbal). This *Sutra* further discussed these five *nayas* elaborately. This theory of *naya* has also been dealt with by different later Jaina logicians like Siddhasena, Devasuri, Hemchandra-Suri, Haribhadra-Suri, and others. MM. S. C. Vidyabhushana has elaborately discussed the Jaina works of logicians like Siddhasena, Devasuri, Hemchandra-Suri, Haribhadra-Suri, and others. MM. S. C. Vidyabhushana has elaborately discussed the Jaina works on logic, extending from 453 A.D. to the seventeenth century A.D. along with the methods of

epistemology and logic. He is of the opinion that the Jainas wrote regular treatises on logic and did not differ much from the Buddhist logicians. As for example, he says that the *Nyayavatara* by Shvetambara Jaina logician, Siddhasena, Divakara (500 A.D.), "traverses almost the same ground as the *Nyaya-Pravesha* of the Buddhist logician Dinnaga (450-530 A.D.). Rabhasa Nandi, a Digambara Jaina logician, wrote a commentary called *Sambandhoddhota* on the *Sambandhapariksha* of the Buddhist logician Dharmakirti (635 A.D.). The *Pramana-vartikatika* of Jaina Kalyanachandra is likewise a commentary on the *Pramana-vartika* of the Buddhist Dharmakirti (635 A.D.). The *Dharmottara-Tippanaka* is the title of a Jaina commentary by Mallavadin (about 962 A.D.) on the Buddhist work *Nyayavindu-Tika* of Dharmottara (847 A.D.)."

\* Vide, MM. Vidyabhusana: *A History of Indian Logic* 1921, pp. 221-222.

## CHAPTER XIII

### THE BUDDHIST SCHOOL

Like the sublime upanishadic thoughts, the Buddhist speculative thoughts have enriched the domain of Indian philosophy. The Vedic and the upanishadic thoughts and ideas prepared the ground of the evolution of the Buddhist thoughts, and so Buddhism is indebted to Hinduism. Dr. Radhakrishnan says: "Buddhism, which began to spread in India about 500 B.C., presupposes not only the existence of the Vedic hymns but the whole Vedic literature, including the *Brahmanas* and the *Upanishads*." Professor Rhys Davids is of the opinion that Buddhism spread to the rest of Aryan India the belief in the *law of karma* and the possibility of attaining Nirvana. Buddha felt that he had the support and sympathy of the *Upanishads* and their followers. So Buddhism, in its origin, at least, is an offshoot of Hinduism, and Buddhism grew and flourished within the fold of orthodox belief. Swami Vivekananda has also said that Buddhism is the rebel child of Hinduism. Professor Oldenberg admits Buddha's debt to Vedic and upanishadic literature and their thoughts. So it can be said that throughout the accounts of early Buddhism the spirit of the *Upanishads* can be found.

The philosophical thoughts of Buddhism evolved on the background of the teachings of Gautama Buddha. His teachings were at first in Pali and then were translated into Sanskrit. The teachings of Buddha are to be found in three *Pitakas*, and they are: the *Sutra-pitaka* (tales), the *Vinaya-pitaka* (disciplines) and the *Abhidhamma-pitaka* (doctrines). These *Pitakas* are again sub-divided into smaller sections. Though Buddha's teachings are mainly founded upon the teachings of the *Upanishads*, yet we find that there are many thoughts which are contrary to those contained in the *Upanishads*. Buddha said that everything is impermanent and so the Self (*Atta* or *Atman*) being

the mind-body-complex, is also impermanent. The world *samsara* exists, but it exists with sorrows and sufferings, so the world should be transcended by attaining Nirvana which is a complete cessation of sorrows and sufferings, and, therefore, it is a positive state, and not a negative one.

The whole of the teachings of Buddha is summed up in 'four noble truths', and they are: (a) there is suffering (*duhkha*), (b) it has a cause (*karana* or *samudaya*), (c) it can be overcome or transcended (*nirodha*), and (d) there is a way to absolute cessation of suffering (*marga*). The sufferings are caused by birth of the physical body, and cravings (*trishna*) generate the cycle of birth and death of the material body. The cravings can be divided into three classes: (a) craving or thirst for sensual pleasures (*kama-trishna*), (b) craving or thirst for being (*bhava-trishna*) and (c) craving or thirst for wealth and power (*cibhava-trishna*). Nescience (*avidya*) or non-knowledge (*ajnana*) causes all kinds of suffering and pain, so Nirvana should be attained by the extinction of the fire of desires. There is the eight-fold path for extinction of desires and they are: right belief (*samyak-drishti*) right resolve (*samyak-samkalpa*), right speech (*samyak-vak*), right conduct (*samyak-karma* or *acharana*), right livelihood (*samyak-ajivika*), right effort (*samyak-vyayama*), right mindfulness (*samyak-smriti*), and concentration (*samyak-samadhi*). In the Yoga psychology, this right concentration is known as the *samyak-dharana* and this *dharana* leads to meditation or *dhyana*, and meditation leads to Godconsciousness or *samadhi* which is similar to Buddhist Nirvana. Buddha himself practised Yoga and attained Nirvana which is a complete cessation of desires and sufferings (*trishna* and *duhkha*). Swami Abhedananda has explained the methods of Yoga adopted by Buddha in his lectures on Buddhism (Cf. *Complete Works of Swami Abhedananda*, Vol. II).

The Buddhist thinkers maintain that all existence is a flux, as everything in this universe is becoming and changing. This flux can be compared to the ever-passing currents of the river, as Heraclitus forwarded, and flying clouds, as advanced by Hume. The Buddhists say that as the currents of water endure for a moment and then



pass away, so the existence of phenomenal things is momentary (*kshanika*). All individuals are also impermanent and momentary, and they can be said to be the momentary states of consciousness, and there is no permanent substance behind the series of consciousness. Advaita Vedanta refutes this theory and says that the momentary states of consciousness pass, but pass on a solid permanent ground and that ground is the *Atman* or Brahman, which has no change at any time. Similar incident happened in the world of Western philosophy, when Kant refuted the skeptic Hume, and determined a changeless ground for the changing ideas. The early Buddhist thinkers did not admit this theory of permanence of the *Atman*, and they said that all individuals and all states of consciousness pass all the time and are governed by the law of causality (*pratityasamutpada*). Now what is causality or law of causation? The early Buddhist thinkers said that causation is nothing but development or transformation, and it is always dynamic. It is known as *pratityasamutpada*, and that means arising (*samutpada*) after getting (*pratiti*), or production of an effect out of a complement of cause and conditions, and when the cause and conditions disappear, the effect appears which is reduced to the theory of *asatkaryavada*. It is also known as *sapeksakaranavada*. In fact, early Buddhism regarded the cosmic order as self-developing according to causal law without any creator and without beginning or end.

It should be remembered that both the disciples, Vacchagotta and Ananda, were present by the side of Bhagavan Buddha during his *parinirvana*, and as Buddha was silent on the question of existence (*satta*) or non-existence (*asatta*) of the soul or *Atta*, Ananda understood from the silence of his Master eternalism (*shashvatavada*) and Vacchagotta understood annihilationism (*uchchhedavada*). Nagarjuna, the greatest expounder of the *Madhyamika* philosophy, said in the commentary of the *Prajnaparamitasutra* that sometimes Buddha taught that the soul (*Atta*) exists as a permanent entity, and at other times he taught that the soul or *Atta* does not exist, so two theories of existence and non-existence (*satta* and *asatta*) of the soul

evolved. Nagarjuna adopted the theory of nihilism (*shunya-vada*) and in his *Mula-Madhyamika-karika*, he proved that there is only void or nothingness. Vasubandhu also discussed the theories of existence and non-existence, and at last exposed himself to the heresy of non-existence or nihilism. Nagasena and Buddhaghosa also followed Nagarjuna, and denied the existence of the soul. Some Buddhist philosophers interpreted this theory of impermanence in this way that the eternal, transcendental, and noumenal self is unreal, while the impermanent, empirical, and phenomenal self is real. The Advaita Vedanta philosophy fights against this theory and proves that the empirical and phenomenal self is unreal being changeable, whereas the transcendental self is real being absolutely free from all changes. The later Buddhist philosophers Dinnaga, Dharmakirti, Santarakshit, Dharmottara, and others criticised the theory as advanced by the Advaita Vedantists, and did not admit the reality of the permanent self.

The Buddhist philosophers, however, believe in *karma* and *dharma* i.e. theory of merit and demerit, or good and evil. They also believe in transmigration and re-birth, and think that these theories have a practical value. They hold that *karma* causes the cycle of births and re-births. *Karma* is the connecting link between life of an individual and that of another, and *karma* with good deed, word, and thought brings peace and tranquility unto men. The Buddhists said that as flame of a lamp burning throughout the night does not remain the same but changes continuously, so there is no identity of the consciousness or soul of a man, and there happen continual changes in it forming as though a series of consciousnesses or soul. Therefore, "there is transmigration of the impermanent psychical series, though there is no identity of the permanent and eternal soul". *Dharma* is used as a synonym of *Atta* or *Atman*, or it is equivalent to the highest reality. "Buddha himself attained Nirvana by intuition (*prajna*) and enlightenment (*bodhi*), so he prescribed *karma* and *dharma* as the means to purification of *chitta* (mind), and that purification prepares the ground of intuition and enlightenment. Buddhism emphasizes purity of the inner life. Universal

love (*maitra*) compassion (*karuna*), joy (*mudita*), and indifference (*upeksha*) are the ethical qualities, which take the *Sadhaka* to the state of Nirvana.

Now what do we mean by Nirvana? The word 'Nirvana' does not convey the idea of void or *shunyata*, but the idea of something positive, of a *thatness*, or a *suchness*. The idea of *shunyata* is also found in the *Prajnaparamita*, and it is divided into eighteen or twenty kinds. Though the theory of *shunyata* was widely propagated by Nagarjuna, yet we got the nucleus of it from his Guru, Arayadeva. Passions are compared with fire which burns the individuality i.e. existence of a man, and Nirvana brings extinction of that fire of passion, greed, and delusion. Buddha conquered the *Mara* means he got control over the passions and mad desires that bind men in the den of delusion. *Mara* was the personified passions and desires, and Buddha conquered *Mara* means he calmed down all passions and desires (*trishna*) that cause *samsara*. In the Pali texts, Nirvana has sometimes been described in two ways, *sa-upadishesha* and *anupadishesha*. *Sa-upadishesha* Nirvana is a state of bliss "with residual vital conditions or with the remainder of mental grasping (*upadana*), the cause of rebirth", and *anupadishesha* Nirvana is "without residual of vital conditions, or without remainder of mental grasping (*upadana*)". The conception of Nirvana was further modified by the sects of Hinayana and Mahayana.

Mahamahopaddhava Gopinath Kaviraja says: "The general conception of Nirvana, according to the older canons, followed by the specific views of particular sects including Sthaviravadins, Vaibhasikas, Sautrantikas and the Mahayanists has been clearly stated. Even in the older school we find two apparently conflicting views regarding Nirvana—one associated with the Vaibhasikas who believed in it as positive and the other with the Sautrantikas whose attitude was distinctly negative in character. Of course, there was a difference of views also even in the same sect. The Sautrantikas held that the Skandhas are not all uniform, some being destroyed in Nirvana and others surviving it. The Vaibhasikas as a rule believed in the doctrine of Survival. A brief resume of most of the views has been

supplied in the book. It has been shown that the secret of much of the difference between Hinayana and Mahayana lies in the fact that while in one view there is emphasis on subjective nihilism (पुद्गल-नैरात्म्य) or elimination of the obscuration (आवरण) of *klesas* only, in the other we find stress laid on both subjective and objective nihilism धर्म-नैरात्म्य or elimination of the obscurations of *klesas* as well as *dharma*s. The point of difference between Hinayana and Mahayana conceptions have been brought out clearly in a tabular form."

The conception of Nirvana differs in different Buddhist sects and schools. As for example, the Vaibhashikas considered Nirvana to be a positive state of existence in which all passions or desires (*tanhas*) are completely extinguished, along with the chances of the re-appearance of miseries. The Sautrantikas absolutely rejected the reality of the eternal elements, and considered Nirvana to be an end of the process of life. The Madhyamikas considered Nirvana as a state where all phenomena are lost, and they said that Nirvana is merely a cessation of the seeming phenomenal flow. Chandrakirti, the commentator of the *Mula-Madhyamika-karika*., supported the view of Nagarjuna, but one of the immediate disciples of Nagarjuna, Aryadeva criticized the Madhyamika system to some extent. It seems to be the fact that the Madhyamika system was founded and perfected by the talented Buddhist thinker, Nagarjuna. This system was gradually developed by his disciple Aryadeva.

Dr. T. R. V. Murti is of the opinion that there was the splitting up of the Madhyamika ideas into two schools, the *Prasangika* and the *Svatantrika*, ably represented by Buddhapalita and Bhavaviveka respectively. In the third period, Chandrakirti re-affirmed the *Prasangika* as the norm of the Madhyamika. Santideva, though coming a generation later, may also be taken as falling within this period. The fourth and last stage was a syncretism of the Yogachara and the Madhyamika, the chief representatives of which were Sanrakshita and Kamalashila.<sup>1</sup> So it is found

<sup>1</sup> Cf., *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (1960), p. 87.

that the speculative thoughts of the Madhyamika school were possessed of some stages of development, which were different from one another, and Ashvaghosa's contribution in the domain of Buddhist philosophy is worth-mentioning. Ashvaghosa considered Nirvana as an ultimate reality which is known as a *suchness* or *tathata*. He said that *tathata* is *shunyata*, and *shunyata* is *tathata*. Suchness is void-in-itself or nothingness. It is the immutable mind, or the absolute soul. The author of the *Lankavatara-sutra* divided this *shunyata* into seven stages, and held the view that when the world (*samsara*) is known as a void or *shunya*, then it is grasped in its own essence which is *suchness* or *tathata*. The *Lankavatara-sutra* said that Nirvana is realized when one can see into the abode of suchness (*yathabhutarthasthana-darshana*). Professor Suzuki is of the opinion that the terms, *prajna*, *sambodhi*, *dharmakaya*, *tathata*, *pratyatmajnana*, etc. are one and the same. Intellect as such (*vikalpa*) cannot enter into the kingdom of *tathata*, for it dissects and establishes somewhat to take hold of (*grahana*), and it will then see that something coming into existence (*utpada*) and disappearing (*nirodha* or *apravritti*). He says that Nirvana has no tangible form (*nimitta*), and it neither comes into existence, nor ceases from working. Nirvana is, therefore, a state of emptiness (*shunyata*) inherent in the nature of things.<sup>2</sup> It is also a state of self-realization obtained by means of supreme wisdom (*aryajnana*), and there must be a revulsion (*paravritti*) at the deepest seat of consciousness, known as the *alaya-vijnana* or transforming consciousness. And it should be mentioned that Nirvana is not to be found in contradistinction to birth-and-death (*samsara*). The Mahayanistic Nirvana, says Prof. Suzuki, goes beyond the dualism of Nirvana and *samsara*, and, therefore, it is to be found where there is the identity of Nirvana and *samsara*.

In the second chapter of the *Lankavatara-sutra*, the doctrine of *vijnana* (*vijnanavada*) has clearly been explained.

<sup>2</sup> In Vedanta, Nirvana is used along with the word Brahman—*Brahman-Nirvana*.

Vide, Dr. Obermiller: *Nirvana according to Tibetan Tradition* (I.H.Q., Vol. 10/No. 2/pp' 211-257).

The *Lankavatarasutra* said that, according to *vijnanavada*, knowledge alone is real, and the external objects are mere manifestations of representation of it and, therefore, they are absolutely non-existent and false. We find here a similarity of thought as held by Vashishtadeva of the *Yoga-vashista-Ramayana*, but Acharya Sankara does not admit this *vijnanavada* of the *Lankavatarasutra* which said about the phenomenal world. Sankara says that it is a fact that the external world is a representation of the internal sense, mind (*characharam bhati mano vilasam*, or *kalpitamindrajala*), but in spite of that the external world has a relative phenomenal existence (*apekshika vyavaharikasatta*) so long as it appears as real because of delusion (*maya*), and when delusion (*maya*) or error (*bhranti*) is removed or corrected, delusive appearance of the world is replaced or sublated by the permanent Brahman-knowledge, and so the world has no permanent or transcendental existence.

This *vijnana* is of two kinds, *khyati-vijnana* (potential knowledge) and *vastu-prativikalpa-vijnana* (objectified knowledge). The potential *khyati-vijnana* remains "in us from time immemorial as a mass of potentialities, reminiscences, tendencies, or impressions, and tends to produce the so-called external objects", and the objectified *vastu-pratikalpa-vijnana* is manifested "as external objects through the act-force (*karma*) inherent in our aforesaid potentialities, reminiscences, tendencies, or impressions." When these two kinds of knowledge are combined, the presentative knowledge of *pravritti-vijnana* evolves and produces the external world drawing us towards it. The seat or ground (*adhara* or *adhisthana*) of this *pravritti-vijnana* is *alaya-vijnana* which is the basic knowledge, or fundamental cognition. This basic cognition is also known as an ego (*aham*). *Pravritti-vijnana* may change, but *alaya-vijnana* or ego remains unchanged. By means of concentration (*dharana* or *dhyana*), we can know the true nature of *aham* (ego), which is perfect (*parinishpanna*) and accomplished. The external world is the non-ego, and it is not permanent and is, therefore, false and contingent.

The *Lankavatarasutra* further stated that the highest

kind of knowledge is the form of Nirvana or *shunyata*. But knowledge is of three kinds, worldly knowledge (*laukika-jnana*), supra-worldly knowledge (*lokottara-jnana*), and supreme supra-worldly knowledge (*lokottaratara-jnana*). The third one, the supreme supra-worldly knowledge is attained by the later Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas, and when a man attains to Nirvana, he attains also the Buddhahood or Tathagatahood and finally comes to the supreme level of realization of the egolessness (*nairatmya*) of all things. This egoless state of the Buddhists can be compared with the tranquil state of superconsciousness or *samadhi* of the Indian Yoga psychology and the *Brahman-nirvana* of the Advaita Vedanta. But this comparison does not seem always happy, as the founders or exponents of different systems of philosophy criticize their views.

The *Prajnaparamitasutra* also gave views about Nirvana as the state of nothingness or *shunyata*. But Asanga and Vasubandhu regarded Nirvana as the eternal blissful consciousness as it has been used in the *Upanishads*. They said that Nirvana is the ultimate reality and the self-identical pure consciousness, and when it is attained, a man enjoys a peaceful and blissful state. So we find that regarding Nirvana there remain controversies among different exponents and commentators.

From the history of Buddhism it is known that Hinayana Buddhism gave birth to the schools of the Vaibhasikas and the Sautrantikas, and Mahayana Buddhism to the schools of the Madhyamikas and the Yogacharas.<sup>3</sup> It is said that after the *mahaparinirvana* of Gautama Buddha, there evolved in India seventeen or eighteen heretical sects among the Buddhists. The Buddhist literature divide the eighteen (and not seventeen) sects into four groups which were included first into the Vaibhasika and Sautrantika schools of philosophy. These sects at first belonged to the 'little vehicle', Hinayana sects, and later on joined the 'great vehicle', Mahayana faith, too. The names of these sects have been mentioned by Rhys David, Rockhill,

<sup>3</sup> The Mahayana Buddhism also gave birth to the Tantric schools of Vajrayana, Mantrayana, Kalachakrayana, Sahajayana, etc.

and the Buddhist historian Taranath, and recently they have been mentioned by Prof. Yamakami Sogen, Kimura, D. T. Suzuki, Mrs. Suzuki, McGovern, Dr. Nalinaksa Dutt, and others.

The Madhyamika philosophy maintains the doctrine of void (*shunya*), and, therefore, reduces everything into nothingness or *shunyata*. Chandrakirti said that "all this worldly manifold disappears without having any trace in the void (of Relativity) as soon as the essence of all separate existence is perceived to be relative and ultimately unreal which can be said to be: *bhava-sambhava-shunyata sarva-dharma-shunyata*." But it is also found that some schools of the Buddhist logicians objected to the wholesale unreality of knowledge and the worldly manifold which reduced everything to nothingness or void.

It is said that both the Hinayana and the Mahayana Buddhists considered the empirical world as consisted of impermanent phenomena, governed by the law of cause and sequence. Like them, the Vaibhasikas also said that there is existence, and reality of the atoms which are manifested as the impermanent fleeting phenomena. The Sautrantikas similarly believed in the existence of the impermanent momentary atoms and elements and their aggregates. And it has been said that the Mahayanists considered *shunyata* or *shunya* as the absolute and eternal Reality. The Yogacharis regarded it as the basis of the *alayavijnana* "which creates all empirical minds and phenomenal objects". In fact, the Madhyamika system of Nagarjuna held that there is nothing which has an essence or nature of its own, and "even heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire, for both the heat and the fire are the results of the combination of many conditions" and, therefore, what depends upon conditions, cannot be said to be the single nature or essence of the thing. Therefore, the Madhyamikas considered the external objects and also the subjective cognitions to be equally essenceless (*nihsvabhava*) with *shunyata* as their eternal basis. They also regarded subject and object as well as all objects of thought as relative and conditional and, therefore, they are essenceless. And so the



Madhyamikas are known as the relativists, phenomenologists, and absolutists.<sup>4</sup>

MM. Satish Chandra Vidyabhushana says that the *Madhyamika-karika* of Nagarjuna or Arya-Nagarjuna (about A.D. 250-320) is the first regular work on the Madhyamika philosophy. This philosophy maintains the doctrine of *shunya* and also that of the middle path: "*shunyata madhyama pratipadmadhyame marga ityuchyate*". The doctrine of the middle path can be apprehended from four aspects: "(1) in contradiction to one-sidedness, (2) as the abnegation of one-sidedness, (3) as unity in plurality, and (4) in the sense of absolute truth." Generally the absolute *shunyata* or void is demonstrated through the assumption of two truths which are the conditional (*samvriti*) and the transcendental (*paramartha*). In Advaita Vedanta also, truth is judged from the viewpoints of the phenomenal or conditional (*avidya* or *maya*) and the transcendental (Brahman). The *samvritika* or *avidyika* state or condition is *vyavaharika*, whereas the transcendent state or condition is *paramarthika*. Both the Madhyamika philosophy and the Advaita Vedanta philosophy admit that fact, but they differ from each other in the *shunyavada* and the *brahmavada*. Sankara refutes doctrine of both the Sarvastivadins who are divided into the Sautrantikas and the Vaibhasikas, believing respectively in the inferential and perceptual existence of all things. He also refutes the Vijñānavādins or Yogacharis, believing in the existence of consciousness or ideas alone and the *Sarvashunyavadins* or the Madhyamikas, who deny the existence of everything, i.e. who are realists, idealists, and nihilists respectively. Sankara has refuted them in his commentaries on the *sutras*, 2.2.28—2.2.32 of the second canto of the second chapter of the *Brahmasutras* of Vyasa. However, the Madhyamikas said that from the viewpoint of the conditional truth alone we speak of the existence or the non-existence of an object, but from the transcendental viewpoint no

<sup>4</sup> Vide, Dr. J. N. Sinha: *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 394.

object comes into being or dissolves into non-being. Nagarjuna expounded in the *Madhyamika-karika* that, no object is possessed of a nature of self-existence, but objects come into existence by virtue of certain relations or conditions. As for example, a whole exists in relation to its parts and the parts exist in relation to the whole. So it is found that the world is an aggregate of relations or relative conditions by virtue of which it revolves like a water-wheel. Those conditions being the cause of confusion, the whole world is no better than a delusion or illusion.

MM. Vidyabhushana says that origination and cessation, persistence and discontinuance, unity and plurality, coming and going—these are the eight fundamental conceptions of relation or condition. So where there is a relation or conditionality, there is no truth, truth and conditionality being incompatible. Therefore “when our mind is purified from the smirch of conditionality, there will come out of the serene moon-light of *suchness* (*tathata*) or transcendental truth (*paramartha*), otherwise known as the void or absolute (*shunyata*).” This so-called *shunyata* is known as Nirvana “which is an unconditional condition in which all contradictions are reconciled”.<sup>5</sup>

Nagarjuna was also a great logician. He composed many logical treatises like *Pramana-vihitana* or *Pramana-vidhvamsana*, the *Upya-kaushalya-hridayashastra*, etc. After Nagarjuna, Aryadeva (A.D. 320) wrote treatises on the philosophy of Madhyamika, and these treatises are the *Shatakashastra*, the *Brahma-pramathana-yuktihetusiddhi*, etc. After Aryadeva, appeared Maitreya or Maitreyanath (A.D. 400) who was an eminent teacher of the Yogachara school. He composed the treatises like the *Saptadeshabhumishastra-yogachara*, the *Abhisamayalamkara*, etc. After him, appeared Arya Asanga (A.D. 405-470), who is said to have lived for some years as a Pandit in the Nalanda University.<sup>6</sup> It is said that he was at first an adherent of the Mahishashaka sect and followed the Vailhasika philosophy of the Hina-

<sup>5</sup> Vide, MM. S. C. Vidyabhushana: *A History of Indian Logic*, 1921, pp. 253.55.

<sup>6</sup> Vide, Prof. H. D. Sankalia: *The University of Nalanda* (1934)

yana. Later on he became a disciple of Maitreyanath and adopted the Yogachara philosophy of the Mahayana sect. He composed the *Prakaranarya-vachashastra*, the *Mahayana-bhidharma-samyukta-sangitishastra*, etc. After him, appeared Vasubandhu (about A.D. 410-490), Dinnaga (A.D. 450-520), Dharmakirti (about A.D. 650-725), Devendrabodhi (about A.D. 650), Shakyabodhi (about A.D. 675), Vinitadeva (about A.D. 700), Ravigupta (about A.D. 725), Jinendrabodhi (about A.D. 725), Shanta-Rakshita (about A.D. 749), Kamalashila (A.D. about 750), Kalyana-Rakshita (about A.D. 829), Dharmottaracharya (about A.D. 847), and others. These Buddhist savants enriched the domain of Buddhist schools of thought and idea.

Prachyavidyarnava Nagendranath Basu is of the opinion that the doctrine of the Mahashunyam as expounded by Nagarjuna, being the basis of the Madhyamika philosophy, is but a reflection of the Brahmavada, as inculcated in the *Upanishads* and the *Brahmasutras* and also in the *Bhagavada-Gita*. We have discussed this point earlier. Dr. Waddel suggests that intense mysticism of the Mahayana Buddhism led to the importation into Buddhism the pantheistic idea of the soul (*Atman*) and Yoga or the ecstatic union of the individual with the universal Spirit, a doctrine which has been introduced into Hinduism by Patanjali. The Yogachara school also assimilated some magic circles with *mantras* or spells in about A.D. 700 from which evolved the new appellation of the Mantrayana. About seventh century A.D. the development of the infatuating Tantrism was found in the philosophy and religious practices of Buddhism. The Tantrika phase of the Mahayana Buddhism reached its climax when the theory of Kalachakra was introduced in it. This theory with a philosophical tenet wanted to establish a mysterious union between the terrible goddess *Kali* of the Hindu Tantra and the *Dhyani-Buddha* of the Buddhist system. In the tenth century A.D. the Kalachakra system of the Mahayana school as a result of further retrograde development passed into the system of the Vajrayana or the 'thunderbolt vehicle' in the religio-philosophical system of Buddhism. Dr. Kern is of the opinion that the philosophical system of

Buddhism took a new course through Tantrism in India from the eighth century A.D. In the tenth-eleventh century the Vajrayani Buddhists composed many mystic songs in the *sandhyabhāsa* (*abhiprayiki-bhāsa*) which helped them in their religious practices, and these were known as the *Charyas*. However, the Mahayana doctrine of the Madhyamika school declined for some time for its rigid canons and strictness, but its cardinal doctrines were further collected and set forth in a more attractive and popular form by the Buddhist masters like Srijnana Dipankara, Narendrasrijnana, and others.

Now, in connection with the Mahayana Tantrika Buddhism, two methods, *pravṛttimarga* and *nivṛttimarga*, evolved aiming at the realization of the unity of the Adi-Buddha and the Adi-Prajna who can be compared to *Purusha* and *Prakṛiti* of the Brahmanical religion. MM. Haraprasad Shastri is of the opinion that when Buddhism had practically vanished for some reasons from India, the pernicious system, propounded by the *pravṛttimarga*, lingered in the Sahajiya cult of the Bengal Vaishnavism, and the *Nivṛttimarga* remained in the religious creed or doctrine as contained in the *Shunya-Purana* and the *Dharma-Mangala*. Some of the scholars are of the opinion that the central force of Ramai Pandit's works "was the doctrine of the *Mahashunyam* or the 'Great Void', which is again the heart and soul of the Madhyamika philosophy". The lines of the *Shunya-Purana*: "*shunyarupam nirakaram sahasra-vighna-nashanam*" etc. clearly suggest the fact. But it has been mentioned before that many savants interpreted the word '*shunyam*' as a positive entity which can be said as 'thatness' or 'sunchness' (*tathata*). But regarding the texts of the *Shunya-Purana* of Ramai Pandit, it is certain that they really suggest the idea of void or nothingness (*shunyam*). However, it is the opinion of many scholars that in the later period, when Buddhism was divided into Northern Buddhism and Southern Buddhism, the tendency of the speculative philosophy of the Buddhists was mostly inclined towards the practice only, or towards the practical side of spiritual *sadhana*, which undoubtedly heightened the current tradition of the Buddhistic thoughts.

## BUDDHIST LOGIC\*

It is said that a system of logic and epistemology was created in India in the sixth-seventh century A.D. by two great scholars of the Buddhist philosophy, Acharya Dinnaga and Acharya Dharmakirti. At the time of Gautama Buddha, India was saturated with the sublime thoughts of the *Vedas* and the *Upanishads*. Evolution of the Buddhist philosophy and logic took place in three periods in different forms and ways. Professor Stcherbatsky says that at the time of Gautama Buddha, Buddhism started with a very minute analysis of the human personality (*pudgala*) into the elements (*dharma*) of which it is composed, and the leading idea of this analysis was a moral one. "The whole doctrine was called a doctrine of defilement and purification. . . . The so-called personality consists of a congeries of ever-changing elements of a flow of them, without a perdurable and stable element at all." In the second period, the new Buddhism started with "the ideal of a real, genuine, ultimate existence or ultimate reality, a reality shorn of all relations, reality in itself, independent, unrelated reality". The new Buddhism propagated two realities, one on the surface and the other under the surface. The third period of Buddhistic logic was the golden age of Indian civilization, "when a part of India was united under the prosperous rule of the national dynasty of the Guptas". In this period, a new direction was given by two savants, Acharya Asanga and Acharya Vasubandhu. The Tibetan historian Lama Taranath informs us that Vasubandhu was the teacher of Dinnaga. Dharmakirti was not the direct pupil of Dinnaga. There was an intermediate teacher between them and his name is Ishvarasena who was a pupil of Dinnaga and the teacher of Dharmakirti. Some scholars surmise that Buddhist logic before Dinnaga was not so systematic and progressive. Through Nagarjuna's standpoint of -extreme relativism was forsaken, yet it is probable that at the time of Nagarjuna the fundamental treatise of the Nyaya school

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\* The Buddhist Logic has been discussed, in short, in connection with Nyaya, and here it is again discussed to make the subject more explicit.

existed in some form or other in the fields of Indian epistemology and logic. Asanga and Vasubandhu took up the study of Nyaya and the work of its adaptation to the idealistic foundations of their philosophy, and after them, Dinnaga and Dharmakirti made that idealistic foundation of Asanga and Vasubandhu more strong and systematic. Historians are of the opinion that though the Buddhist school of Hinayana have not preserved any manual on the art of debate, yet it is highly probable that such works must have existed. Prof. Stcherbatsky suggests that "the opening debate of the *Kathavattu* on the reality of the soul (*Atman*) is conducted with so high a degree of artificiality and every kind of dialectical devices that it suggests the probable existence of special manual in which the art of debate was taught. . . . The oldest Buddhist compositions on the art of debate that have reached us in Tibetan translations are two tracts by Nagarjuna, the *Repudiation of Contests* (*vigraha-vyartini*) and the *Dialectical Splitting* (of every thesis)—*Vaidalyasutra-prakarana*". MM. S. C. Vidyabhushana has said that though the Buddhist work *Kathavattu* furnished several logical terms like *upānayana*, *nigamana*, etc. of syllogistic reasoning, yet "we find not a single instance where these terms have been methodically combined, so as to form a syllogism proper". It has been said before that the system of logic was not really a systematic one and it took a new and novel course in the hands of Dinnaga and Dharmakirti. And it is quite true that Dinnaga and Dharmakirti were indebted to Asanga and Vasubandhu, but they led the courses of the systems of epistemology and logic of their predecessors in a new way. It is said that Dinnaga and Dharmakirti made some changes in the number of categories, universal ties in the form of dialectic, theory of valid knowledge, and in the form of syllogism, inference, etc. It is true that the school of Nyaya had already developed when the Buddhists began to manifest a keen interest in logical problems, but it is also true, as Prof. Stcherbatsky suggests, that then a clash supervened at once between the two utterly incompatible outlooks, because while the Bahmanical logic was formal and was built up on a foundation of naive realism, the Buddhist

logic at that time became critical idealists and their interest in logic was not formal, but philosophic, i.e. epistemological. "A reform of logic became indispensable. It was done by Dinnaga."<sup>7</sup>

However, regarding knowledge of perception, the Buddhist logicians defined (*pratyaksha*) as the doubtless unerring knowledge or cognition of a given sensum in complete isolation from all ideata, as it has been mentioned by the *Nyayavindu*: "*pratyaksha kalpanapo-dharmabhramantan*" (Chapter I). In this method, the object of knowledge or cognition is a unique individual (*svalakshana*), and the process of knowledge or cognition is a mere sensing without any element of ideation (*kalpana*) in it.<sup>8</sup> The later Buddhist logicians like Dinnaga, Dharmakirti, and others reduced knowledge of perception to "a mere sensation from all conceptual determination". Vasubandhu of the Yogachara school characterized perception as a knowledge or cognition (*prama-jnana*) which is directly produced by the object of which it is the knowledge or cognition (*tato'rthadvivijnanam pratyaksham*). Dinnaga brought out the implications of Vasubandhu's definition of perception, and said in the *Bramanasamuchchaya* (Chapter I), that perception is a cognition which is not at all subjectively determined and is not modified by ideas or concepts (*kalpana*). The Naiyayikas criticized the Buddhist definition of *prataksha* and said that those definitions are self-contradictory (*vyahata*) in so far as they tried to define and determine what is undefinable and indeterminate, because what is perfectly unknowable cannot be known as unknowable, and so we cannot consistently determine a perfectly indeterminate experience as perception.<sup>9</sup>

The Buddhist logicians also defined inference (*anumana*) and sources of valid knowledge and at many places they differed from the Naiyayikas, Mimansakas, and Vedantists. But it is true that the Buddhist logicians proved their brilliancy of intellect and intuition in the fields of both epistemology and logic like the Hindu logicians.

<sup>7</sup> Stecherbastsky, *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, 1958, pp. 26-27.

<sup>8</sup> Vide, Dr S. C. Chatterjee: *Nyaya-Theory of Knowledge* (3rd Edn.), p. 118.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, p. 121.

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE MIMANSA SCHOOL

The Mimansa school was founded by Jaimini in 400 B.C. Many savants like Savara, Kumarila, Upavarsha, Bodhayana, and others have written commentaries upon the *Mimansasutra* of Jaimini. The commentary, *Savara-bhashya* by Savara Svami, is a reputed one. Kumarila Bhatta has written some monumental works on the Mimansa like the *Slokavartika*, the *Tantravartika*, and the *Tuptika*, following the *Mimansasutra* of Kumarila, though he differs on many points from the theories of Jaimini and Savara, and has established a new school of epistemology of the Mimansa, known as the Bhatta school. Mandana Mishra, Prabhakara Mishra, Vachaspati Mishra, and Parthasarathi Mishra, Shalikanath Mishra, and Murari Mishra have also written commentaries on the Mimansa philosophy. Prabha-kara Mishra has founded a school, known as the Prabha-kara school, and his two commentaries, *Brihati* and *Laghvi* are noted. The commentaries of Murari Mishra are lost, and there is no book of the third school of *Mimansa*, founded by Murari Mishra.

The word 'Mimansa' means 'revered thought' which used to be applied originally in the interpretation of the Vedic rituals. The Vedic rituals used to be observed with highest estimation. Gradually the word was used in the Vedic *Parishad*, so as to critically investigate any subject or problem, and this meaning or interpretation is now observed. The Mimansa school of Jaimini "justifies both these meanings by giving us rules according to which the commandments of the Veda are to be interpreted and by giving a philosophical justification for the Vedic ritualism." Mimansa is of two kinds, Dharma-Mimansa and Jnana-Mimansa, or it can be said Purva-Mimansa and Uttara-Mimansa. The word *purva* suggests the word '*uttara*'

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Dr. Chandrahar Sharma: *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy* (Indian edition, 1964), p. 211.



and that means Purva-Mimansa should be studied first and then Uttara-Mimansa or Vedanta.

Purva-Mimansa advocates *karma* like performance of the rituals so as to create an unseen power, *apurva* that enables the performers to go into the higher region or *svarga*, whereas Uttara-Mimansa or Vedanta refutes that kind of *sakama-karma* and instructs to acquire highest knowledge of the Atman or Brahman by means of 'discriminative knowledge and renunciation (renunciation of the results of works).

It has already been said that the Mimansa philosophy is known as Purva-Mimansa, whereas Vedanta philosophy is known as Uttara-Mimansa. The Mimansa is also known as *Purvakanda*, *Karma-Mimansa*, *Karmakanda*, *Yajnavidya*, *Adhvaramimansa*, and *Dharmamimansa*, and it has been said that Purva-Mimansa or Karma-Mimansa is prior to Uttara-Mimansa or Vedanta.

The Mimansa school is mainly based upon the Vedic injunctions, and it deals with the Vedic rituals and sacrifices which were performed with different rules and paraphernalia. The Mimansa school believes in the reality of the phenomenal world and the existence of heaven and hell, individual souls, law of *karma*, good and evil, bondage, and liberation. It rejects the notion of God as the Creator, but it believes in different gods or deities, who appear in their subtle bodies at the time of sacrifices and confer boon upon the devotees. It also believes in the unknown power of the *mantras* which are constituted out of the eternal letters and holds that the deities are themselves the *mantras* (*mantramaya-devata*). The Yogis can perceive through their ecstatic vision the causal vibrations of the *mantras*. The Mimansa holds that there originates from the sacrifices some invisible or unseen mysterious power, known as *apurva*, and this *apurva* enables the sacrificer to go to different heavens for enjoying pleasures and happiness. Regarding *apurva*, Ganganath Jha, in the Introduction to the English translation of Kumarila's *Slokavartika*,<sup>2</sup> writes: "It does not appear quite reasonable that

<sup>2</sup> Vide, *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy* (Indian Ed. 1964), pp. 246-47.

momentary disappearing actions should bring about any such future effects, as the attainment of heaven and the like. But the fact is that, from certain Vedic passages, we come to know of the capability of the enjoined and prohibited actions to bring about certain results, and in order to render reasonable production of future effects by means of momentary disappearing actions we assume certain intervening transcendental agencies in the shape of *punya* (virtue) and *papa* (vice). Thus, then the causing of the attainment of heaven (*svarga*) by sacrifices (*yajna*) is not immediate, but *indirect* through the unseen agency of virtue. This is what is called the unseen force (*adrishta*) leading to a particular effect, and the cause of this unseen force is the primary action. \* \*” So, according to the Mimansa school, the intermediate unseen force (*adrishta-shakti*) is known as *apurva* that leads the sacrificer to heaven.

Now, what do we mean by *prama* and *pramana*? The Tarkikas say: ‘*pramakaranam pramanam*’. i.e. means of valid knowledge is the instrument of valid knowledge, and *yatharthanubhava* *prama*, i.e. experience of an object as it is, is valid knowledge. But the Mimansakas say: *avisamvadi vijnanam pramanam*, i.e. knowledge producing successful activity in respect of the object: *avisamvadyam cha arthakriyakaritvam*. So it is found that according to Mimansaka that which does not fail to accord, is valid. Now, what do we mean by *avisamvada*? The Buddhists say that non-failure to accord means producing successful activity in respect of the object: *avisamvadyam cha arthakriyakaritvam*. So it is found that, according to the Mimansa philosophy, only an instrument of knowledge of an unknown real object is, to us, a means of valid knowledge.<sup>3</sup> The Mimansa admits six means of valid knowledge and they are perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumana*), authority (*shabda*), analogy (*upamiti*), presumption (*arthapatti*), and negation (*abhava*).

Now, what is perception? (1) *Direct valid knowledge*

<sup>3</sup> Vide, *Mandmeyodaya* translated by C. Kunxan Raja, Adyar, 1933, pp. 6-7.

or *pratyakshajñāna*, says the Mimāṃsā, produced by the contact of the senses, is perception: *indriya-sannikarshajñānaṃ pramāṇam pratyakṣam*. The mind is assumed to be a sense as the instrument of the direct cognition of pleasure, pain, etc. Now contact (*sannikarsha*) by senses is of two kinds, conjunction and identity (*samyoga* and *samyukta tadatmya*). The logicians admit six kinds of contact, but the Prabhakaras admit three kinds of contact, *samyoga*, *samyukta-samavāya*, and *samavāya*. Again knowledge or cognition originated by the contact of senses is of two kinds, non-determinate and determinate (*nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka*). The Grammarians do not admit non-determinate cognition. (2) *Knowing of inference* or *anumāna* is the cognition of what is not proximate resulting from the perception of what is pervaded: *vyāpya-darśanādasannikrīṣṭārthajñānam anumānam*. From seeing the mountain to have smoke, there is the cognition of its having fire. Now, what is pervasion (*vyāpti*)? Pervasion is natural relation (*syābhāvika-sambandho vyāpti*), and this naturalness is freedom from extraneous adjuncts. Now extraneous adjunct (*upādhi*) is that which has reciprocal pervasion with the probandum. Prabhakara says that the relation of smoke with fire is understood even with a single observation. The Buddhists say that pervasion (*vyāpti*) can be established only through identity and origination therefrom. Inference is again two-fold, being divided into what is for oneself and what is for another (*svārtha* and *parārtha*). The definition of inference, as given by Kumārila and Śaṅkara, has slightly been modified by Prabhakara. They say that inference is the knowledge or cognition of a predicate (*viśaya*) in a subject (*viśayi*) from the perception of a sign or reason (*hetu*) on the ground of the knowledge of a uniform relation between them if the knowledge is not contradicted by another knowledge. (3) *Knowledge of comparison* or *upamāna* comes by comparison of similarity. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Śaṅkara Svāmī, and Prabhakara are of the same opinion that comparison is a knowledge of similarity subsisting in a remembered object, that arises from the perception of similarity (*sādrishya*), and this similarity is an independent cate-

gory. (4) *Presumption* or *arthapatti* is an assumption of an unperceived object without which inconsistency among perceived facts cannot be reconciled. Kumarila and Prabhakara have followed this definition to some extent, as both of them have slightly modified the definition, given by Savara, and at the same time it is found that Kumarila and Prabhakara have differed from each other in their definitions as well as in views on presumption. Prabhakara maintains that there is an element of doubt (*sandeha*) in presumption, while Kumarila denies existence of doubt in presumption. Parthasarathi Mishra and Shalikanatha Mishra have followed the definition of Savara Svami. (5) *Knowledge of non-apprehension* or *anupalabdhi* is the absence of any means of valid knowledge, which cognizes the non-existence of an object, which is not present to a sense-organ. Kumarila has followed this definition of Savara Svami. Prabhakara differs from both Savara and Kumarila, as he does not recognize non-apprehension as an independent valid knowledge of *pramana*. In fact, Prabhakara has rejected *abhava* or non-existence from the category of valid knowledge. (6) *Testimony as verbal authority* or *shabda-pramana* is divided into human and superhuman. Kumarila Bhatta defines testimony as verbal authority, because its knowledge is derived from sentences by comprehending the meanings of the constituent words, i.e. there happens a relation (*sambandha*) between *vakyartha* and *padartha*, and *buddhi* or intellect helps to bring the connection between them. Kumarila says that there is a relation between a word and its object, i.e. a relation (*sambandha*) between *vakyartha* and *padartha*, and *buddhi* or intellect helps to bring the connection between them. Kumarila says that this relation (*sambandha*) is not created by a person, but it is natural or inherent. Besides, Kumarila Bhatta, Savara Svami, Prabhakara, and others recognize the Vedas as uncreated and self-revealed, and they prescribe the rules and injunctions for and against, for performing Vedic rituals and ceremonies.

Kumarila Bhatta admits the necessity of the categories. He has divided those categories into positive (*bhava*) and negative (*abhava*) ones. The positive categories are substance

(*dravya*), quality (*guna*), action (*karma*); and the negative ones are prior non-existence, posterior non-existence, mutual non-existence, and absolute non-existence. The categories of particularity (*vishesha*) and inherence (*samavaya*), which are advanced by Kanada, are rejected by Kumarila. Prabhakara has mentioned eight categories, but they differ somewhat from those advanced by Kumarila. According to Prabhakara, the categories are *dravya*, *guna*, *karma*, *samanya*, *samavaya*, *shakti*, *samkhyā* and *sadrishya*. Here it is found that *samanya* has been accepted by Prabhakara, but Kumarila rejects it.

The Mimamsa philosophy is specially concerned with different rites and sacrifices according to Vedic rules for attaining *dharma*. Now, what is a *dharma*? Pandit Laugakshi Bhaskara says: '*yagadireva dharmah*', i.e. Vedic sacrifices are themselves *dharma*. Jaimini says: '*chodanatakshanārtha dharmah*'. The word '*chodana*' means the Veda, or the Vedic rules and instructions: '*chodana-shabdāsya vedamatra-paratvat*'. Jaimini says that sacrifices should be observed for attaining the heavens: '*yagadi svargakama yajeta iti*.' Here desires (*kama* or *bhavana*) for performing the sacrifices involve *pratyaya* which consists of *akhyata* and *linga*. Now, what do we mean by '*bhavana*'? *Bhavana* is an effort of action (*vyapara*), and this *bhavana* is divided into *shabdi-bhavana* and *artha-bhavana*. The word *bhavana* also connotes the idea of origination (*utpatti*). *Shabdi-bhavana* is again divided into three parts, *sadhya*, *sadhana*, and *itikartavya*. The Veda is not created by any person (*apaurusheya*), and it has five elements: *vidhi*, *mantra*, *namadheya*, *nishedha*, and *arthavada*. Maharshi Jaimini and Savara Svami have explained these five parts of the Veda in detail for their application in the sacrificial performance. *Vidhi* is the positive instruction or diction which is divided into four: *utpatti*, *viniyoga*, *adhikara*, and *prayoga*, *nishedha* is the negative instruction. *Utpattividhi* suggests only *karma* or sacrifice. *Karma* or *Yoga* is of two kinds, *dravya* or materials for sacrifice and *devata* or deity. The *dravya-tyaga* is the offering (*utsarga*) to sacrifice. *Viniyogavidhi* suggests the priority or primacy of *anga* or limb. As for example,

it is the sacrifice with the help of curd. *Anga* or *paratha* directs the person to perform the main function of the sacrifice. *Shruti*, *linga*, *vakya*, *prakarana*, *sthana*, and *samakhyā*, these six *pramanas* are helpful to *vidhi*. (1) The *shruti-pramana* is impartial and is divided into *vidhatri*, *avidhatri*, and *vinijoktri*. These are again divided into different part or forms. (2) The *linga-pramana* is eligible to produce sound. (3) The *vakya-pramana* suggests manifold forms (*samabivyahara*). Savara says: '*ekarthamanekapadam vakyam*'. (4) The *prakarana-pramana* suggests both the meanings, or objects, or desires, and it is divided into *maha-prakarana* and *avantara-prakarana*. (5) The *sthana-pramane* means the general place or region. (6) The *samakhyā-pramana* is *yougika*, and it is divided into *vaidika* and *laukika*. The *vidhis* are very important for the sacrificial functions. There are also orders (*krama*) in the sacrifices, and these orders are divided into primary order (*mukhya-krama*) and secondary order (*avantara-kramas* like *pathakrama* and *pravritti-krama*).

Now, what are the *mantras*? The *mantras* are the means for invoking the deities of the sacrifices. The *mantras* are themselves the deities. The *mantras* help to remember the meaning or significance of the application in the functions of the sacrifice. The *apurva* and *parisamkhyā vidhis* are essential for the functions of the *Yaga*.<sup>4</sup> The *apurva-vidhi* is applicable when it is suggested by different *shastras* (*pramanantara*) and the *parisamkhyā-vidhi* connotes the idea that when both the *vidhis* are suggested out of them, should be avoided. This *vidhi* is divided into *shanti* and *lakshaniki*. There is also a problem of *namadheya* which is of four kinds. *Nishedha* is to be observed like *vidhi*. In fact, *nishedha* is that which saves the performer of the sacrifice from the evil effects (*anartha*).<sup>5</sup>

Now, what is an *arthavada*? In the *Mimansa-Pari-bhasa* and the *Arthasamgraha*, *arthavada* has been defined as: '*prashastya-nindanyataraparam vakyam*', i.e. what says

<sup>4</sup> Cf. also *Arthasamgraha* (Sanskrit).

<sup>5</sup> Vide, *Arthasamgraha* (Calcutta).

highly, about something, is *arthavada*, and this *prashastyam* is known as '*vishishta-prakara-hetatyene pratiti-vishayatvam*'. *Arthavada* is of two kinds, *vidhishesha* and *nishedhashesha*. The word *vidhishesha* means what is helpful to *vidhi*, and what is injurious is called *nishedhashesha*. Further it is divided into three, *gunavada*, *anuvada*, and *bhutarthavaida*. These three *vadas* or words differ when they are contradicted by perception or direct knowledge and other means of knowledge (*pramanantara-virodhe pratyakshadi-pramana-virodhe*). The *Mimamsadharshana* says that when *dharma* or *Yaga* is performed for some selfish purpose, it is limited; and when it is performed in the spirit of service of God or *Devata* (deity), it becomes the cause of celestial bliss (*nihsreyasa*). Now, these are the essential things to be known or observed for performance of *dharma* or *Yaga* which promises to grant celestial bliss (*svarga-sukha*) to them who perform the *karmas* or sacrifices according to the laws and dictions of the Vedas.

## APPENDIX

VALIDITY OF THE VEDA IN REGARD TO DHARMA  
(Extract from the '*Sastradipika*' by Parthasarathi Mishra)

As regards the nature of *dharma* with its attributes *bheda*, *sesa*, *prayukti*, *krama-niyama*, *adhikara*, *atidesa*, *badha*, *uha*, *tantra* and *prasanga* (vide note 15—7th Chapter) the Veda alone is the valid means of knowledge (*chodanaiva pramanam*) and that the Veda is indubitably valid (*pramanameva*). There by the exclusive emphasis on *chodana* (as indicated by the particle '*eva*' in *chodanaiva*), the assertion was made of the invalidity of *pratyaksa* etc. which do not desiderate the Veda, but which (on the contrary) lies with it claiming equal validity; and that (assertion) was established by means of the *Pratyaksa-sutra* (IV). And the (second) part, "indubitably valid" (*pramanameva*) was established in the fifth and the remainder

*sutras* of the (first) *pada* (i.s. from VI to VIII with their sub-divisions *guna-sutras*). Now when the two specific propositions set forth in the *chodana-sutra* (viz. the Veda alone is *pramana* and valid certainty is the Veda) have been demonstrated the succeeding three *padas* are not (it is clear) connected with the *chodana-sutra* as its complement (*sesha*); but in the first *sutra* the object set out in "What is the *pramana* of *dharma* (*kim laksano dharmah*)" was that the valid means of the knowledge of *dharma* should be investigated; and as regards that (question) the validity of the Veda (as the only source) having been demonstrated the validity of *arthavada*, *smriti* and *namya-dheya* will be established in the succeeding three *padas* (of the first *adhyaya*). Hence similar to the *chodana-sutra* the three *padas* are related to this very proposition set out in the first *sutra* in (the words) "which is *dharma*? The objection cannot be raised that the proposition, "The Veda alone" (is the right means of the knowledge of *dharma*) would be subversive of the validity of *arthavada* exhortative passages etc. The object of the emphasis is to exclude those falling under the same category (viz. *pramana*). For example, when it is said 'the cloth is white' the exclusion is with reference to 'black' etc. and not to substances (the class-notion of *dravya*). In the same way, by the emphasis in '*chodanaiva*' the exclusion is only of perception and the rest which claim independent validity like the Veda (in the ascertainment of *dharma*); but the validity of *arthavada* etc., since they are in syntactical unity with Veda (i.e. the mandatory texts) and since their authoritativeness is admitted on the ground that they have their source in the Veda (the *smritis* for example) is not vitiated by the emphasis on *chodana*, nor is their validity demonstrated (in the first *pada*). Their validity will however be demonstrated in the succeeding three *padas* as declared (in the *Vartika*): Thus in this section having as aforesaid established the validity of the Veda in regard to *dharma*, thereafter, however, dividing the Veda into three parts, what its import is, will be revealed."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Vide, The Gackwad's Oriental Series, Vol. No. LXXXIX, pp. 231-233.



## CHAPTER XV

### THE ABSOLUTE NON-DUALISTIC SCHOOL (VEDANTA)

#### I

#### PRE-SANKARA VEDANTA SCHOOL

Gaudapada, the preceptor of Govindapada who was the spiritual teacher of Acharya Sankara, was the first promulgator of the systematic thought on Advaita Vedanta before the advent of Sankara. Gaudapada has composed *Karikas* on the *Mandukya-Upanishad*. There are only six aphorisms which explain the significance of Omkara or Pranava, and with the help of those six aphorisms, Gaudapada has developed his theory of Ajati as well as his philosophy from the standpoint of absolute Vedanta. Pranava is divided into four main parts and other two subtle parts, *Kala* and *Vindu* on the top. And yet Pranava is known as the Divine Principle of four parts or quarters ('*so'yamatma chatuspat*'): *Turiya* or transcendental quarter, *Isvara*, *Hiranyagarbha*, and *Virata*. These parts or quarters are known as *padas*. Those parts are also known as transcending (*Turiya*), deep sleep (*sushupti*), dream (*svapna*), and waking (*jagrat*), states which are found in all the individual beings in a collective (*samasthi*) way, and *turiya* (fourth), *prajna*, *taijasa* and *vishva* in an individual (*vyasthi*) way. The last or sixth aphorism ends with the *mantra*:

‘एष सवेद्वरः एव सर्वज्ञ एषोहन्तर्यमिगेष

योनिः सर्वस्य प्रभवापग्रयौ हि भूतानाम् ।

i.e. ‘The all-knowledge and all-bliss Lord is the knower of all, this is the controller within, this is the source of all, and that is that from which all things evolve and in which all things finally disappear.’

The *Karikas* of Gaudapada are also known as the *Agamashstra*. It has been said that the fundamental doctrine of Gaudapada is *Ajativada* or doctrine of No-

origination, which proves that world as creation (projection) never evolves, but it *appears* as created or evolved owing to the influence of inscrutable *maya* or delusion. Gaudapada agrees, to some extent, with the Vijñānavādins or Yogachari Buddhists who hold that the world-appearance is ultimately delusive and unreal, for it cannot exist independently and outside of consciousness (*vijñāna*) which is the only Reality. This view of Gaudapada reduces his doctrine of philosophy into subjective idealism which can be said to be solipsism. This subjective idealism ignores or rather denies the external existence of the world phenomena. But Sankara has a compromising attitude like Immanuel Kant who refuted Berkeley, Hume, and other subjective idealists. Sankara has made compromise with realism and idealism, and has admitted the temporary phenomenal existence (*vyavaharika-satta*) of the world-appearance, so long as the Brahman-knowledge does not dawn upon the horizon of the human experience. But Gaudapada does not admit the phenomenal existence of the world even temporarily, as he says, the phenomenal existence is illusive and unreal being the mind-construction, and the transcendental existence (*paramarthika-satta*) is only real. In the *Karika*, III 31, Gaudapada says:

मनोदृश्यमिदं द्वेतं यत्किञ्चित्सचराचरम् ।

i.e. duality or world-appearance is the creation of the mind, and when the mind is unmindful or concentrated, the duality of appearance vanishes. The *Astavakra-samhita* sings the same song, when it says:

(a) 'यत्र बिम्बमिदं भानि कल्पितं रज्जुसर्पवत्' (1.10),

(b) 'भावामात्रमिदं बिम्बं' (3.11).

In favour of non-origin of the world-appearance, Gaudapada has said '*ajatasya*' (III.20), *ajayamana* (III.26), *aiate* (IV.43), etc. Gaudapada has also used in some places the word *vijñāna* (Vide IV 45, 40, 48, 50, 51, 52) which is not the *vijñāna*-consciousness of the Yogachari Buddhist, but it is the *Brahma-vijñāna* of Advaita Vedanta. Besides, Gaudapada has used the word Buddha (Vide IV. 42, 78, 80, 87, 88, etc.) which does not mean Gautama Buddha, but it means the wise and realized soul. He has further

used the word *samvriti*<sup>1</sup> which means *maya* or delusion (Vide IV. 73, 78, etc.). The word *samvriti* in the sense of *maya* or delusion is generally found in the Buddhist philosophy, but Gaudapada has used the word *samvriti* in the sense of *maya*, as there was Buddhist influence in philosophy. Some scholars, including MM. B. Bhattacharya, are inclined to prove that the *Agamashastra* of Gaudapada is purely Buddhistic, and it expounds the Buddhist thoughts in the garb of the Hindu philosophy. But this view is untenable, as Gaudapada has purely propagated the Hindu Vedanta philosophy, and thus has paved the way of the non-dualistic Vedantic ideas or thoughts in the pre-Sankara time. While explaining the real tenets of Advaita philosophy, as forwarded by Gaudapada, Dr. Chandradhar Sharma has beautifully put: "The external objects are not the creation of the individual self, for both are only manifestations or consciousness. That which has empirical existence cannot be called ultimately real. Consciousness which is immanent in the subject and in the object, yet transcends them both. It transcends the trinity of knower, known, and knowledge. Consciousness is really *asanga*; it has no attachment or connection or relation with anything else. It is called 'Unborn' (*Aja*) from an empirical standpoint. From the ultimate standpoint, it cannot be called even 'Unborn', for it is really indescribable by intellect. Realizing the truth of Non-origination, one bids good-bye to all sorrow and desire and reaches the fearless goal"<sup>2</sup>

It might be the fact that Gaudapada expounds his theory of Advaita-Brahmavada with some contemporary words and references of the Buddhist philosophy which were current in his time, but his viewpoint of non-dual Reality is clear when he has said,

स्वप्ने-माये यथा दृष्टे गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।

तथा बिम्बमिदं दृष्टं वेदान्तेषु बिचक्षणैः ॥

<sup>1</sup> *Samvriti* is a Buddhist term.

<sup>2</sup> Vide, *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy* (Indian Ed. 1964), pp. 246-47.

That is, 'as dream and magical mysterious *maya* are seen to be unreal, or as a city in the sky, so also is this whole universe known to be unreal from Vedanta or *Upanishad* by the wise'. Regarding *paramarthata* (highest or absolute) Truth, Gaudapada has said that as the absolute Truth is eternal and is an accomplished fact, so there remains neither the question of *utpatti* (origination) and *nirodha* (dissolution), nor of bondage (*bandhan*) and striving or desire for *moksha* (emancipation). The discussion on 'Quenching of Fire-band' or *alatashati-prakarana* is very interesting in Gaudapada's philosophy. Sankara in his commentary on the first aphorism of this chapter has said that in order to conclude the final examination for the establishment of the philosophy of non-dualism, this chapter begins. When a fire-band or blazing *mashala* is turned around with quick speed, it looks like a circle. Gaudapada says (IV. 48,)

अस्पन्दमानमलातमनाभासमजं यथा ।

अस्पन्दमानं विज्ञानमनाभासमजं तथा ॥

'As a fire-band, when not in motion, is free from all appearances and remains changeless, similarly, consciousness (*vijnanam*) or Atman, when not in motion, is free from all appearances and remains changeless.' Gaudapada has also mentioned about the fire-band in IV. 49 and IV. 50, and his contention is this that consciousness or Brahman is changeless all the time, but it appears to be changing and posing forms only on account of ignorance of the perceived mind. In fact, the mind is non-dual, but in dream it appears as dual, and in a similar way, the Brahman is non-dual, but it appears as dual in ignorance. In fact, all appearances and dualities are mind-construction, so when the mind is withdrawn or concentrated, all appearances and dualities disappear. Gaudapada is of the opinion that *vijnanam* or *Brahma-vijnanam* means consciousness which is birthless and deathless. This state of consciousness (*vijnanam*) transcends one and many, but the mind makes it dual or manifold for its changing character. So the mind with its modifications should be turned to inward direction towards the Brahman, the all-consciousness, and then the mind will

be transformed into its own form of pure consciousness. Then the immortal and immutable Brahman is realized in consciousness as consciousness.

Next we find the similar non-dualistic thoughts among some pre-Sankara thinkers, headed by Bhartrihari or Bhattriprapancha, who appeared in the seventh century A.D. He has propounded his unique doctrine of the *Shabdabrahman* or the philosophy of the eternal Logos or Word. The theory of *Shabdabrahman* is mostly akin to *Advaitavada*, as forwarded by Sankara. Bhartrihari, in his celebrated *Vakyapadiya* and other works, has proved that the empirical world is superimposed (*kalpita* or *adhyasta*) and the eternal Word (*Sphota*) is the Reality that forms the ground and the cause of this world-process. According to Bhartrihari, the Logos or Word or *Sphota* is the infinite Self, devoid of *avidya* or *maya*, and is free from all kinds of change or modification. When this Logos is contaminated with *avidya* or *maya*,<sup>3</sup> it appears as a limited soul (*jiva*). But with the union (*sayujya*) of their finite self with the infinite Self, the Logos, release or emancipation (*mukti* or *moksha*) is accomplished, and, according to Bhartrihari, this release is no other than identity with the Logos, or Word, or *Sphota*. The Logos or *Sphota* is the *Shabdabrahman*, which creates Pranava or Omkara, the symbol (*vachaka*) i.e., conveyor of the eternal and uncreated *Sphota*. This theory of the *Shabdabrahman* or *Sphota* is undoubtedly incorporated by Bhartrihari from the *Mahabhashya* of Patanjali, which is the philosophical exposition on the aphorisms of the Panini's grammar.

Further we find the ideas of non-duality in the *Puranas* and *Samhitas* like the *Bhagavata-Purana*, *Ashtavakra-Samhita*, etc. In the *Mahabharata*, we also find the nucleus of the *Advaitavada*, but Sankara has expounded the thoughts of the Advaita philosophy in a very systematic and logical way. The non-dualistic philosophy, as presented

<sup>3</sup> Padmapada has made no distinction between *maya* and *avidya*, but Prakashatman has pointed out that *maya* and *avidya* are different in the sense that *maya* has predominantly the potency of *vikshepa*, while *avidya* has that of *avarana*. So there are differences of opinion in the *Vivarana* school regarding the works or powers of *maya* and *avidya*.

by Sankara in his commentaries of the principal *Upanishads*, the *Bhagavad-Gita*, and the *Brahmasutras* of Badarayana-Vyasa (*Prasthanatraya*) are enabrate, systematic, and scientific, and the post-Sankara philosophers of Advaita Vedanta like Padmapada, Vachaspati Mishra, Anandagiri, Sarvajnatamuni, Shriharsha, Prakashatman, Vidyaranya, Chitsukha, Madhusudana Sarasvati, Appaya-Dikshit, and others have mostly followed Sankara and sometimes contributed their new and novel ideas in the field of the Advaita philosophy.

## II

### SANKARA AND HIS NON-DUALISTIC SCHOOL

When we discuss about the non-dualistic or monistic system of Indian philosophy, known as the Advaita school, we mainly take the Advaita system of Vedanta as interpreted by Sankaracharya who lived in the ninth century A.D. and expounded his system of non-dualistic or Advaita philosophical thoughts in the form of commentaries (*bhashyas*) on some principal *Upanishads*, the *Bhagavad-Gita*, and the *Brahmasutra* of Badarayana-Vyasa. Some say that he also wrote the *Prapanchasara-Tantra*. Really Sankara has maintained the Vedic teachings and truth throughout his expositions of the commentaries and works based on systematic and strong logical ground, with his deep spiritual insight and direct realization (*brahmanubhuti*). But before the advent of Sankaracharya there were some schools of thoughts which upheld the speculative ideas similar to Advaita Vedanta.

Now to represent the central philosophy of Advaita Vedanta, it may be said that there are three types of things: the Brahman, the pure *chit*, is *paramarthika* or absolute real; the world, a product of nescience or *ajnana*, is *vyavaharika* or phenomenally real, and the object of wrong knowledge is *pratibhasika* or real so long as its knowledge continues. The true knowledge i.e. transcendental consciousness is eternal, unchanging, and self-evident, whereas

phenomenal or relational knowledge is changing and unreal. Nescience (*ajnana* or *avidya*) is the stuff of the contingent world, and is superimposed on pure *chit* or higher consciousness. The object of the phenomenal knowledge is subject to change, is contradicted, and is sublated by the object of true knowledge or pure consciousness.

True knowledge is neither contradicted nor sublated, but it is a valid knowledge (*pramana*). Nescience or *maya* is *sadasadvilakshana* i.e. which is neither real, nor unreal. *Chit* or pure consciousness forms the ground of both the nescience and the world.

In the language of Vidwan H. N. Raghavendrachar it can be said: "*Ajnana* as *maya* conditions *chit*, and is the material cause of the world. *Chit* being conditioned by *maya* is *Isvara*, the material and the efficient cause of the world. . . *Chit* conditioned by *antahkarana* is the individual soul (*jiva*). *Jiva* in its essence is the Brahman." By means of *shravana*, *manana*, and *nididhyasana* one can discriminate between the eternal and the non-eternal, and can thus realize himself as one with the Brahman, and this realization of the Brahman is known as *mukti* or *moksha*, according to Advaita Vedanta.

True knowledge (*yathartha-jnana*) is caused or determined by *pramana*, and all Acharyas admit that a *pramana* is the means of valid knowledge. *Pramanas*, according to Advaita Vedanta, are six, and they are: perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumana*), scriptural testimony (*agama*), comparison (*upamana*), presumption (*arthapatti*), and non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*). Sankara has also adopted in his Advaita Vedanta system these six *pramanas* as the sources of valid knowledge.

Now, a *pramana* is that which gives rise to a *vritti* or modification that manifests *chit* or consciousness, and a *pramana* is said to be a modalised consciousness (*vritti-jnana*). *Chit* or pure consciousness is self-shining (*svayam-jiyoti*), self-revealing (*svyam-prakasha*), and undivided (*akhanda*), but when it manifests through the medium of the internal organ (*antahkarana*) or mind, it assumes the form of *vritti-jnana*. A *vritti* is, therefore, a product of

*chit* and *ajnana*, i.e. a consciousness and *antahkarana*<sup>4</sup> or mind, which is a product of nescience or *ajnana* (*ajnana-parinama*). The *Vedanta-Paribhasa* defines *vritti* as '*parinama vrittih uchhyate*'. Advaita Vedanta admits two kinds of *vritti*: *antahkarana-vritti* and *avidya-vritti*. *Antahkarana-vritti* happens to be a subject, 'I', and both I (soul) and its objects are superimposed (*adhyasta*) on *chit* or consciousness, and are, therefore, unreal. Similarly *avidya-vritti* and its objects are superimposed on *chit* or consciousness, and are, therefore, unreal. In fact, a *vritti-jnana* or modal consciousness is not real, and consciousness devoid of any *vritti*, is real being free from any change.

Now *pramana* gives rise to a *prama* or knowledge. In Vedanta, a *prama* is defined as a novel knowledge which is not given to any sense (*anadhigata*), and is not sublated (*abadhita*). Now, what do we mean by a perception (*pratyaksha-pramana*) in Advaita Vedanta? In perception, three consciousnesses: subject-consciousness (*pramatri-chaitanya*), object-consciousness (*prameya* or *vishaya-chaitanya*), and knowledge-consciousness (*pramana-chaitanya*) become one, and from the standpoint of consciousness, there remains no difference among them. Now this one and the same consciousness is the pointer (*nirdeshaka*) of the Divine Brahman-consciousness; or it can be said that, from the standpoint of one and the same consciousness in three categories, subject, object, and process, the *chit* or consciousness manifests as one without a second, but from the standpoint of three contents of knowledge, subject (*pramatri*), object (*prameya* or *vishaya*), and conjoining process or principle, it can be said that the same consciousness manifests as three principles, when limited by *ajnana*. Again it is seen that one and the same consciousness (*shuddha-chit*) appears as two forms, *chaitanya* (pure consciousness) and *vritti-chaitanya* (modal consciousness).

Now it can be asked as to how does perception of all

<sup>4</sup> *Antahkarana* means internal organ. It is sometimes used as mind, though practically mind or *manah* is one of the modifications (*vrittis*) of *antakarana*.



objects happen? To this it can be said that at the time of external perception, *antahkarana* or mind goes out through the medium of eyes, reaches and covers the object, and instantly assumes the form of the object. This form is the *vritti* (modification) of the object. Next, both the object and its *vritti* occupy the same point of space. On account of *vritti*, the nescience (*ajnana*) in the object or object-consciousness (*prameya* or *vishaya-chaitanya*) is destroyed, and as a result, the *pramana-chaitanya* is identified with *vishaya-chaitanya*, and this identity gives rise to the knowledge of perception.

Regarding this valid knowledge of perception (*pratyaksha*). Dharmaraja Adhvarin has said in the *Vedanta-Paribhasha*: "Just as the water of a tank, going out through a hole and entering fields through channels, comes to have, even like those (fields), a quadrangular or other figure, similarly, the internal organ too, which is of the nature of light, going out through the sense of sight etc. (as the eyes are luminous or *taijasa*), and reaching the locality of contexts like a pot, is modified in the form of contexts like a pot, is modified in the form of contexts like pot. This same modification is called a psychosis or modal consciousness (*vritti*).<sup>5</sup> In fact, the sense-organs are the outlets, and whenever there is any contact between a sense-organ and its object, it assumes the form of the object. This form is called *antahkarana-vritti*. It is also the state of *antahkarana*. Vidwan Raghavendrachar has beautifully classified this subject when he writes: "Before knowing a thing, it is not known. So before there is the knowledge of a thing, is the non-knowledge of it. This non-knowledge is not the absence of knowledge. For to be conscious of such absence is to be conscious of knowledge itself and so of the object of knowledge. Hence the non-knowledge that precedes knowledge is *bhavarupa-ajnana*. This is *ajnana* of the object in view. *Ajnana* is revealed by *sakshi* (witness). Its object also is revealed by it. So all the objects of *ajnana* are the

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<sup>5</sup> *Tatra yatha tadagodakam chidrannir-gatya kulyatmana kedaran prabishya tadvadeva chaskonadyakaram bhavati tatha taijasamntah-karanamapi chaksuradivara nirgatya bhatadi-vishyadesham gatva ghata-divishakarena parinamate. Sa eva parinamo vrittih.*

objects of *sakshi* or witnessing consciousness.<sup>6</sup> Vidyaranya Svami divides witnessing consciousness (*svakshi-chaitanya*) into two, or it can be said that he admits dual function of witnessing consciousness, *vritti-chaitanya* and *adhara* or *kutastha-chaitanya*, though Vedanta has admitted two witnessing consciousness, *jiva-sakshi* (vide *Vedanta paribhasa*). In the *kutastha-dipa* (Chapter VIII), Vidyaranya Svami says in the *Panchadasi* :

घटं काकारधीस्था चिद्घटमेवावभासयेत् ।

घटस्य ज्ञातता ब्रह्मचैतन्येनावभासते ॥

‘An external object, such as a pot, is known or cognized through modifications (*vrittis*) of the mind or intellect assuming its form, but knowledge ‘I know the pot’ comes directly through substrate consciousness, Brahman’. So there are two knowledges, knowledge of the object, pot, and knowledge of ‘knowledge of the pot’ or ‘knowledge that I know the pot’ or ‘knowledge that I have an idea or the pot’. The first knowledge (*vritti-jnana*) manifests the pot, and the second knowledge makes possible knowledge that I know the pot.

So we find that knowledge of a pot involves a double consciousness viz. *vritti-cum-chidabhasa*-consciousness (covering the pot) and Brahman or *kutastha*-consciousness (manifesting the pot to the cognizer). The *Panchadasi* says,

चैतन्यं द्विगुणं कुम्भे ज्ञातत्वेन स्फुरतः ।

So in the next verse, Vidyaranya Svami made clear, when he said,

घटोद्दयमितां सावृत्तिराभासस्य प्रसादतः ।

बिज्जातो घट इतुगत्तिब्रह्मावुग्रहो भवेत् ॥

‘Knowledge or cognition ‘this is a pot’ is due to *chida-bhasa* (*vritti-jnana*) but knowledge or cognition ‘I know the pot’ is derived from *adhara* or Brahman-consciousness’. So knowledge of the pot to me is possible for *chida-bhasa* and pure consciousness, which involves dual function. (Vide *Panchadasi* VIII. 4, 5, 16.)

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *The Dvaita Philosophy and Its Place in the Vedanta*, p. 36.

Therefore it is true that *vritti*-knowledge (knowledge of the modification of the mind or intellect) is revealed by *sakshi*, and its objects are revealed by the same.<sup>5</sup> Hence all objects whether they are known or not are the objects of *sakshi*. Therefore, it is stated in the Advaita works, "*sarvam vastu jnatataya ajnatataya va sakshibhashyam*", i.e. every object as known or unknown, is revealed by *sakshi* or witness-consciousness.

Perception is again two-fold, because of the difference as determinate (*savikalpaka*) and indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*). The *Vedantaparibhasha* says that the determinate is a cognition or knowledge apprehending relatedness (*vaishishtavagahi*), e.g., the cognition, 'I cognize the pot', and the indeterminate is a cognition not apprehending relation (*samsarganavagahi*), e.g. the cognition generated by statements like, 'this that Devadatta' or 'thou art that' (*tattvamasi*). Further, cognition or knowledge of perception is two-fold, *jiva-sakshi* and *Ishvara-sakshi*. Of these, what is called the *jiva* or individual soul, is internal organ-defined consciousness, and the witness (*sakshi*) of that is consciousness qualified *per accidens* by the internal organ. This *jiva-sakshi* is different in each individual. And the *Ishvarah-sakshi* is the consciousness qualified *per accidens* by *maya* (*mayopahitam chaitanyam*), which is one because of the oneness of *maya* (*mayaya ekatvam nishchijate*) which is its qualification *per accidens*.<sup>7</sup>

Now, because of the twofoldness of the witness (*sakshi-dvaividhyena*), there is twofoldness of knowledge of perception, *ineyagata* and *jnaptigata*, i.e. knowledge as present in the object cognized and as present in the cognition.

There is also illusory perception (*bhrama-darshana*), as we erroneously perceive a piece of rope as a snake, or a piece of nacre as a silver. The illusory snake or silver is a modification of nescience or *avidya*, which exists in the consciousness subsisting in *avidya*. An erroneous perception (or knowledge) happens due to a defect in the visual organ. Now, when we perceive a piece of rope as a snake,

<sup>7</sup> "Java-sakshi pratyatmam nana: . . . Ishvara-sakshi tu mayopahitam chaitanyam tachchaikam, tadrdpdlbhuta-mayaya ekatvat"—V.P.

the illusory snake has illusory reality (*pratibhasika-satta*) while a real rope has an empirical reality (*vyavaharika-satta*). The *Vedānta-Paribhasha* has explained it thus: “*tatha hi, kachadidosadusi-talochanasya \* \* \* rajata-jñanabhasakarena cha parinamate*”. However error or illusion is contradicted by right perception (or knowledge). In a similar way, we perceive the unreal world as the real Brahman. This unreal world is neither existent, nor non-existent, nor existent-non-existent but indefinable (*anirvachaniya*).

The viewpoint of Nyaya, as regards the knowledge of perception, is different and realistic. Nyaya holds that knowledge of any kind is the product of contact of the senses and the mind with the self, and when the senses come in contact with the objects, knowledge of the objects originates, and, in this process, mind and self help in originating knowledge. Modern science subscribes to a somewhat similar view. Modern science states that external objects send out *stimuli* which are received in the brain, where they somehow result in the knowledge of perception of the objects. Psychology says that knowledge of perception of anything is only possible so long as that thing or energy, radiating from it, affects some sense-organ and initiates in it a nervous current which transmits itself to the brain. Professor McDougall<sup>8</sup> has said that thus “all our perception of the beauty and wonder of the material world about us is only possible in virtue of these streams of energy poured upon us from material things. . . . For it is only through the medium of our sense-organs that we become aware of one another that we perceive one another and communicate our experience, our knowledge, our feeling, and our striving”.<sup>9</sup> Swami Abhedananda elaborately discusses the theory and process of the knowledge of perception in his monumental work, *True Psychology*. The Swami has said that, according to Western psychology, the act of knowledge of perception involves the physico-psychical process. But Advaita Vedānta maintains a quite diffe-

<sup>8</sup>Vide, W. McDougall: *An Outline of Psychology* (London, 1936), p. 222.

<sup>9</sup> Vide also *A Note On Some Aspects of the Psychology of Visual Perception* by P. V. Ramamurti in *Perception* (1966), pp. 21-23.

rent view regarding the knowledge of perception. According to Vedānta, said Swami Madhavananda, "it is eternal Pure Consciousness (*chaitanya*); only it is manifested through mental states (*vrutti*). The Vedāntin's theory of perception is in sharp contrast with the Naiyāyika's. Vedānta holds that pure consciousness has three forms—as associated with the mutual state, and perception of any external object (that is present and capable of being perceived) takes place when these three occupy the same space, by the mental state issuing through the organ and spreading over the object so as to assume the same form—like the water of a tank reaching a field through a channel and being shaped like a field. The mental state serves to remove the veil of nescience (*avidya*) from the consciousness associated with the object, which is revealed by a reflection of the consciousness associated with the subject (that is, of the Self, which is of the nature of intelligence)."<sup>10</sup> In fact, the Vedāntists, including Sāṅkara, have made the Self (*Ātman*) responsible for all manifestations in experiences or knowledge. Intellect (*buddhi*), being most internal and subtlest, is the first to receive the light of consciousness, and the mind (*manas*) comes next in contact with intellect (*buddhi*), and then the senses (*indriyas*) come in contact with mind (*manas*), and the body comes in contact with the senses, and then the rest of the phenomenal universe is bound with the law of cause and sequence to complete the process of knowledge or experience of everything of the phenomenal world.

Now let us describe knowledge of perception, according to Western philosophy. Knowledge of perception is the apprehension of a supposed outer reality or of an integral object. In every act of perception, however simple, has said Professor Ledger Wood, recognition and interpretation play their indispensable role. It is a cognitive process, and is analysable into sub-cognitive or infra-cognitive ingredients and this analysis is an indispensable preliminary to the epistemology of perception.

<sup>10</sup> Vide, *The Vedānta-Paribhāṣha* (translated into English by Swami Madhavananda), 'Introduction', pp. VI-VII.

Really knowledge of perception is 'a structural whole having a sensory nucleus and an interpretational fringe'. So we think that there are four steps in perceptual analysis, and mind in each step or in every act of perception, exercises all interpretative functions, and we seem to be face-to-face with real objects and to apprehend the qualities also, which externally belong to the objects.

While explaining perception, Professor H. H. Price has dealt with that given *naïve* realism, the causal theory, the nature of sense-data, perceptual acceptance, and perceptual assurance in connection with perceptual consciousness, the relation of sense-data to one another and to matter and also the origination of sense-data to explicitly define and analyse the theory and process of perception. In conclusion, Professor Price has said that individual sense-data are private and dependent each on a certain mind, "but as we have seen families of sense-data are not; therefore, the world of complete things also is public and independent of minds. It is discovered, and not made, by minds (whatever 'making' may mean), though to be sure that it is not discovered by sense alone. It is the object of perceptual assurance, and if this mode of consciousness is not acquaintance or demonstration, still it is quite good enough for the confirmation process upon which it is based can be continued *ad libitum*. In short, the world of 'complete' things is as real as any realist could desire. And it is the only sort of world which is of any interest to us."<sup>11</sup>

Besides perception, there are sources of knowledge like inference (*anumana*), verbal testimony (*agama*), etc., which will be explained afterwards. For general information about methods of knowledge according to both Eastern and Western schools of philosophy, the following books may be suggested for consultation: (a) Professor Price: *Perception* (1950); (b) Professor Ledger Wood: *The Analysis of Knowledge* (1940); (c) Professor N. O. Lossky: *The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge* (1919); (d) W. M. P. Montague: *The Ways of Knowing* (1925); (e) Dr. D. M. Datta: *The Six Ways of Knowing*; (f) Swami Satprakashananda:

<sup>11</sup> Vide, *Perception* (1950), pp. 320-21.

*Methods of Knowledge* (1965); (g) Swami Prajnanananda : *Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge* ; (h) Dr. S. C. Chatterjee : *The Nyaya-Theory of Knowledge*, etc.

Regarding origin of knowledge and different ways of knowing, we find great divergent opinions even among the ancient Greek philosophers. "In their psychological theory", says Professor Windelband, "the Greeks always regarded the intellect as passivity, or as a respective activity, and to them the reception or mirroring (picture-theory) of reality in the soul, not mingled with any disturbing or distorting activity of one's own, was so peculiarly knowledge that this unresisting reception would find its religious completion in the vision of the mystic."<sup>12</sup>

In the origin of knowledge, we generally come across two opposite theories of Empiricism and Rationalism, Empiricism leads to the formula that all knowledge comes from natural experience, whereas Rationalism leads to the formula that all knowledge is based upon rational thought. All the philosophers from Bacon and Descartes to about end of the philosophers of the eighteenth century, were characterized by this contrast of Empiricism and Rationalism. All of these philosophers were filled with the struggle about 'innate ideas'. The Empiricists used to deny this conception of 'innate ideas'.

Locke has maintained two sources of empirical knowledge, internal and external, and suggests origination of soul's knowledge from its own activities on one hand and from the impressions which the soul receives through the material body from the envioning world in space, on the other hand, Prof. Windleband has called these two sources of empirical knowledge the dualistic metaphysic of the distinction between consciousness and extension, or spirit and matter. Locke's theory may be called as Sensualism. The neo-Platonists of the Renaissance following the example of the stores, "had regarded this aboriginal knowledge as belonging to the soul from its very nature and in virtue of its divine origin." The Cartesian philosophy

<sup>12</sup> Vide, *An Introduction to Philosophy* (1921), translated by Joseph McCabe, p. 176.

adopted this view. In Leibnitz, the conflict between Empiricism and Rationalism was overcome, i.e. the psychological antithesis of Empiricism and Rationalism was raised to a higher level.

Now, in antiquity and also in the Scholastic movement, there developed the antithesis of the two points of view on the theory of knowledge which are known as Realism and Nominalism. Realism affirms that our knowledge consists of concepts and must be of a knowledge of reality, and the contents of the concepts must be regarded as copies of being. Nominalism, regards the concepts "as intermediate and auxiliary constructions in the reflecting mind, not as copies of something independent of the mind and existing itself." In the meantime, Scepticism with doubling mind on enquiry evolved along with Dogmatism. The phenomenalistic theory also evolved with its two forms, *sensualistic* and *rationalistic*. The *sensualistic* phenomenalism holds that the "contents of sensory perception are real, while the concepts are regarded as mere ideas or names—at all events, as something the validity of which is restricted to consciousness", whereas the *rationalistic* one submits that "all sensory presentations are only appearances of reality in consciousness, and finds reality in the concepts, the contents of thought." Further, in connection with the origin of knowledge and its methods, we find that idealistic schools of thought, known as Idealism, reduces the external reality to presentations, the case being just the reverse with Realism, which calls the external reality real and locates out there. Critical Realism forwards an account of knowledge of perception "as involving the separation of the 'what' from the 'that'," has said Professor Bosanquet. "The 'what' is in the form of 'essences' or quality groups; the 'that' is the form of existents, identified with physical objects". Therefore, knowledge or knowledge of perception consists in qualifying the existent 'that' by the ideal 'what'.<sup>13</sup> Thus we find that Critical Realism believes "in a world of existents which are in themselves what they are,

<sup>13</sup> Vide, 'The Meeting of Extremities in Contemporary Philosophy' (1924), p. 134.



and are not affected in their nature as existents by perception or cognition, but exist just the same whether there is awareness of them or not.”<sup>14</sup> So an object of perception, or of knowledge, according to Critical Realism, is not the percept, and the percept is not the object, and so nothing of the “that” should overflow into the “what”. Idealism and Absolute Idealism do not admit this position, as advanced by the theory of Critical Realism. Professor Laird has said that Idealism “has many species, and each of these species has several varieties. Thus the term may stand for a pan-spiritual ontology, that is, for the doctrine that nothing exists save spirit and its states, and such an ontology is pluralistic, if it asserts that there are many spirits, and monistic, if it asserts that there is only one”.<sup>15</sup> Again we find the theory of Absolute Idealism in connection with the theory of knowledge, and this theory may be called as a combination of Pan-spiritualism, Idea-ism and Idealism. This Absolute Idealism is found in Hegel. Professor Laird says that we must see that Hegel’s fundamental contentions were that ‘ideas’ entailed in Idea-ism must be rational ideas. In Bradley, Royce, Bosanquet, McTaggart and also in Croce and Gentile, we find the tint of Absolute Idealism. Bradley has said that “all we know consists wholly of experience. Reality (being a seamless unity) must be, therefore, one experience. . . .”. But Croce has brought revolution in the field of Idealism or Absolute Idealism, or rather he has shocked the intransigent Absolutists more profoundly. He has said that as philosophy is identical with history, so knowledge, being always knowledge of existence, implies a sensory, that is, a historical element, and also implies thought, i.e. implies philosophy. Now, apart from all theories or ‘isms’, we can safely say that in all knowledge or consciousness “we encounter the fundamental antithesis of the *function*, the activity or state and the *content*, in which this function is discharged.” Again in experience of knowledge, knowledge and content of know-

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, p. 130, Vide also Prof. G. Dawes Hick’s ‘*Critical Realism*’ (London).

<sup>15</sup> Vide, ‘*Recent Philosophy*’ (the Home University Library, London, 1936), p. 48.

ledge are inseparably connected, as function of knowledge is impossible without content (or object), and content (or object) is equally impossible without function. Professor Windleband has said that from the empirical knowledge of the individual we rise to the collective knowledge of any historical group or human beings, and beyond this to an ideal or normative culture-consciousness—in the end, metaphysically, to an absolute world-knowledge or world-consciousness.<sup>16</sup>

In recent times, some of the philosophers have interpreted the problem of knowledge in some new way. In his *Theory of Knowledge* (1966) Prof. R. M. Chisholm has said that “we have defined ‘know’ in terms of ‘evident’. And we have defined ‘evident’ in terms of ‘more reasonable’. The definition of ‘evident’ is not completely empty, for we have seen that ‘more reasonable’ is also adequate for the definition of other basic terms of epistemic appraisal.”

Two quite different questions of the theory of knowledge, he says, are ‘what do we know? and how are we to decide, in any particular case, *whether* we know? The first of these questions, may also be put by asking, what is the *extent* of our knowledge? And the second, by asking, what are the *criteria* of knowledge’. However, Prof. Chisholm has forewarded in the Introduction that “there are some things which cannot themselves be said to be evident. but which resemble that can be said to be evident in that they may function as evidence for certain others things.” “These two formulations”, he further says, “would seem to differ only verbally. If we adopt the first, we may say that some things are *directly evident*.” So things that we ordinarily say *we know* are things that are thus *directly evident*. Should we say, therefore, that the whole of what we know at any given time, is a kind of ‘structure’ having its ‘foundation’ in what happens to be directly evident at that time? If we do say this, then we should be prepadred to say just how it is that the foundation serves to support the rest of the structure.<sup>17</sup> But whether this ‘structure’ is an image

<sup>16</sup> Vide, ‘An Introduction to Philosophy’ (1921), pp. 197-198.

<sup>17</sup> Vide, *Theory of Knowledge* (1966), p. 2.

or copy, Prof. Chisholm has not said in any definite way. The Yogachara Buddhists also believe what we perceive in the outer world, is the reflection of the mind, and the real thing remains in the mind, and the image or reflection of this thing is manifested in the external world. But whatever may be the differences of opinion, it is a fact that we see or perceive a thing in the outer world either dependent or independent of the subjective mind, and whenever we perceive a thing in the outer world, it becomes the object, and he, who perceives it, becomes the subject, and thus the object appears as different from the subject truly or seemingly.

It has already been said that apart from knowledge of perception (*pratyaksha*), there are other methods or ways of knowing in Indian philosophy. Advaita Vedanta, like other Indian philosophical systems, has adopted a second means of knowledge, known as inference (*anumana*), though knowledge of inference depends on knowledge of perception for its validity. Inference is the distinctive cause of inferential knowledge, and this distinctive cause is the knowledge or cognition of pervasion or invariable concomitance: "*anumiti-karananccha vyapti jñanam*", and the residual impression (*tat samaskara*) is an intermediate function (*avantara-vyaparaha*). As for example, we perceive that 'the hill possesses fire' (*parvato bahniman*). Now, in this, knowledge of inferential perception is only in the fire or fire-aspect, not in respect of the hill-aspect, for in the latter (hill-aspect), perceptual nature (*pratyakshatva*) has already been given or explained. And this inference is *anvayi*, and not *kevalanvayi*, as it depends upon the agreement in presence between the middle term and the major term, and, therefore, it (inference) is founded on their positive concomitance or pervasion ("*taccha anumanam anvayirupameya, na tu kevalanvayi*"). It is the contention of Advaita Vedanta that *kevalanavayi* or nature of bare-co-presence is untenable, "as the Brahman is the constant ground or substratum of differenced reality, the negation of all things is existent." Again, as there is absolute negation of all kinds of attribute (*guna*) and adjunct (*upadhi*), *anvaya-vyatireki* or co-presence-cum-co-absence inference is also untenable.

This inference is two-fold i.e. divided into that for oneself (*svārtha*) and that for others (*parārtha*). Of these two, that for oneself (*svārtha*), the point is clear, and for another, it is established by a syllogism (*nyāyasādhya*). According to Advaita Vedānta, inference thus being demonstrated, the delusiveness of the entire world other than the Brahman is established. It is thus: everything other than the Brahman is delusive, because of otherness from the Brahman; what is thus (other than the Brahman) is so (delusive), like nacre-silver. Similarly Dharmarāja Adhvarin has said: “*evanumane nirupite tasmāt brahmanṇa-bhinnā-nikhīla-prapañcasya mithyātvāśiddhiḥ, Tathā hi, brahma-bhinnam sarvaṃ mithyā, brahmabhinnatvāt, yadevaṃ tadevaṃ, yathā śukti-raupyaṃ*”.

The third means of valid knowledge is comparison (*upamāna*). Comparison is the means of the knowledge of similarity (*sādrishya-pramākarānam upamānam*). This view of Advaita Vedānta is similar to that of the Mīmāṃsā philosophy, i.e. both Kumārila and Prabhakara agree with the doctrine of Advaita Vedānta, as they, like the Vedānta-chāryas, hold that comparison (*upamāna*) is the knowledge of similarity of ‘the remembered cow with a perceived wild cow.’ The Nyāya philosophy differs here, as it holds that comparison (*upamāna*) is the knowledge of similarity (*sādrishya*) of an unfamiliar object (e.g. a wild cow) with a familiar object (e.g. a cow).

The fourth means of valid knowledge is testimony (*āgama*). Dharmarāja Adhvarin has said that when for a statement is syntactical relation that is purportful is not contradicted or sublated by other evidence, that statement is a *pramāna*, and in respect of statement—generated knowledge or cognition, the causes are four: (1) syntactical connection or expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), (2) fitness or competency (*yogyatā*), (3) proximity (*asatti*), and (4) objective intension or cognition of purport (*tatparyā*). In fact, a sentence refers to an objective relation and when it is not contradicted by any other means, it becomes a means of valid knowledge (“*yasya vākyasya tatparyā-viśayibhūta saṃsārgo manāntareṇa na vādhyatō, tadvākyaṃ pramānam*”). Now, a word and even a sentence convey an idea or a sense, and

that idea or sense is two-fold, expressed (*shakya*) and implied (*lakshya*). The expressed sense is *sakti* and it is the primary denotation (*mukhya-vritti*) of the word (or even of the sentence), in respect of ideas or objects. In fact, words are composed of sounds, and sounds are, in reality, unelated, and, therefore, are only manifested, and not created. So, when a letter (*varna*) is uttered, it is not created anew, but is only manifested in an audible form (*dhvani*). Advaita Vedanta holds that word is eternal, but its manifestation is non-eternal, being in time. As word is eternal and uncreated and as the Vedas are composed of words, so the Vedas are eternal and uncreated, and the word as well as the Vedas are remembered by God (*Ishvara*), and, therefore, the Vedas are self-evident and eternal.

The fifth *pramana* is presumption (*arthapatti*). It is the assumption or postulation (*apatti*) of a fact (*artha*) to account for another inexplicable or unintelligible fact. The *Vedanta-Paribhasa* states: "*tatra upapadya-jnanena upapadeka kalpanam arthapatti*", i.e. presumption consists in the postulation by a cognition or knowledge which has to be made intelligible, of what will make (that) intelligible. There is a distinctive cause and intelligible effect in an *arthapatti*. It is of two kinds, *drishta* or perceived and *shruta* or verbally cognized.

The definition of presumption (*arthapatti*), as advanced by Advaita Vedanta, agrees with that of Kumarila. But Prabhakara or the Bhatta school of Mimamsa holds that there must be an element of doubt (*samshaya*) in regard to the truth of two inconsistent facts perceived, and such doubt is removed by presumption.

The sixth means of valid knowledge is non-apprehension (*anupalabhi*). By dint of this *pramana* negation (*abhava*) or non-existence is cognized. But it should be remembered that Vedanta recognizes *abhava* as a *bhava-padartha*, as *abhava* does not mean a void: Really we know non-existence by non-apprehension. As for example, we perceive the locus or ground (*adhikarana*) of a jar. When the jar is removed from its locus or ground, we perceive the locus (*adhikarana*) of the non-existence (*abhava*) of the jar, and not the non-existence itself. But the Bhatta

school maintains that the non-existence of a thing is non-different from its bare locus, so when the jar is absent from the locus or ground, we perceive the bare ground only. Now the perception of the mere locus or ground is a positive cognition. Advaita Vedānta also admits non-existence as non-different from its locus, and, therefore, it considers the world-appearance to be its locus.<sup>18</sup>

Dharmarāja Adhvarin has admitted four kinds of non-existence (*abhava*), and they are: previous non-existence (*pragabhava*), non-existence as destruction (*pradhvamsabhava*), absolute non-existence (*atyantabhava*), and mutual non-existence (*anyonyabhava*). Again difference (*bheda*) is of two kinds, conditioned (*sopadhika*) and unconditioned (*nirupadhika*).

Now it can be said in this connection (i.e. in connection with the means of valid knowledge or *pramāṇa*) that the validity of knowledge is also spontaneously apprehended (*jñayate cha pramāṇyam svataḥ*). The ground of the validity is consciousness, manifested as the mental state, and the cause of its cognition is consciousness designated as the witness (*sakṣhi*).<sup>19</sup> That too, when it apprehends consciousness manifested as the mental state, apprehends the validity of the latter as well.

Sankarācārya was a great exponent of Advaita Vedānta, and truly speaking, he for the first time brought the Advaita Vedānta philosophy into a coherent system of speculative thoughts of Vedānta. His advent (788-820 A.D.) in the domain of Indian philosophy is unique in the history of the world. It has already been said that Gaudapada (600 A.D.), the teacher of Govindananda, has developed his philosophy of absolute idealism in the *Kārikas* of the *Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad*, and some are of the opinion that his doctrine of *ajativāda* was more or less indebted to the doctrine of dialectic of Nāgārjuna and that doctrine of Gaudapada can be said to be absolutism or transcendentalism (*brahmavāda*) "blended with Nāgārjuna's relativism, phenomenalism, and subjectivism". But it is a subject to

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Dr. Sinha: *History of India Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 569.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *The Vedānta-Paribhāṣa: Non-apprehension*, Eng. Translation by Swami Madhavananda (Advaita Ashrama Edn.), pp. 146-147.

be critically investigated whether the philosophical doctrine of *ajativada* is exactly similar to and is indebted to the *kshanika-vijnanavada* of the Yogachara Buddhists, or to the *shunyavada* of Nagarjuna, the founder of the Madhyamika philosophy.

To discuss it in a more explicit way it can be said that there appeared many upholders of the theory of non-dualism or monism (*advaitavada*) before the advent of Sankara, and their names are: Asvarathya, Atreya, Kashakrishna, Audulomi, Kashyapa, Bhatripapancha, Bhartrihari, Bhatri-mitra, Upavarsha. Bodhayana, Brahmanandi. Tanka, Brahmadatta, Bharuchi, Dravidacharya, Sundarapandya, Gaudapada, Govindapada, and others. Among these upholders of the theory of Advaita, the names of Bhatri-prapancha, Brahmadatta, and Gaudapada are worth-mentioning. MM. Gopinath Kaviraj has recently discussed the philosophical ideas of these Acharyas in his book *Bharatiya Sadhanar Dhara* (Bengali, 1968). It is said that Acharya Brahmadatta was senior and contemporary to Sankara, and it is found that the philosophical ideas as well as the viewpoints of Brahmadatta are somewhat different from those of Sankara. As for example, Brahmadatta is the upholder of the doctrine of *jnana-karma-samuchchaya*, i.e. the doctrine of assimilation of both knowledge and work, whereas Sankara has refuted this doctrine and maintained the doctrine of knowledge, i.e. *brahmavada*. Again Brahmadatta believes in the doctrine of *videha-mukti* (liberation after dissolution of the material body) and rejects *jivanmukti* or liberation in one's life time, but Sankara has maintained *jivanmukti* and explains the validity of this theory of liberation in one's life time in her commentary of the *Brahmasutra*: "*tat tu samanvayat*" (1.1.4) and in many other places. Sankara says that after attaining to the state of *jivanmukti*, one can live and move in the world of nescience without attachment to the world, and so *videh-mukti* is superfluous.

It has been discussed that Gaudapada, the teacher of Chandracharya or Govindapada, has written the *Karikas* on the *Mandukya-Upanishad*. It is found that Gaudapada divides his entire *Karikas* into four chapters (*prakaranas*), and

they are: *agama-prakarana*, *vaitathya-prakarana*, *advaita-prakarana*, and *alatashanti-prakarana*, and these four chapters contain 215 *Karikas*. It has also been discussed that some are of the opinion that though Gaudapada upholds the theory of non-dualism and the Advaita-viewpoint, yet the language of the *Karikas* as well as his trend of thought in them prove that he was influenced by the philosophical ideas of Nagarjuna, the author of the *Mula-Madhyamika-Karika*, which expounds the doctrine of nothingness or *shunyavada*. Some say that like the *shunyavadi* Buddhists, Gaudapada has forwarded his four-fold (*chatshkoti*) doctrines of the *Atman*, or Brahman, which are: existence (*asti*), non-existence (*nasti*), existence-non-existence (*asti-nasti*), and non-existence and non-existence (*nasti-nasti*): “*asti-nastyasti nastiti nasti nastiti va punah*”, etc. From this doctrine of *chatushkoti*, it appears that the *Atman* is *sat*, *asat*, *sadasatubhayatmaka* and *sadasat-vilakshana*. Like Gaudapada, Nagarjuna has explained these four-fold doctrines of existence and non-existence in his *Madhyamika-Karika*. Nagarjuna has stated that the *tattva* or truth is: “*na sannasanna-chapanubhayatmakam, chatushkoti-vinirmukta tattvam madhyamika viduh*”. Shriharsha has also discussed these four-fold doctrines in his *Khandakhandana-khadya* and *Naishadhacharita* (13.36).<sup>20</sup> But most of the scholars are of the opinion that similarity in language, logic, and arguments does not prove that one has borrowed the ideas from the other, or one is influenced by the other. In truth, Gaudapada is not a Buddhist in disguise, but he expounds the doctrine of Advaita, though his viewpoint of *ajata* (non-manifestation) differs somewhat from the viewpoint of Sankara regarding *vyavaharika-satta* and *paramarthika-satta* of the world-appearance.

Similarly some of the thinkers of both the East and the West are of the opinion that Sankara is the expounder of the doctrine of illusion (*mayavada*), which is exactly akin to the *vijnanavada* of the *Yogachara* Buddhists. and, therefore, Sankara is said to be a Buddhist in disguise (*prachchhanna-Bauddha*). It seems that such a characteriza-

<sup>20</sup> Vide, MM. Gopinath Kaviraj: *Bharatiya Sadhanar Dhara* (1968), pp. 114-129.



tion found its place for the first time in the *Padma-Purana*: “*mayavadam asat shastram prachchhannam bauddham eva cha, mayaiva kathitam devi kalau Sankara-rupina*”. Dr. R. S. Naulakha and Dr. R. P. Singh are of the opinion that the term ‘*mayavada*’ was first applied to Sankara’s philosophy by Bhashkaracharya (9th century A.D.), who was either a contemporary to Sankara, or flourished just after his (Sankara) death.<sup>21</sup> As the *Padma-Purana* uses the terms, *mayavada* and *asat-shastram*, so Bhaskara has also used the terms, *mayavada* and *vichchhinna-mulam*. But his charge against Sankara or Sankara’s philosophy is absolutely unjust and untenable. While discussing about this charge against Sankara, Dr. Naulakha has said that “from the sixth century A.D. onward Buddhism was on the wane, and the old Vedic religion was gradually gaining ground in its various revised forms, with the result that during the days of Bhaskara, and afterwards people in general began to look down upon such views as could be shown, in any way, to be associated with the fast decaying and the then disfavoured Buddhism. And this state of affairs seems to have been, in all likelihood, taken advantage of by those persons who could not see eye to eye with Sankara”.<sup>22</sup> Dr. Hiriyanna has forwarded some reasons in favour of Sankara in a different way, when he said that “in the time of Ramanuja there was a fresh circumstance, viz., the reaction against the purely absolutist philosophy of Sankara and its seeming negation. . . .”.<sup>23</sup> In fact, from the time of Ramanuja (11th century A.D.) we find polemics appearing in the form of refutation of Sankara’s doctrine of *advaita-brahmavada*, and we see that the use of the term *mayavada* is not at all objected to by many scholars, writers, and commentators during the times of Ramanuja, Madhva, Bhaskara, and others. Even Vachaspati Mishra,

<sup>21</sup> (a) Dr. Naulakha: *Shankara’s Brahmapada* (1964), p. 12.

(b) Dr. Singh: *The Vedanta of Shankara*, p. 369.

(c) *Is the Advaita of Shankara Buddhism in Disguise*. (Article in *Quarterly Journal of Mythic Society*, Vol. 24, Nos. 1-2, July-October.)

(d) Vide also *Bharatiya Sadhanar Dhara*, pp. 168-169.

<sup>22</sup> Vide, *Shankara’s Brahmapada*, p. 12.

<sup>23</sup> Vide, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 384.

the writer of the commentary, *Bhamati* on the *Vedantasutra* uses the term *mayavada*, though interpreted in a different way. Dr. R. P. Singh makes a distinction between the term *mayavāda* as used by Bhashkara and by Vachaspati Mishra: "To Bhashkara, the *mayavadin* did not believe in the reality of external objects, he was a mere *avahyarthavadin*, *avidya* was the sole explanatory principle with him,—he was an *avidyamatra-vadin*; for him the external objects were merely phases of consciousness; thus the *mayavadin* was merely a hidden Buddhist. But for Vachaspati *mayavāda* is the doctrine that the Brahman, the ultimate reality, creates the entire universe of names and forms, which is characterized by multiplicity, without destroying its real nature. This is what Sankara also holds, though he calls this view *Brahmavada*, and not *mayavada*, as Vachaspati does".<sup>24</sup>

The opponents, who bring false charges against Sankara as a *mayavadin*,<sup>25</sup> have not done proper justice to him. Sankara is really a *brahmavadin*, because his doctrine of Advaita Vedanta philosophy is *brahmavada*, and not *mayavada*. *Maya* is to Sankara a negative fact, and not a positive one, and all through his commentaries on the *Brahmasutra*, the *Upanishad*, and the *Bhagavad-Gita*, and in many of his independent works, Sankara's utmost attempt is to prove the unreality of the changing world and the absolute reality of the Brahman. In the commentaries on the *Brahmasutras*, II.1.6, II.1.14, II.1.29, II.3.53, and even on the *Sutras*, I.1.31, I.1.41 and II.2.9, Sankara calls himself a *brahmavadin*: "*vayam tu brahmavadinah*". While refuting the doctrines of the Sankhya and the Vaisheshika in the commentary on the *Sutra*: "*svapaksha-doshacca*" (II.1.29), Sankara has called the followers of the Sankhya '*pradhanavadins*' and the followers of Vaisheshika, *anu-vadins*. and has called himself and the upholders of Advaita Vedanta, *brahmavadins*: "*tastu brahmavadino pyavishishtah*", "*parihritastu brahmavadina svapaksha-dosah*".

<sup>24</sup> Vide, *The Vedanta of Shankara*, p. 372.

<sup>25</sup> Even a scholar and savant like Sri Aurobindo has treated Sankara not quite properly, as he also uses the term, *mayavadin* Sankara in his monumental work, *The Life Divine*.

In the commentary on the *Sutra*: *drishyate tu* (II.1.6), he uses the expression: '*brahma-karana-vadinah*', and again in the commentary on the *Sutra*: "*pradeshaditi chennantarbhavat*" (II.3.53), he states "*brahmavadinno siddham*". Besides, in the commentaries on the *Upanishads*, *Shvetashvatara*, *Kena*, etc. Sankara uses the terms, *brahmavadin*, *brahmavid-sampradaya*, etc. So it is true that "whenever *maya* is brought in", says Dr. Naulakha, "it is not with a view to make his reader realize its importance or value, but, in order to direct his mind towards the realization of his all-important Brahmin. . . . Sankara's philosophy should, therefore, be called *brahmavada*, for the Brahman is indubitably the most fundamental concept of it".<sup>26</sup> Therefore the term *mayavada* or *mayavadin* is rather a misnomer for it.

Sankara's *Adhyasa-bhashya* or the commentary on the 'Doctrine of Falsity' is a unique and unparalleled dissertation in the history of philosophy. His 'Theory of Falsity' is illuminating and scholastic, and it has thrown sufficient light upon all the commentaries on the *Brahma-sutra*. Sankara has asked as to what is *adhyasa*—"ko'yama-dhyaso nameti"? and he answers: "*smritirupah paratra purva-drishitavadhasah*", i.e. superimposition is an awareness similar in nature to memory and it arises on a different (foreign) basis as a result of some past experience. Further Sankara defines *adhyasa* as "*adhyaso nama atasminstad-buddhiriti avochama*", i.e. 'due to error or wrong knowledge we take one thing for another, as we take a piece of wood for a ghost.' Vachaspati Mishra elaborately deals with this subject forwarding many arguments and cross-arguments. Similarly Padampada and Vedantists of the Vivarana school forward many arguments for and against superimposition. In the *Vivarana-prameya-samgraha*, Bharati-tirtha Vidyaranya Munishvara has discussed in detail in the first chapter of the book the objections of the Naiyayikas and other schools. The Naiyayikas have objected that as *adhyasa* or super-imposition is an effect (*karya*), or product of wrong knowledge, so it cannot be taken as eternal: "*nanu sutra-*

<sup>26</sup> Vide, Dr. Naulakha: *Sankara's Brahmapada* (1964), p. 16.

*suchito'pyadhyaso na yuktisahah*", and, therefore, *tadatmadhyasa*, *ekatvadyasa*, *anyonyadhyasa*, *samargadhyasa*, or *jnanadhyasa*, etc. are untenable. The Vivarana school refutes these objections of the Naiyayikas and others, and says that due to wrong knowledge or error and also for want of discrimination, superimposition is possible, and is also natural (*naisargikah*), and this superimposition is removed by the right or correct knowledge.

Now, how this *adhyasa* or superimposition happens? Sankara says in the *Adhyasabhashya*: "The *adhyasa* or superimposition of the object, referable through the concept 'we' (should be impossible), and contrarywise the superimposition of the subject and its attributes on the object should be impossible."

Nevertheless, owing to an absence of discrimination between these attributes, as also between substances, which are absolutely disparate, there continues a natural human behaviour based on self-identification in the form of 'I am this' or 'this is mine'. This behaviour has for its material cause an unreal nescience and man resorts to it by mixing up reality with unreality as a result of superimposing the things themselves or their attributes on each other.<sup>27</sup> Now, there are differences of opinion regarding definition as well as cause of superimposition, as some say that it consists in the superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another, and others say that wherever a superimposition on anything occurs, there is in evidence only a confusion arising from the absence of discrimination between them. Again some others say that the superimposition of anything on any other substratum consists in fancying some opposite attributes on that very basis. However from every point of view, there is no difference as regards the appearance of one thing as something else. And in accordance with this, we find in common experi-

<sup>27</sup> (a) Vide, *Shankara's Brahmapada*, p. 16.

(b) It is also a pity that a scholar like Dr. B. N. K. Sharma calls the doctrine of Sankara *mayavada*; Vide, *A History of Dvaita School of Vedanta and Its Literature*, Vol. I, pp. 84-85.

ence that nacre appears as silver, and a single moon appears as two.<sup>28</sup> Thus, says Sankara, there occurs this superimposition that has neither beginning nor end, but flows on eternally and appears as the manifested universe and its apprehension conjures up agentship and enjoyership, and this is perceived by all persons.<sup>29</sup>

Padmapada has also discussed the theory of superimposition, as forwarded by his *Guru* Sankara. In the *Panchapadika-Vivarana*, Padmapada says: "In so far as its nature is considered (i.e. in itself—*svatastvat*), the *vishayi* or the self can have (in reality) no identity of being with the *vishaya* or the non-self, because it (the self) is wholly of the essence of consciousness (*chidekarasa*) nor through other (*vishaya*), because it is incapable of transformation (*parinama*), and is unattached. The object also cannot by its own nature attain identity (*tadatmya*) of being with the self by transformation itself into consciousness (*chit*), for then it will lose its characteristic as object by attaining equal status with consciousness. Nor through the other (the self by drawing the non-self into itself) can the non-self partake of the nature of the self, for the self is actionless (*nishkriya*).<sup>30</sup>

Padmapada further says that superimposition (*adhyasa*) means manifestation of the nature of something in another which is not of that nature. That (manifestation), it is reasonable to hold, is false (*mithya*). The word *mithya* is of double significance: it is denotative of negation as well as of inexpressibility (*anirvachaniyata*). Here it is an expression of negation. The above statement: "*mithyeti bhavitum yuktam*" means that it is reasonable to ascribe non-existence alone to superimposition (*adhyasa*).<sup>31</sup> In fact, superimposition as is evident in 'I' and 'mine' means egoism in the form of 'I am a man'. Hence the sentence means that the content 'I am a man' is a matter of common experi-

<sup>28</sup> Vide, English translation of the *Brahmasutra* by Swami Gambhirananda (Advaita Ashrama edition, Calcutta, 1965), p. 1.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>30</sup> Vide, English translation of *Panchapadika* by D. Venkataramiah (Baroda), p. 7.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

ence and is beginningless. The statement: '*satyanrito mithunikritya*' means coupling together truth and error. *Satyam* means 'not this' (i.e. other than the world of perception—intelligence: *chaitanya*). Again the word *mithyajnana-nimitta iti* connotes that which is *mithya* (erroneous) and at the same time, *ajnana* (nescience), is *mithyajnana*. Further the word *mithya* means 'inexpressible' (*anirvachaniya*), and by *ajnana* is meant the potency of *avidya* which is the nature of insentience and is the negation of *jnana*. And word '*tannimitta*' means having that (viz. *mithyajnana*) as the material cause.<sup>32</sup> Padmapada further forwards: Hence *avidya* is but the cause of manifestation of something difference (from the original), the real e.g. appearance of silver in shell, *rupantara*. This is due to the *vikshepa-sakti* of *avidya*. In the inner Self, however, which is of the nature of (pure) intelligence and as such self-lucent, since the manifestation of the Brahman cannot be accounted for by anything else, its non-manifestation (it must be admitted) is due to the obstruction caused by the potency of nescience which is existent therein (in the Brahman) and is beginningless. Hence, it (primal nescience) obstructs the manifestation of the real nature of the Brahman in the inner self (*jiva*), and it becomes the cause of appearance of something other than its true nature, like the ego-notion etc., and in deep sleep (*sushupti*) etc. having remained in the residual state of mere impressions of ego-notion etc. which are the outcome of its projective power, it revives again (on waking). Hence, though the superimposition as evidenced in the notions of men such as 'I' and 'mine' is beginningless (because the *hetu*, viz. *avidya* is beginningless), it is spoken of as having *mithyajnana* as its cause, but not as adventitious.<sup>33</sup> Prakashatmayati in the *Panchapadika-vivarana*, Akhandananda Muni in the *Tattvadipana*, Narayana Sarasvati in the *Vartika*, and Chitsukha Muni in the *Bhashyalbhavaprakashika*, and Vachaspati Mishra in the *Bhamati* have elaborately dealt with the problem of *adhyasa*, and all have agreed that *brahma-jijnasa* or asking about

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

the Brahman is necessary to remove the false knowledge (*mithyajnana*) or *adhyasa* for attaining to the knowledge of Brahman.<sup>34</sup>

There are some theories of error (*khyati*), which "make different ontological assumptions with regard to the nature of the real and the unreal and their inter-relation. Vedanta contends that all these doctrines of reality and unreality are inadequate for the facts which necessitate fresh reconstruction in the realm of metaphysics. Error thrusts upon us the concept of *anirvachaniya*, and the new doctrine of Reality must find a place for their novel entity"<sup>35</sup>

There are some problems of error, and mainly we confront three theories of error, *sat-khyati*, *akhyati* or *anyathakhyati*, and *anirvachaniya-khyati*. Depending upon the doctrine of *panchikarana* (quintuplication), Ramanuja and his followers have asserted that "everything contains the elements of everything" (*prithivyadi-sarva-bhutanam sarvatra vidyamanatvat*). (1) The aim of *sat-khyati* "is to show that *jnana*, including the so-called illusion, never deviates from reality". As all knowledge is true, it refers to the existent (*sat*) which is qualified. "The so-called illusory knowledge is illusory, not because it has an unreal object, but because it fails in life. When error is dispelled, the object is not negated, but only activity is arrested". (2) *Akhyati* theory of the Mimamsa proves that "all knowledge must be recognized to be valid. The shell-silver experience consists of two cognitions, one being of the nature of memory and the other of the nature of 'primary experience' or 'direct apprehension' (*anubhava*). The theory is named *akhyati* because of its emphasis on non-apprehension as the chief element of errors. Padmapada says that erroneous perception is possible by the causes of two different cognitions: "the sense-object contact which brings about perception and the impression (*samskara*) of a previous cognition which becomes the cause of a memory-experience". Vachaspati Mishra disagrees somewhat from this view of Padmapada.

<sup>34</sup> Vide, *The Brahmasutra-Sankara-bhasyam*, Vol. I (edited by Pandit Amareswara Thakur, Calcutta, 1933).

<sup>35</sup> Vide, Dr. N. K. Devaraja: *An Introduction to Sankara's Theory of Knowledge* (1962), p. 133.

(3) *Anyatha-khyati* and also *atma-khyati* maintain that the object apprehended or perceived in illusion exists elsewhere, and recollection of the object produces the perception of the object, in contact with the visual organ. In fact, in *anyatha-khyati* and also in *atma-khyati*, the idea of the object, reproduced in memory by association, produces the visual perception or cognition of the object. The *Akhyativadins* do not accept this theory of the *Anyatha-khyativadins*, because they say that there remains a great difference between recollection (*smriti*) and perception (*pratyaksha*). (4) *Anirvachaniya-khyati* maintains that illusory experience has an objective basis and even illusion or delusion has its root in reality, and we know that the object of illusion can neither be real (*sat*), nor unreal (*asat*) and nor even real-unreal at the same time, and so it is *anirvachaniya* or inexplicable. Sankara, Padmapada and others have admitted this *anirvachaniya-khyati*. As for example, "the solver that appears on the presentation of the shell is a product of *maya* and it bears a unique relation to the shell. This relation is technically known as *adhyasa* or superimposition".<sup>36</sup>

Swami Satprakashananda critically discusses the nihilistic theory of *asat-khyati* or apprehension of the non-existent, the idealistic theory of *atma-khyati* or the apprehension of the subjective cognition, the Nyaya theory of misapprehension or *anyatha-khyati*, the Sankhya theory of *sadasat-khyati* or apprehension of the real-unreal, the Vishishtadvaita theory of *sat-khyati* or apprehension of the real and the Advaita view of the indefinability (*anirvachaniyatva*) of the illusory object.<sup>37</sup> Professor Nani Lal Sen similarly forwards beautiful account of fourteen kinds of theory of error (*khyati*) in his book, *A Critique of the Theories of Viparyaya* (1965). He defines and also describes *nirvishesa-khyati*, *niradhisthana-khyati*, *akhyati*,

<sup>36</sup> Regarding these *khyatis* or theories of error, vide,

(a) Dr. Devaraja: *Sankara's Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 122-120;

(b) Dr. Hirivana: *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*;

(c) Dr. J. N. Sinha: *Indian Psychology*, pp. 181-82;

(d) D. M. Datta: *Six Ways of Knowing*, pp. 125-126.

<sup>37</sup> Vide, *Methods of Knowledge* (London, 1965), pp. 129-133.



*alaukika-khyati*, *prasiddhartha-khyati*, *anyakhyati*, *sadasat-khyati*, *atma-khyati*, *asat-khyati*, *sat-khyati*, *viveka-khyati*, *anyatha-khyati*, *anirvachaniya-khyati*, and *achintya-khyati*.<sup>38</sup> But it seems that these fourteen theories of *viparyaya* may be reduced to four main *khyatis*.

Sankara maintains *anirvachaniya-khyati*, and his philosophical viewpoint is said to be Absolutism or Transcendentalism, though he shows his objective idealistic view in respect of the empirical phenomenal reality (*vyavaharika-satta*) of the world, so long the Brahman as the absolute reality (*paramarthika-satta*) is not realized. To make the position of Sankara clear, it can be said that he maintains the view that when Brahman-knowledge dawns upon the horizon of a man, all relative existences, known as nescience, disappear. The empirical existence (*pratitika-satta*) appears as real, but is not real, as it is contradicted by true knowledge. The phenomenal existence (*vyavaharika-satta*) appears also as real for the time being, but it is sublated by the knowledge of the absolute Reality. The transcendental existence (*paramarthika-satta*) only is real and uncontradicted (*yatharta* and *avadhita*). Sankara lays stress upon this transcendental existence or knowledge.

Now, Sankara's method of epistemological enquiry into the systems of Indian philosophy is unparalleled in the history of the world, and almost all the thinkers and even most of his opponents have admitted that his commentaries are as soothing and sublime, so profound and penetrating (*prasanna-gambhiram*). Moreover, Sankara's scriptural and rational arguments of the Vedanta metaphysics and his regardful attitude towards the agelong Upanishadic tradition betray his sharp and acute intellect and deep intuitional knowledge, along with his God-realization or *aparokshanubhuti*. He ably and logically refutes the unscientific theories and arguments of Samkhya Yoga, Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Mimamsa, and different Buddhist thinkers, both orthodox and heterodox.

Sankara emphasizes the reality of the unconditioned and unqualified transcendent Brahman, and regards

<sup>38</sup> Vide, *A Critique of the Theories of Viparyaya* (1915).

*Ishvara*, *jiva*, and *jagat*, as appearance due to an indefinable principle, *maya* or *avidya*, which is recognized as neither real, nor unreal, nor both real and unreal. The Brahman is one without the second, and it transcends the duality of subject (*vishayi*) and object (*vishaya*). It also transcends the empirical categories of time, space, cause, ground, substance, and the like. It is a pure identity. It is one homogenous consciousness. It is not liable to the tripartite adjuncts of the subject, the object, and the relation, or the knower, the knowledge, and the known (*jnata*, *jnana*, and *jneya*), but it is above all kinds of division or distinction, external and internal.

Sankara recognizes the empirical reality (*vyavaharika-satta*) of the appearance of the world, so long as it is not negated or sublated by the knowledge of the absolute Brahman which possesses, or is of the nature of, ontological reality (*paramarthika-satta*). He says that so long as the material body exists, the seeming appearance of the world also exists, but when the Brahman-knowledge is revealed, the apparent reality of the world is eternally negated i.e. sublated. The Self, or the *Atman*, according to Sankara, is not altogether beyond the reach of human apprehension, but is apprehended or intuited as a content of the concept of 'I' (*aham*), and because the Self, opposed to the non-self, is well-known as immediately given to knowledge as a self-revealing entity. Sankara says in his *bhashya*: "*na tavat ayam ekantena avishayah, asmat-prataya-vishayatvat, aparokshatvaccha*". The superimposition (*adhyasa*) is due to *avidya* or nescience, and the ascertainment of the nature of the Reality is due to *vidya* or *jnana*. Really, due to false knowledge (*mithya-pratyaya*) men are subject to error (*bhrama* or *bhranti*), and the error is corrected with right knowledge (*yatharta-jnana*) of the all-consciousness Brahman.

Now from critical analysis of Sankara's view of reality, it can be said that he recognises three types of reality from three standpoints: (1) Firstly, he says that reality is the unconditioned Brahman. It is one without a second—'*ekamevadvitiam*'. (2) Secondly, he says that the world of objects, as perceived in the waking state, is possessed of

objective value. They are relatively real, but from the absolute standpoint they are the mere appearance. Because the world is real so long as the absolute Brahman is not realized, and so the world is possessed of a phenomenal or empirical objective reality—*vyavaharika-satta*. (3) Thirdly, he admits reality of the objects of delusion and dream, because he says that so long as the objects in delusion (e.g. mirage) and dream, are perceived, they seem to be real, but when right knowledge and waking state come, delusion and dream are replaced. So Sankara's recognition of reality of objects of delusion (*maya*) and dream (*svapna*) last so long as delusion or dream lasts. In fact, Sankara's realistic position holds good so long perceptions have their objective counterparts, otherwise his transcendental viewpoint is marked always by reality of the absolute truth.

Advaita Vedanta says that due to *maya*, the individual souls, being essentially divine and free, are bound hand and foot in the chain of forgetfulness, and as soon as they come to know their real essence or regain their lost consciousness, they are set free from all kinds of bondage. Now, what is *maya*? Advaita Vedanta says that *maya* is an inexplicable power, or a mysterious power of God (*Ishvara-sakti*), which appears due to false knowledge, but disappears with the dawn of the Brahman-light. Swami Vivekananda calls it *a statement of fact*, and Swami Abhedananda has called it *a conditional or relative existence*. Swami Abhedananda says: "We must not consider *maya* as illusion. It means *phenomenal existence*, or *conditional or relative existence*. It means my existence depends upon the existence of Madras. Madras exists so long as there is India and India exists so long as there is the universe and the universe exists so long as there is the solar system. Therefore, *maya* is conditional existence and that existence is possible only in time and space, and when relativity vanishes, there is neither *maya* nor manifestation of *maya*, and there is the abode of infinite wisdom and yet, at the same time, it (the infinite Brahman) forms the background of *maya*".<sup>39</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *Vedanta Towards Religion* (R. K. Vedanta Publication).

Now let us see what Sankara says about *maya*. Sankara says that *maya* means error or false knowledge, i.e. when we take unreal things as real or real things as unreal, then that wrong or erroneous knowledge is *maya*. Sankara calls it in the *Adhyasabhashya*: "*atasmīn tad-buddhi*", i.e. what is non-existent, we take as existent. As for example, when we take a piece of rope as a snake, then that erroneous knowledge of sight is called *maya*. But it should be remembered that when we superimpose the snake upon the rope, we impose the remembered image of the real snake seen or perceived sometime at a near or distant place. That is, we practically possess the knowledge as well as an impression of the real snake seen or perceived somewhere, and then as soon as we see a piece of rope, we instantly identify the remembered image of that seen or perceived snake with the nearby piece of rope by knowledge of similarity (*sadrishya-jnana*). This identification of the rope with the remembered image of the real snake happens generally for want of sufficient light, or for defect of the eyes. But, when afterwards we come to know the real form of the rope, our act of identification ceases and our erroneous knowledge of the snake in the rope is corrected. This correction brings the real knowledge of the rope and then we say that 'it is not snake, but is rope'. Now the erroneous knowledge of the rope is *ajnana*, and right knowledge of the rope is *jnana*. Sankara says similarly due to wrong knowledge or *ajnana* we superimpose the real Brahman upon the unreal world and its belongings, and take the world and its belongings as real, but when with the help of discrimination we come to know the deceitful unreal nature of the world, there dawns the right knowledge (*yathārtha-jnana*) and we realize the real Brahman. It is the nature of real knowledge that it is never sublated by any other knowledge, whereas the unreal knowledge is always sublated. Here, in the case of knowledge of the unreal world, knowledge of the world is sublated by the real Brahman-knowledge, and the Brahman-knowledge, being always real, is neither sublated nor contradicted.

Now to determine further the real nature of *maya*, it can be said that *maya* is not real (*sat*), because if it would

have been real, it would appear as real (*yatharta*) all the time-present, past and future, but it does not appear so. Again *maya* is not non-existent (*asat*), because, if it would be absolutely non-existent, then it would never appear even as a wrong or defective knowledge. *Maya* is not even both existent and non-existent (*sadasat*), or as thesis and antithesis, at the same time. If it were so, it would appear at one time as real (*sat*) and at other times as unreal (*asat*). Therefore, *maya* is different from *sat* and *asat*, and is known as an unspeakable and indescribable something (*sada-sadbhyan. . . . anirvachaniyamiti maya*),

Therefore *maya* is not existent, and not even non-existent, but it plays a hide and seek game with men of the phenomenal world. But it has an apparent existence, so Sankara admits its phenomenal existence, (*vyavaharika-satta*), but this phenomenal existence is negated by the Brahman-knowledge. It has been said before that Sankara's main contribution to Indian philosophy is his theory of *adhyasa* or superimposition, which is known as a natural (*aguntaka*) becoming. It has been discussed before that Sankara admits the phenomenal or empirical existence (*vyavaharika-satta*) of the world-process, and so it can be said that he takes projection (*srusti*) as a matter of fact (*vyavaharika*) truth. "So long as there is a mind, there is the diversity of creation. It is not idealism. The outer world is not the creation of the mind. It is as real, as independently real, as the mind itself. Here Sankara is a realist of the realists. To him the material world is as real as the mental, the distinction between the two being that while the one is finer, the other is grosser. And there is no end of these grades of fineness and grossness".<sup>40</sup>

In Kant's philosophy, we also find that both idealistic and realistic tendencies are at work, and thus it evolves from the two tendencies which produce the doctrine of the thing-in-itself. It can be said in other words that Kant starts with a dualism between finite mind as a functional unity and the extra-mental world, and develops his theory of knowledge, where there is a point of contribution of

<sup>40</sup> Vide. Swami Satswarupananda: The article—'History of Vedantic Thought' (*The Prabuddha Bharata*, November 1935, p. 726).

the elements of mind and the elements of the extra-mental world. There are, therefore, two kinds of pure knowledge, says Professor Lindsay, the one is knowledge of the relations of the intelligible world, the other is knowledge of the principles by which we order the sensible.<sup>41</sup>

"At any rate", says Dr. Paton, "Kant's doctrine is this that scientific thought can penetrate beyond our passing sensations to a common and objective world of substances in interaction, but that this world is a world of things, as they appear to human mind, and not a world of things as they are in themselves". Dr. Paton is of the opinion that the world, even as it is known to science, is essentially an appearance to human minds and is an idealist doctrine (not of course the only idealist doctrine). "It is because in a sense a realist that he holds this world not to be a creation of human minds, but to involve the reality of things-in-themselves".

Now, central principle of Kant's argument is the revolutionary and paradoxical view that we can have *a priori* knowledge of things only in so far as what we know of them is imposed by the nature of our own minds. Kant hopes to show, says Dr. Paton, "(1) that we do possess a *a priori* (that as universal and necessary) knowledge, and (2) that there is no explanation of such knowledge unless the character of the objects as known is determined by the nature of our powers of knowing." Kant's critical argument, therefore, may be said to differentiate itself into three main arguments, and these are concerned with *intuition*, *understanding*, and *reason*. *Intuition* involves an immediate relation to a given individual object, and the human being's intuition is always sensuous and not intellectual, which means that it is passive and not active. *Understanding* is a power of thinking, by means of concepts, the objects given in intuition. *Reason* is a power of thinking objects

<sup>41</sup> (a) Cf. Kant's *Refutation of Idealism* in the First edition of the *Critique* and vide Dr. Norman Kemp Smith: *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (1923), p. 298.

(b) Cf. also Edward Caird: *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant* (1909), Vol. I, pp. 586-587, and specially Chapter IX: "Empirical Thought".

which can never be given in sensuous intuition. But neither by intuition, nor by understanding, and nor by reason, nor by the combination of these, can we have a *a priori* knowledge of things-in-themselves, although we can have such knowledge of the phenomenal world<sup>42</sup>

Dr. Caird has also dealt with this problematic subject while dealing with 'Empirical Thought' in Kant's philosophy. He says that we can refute the so-called idealism which denies the reality of the external world and reduces it to the sensations of the individual subject, by the very process by which we establish the true idealism, *viz.* the doctrine that an external object is not seen in its whole truth until its relation to the self is considered and until indeed it is regarded as an element in the process of spiritual life. Kant shows the defect of three imperfect theories as to the nature of inner experience. These theories are: (a) we cannot treat inner experience as the consciousness of another object which forms part of the same context of experience with external objects, (b) nor can we treat it as a separate kind of experience which is capable of being brought under the same categories, though perhaps with a less definite result owing to the nature of the form of time, and (c) nor, finally, can we regard it as a consciousness of the process whereby sensations are developed into an intelligible consciousness. Again, while refuting the theory of subjective idealism of Berkeley, Kant says that to deny the existence of the external world means to deny also any consciousness of sensations as states of the self or ego. In fact, the life of a purely sensitive being is not for an inner world. *i.e.* not a consciousness of a series of states of its own being any more than it is a consciousness of an outer world of objects. "On the other hand, the self-conscious being which has an inner life, cannot separate it from the outer life which it presupposes. Its inner life is not the consciousness of a series of sensations as such, but of perceptions or ideas which refers to exter-

<sup>42</sup> (a) Cf. Dr. H. J. Paton: *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience* (1936), Vol. I, pp. 68-74.

(b) Vide also Dr. Norman Kemp-Smith: *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (1923), pp. 298-305.

nal objects".<sup>43</sup> Yet it is a fact, says Kant, that the external world *exists* or *appears* in relation to "I" or ego, which is self-consciousness.

It has already been said that in Sankara, we find both the realistic and idealistic tendencies. We also know that he admits the empirical existence (*vyavaharika-satta*) of the world-appearance so long as the transcendental reality or existence (*paramarthika-satta*) is realized. Sankara forwards his view that the world of appearance as given to us bears a phenomenal value and reality and there is no reason to deny them. The outer appearance might be a representative or copied one, but yet it appears, is seen, and is felt as real so long it is not negated or replaced by the permanent transcendental reality.

Now to make it explicit it can be said that Advaita Vedanta admits threefold division of existence (*satta*): transcendental or *paramarthika*, empirical or phenomenal i.e. *vyavaharika*, and illusive empirical or *pratitika*. The illusive *pratitika-satta* is contradicted as well as sublated by phenomenal or *vyavaharika-satta*. A dream (*svapna*) is the creation of the *Jiva*, and dream is considered as *pratibhasika* and it is sublated by the waking state (*jagrata*). The waking is the perception of objective realities (*vyavaharika*), supported in existence by *maya*. "*Maya* or *avidya* is the *causa-materia* of the empirical order, *manas* is the *causa-materia* of the dream illusion. The objective illusion is due to the primal ignorance, the subjective illusion is due to the primal ignorance, the subjective 'illusion is due to the secondary ignorance.'"<sup>44</sup>

The reality of the world-process (*jagat*), or of projection (*sristi*), is not a transcendental (*paramarthika*) something, because it is contradicted by real knowledge. Viewing from the standpoint of projection (*sristi*) or world-appearance, there creeps the question of cause (*karana*) and ground (*adhisthana*), though, in reality, the absolute Brahman is neither the cause nor the ground. But, regard-

<sup>43</sup> Vide, Dr. Caird: *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant* (1909), Vol. I, p. 597.

<sup>44</sup> Vide Dr. M. N. Sircar: *The System of Vedantic Thought and Culture* (Calcuta University, 1925), pp. 172-173.



ing the Brahman as the cause of the world, there we find differences of opinion among some of the post-Sankara Vedantists. They say that it is true that from the viewpoint of projection or *maya*, the Brahman is liable to be involved in the category of cause as well as of ground, but whether the Brahman is the direct or indirect cause of the world, that should be ascertained. Advaita Vedanta like Sankhya admits the theory of *satkarya* (*satkaryavada*) which means *karya* or effect is projected (or created) from that which already exists, and not projected (or created) out of nothing, and that thing from which effect is projected (or created), is known as cause (*karana*). It is true that in order to accommodate *satkaryavada*, Advaita Vedanta postulates two functions of *ajnana* or *maya*, viz. *avarana* and *vikshepa*. *Ajnana* primarily comes in as an explanation of *avarana* (covering), but the function of *vikshepa* (materialising) is only added. Again Advaita Vedanta admits the doctrine of *vivarta* which holds that the world or anything which is the product of nescience, is superimposed upon the pure Brahman. Sankara, being a *vivartavadin*, recognizes the Brahman as both material cause (*upadana-karana*) and efficient cause (*nimitta-karana*), because if we admit projection (*sristi*) due to *ajnana* or *maya*, we will have to admit also the cause of the projection, as an effect is always followed by a cause. But, it may be asked as to what do we mean by a cause and also by an effect? "No cause, we are told", says Dr. Kalidas Bhattacharyya "ever produces the effect. What happens is only that a phenomenon, called cause, happening another phenomenon, called effect, happens though invariably (and without condition)". The Nyaya-Vaisheshika systems define cause (*karana* i.e. efficient cause) as *niyata-purvavarti* or invariably before, and not relevant and *avyahita-purvavarti*, i.e. immediately before the effect. The Sankhya-Vedanta systems forward the views that cause itself manifests as effect, and effect lies in cause. In Advaita Vedanta, the Brahman is recognized as both an efficient cause and a material cause like a spider.. Now, what do we mean by a material cause? The material cause of a phenomenon "is that which being a relevant invariable antecedent either

constitute or is constituted by the phenomenon. The parts of a whole as its material cause constitute it, and a substance as the material cause of its attributes is constituted by these.”<sup>45</sup> The material cause, says Dr. Bhattacharyya “must fall outside the effect, because it is after all a cause, and a cause is always outside, as we find with the efficient cause”. If the efficient cause is outside, there is no reason why the material cause should not be so. Their only difference is that while the latter is also the substrate of the effect, the former is not. The material cause is that in which the effect *inheres*. Now, this is one of the positive arguments, but there are also negative arguments. Advaita Vedanta somewhat differs from Nyaya-Vaisheshika, while defining the material cause and also the efficient cause for its notion of doctrine (*vada*). Advaita Vedanta admits *vivartavada*, while Nyaya-Vaisheshika holds *parinamavada*. *Parinama* means transformation or change from one form to another, whereas *vivarta* means that which amidst all changes, remains ever unchanged or undisturbed in its self-contained identity. In fact, Advaita Vedanta admits change, but that change connotes the idea of *vivarta*. Now, the category of cause, whether material or efficient, is postulated to determine effect, which is either different or non-different from cause, and in this postulation of nescience, we find that nescience plays its role in a different way in the doctrine of *parinama* from the role it plays in the doctrine of *vivarta*. We know that *ajnana* is primarily postulated in Advaita Vedanta which upholds the doctrine of *vivarta* to account for the fact that the self-evidencing pure consciousness has appeared otherwise in the form of the objective world. To make it more explicit it can be said that “when the ultimate reality”, says Dr. Kalidas Bhattacharyya, “is taken as pure consciousness, the role of *ajnana* is that of a meditator, somehow reconciling two opposing things, and, therefore, its (of *ajnana*) relation to the world might be understood as different from that between pure consciousness and the world. This is why if the latter be *vivarta*, the former is

<sup>45</sup> Vide the detailed discussion on “*The Concept of Cause as in India and the West*” by Dr. Kalidas Bhattacharyya, appeared in “Our Heritage”, Vol. I, 1953, pp. 30-142.

taken as *parinama*. But the case is different when *ajnana* plays only the part of a messenger between pure existence and worldly objects. Here the relation between *ajnana* and these objects might without least violence be understood exactly as that between pure existence and these. If, therefore, the latter is *vivarta*, the former also is one such".<sup>46</sup>

Now, regarding this theory of causality, we find different opinions among the Advaita schools of the *Bhamati* and the *Vivarana*. As for example, Vachaspati Mishra says in the *Bhamati* that *maya* or nescience rests upon individual souls (*jivashrishta*), or the individual souls are the locus of *ajnana* or *maya*. He says further that when we say: "I am ignorant" (*aham ajnah*) we find that 'I'-consciousness being covered by egoism, becomes the locus or ground of *ajnana*. Regarding it, Appaya-Dikshit says in the *Siddhantalessa-samgraha*: "*vachaspati-mishrastu jiva-maya-vishayikritam brahma svata eva jadya-shraya-prapanchakarena vivartamanatayo'padanamili maya sahakari-matram*". Vachaspati Mishra has recognized two kinds of *maya* (1) sum-total of desires that causes error (*karma-vikshepika*), and (ii) indescribable causal nescience or *anirvachya-mulavidya*. Regarding desire that causes error, the commentary, *Kalpataru* said: "*karma-vikshepika-avidyah bhrantayah, tasam vasanbhih*". Besides, Vachaspati Mishra says that the insentience (*jadata*) of the world-process must be due to something other than the pure and absolute Brahman, but this insentience is due to the natural characteristic of the world, or to Brahman-*maya*. Achyutananda, the commentator, remarks regarding it: "*jagatyanaugatam jadyam na karma-gunah, kintu jagat eva svalbhavikam*". Badaravana also supports this view of Vachaspati Mishra, in his *Brahmasutra*: "*na vilakshanatyadhikarane*" (II.1 4-11). But it is found that the authors of the *Padarthatattva-nirnaya* and the *Siddhanta-muktavali* recognizes *maya* as only the material cause of the world.

It has been said before that according to Vachaspati Mishra, the individual soul (*jiva*) is the locus (*ashraya*) of *maya* and the object (*vishaya*) is the consciousness

<sup>46</sup> Vide, "The Concept of Cause as in India and the West", in *Our Heritage*, Vol II, p. 113.

(*chaitanya*) associated with egoism (*ahamkara*). Vachaspati Mishra says that *shuddha-Brahman* can neither be the locus (*substratum*), nor the knower of *maya* (nescience), but the '*ahantavishishtam chaitanyam*' i.e. consciousness associated with egoism (*ahamkara*) is the locus of *maya*. The Vivarana school rejects this view of Vachaspati, as it holds that the Brahman is both the locus (*ashraya*) and the object (*vishaya*) of *maya* (nescience).

Vachaspati even regards the individual soul as the locus of *mulavidya* (causal nescience) and this *mulavidya* or *maya* resides outside the body of the soul and is an adjunct (*upadhi*) of the *shuddha-chaitanya*. But the Vivarana school rejects this view of Vachaspati, as it holds just the opposite view. The Vivarana school maintains that the Brahman-consciousness is the substratum of *Ishvara* who associates with and at the same time predominates over *maya*, and, therefore, the existence of *Ishvara* (God) depends upon the existence of the Brahman-consciousness (*Brahman-chaitanya*) and not upon that of the individual soul. The *Siddhantaresh-samgraha* states: "*vivarananusarinastu \* \* maya-shavalamishvararupameva brahmopadanam*". Dr. S. N. Dasgupta says in this connection: "Prakashatman, Akhadananda, and Madhava (Madhava-Vidyaranya) hold that Brahman in association with *maya*, i.e. the *maya*-reflected form of Brahman as *Ishvara* should be regarded as the cause of the world-appearance. The world-appearance is an evolution or *parinama* of *maya*, as located in *Ishvara*, where *Ishvara* (God) is the *vivarta* causal matter".<sup>47</sup> Therefore, from this standpoint *Ishvara* is the cause of the world (*jagat-karana*), and the selfhood (*jivatva*) is also created by God. But Vachaspati Mishra maintains a different view. On the other hand, as the Brahman-consciousness is the locus of nescience, the existence of God does not depend upon that of the *shuddha-Brahman*. God's existence depends upon the idea or imagination of the soul. Or it can be said that like the world-appearance, God, the cause of the world, is also imagined by the nescience that resides in the soul. Further it is

<sup>47</sup> Vide, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 468-469.

found that the Vivarana school maintains that the individual soul is created by God, whereas the Bhamati school holds that God is imagined by the individual soul. So we find that there are differences of opinion as regards *maya*, *jagat*, and *Ishvara* as well as the locus (*ashraya*) of *maya* and cause (*karana*) of the world-appearance.

Like the Samkhyas, Naiyayikas, Yogins, and the Buddhist thinkers, Sankara has admitted the state of *jivanmukti*, i.e. emancipation in one's life time, though some Vedantists like Mandana Mishra, Prakasatma Yati, Yogavashishtha (of the *Vashishtha-Ramayana*) and others object to it, because they believe that *videhamukti* or liberation after the dissolution of the material body, which is the product of nescience, is acceptable. Sankara's argument in favour of *jivanmukti* is this that a man can correct his error of false knowledge (*mithya-jnana*) by the simultaneous functions of correction of the error and of realization of the true nature of the *Atman*, and so the material body does not stand against the path of *jivanmukti*. When commenting on the *Sutra*: "*tattu samanvayat*" (1.1.4), Sankara says that *sashariratva* or the sense of the existence of the material body comes due to nescience or ignorance, but when the false knowledge (nescience) is removed, a man realizes the Brahman even in his life time, i.e. even when his material body exists. After the realization of the Brahman, the Jivanmukta feels the material body as well as the material world of *karma* in a different vision.<sup>48</sup> Sankara says in objection to the question of his opponent: "*Sharire patite'sharitvam sanna jivata iti chet; na, sa-shariratvyasya mithya-jnana-nimittatvat. Na hi atmanah shariratmabhimana-lakshanam mithyajnanam mukta anyata sa-sharitvam shakyam kalpayitum. . . . Tasmanmithya-pratyaya-nimittatvat sa-sharitvasya, siddham jivato'pi vidusho'shariratvam. . . . Tasmanna avagata-brahmatma-bhavasya yathapurvam samsaritvam*".

Sankara maintains that the Brahman-knowledge is positive and immediate. It is an immediate awareness

<sup>48</sup> But Mandana Mishra in the *Brahmasiddhi* and Sarvajnatma Muni in the *Samkshepa-shariraka* recognize *videhamukti* or liberation in the disembodied state.

or realization (*upalabdhi* or *pratyakshanubhuti*), devoid of adjuncts of the knower, the known, and the knowledge, and also of all relations or processes. Further the *brahma-bhava* or *moksha* is self-complete (*svayam-sampurna*) and self-effulgent (*svayam-jyotih*) and is, therefore, self-revealing (*svayam-prakasha*). Here it can be asked as to what do we mean by the word 'self-revealing'? Advaita Vedanta says that as the self-effulgent sun shines always in the sky and its disappearance is caused by the covering of the cloud, and when the cloud is removed (by the gust of the wind), the sun shines as before. Sadananda-Yati gave this very illustration in his *Vedantasara*. Similarly Sankara says that the realization of the *Atman* means to remove only nescience (*ajnana* or *maya*), which covers the self-effulgent light of the *Atman*, and when the darkness of nescience is removed, the *Atman* shines in its own undying glory. So the attainment of the Godconsciousness does not mean the achievement of something new, but to recover or recognize the essence that is present already. Sankara gives an illustration for it in the recovery of a forgotten necklace that existed already in the neck, and this recovery of the necklace is nothing but correction of an error (*bhranti-nirasana*).

Again, the knowledge of the Brahman, or knowledge as the Brahman (i.e. Brahman-knowledge), is not an outcome or product of any religio-spiritual practice or work (*sadhana* or *karma*). But sometimes it is believed that *karma*, or Vedic sacrifice, or spiritual practice, is essential for realizing the Brahman. Sankara refutes the theory that *jnana-vichara* accompanied by *karma* is helpful in attaining the knowledge of the Brahman. Sankara says that the theory of *jnana-karma-samuchchaya* or knowledge combined with work is untenable for attainment of *moksha*, because knowledge (*jnana*) and action (*karma*) are antagonistic to each other.<sup>49</sup> Knowledge is *vidya* or light and action is *avidya* or darkness, so they cannot stand on the same platform. Knowledge itself is the sure guarantee for achieving the state of liberation which is no other than God-realization. Action (*karma*) may be regarded as an

<sup>49</sup> But Ramanuja, Bhashkara, Madhva, and others supported the doctrine of *jnana-karma-samuchchaya*.

indirect cause for God-realization, as it helps to purify the mind so as to transform the mind into *chit* or consciousness. But knowledge is the direct cause. In the commentary on the *Gita* (II.3-4), Sankara says: “*tasmat kayapi yukta na samucchayo jnana-karmanah*” (III.3), “*athava jnana-karma-nishthayoh paraspara-virodhat ekena purushena yugapat-manushtthatam ashakyatve \* \**” (III.4). Similarly, in the commentaries on different *Upanishads*, Sankara says: “*vidya-karmanoshcha samucchayo na*” (*Isha-Upanishad*, 18).<sup>50</sup> So Sankara says that *moksha* or the Brahman-knowledge is attained only by knowledge (*jnana* i.e. *jnana-vichara*): “*kevaladeva jnanat mokshah*”, because action (*karma*) is always motivated by desire for something, and so it leads men to attachment (*pravritti*), whereas knowledge (*jnana*) cuts asunder all the knots of desires, so it leads men to detachment (*nivritti*). So it is found that these two things cannot meet together because of their opposite nature and tendency, and so Sankara has said: “*bhinna-purusha-katrike eva jnana-karma-nishthe*” (commentary on the *Gita*, III.3).

It has already been said that Sankara's theory of falsity or error (*adhyasa*) is a unique contribution to the domain of the Advaita Vedanta philosophy. The concept of falsity, as advanced by Sankara, sets right two dominant fallacies of European philosophy. Speaking of these two fallacies Dr. P. S. Shastri, in his recent article on *Adhyasa* (Metaphorical Structure of Experience) says: “The first fallacy refers to knowledge. Either we derive knowledge from experience and say that knowledge exhausts experience, or we analyse knowledge exhaustively. . . . The second fallacy is that of verbalism, when one is gifted with an artistic power, he seeks to express his experience through metaphor. . . .”. Now Sankara forwards two definitions of *adhyasa*: (1) One is ‘*smritirupah paratra purva-drishtavabhasah*’ i.e. an awareness similar in nature to memory, that arises in a different ground as a result of some past experience, and (2) the second is ‘*atasmintadbuddhih*’. i.e. the appearance of one thing as something else. Sankara

<sup>50</sup> Vide, *The Mandukya-Upanishad*, 1.1.12; 1.1.7. *Taittiriya-Upanishad*, 1.11; *Chhandogya-Upanishad*, II.3.

says: “*tatha cha loke’nubhavam-suktika hi rajatavabhasate, ekushchandrah sadvitiyavaditi, katham punah pratyagat-gatmanyavisayo*”: ‘*dhyaso visayayaddharamam, sarve hi purve’vaslhlite visaye visayantaramadhyasyati*”, etc. So an *adhyasa* is a false-knowledge or an error due to *vivarta-varana*, i.e. concealment in the process of *vivartavabhasa*, and though this erroneous knowledge happens, yet it is corrected by right knowledge. Therefore, *correction of error* means *the realization of the Brahman*, and this correction or correct knowledge is the knowledge of the absolute Brahman, which is the highest criterion of truth. And it has already been said that this correct knowledge is devoid of tripartite process of subject, object, and their relation (*jñata*, *jñeya*, and *jñana*), because any kind of process or relation makes the pure, stainless, and immutable (*shuddha*, *apapaviddha*, and *kutastha*) Brahman limited. In other words, the Brahman falls short of his absolute nature for any kind of adjunct.

Sankara refutes the doctrines of the Samkhya (special ly in the *Brahmasutra-bhashya*, II. 1.10.37) and the Vaishe-sika (BSB II. 2.12.37) as well as those of the Buddhist (BSB. II. 18-32), Jaina (BSB. II. 2.33-36), Saiva (BSB. II. 2.37-41), Bhagavata (BSB. II. 2.41-45), and other schools, and established the doctrine of the pure *brahmavada* which substantiates the theory that the secondless Brahman is neither the cause (*karana*),<sup>51</sup> nor the substratum (*adhiish-thana*), of the world of appearance, but is absolutely above all categories and adjuncts (*visheshanas* and *upadhis*). Further the Brahman is neither one, nor many, but is an indefinable and unspeakable existence (*satta*) which is only felt in an inexpressible divine experience (*anubhutamatra-gocharam*).

Sometiaes it is wrongly believed that Sankara does not admit the importance of God (*Isvara*), devotion (*bhakti*),

<sup>51</sup> Badarayana said: “*smrityanavakasha-dosha-prasanga* \* \* ” (II.1.1., i.e. ‘if it be argued that from the acceptance of Brahman the cause of the universe arises the defects of the (*Sankhya*) Smriti’, etc. *Vide* the detailed discussion on the refutation of the *Sankhyamata* by Sankara in the commentary of this *Sutra* of Badarayana. It is to note that Sankara accused the schools of Sankhya and Yoga as the dualists (*dvaitinah*).



and action (*karma*). But that is not correct, because in the commentary on the *Bhagavad-Gita*, he clearly says about God, devotion, and work, along with many other things. In the Introduction (*upakramanika*) of the *Bhashya* on the *Gita*, Sankara writes “*sa cha bhagavan jnanaishvaryya*” etc., “*ihvararpana-buddhya*”, etc. Here by ‘*Isvara*’ Sankara means Vasudeva who is *jagata-sthiti-karanah*, etc. While commenting on the *Shloka*: “*Isvarah sarva-bhutanam*”, etc., Sankara says: “*Isvara ishanashilo narayanah*” (18.61). This *Isvara* shines along with causal nescience (*karana-ajnana*) or *maya*, but He fully controls *maya* (being *maya-dhisha*). Sankara calls *maya* as the power or energy of God—‘*paramesha-saktih*’, but that power or energy is under His control. Therefore, *Isvara* is *shuddha-buddha-mukta-svabhavah*, but, yet with the help of His *vaishnavi-maya*, He assumes the form of Creator of the universe.<sup>52</sup> In fact, *Isvara*, according to Sankara, is a product of nescience or *maya*—“the highest reading of the *nirguna*-Brahman by the individual soul”. *Isvara* also assumes the material body as an Incarnation (*Avatara*) by the help of his *maya* (*sva-mayaya*). In the *Badarayana-sutra*: “*lokavattu lilakaivalyam*” (II.1.33), which means ‘creation or projection is a mere sportive play like what is seen in the world’, we find that Sankara considers God as the cause of creation or projection though, in truth, God is not responsible for creation or projection. God can have activities of the nature of mere sportive play (*lila*) out of His spontaneity without any extraneous motive and effort, like the spontaneous movement of the breath. Now, it can be asked as to whether this spontaneous movement of projection of God as a sportive play is real or unreal. To this, Sankara says that this *sutra* (II.1.23) is meant only for propounding the fact that everything is possessed by the Brahman as its self, and this *sristi-shruti* is not in the transcendental sense ‘*paramartha-vishayah*’.

Sankara also mentions the importance of devotion (*bhakti*) for the devotees who surrender themselves to God.

<sup>52</sup> Vide, the controvertial views of the Bhamati and the Vivarana schools regarding it.

In the commentary on the *Bhagavad-Gita* (18.68), Sankara explains *bhakti* as a service to God, the Supreme Mediator: "*Bhagavatah paramagurorachyutasya shushrusa*". He says that *bhakti* means *bhajana* and, therefore, *Bhakti Yoga* means to serve i.e. to meditate upon *Isvara* who exists in the hearts of all living beings ("*Isvaram narayanam surva-bhuta-hridayashritam*"). In fact, according to Sankara, devotion (*bhakti*) should always be accompanied by discriminative knowledge (*jnana-vichara*), and without *jnana*, *bhakti* is lifeless. In the philosophy of Ramanuja, we also find that devotion (*bhakti*) must accompany knowledge (*jnana*), intense affection (*nishtha*), and self-surrender (*atma-samarpana-buddhi*) to All-love God. Well has it been said by Dr. Anima Sen Gupta: "By admitting the supremacy of *jnanamulaka-bhakti* in the form of *dhruvasmriti* involving a complete self-surrender to God, Ramanuja has been able to satisfy the eternal cravings of human heart".<sup>53</sup> Ramanuja also believed that knowledge of God must be of the nature of devotion—"*bhakti rupapannam jnanam*". However, when we love something or some one, we take it for granted that we know the nature of that something or some one, and that knowledge about the thing or person creates a certitude of the act of loving.

Sankara also prescribes *karma* for all kinds of men. He says that *karma* is ordinarily antagonistic to knowledge, as darkness is to light. but when it is performed in the spirit of worship without seeking its result (*phala*), then that selfless work of worship helps men to get emancipation (*moksha*). Sankara does not, therefore, give any indulgence to the flying and hiding tendency (*palayana-vritti*) of anyone, because this tendency nourishes the ego-centric idea or selfishness<sup>54</sup> within men, which deludes them and binds them in *samsara* ("*phale saktah nivadhyate*"). So men of Divine knowledge (*nivritti-kami*) work without seeking the result, because selfless work purifies the mind (*antahkarana*) and absolutely silences the modifications

<sup>53</sup> *A Critical Study of the Philosophy of Ramanuja* (1967) p. XXVIII.

<sup>54</sup> Selfishness is the product of *avidya* or nescience, so it contracts the mind and does not make expansion of the mind, and the result is that selfish men are deluded and cannot make them free from bondage.

(*vritti*) of the mind, and thus helps the mind to be concentrated for meditation upon the Absolute, and brings the realization of the knowledge of the Absolute.

In fact, Sankara is a *nishkama-karmavadi* i.e. he advises all to work for the worship of God, without asking the result. He says: "*kevalamistvarartham tatrapisvaro me tushyati asangam tyaktva*". Sankara says: "*saskto hi yasmāt samacharan isvarartham karma kurvan moksham apnoti purushah satvashuddhi-dvarena ityārtha*". That is, if we do not seek any result to satisfy our selfish motive, then that kind of work (*karma*) causes purification of the mind (*chitta-shuddhi*, and when the mind is purified, then devotion to knowledge (*jnana-nistha*) originates.

Similarly, regarding devotion (*bhakti*), Sankara says in the *Vivekachudamani*: "*moksha-karana-samagryam bhaktireva gariyasi*". Sankara defines *bhakti* as *atmanusandhani-vritti* i.e. the seeking tendency for the all-knowledge *Atman*, is known as devotion (*bhakti*), and this *atmanusandhani-vritti* binds God and man into one loving thread. The root *bhuj* connotes the idea of undivided communion—'*tadakarakarita*'. When a man meditates on the *Atman*, his mind takes the (mental) form of God, and then the mind is expanded and is known as the cosmic mind, and then that purified cosmic mind intuites the *Atman*, or the Brahman. Devotion or *bhakti* helps the devotees to realize the *Atman*.

However, Sankara's philosophy of Advaita Vedanta teaches the seekers after Truth to discriminate the real from the unreal, removes the unnatural delusion (*naisargika maya*) from them, and helps them to realize the ever-accomplished and self-revealing Brahman which is one without the second

### SADHANA OF ADVAITA VEDANTA

Well has it been said by Swami Abhedananda: "Vedanta does not go on speculating and speculating, theorizing and theorizing, like other philosophies, but it starts by taking the present conditions of our lives as they are and then it shows the way of it by removing their

cause. The cause of such a slavery is nothing but our ignorance of truth". Really ignorance of truth makes us forgetful of our absolute Truth. In fact, we are already in that Truth, but we have entirely forgotten our immortal heritage. It is like a lost necklace that already exists in the neck. It requires, then, recognition (*pratyabhijnana*). It requires to recognize that the necklace exists already in the neck. The Advaita Vedanta philosophy teaches this grand truth. It teaches that Truth which is one without the second, cannot be obtained as a result of any effort or work, but it exists already, and we have only to recognize it. We think ourselves as a man, as a son, or as brother, father, mother, wife, or husband, or someone due to nescience (*ajnana*) which deludes us, and makes us forget our real nature, but as soon as we will search within, and seek who are we in reality, then we will know that we are not mortal men with flesh and blood and with all relations of friendship and kinship, but are the immortal Brahman, then that knowledge is known as divine recognition (*pratyabhijnana*).

Advaita Vedanta prescribes spiritual *sadhana* for regaining the real and divine knowledge of the Brahman. It has prescribed many methods of *sadhana*, and has said that *shravana*, *manana*, and *nididhyasana* form the best method. First, we will have to hear the *mahavakya* like '*tattvamasi*', or '*ayamatma brahman*' from a realized man or *Guru*, and then we will have to think and concentrate over the real meaning or significance of that *mahavakya*, which will involve a process of *vichara*, and when the real meaning will be ascertained, then we will have to meditate upon the Reality. Now, this *nididhyasana* of Advaita Vedanta is somewhat different in process from *dhyana* of *Yoga-darshana* of Patanjali, as *nididhyasana* is an intuitive process which absolutely determines the Reality or real existence of the Brahman. Though in both the processes of *nididhyasana* and *dhyana* discrimination (*sadasadvichara*) and concentration (*dharana*) are necessary, yet in *nididhyasana* of Advaita Vedanta, the intuitional process is more essential than the intellectual one, and *nididhyasana* of Advaita Vedanta can be recognized as the absorbing state of *samadhi*, i.e. *nirvija* or *nirvikalpa-samadhi* of *Yoga*, though

*aparokshanubhuti* of Advaita Vedanta and *samadhi* of Yoga are not similar things. *Jnana-sadhana* in Advaita Vedanta directly begins with *chit*, and rests on *chit* or pure consciousness, and *aparokshanubhuti* once attained, is never lost. In *aparokshanubhuti* or immediate awareness of the Brahman, the causal or primal nescience (*karana-ajnana*) that remains as impression, is removed for ever and ever and there remains no veil or obstruction of any object. "Thus", says Dr. N. K. Brahma, "the intuition of Brahman, once gained, is never lost and endures for ever, and we shall see that this is the point of difference between the *aparokshanubhuti* of Sankara and the *samadhi* of Patanjali".<sup>55</sup> Really there is a great deal of difference between the intuition of Patanjali and that of Advaita Vedanta. To make that point of distinction more explicit, let us quote Dr. N. K. Brahma. He writes: "In the *nirvikalpa-samadhi* state, the self is realized directly in its real nature by the self. This is very near to Sankara's *aparokshanubhuti*. But there seems to be a point of distinction. The self is here perceived as different from the not-self. The discriminative knowledge (*viveka-khyati*) is the highest form of knowledge, according to the Sankhya and Yoga. The *samadhi* state, even in its *nirvikalpa* form, is at best a withdrawal and a merging into the self. The universe remains as a real not-self which the self can withdraw from but cannot resolve into itself. This *laya-samadhi* (absorption) is different from the *badha-samadhi* (transcendence) of Vedanta. In the latter, the not-self is resolved into the self, and nothing but the self is real. So, whereas in *Patanjala-samadhi*, the aloofness and withdrawal of the self from the not-self become the source of liberation (*kaivalya*) and, as such, *moksha* (liberation) and *viveka-jnana* (discrimination) become dependent from a process, the Vedantic *jnana* is eternal (*nitya*), and is not dependent upon any process or condition. The *jnana* is not produced or generated (*utpada*), does not come to exist upon a previous stage of non-existence, because it eternally is."<sup>56</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Vide, *Philosophy of Hindu Sadhana*, p. 148.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 164-165.

Further he says: "Although the *nirvikalpa-samadhi* of Patanjali is commonly regarded as identical with Vedantic intuition, and it is supposed that there is no *vyutthana* (passing off) from the same, yet it is to be admitted that the former, being dependent upon a process, cannot be altogether free from a chance of destruction. \* \* \* Patanjali's *samadhi* is like touching a point gained by the removal of disturbances; Sankara's *jnana* is the feeling of a vast expansion which not only is *now*, but *was* and *will* always be. In the *nirvikalpa-samadhi* state, the not-self is ignored and not felt, whereas in Vedantic intuition, the not-self is a resolved contradiction and is eternally negated in Brahman".<sup>57</sup>

Regarding complete removal of nescience (*ajnana-nirvritti*) and immediate knowledge (*aparokshanubhuti*) of the absolute Brahman from hearing (*shravana*) of the *mahavakya* of Vedanta, there are differences of opinion among the Vedantists. Brahmadata, an exponent of Vedanta, is of the opinion that complete removal of nescience is possible from the direct experience, evolved from *bhavana* or *upasana*, the mental process of thinking about the Brahman. From hearing (*shravana*) of the *mahavakya*, the knowledge of '*aham brahmasmi*'—'I am the Brahman' evolves, and after the evolution of this knowledge (*yatharta-pratyaya*), the *Sadhaka* must pursue the central process of *bhavana* or *upasana* for manifesting or revealing the direct cognition of the Brahman, which removes nescience. Brahmadata says that like the work-portion (*karma-kanda*) of the Vedas, the knowledge-portion (*jnana-kanda*) of the *Upanishad* is also subject to some affirmative injunctions (*vidhis*). In fact, Vedic injunction is given not only for work (*karma*) but also for knowledge or *upasana* (*upasana-vidhi*), and this *upasana-vidhi* is not enough for manifesting the Brahman-consciousness, derived

<sup>57</sup> (a) *Ibid.*, pp. 165-166.

(b) It is to note in this connection that the method of passing off or *vyutthana* is concerned with the *Yoga* system, and not with Advaita Vedanta, though Sankara and other Advaita Vedantists used this term of *vyutthana* in their writings while explaining the state of *samadhi* in connection with *mukti*.

from hearing of the *mahavakya*. Sankara differs from Brahmadata in this respect, for he maintains that a real Sadhaka (*Adhikari*) realizes the Brahman directly from hearing (*shravana*) of the *mahavakya* of Vedanta. But Brahmadata is of the opinion that performance of work, as sanctioned by the Vedas (*vaidika-karma*), along with the mental process of *upasana*, i.e. *jnana-karma-samuchchaya* (assimilation of knowledge with work) is essential for attaining the Divine knowledge of the Brahman. It has already been said that Sankara refutes this theory of *jnana-karma-samuchchaya* in favour of direct awareness of the Brahman. Sankara says in the commentary on the *Gita*: “*asmaccha bhinnapuruṣaṇusttheyatvena jñāna-karmanisthayaorbhagavataḥ prativachana-darśanāt jñāna-karmanoh-samucchayanupapattiḥ. Tasmāt kevalat eva jñāna-mokṣaḥ*”.

Mandana Mishra accepts the view of Brahmadata, as, according to him also, the Vedantic *mahavakya* is liable to Vedic injunction. Mandana Mishra says in favour of his opinion that the knowledge of ‘*aham brahmasmi*’ or ‘I am the Brahman’ arises from hearing of the *mahavakya* due to contact of the word with its meaning (*vakya-artha-samsarga*). But, for the immediate knowledge of the Brahman (*Brahman-sakshatkara*), knowledge devoid of contact between word and its meaning is necessary, i.e., according to Mandana, *asamsargatmakajñana* causes revelation of the knowledge of the Brahman. So Mandana Mishra admits the utility of *nididhyasana*, Sureshvaracharya refutes all these views in his *Naishkarmasiddhi*, and says that *bhavana* or *prasankhyana* or *nididhyasana* (or *dhyana*) is also necessary for revealing the Brahman-knowledge.<sup>58</sup>

Padmapada does not admit the mental process of *manana* and *nididhyasana* as essential for the Brahman-knowledge and he maintains hearing (*shravana*) alone is capable of revealing the knowledge of the Brahman, because hearing (*shravana*) of the *mahavakya* involves in itself the mental process of discrimination or *vichara*, and, therefore, hearing of the *mahavakya* alone enables the *Sadhaka*

<sup>58</sup> MM. Gopinath Kaviraj discussed these views of Brahmadata, Mandana Mishra, Bhatiprapancha, Sureshvaracharya, and Sankara in his recent book *Bharatiya Sadhanar Dhara* (Bengali, 1968), pp. 145-146.

to immediately attain to the Brahman-knowledge. But Vachaspati Mishra differs from Padmapada and forwards his view in the Bhamati that *shravana*, *manana*, and *nididhyasana*—all these three are essential for revealing the knowledge of the Brahman.<sup>59</sup> While explaining the viewpoint of the Vivarana school (*Vivarana-sampradaya*), Prakashatma-Yati refutes in the *Vivarana-prameya-samgraha* the view of Vachaspati Mishra, and lays stress upon *shravana* or hearing of the *mahavakya* only, and calls *manana* and *nididhyasana* as the *angas* or helpful ones to *shravana*. Prakashatma-Yati says that *shravana* itself is the *brahman-vichara*, so it alone determines the real nature of the Brahman and completely dispels the darkness of ignorance (*ajnana*). The realization of the Brahman comes in itself, and after this *brahmanubhuti*, a released man can live in this phenomenal world as before, though his vision is entirely changed. Vidyaranya Munishvara says: “*‘shrotavyo mantavyo nididhyasitavya’ iti manana-nididhyasanabhyam phalopakaryan-gabhyam saha shravanam-namangi vidhiyata iti*”. That is, Munishvara says that *shravana* or hearing of the *mahavakya* of Vedanta should repeatedly be practised with the secondary means, *manana* and *nididhyasana* for realization of the self-revealing Brahman-knowledge: “*ata itikartavyataya phalopakaryan-gabhyam chopkritanangibhutam shravanameva nischala-parokshanubhavanakam*”.<sup>60</sup>

### THE POST-SANKARA PHILOSOPHERS

After Sankara (788-820 A.D.) many Advaitins appeared, who enriched the field of Indian philosophical thought. Some of them followed Sankara, and some of them differed from him in some respects. Those Advaitins were known as the post-Sankara savants of Advaita Vedanta. After Sankara the following names of the Advaitins are worth-mentioning, and they are, Padmapada, Vachaspati Mishra, Prakashatman, Vidyaranya Muni, Amalananda, Ananda-

<sup>59</sup> These will be discussed separately.

<sup>60</sup> Vide, *The Vivarana-prameya-samgraha*, I.1.



Giri, Sureshvaracharya, Mandana Mishra, Sarvajnatma Muni, Amalananda Appaya-Diskhit, Govindananda, Anandabodha, Vimuktatman, Madhusudana Sarasvati, Sri Harsha, Chitsukhacharya, Sadananda Yati, Nrisimha Sarasvati, Ramatirtha, Amalananda, Prakashananda, Rangaji-Bhatta and others.

In the post-Sankara philosophical views, we find some differences of opinion regarding definitions of *maya*, and *avidya*, locus of *maya* or *ajnana*, status of *mukti* or *moksha*, etc. Besides, we notice two main schools of post-Sankara philosophy. Vivarana and Bhamati. Padmapada is known as the founder of the Vivarana school, whereas Vachaspati Mishra, as the founder of the Bhamati school. It is said that Padmapada maintains the direct tradition of Sankara and so he forwards the traditional views of Sankara. Vedanta, in his commentary, *Vivarana*, made only on the first four aphorisms (*sutras*) of the *Brahmasutra*, whereas Vachaspati Mishra develops also old traditional views of Advaita Vedanta, slightly differing in some respects. The close study of the two schools will reveal those minor differences in their views or *siddhantas*. The Vivarana school is maintained by most of the Sannyasins, and specially by the Dandi Sannyasins, whose customs and creeds are somewhat different from the Sannyasins who leave the sacred *dandas* after the Sannyasa initiation. Some of the Avadhutas, belonging to Tantric tradition, also follow some doctrines and rituals (*acharas*) of the Advaita Vedantins, but their school of thought is different from that of Sankara.

## APPENDIX I

### THE VIVARANA-SCHOOL

Now let us describe separately some of the features of the philosophical doctrines, as maintained by the two main commentators, Padmapada and Vachaspati Mishra. Padmapada was one of the chief disciples of Sankara. His original name was Sanandan. Padmapada was made the chief of the Govardhan Math. It has been said that he has

composed the commentary of the *Panchapadika* only on the four aphorisms of the *Brahmasutra*. From the Madhava-charya's *Sankaradigvijaya* we know that the last part of the *Panchapadika* was known as *Vritti*, but it is not available. The *Panchapadika* is generally known as the *Vivarana-prasthanana*, which is divided into nine *varnakas*. The word *varnaka* means explanation (*vyakhyā*) of the philosophical discussion as contained in the *Panchapadika*. The first *varnaka* deals with the description of *adhyasa* in detail. The second *varnaka* deals with the topic that without *dharmajijnasa* or *karma-jijnasa*, *brahma-jijnasa* is not possible. The third *varnaka* deals with the utility of Veda, Upanishad, and other treatises for the acquiring of the *Brahman-knowledge*. The fourth *varnaka* deals with the status of the *Atman*, and the opposite views of the doctrine of the *Atman* have been refuted. The fifth *varnaka* deals with the determination of the characteristic of the Brahman. The sixth *varnaka* deals with description as well as affirmation of the fact of the evolution of the Vedas from the Brahman. The seventh and eighth *varnakas* deal with the fact that the utility of the spiritual treatises is to determine the status of the Brahman, and the Shastras are the means for acquiring the knowledge of the Brahman. The ninth *varnaka* has proved the harmony between Vedanta and the Brahman.

The *Panchapadika-vivarana* explains that the object of Vedanta is to determine the Brahman which is one without the second, and nescience (*ajnana*) deludes men and brings false knowledge about the real status of the Brahman, and the doctrines of Vedanta remove that false knowledge. Padmapada says that in the statement: '*mithya cha tada-jnanam*' etc *mithya* means '*anirvachaniya avidyasakti*', and *ajnana* means the inert *avidya*: '*ajnanam iti jadatmika avidyasakti*'. Again *adhyasa* is not *smṛti* or remembrance, but it means 'like remembrance' (*smṛtirupah*). Therefore false knowledge (*brahma-jnana*) is the knowledge of wrong perception, and not remembrance (*smṛiti*). Padmapada says that there must be a ground (*asraya*) of a false knowledge, and that ground is the Brahman or Brahman-knowledge. The false knowledge is the cause of creating

the manifold selves and the world. *Avidya* is inert by nature, but still it is the *chit* or consciousness, because this *avidya* is known as the covering quality (*tiraskarani*) or property, which is shining in itself, and it exists along with the existence of the all-revealing Brahman as its ground or substratum (*adhithana*).

There exist two powers, *jnanasakti* and *kriyasakti*, and for these two powers the Brahman is reflected on *avidya*. The Brahman is recognised as possessed or those two powers or qualities. Padmapada says that qualified or determinate Brahman is known as the individual being or *jiva*. Therefore, the reflection of the self-shining Brahman is known as an individual being: '*nanu ko'yaṁ jīvo naṁā brahmaiva avidyā-prativimbā itī vadamaḥ*'. The real (*vimba*) and the reflection (*prativimba*) are, in truth, non-different i.e. one and the same. Padmapada says that the reflection is an adjunct (*upadhi*) of the Brahman, the real or *vimba*, and the difference (*bheda*) between them is false or unreal, and, therefore, the individual being is no other than the universal Being, the Brahman. The individual being, the reflection (of the Brahman), is sentient and shining by nature, but this shining is covered by the darkness of nescience (*avidya*).

The Brahman is also the ground or substratum of the world of name and form, and as the world is illumined by the light of the existence of the Brahman, so it appears as true. So when the Brahman as ground is realized, the world is also realized as the Brahman, and there exists no separate entity of the world-appearance other than the Brahman. The fact is that with the knowledge of the Brahman world-appearance is negated, i.e. sublated.

Padmapada further says that the world is '*mithya*' (false) means the nature of the world is '*anirvachaniya*' (indescribable), and the word, '*anirvachaniya*' means that which is different from both reality and unreality—'*sadusad-vilakṣṇam mithyatvam*'. That is, what is contradicted by knowledge, is false or *mithya*—'*jñāna-nivartitvatam mithyam*'; or that which is absent in its ground (*adhithana*) is known as false.

Padmapada says that *maya* and *avidya* are one and the

same. The covering power (*avarani-sakti*) of *ajnana* is known as *avidya*, and the revealing power (*viksepa-sakti*) is known as *maya*, which is the universal Mother or *Prakriti*—*'viksepa-pradhanyena maya acchadana-pradhanyena avidyeti-vyavahara bhedah'*. Therefore the Brahman is both the ground (*asraya*) and the object (*visaya*). And, therefore, there is no contradiction between the witness-consciousness (*saksi-chaitanya* as the revealer of *avidya*) and nescience with covering power (*tiraskarani-avidya*). When the Brahman is realized through the medium of the reflected consciousness (of the Brahman) that 'I am Brahman', then that reflected consciousness (*vrutti-jnana*) exists in contradiction with *ajnana*, and, therefore, *ajnana* or *avidya* is removed by the reflected consciousness (*vrutti-jnana*), and there lies no contradiction of the Brahman (*jnana*) with nescience (*ajnana*) having its covering power. And so, Padmapada says that *ajnana* is not an absence (*abhava*) of *jnana*, as darkness is not an absence of light. So *ajnana* is an existing property with a covering power—*bhava-padartha*. And the validity of the existing nature of *ajnana* is proved by the knowledge of perception.

Padmapada further says that though the *brahman-chaitanya* is self-revealing and all-pervading, yet its revelation depends on the internal organ or *antahkarana*, and the Brahman is revealed when the subject-consciousness and the object-consciousness appear as one and the same. The Brahman is revealed by hearing of the *mahavakya*—*tattvamansi* or *'aham brahmasmi'*. Therefore *sabda-pramana* is sufficient for revealing the Brahman. Padmapada admits that only hearing (*s'ravana*) of the *mahavakya* is sufficient for the realization of Brahman, and *manana* and *nididhyasana* are the helping ones to *s'ravana*. But it should be noted that Padmapada and the upholders of the *Vivarana*-doctrine do not admit the validity of the *sphota*, and thus they also have refuted the doctrine of the *Shabda-Brahman*.

## THE BHAMATI SCHOOL

Vachaspati Misra was the founder of the Bhamati school. It is also known as the *Bhamati-prasthanā*. Vachaspati Misra was a versatile genius. He composed the commentaries of the Sankhya, named the *Sankhyatattva-Kaumudi*, of the Patanjala, named the *Tattvavaisaradi*, of the Nyayadarsana, named the *Nyayavartika-tatparya* and the *Nyayasuchi-nibandha*, of the Mimamsadarsana, named the *Tattvavindu* (of the Bhatta School), etc. Vachaspati Misra appeared in the earlier part of the 9th century A.D. His wife's name was Bhamati, and it is said that he wrote commentary of the *Sankara-bhasya* to commemorate the name of his devoted wife.

Vachaspati Misra divides *avidya* into two, *mula* and *tula*. *Avidya* which is an existent something (*bhava-rupa*), and which creates the world-appearance, is known as *mula-vidya*, and when *avidya* becomes the adject (*upadhi*) of the individual being (*jiva*), it is known as *tulavidya*. Therefore *maya*, according to Vachaspati Misra, is a relational or helping cause (*sahakari-karana*) and is not contained in creation as an effect (*anugata-karana*). He, therefore, refutes the view of Padmapada that the pure Brahman without any kind of adject is the cause of creation, or of the world-appearance.

Vachaspati Misra raises a question of opposition as to the first aphorism of the *Brahmasutra*: '*athato brahma-jijnasa*'. He says that asking of a question arises where there creeps a doubt, but regarding the knowledge of the Brahman there arises no doubt, but it is certain that the knowledge of the Brahman should be known, and this fact is a well-established one, and, therefore, *jijnasa* for the Brahman or Brahman-knowledge is unnecessary. Moreover the Brahman is known to us by the help of I-consciousness (*aham-pratyaya*), so *jijnasa* is required only for the removal of nescience i.e. ignorance about the Brahman, because the Brahman is a well-established fact—'*vastu-taniratvat*'.

Now, what is an *adhyasa*? '*Adhikrtya aste iti adhyasah*' i.e. the thing which we perceive by the eyes,

does not exist there, but we perceive another thing in place of the real thing,<sup>1</sup> and so Sankara defines *adhyasa* as '*smrtirupah paratra purva-drstavabhasah*'. Vachaspati Misra says that the word *avabhasah* connotes the idea of *adhyasa*—'*avabhaso'dhyasah*'. The word *bhasa* means manifestation or light (*prakasa*), and when the affix *gham* is added to the word *bhasah*, it means an object of knowledge (*jneya-vastu*)—'*avasanno'vamato vabhasah avabhasah . . . etavata mithya-jnanamityuktam bhavati*'. Like Sankara, Vachaspati Misra admits three kinds of reality: (a) transcendental truth (*paramarthika-satta*), (b) phenomenal and relative truth (*vyavaharika-satta*), and (c) assuming truth (*pratitika-satta*). (a) The transcendental truth is not contradicted in future, present and past times '*trikala-vdhyatvam paramarthikam*'. (b) The phenomenal reality is replaced by the realization of the Brahman-knowledge, and (c) the assuming reality is replaced by the phenomenal reality—'*vyavaharika-jnanavadhyah*'.

Vachaspati Misra says that *avidya* does not mean the absence of *vidya* or *jnana*, as *avidya* is eternal and indescribable and is, therefore, an existent thing (*bhava-padartha*). This existent *avidya* is the cause or seed of the process of creation or projection of the world-appearance. It is an energy or a power of *Isvara*, and when everything is destroyed in deluge, they are not lost, but sleep on the bed of *avidya* in the form of seed. Besides it, the individual (*vyasti*) and the universal internal organ (*antahkarana*), its modifications, its impressions (*samskaras*), desires, etc remain in causal state in the womb of the *antahkarana*, (here *antahkarana* means the Hiranyagarbha-Brahma, the Creator), and they are manifested again in gross form by the will of God—'*jadyapi mahapralaye nantahkaranadayah samudachad-vrittayah santi, tathapi svakarane anirvachyayamavidyam linah suksmena saktirupena . . . . sahavatisthanta eva*'. Vachaspati Misra further says that *avidya* is superimposed (*adhyasta*) in the Brahman as the witness (*saksi-Brahman*), and it (*avidya*) is also illumined by

<sup>1</sup> Vide, *Vedantadarsana Advaitavada* by Dr. Ashutosh Bhattacharya Sastri (Calcutta University, 1st edition), pp. 3-4.

*saksi-Brahman*. He forwards that the individual self is the reflection of the *Brahman* (*Brahman-vimba*), and, therefore, the manifestation of the individual self is an imaginative play, and is, therefore, unreal. The delusive impression (*vibhrama-samskara*) is the cause of superimposition (*adhyasa*). For, the manifold adjunct, the individual self, appears as many, and then *avidya* appears also as many. Vachaspati Misra does not admit any *vidhi* (injunction) in the transcendental knowledge, as it is self-revealing and self-existing. The knowledge of the Brahman does depend undoubtedly on the hearing (*shravana*) of the *mahavakya*, but this *shravana* does not mean only the hearing of the *mahavakya*, by the ears, but the self-knowledge (*atma-vijnana*), originated from the instructions of the Acharya, is required for the realization of the Brahman. The liberation (*mukti*) exclusively depends on the self-knowledge—'*vastu-svarupavadharanam vidya chidrupam svarupe vyavatatishante*'. And it is to note that Vachaspati Misra does not admit the *sphotavada*.

Now, from the standpoint of the *Jiva*, all kinds of philosophy and their arguments begin. The *Jiva* is the starting point, and its highest point is the Brahman, though *Advaita* Vedanta establishes absolute identity between the *Jiva* and the Brahman.

We have discussed above the main different features of the two lines of non-dualistic thought of Vivarana and Vachaspati. We have also seen that Vachaspati characterises *avidya* as centred in the *jiva*, making the Brahman its object, and the *Jiva* co-exists with *avidya*. Sarvajnatma-Muni, Prakashatma-Yati, and others regard *avidya* to be resting in the Brahman as the locus, keeping away from view its transcendent nature. Vachaspati insists upon the co-existence of *avidya* and *Jiva* from eternity.<sup>2</sup>

Like Sarvajnatma-Muni, Madhusudana Sarasvati also admits that the pure consciousness or Brahman is the substratum (*adhisthana*) of *avidya*. But we have seen that Vachaspati Mishra maintains that the *Jiva* is the locus (*ashraya*) of *avidya*, but Madhusudana Sarasvati has refuted this view.

<sup>2</sup> Vise, Dr. M. N. Sircar: *The System of Vedantic Thought and Culture* (Calcutta University, 1925), p. 81.

## APPENDIX II

### DIFFERENT VIEWPOINTS IN ADVAITA SCHOOL

The Vivarana school of Advaita Vedanta maintains that *avidya* is co-eternal with the Brahman, and when pure consciousness (*chit*) is reflected in *avidya*, it is called the individual self or *Jiva*. The Brahman (*Turiya*) itself is ever-transcendent, and the Brahman as witnessing consciousness *Saksi* or *Bimba* is *Isvara*, and the Brahman as a reflected consciousness is *Jiva*.

From this if we proceed further, we get the theory of *eka-jivavada* (opposite to *aneka-jivavada*). In the *eka-jivavada*, it is taken that the Brahman expresses itself in nescience, and that means the Brahman then assumes the form of *Jiva*. The nescience is one, and, therefore, in *eka-jivavada*, the Brahman appears as a unit of conscious being (i.e. *Jiva*). Madhusudana Sarasvati also admits *eka-jivavada*. Madhusudana Sarasvati says that in *eka-jivavada*, the concept of *upadhi* (adjunct), *avacchedaka*, and *prativimba* (reflection) work simultaneously.

Mainly there are three doctrines in relation to *Jiva* and *Isvara*: (1) *Abhasavada*, (2) *Bimba-prativimbavada*, and (3) *Avacchedavada*.

(1) *Abhasavada* is maintained by the authors of the *Vartika* and the *Sanksepa-shariraka*. This theory of *abhasavada* holds that the Brahman is reflected on *avidya*, and it appears as being identical with the reflection which is the cause of the manifold appearance. In fact, according to *abhasavada*, when the *Atman* is reflected on *avidya*, it is identified that *avidya*. Madhusudana Sarasvati differs somewhat from the above explanation.

(2) *Vimba-prativimbavada* is maintained by Padmapada and Prakashatma-Yati. Prakashatman says that what (consciousness) appears in reflection, is true, though reflection is false, so that it is in itself true, though false as a reflection. This theory explains that *Isvara* is the self-limited (*upahita*) by the causal nescience (*karana-ajnana*), which is the cause of the world. Some others define this theory in a different way.



(3) *Avacchedavada* is maintained by Vachaspati Misra. Vachaspati says that every finite conscious unit is known as a mode of the substance, and it is a limited consciousness by something. That is, according to *avacchedavada*, the pure consciousness, *Isvara*, is the object (*vishaya*) of nescience (*avidya*), while the individual self (*Jiva*) is the container (*ashraya*). In this theory, the *Jiva* is known as the *ashraya* of nescience (*avidya*).

Besides, there is *dristi-sristivada* which advocates that the world-appearance is the result of God's self-willing, and God looks on before He projects the world.<sup>1</sup> *Dristi-sristi-vada* can be explained from the viewpoint of the individual self that as the *Jiva* sees the appearance of the world, so it is created, and it also exists, and when he does not see it and remains in deep sleep (*susupti*), or in an unconscious state, the world does not exist to him. Some scholars maintain that this theory subscribes, in some way or other, to subjective idealism, as maintained by Berkeley and others in the West and the school of the *Yogachari* Buddhists and that of the *Yogavasistha*.

Berkeley says *essi* is *percipi* i.e. *dristi* is *sristi*. At that time, the universe appears as purely subjective and remains ever as such. The *Vedanta-adarsha* says,

*Dristireva bhavet sristi dristi-sristirmate tatha*  
*Dristikalin-srististu dristi-sristirmatantare*

However, *dristi-sristivada* can be taken in two ways: "Everything real, for it appears, and that which does not appear, does not exist. This *dristi-sristi* theory has two forms: (1) *Sristi* is *dristi*: *percipi* is the being of *essi*, there is nothing objective. Prakashananda admits this theory. (2) The empirical manifold has no existence independent of consciousness, but it is still not identical with consciousness. *Essi* is, no doubt, dependent upon *percipi*, but *percipi* does not constitute the being of *essi*."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>(a) Vide, Dr. M. N. Sarcar: *The System of Vedantic Thought and Culture* (Calcutta University, 1925), pp. 109-112.

(b) Dr Sanjukta Gupta: *Studies in the Philosophy of Madhusudana Sarasvati* (Calcutta, 1966), pp. 122-129.

<sup>2</sup>Vide, Dr. M. N. Sarcar: *Vedantic Thought and Culture* (Calcutta University, 1925), pp. 126-127.

## APPENDIX III

KNOWLEDGE OF PERCEPTION  
ACCORDING TO VEDANTA

Knowledge of perception differs for its different angles of vision. It differs from the viewpoint of materialism, direct realism, critical realism, neo-realism, objective idealism and subjective idealism, absolute idealism, spiritualism, as well as from the viewpoints of dualism, qualified dualism, and non-dualism. According to materialistic or realistic viewpoint, when we perceive the objects out there in the external world, independent of mental images, perception becomes materialistic or realistic. Knowledge of perception becomes idealistic, when we perceive objects as the representations of the ideas or mental images of the objects. In objective idealism, the object is temporarily admitted as an existent one, whereas in subjective idealism, the object is known as no other than the consciousness itself. Berkeley says *esse is percipi*, i.e. we perceive things which are mental. In India, the Yogachara Buddhists and the upholders of the *Yogavasistha-Ramayana*, *Astavakra-Samhita* and the *Gaudapada-Karika* maintain the theory of subjective idealism, which reduces it to the theory of solipsism, whereas Sankara and most of the post-Sankara non-dualistic philosophers maintain the theory of objective idealism, which says that the object of knowledge is true, so far as it exists in the external world and is not replaced or negated by the transcendental knowledge. So the phenomenal existence (*vyavaharika-satta*) is temporarily admitted until and unless it is not contradicted or replaced by the transcendental existence (*paramarthika-satta*). Kant also admits this theory of perception like Sankara, as he says that the transcendental knowledge is true, but so far it is not reflected, the phenomenal knowledge is accepted as existent. The spiritual perception comes from the revelation of the spiritual vision which is permanent and undying.

Now, what is perception? From the standpoint of naive realism, or of psychology, perception is defined as knowledge or cognition of external objects "through the

interpretation of one or more sensations". Let me quote, regarding it, the statement of Dr. S. C. Chatterjee: "When I perceive a rose as red what happens is that the sensation of red colour produced by the stimulation of my visual sense is understood by me as the quality of a thing called rose. Similarly, when a boy perceives a fruit placed on the palm of his hand as an orange he takes his visual and tactual sensations as signifying the colour and touch qualities of an object named orange. If we analyse the mental processes involved in the perception of the rose we shall find that there is first the discrimination of the given sensation of red colour from other kinds of sensations like sound and touch or other variations of the same kind, like yellow and white. Secondly, it involves the act of assimilating the given sensation with like sensations, i.e. recognising it as similar to the red colour of others roses. Thirdly, the given colour sensation revives in my mind other touch and smell sensations with which it was connected or associated in my past experience, although I may not be explicitly aware of the process of reproduction. Then, we find that the whole group of given and revived sensations is referred to a particular point of space occupied by the object of perception which is believed to be really existing in the outside world and to possess the qualities of red colour, soft touch and sweet smell. What is true of the perception of the red rose is true of the perception of any other object of the external world. It is to be observed here that from the psychological standpoint we do not raise any question as to the truth or validity of perception. The object of perception may not really exist, or it may exist in a way different from that in which it is perceived by us. Still, if we believe that it exists just as it is perceived, our cognition of the object is as good a perception as any other. Of course, in psychology we do not ignore the distinction between true and erroneous perception or illusion. But for psychology both are perceptions, since both are due to sense-stimulation and interpretation of given sensations, although in the latter case the object which we believe to be real is not real."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Vide, *The Problems of Philosophy* (Calcutta, 1949), pp. 106-107.

The Nyaya-Vaisheshika philosophy upholds the theory of perceptual knowledge as realistic. They say that knowledge of perception comes from the contact of the senses with the external objects—*indriya-sannikarsa-janyam jnanam*. But there may be immediate knowledge without any stimulation of sense is admitted by many leading philosophers of the West. The Sankhya philosophy maintains, on the contrary, the idealistic knowledge of perception as it upholds the *satkaryavada*, or the theory which maintains that effect comes in a manifested form from the unmanifested cause, and when effect dies out, it goes back to its causal state—‘*nashah-karana-layah*’. The Buddhists define perception “as the unerring cognition of some given sensum without any modification of it by subjective ideas (*kalpana*), or the concepts of name, class, quality, action and relation”. The empiricists or associationists, the rationalists and the phenomenologists also differ in their definitions of knowledge of perception. So knowledge of perception (*pratyaksha-jnana*) differs from different angles of vision, or for different interpretations. The Advaita Vedanta holds that through the process of direct knowledge of perception we are in contact with the basic or transcendental knowledge which knows no tripartite divisions of the knowledge, the known and the knower (*jnana*, *jneya*, and *jnata*), as well as which bears no least spot of nescience and duality. The pure consciousness takes the form of the modal consciousness (*vritti-jnana*) when it comes in contact with some objects, mental or material. Dharmaraja Adhvarindra says in the *Vedanta-paribhasa* that our consciousness goes out of the internal organ (*antahkarana*) and takes the form of the objects, and it is true that consciousness (*chit*) that resides in the internal organ, that emits from it, and that takes the forms of the objects, are one and the same consciousness, and this unique and one consciousness is, in essence, the Brahman-consciousness. So, if we realize that consciousness really reveals the objects of the universe with its self-luminous light, then we perceive the objects means we come in contact with the pure consciousness, and we are ever-illuminated by the basic consciousness, the Brahman.

## CHAPTER XVI

### THE BADARAYANA SCHOOL

Swami Vireswarananda says: "Badarayana, to whom the authorship of the *Brahmasutras* or *Vedantasutras* is ascribed, is not the only one who had tried to systematize the philosophy of the *Upanishads*."<sup>1</sup> Some are of the opinion that Badarayana and Vyasa are different persons, but Vachaspati Mishra, Anandagiri, and others identify Badarayana and Vyasa, and Ramanuja and other commentators on the *Brahmasutras* attribute it to Vyasa, and have not mentioned about the name of Badarayana.<sup>2</sup> Swami Vireswarananda further discusses this point in his *Brahmasutras*. He has said: "In support of the view that the two persons are one it can be pointed out that there existed in the time of *Paninisutras* known as *Bhikshusutras* which are identified by Vachaspati with the *Vedantasutras*. The subject-matter of the *Vedantasutras* being Brahman, the knowledge of which is pre-eminently meant of Samnyasins, it might well be called *Bhikshusutras*. Panini in his *sutras* ascribes these *Bhikshusutras* to Parasarya, the son of Parasara i.e. Veda-Vyasa, who was also called Badarayana, as he had his Ashrama at Badari (Badrikashrama) in the Himalayas."<sup>3</sup>

While discussing Sankara's interpretation of the *Sutras*, Swami Vireswarananda says: "There is a strong opinion current amongst scholars today that whatever be the merit of Sankara's metaphysical doctrines considered by themselves or even as doctrines elucidating the teaching of the *Upanishads*, he is not faithful to Badarayana in his interpretation of the *sutras*. They hold that Badarayana was ignorant of a twofold Brahman and, consequently, of a twofold knowledge; that he was not aware of the doctrine

<sup>1</sup> Vide, 'Introduction' to the *Brahmasutras*, published by Advaita Ashrama, 1936, p. vi.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. VII-VIII

of Maya, and so did not hold that the world was unreal, but that Brahman underwent a real change into this world-order; and that the *sutras* do not hold the view of absolute indentity of the individual soul and Brahman. In short, their view is that the system of Badarayana is a theistic system which has more affinities with the system of Ramanuja an Nimbarka than with Sankara's pure Non-dualism. This view is nothing new. Bhaskara at the beginning of his commentary on the *sutras* accused Sankara of this very thing. But at the same time we can also cite Sandilya, the author of the *Bhakti-sutras*, who in *sutra* 30 of his work refers to Badarayana as a Monist, which shows that the view that Badarayana was an Abhedavadin was prevalent in ancient days, even as early as the *sutra* period. . . . All the same we shall take some salient points connected with this (controversial) discussion and try to see how far such a criticism against Sankara is justified."<sup>4</sup>

But most of the scholars are of the opinion that at places Sankara's interpretations of some aphorisms of Vadarayana appear different, and Sankara himself also admitted that fact. Some scholars have further suggested that though at the outset Sankara's interpretations of some *sutras* (of Badarayana) seem to be far-fitted or different, yet if we critically follow the connecting letters of the *sutras*, then there will be no difficulty to get the consistent interpretations of the *sutras* as well as not to miss the general spirit of the *sutras* as a whole.

It is said that it is the aim of Badarayana to interpret *sutras*, then there will be no difficulty to get the consistent the thought of the *Upanishads* and the *Bhagavad-Gita*, so he has not written any separate commentary, but has written the *sutras* which are originally meant to be commentaries of the *Upanishads* and the *Gita*. Badrayana's philosophical aphorisms are known as the *Uttara-Mimansa*, or the *Brahmasutras*, supported by the Upanishadic texts and rational arguments (*shruti-pramana and yukti-pramana*). Really *Uttara-Mimansa* is the intuitional portion (*jnana-kanda*) of the *Vedas*, whereas *Purva-Mimansa* is the sacri-

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. XVI.

ficial portion of the *Vedas* (*karmakanda*). Some are of the opinion that *Purva-Mimansa* is the preparatory ground of *Uttara-Mimansa*, and the first *sutra*: "*athato brahma-jijnasa*", i.e. 'hence (is to be undertaken) thereafter a deliberation on the Brahman' signifies it. The *sutra* says that Brahman is to be inquired into for the knowledge of the Brahman which leads to *moksa*. As regards deliberation, most of the scholars say that a deliberation on the Brahman comes after the proper practices of *shama*, *dama*, *titiksha*, *samadhana*, *shraddha*, etc. so it is not wholly correct.

Now what do we mean by Vedanta? Sadananda Yati has said in the *Vedantasara* that '*Vedanta*' means the *Upanishad* ("*vedanto nama upanishad-pramanam*"). The *Upanishad* is known as the last or intuitional portion of the *Vedas*, and the aphorisms of the *Shariraka-sutras* are helpful to the *Upanishad* ("*tadupakarini sharirakasutradlini cha*"). The word '*shariraka*' connotes the idea of an individual ego (*jiva* or *jivatman*), which is known as *tam* and is apparently different from '*tat*' or the Brahman, but essentially both the terms convey one and the same idea. The *Vedas* are generally divided into three parts: sacrificial (*karmakanda*), meditative (*upasanakanda*), and intuitional (*jnanakanda*). The intuitional portion of the *Vedas* is the *Upanishad* or the treatises that teach how to realize the absolute Brahman.

Badarayana lays stress on *mimansa* which means *vichara* or a pure epistemological and intellectual process—*jnana-vichara* as a means to determine merit and demerit ("*dharma-dharma-vishyaka-vicharah*"). Padmapada, the foremost disciple of Sankara, as well as the followers of the Vivarana school prescribe *shravana* as equivalent to *vichara* for the determination and realization of the Brahman-knowledge. Padmapada says *manana* and *nididhyasana* are not the prime factors, but are only helpful to *shravana*. But Vachaspati Misra does not agree to this view, as he has said that *shravana*, *manana*, and *nididhyasana*—these three factors or functions are essential for realization of the Brahman.

Sankara has made the central idea of the intuitional portion of the *Vedas* explicit by his different illuminating

commentaries. He proves that the Vedic (sacrificial) functions have no power or capacity to rescue men from the den of delusion (*maya*), rather they bind them in the trap of *karma* and its results (*phala*), and it is the Brahman-knowledge that makes them free from nescience or delusion. For the realization of the Brahman, we will have to know the real meaning of the *mahavakyas*, or the grand Upanishadic teachings. We will have to hear (*shravana*) the *mahavakyas* of Vedanta from the men of realization and then to think (*manana*) over them and to meditate upon the real meaning and essence of the Brahman (*nididhyasana*). It has already been said that Vivarana school laid stress upon *shravana* which is an intuitional function for discrimination and right determination of the Truth.

Dr. P. M. Modi in his learned article on *Badarayana's Conception of Brahman* discusses this matter, and has said that "while professing to base their (different '*acharyas*') systems only on the *Upanishads* and the *Bhagavad-Gita* as did Badarayana, instead of availing themselves of this freedom, they preferred to revere Badarayana by raising his work to the status of a Prasthanas." Dr. Modi also places many facts and reasons as to why the later *Acharyas* differed from Badarayana, or rejected his views. Dr. Modi says that they (the *Acharyas* of Vedanta, including Sankara) differ from Badarayana due to two facts: "(1) Badarayana was the first known *Acharya* of the Vedanta school and, therefore, every subsequent *Acharya* must, in the opinion of the Vedanta school, follow (or profess to follow) Badarayana, and (2) when the exact meaning of each *sutra* and the very doctrine of Badarayana's work were forgotten, it was easy for each subsequent *Acharya* to interpret it in his own way and thereby to assert his allegiance to the first (?) *Acharya* of the Vedanta school".<sup>5</sup> Now, these might be possible facts, but whether the second fact or reason is applicable to the most intellectual and original commentator, Sankara, is a debatable subject.

It has been already mentioned that most of the scholars are of the opinion that Sankara differs in his interpretation

<sup>5</sup> Vide, *The Prabuddha Bharata*, July, 1939, p. 341.



in some of the *sutras* of Badarayana. Again, after a close study and proper investigation, we do not find any anomaly or discrepancy in Sankara's interpretations. As for example, while commenting on the *sutra*: '*athato brahma-jijnasa*', i.e. 'the Brahman is to be inquired into, for the knowledge that leads to liberation (*moksha*)', Badarayana defines Brahman in the second *sutra*: "*janmadyasya yatah*". Apparently, "we get a *saguna* Brahman as the subject-matter of the *sutra* and not the *nirguna*-Brahman of Sankara which is Existence-Knowledge-Bliss absolute". Regarding it, Swami Vireswarananda says: "So it appears that the author at the very beginning of the work precludes any chance of Sankara's doctrine being read in his *sutras*. But let us investigate into the matter a little and see whether it is actually so. After the statement in *sutra* 1 that Brahman is to be known, naturally the question about the nature of Brahman arises. The Sutrakara (aphorist) here anticipates an objection that Brahman cannot be defined at all. For whatever we recognize in this world, is limited and as such cannot be a characteristic of Brahman which is infinite. A limited thing cannot define an unlimited thing. Nor can any characteristic which is absolutely beyond our experience, like Reality etc., define Brahman, for it is only a well-known characteristic that defines a thing and distinguishes it from other things. Again, the scriptures cannot define Brahman, for being absolutely unique, it cannot be expressed in speech. Thus in the absence of any definition Brahman cannot serve human purpose. To refute all such objections the Sutrakara defines Brahman in *sutra* 2. Granted that the world we experience cannot define Brahman as being a quality of It, or as being identical with It, yet the quality of being the (supposed) cause of the world may indicate It. "Birth etc." mentioned in the *sutra* 2 defines Brahman *per accidens*. Though they inhere in the world and do not pertain to Brahman, the causality connected therewith pertains to Brahman and, therefore, the definition holds good. This causality indicates Brahman even as the snake indicates the rope when we say that, that which is the snake, is the rope, where the rope is indicated by the snake, owing

to the illusory connection between the two. This definition, therefore, actually aims at the *nirguna* Brahman and cannot be taken as a definition of the *saguna*-Brahman.”<sup>6</sup>

In this way, we can reconcile some of the differences which apparently appear to us. But most of the scholars say that Sankara has really differed from Badarayana in his views, while commenting on the *sutras* I.1.19, III.3.12, and III.4.11. In the commentary on the *sutra* III.3.12 “*priya-shira. . . hi bhede*”, Sankara has mentioned the name of Badarayana: “*brmadharmangstetan . . . . midam acharyenadarshitam. . .*”, and says that “Acharya Vysadeva (Badarayana) has accepted them as *Brahmadharma*, and so he has shown only the arguments (*yutimatram*) on this *sutra*, III.3.12. It is said that Gaudapada has also criticized Badarayana in his *karika* on the *sutra*: “*tadananeytvamarabha-shabdadibhyah*” (II.1.14), and Dr. Modi says it seems that Gaudapada has also criticized the illustration of *bija* and *amkura*, or the seed and the plant (“*vijankura vadhetumadbhavana*”—*Bhashyam*), given by Sankara on the *Brahmasutra*, II.1.35: “*no karmavibhagaditi chennaditvat*” in his (Gaudapada) *karika*: “*vijankurebhyodrish-tantah. . . .*” (IV. 20). In fact, Gaudapada lived before Sankara and his criticism of the seed-plant illustration, which occurs in the commentary of Sankara, is accidental, or appeared naturally.

It is also found that *Badarayana* admits two aspects of the Brahman, *arupavat*, i.e. *nirakara* or formless and *rupavat*, i.e. *sakara* or with form: “*arupavad eva hi tatpradhanatvat*” (*Brahmasutra*, III.2.14), i.e. Badarayana says that the Brahman on the *Para* is *arupavat* only, because this is the supreme aspect of the Brahman. Again in the *Brahmasutra*: “*tad avyaktabahahi*” (III.2.33) i.e. ‘*tat brahma avyaktam, rupadi abhavat*’, etc. i.e. the Brahman is without any form, so it is called *avyaktam* or unmanifested. Sankara in his commentary (*bhashya*) has quoted the line of the Gita (II.25): “*avyakto’yam achinto’yam*” etc. in support of the word *avyaktam*, which can also be called *pradhana*.

<sup>6</sup> Vide, Swami Vireswarananda: *The Brahmasutras* (Advaita Ashrama, 1936), pp. XVII-XIX.

In the next *Sutra*, III.2.24, Badarayana has said: “*ahi samradhane pratyakshanumanabhyaṃ*”, i.e. at the time of meditation the unseen and unmanifested *avyakta* can be seen by the Yogis in their ecstatic vision. Now, from the non-dualistic standpoint *Avyakta* or *Ishvara* shines associated with causal nescience or *maya* though, in essence, *Avyakta* or *Ishvara* and the transcending fourth principle, the *shuddha*-Brahman (*arupavat*) are one and the same. Now, for the words, *arupavat* and *rupavat*, Sankara has used the words *nirguna* and *saguna*, i.e. indeterminate and determinate. Really we concentrate and meditate upon the conceptual form of the Brahman (*rupavat*) to reach or to realize the formless and attributeless Brahman (*arupavat*) which is the real and supreme aspect of Brahman. The *Upanishads* and the *Bhagavat-Gita* have also given this hint, and some scholars are of the opinion that Badarayana does his best to correctly interpret the real meaning of the *shruties*. And for this it is found that Badarayana has given emphasis upon the word *Purusha* instead of the Brahman. In the *Mundaka-Upanishad*, it has also been said: “*paratparam purushamupaiti divyam*” (III.2.8).

Now, in the *sutra* I.3.26, Badarayana has mentioned his name: “*taduparyapi Badarayanah sambhuvat*”, i.e. ‘Badarayana thinks that beings higher than these (men) are also qualified for knowledge, for that is possible.’ But Sankara in his commentary on this *sutra* disagrees with the view of Badarayana and he says in his commentary (*bhashya*): It is true that the scriptures sanction the competence of human beings (for religious deeds); but with regard to the knowledge of the Brahman, there is no hard and fast rule that the sanction in this field (also) is for the human beings alone. The teacher Badarayana thinks that the scriptures sanction the competence even of those divine beings and others who exist above these men”.<sup>7</sup>

Further, in the *sutra* I.3.33, Badarayana mentions his name: “*bhavam tu badarayanosti hi*”, i.e. ‘But Badarayana upholds the competence (for the gods); for, the requisite for competence exists in them.’ Here Sankara does not

<sup>7</sup> Cf. English translation by Swami Gambhirananda, p. 207.

also agree with the view of Badarayana and he says in his commentary (*bhashya*): "But the teacher Badarayana thinks that competence does exist even for the gods and others . . . still they have the possibility of competence for pure knowledge of the Brahman, since this competence is dependent on desire, ability, non-prohibition, etc. . . ."<sup>8</sup>

Now, from some of the *sutras* of *Badarayana*, it appears that he holds some independent views which, it is said by some scholars, have been interpreted by Sankara in different ways. But some are of the opinion that Sankara has explained the *Brahmasutras* of Badarayana in best possible ways to maintain throughout the real and proper meaning of the *sutras* from the non-dualistic standpoint.

It has already been said that Badarayana writes the *Brahmasutras*, i.e. the *sutras* or aphorisms for determining different aspects as well as real aspect of the Brahman, the supreme achievement of the human soul. All the *sutras* are divided into four chapters: *samanyayadhyaya*, *avirodhadhyaya*, *sadhanadhyaya*, and *phaladhyaya*. The first *adhyaya* discusses how the Vedas deal with the Brahman and also shows how the Brahman is the ground (*adhithana*) of all that exists. The second *adhyaya* removes the difficulties in viewing the Brahman as the substratum of all and also explains how the world, consisting of individual spirits and matter, is entirely dependent on Brahman, and what the real nature of the souls is and how they are related to Brahman. The third *adhyaya* explains how Brahman is realized and *moksha*<sup>9</sup> is attained, and the fourth mainly describes the course and nature of *moksha* or *brahmanubhuti*, and it also determines both the real nature of and relation between souls and the Brahman.<sup>10</sup> The *sutras* are brief statements and the commentators (*bhashyaka*) have entire freedom to explain or interpret them to

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 224.

<sup>9</sup> When *Moksha* or *Brahmanubhuti* is attained even while the material body remains, this is known as *jivanmukti*. In the commentary of Badarayana's fourth *sutra*: "*tat tu samanvaya*", Sankara has admitted *jivanmukti*, and this is also the view of Badarayana.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Vidwan H. N. Raghavendrachar: *The Dvaita Philosophy and its place in the Vedanta* (1941), pp. 6-7.

bring out the meanings of the *sutras*. But Badarayana's *sutras* are the original presumption of the Vedanta philosophy that India has contributed to the domain of speculative thoughts and ideas of the world.

Again we find in the *sutras*, III.2.41, III.4.1, and III.4.19, that Badarayana has given his own opinion. As for example, in the *sutra*: "*purvantu Badarayana hetu-vyapadeshat*" (3.2.41), Badarayana has admitted that according to merit or demerit of the individual soul, *Parameshvara* gives good or bad result: "*Ishvarat phalamiti siddhantak*" concludes Sankara also. In the *sutra*: "*purushartha'tah shabdaditi Badarayanah*" (III.4.1), Badarayana refutes *jnana-karma-samuchchaya* like Sankara, and he says that without the help of action (*karma*), one can attain to *purushartha* or salvation, through self-knowledge, prescribed by Vedanta: "*vedanta-vihitat atmajnanat svatantrat purusharthah sidhyatiti badarayana acharya manyate*" says Sankara in the *bhashya*. Again in the *sutra*: "*anustheyam badarayanah samyashrute*" (III.4.19). In the Vedas, four *ashramas* (household-life or *garhasthya*, etc.) have been prescribed and they have been equally stressed. And Badarayana says that like the household-life, i.e. *garhasthya*, *brahmacharya*, *vanaprastha*, and *sannyasa*, should also be observed.

In conclusion, it can be said that the *sutrakara Badarayana* was an original thinker. He had a system of thought of his own, so we find that some of the leading commentators like Sankara, Ramanuja, and others differed from him in some of the *sutras*, and established their own views. However, a close study, or a careful analysis, of his *sutras* will undoubtedly prove that Badarayana had some view of his own and those have been delineated in the *sutras* in different ways. But it is true that his whole philosophical ideas are concentrated in disclosing the grand truth that intuitive knowledge of the Brahman should be achieved to remove the ignorance which bears no value of its own.

Well has it been said by Prof. C. Hayavadana Rao: "In the first, he (*Badarayana*) stresses, as against the prevailing contradictory views and opinions, the need for a know-

ledge of the Brahman, the highest knowledge, which will open the key to the truth of being and becoming, of cosmos and man, and of here and hereafter. Then, in the second *sutra* he answers the question what is Brahman', i.e. he suggests it is that which gives us knowledge of creation i.e. of the cosmos. In the third, he refers to the source of knowledge, and throws down the hint that *sutra* (Scripture) forms the source. Lest you should run away with the idea that the very contradictions he condemns, cannot be the source of knowledge, he lays down in the fourth *sutra* the proposition that true knowledge is to be sought in agreement, not in contradiction. Badarayana concedes, as it were, the fact that it is difficult to know the truth. But he suggests that it can be. Every stray opinion, he says, is not truth. . . . Think before you theorize. The Sankhyas, Naiyayikas, Viseshikas, Madhyamikas, Charvakas, and the rest of them may each put forth their own views; these may differ from one another; may contradict each other; some of these may even deny truth, or say they know it not, or suggest that one view is as good as another. This, opines Badarayana, is not right. If there is diversity of thought, it is our duty to see whether in the very conflict of opinions that is perceived, there is some common ground on which all can stand, some principle to which every school of thought can subscribe or agree. To evolve such universalised propositions was the aim and object of Badarayana. That was the sole purpose of his method—the method of *samanvaya*.<sup>11</sup>

Badarayana proves throughout the *sutras* that the sense-perception is no source of knowledge, but it is the super-sensible divine and direct knowledge that can assure guarantee for attaining the Brahman-knowledge. So Badarayana does not support the views, as forwarded by the Sankhyas, Naiyayikas, Mimamsakas and the Bauddhas. Prof. Hayavadana Rao is right when he says that there can be no question that Badarayana's system of Vedanta

<sup>11</sup> Vide, *The Sariraka-Bhashya*, published from Bangalore City, 1936, Preface, pp. XXXI-XXXII.

represents the high water-mark of the Upanishadic interpretation of his time.

But we find that different commentators explain the *Vedantasutras* in different ways, i.e. they throw some old as well as some new lights on the *sutras*, and so sometimes the opinions of many commentators differ from the contentions or ideas as laid in some *sutras* by Badarayana himself. Prof. Hayavadana Rao says: "The writers of glosses and commentaries have had a useful role to fill . . . . A great man need not be followed slavishly and may be more honoured by divergence than by obedience. That is the line of advance that has marked the work of Indian glossators on Badarayana's text and the various commentators who have tried to elucidate him centuries ago."<sup>12</sup> So, whether a long line of commentators like Sankara, Ramānuja, Madhva, Nīlvaṛṇa, Vallabha, Śrīkantha, Śrīpaṭhi, and others have either adopted and followed the real tenets of the Vedāntasūtra by Badarayana or criticised them, that does not matter, but it is true that all of them have tried their best to find out the central philosophical ideas that are contained in different *sutras* as well as a *samanvaya* or synthesis in them.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, *Preface*, pp. XIIV-XIV.

## CHAPTER XVII

### ABSOLUTE IDEALISTIC SCHOOL OF YOGAVASISTHA

The philosophical school of *Yogavasistha* is worth-mentioning in this connection. Dr. K. C. Chakravarti says that in two distinctive ways the ideas of Advaita school of philosophy can be traced: (1) in the earlier school of Gaudapada, the preceptor of Govindapada, the teacher of Sankaracharya, and (2) the other, in the non-dualistic school, established by Sankara. "The ideas of the later Advaita Vedanta will be found to be slightly different from those of the earlier form as embodied in *Ashtavakra-samhita*, Gaudapada's interpretation of *Mandukya-Upanishad*, and *Yogavasistha-Ramayana* . . . . The *Karikas* of Gaudapada represent a later phase of the Advaita school of thought, when it had become more critical and controversial, whereas *Yogavasistha* represents the earlier and higher phase, in which all later conflicts and divergences were harmonised and synthesised."<sup>1</sup>

It can be said that the *Yogavasistha-Ramayana* upholds the doctrine of subjective idealism, which reduces everything external to mental or internal one, and which says that all thoughts and things of our knowledge and experience are projections of the mind, and they are mere thoughts or images that make them appear real to us. The *Yogavasistha-Ramayana* upholds the theory of *dristi-sristi* i.e. *esse* is *percipi*, as forwarded by Bishop Berkeley. The theory of *dristi-sristi* amounts in effect to later *ajativada* i.e. theory of non-creation, which has been depicted in the *Karikas* of Gaudapada and in the *Astavakra-samhita*. Sometimes it is believed that Sankara believes in the spiritual monism, which is distinguished from the idealistic monism, as maintained by Vasistha, Astavakra and Gaudapada, but Sankara maintains the *brahmavada*.

Well has it been said by MM. Gopinath Kaviraj: "The school of *Yogavasistha-Ramayana* was once one of the most

<sup>1</sup> Vide, Dr. Chakravarti: *Vision of Reality* (Calcutta, 1969), p. 40.



widely read book in the country and . . . . it greatly influenced general philosophical thought. Though a Vedanta work of the highest order, it has a place of its own in the history of Indian spiritual philosophy to the school of thought associated with the name of Sankaracharya". But Sankara has not mentioned this book anywhere in his writings, though some post-Sankara philosophers like Vidyaranya and others have mentioned its thoughts in their writings. From this it seems that like the *Srimad Bhagavata*, the *Yogavasistha* system of philosophy is of post-Sankara origin, though some scholars ascribe its date of composition in the seventh or eighth century.<sup>2</sup>

Regarding the means of valid knowledge (*pramana*), *Yogavasistha* admits only one means of valid knowledge and that is direct cognition (*pratyaksha-anubhava*). This direct cognition (*pratyaksha-pramana*) is the only and ultimate source and certitude of knowledge, according to *Yogavasistha* and it does not recognize any other *pramana*.

Some are of the opinion that the philosophy of *Yogavasistha* resembles the absolute idealism of Gaudapada and Sankara, relativism of Nagarjuna and the *vijnanavada* of *Lankavatara-sutra* and of Aasnga and Vasubandhu.<sup>3</sup> In fact, the *Yogavasistha* school holds that there is no real existence of the external objects other than their source, the internal ideas (*kalpana*). The mind is the cause of the world (*'mano hi jagatam kartri*), as the mind or the internal idea creates everything of the universe. This doctrine of the *Yogavasistha* appears similar to Sankara's saying: "*characharam bhati manovilasam*", i.e. everything that appears in the

<sup>2</sup> It is found that not only Sankara, but also Ramanuja has not used any reference from the *Srimad Bhagavata*, and from this it seems that the *Bhagavata-Purana* was compiled or composed by a great scholar, Veda-Vyasa by name, probably in 10th-11th century A.D., with the materials of the *Pancharatra* literature, the *Bhagavad Gita*, and some old *Puranas*. Similar assumption can be made about the *Yogavasistha-Ramayana*, no reference of which is used in the commentaries and writings of Sankaracharya, who lived in the ninth century A.D. and from this also it seems that the *Yogavasistha-Ramayana* was composed by one Vasistha after ninth century A.D.

<sup>3</sup> Vide, Dr. J. N. Sinha: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 455.

universe, is the creation of the acts of the mind.

The philosophy of Yogavasistha lays full stress upon mind, i.e. on the activities of the mind. It has already been said that the whole universe is the construction of the mind. It is thought that gets materialized into material (or physical) objects. The thoughts themselves are the conspiring-centres (*samkalpa-mula*) which can be said to be the 'Creative Will'. From this Will, mind, consciousness, and matter evolve and these are known as three planes (objective continua) of manifestation. Vasistha calls them thought-continuum, ether-continuum, and consciousness-continuum. These planes are also known as the central unit, *akasha*:

*Chittakasham chidakasham akasham cha tritiyakam*

*Dvabhyam shunyataram viddhi chidakasham varanane.*

The *chidakasha* or ether of consciousness is the subtlest of the three *akashas*. It is also known as the absolute consciousness in which everything is a movement. As ideas manifest themselves objectively or materially in things, so the movement or activity of conspiring (*samkalpa*) manifest itself objectively as an energy or *prana*. The *prana* (energy) is, therefore, the objective manifestation of the subjective *samkalpa* (will). In the Vedas, we also find that Prajapati willed to create and the objective world manifested. In *Yogavasistha*, Vasistha has described the process of manifestation as well as its ultimate source thus: The body is the seed of the tree of the world. The seed of the body is the mind or *chitta*. Of the tree of the mind, there are two seeds. the movements of *prana* and intense desires. The *prana* moves on account of desires, and desires arise when *prana* moves. The seed of the fluctuations of the *prana* and the surging of desires is the tendency towards objectivity (*samvedyam*). This tendency towards objectification has its seed in consciousness, when it assumes a definite form through intense imagination consciousness is when it assumes a definite form through intense imagination consciousness is rooted in 'being' (*satta*).

The *satta-samanya* is that state of uniform existence which is above thisness or thatness, and it is the ultimate Reality. This ultimate Reality is neither being, nor non-

being, neither known, nor unknown, neither self, nor not-self, and it is the ultimate source or seed of everything and it has no source other than it.<sup>4</sup>

Now it is found that the mind (*manas*) is the definite form of the all-powerful absolute consciousness, assumed by it through its own will-power (*samkalpa*).<sup>5</sup> This mind or absolute consciousness is often called by Vasistha as *chidanu* (*chit-anu*), i.e. energized atom of consciousness, which is similar to *paramanu* of Kanada, *world-soul* of Bruno and *Monad* of Leibnitz. According to *Yogavasistha*, intellect, ego, activity, memory, desire, *maya*, *prakriti*, *jiva*, *indriya* *sukshma-sharira*, *sthula-sharira*, *indriya-vishaya*, etc. are different names and forms of the same mind (*manas*) or absolute consciousness. Even the Brahman, in a definite form, is the mind; or mind (*chidanu*) can be called an embodiment of the self-affirmed Will of the absolute Brahman, which manifests as consciousness of the objective world. The self-affirmed Will of the Absolute imagines its own world of objects, and clings to them owing to ignorance of the identity with the Absolute. It also forgets the identity of the world with the Absolute. The Absolute is the subject-objectless pure and indeterminate Brahman. "The individual mind (*jiva*) is the subject-consciousness of empirical objects. It is empirical consciousness with objectivity. It is a pulsation of the Absolute consciousness, which partakes of subjectivity and objectivity both. It is called the *jiva*, because it is the living principle in the body. It binds itself to its body like a silk-worm. It binds itself to a net-work of objects created by its own imagination".<sup>6</sup> Now the bondage of the *jiva* is due to the sense of individuality, and when this limited sense is removed by the knowledge of identity with the

<sup>4</sup> Vide, Dr. Atreya: *The Philosophy of Yogavasistha* (1936), pp. 195-196.

(b) The *Yogavasistha* also says:

*Samsriti-vratater-vijamshariram viddhi raghava*  
*Vijamasya sharirasya chittam asha-vashanugam*  
*Ekam prana-parispando dvitiam drira-bhavana etc.*

<sup>5</sup> The *Yogavasistha*, III.96.3.

<sup>6</sup> Dr. Sinha: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 459.

subject-objectless pure Absolute or Brahman, liberation (*maksha*) is attained. Therefore, ignorance of identity with the Brahman is bondage (*bandha*) and true knowledge of this identity is liberation (*mukti*).

Further, liberation (*mukti*) or (*moksha*), according to *Yogavasistha* philosophy, is the knowledge of the Absolute Brahman and it is the only means, and any other religious and spiritual practices like renunciation or any kind of action, worship of God or gods, performance of sacrifices or rites, are not necessary. Self-reliance and self-effort are helpful in the path of salvation. However, there are seven stages (*bhumis*) of the Brahman-realization, and they are: *subhechchha*, *vicharana*, *tanumanasa*, *sattapatti*, *asamsakti*, *padarthabhavana*, and *turiya*. The Jaina philosophy has admitted fourteen stages (*gunasthanas*) between the life of an ordinary man and the perfected *Kevalin*; the Mahayana Buddhist philosophy has accepted ten stages (*bhumikas*) between an aspirant and his realization of the *bodhisattvahood*; the Theosophical philosophy distinguishes five definite stages on the path of realization of the cosmic consciousness, and the Tantra philosophy has admitted six stages (*sat-chakras*) for getting reunion of the *jivatman* (*kundalini*) with the *Paramatman* or the *Parama-Siva* in the seventh *sahasrara-chakra*. From the psychological viewpoint three levels of consciousness—the sub-consciousness, consciousness and superconsciousness have also been accepted for the integral feeling of the *Atman*, or the Brahman. Now, as the Tantra philosophy recognizes the seventh level of consciousness (*sahasrara*) as the final one, *Yogavasistha* philosophy recognizes the seventh level or *turiya* as the last level where a *sadhaka* attains the unspeakable Nirvana (*Brahma-nirvana*). This *turiya* (seventh level) consciousness is the stage of a *jivanmukta*, i.e. attainment of *moksha* in one's lifetime, and after the dissolution of the material body, a *sadhaka* attains the *videhamukti* or disembodied *Brahman-nirvana*. In the *videhamukti*, *sadhaka's* mind, individuality, and everything are dissolved in an infinite ocean of the unconditioned Brahman-consciousness and he feels complete oneness with the secondless Brahman.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### THE QUALIFIED NON-DUALISTIC SCHOOL

Ramanujacharya, who lived in eleventh-twelfth century A.D., imbibed the spirit of the doctrine of qualified non-dualistic school of Vedanta from his spiritual teacher, Yamunacharya. who wrote *Agamapramanya*, *Siddhitraya*, *Gitartha-samgraha*, and *Mahapurusha-nirnaya*. In the *Siddhitraya* Yamunacharya gave the central philosophy of *Vishistadvaitavada*.

Ramanuja elaborately and systematically has enunciated the philosophical thoughts and ideas of *Vishistadvaitavada* in his *Sribhasya*, the commentary on the *Brahmasutra* as well as the commentaries on the principal *Upanishads*, *Bhagavad-Gita*, *Vedantasara*, *Vedantadipa*, etc. After Ramanuja, Sudarsana, Lokacharya, Vedantadeshika, and Srinivasacharya have also propagated the qualified non-dualistic Vedanta philosophy. Ramanuja's philosophy and his doctrine of *vishistadvaitavada* can be considered as "a harmonious compromise between intellectual attainment of the Advaita Vedanta and emotional outpourings of the Alvars (or the Vaishnava poets)" of South India. It can also be said to be an admixture of *jñana* (knowledge) and *bhakti* (devotion) which are found in the philosophies of the Veda and the Brahmana and also of the Saivas, Shaktas, and Vaishnavas from ancient India.

Regarding the antiquity of the Alvars, there are some differences of opinion. K. G. Sesha Ayyar writes that from the very earliest times of which Tamil literature treats, the worship of Vishnu has been largely prevalent in South India. *Tol-Kappiyam* is regarded as the earliest Tamil work now extant. This literature gives the valuable and interesting information that Mayon or Vishnu is the guardian deity of *mulla-makkal* or the inhabitants of pastoral lands. Now the Alvars are the Vaishnava saints who lived in South India. According to *Guru-parampara*, there are twelve orders of the Alvars. It is said that the first

five are respectively the incarnations of *samkha*, *gada*, *naudaka*, *chakra*, and *vishvasena* and the rest are the embodiment respectively of *Kaustubha*, *Padma*, *Shri* or *lakshmi*, *vanamali*, *shrivatsa* and *saranga*. Dr. S. Krishnaswami Aiyanger writes in his *Early History of Vaishnavism in South India* that Mudal Alvars should be placed in the second century A.D. There is also a statement found in the records of the Kanchi Kama-Koti-Pitha that during Ujvala Sankara, who was the 14th in succession from Sri Sankaracharya in the Kanchipura Math, there were many noted Alvaras who composed many songs, and the date of Ujvala Sankara is the latter half of the fourth century A.D. In the eighth-ninth century A.D. we also find many Alvaras who dedicated their lives to Vishnu-Narayana and composed hundreds and thousands of mystic legendary songs.

The philosophy of Ramanuja is really a balance between absolutism and theism, or between philosophy and religion. Ramanuja conceives of three principles, *chit*, *achit* and *Ishvara*, or soul, matter, and God, or *jiva*, *jagat*, and *Ishvara*, along with their eternal relation between them. In the theistic philosophy of Ramanuja, devotion (*bhakti*) occupies a prominent place and Ramanuja also admits that *bhakti* accompanied by *prapatti* or self-surrender to God is the supreme goal of all human beings. So Dr. Anima Sen Gupta has ably said that Ramanuja's philosophy "has the merit of bridging the gulf between different systems of ancient Indian philosophy in the spheres of ontology, epistemology, ethics, and religion as a result of which his philosophical approach to different problems of life and the universe has become primarily synthetic".

Ramanuja upholds the doctrine of *satkaryavada* like the Sankhya philosophy. The doctrine of *satkaryavada* states that cause and effect both are real and effect is contained in the cause. Production or creation is modification of cause into effect, and in destruction the creation goes to its causal state, as the Sankhya says: "*nashah karana-layah*". According to the qualified non-dualism, world process is not unreal, but exists as real or God's creation. The creation (*jagat*) is different from the Creator (*Ishvara*)

and the individual souls being the parts (*amsha*) of God, is different from God also. *Maya*, *prakriti*, and *avidya* are one and the same<sup>1</sup> *vaishnavi shakti* (divine power) of God and with the help of this power God creates the world. Now it is found that Ramanuja admitted three principles—*chit*, *achit* and *Ishvara*, or *jiva*, *jagat*, and *Ishvara*—as real. *Ishvara* is recognised as the soul or vital force of both organic and non-organic nature, and so *Ishvara*, or the Brahman, is an organic unity as well as a living organism, in which “one element predominates over and controls the rest. The subordinate elements are called the *visheshana* (attribute) and the predominating element, the *visheshya* (object), and, conversely, the predominant one may be conceived as the *visheshana* of the subordinate ones as *visheshya*, as by hypothesis one of them can exist separately, the complex whole (*vishishta*), in which they are included being conceived of as a unity. This is why the system is called *vishistadvaita*”. The doctrine of *vishistadvaita*, therefore, formulates the relation of unity-in-difference which makes the Brahman involved in the discrepancy of duality.

Regarding sources of knowledge or epistemology, Ramanuja says that valid knowledge is the knowledge which apprehends an object as it really exists. In fact, “Ramanuja recognizes the realistic test of correspondence, the pragmatic test of workability, and the idealistic test of coherence”. These are the tests of truth. *Pramana* is the means of valid knowledge (*prama*). Perception (*pratyaksha*), inherence (*anumana*), and testimony (*shabda*) are the three sources of knowledge. But Srinivas and some other post-Ramanuja qualified non-dualistic philosophers have admitted one more means of valid knowledge and that is comparison (*upamana*). According to Ramanuja, perception (*pratyaksha*) is the means of immediate valid knowledge. Perceptual knowledge is immediate and it is different from inferential knowledge which is mediate. Perception is indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) and determinate (*savikalpa*). In-

<sup>1</sup> In the *Tattvatraya*, Lokacharya has written: “*prakritiya 'vidya-maya'—paranamadchidvishesah*”.

determinate perception is a presentative process, as it is the perception of the first-individual of class, endowed with qualities and a particular arrangement of parts, whereas determinate perception is a presentative-representative process, being the perception of the second individual and the like, qualified by attributes and a particular configuration.<sup>2</sup> Again perception is sensuous and non-sensuous. Sensuous perception is caused by the senses (*indriya-janya*) and Ramanuja has said that non-sensuous perception is yogic perception, "on supra-mandane intuition due to the grace of God". The Naiyayikas also admit two kinds of perception, normal and super-normal. Of these six kinds of connection (*sannikarsha*) are normal and three kinds are super-normal.

Inference (*anumana*) is a valid knowledge of a specific instance of the probandum on recollection of the pervasion of the probans by the probandum. The Naiyayikas say that in inference, the knowledge of invariable concomitance is the instrument (*karana*). Now what is the process leading to the knowledge of invariable concomitance? It happens in this way: If a man who has noticed in a kitchen etc. that smoke is a concomitant (*vyapya*) of fire, happens to see afterwards, on a hill or the like, a trail of smoke connected with the surface, then he recalls the invariable concomitance that smoke is a concomitant of fire. Next he has the knowledge that the hill is possessed of smoke which is a concomitant of fire. This is what is called consideration (*paramasha*), according to *Nyaya*. Invariable concomitance (*vyapti*) is a feature and it is necessary for inference, though its process or method has been criticized by the Mimamsakas and the Advaita Vedantists. It (*vyapti*) is known by repeated observation of the co-existence of the middle term and the major term, not vitiated by conditions (*upadhi*). The *Nyaya* system holds syllogism to consist of five members: proposition (*pratijna*), reason (*hetu*),

<sup>2</sup> Vide, Dr. J. N. Sinha: *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 655.

<sup>3</sup> Vide, *The Siddhanta-muktavali*, English Translation by Swami Madhavananda—*The Bhasha Pariccheda* (Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta), p. 105.



example (*udaharana*), application (*upanaya*), and conclusion (*nigamana*). Ramanuja does not admit five members of syllogism, and says that the example (*udaharana*) or universal major premise and the application (*upanaya*) or minor premise are enough for a syllogism, and if necessary, conclusion (*nigamana*) is required for men of lesser intelligence. Ramanuja recognizes only two kinds of inference, *kevalanvayi* and *anvaya-vyatiireki*.

Testimony (*shabda* or *agama*) is the third means of valid knowledge. Testimony is either secular or scriptural. Secular testimony is knowledge produced by a sentence uttered by a reliable person and scriptural testimony is knowledge of supersensible objects produced by sentences uttered by trustworthy persons.<sup>4</sup>

According to Ramanuja, qualified or attributed objects are apprehended, and knowledge reveals a real object. Ramanuja upholds the doctrine of *satkhyati*, as according to him, things that are perceived or apprehended, are valid. As for example, a shell is perceived as silver and this perception is valid, because there is an element of silver in a shell. Ramanuja describes the Brahman as the *Purushottama*, the Supreme Person, who is endowed with innumerable divine qualities and is devoid of all kinds of impurities. The Brahman is possessed of *satya*, *jnana* and *ananda* (reality, knowledge, and divine bliss). Ramanuja does not believe in the attributeless indeterminate (*nirguna*) Brahman, because indeterminate Brahman is out of the reach of any human conception, and, so he says that Brahman is determinate (*saguna*), and is eternal, unborn, immortal, infinite, identical in essence and immaculate. He is one in many, and He assumes the immaterial divine form (*chinmaya-tanu*) of all-merciful God. God can also assume an embodiment of a *vigraha*, and he offers his benediction and grace to his sincere devotees (*bhaktas*). God can also assume the four-fold manifestations (*vyuhas*) of Vasudeva, Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha, so as to perform the divine functions of creation, preservation, and destruction. Some say that this idea of Ramanuja is a

<sup>4</sup> Vide, Dr. J. N. Sinha: *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 657.

development of the ideal already culminated in the *Panchasastra* literature and the *Srimad-Bhagavata*. It has already been said that Ramanuja has criticized Bhaskara, Yadavaprakasha, and others in many places in his commentaries on the *Brahmasutra*. As for example, Bhaskara maintains that both cause and effect (*karya-karana*) are real and the difference between the Brahman and the individual self (*jiva*) is accidental, due to limiting adjuncts (*upadhi*). Yadavaprakasha maintains that one and a unique Brahman is transformed into the enjoying soul, the enjoyed objects, and their controller. But Ramanuja criticizes both the views of Bhaskara and Yadavaprakasha. Regarding Bhaskara's views, Ramanuja has argued that his (*Bhaskara's*) doctrine directly contradicts the Upanishadic text or *shruti* which says that the Brahman and the individual soul (*jiva*) are distinct from each other in so far as the Brahman is free from all evils and not subject to the power of *karma*, while *jiva* is impure and subject to the power of *karma*. Regarding Yadavaprakasha, Ramanuja says that he (Yadavaprakasha) is not correct, because if one Brahman assumes the forms of the enjoying souls, enjoyed objects, and their controller, then God (*Ishvara*) and the individual souls will be subject to birth and death and will be non-eternal. So the Brahman should be taken as the cause, and God, soul, and matter, as the effects. Ramanuja has criticized also Sankara in many respects and specially has refuted the doctrine of *maya* or *avidya*.<sup>5</sup>

But it should be remembered that Sankara is not the upholder of the doctrine of *maya*, rather he has refuted it, and has established the doctrine of Brahma (*brahma-vada*), and in many places of his commentary, he has said that he and his followers are *brahmavadi*.

However, Ramanuja has refuted *maya* or *avidya* which has been used by Sankara (for establishing his *brahma-vada*). Sankara calls *maya* or *avidya* as a covering (*avarana*) and defect (*dosha*), and for the covering of *maya*, the one self-luminous stainless Brahman *appears* as the mani-

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<sup>5</sup> For detailed controversy between Ramanuja and Sankara, vide, Dr. Sinha: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 680-687.

fold world, and why the self-luminous Brahman is influenced by the refutable *maya*, it cannot be explained. Ramanuja has said that there lies the weak point in Sankara's philosophy for explaining as well as for admitting this impossible power of *maya* or *avidya*. Ramanuja, therefore, forwards some objections to it. He says:

(a) *Maya* or *avidya* is impossible since it must rest on some other thing for its support (*ashraya*), and it is clear that individual souls (*jivas*) being the product of *maya*, cannot be the support. Similarly, the Brahman being the self-luminous divine principle, is opposed to *maya* or *avidya*, and so the Brahman cannot be the support or ground of *maya* or *avidya*. Besides, the Brahman being the self-revealing principle, is not liable to be revealed by any other thing other than it, and so the statement: *maya* or *avidya* covers the luminous nature of the Brahman, is false.

(b) The Brahman being the pure knowledge or intuition by itself, it cannot be the object of any other knowledge, nor be revealed by other knowledge. "Moreover, to say that Brahman, which is of the nature of pure illumination, is hidden by *avidya* is to say that the very nature of Brahman is destroyed (*svarupa-nasha*); for, since pure illumination is never produced, its concealment can only mean that it is destroyed, since it has no other nature than pure self-illumination."<sup>6</sup>

(c) Again if the Brahman is taken as an eternal principle, then its defect, the *maya* or *avidya* will be eternal, and, therefore, for want of the removal of *maya*, emancipation (*moksha*) as well as cessation of the world-appearance will never happen.

(d) Sankara has defined that *maya* is indefinable being different from both the existent and the non-existent, but this definition of Sankara is not happy, as how can there be anything which is neither existing nor non-existing?

(e) Ramanuja forwards that Sankara and the followers of Sankara say that nescience (*ajnana*) is directly perceived

<sup>6</sup> Vide, Dr. S. N. Dasgupta: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. III (1940), p. 176.

in such perceptions: 'अहमब्जः', 'अहं न जानामि' ; here *ajnana* is the object of our knowledge. But that is not possible. "Ramanuja argues", says Dr. S. N. Dasgupta, "that the ignorance perceived, cannot refer to its specific and determinate object, for, if it did, then the object would be known and there be no ignorance at all; and if the *ajnana* does not refer to any specific object, how can the *ajnana* or ignorance, standing by itself, be perceived or realized? . . . Thus, even if a positive ignorance is admitted, it must somehow be related to something else to which it refers."<sup>7</sup> In fact, Ramanuja argues that if the Brahman is pure intelligence, ignorance (*ajnana*) cannot cover and hide the Brahman. Besides, it is quite easy to formulate the theory that *maya* or *avidya*, as forwarded and explained by Sankara and the followers of Sankara, is absolutely unattainable. And it is a fact that Ramanuja's theory of illusion or delusion proves that all knowledge is real. .

<sup>7</sup> Vide, Dr. S. N. Dasgupta: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. III, pp. 177-78.

## CHAPTER XIX

### THE SCHOOL OF DUALISTIC NON-DUALISM

Nimbarka advocates the doctrine of dualistic monism (*dvaitadvaitavada*). His philosophy or doctrine attempts to prove that the Brahman is different (*bheda*) as well as non-different (*abheda*) from the world and the individual souls, and, therefore, there is the relation of identity-in-difference between the Brahman and the world and the souls. In truth, Nimbarka admits the *brahma-parinama-vada*, i.e. the Brahman is transformed into the world and the souls.

Regarding the date of Nimbarka, there are controversies among the historians and the scholars. But it is interesting to note that Nimbarka referred to Ramanuja in his commentary on the Badarayana's *sutras*, and it is probable that he lived sometime after Ramanuja. Dr. S. N. Dasgupta has fixed his date about the middle of the fourteenth century. Dr. Rama Choudhury has ascribed the date to not before the thirteenth century A.D. Dr. R. L. Mitra says that Srinivas flourished after Ramanuja, Madhva, and Vallabha. The *Vedanta-parijatasaurabha*, the commentary on the *Brahmasutra*, is written by Nimbarka and this *Saurabha* has been translated into English with its central philosophy by Dr. Rama Choudhury. Nimbarka deals with the problems of the Brahman, the *jiva* (*chit*), *jagat* (*achit*), the relation between the Brahman and *chit*, different states like waking, dream, deep sleep, swoon (*murchchha*), and death of the *jiva* or *chit*, different destinies like heaven, hell, and *apavarga* of the individual soul, *achit* or *jagat* and its different kinds like *prakrit*, *aprakrit*, and *kala*, criticism of the schools of Nyaya, Vaishesika, Sankhya, Yoga, Mimansa, and also of Advaita Vedanta, ethics or *sadhana*, *karma*, *vidya*, and its relation to *karma*, the *adhikaris* of *vidya* and also rise of *vidya*, *upasana* or *dhyana* and its mode, posture, place, time, and result and kinds, *upasana* and *bhakti*, *prapatti* and its general nature

and factors, *gurupasatti* and its general nature, and theology.

Nimbarka recognizes *parinamavada*, as he maintains that *chit* and *achit*—*jiva* and the world-appearance—are the transformation of the Brahman. He holds that the means of valid knowledge (*prama*) are perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumana*), and authority (*shabda*). He says that perception (*pratyaksha*) is the knowledge arising from the connection of sense-organs with objects. Inference (*anumana*) is the knowledge arising from the knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyapti*). Authority (*shabda* or *aptavakya*) is the word or testimony of the wise. According to Nimbarka, testimony or *apta-vakya* is divided into three and the wisest (*aptatama*) are the vedic texts. Again there are two kinds of *shabda-vritti*: *lakshana* and *gauna*, i.e. primary and secondary. The *mukhya-vritti* is of the form of *sakti* (inherent power) of a word to express its meaning. It is of three kinds, *rudi*, *yoga*, and *yogarudi*. *Rudi* implies *samudaya-sakti* of a word. This *sakti* is again of two kinds *paryaya* (synonyms or having one sense) and *anekartha* (having many senses). Again *laksana* is of three kinds, *jahat*, *ajahat*, and *jahadajahat*.<sup>1</sup> These have also been explained in Sadananda Yati's *Vedantasara*.

Nimbarka recognizes the ultimate Reality as the personal God, endowed with infinite qualities. The Brahman is omnipresent and omnipotent creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. It is both transcendent and immanent. It is both material and efficient cause (*upadana* and *nimitta karana*) of the world-process, but Nimbarka has not explained clearly in what sense the Brahman is the material cause. Really the inconceivable creative power of God is the cause of the world, and God, Krishna or Hari, creates the world through His infinite power (*sakti*). This power or *sakti* is His Divine Will, which is real and, therefore, the world and the individual souls, being the trans-

<sup>1</sup> Vide, the detailed discussions of these *vrittis* in Dr. Rama Choudhury's *The Vedanta-parijata-saurabha* (English), Vol. III (1943), pp. 98-99.

Vide also Nimbarka's commentary on the *Brahmasutras*, published by the Nimbarka Ashrama, Howrah.

formation of the *saguna*-Brahman, are also real. So we find that the philosophical system of Nimbarka can be said to be similar to that of Ramanuja, but still there remains difference between the two systems, as Nimbarka lays stress on assimilating the two fundamental principles (*bheda*) and non-difference (*abheda*), which apparently seem contradictory. He takes his stand on the cause-effect or whole-part relation, which is neither a relation of pure identity, nor that of difference, but is one of identity-in-difference. Nimbarka has clarified the position of his *bhedavedavada* thus: He says that *bheda* or difference is seen in attributes and activities from the standpoint of effect, and also in transcendence over effect from the standpoint of cause, and as regards *a-bheda* or non-difference, he says that non-difference means non-difference of essence from the standpoint of effect, and immanence in effect from the standpoint of cause. Now it can be observed from these facts that non-difference (*a-bheda*) simply implies sameness of essence and immanence of the Brahman in the world of appearance, and does not mean, therefore, absolute identity or complete merging. Similarly difference (*bheda*) does not mean complete distinction like that between spirit and matter, but it only signifies difference of forms, attributes and activities, as well as transcendence of the Brahman over the world process. So we find that Nimbarka is credited to devise some new approach to the philosophical problem of establishing a relation between One and Many—between unity and difference of the Reality.<sup>2</sup>

Like Kapila, Nimbarka considers effects as non-different from cause, and that means effect is not absolutely different from cause. Effect can be said to be a transformation of cause, and it is to be noted that cause and effect must not always be of similar nature. Again, Nimbarka explains the Brahman as correlative, i.e. one always implying the other, and so the Brahman is not considered to be complete without its correlated part, the world. Now, it can be asked, as to what is the nature of the creation that is

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Nimbarka and his philosophy by Dr. Rama Choudhury, appeared in the *History of Philosophy, East and West* by the Ministry of Education, New Delhi.

produced by, or which emanates from, the Brahman? Is it transformed into the world with its entirety, or a part of it only transforms into the world? To this Nimbarka replies that the world is not a part cut off from the Brahman, but it always inherits in the Brahman during creation-*cum*-transformation. Before creation-*cum*-transformation, the world-appearance remains unmanifested in the Brahman as a subtle power (*sukshma-sakti*) and its creation or transformation as the world means it is manifested from the unmanifested form, and, therefore, creation or transformation means the full manifestation of the inherent power of the Brahman (*svasakti vikshepa*). Bliss is the very essence of the Brahman. The Brahman is also existence and knowledge. It has been said before that Nimbarka conceives of the Brahman as Sri Krishna and its power as Sri Radha.

It has been discussed before that Nimbarka recognizes *chit*, *achit*, and Brahman as different from one another, but essentially *chit* (*jiva*) and *achit* (*jagat*) are non-different from the source, the Brahman. Nimbarka forwards the upanishadic text: '*dva suparna*' etc., i.e. two birds in the same tree, one sitting on the top and the other, below. The two birds are *chit* and *achit* (*jiva* and *jagat*) which are different (*bheda*) from the Brahman or God, the supreme Principle, and again the Upanishadic texts: '*sadeva somya adamagra asit*' and '*sarvam-khalvidam brahma*', i.e. (i) 'O Soumya, *sat*, the transcendental Existence exists in the Front' and (ii) 'everything in this phenomenal universe is undoubtedly the Brahman'. Now, these two texts prove that *chit* and *achit* (*jiva* and *jagat*) are non-different (*abheda*) from the Brahman. So we find some contradictions in the vedic texts and for that reason the seekers after Truth are sometimes confounded in ascertaining the real status of the three qualitative principles, *chit*, *achit*, and Brahman. But they try to earnestly determine the real nature of them and realize that though the eyes, ears, nose, and other organs are different from one another for their respective functions, yet, as they all depend on the same vital breath or *prana*, they, i.e. *chit*, *achit*, and Brahman are non-different from one another. And again



when differences (*bheda*) are shown among the three principles, the Brahman appears as cause and the universe as effect, and as such the two cannot be absolutely identical. The Brahman is sentient, non-gross, non-material, and ever-pure, and the universe is quite opposite. The Brahman is the subject, whereas the universe is the object and in this way the Brahman and the universe are shown to be different from each other, and thus Nimbarka has established his *svabhavika-bhedabheda-vada* or *dvaitadvaita-vada*. We find also a theological aspect in Nimbarka's philosophy, where he advises the devotees *upasana*, *bhakti* *atma-nivedana* or *prapatti*, reverence, straightforwardness, faith and detachment (*vairagya*), manifests as *sahetuka* and *nirhetuka*. Nimbarka is very liberal in his vision about spiritual discipline or *sadhana*. He does not say that this kind of *sadhana* is effective and helpful and that kind of *sadhana* is not effective, but he simply treats them separately that each of them will lead to salvation (*moksha*) in its own way. Nimbarka has advised men to take refuge in an enlightened *Guru* to lead to the path of spiritual *sadhana*.

## THE DUALISTIC VEDANTA SCHOOL

Madhvacharya lived in thirteenth century and is known as Puranaprajna and Anandatirtha. He has written commentaries on the *Brahmasutra*, *Bhagavad-Gita*, and principal *Upanishads*. He is the founder of the dualistic school of Vedanta. His doctrine of dualism is out and out realism that recognizes God, individual souls, and the world. The term 'dualism' or (*dvaita*), says Dr. Sharma, signifies a system of philosophy which admits more than one fundamental metaphysical principle or category to explain the universe, or a fundamental distinction between the human souls and the supreme Being, for all time. While refuting the philosophical doctrines of Sankhya and Yoga, Sankara has said in his commentary on the *Brahmasutra* (II.1.3): "*dvaitino hi te samkhya yogisehanatmaikatya-darshinah*", i.e. the upholders of the Sankhya Yoga doctrines are dualists, because they are not seers of non-dual *Atman*. In the commentary on the *Bhagavad-Gita*, Sankara says: "*atmano vandha-muktavasthe paramarthata eva vastubhute mate sarvesham dvaita-vadinam* (XII.2), i.e. 'the dualists are those who recognize the state of bondage and release as real states or experiences pertaining to the *Atman*'. Madhva is included in the category of the *dvaita-vadins*, and his philosophical doctrine is known as *shuddha-dvaita* different from *vishishtadvaita* of Ramanuja and *nirviseshadvaita* of Sankara. Dr. B. N. K. Sharma designates Madhva's doctrine as *svatantradvaita*, because he says that the term '*svatantra*' "would thus serve to emphasize the transcendence of the Supreme over the other reals and show how the conception of Brahman, here, differs from the '*nirvishehadvaita*' of Sankara".<sup>1</sup>

Madhva has laid stress, on one hand, on the logical

<sup>1</sup> Vide, Dr. Sharma: *A History of the Dvaita School of Vedanta and Its Literature*, Vol. I, p. 7.

and epistemological aspects of his philosophy, and, on the other, on devotion (*bhakti*) and action (*karma*). Jayatirtha has given in his *Pramanapaddhah*, *shatarishisacharya*, and *Pramanachandrika* elaborate expositions on the Madhva logic.

Like other philosophers, Madhva maintains *pramana* as valid knowledge, which according to him, is of two kinds: direct and immediate knowledge of objects (*kevala-pramana*) and the means of valid knowledge (*anu-pramana*). The direct and immediate knowledge or intuition (*kevala-pramana*) is of four kinds: (a) knowledge of the Lord, Narayana, (b) knowledge of Lakshmi, (c) knowledge of the Yogin, and (d) knowledge of an ordinary person (i.e. *sadharana*). The means of valid knowledge (*anu-pramana*) is again of three kinds: perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumana*), and vedic testimony (*agama*):

(1) *Perception* or perceptual knowledge, according to Madhva, is always direct, immediate, and determinate (*savikalpaka*). Indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) perception is rejected by him.

(2) The method of inference (*anumana*) has already been discussed. *Vyapti* is invariable concomitance of the probans (*hetu*) and the probandum (*sadhya*). As for example, 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire', (*yatra yatra dhumah, tatra tatra vahnih*). Here a close relation is found between *hetu* and *sadhya*. Inference is of three kinds: (a) Inference from effect (*phala*), (b) inference from cause (*karana*), and (c) inference from events which are neither causes nor effects (*karana-phala-vyatireka vyaparah*). Madhva rejects the three divisions of inference as forwarded by the Nyaya philosophy.

(3) *Testimony*, according to Madhva, is knowledge acquired from the Vedas or reliable persons.

Madhva recognizes ten categories: *dravya*, *guna*, *karma*, *samanya*, *vishesha* (which is *vastusvarupa* or essence of a thing), *vishishta*, *amshi*, *shakti*, *sadrishya* and *abhava* (i.e. substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, qualified, whole, power, similarity, negation). The substances (*dravyas*) are twenty in number, such as, God,

Lakshmi, souls, etc. The uncreated space or ether (*avya-krita-akasha*) is different from the elemental space or ether (*bhutakasha*).

Madhva believes in two orders of reality, independent (*svatantra*) and dependent (*paratantra*). God is the independent and eternal reality, and He is possessed of six infinite and excellent qualities. He is determinate (*saguna*), and is *sat-chit-ananda* (existence-intelligence-bliss). He is absolutely different from *jiva*, as *jiva* is impure and imperfect, being contaminated with nescience (*avidya*) or *mala*. If *jiva* wishes to get away from the bindings of the worldly sorrows and sufferings and if he wants to enjoy heavenly bliss, he will have to receive the divine grace of Vishnu-Narayana who is the only bestower of unbounded eternal joy and happiness. God is Vishnu or Vishnu-Narayana, and He is the embodiment of all good and divine qualities. He is all-pervading (*sarva-vyapaka*) and is the world-essence. It has been said that He is absolutely independent (*svatantra*), whereas the world and the individual souls are dependent (*paratantra*). *Prakriti* is Lakshmi who eternally contemplates God, the Vishnu-Narayana. In the *Puranas*, *Prakriti* or Lakshmi is found serving *Purusha* or *Narayana* who lies on the bed of the causal water or ocean *karana-salila* or *karana-samudra*. She is the eternal companion, but is dependent on Vishnu-Narayana. *Prakriti* or Lakshmi is called *maya* or *avidya* who is eternally real and is the essence of God, the Vishnu. In the *Tantra*, we find that Vishnu (*Purusha*) and Lakshmi (*Prakriti*) eternally co-exist in time and space. But there lies a difference between *Purusha-Prakriti* (*siva-sakti*) of *Tantra* and *Purusha-Prakriti* (*Vishnu-Lakshmi*) of *dvaita* philosophy of Madhva, because, in the *Tantra*, *Purusha* (*Siva*) and *Prakriti* (*Sakti*) are non-different in causal unmanifested form and apparently different in manifested form; or, in the *Tantra* static *Purusha* or *Siva* himself is manifested as dynamic *Prakriti* or *Sakti*, but in the *dvaita* philosophy of Madhva, *Purusha* or Vishnu is independent (*svatantra*) all the time, and *Prakriti* or *Lakshmi* is dependent (*paratantra*) on Vishnu. In *dvaita* philosophy, Vishnu and Lakshmi rejoice in each other, though they are also eter-

nally united with each other. The world and the individual souls are created by God, or Vishnu-Narayana out of *Prakriti* which is not a false appearance. The act of creation of God is a divine sportive play (*lila*). The individual souls (*jivas*) are the knower, enjoyer, and doer (*jnata, bhokta, and karta*). They are atomic in size (*anu-parimana*). They are all the time different from God. They are liberated through the grace of God, Vishnu. But there are divisions in the souls: the *nitya* souls are eternally free, the *mukta* souls are like the gods, or the *Yogis*, and the *baddha* souls are bound by the chain of desires. The *baddha* souls are freed by the grace of God.

To sum up the whole philosophy of Madvacharya, it can be said that there are nine leading tenets of his system of thought, and they are:

(1) Vishnu is the supreme Deity who is the efficient cause (*nimitta-karana*) of the world-appearance. *Avidya*, *karma* and *lingasharira* (nescience, action and subtle body) are the secondary causes of the chain of existence.

(2) The external world is real and it continues to exist all the time.

(3) The ultimate reality of the fivefold difference is accepted, and the fivefold difference exists between God and soul (*Ishvara* and *jiva*), between soul and soul (*jiva* and *jiva*), between God and matter, between soul and matter and between matter and matter.

(4) All souls are dependent on God who is alone independent.

(5) There are gradations among the souls. There are three kinds of souls: those that are fit for *mukti*, those that travel endlessly through the cycle of birth and death, and those that are fit to be eternally in hell.

(6) Liberation means the realization of the soul's innate bliss.

(7) Devotion (*bhakti*) is the means to attain realization. Devotion is that kind of attachment to the Lord which is based on a complete understanding of His supremacy. Besides devotion, God's grace and divine desire to protect the devotee are necessary for liberation.

(8) There are three means of valid knowledge: perception, inference and verbal testimony.

(9) The existence of God is known only by correct methods of reasoning.<sup>2</sup>

## MADHVA LOGIC

Madhva logic deals with *pramanas* and different *virodhas* (of them), etc. The faultless contact of the sense-organs supply faultless objects and their perception. Cognitive senses are of two kinds: intuitive and ordinary. "The *intuitive* faculty of the cognition agent which is identical with himself, and *ordinary* cognitive senses of smell, taste, eye, touch, ear and *manas*; by the power of the intuitive faculty are perceived the self and its qualities, ignorance, *manas* and its faculties, and all sense-knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc., time and space."<sup>3</sup> In the *Pramana-paddhati*, Jayatirtha has elaborately discussed these matters, and in the *Tarka-tandava*, Vyasa-tirtha has also discussed them in somewhat different way.

### *Defects of Inference*

Madhva defines inference (*anumana*) as defectless probans. But there are two defects, defects relating to meaning, and defects relating to speech. Each defect is of two kinds: (1) "those that are common to the parts of a debate—discussion, question, establishment of one's own position an refutation of the opponent, and (2) those that pertain to the inference itself."<sup>4</sup>

Besides, there are three kinds of contradiction in an inference: (1) contradiction of proposition (*pratijna-virodha*), (2) contradiction of probans (*hetu-virodha*) and (3) contradiction of example (*dristanta-virodha*). Again contradiction of proposition (*pratijna-virodha*) is divided into two, contradiction of that which is settled by valid

<sup>2</sup> Vide, Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao: *The Epistemology of Dvaita Vedanta*, pp. 2-3.

<sup>3</sup> Vide, Dr. S. N. Dasgupta: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. IV (1949), pp. 181-182.

<sup>4</sup> Vide, Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao: *The Epistemology of Dvaita Vedanta* (1958), p. 70.

knowledge (*pramana-virodha* and contradiction of one's own words (*sva-vachana-virodha*) Further those contradictions are divided and are, therefore, different.

We find further classifications, known as twentytwo vulnerable points (*nigraha-sthanas*).<sup>5</sup> There are also *Jatis* or Futile Objections, numbering twentyfour and five *hetvabhāsas* or fallacies. Jayatirtha forwards sevenfold classification of fallacies of the probans.

Similarly there are different points of discussion in verbal testimony. Madhva admits two testimonies, *apauruṣheya* and *pauruṣheya*. The authoritative works for Madhva are four Vedas, the *Ramayana*, the *Mahabharata*, the *Pancharata-Agamas* and the *Puranas*. Revelation is the ultimate authority in matters of the spirit. Scriptures has to be interpreted according to the six determinative marks of purport; the initial and the concluding passages, repetition, novelty, purpose, glorification by eulogistic passages and condemnation by deprecatory ones, and intelligibility in the light of reasoning.”<sup>6</sup>

Madhva has also discussed about the problem of validity, and he has said that validity is intrinsic with reference to origin and ascertainment. Knowledge and its validity are cognised by the witness-consciousness (*sakshi-chaitanya*). In fact, *Sakshi* cognises the knowledge, originated by the *pramanas*. Inference can prove the existence of time, but time is only cognised by the *Sakshi* or witnessing Principle. Moreover, the *Sakshi* cognizes all things and all experiences. But Madhva admits many *Sakshins*, and they differ with each individual, otherwise, the differences in individual experiences cannot be known.

<sup>5</sup> The detailed description of them have been discussed by D. P. Nagaraja Rao (Vide, *The Epistemology of Dvaita Vedanta*, published in the 'Brahmavidya', Vol. XXII, pts. 3-4, December 1958, pp. 72-76).

<sup>6</sup> (a) *Ibid.*, pp. 103-104.

(b) Cf. Dr. S. N. Dasgupta: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. IV (1949), pp. 184-199.

## CHAPTER XXI

### THE PURE NON-DUALISTIC VEDANTA SCHOOL

Vallabhacharya (1473-1531 A.D.) was the founder of the pure non-dualistic (*shudhadvaita*) school of Vedanta. He wrote commentaries on the *Brahmasutra*, *Srimad Bhagavata*, and other works. The commentary on the *Brahmasutra* is known as *Anubhashya*. The pure (*shuddha*) Brahman is the only reality. The Brahman is called indeterminate (*nirguna*) in the *Upanishad*, because it is free from all qualities of *Prakriti*. It is known as *Purushottoma*, and creates the world and the individual souls by his inherent power (*shakti*) *maya*. The *Purushottoma* or Brahman is, therefore, the inherent cause (*samavayi-karana*) as well as the efficient cause (*nimitta-karana*) of the world.

We have already pointed out that the Brahman, according to Vallabha, is free from all qualities of *Prakriti* which is the stuff of the world-process as well as the power of the Brahman or God, but he says that the Brahman is possessed of the attributes *par excellence* like *sat* (existence), *chit* (consciousness), and bliss (*ananda*). He is of the opinion that the *Purushottama* conceals and also manifests the qualities at His Will, i.e. He conceals His qualities like bliss (*ananda*) and Lordship (*Ishvaratva*) in the individual souls (*jivas*) and also conceals His quality of consciousness (*chit*) in the material world, and that means the *jivas* are, to Vallabha, the Brahman or *Purushottoma* minus bliss and Lordship, and matter or the material world is *Purushottoma* minus bliss and consciousness. Therefore, it is found that the souls, the world, and the Brahman or God, the *Purushottoma*, are different from one another according to evolution (*avirbhava*) and involution (*tirobhava*) of those qualities of bliss, consciousness, and Lordship, but in essence they are non-different from one another. In fact, *Purushottoma* plays the sportive play (*lila*), when He wills to be many, nay, His creative act is the sport and this play is a voluntary one. His play consists of the voluntary



acts of evolution (*avirbhava*) and involution (*tirobhava*). He is transformed into the souls and the world, but He Himself remains unmodified, as a lump of gold remains gold itself being transformed into many ornaments. So Vallabha advocates the doctrine of immutable transformation (*avikritaparinama*).<sup>1</sup> Therefore, plurality of forms of the Brahman is due to its own will-power (*shakti*), but it is in itself the Unity.<sup>2</sup> Regarding the individual souls (*jivas*), it has already been said that Vallabha says that an individual soul (*jiva*) is infinitesimally small (*anu-parimana*) like the *Naiyayika's* mind and so power and knowledge of the soul are limited and imperfect. The soul (*jivatman*) can be compared to a small spark of fire, whereas God, being the *Purushottoma*, is like a big fire or volcano; soul is like an atom, whereas God is like a mountain. The soul suffers always from the bindings of the *samsara* (world) of nescience, whereas God, the *Purushottoma*, resides in the *Golaka*, the eternal Abode of Bliss, grandeur, and happiness. If the individual souls want to get rid of the worldly trap, they must pray to the *Purushottoma* for His Divine grace and that grace will make them free.

Regarding the world, Vallabha says that it is real, being the creation of the Reality which is the determinate (*saguna*) Brahman, which is endowed with infinite power, infinite love and infinite knowledge. Now, if we comparatively estimate the views of Madhva, Nimbarka, Bhaskara and Vallabha as regards the world and the individual souls, then we find that Madhva maintains difference (*bheda*) between the Brahman and the world; Nimbarka maintains real identity-in-difference (*bhedabheda*) between them, Bhaskara maintains identity-in-difference (*bhedabheda*) between them due to their adjuncts (*upadhis*), and Vallabha maintains identity (*abheda*) between them and the individual souls are the parts (*amsha*) of the Brahman. According to Vallabha, bondage of the individual souls is due to ignorance of their idea of identity or non-difference with the

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Mahendra Nath Sircar: *Comparative Studies in Vedantism*, pp. 100, 102.

<sup>2</sup> Vide, Dr. J. N. Sinha: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 708 711.

Brahman and the ignorance happens to them due to *avidya*, and liberation (*mukti*) comes to the souls when their knowledge of identity with the Brahman arises with the removal of ignorance or *avidya* through the divine grace of God. Vallabha does not believe in the state of *jivanmukti*, i.e. emancipation of a soul during his life-time, but he says that when *avidya* is destroyed, the material bodies being the product of *avidya* are also destroyed and the souls then enter into the eternal abode of bliss and that may be called the *videhamukti* or disembodied liberation.

Vallabhacharya divides the individual souls into three classes, *pusti*, *maryada*, and *pravaha*. *Pravaha* means the current of the world (like the current of water) and the souls those move aimlessly in the world and are engrossed in it, are known as *pravaha*. These souls come and go for eternity and thus create an unbroken cycle of birth and death, and cannot, therefore, find the path of liberation (*mukti*). The *maryada* souls follow the laws and principles of the holy scriptures, understand the nature of God through their repeated acquired knowledge, and thus they can find the path of salvation. The *pusti* class of souls are known as the chosen people of God. They worship God with intense love and longing, and thus attain the unbounded joy and peace of liberation.

Vallabha lays stress on the grace of God, which comes through devotion of hearing, and reciting the names of God, and also through the service of God. Like the Vaishnavas, Vallabha believes and, therefore, adopts *raga-nuga-bhakti*, which brings unto the Sadhakas the boundless bliss and love for God who is no other than Narayana or Krishna-Vasudeva.

Vallabha maintains three sources of valid knowledge (*pramana*) and they are perception, inference, and testimony. Valid knowledge, according to him, "is a determinate apprehension of the real nature of an object which was not known before". He does not maintain any indeterminate perception which is devoid of any contact of the senses. The determinate perception, according to Vallabha, is of two kinds, *vishishta-buddhi*, and *samuhavalambana*. *Vishishta-buddhi* perception is a direct and determinate

apprehension of an object having subject-predicate relation and *samuhavalambana* perception is direct and determinate apprehension of a collection of objects. The inference is an indirect and mediate knowledge. Vallabha believes in two kinds of inference, *kevalanvayi* and *kevalavyatireki*. The Vedas are self-revealed and it is devoid of all kinds of error, and, therefore, the words of the Vedas are the source of valid knowledge, which is known as testimony.

## CHAPTER XXII

### THE DUALISTIC-NON-DUALISTIC VEDANTA SCHOOL OF BHASKARA

Bhaskaracharya lived in 900 A.D., almost contemporary to Acharya Sankara. It is said that Bhaskaracharya for the first time has accused Sankara as *mayavadin* and a Buddhist in disguise (*prachhanna-bauddha*). Bhaskara's doctrine of Vedanta school can, therefore, be called the *Brahma-parinamavada*, as the Brahman, according to him, is transformed into the world in its unconscious part. The world is real and it is the transformed aspect of the determinate (*saguna*) Brahman, which is both one and many—unity and variety—the unconditioned and the conditioned. The conscious part of the Brahman is one and unconditioned, and the unconscious part or the manifold is conditioned by the adjuncts (*upadhis*); or it can be said that the Brahman, according to Bhaskara, is one in its causal and unmanifested state, and is many in its effected and manifested state, and so both cause and effect are real.

The Brahman in its essence is partless, but yet it transforms itself into the world-process being unchanged in itself. It is both, the *bhogyā* (the enjoyable world and its objects) and the *bhoktri* (the enjoying selves), and yet it does not lose its identity in them. That is, the Brahman, according to Bhaskara, is neither absolute identity (*abheda*), nor absolute difference (*bheda*); but it is *bheda* and, at the same time, *abheda*. And from this it is understood that there is difference as well as non-difference between *Shakti* and *Shaktiman*, as the sun is different and at the same time non-different from its rays or heat. The Brahman is, therefore, immanent and transcendent—finite and infinite. But it should be remembered that the Brahman in its essence or in its conscious transcendental part, is pure, partless (*niramsha*), formless (*nishprapancha*), attributeless (*nirguna*), and without any adjunct (*nirupadhika*).

The individual self, according to Bhaskara, is possessed

of form of the formless Brahman. From this it is understood that when the formless Brahman is endowed with the form or body and when is limited by the adjuncts (*upadhis*) of nescience (*ajnana* or *avidya*), desires (*kama*), and actions (*karma*), it is called the individual self or *jiva*. But this *jivabhava* of the soul will disappear, when the soul performs *karmas* with the help of *jnana* or *jnanavichara*, and then the soul realizes its real formless and attributeless aspect of the indeterminate Brahman. Bhaskara admits the doctrine of *jnana-karma-samuchchaya*, which has been refuted by Sankara, because Sankara maintains that as the Brahman-knowledge is an accomplished fact and is also self-revealing (*svayam-prakasha*), so any kind of action or *karma* is not helpful to the attainment of the Brahman, the Brahman knowledge not being the result of any work. Bhaskara has admitted *vidha-mukti*, i.e. liberation to be attained in the disembodied state and so theory of *jivanmukti* is untenable to him.

Yadavaprakasha who lived in 1190 A.D. also maintains the theory of identity and difference (*bhedabhedavada*). He believes in the doctrine of *Brahma-parinama*, i.e. the ever attributed (*saguna*) Brahman transforms itself in the forms of the world-process and the individual souls. Matter and spirit are different phases of one and the same Brahman, because Yadavaprakasha says that the manifested phase or form of the Brahman is the world (*jagat*), the souls (*jivas*), whereas its unmanifested phase or form is the Brahman. But Ramanuja has criticized both Bhaskara and Yadavaprakasha for their views regarding the Brahman, the soul, and the world.

## CHAPTER XXIII

### THE INCONCEIVABLE DUALISTIC AND NON-DUALISTIC SCHOOL OF VEDANTA

The doctrine of inconceivable dualistic-non-dualistic school (*achintya-bhedabhedavada*) evolved on the philosophical thoughts or doctrines of Sri Chaitanya (16th century A.D.) and Krishnadas Kaviraja (17th century A.D.) together with those of Sri Jiva Goswami (end of the 17th century) and Baladeva Vidyabhushana (18th century). And it will not be unwise to estimate that main structure of *achintya-bhedabhedavada* is designed by Baladeva Vidyabhushana. Sri Chaitanya's religio-philosophical thoughts are mainly based on the *Srimad-Bhagavata*, the *Gitagovinda* of Kavi Jayadeva, the *Vilvamangala* of Lilashuka, *Sri-krishna-kirtana* of Thakur Vidyapati and other books, because from the life of Sri Chaitanya we come to know that in the lonely place of Gambhira in Puri, Sri Chaitanya used to hear and discuss those books along with his attendants, Ramananda Ray and others. Though Sri Chaitanya has not written any definite treatise on the *Vaishnava* faith and doctrine, yet Krishnadas Kaviraja has written the *Chaitanya-charitamrita* which contains the religio-philosophical thoughts of the Chaitanya school. In the *Chaitanya-charitamrita*, there are some discussions between Sri Chaitanya and Vasudeva Sarvabhauma and Sri Chaitanya and Ramananda Ray and from those discussions we come to the central philosophy of Sri Chaitanya and also the basic philosophical thoughts of the Gaudiya-Vaishnavism, or Vaishnavism of Bengal. There we find that God, or the Brahman, has been conceived as the supreme Lord endowed with inconceivable (*achintya*) qualities. The Lord is determinate (*savishesha*) and is possessed of six powers (*sadaisharya*) of Lordship. He has *chichchhakti*, *jivaskti*, and *mayashakti* which are known as *vishnushakti*, *kshetra-jnashakti*, and *avidyashakti*. The *chichchhakti* or *vishnushakti* is the internal (*antaranga*) or essential *svarupa* power

of Lord Vasudeva, who pervades the universe with His *shakti* and *madhurya*. The *jivashakti* or *kshetrajnashakti* is the inessential (*tatastha*) power, and the *mayashakti* or *avidyashakti* is the external (*vahiranga*) power. The individual souls (*jivas*) are different from the Lord and God or Vasudeva is transformed into the world-process and this process is His richness (*aishvarya*) and beauty (*saundarya*), and sportive play (*lila*); or it can be said that the world-process is the modification of *mayashakti* of Vasudeva.

The conversation of Sri Chaitanya with Ramananda Ray discloses the philosophical doctrine which seems to be akin to that of Advaita Vedanta, but, in fact, this doctrine was accompanied by devotion, intense love, and complete dedication (*sharanagati*) to the Lord of the universe. Krishnadas Kaviraj describes Sri Krishna as the Supreme Deity of all individual souls. Lakshmi and Radha are identical, and Radha is the Divine consort of Sri Krishna. Krishna is manifested in Vasudeva, Samkarshana, Pradumna, and Aniruddha. This idea of Vasudeva and other manifestations-cum-incarnations had its culmination in the earlier *Pancharatra* literature and in the 10th-11th century A.D. in the *Srimad Bhagavata*. They are known as the four *Vyuhas* or *Avataras*. In some of the earlier *Puurnas*, these *Vyuhas* or divine manifestations of Krishna or Narayana are mentioned. The individual souls are the parts like the sparks of fire. Devotion and self-surrender are the means to receive the boon or grace of the Lord Sri Krishna. And these philosophical conceptions of Bengal Vaishnavism were contributed by Krishnadas Kaviraj.

Then we find the philosophical conceptions as contributed by Jiva Goswami, the nephew of Rupa and Sanatana. Jiva Goswami's philosophical ideas are indebted to the *Srimad-Bhagavata* and his *Sarvasamvadini* discloses the essence of the *Bhagavata*. He says in the *Sarvasamvadini*: "*ityatra 'vishnushakti' vishnoh svarupabhuta para-chit-svarupa shaktih paramapada-parabrahma-paratathadyakhya prokta*", i.e. the *vishnushakti* is not different from Vishnu Himself and this *sakti* is consciousness and the ultimate principle like the *brahmapada*. Ramanuja holds that

*sakti* and *saktiman* are non-different like the rays and the sun. Jiva Goswami calls the relation between *sakti* and *saktiman* inconceivable (*achintya*), as this relation cannot be determined. Besides, he says that *sakti* is of three kinds, *antaranga*, *tatastha*, and *vahiranga*. Jiva Goswami calls the ultimate Reality, the *Brahman*, the *Paramatman*, and the indeterminate *Bhagavat*. This ultimate Reality is beyond *maya* and it controls the world and its individual souls. This Reality is endowed with *mayasakti* and *chit-sakti*. He has powers of being (*sandhini*), consciousness (*samvit*), and bliss (*hladini*). The individual souls (*jivas*) are like the *monads* (*anus*) and are rescued from nescience by the grace of the Lord, *Paramatman*.

The last culmination of the *achintya-bhedabhedavada* after Jiva Goswami we find in the hand of Baladeva Vidyabhusana, the author of the *Govindabhashya* which is the commentary on the *Brahmasutra*. He has also written a summary of Sri Chaitanya's philosophy in his *Prameya-ratnavali*. Baladeva Vidyabhusana is a scholar and so he presents his philosophy with sufficient logical arguments. But he is greatly influenced by Madhvacharya.

The Brahman according to him, is determinate (*saguna*) and supreme "There is no difference between Brahman and his qualities. Nor is there identity-in-difference between them. There is non-difference between a substance and its qualities. They (qualities) appear to be different owing to *vishesha*".<sup>1</sup> This concept of *vishesha* has been taken by Baladeva from Madhva "in order to explain the non-difference of a substance from its qualities". *Vishesha* is the intrinsic nature and it defines its own nature. Though the Brahman is possessed of the relation of *guna* and *gunin*, yet, in reality, he is an undifferentiated Reality. He is supra-logical (*achintya*) and transcendent (*alaukika*)<sup>2</sup>

The individual souls are *anu-chaitanya* and are the parts of the Brahman. The world is dependent on God and is real. Baladeva criticizes Sankara and supports the

<sup>1</sup>Vide, Dr. Sinha: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 724-25.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 725.



views of Ramanuja in many respects

Swami Chidghananda (late Rajendranath Ghose) has written an article on *Achintya-bhedabheda* and *Advaitavada*,<sup>3</sup> where he says that the name of the theory of *achintya-bhedabheda* is not so very ancient, as it was first used by Jiva Goswami who lived after Sri Chaitanya. In the *Sarvasamvadini*, Jiva Goswami gave the significance of the theory of *achintya-bhedabheda* thus: "*Tasmat bhinnatvena chintayitum ashakyatvat abhedascha pratiyate svarupad abhinnatvena chintayitum ashakyatvat bhedah, iti sakti-saktimatoh bhedabheda eva angikritan, tan cha achintau iti.*"

That is, as it is non-different from the Reality, so it is not conceived and is, therefore, different, and as it is different from the Reality, so it is taken as non-different and thus we conceive *sakti* and *saktiman* as different as well as non-different and is, therefore, inconceivable (*achintya*). Further, Jiva Goswami says that the word *achintya* the idea of *anirvachya*, i.e. "*achintyam tarkasaham yajjnanam karyanyathanupapatti pramanakam tasya gochara santi*", i.e. the principle which is not determined by *anumana* (inference) and *tarka* (argument) but is determined by the *arthapatti-pramana* is known as *achintya* or *anirvachaniya*. However, Swami Chidghanananda has proved the incompatibility of the theory of *achintya-bhedabheda* in comparison with the theory of *anirvachaniya* as held by the Advaita Vedantists, or it can be said that *achintya-bhedabhedayada* of Jiva Goswami and Baladeva is no other than *anirvachaniyavada* of Advaita Vedanta.

<sup>3</sup> The *Udbodhan* (Bengali Monthly), 1347 B.S. Magha and Phalgun numbers, pp. 6-17 and 69-76.

## CHAPTER XXIV

### THE TANTRA SCHOOL

#### *Its Origin*

It can be asked as to how Tantra as well as Tantric cult originated. Though there are controversies regarding the time of the origin of Tantra and Tantric cult, yet most of the Eastern scholars are of the opinion that Tantra and Tantric cult originated in the Vedic time in India, and the conception of the Mother-goddess gave rise to Mother-worship at that time. In the Rigveda, we find the deities, Varuna, Mitra or Mithra, Indra, Aditi, Agni, Prithivi, etc., and among them we find the twin phases of the deities, Mitra-Varunau, Dyva-Prithivi, or Dyvas-Prithivi, etc. We have discussed in the philosophical ideas in the Rigvedic time, how Varuna was conceived as the Milky Ocean (*Kshiroda-Samudra*) and the Sun used to float in the bosom of that Ocean. Regarding the demarcation of the upper world and neither world, the Sky or Varuna was conceived as the Father, and the Earth or Prithivi, as the Mother, and thus originated in the most ancient past the conception of the Father and the Mother. Swami Abhedananda has said in his *Divine Heritage of Man*: "The religious history of the world shows that the conception of God as the Father of the universe first arose among the Aryans, and not among the Aryan nations, and not among any of the Semitic tribes."<sup>1</sup> The Swami has further said: "Yahveh possessed all human attributes . . . The same Yahveh, when addressed by Jesus the Christ as the Father in heaven, did not lose his Yahvenic nature, but was simply endowed with the fatherly aspect of Jupiter, or the Greek Zeus-pitar. . . The word Jupiter, or Zeus-pitar, has a long history behind it, . . . It meant father in heaven and is transmuted

<sup>1</sup> Vide, *Divine Heritage Man* (R.K.V. Math, Publication, Calcutta, 1917), p. 83.

from the Sanskrit Dyus-Pitar or Dyaus-Pitar, which very often occurs in the Rigveda, the oldest of the revealed Scriptures of the world." Swami Abhedananda has continued: "The term 'Dyaus' or 'Dyus' originally signified 'shining space' or 'heavens', but afterwards it was used for the self-effulgent Spirit dwelling in the heavens, and 'Pitar' was the father and protector. In the second book of the Rigveda (Ch. III, Ver. 20), we read: '*Dyaus me pita yanita nabhi ratra*.'" Here we find the word '*pita*' means 'father' as well as 'protector'.

Again, in the Rigveda, we find the word 'Aditi', the unflinching and immanent support of the phenomenal universe. Similarly, we find the word 'Dharitri' which means supporter i.e. the supporter of the universe. From the word Aditi evolved the idea of Prakriti (Latin *Procreatrix*) which was known as the primal creative Power or Energy, or Divine Mother.<sup>2</sup> The idea of Divine Energy or Mahamaya also evolved from Prakriti.

It is interesting to note that in the Rigvedic time, we do not find any Mother-worship in its anthropomorphic form, but in the pre-historic or pre-Vedic time, both the Mother-worship (Sakti-Upasana) and Siva-worship (i.e. Father-worship) in the form of Yogi (eyes concentrated on the tip of the nose) were prevalent, and this genuine proof has been revealed from the excavated pre-historic mounds of Mohenjo-daro, Harappa, etc. The archaeological findings of the Sakti-worship and Yogi-worship or Yogic-practice have been forwarded by Sir John Marshall, Earnest Macay, Rakhaldas Banerjee and other archaeologists, and there creeps a doubt that as the remains of the Sakti or Mother-worship and Yogic practices are not found in the Rigvedic time, so it is certain that the pre-historic period was different from the Rigvedic period.

Dr. D. C. Sircar writes: "The objects found at Mohenjo-daro include many figurines of the Mother-goddess and point to the wide prevalence of her cult. Such figurines, discovered from the prehistoric as well as later sites in different parts of India, are usually nude, but wear

<sup>2</sup> Vide, pp. 92-100.

a peculiar head-dress, a wide girdle and quantity of jewellery. A prehistoric terracotta seal from Harappa contains a representation of the same goddess who is shown upside down with her legs wide apart and a plant issuing from her womb and with a pair of tigers (cf. the association of the lion with the Indian Mother-goddess) towards the are to be found even in the earliest of the Vedic works, e.g. the Rigveda, as also in other parts of the Vedic literature.”

Regarding the prehistoric culture, Dr. B. N. Dutta writes: “Much of the religious culture of the Indus Valley civilization is to be seen in the Vedic and the post-Vedic culture of India. But we are not yet in a position to know which is the genuine one, as we have no data in hand either to prove the independent origin of these cults (of Tantra and Yoga) by putting them up as examples of parallelism in history . . . All we can say in the matter is that much of the religion of Mohenjo-daro was not unknown to the Indo-Aryans of the Vedic Age, and there is a continuous link between this religion and the present day popular Hinduism. Hence it can be said that in religious matters, the present-day Hindus are the descendants of the Indus people.”<sup>3</sup>

Dr. Chakravorty quotes regarding the antiquity of Tantra: “*The Tantras: Studies on Their Religion and Literature* (1963): “According to Shyama Sastri, the Tantra form of worship may be traced back to India as early as the first millenium B.C. This he (Sastri) seeks to show that the symbols which admitted by old coins (supposed to be earlier than even the 6th or 7th century B.C.) bear and of which no satisfactory explanation could be suggested by Western scholars are nothing but Tantric hieroglyphics (cf. *IASB*, Vol. IV p. 628) These, he shows, are the origin of the Devanagari alphabets. He is also of opinion that though some of the Tantras are comparatively modern, they undoubtedly embody old tradition (vide *Ind. And.* 1906, pp. 277 ff). The Tantric Upanishad like the *Tripiropanishad*, he says, containing the description of Tantra hiero-

<sup>3</sup> Vide, Dr. Dasgupta: *Philosophical Essays* (Cal. University).

glyphics only reproduce a tradition of bygone ages (vide *Ind. And.* 1906, pp. 274-276).

Now, regarding Sakti or Prakriti, we find in different scripts and philosophical treatises of India, the conception of Prakriti in the names of *Avyakta*, *Avyakrita Sakti*, etc. It has been said before that the conception of Mother as Divine Energy evolved from that ancient prime Principle, Prakriti. In the *Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad*, we find the mention of the productive Principle, *Avyakriti* or *Avyakta*, in which all the causal impressions of the living being and materials remain sleeping, and in the time of creation, those impressions awoke and came into being with their life and vigour. The *Avyakta* or *Avyakrita* was, therefore, conceived as the vast container or limitless receptacle. Now from this idea of receptacle or ground arose the conception of Mother, and in the *Chandi*, we find that this *Avyakrita-Prakriti* is worshipped as the Mother, who supports, contains, and sustains all the living beings and non-living materials of the universe. So there is no doubt that the conception of both Mother and Father came into being from the Vedic time, and the idea of the Mother-worship or Sakti-worship is undoubtedly a Vedic one.

### *The Saivas and the Saktas*

There are the philosophical schools of the Saivas and the Saktas. Vachaspati Mishra has mentioned four main schools in the *Bhamati*, and they are *Saiva*, *Pasupata*, *Karunika*, and *Kapalika*. Tantra belongs to the *Saiva* school, having *Siva-Sakti* as the coupled prime principle. It originates on the solid rock of the Vedic rituals, metaphysics, and theology. Regarding the significance of the word '*Tantra*', Dr. S. N. Dasgupta says: "The word '*Tantra*' has been derived in the *Kasikavritti* in connection with rule '*titutratathasisusarakasesu*' (7.29), from the root *tan*—to spread, by the rule: '*sarvadhota'bhua' sta*'. Vachaspati, Anandagiri and Govindananda, however, derive the word '*Tantra*' from the root *tatri* or *tantri* in the sense of (*vyutpadana*) origination or knowledge".<sup>3</sup> In fact, the root *tan* means 'to expand' or 'to make' *vistara* (*tanoti*), and

from it, it is understood that the word '*Tantra*' connotes the idea of 'expansion of the level or limit of consciousness or knowledge' so as to make a man realize the undifferentiated relation between *Siva* and *Sakti*—between the transcendental consciousness and the dynamic Divine energy.

Swami Pratyagatmananda says: "*Tantra* in its extended sense is the science (one may call it 'esoteric' when it ventures beyond the empirical) as well as the art of realization. As a science it has to enunciate its first principles, promulgate its fundamental theory and systematic doctrine. Basically, this is *tantric* metaphysics and philosophy. But as an art it has to make good, where and as far as possible, its theoretical doctrine by adequate and conclusive experimental demonstration. . . In the special sense *tantra* means the *Yantra* designs. If *mantra* is the operative formula and *Yantra* the operative form, then *tantra* is the actual, suitable formulation itself"

The South Indian school represents the Srividya school which are culminated in worship and essential (*puja* and *tattva*) of the Tripurasudari. It is said that the Srividya school was practised by Acharya Sankara himself. The *Prapanchasara-Tantra* is written by him.

The school of Tantra is mainly divided into three, though they are commonly known as five according to *pancha-amnayās* or five faces of the Lord Siva. The main three school of Tantra are *Gauda-Vanga* or *Gaudiya* school, Kashmir or *Kashmiriya* (*Trika*) school and Dravidiya or Kerala school. *Trika* is known by its three principle, *Siva*, *Vimsara* and *Jiva*, or *Pati*, *Pasha*, and *pashu*. According to Tantric tradition the boundaries of the *Gauda* is extended upto North Nepal, the Vindhya Hills on the West, to great ocean on the South and to the *Kalingadesha* on the East. In the *Gauda-Vanga* or *Gaudiya* school of the Saktas, the *Sadhakas* worship the deities of the Northern face of Siva which is known as *Uttaramanaya* ('*uttaramanaya gauda syat*'). The *Uttaramanaya* is extended from the North Eastern borders of the Vindhya Hills and runs Eastwards. The presiding *Rishi* of the *Uttaramanaya* is Vamadeva, who has been mentioned in the *Chhandogya-Upanishad*. The Goddess of the *Uttaramanaya* or *Gaudiya*

school is Devi Dakshina-Kalika. The Kashmiri (*Trika*) school of Tantra or Sakti worships the Goddess in the macrocosm, whereas the Kerala school worships the Goddess both in the macrocosm and the microcosm. The Kashmir school is included in the *samaya*-group. The Goddess of the Kashmir school is Tarini or the Rescuer, whereas the Goddesses of the Gaudiya school are Dakshina-Kalika, Durga, Tara or Nila-Sarasvati, Mahishamardini and the like. It is to note that the Saktas or Kulavadhutas of the Gaudiya school use human skulls or *mahakapalas* as *patras* (sups), whereas the monks, or Kulavadhutas, of the Kashmir school use the cocoanut skulls as *patras*.

### *Schools in Tantra*

Now we see that the Gaudiya school follows the practical (*sadhana*) side of the Tantra, whereas the Kashmiri or Trika school is based on the philosophical-cum-meta-physical side, and the South Indian Kerala school seems to be the admixture of the two. In the Bengal school, there are further three distinctive features of the doctrine, known as *Ka-di Ha-di* and *Ka-Ha-di*. *Ka-di* is known as the *Kalikula*, i.e. *Kula* means *Sakti*, and *Kali* or *Dakshina-Kalika* is *Sakti* or presiding deity of the *Kadi* of Gaudiya school. Now it should be remembered that there are mainly two kinds of *Vidya*, *Kadi-vidya* or *Kamaraja-vidya* and *Hadi-vidya* or *Lopamudra-vidya*. These two *Vidyas*, *Kadi*, and *Hadi* are consisted of 22 letters. The *Tantraraja-Tantra* and the *Tripura-Upanishad* favour these two *Vidyas*. Some of the Tantras and *Upanishads* speak of schools of *Vidya*, *Kadi*, *Hadi* and *Sadi* or *Ka-Hadi*.<sup>5</sup> These *Vidyas* have established some schools or *matas*. The *Bhavana-Upanishad* has explained the *Kadi* school as well as its viewpoint. The *Bhavana-Upanishad* says that the human body of the *Sadhaka* is to be conceived as *Sri Chakra*, being the expression of one's own Self or *Atman*. The fifteen letters of both the schools or *Vidyas* represent fifteen *Kalas* of the moon and, therefore, those *Kalas* are the lunar

<sup>5</sup> I have elaborately discussed these *matas* in my *Tantratattva-Nirdeshika* (Bengali).

*tithis* from *pratipad* to *purnima*. These *tithis* are known as the 'Wheel of Time' which constantly revolve within the Sri Chakra. With the help of *chakra*, *mantra*, and *puja*, Siva-Sakti, Kamesvara and Kamesvari are aroused with their inherent non-different aspects, which are Light and supreme Consciousness.

Tantra is known as the *Kaula-shastra*, which means the practice that discloses the secret of *kula* or Kali or *Kamakala-kundalini*, which resides in the primal lotus, *muladhara*. In fact, '*kula*' means Sakti, and *akula* means Siva: '*kulam shaktiriti proktam akulam shiva uchyate*'. So importance of the *kaula-shastra* or Tantra is to give full knowledge of the Siva-Sakti principle which also involves the system of *astanga-sadhana* of Patanjali. Tantra has adopted the Yoga system in the Tantric Sadhana from the system of Patanjali, for maintaining discipline in practices or to make the Tantric practices systematic.

It has already been said that Tantra is the *Kaula-shastra*, and the real followers of the Tantric practices are known as the Kaulas. The Kaulas really follow the *kaulamatas*. In the *Saubhagya-bhaskara* (p. 113), Bhaskara Ray writes: "*samayamatam kaulamatam mishramataucheta vidyapastaumabatrayam. Shuka-vashishthadi-samhitā-panchakoktam vaidikamargakarmavitamadyam. Chandra-kaladitantrashtakoktam tu charamam kulasamayobhayanusaritvat. Etad bhinna-tantroditam kaula-margah*". And quoting *Vamakeshvara-tantra-tika*, Bhaskara Ray further says that Tantra being the words and teachings of the Vedas and of the Lord of the universe, has no quarrel with any other *shastras*. Parashurama also writes in his *Kalp-sutra* (1.2): "*Panchamnan paramarthasarabhutan praminaya iti*". Pandit Laxmidhara writes in the commentary on the *Saundaryalahari* that sixty-four Tantras are included in the Vedas. So it is found, says Bhaskara Ray, that Tantra is not antagonistic to Vedas, *Upanishads*, and other Hindu *shastras*. He further says in the *Saubhagya-bhaskara* (p. 4) that *Kamesvari* and *Lalita* are no other than *Srividyā*. *Srividyā* is the *Mahaprakriti*, and the Devi manifests as Kali, Tara, Shodashi, Bhubaneswari, Kamala, Chhinnamasta, Bagala, Dhumavati, and others. *Srimat*



Purnananda Giri has said in the *Shritattvachintamani* and the *Shyamarahasya* that Shri and Shyama are one and the same, they differ only in their names and forms. In the *Vamakesvara-Tantra* (first chapter), sixty-four Tantras have been mentioned, and these are known as the *Kaulatantra*.<sup>5</sup>

The Kaulatantra prescribes the *kaulamarga*. Now, what do we mean by *kula*? In the *Saubhagya-bhaskara*, Bhaskara Ray says: "*sajatiyanam matri-mana-meyanam samuham kulam*". In the *Tararahasya-vritti*, Acharya Sankara also writes: "*kulam matri-mana-meyam, mata jivah, manam pramanam jnanamit yavat, mayam ghata-patadirupam vis'vamiti yavat*". That is, the *shastra* that discloses the scent of *pramata*, *pramana*, and *prameya* or *jnata*, *jnana* and *jneya* is known as the *kula* or *kulashastra*, and when the *Sadhaka* transcends the *triputi* or the tripartite categories, he attains to *kaula-jnana* and becomes the Brahman, and then he sees the world as saturated with the *Brahma-chaitanya*, and realizes the Advaita-jnana. But it should be remembered that this Advaita-jnana or non-dual supreme knowledge is the knowledge that Siva and Sakti are not different from one another, but are one and the same, as the positive and the negative parts of a pea (*chanaka*) co-exist as non-different.

### *Sadhana in Tantra*

The duty of the *Kaula-Sadhaka* is to arouse or to make dynamic first the basic energy (*Kula-Kundalini*) that sleeps, i.e. remains inactive in the primal base, *muladhara*. The Tantrakaras have conceived the basic energy, *Kundalini* as the *jiva-sakti* and when this energy becomes dynamic and comes in contact with the Paramashiva, Paramatman in the thousand petalled lotus (*sahasrara*), it is known as Siva-sakti or Brahma-sakti. In fact, Sakti is Siva and Siva is Sakti, and Sri Ramakrishna Paramahansa has emphasised this fact of non-difference of the prime principles, Siva and Sakti. These two prime principles

<sup>5</sup> Vide, Satish Chandra Siddhantabhushana: *Kaulamarga-rahasya* (1935 B.S.), pp. 6-8.

appear as *two orders* of Reality, but, in truth, they are one and the same. The transcendent absolute Reality, the *shuddha kutastha*. Brahman appears as two, Siva and Sakti, as the indeterminate and formless (*nirguna* and *nirakara*) Brahman and the determinate and formed (*saguna* and *sakara*) Brahman, and this is the Divine realization of Sri Ramakrishna. In truth, these realizations of the non-dual transcending Brahman is somewhat different from the non-dual Brahman (Advaita Brahman) of the Tantra philosophy. In Sri Ramakrishna's realization, when the indeterminate transcending Brahman is connected with the individual souls (*jiva*) and world-process (*jagat*), or when the indeterminate Brahman manifests itself as the individual souls and the world, it is known as the determinate (*saguna*) Brahman, and when it shines in its own status and undying glory, it is known as the indeterminate (*nirguna*) Brahman. But in Tantra, when the static indeterminate Siva manifests him as dynamic Sakti, he is known as the determinate (*saguna*) Brahman and when Siva co-exists with Sakti as coupled, static and non-different, then he is known as the Advaita *nirguna*-Brahman.

Now, after taking initiation (*diksha*) in the *kula* or *kauladharmā*, a *Sadhaka* must observe one of the seven *acharas*: *veda*, *vaishnava shaiva*, *dakshina*, *vama*, *siddhanta*, and *kaula*.; and also follow one of the three *bhavas* (sentiments) *pashu*, *vira*, and *divya*. The *acharas* or practices are external ones, and the *bhavas* or sentiments are internal ones. Now, what are these seven *acharas* and three *bhavas*? In Tantra all individual souls (*jivas*) are known as *pashu*, because as animals are tied with rope, so all individual souls are tied and limited by the rope of nescience (*ajñana* or *avidya*). The individual souls (*pashus*) are divided into two classes, inferior and superior. Those individual souls who are addicted to sensual and phenomenal pleasures and live without any spiritual sense, are inferior *pashus*, and those who are religious, ethical, and believer in God, are superior *pashus*. Those *Sadhakas* who are strong enough to cut asunder the rope of *maya* and try to attain to God, are known as the *Vira*. In the Tantra *sadhana*, the strong (*vira*) *Sadhakas* get success in realizing the highest Truth,

whereas the weak *Sadhakas* are unsuccessful. The *Upanishad* also says: "*nayamatma valahinena labhyah*", i.e. the *Atman* is not realized by them who are physically and mentally weak and unfit. And those *Sadhakas* attain the *divyabhava*, who forget their separate entity and make themselves one with the Siva, and these *Sadhakas* of the *divyabhava* are known as *Kaulas* or *Kulavadhutas*.

### *Different Acharyas in Tantra :*

Now, let us explain the *acharas*. (a) *Vedachara*: When a *Sadhaka* performs Tantric *sadhana* according to the rules and restrictions of the Vedas, the Smritis, and the Puranas, he is known as a *vedachari*. (b) *Vaishnavachara*: When a *Sadhaka* observes all the rules of *veda-chara* and at the same time does not take the five *makaras* and does not find any fault with others, he is known as a *vaishnavachari*. (c) *Shaivachara*: When a *sadhaka* practises *yama*, *niyama*, *asana*, *pranayama*, *pratyahara*, *dharana*, *dhyana*, and *samadhi*, as prescribed by Patanjali in the *Yogadarshana*, and also worships Siva and Sakti according to the rules of the Vedas, Smritis, and Puranas, he is known as a *shaivachari*. (d) *Dakshinachara*: When a *Sadhaka* follows the practices of the *vedachara* and at the same time takes *vijaya* (siddhi etc.) after concentrating upon *Ishtamantra* and *Ishta-devata* followed by counting of the beads, and also worships the *Devi*, identifying himself with the *Devi* (*devim bhutva devim pajet*), he is known as a *Dakshinachari*. (e) *Vamachara*: When a *Sadhaka* worships the *Devi* with sufficient control on the senses in the day time and also worships the *Devi* with five *makaras* at night, leaves the practices according to the rules of the Vedas and the Smritis, and thinks *Vama* or *Sakti* as his desired Deity, he is known as a *Vamachari*. According to the *Vishvasara-Tantra*, the *Vamachari sadhaka* is superior to the *vedachari*, *shaivachari*, *vaishnavachari*, and *dakshinachari sadhakas*. This *achara* is recognized as divine in the *Tantra sadhana*. But sufficient restriction or control is necessary and right conception about *sadhana* and its goal is essential in this *achara*.

Sometimes it is erroneously believed that *vamachara* is an antagonistic practice (*Pratikula-sadhana*) to *Sakti-sadhana*, but that is not correct. Some say that Swami Vivekananda has vehemently criticized and also condemned the *vamachara* of the *Tantric sadhana*. To this it can be said that they have missed the real meaning and correct significance of *vamachara*. It is true that Swami Vivekananda has criticized and condemned the perverted idea and mis-application of *vamachara* in *Tantric-sadhana* and he has not condemned the *Tantra* and *Tantric sadhana*. Sri Ramakrishna Paramahansa also practised the *Tantric sadhana*, according to sixty-four *Tantras* of different *amnyas*, under the able guidance of Yogesvari Bhairavi at Dakshinesvara Panchavati and attained *siddhi*. Sri Ramakrishna also gave the *Tantriki diksha* to his disciples of the inner circle (*antaranga-parshadas*) by giving *karavindus* (drops of sanctified wine) in their hands. It is also a fact that some of his disciples, including Swami Saradananda, Swami Abhedananda and others were supporters of *Tantric sadhana* as one of the divine means to God-realization. The Swamiji's too gave *Tantric* initiations to some of their disciples, with the application of *divyachara* or *divyabhava*. So *vamachara* itself is not to be blamed or condemned, but its ill conception and incorrect application or *sadhana* must be condemned.

In the *Vishvasara-Tantra*, *vamachara* and *dakshinachara* have been dealt with in detail. The *Vishvasara-Tantra* says:

*Acharo doibidho devi vama dakshina bhedatah  
Pancha-mudradi-samyukto vamacharah prakirtitah  
Pancha-mudradi ra'ito dakshinachara-samijnakah.*

That is, that *upasana* which is practised with the help of *panchamudras* (*ma-karas*), is known as *vamachara*; and *upasana*, in which these *mudras* are not used, is known as *dakshinachara*. In Bengal school of *Tantra* as well as in *sadhana*, these two *acharas*, *vama* and *dakshina*, are current and are also appreciated. In the second chapter of the *Kularnava-Tantra*, seven *acharas* have been explained and there it has been said: "*shaivat dakshinam uttamam, dakshinat uttamam vama, vamat siddhantam uttamam,*

*siddhantat ultamam kaulam*", i.e. *vamachara* is superior to *dakshinachara*, *siddhanta* is superior to *vama*, and *kaulachara* is superior to all and is supreme. It should be remembered, says Pandit Haran Chandra Shastri,<sup>6</sup> while explaining the term '*panch-makara*', the *Kularnava-Tantra* says that it connotes the idea of *vasana* which does not mean 'will' but means Sakti or *para-Sakti* which resides in the bed of the basic lotus, *muladhara*. In the *Manosollasa-Tantra* (IV.12.13), it has been described as "*Yatra kundalini nama parah shaktih pratishthitah*", i.e. the *kundalini* or *kamakala* is sleeping in the form *jiva* (individual soul) in the basic lotus (*muladhara-padma*). It should be aroused by will-power (*ichchha-sakti*) and should be directed towards the thousand petalled lotus (*sa'cscrara-padma*), where Prama-Siva with His undying lusture shines and be communed with that Siva, and this non-dual divine communion of the *kundalini-Sakti* with the supreme consciousness, Parama-Siva is *samarasya*. It is the summation of all the *makaras* and *acharas* as well as the communed form of *Kundalini* and Parama-Siva. This *sadhana* of *vasana* should be practised under the direction of an advanced *Guru* or teacher of Tantra. Now, this use (*seva*) of the *pancha-makara* or *vasana* leads a *Sadhaka* to liberation according to Tantric *sadhana*. The *Kularnava-Tantra* has not only instructed to know the inner meaning and significance of *panca-makara* (*pancha-mudra*) or *vasana*, but also prescribed the external practice of *pancha-makara* with its materials, *madya*, *mamsa*, *matsya*, *mudra* and *maithuna*. But it should be mentioned that until and unless we realize the inner or real meaning of *pancha-makara*, the external practice of *pancha-makara* will not be successful. The *Parashurama-Kalpasutra* is an authentic treatise on the *sadhana* of *pancha-makara*. This treatise has instructed the *Sadhakas* to practise the *pancha-makara-sadhana* in secret: "*guptah kula-vadhiriva*". The *Parashurama-Kalpasutra* (I.12; V.56) states: " \* \* \* *Pancha-makarah tairarchanam guptya prakattannirayah*", i.e. if

<sup>6</sup> Vide, the Bengali article, *Vamachara*, published in *Udbodhan* (Pengali journal), *Asvin*, 1348 B.S., p. 516.

*sadhana* of *pancha-makara* is not practised in secret, the *Sadhakas* or *Viras* (those partake in the *chakra-sadhana* in the Tantric worship) go to hell. So those who are not sufficiently pure in heart and not restrained, are not fit for practising *pancha-makara-sadhana*, and that means, they are not entitled to practise *vamachara-sadhana* of Tantra. But some of the Tantrikacharyas like Pandit Bhaskara Ray (the author of the commentary on the *Lalita-sahasranama*), the author of the *Kalika-Purana*, Pandit Lakshmanendradeshika (the author of the *Sharada-tilaka-Tantra*) and Pandit Appaya Dikshit (the author of the *Shivarkamani-dipika*) prefer *dakshinachara* to *vamachara*, because they maintain that real *Sadhakas* of the *vamachara* with *pancha-mudra* are rare in the society. But the authors of the *Kularnava-Tantra*, *Parashurama-Kalpasastra*, etc. say highly about *vamachara* or the *vasana*, i.e. divine communion of *kundalini* and Parama-Siva.

(f) In *siddhantachara*, religious disciplines of *vamachara* are followed to some extent, but the tendency of the *sadhana* is always towards meditation upon the Deity, Sakti. The main objective of *dakshinachara* is to arouse *kamakala-kundalini* and commune with the Parama-Siva in the thousand petalled lotus (*sahasrara*), and *kaulachara* is the last and highest *achara* or spiritual Tantric practice. In *kaulachara*, the *Sadhaka's* mind is absorbed in the Parama-Siva and becomes one with Siva or the coupled undivided seconcess Parama-Siva. The *siddha Sadhaka* of *kaulachara* is known as the Kaula or Kulavadhuta. The orders of the Avadhutas somewhat differ in the schools of Gauda Kashnir and Kerala.

(g) *Kaulachara*: Regarding *kaulachara*, the *Bhava-chudamani-Tantra* says:

*Na bhedo yasya deveshi sa kaulah parikirtitah.*  
*"Shmashane bhavane devi tathaiva kanchane trine,*  
*Mathitva jnana-dandena vedagama-mahodadhi,*  
*Sara eva mahadevi kaulacharah prakalpita.*

That is, a *kaula-Sadhaka* lives like a mad man (*unmattavat*) or a demi-god (*pishachavat*), and takes mud and sandal-paste, cremation ground and palace, and gold and grass as one and the same. Again in the *Vishvasara Tantra*,

*acharas* are mainly divided into two, *vama* and *dakshina*. It has been said before that the practice, in which five-*makaras* are used, is known as *dakshinachara*. According to the *Vishvasara-Tantra*, *vamachara*, *siddhantachara*, and *kaulachara* are included in the category of *vamachara*; and *vedachara*, *vaishnavachara*, *shaivachara*, and *dakshinachara* are included in the category of *dakshinachara*. But other Tantras differ from the *Vishvasara-Tantra* view.

### *Main Principles : Siva and Sakti*

In the *Shiva-Sakti-Agama*, Siva is both immanent and transcendent (*sakala* or *saguna* and *nishkala* or *nirguna*), in the form of Siva. "Thus the Tantra system of thought", says Dr. S. N. Dasgupta, "can neither be called dualistic, nor monistic. When we find the stress or emphasis to the monistic side as in the *Mahanirvana-Tantra* or the *Gandharva-Tantra*, we may be disposed to call it monistic, but if we look at the dualism on the *sadhana* side, we may be tempted to call it dualistic or pluralistic just as we please". In fact, Tantra philosophy upholds out-and-out the *shaktadvaitavada*, which means a synthesis of the dualistic and monistic systems of thought. In the final analysis, Siva and Sakti coalesce or are coupled together as one without a second, like a pea (*chanaka*) composed of positive and negative parts. So the viewpoint of Tantra differs from that of Advaita Vedanta in the fact that when Advaita Vedanta calls the Brahman *dvaitadvaita-vivarjitam*, Tantra calls the Brahman as the polarised this-consciousness with that-consciousness (*aham-idam-samvid-mithuna*).

Siva has been described in Tantra as the *prakasha* or pure illumination or shining intelligence (*shuddha-chaitanya*) and Sakti as *vimarsha* or the inherent and dynamic thought and activity. So when Siva is *sat*, Sakti is *sati*, when Siva is *chit*, Sakti is *chidrupini*, when Siva is *ananda*, Sakti is *anandarupa* (the very soul of *ananda* and its wave of absolute play), and when Siva is Brahman, Sakti is *Brahmamayi*. In Tantra, Sakti is known as the consummation of *jnana*, *ichchha*, and *kriya* (*jnana-*

*ichchha-kriyamayi*) or it is said to be the act (*kriya*) or movement (*spandana*) of thinking, feeling, and willing in one aspect or in one concept. These three acts or movements are manifested (*vyakta*) in Sakti, whereas they are unmanifested (*avyakta*) in Siva. So Siva is known as the *para-bindu* or *karana-bindu*, and Sakti is known as the *apara-bindu* or *karya-bindu*. In fact, from the *karana-bindu* evolves the *karya-bindu*, the *elan* or *vital* force. The *karya-bindu* is also known as *kriya-bindu*, i.e. when the formless indeterminate (*nirguna*) Siva transforms Himself into the dynamic form of Sakti, He is known as *priya-bindu* or Activity. In fact, Siva assumes the form of Sakti and Sakti goes into its original form, Siva.

The Trika system of Tantra is known as the Advaita Saiva philosophy of Kashmir. It is said that Vasugupta who lived towards the end of the eighth century or the beginning of the ninth century A.D. first promulgated this philosophical and epistemological Tantra doctrine which was contained only in the cult or ritualistic practice. The Saiva literature of the Trika may be divided into three heads: (a) *Agama-shastra*, (b) *Spanda-shastra*, and (c) *Pratyabhijnana-shastra*. We shall give some extracts of the Trika system of Kashmir Tantra from the *Pratyabhijnana-hridayam* by Kshemaraja, a pupil of Abhinavagupta. While discussing in a nutshell the philosophy of the Kashmir Tantra, Kshemaraja treated in his *Hridayam* the ultimate reality, together with the problems of the world-process, individual self, bondage, and liberation. The individual self (*jiva*) is Siva in essence, but due to *anava-mala* the self makes itself limited. The ultimate reality of the Trika literature is *Chit* or *Parasamvit*. In this *Parasamvit*, neither 'I' nor 'This' is distinguished, but both are coupled into undivided unity of 'I' and 'This' (*aham* and *idam* consciousness). It is non-relational and immediate *prakasha*. Sakti is *vimarsha* and *chidrupini*. Sakti is known as the heart of the supreme Siva, but Siva and Sakti together constitute the unitary whole as the bound up *prakasha-vimarsha*-principle. In fact, Parama-Siva and Parasakti are one and the same, and they appear different through ignorance. The Parama-Siva is both tran-



scendental and immanent, and only Sakti is immanent and the dynamBic aspect of the Parama-Siva. For the *anava-mala* or innate ignorance, ignorant men are liable to bondage, and liberation or *mukti* comes with the recognition (*pratyabhijnana*) of one's true nature which is no other than "the attainment of *akritrima-aham-vimarsha*—the original, innate, pure I-consciousness". In the *Tantraloka*, Abhinavagupta says: '*moksha hi nama naivanyah svarup-prathanam hi ta.*' At that time *chitta* or mind is transformed into *chit* or pure universal consciousness. Sometimes it is said that by *saktipat* individual soul (*jiva*) attains to salvation (*mukt*). But *saktipat* means the descent of Sakti and that means Divine grace or *anugraha* of Siva-Sakti. This grace is known also as *moksha*.

Tantric conception of worship (*sadhana*) also evolved in the *Mahayana* Buddhism. It is said that Indrabhuti introduced the mystic cult of Tantra in Buddhism. In Buddhism also, there evolved some schools like *mantrayana* (*yana* means path or school), *vajrayana*, *kalachakrayana*, etc. Besides, there are two main *yanas*, *Hinayana* and *Mahayana*. About the theological and esoteric sides of Tantric Buddhism it is said that from the Vajrasattva or Adi-Buddha emanaged five *dhyan*i-Buddhas, Virochana, Ratnasambhava, Amitabha, Amoghasiddhi, and Akshobhya, who are represented by five *Sankhyan* elements; earth, water, fire, air, and ether. Those *rhyani*-Buddhas are also known as five *Tathagatas*. Again the five Saktis represent the five *dhyan*i-Buddhas with their respective *mudras* and *bija-mantras*. It has been said in the Buddhist Tantra that Vajrasattva is the supreme principle which is not merely of the nature of *shunyata*, but is a non-dual state of *shunyata* and *karuna*, so as to imply that the void-consciousness is also of the nature of an identity of both *shunyata* and *karuna*. Akshobhya is marked by Vajrasattva who is identified with *Bodhichitta*. "It is said that when *Prajna* or the *shunyata*-knowledge co-mingles with the universal compassion, there remains no thinker, no thinkable and no thought, and this is the state of non-duality (*advaita*), this is called the *Bodhichitta*, this is the adamant truth, this is the Vajrasattva, the perfectly enlightened one

(*sambuddha*) and this is perfect wisdom".<sup>7</sup>

### *Tantric Tattvas*

Again *shunyata* and *karuna* are widely known as *Prajna* and *Upaya* respectively. When *shunyata* is called *Prajna*, it is not known as void, nor nothingness. It is also known as perfect knowledge and *bindu*, according to Tantric Buddhism. Similarly *Karuna* as well as *Upaya* implies the dynamic forces or incomprehensible activity. *Prajna* and *Upaya* have been described as *Nivritti* and *Pravritti*. "With this conception of *Prajna* and *Upaya* as *Nivritti* and *Pravritti*, or as *Adi-Prajna* and *Adi-Buddha*, we may compare the conception of Siva, and Sakti, or *aham* or 'I-ness' or *idam* or 'that-consciousness' produced by their union (*Shiva-Sakti-mithunapinda*)". So Dr. S. B. Dasgupta has said that the fundamental theological position of the Buddhist Tantras and that of the Hindu Tantras is the same. And it can be mentioned that the followers of the Buddhist Tantricisim used in their *sadhana*: *mantra*, *yantra*, *dharani* and other mystic symbols, together with the practice of Yoga, as prescribed in the *Yogadarshana* of Patanjali.

It will not be out of place to mention in this connection that Srikantha's ultimate Reality somewhat resembles with that of the Tantra school of philosophy. Srikantha wrote a commentary on the Badarayana *sutras* (the *Brahmasutra*), known as the *Shaivabhashya*. Appaya-Dikshit wrote a commentary on this *Shaivabhasya* of Srikantha, known as the *Shivakamani-dipika*. From general estimation it can be said that Srikantha's philosophy is partly similar to that of Ramanuja and partly to that of Tantra. Some are of the opinion that Srikantha's philosophy can be said to be the combination of *vishistadvaitavada* of Ramanuja and *shaktadvaitavada* of Tantra and is generally known as *shaivadvaitavada*. Really Saktism also holds a position between monism and qualified monism, and in this respect Srikantha's philosophical doctrine is similar to Tantra

<sup>7</sup> Vide, Dr. S. B. Dasgupta: *An Introduction to Tantric Buddhism*.

doctrine. Accordingly, we find that Srikantha's Brahman is the combination Siva and Sakti. Causation, according to Srikantha, is also known as transformation (*parinama*). Sakti or *Mahamaya* (i.e. *maya*) is the *Chit-Sakti* and this *Chit-Sakti* is transformed into the world-process, which has a real existence. Dr. J. N. Sinha is of the opinion that the relation of the Brahman to the world is non-different from the Brahman, even as a pot is non-different from clay. Yet it (world) is not absolutely identical with him (Brahman). It (world) is unintelligent (*jada*) while the Brahman is intelligent (*chaitanya*). So it (world) is different from him (Brahman). The Brahman is identity-indifference also lies between the soul (*jiva*) and God (*Ishvara*). Tantra advocates that when polarised, Siva and Sakti are non-different Advaita, and when Sakti takes to the dynamic dance of activity, she apparently seems to be different from Siva. But the *Shaivagama* says that Siva is Sakti and Sakti is Siva, both are one and the same, and they appear as different from the apparent transformation of Siva and Sakti

### TANTRIC ABADHUTA-ORDER

Abadhutas are they who have realized the Kali-Brahman or Parama-Siva. There are some kinds of Abadhuta: Brahnavadhutas, Saivavadhutas, Vaisnavadhutas and others. The Brahnavadhutas are the Brahnavadins, the Shaivavadhutas are initiated in the Siva Cult, the Vaishnavadhutas are the worshippers of Vishnu. But all of them are accomplished *Sadhakas*, and some of them are Siddhas.

The Kulavadhutas are the Tantric *Sadhakas* who attain the Sivahood by observing the *kulachara*, and they are known as the Kaulas. These Kaulas or Kulavadhutas are divided into three orders accordingly.

The Abadhutas or Kaulas, who belong to Kerala i.e. South-Indian Sri Vidya school, constitute the Samaya-group which does not follow the worship in the macrocosm. The Abadhutas or Kaulas who belong to Kashmir-Trika school, are the worshipper of Sakti, and though they con-

stitute the Kaula-group by their own method of worshipping Sakti or Divine Mother in the macrocosm, yet they differ somewhat from Gaudiya or Bengal school of the Saktas. The late Krishna Chandra Vedantachintamani, one of the great Tantric scholars, has said: "According to this school (Gaudiya or Bengal school) of thought, theology and ritual worship of the dieties of the Northern Face, one is not entitled to worship any of the dieties unless he is properly initiated by the ritual performance of Anointing or *Abhiseka*. One must have the 'Full Initiation' before he could be rightly permitted to worship any of the Goddesses of the *Uttara-Amnaya*. For instance, to be initiated into the worship of Dakshina-Kalika, one is required to go through the ceremonial performances of the 'Full Initiation'. In the case of Tarini on 'Pancha-Mundi', the aspirant is required to be initiated into *krama*, in the worship of *mohashodashi* the '*samrajya*' initiation is needed and so on and so forth."

The Kaulas are the worshippers of Kali i.e. Dakshina-Kali (Kula means Kali or Sakti). Prof. Benoytosh Bhattacharyya says that from the word *kula* the words *kulachara*, *kaulika* are derived. The Kaulas declare themselves to be the Tantric Hindus. The Buddhists also know the real significance of the words Kula and Kaula. The Kaulas, according to the Buddhists, mean the worshippers of followers of the originators of the five families i.e. five *Dhyani Buddhas*. There is indeed very little difference between the *Kaulachara* and the Tantric *Bauddhachara*, because in both desire to do improper and illegal things in the fullest extent is present.<sup>1</sup>

It should be remembered that in Gaudiya school, all these forms of initiation or *Abhiseka* begin with *purna-bhiseka* and end with the *maha-purna-abhiseka*. In fact, the Kulavadhutas constitute the monastic order of the Gaudiya school, for they are known as the monks or members of the fourth Ashrama, Sannyasa, as prescribed by the Agamas and Nigamas. But the way of living of some of the Abadhutas belonged to Gaudiya school is different, as

<sup>1</sup> Vide, *Introduction to Sadhanamala*, Vol. I, p. xix.

they live with families to hide their faith and cult, but yet they are inferior to those who belong to Sannyasa Ashrama. The above group is known as Guptabadhuta (belonging to a secret order).

The Gaudiya school of Tantric thought or faith are also seen in the following countries, Sarasvat, Kanyakabja, Mithila, Utkal and Gouda-Banga. The Abadhutas belong to all these countries i.e. school of Tantric thought. as for example, Sarasvat school, Kanyakubja school, Kanouji school, Maithili school and Gaudiya or Bengal school. And it should be remembered that the Abadhutas of those respective school differ from one another for their rituals and practices. Besides, the Kerala group differ from the Kashmir group for their uses of *Mahakapalas* (human skull) as *patras* (pots), whereas the Kashmir group use the pots of coconut shells. The *panshatattva-sadhana* also differ among them. Besides, the Abadhutas of different schools also worship different faces of Siva. But differences of the religious methods and faiths do not affect the central aim of the Abadhutas. Their cardinal faith is to realise that the Jiva or Ham-Sa is no other than Siva or So'ham.

‘जीबो हंसेति संप्राक्तः, हंस सोहहंस्वरूपिणी

The Kulavadhutas of the Gaudiya (Bengal) school, who worship in Northern Face (*Uttaramnaya*) of Siva have for their ascetic title ‘Giri’. Similarly, there are other titles like Puri, Bharati, Sarasvati, etc., who claim to be included themselves in the order of Dasanami, established by Acharya Sankara.

## BUDDHIST TANTRA

Some of the scholars headed by M. M. Haraprasad Sastri, Dr. Dinesh Chandra Sen, Prof. Benoytosh Bhattacharya, are of the opinion that Buddhist Tantra is the source of the Hindu Tantra. In the Introduction to the *Sadhana-mala*, Prof. Benoytosh Bhattacharyya has made a remark: “The developments on Tantra made by the Buddhists and the extraordinary plastic art they developed, did not fail again to create an impression on the mind of the Hindus,

and they readily incorporated many ideas, doctrines and gods originally conceived by the Buddhists in their religion and literature". But this remark is quite untenable, as the Hindu and the Buddha Tantras were in practice side by side, and this is opinions of Aurther Avalon, Dr. S. B. Dasgupta and others.

Now, we would like to mention two opinions about the introduction of the Tantrism to the Buddhist faith:

(1) The historian Taranath has said that though Tantricism existed from very early times, yet it was really developed and transmitted in the most secret manner possible from the time of Asanga down to the time of Dharmakriti. Asanga was the brother of Vasubandhu (280-360 A.D.), and he probably flourished in the first half of the 4th century and Dharmakriti flourished in between 600-650 A.D. Therefore it is seen, says Prof. Benoytosh Bhattacharya that during a long period of nearly three hundred years Tantrism was handed down from Gurus to disciples in the most secret manner, 'and it seems quite possible that Saraha, Nagarjuna, Luipada, Padmavajra, Anangavajra and finally Indrabhuti were the chief masters to boldly and publicly preach their doctrines and exhort people to follow their tenets and practices. . ."

(2) Some are of the opinion that Buddha himself introduced Tantric Cult and practices to some of his trusted disciples who used to practise the rites in secret. The monks who were entrusted, composed Tantras in the form of *Sangitis*, and those *Sangitis* were introduced in Buddhist faith. "And probably, if we could go to the root of this Mantrayana (i.e. *Manjushrimulakalpa*), we would have voiced the opinion of Santaraksita and Kamalasila that instructions on Tantras, Mantras, Mudras, and Mandalas were delivered by Buddha himself for the benefit of such of his followers who cared more for the material prosperity than the spiritual."

The Tantric literature were afterwards divided into main three vanas, Vajrayana, Sahajayana, and Kalachakrayana. Besides, there were Tantrayana, Bhadravayana, etc., and in the Tibetan Buddhism, we will find more 'panas' or spiritual paths for adopting the idea of Tantra practice.

Really Indrabhuti (717 A.D.) was the King of Uddiyana, which is generally identified with Orissa or Utkala. Indrabhuti's father was Padmasambhava and his sister Laksminkara. All of them were initiated in the Cult of the Buddhist Tantra. Indrabhuti was regarded as an authority on Vajrayana and Tantra schools. In his *Jñānasiddhi*, Indrabhuti says that Vajrayana is the essence of all Tantras. The Tathagatas were designed in Vajrayana, as Samantabhadra, and Mahamudra. Again these three deified Tathagatas were sub-divided into five: Adarsajnana, Samantajnana, Pratyaveksanajnana, Krityanusthanethanajnana and Suvisuddhijnana, i.e. all of them were conceived as Dhyani-Buddhas, the embodiments of knowledge. It has been said that armed with these five kinds of knowledge the Tantric Sadhaka should think himself as *Sunya* in essence and all else as *Sunya*. The historian Taranath has given a long list of the Buddhist Tantras, in which we find the philosophical ideas as contained in the deified form of the Dhyani-Buddhas as well as different Tantric cults and their practices.

We find the name of Dombi Heruka (777 A.D.) who was a king of Magadha, but was initiated by Sahajayogin and became a Tantric ascetic. Dombi Heruka has composed a *sadhana* of the goddess Nairatna i.e. Nairatma Devi. Dombi has formulated the worship of *kula*, in which five Dhyani-Buddhas, Aksobhya, Vairocana, Amitabha, Ratnasambhava and Amoghasiddhi have been conceived for meditation. These Dhyani-Buddhas are possessed of different colours and Saktis. Dr. H. V. Guenther has mentioned in the *Yuganaddha*: "The five Buddhas are in the sequence of the five Skandhas: the white Vairocana, the yellow Ratnasambhava, the red Amitabha, the green Amoghasiddhi, and the dark blue or black, Aksobhya. The five corresponding female deities are Lochana, Mamiki, Panduravasini, Tarini (or more frequently Tara) and Vajradhatvisvari."

Dombi Heruka has written about the theory of Mahasukha i.e. infinite happiness and bliss obtained by Tantric *sadhana*. The happiness and bliss are experienced in four successive stages, Ananda, Paramananda, Vairama-

nanda and Sahajananda.<sup>2</sup> Besides, by combination of Prajna and Upaya—the female principle and the male principle, these four aspects of Ananda, are obtained. Dr. Guenther has elaborately explained these two main principles, Prajna, the female aspect, and Upaya, the male aspect, which are symbolized as the dual aspect of a man. Dr. Guenther says: “The fact that the elementary phenomena, the ‘reserves’ (*dhatus*), are thought to be made male and conceived as ‘wisdom’ (*prajna*), while the forces (*skandha*) that operate conjointly with them are thought to be made male and conceived as ‘activity’ (*upaya*), is ample proof of the deep insight into and understanding of the wholeness of life the Buddhist Tantrics have had.”<sup>3</sup>

It has been said before that the deities of the Vajrayana system represent *Sunya*, and they are *Sunya* in essence with the three elements, *Sunya*, *Vijnana* and *Mahasukha*. They are rather their voluntary manifestations of the *Sunya* in accordance with the *vijamantras*.

The Vajrayana school has conceived innumerable deities, the many of the Buddhist deities are not similar to those of the Hindu Tantra. The Hindu Tantra has mainly conceived the main ten forms of Sakti (*Dashamahavidya*), but the Buddhist Tantra has conceived different kinds of Sakti. Now, it is also found that many of the Hindu i.e. Brahmanical gods are humiliated and made subservient to the Buddhist gods. As for example, Prasannatara is described as trampling upon Indra and Upendra and pressing Rudra and Brahma between the two. Aparajita is, described as a goddess whose parasol is raised over head by wicked and mischievous gods, like Brahma and others. The cause behind it is clear that there was not peaceful situation and spirit of amity all the time between the Hindus and the Buddhists.<sup>4</sup>

While explaining the Tibetan Tantric faith, Dr. H. V. Guenther has said in his monumental book, *Tibetan*

<sup>2</sup> Cf. S. Prajnanananda: *Historical Development of Indian Music* (2nd edition, 1973), *charya*-topic.

<sup>3</sup> Vide, *Yuganaddha* (Varanasi-1, 1969), p. 17.

<sup>4</sup> In the *Tantric Tradition*, Agheyananda Bharati has also discussed this matter, Vide p. 203.



*Buddhism Without Mystification*<sup>5</sup>: We know that at first Buddhism was divided into two main sects, Hinayana (Lesser Course) and Mahayana (Great Spiritual Course). The Hinayana was further divided into Shravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana. The Shravakayana was considered as the infancy stage of spiritual *sadhana*, whereas the Pratyekabuddhayana was known as superior to Shravaka

Gradually evolved Paramitayana and Mantrayana. Among them (1) Paramitayana emphasizes the practice of the 'perfections' of liberty, ethics and manners, patience, strenuousness, meditative concentration; and (2) Mantrayana evolved from the method, as prescribed in the *Guhya-samajatantra*, and its real name is *Muhya-mantra-phala-vajrayana*. It is also known as Guhyamantrayana, Phalayana, Upayayana and Vajrayana. The texts of the Vajrayana is mystical, and it leads to the Tantric Sadhakas to upward movement of illumination. Though less known, the Mahayana Buddhism, which infused vitality and force to all other Yanas and faiths, is also known as Lakshmanayana i.e. course of philosophical investigation, and Hetu-yana or course of spiritual training in which attention is concentrated on the ultimate cognitive norm in human experience.

Dr. Guenther has further said that Vajrayana is very important Tantric treatise, which gives real impetus to the faith of Tantric *sadhana*. 'Yana' means path or method of transformation and transfiguration in which the goal of life is determined and reached. Vajrayana is sometimes synonymous with Mantrayana though it demands a different kind of thought. Vajrayana is a path to get into the union of Prajna and Upaya, as has been said before. Vajrasattva is a quite different thing, which means the union of insight and action, and from this viewpoint of meaning Vajrayana and Vajrasattva convey the same idea. "Vajra is the Dharmakayic awareness in which three types of enlightenment enter indivisibly from ultimateness and Sattva is the apprehendable form pattern deriving from it" However, the Vajrayana path is open to the 'superior individual' who has traversed the common path and by having

<sup>5</sup> Published from Leiden in 1966.

had the experience of that which is involved with the lower stages of the inferior and mediocre individuals, has built himself a solid foundation. Similarly Mantrayana is the climax of Buddhist spiritual culture, it remains in itself a graded process. This is evident from its division into Kriyatantra, Charyatantra, Yogatantra and Anuttarayogatantra. "Those who can identify their desire to look at the goddess of their contemplation with the path of their spiritual development are taught the Kriyatantra; those who, in addition, are able to smile at their partner, but cannot do more than this, are given the Charyatantra; those who can hold the hands of the inspiring female or desire bodily contact, but are unable to proceed further towards the consummatory act, are taught the Yogatantra; and those who not only stay with contemplation but make the desire to copulate with a real woman the path of their spiritual growth, are taught the Anuttarayogatantra."

The Buddhist Universities were the seats of Tantrism, and great Pandits like Shantarakshita, Kamalashila, Dipankara Shrijnana and others of the Universities of Vikramshila, Odantapuri, Nalanda, etc. were the followers of Vajrayana. From the copperplate of Devapaladeva, we know that Nalanda was the abode of the *Bhiksus* and the *Bodhisattvas*, who were well-versed in the treatises as well in the ritualistic cults of Tantra. Dr. H. D. Sankalia has written in his book, *The Universities of Nalanda* (1934): "From references in Tibetan works to Nalanda as a great centre of Tantric studies, or to a person as a professor of Tantra at Nalanda,<sup>6</sup> and also from a number of books, evidently Tantric, ascribed to the Pandits of Nalanda in the Chinese,<sup>7</sup> it would appear that Tantra was, perhaps, a very popular subject with the students as well as professors in the Nalanda University.<sup>8</sup> Now it would have been suffi-

<sup>6</sup> Kamalashila was a professor of Tantras. Vidyabhusana, H.I.L., p. 327.

<sup>7</sup> *Catalogue du fond Tibétain*.

<sup>8</sup> We have epigraphical evidence to show that Nalanda was a renowned centre of Tantric studies. We are told by the Nalanda copperplate of Devapaladeva (II.37-42, Ep. Ind., XVII, p. 325) that "Nalanda was the abode of *Bhiksus* and *Bodhisattvas* well-versed in the Tantras".

cient only to have observed that Tantra was taught at Nalanda, and to have mentioned a few books written by the Nalanda pandits, were it not for the fact that Tantra and the whole cult which goes under the name of Tantrism is even after the publication of many works on it, regarded as "gibberish".<sup>9</sup> For references, as the one above quoted, cast a slur, even though incidently on the education that was given by the Nalanda University. In order, therefore, to decide or to come to any conclusion on the values of Nalanda education it is thought desirable to give a short history, and nature of the Tantras or better of the cult, that goes under the name of Tantrism or Tantricism.

Tantrism, particularly that which was prevalent at Nalanda, had its origin amongst the various religious and even philosophical practices that were followed by the Hindus as well as Buddhists. It had something to do with religion and not anything else. This much is conceded by all."<sup>10</sup>

### *Tantricism in Tibet*

Tantric Buddhism was introduced in Tibet first by Padmasambhava, the son of King Indrabhuti, and then by Sri-Jnana-Dipankara. Some are of the opinion that Padmasambhava, married Santaraksita's sister, Laksminkara and conjointly created a Buddhist monastery of Samye in Tibet in the year 749 A.D. Dipankara was a professor in the Vikramsila University and he was invited by Pandit Jayasīla (Tshul-Khrims-rgyal-ba) of Tibet. Atisha-Dipankara's Tantric Guru was Rahulaguhyavajra, and he was the worshipper of Arya-Tara, and was initiated by his Guru in the cult of Vajrayana Rahul. Sanskritayana is of the opinion that Atisha made a severe penance and *sadhana* in the cult of Hevajra under the guidance of Acharva Avadhuti-Pa or Paindapatika, and attained *siddhi* with the help of six *dharanis*, ordained by Varahi Devi. Atisha has himself admitted that he practised Tantric *sadhana* of the

<sup>9</sup> Prof. Winternitz, I. H. Q., IX, No. 1, March, 1933, p. 4.

<sup>10</sup> Vide, *The University of Nalanda* (1934), p. 86.

Matri class.<sup>11</sup>

The Tibetan Tantra-*sadhana* is more or less admixture of Tantra and Buddhist Yoga. Now what is the Buddhist Yoga- Dr. H. V. Guenther says: "In Buddhism, Yoga never means to be swallowed up by an Absolute, nor does it imply anything which Occidental faddism fancies it to be, *it always means the union of fitness of action' and 'intelligence'*. In this process, certain norms are revealed, which are always active and dynamic. They have become known by their Indian names, Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya, and Nirmanakaya, but never have been understood properly, within the frame-work of traditional Western semantics, because of the essentialist premises of Western philosophies."<sup>12</sup> Dharmakaya is no other than the intentional structure of the noetic in man, and Sambhogakaya and Nirmanakaya are the cognitive-spiritual mode. In fact, Nirmanakaya is the implementation of man's whole being, 'the ordering of his world in the light of his ultimate possibilities'.

Lama Anagarika Govinda (the Tibetan name, *Anangavajra Khamsum-Wanchuk*) has explained the Tibetan system of Yoga and meditation (*Tapas and Gtum-Mo*) in his book, *Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism*;<sup>13</sup> Lama Govinda has said that the purpose of this Yoga i.e. 'Yoga of the Inner Fire' is purely spiritual, aiming at the state of perfect inner unity and completeness in concentrated and integrated like the rays of the sun in the focus of a lens. This process of Yoga or perfect integration according to Tibetan tradition, is represented by the symbol of the flame or the flaming drops (Skt. *bindu*, Tib. *thig-le*) and expressed by the seed-syllable (*bija*) HÜM. The *Demchog Tantra* says that HÜM represents the 'mind free from all thought-contents or concepts' (*hzin-dan-bral-pahi-sems*). The letter U corresponds to the Wisdom of Amogasisiddhi, which 'accomplishes all works'; the letter H corresponds to the 'Distinguishing Wisdom' of Amitabha; the head of H cor-

<sup>11</sup> Vide, Dr. Aloka Chatterjee: *Atisha and Tibet* (Calcutta, 1947), p. 57.

<sup>12</sup> Vide, *Tibetan Buddhism without Mystification* (Diden, 1966), p. 57.

<sup>13</sup> Vide, 'Rider and Co., London), pp. 159-165.

responds to the 'Wisdom of Equality' of Ratnasambhava. The crescent corresponds to 'Mirrorlike Wisdom' (of Aksobhya), and the flaming drop corresponds to the 'Dharmadhatu Wisdom' of Vairocana. Therefore, we find that the mystic syllable *IIUM* corresponds to five Dhyani-Buddhas and the syllable, therefore, emits five rays of five colours, blue, green, red, yellow, and white, while the white ray or light represents the inner nature of *Maha-sukha*, who herewith reveals himself as a form of *Vajra-sattva*, the immanent and all-pervading reality of the adamantine voidness (*Sunyata*).<sup>14</sup>

Dr. W. Y. Evans-Wentz has elaborately discussed the problem of Tibetan Yoga in his monumental book, *Tibetan Yoga and Secret Doctrines*. He follows Patanjali in defining the meaning of Yoga and forwards the living example of Yogi Milarepa of Tibet. He says that the whole aim of Yoga is to dissipate ignorance and to guide the Yogi to what the Buddhists call Right Knowledge. It seems that the Tibetan method of Yoga which was mixed with the Tantric practices, was introduced by the learned Buddhist teachers who were well-conversant with the system of Yogas, as advanced by Rishi Patanjali, and so various methods of Yoga like Hatha-Yoga, Laya-Yoga, Bhakti-Yoga, Sakti-Yoga, Mantra-Yoga, Yantra-Yoga, Dhyana-Yoga, Raja-Yoga, Karma-Yoga, Jnana-Yoga, Kundalini-Yoga, Samadhi-Yoga etc. were introduced along with Tantra practices, as formulated by the Buddhist Vajravana Treatises. Laya-Yoga and Sakti-Yoga are helpful to each other. Mantra-Yoga is akin to Mudra-Yoga, and Yantra-Yoga is also included in the Mudra-Yoga. However, Yantra, Mantra and Mudra-Yogas are conferred for spiritual power at the time of Lamaic initiations. 'In so far as these two Yogas (Yantra and Mantra) are dependent upon Yogic visualization, and, therefore, upon certain degree of Yogic control of mind'. In the *Siva-Samhita* (V. 30), we find the mention of Nada Yoga which is a form of Mantra-Yoga, and this Nada-Yoga has also been introduced to the Tibetan Tantric *sadhana*. There is a system of secret transmission

<sup>14</sup> Vide, *Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism* (1962), p. 188.

of power. This system is known as Transference and Inspiration, and (Yogic art), the principles of consciousness of two human beings can be mutually exchanged, or in other words, that the consciousness which animates or inspires are human body, and this inspiration can be transferred to other human body. The Gurus or Siddhas of Tibet are able to do all these. It seems that when Padma-sambhava and afterwards Dipankara or Dipankara Atisha preached the Indian Buddhist Tantricism to Tibet, the system of *sadhana* was akin to the laws and principles, as laid in the Vajayana scriptures, and some Yogic practices were also introduced to fit the Tantric practices. Gradually many mysterious and occult practices were developed by the Tibetan Lamas. Dr. Evans-Wentz has also discussed about the performance of the mystery-play which were developed by all sects of the Lamas.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Cf. The Performance of the Mystery-Play of Tibet and Sikkim (Vide, *Path of the Mystic Sacrifice: Tibetan Yoga*, pp. 289-296).

## CHAPTER XXV

### THE SAIVA-SIDDHANTA SCHOOL

The term 'Saiva-Siddhanta' denotes a complete system of philosophical thought which evolved in Tamil-Nad, in South India in ancient time. The word 'Saiva' is derived from 'Sivam' meaning 'the auspicious' or 'the blissful' Lord, and 'Siddhanta' means the conclusion of conclusions. In the *Tamilagama*, Saiva-Siddhanta is often referred to as 'Siddhantam' or 'Saivam'. It is also called 'Agamanta', being both a philosophy and a religion.

The very terms used in Saiva-Siddhanta are: *pati*, *pashu* and *pasha*, which are Vedic. The word *pati* is used to denote the Lord of the Vedic sacrifice (*yajna*) and *pasha* is the rope which was used to bind to the stake (*yupastambha*) animals offered at the sacrifice. *Tevaram*, *Tiruvachagam* and four other collections, all of which together form the *Panniru Tirumurai* in Tamil, are considered sacred scriptures. *Tevaram* and *Tiruvachagam* in particular are regarded as Tamil Vedas for the Saivaitees.

The fourteen *Siddhanta-Shastras* in Tamil form the central philosophy of Saiva-Siddhanta. The *Sivajnana-bodham* in *sutra* form in Tamil is the original treatise of the Saiva-Siddhanta and it was composed by St. Meykander, the saint of Tiruvainaimallur in eleventh or twelfth century A.D. Tirumular said that Vedas are meant for all, but the Saiva-Angamas are meant for those who are advanced in spiritual culture. St. Nilakantha Sivacharya expressed similar views in his commentary on the *Brahma-sutras*.

The Saiva-Siddhanta generally deals with the *tripadarthas*, viz., God (*Isvara*), individual souls (*jiva*) and the world (*jagat*). Pati or God is the perfect Being, who is different from *maya* and *anava*. He is unchangeable as well as the source of all knowledge. He neither thinks, nor desires, nor acts, because any kind of activity will simply change Him. He (God) has two aspects: *svarupa*

or *parasiva* aspect (as He is in Himself) and *tatastha* or *pati* aspect (as He stands in inseparable relation with the souls and matter). The Supreme Siva is indeterminate (*nirguna*) and yet is conceived as a personal Being (determinate or *saguna*). In His *pati* aspect He is known as Sadasiva, and for giving release to the souls (*jivas*) from *mala*, He (i.e. Sadasiva) performs five acts of creation, preservation, destruction, concealment, and revelation. He has His power or *sakti*, known as divine grace, which is inseparable from Him, just as the rays of the sun are inseparable from the sun. His *saktis* or powers are His compassion, knowledge, and power. These *saktis* or powers are conceived as female, whereas Siva is male. But these aspects, Siva and *saktis*, are inseparable like the Ardhanarishvara. But it should be remembered that this Siva of Saiva-Siddhanta is not one of the Hindu deities of the Trimurtis, viz. Brahma, Vishnu, and Maheshvara, because, according to Saiva-Siddhanta, Maheshvara or Siva or Rudra of the Hindu Trinity is classed among the individual souls (*jivas*).<sup>1</sup>

The Lord Siva of the Saiva-Siddhanta-Agama causes evolution of the world for his unlimited energy or power. The only quality of Siva is His lovingness, because Siva and love are non-different. Siva's love are fivefold: first of these is the gift of the material body and the mind; the second gift is the power to sustain the body, the third and fourth gifts are enlightenment and suppression of *anava*. The fifth gift of Siva's love is disembodiment or removal of the physical body, and the fifth gift are embodiment or creation, sustenance, death, suppression of *anava* and enlightenment.

*Anava* (*mala*) is constituted out of desire, selfishness, ignorance, etc. *Anava* "means that which tends to make the soul's powers indefinitely small". *Anava* prevents the full flow of energy, and so it brings limitation to the soul (*jiva*).

*Maya* is the source that enables men to know, to

<sup>1</sup> Vide, S. Satchidanandam Pillai: *The Philosophy of Saiva-Siddhanta in Vedanta* in *The Vedanta Kesari*, 1942, pp. 18-26.



desire, and to do. The soul (*jiva*) has only the abilities for these activities or functions. Now that which supplies energy and faculty is called *maya*. The thirty-six elements or attributes, viz. *buddhi*, *manas*, *ahankara*, five *bhutas*, five *tanmatras*, *guna* and *mula-Prakriti*, etc. are the products of *maya*. These are again divided into three sections. Again those sections consist of two parts, one part supplies energy and other part is the tools. The first part evolves in succession into *nada*, *bindu*, *sadakya*, *Isvara* and *shuddha-vidya*. The second part consists of two sections, the regulators and the tools. The regulators are *kala*, *niyati*, *kala*, *vidya* and *raga* (or desire) and also empirical ego and *mula-Prakriti*.

The soul (*jiva*) is the essence of all living beings. The souls are innumerable. It has ability of knowing, desiring, and doing something. There are differences in the souls, as some are moral and some immoral. The soul has power to know the ultimate purpose or perfection, but *anava* obstructs the path or attaining to perfection. So when *anava* is overcome, *pasha* or *malu* is removed and perfection is attained by the soul. It is true that *kala* and *niyati* determine the results of the works, done by the individual souls. The souls are divided into three classes *vijnana-kala*, *pralayakala*, and *sakala*, according to the degree of freedom they have achieved. Works or acts performed by them, are classified into wrong acts, relatively right acts, commission and omission, right acts which are included in *charya*, *kriya* and *yoga* and acts or detachments which may be called unethical, ethical, super-ethical, and spiritual. Among the five acts, 'first three are performed respectively by those who regard the body, the soul and God as ultimate realities, and the last by those who have no distinction of realities and unrealities and who have almost reached the Goal'.<sup>2</sup> The law of *karma* operates in three distinct channels, but when the individual souls acquire knowledge about them they make themselves free.

Srikantha also advocates *Sivadvaitavada*, but his

<sup>2</sup> Vide, S. Shivapadasundarami: *The Sāiva School of Hinduism* (London, 1934), p. 113.

Saiva-siddhanta echoes the *vishistadvaitavada* of Sri Ramanuja. Srikantha calls the Brahman Sive or Parama-Siva who is qualified by the subtle conscious souls and unconscious matter (*chit* and *achit*). Appayadikshit (1600 A.D.) has written a sub-commentary, known as *Sivakramanidipika* where he has proved that *sivadvaitavada* is no other than *vishistadvaitavada* of Ramanuja. Really Srikantha's saiva-doctrine is similar to qualified non-dualistic doctrine, as maintained by Ramanuja, as Srikantha says that Siva is possessed of supreme bliss and infinite qualities. In fact Siva embraces all the objects, conscious and unconscious, and so He is the consummation of both self and the not-self—spirit and matter. In his book, *Sivadvaitanirnaya*. Appayadikshit has made this view point more clear.

Siva of Srikantha is called as *Sharva*, *Ishana* *Pashupati*, *Rudra*, *Mahadeva* and others. Siva is known as *Sivatatta* since He is devoid of all impurities (*malas*) or imperfections of empirical or phenomenal life. He is called the Brahman, because He is both of the world-appearance. Acharya Sankara also admits this theory, but Srikantha differs from Sankara for his qualified non-dualism. Sankara advocates the theory of pure non-dualism (*advaitavada*) which rejects the real existence of the world, whereas Srikantha admits the world-appearance as real, because world-appearance is an essential part of the Brahman, Siva.

The *Pratyabhijna* school of (Kashmir) Saivism has been represented by Vasugupta, Somananda, Utpaldeva, Abhinava gupta, Kshemaraja and others. Somananda says that Siva is always co-existent with Sakti, i.e. Sakti and Saktiman are non-different. Somananda is of the opinion that Siva is possessed of five powers and they are: power of consciousness, power of bliss, power of violation, power of knowledge and power of action i.e. powers of *chit*, *ananda*, *iccha* *jnana*, and *kriya*. He is both I-consciousness and It-consciousness (*aham* and *idam*). Kshemaraja admits this view, as according to him, Siva is the embodiment of *prakasha* and *vimarsha*. His *prakasha* or I-consciousness" is the transcendental delight in the experience of supreme 'I' in creating, preserving and destroying the universe. He is the ground (*adhisthana*) as well as the cause (*karana*).

Kshemaraja describes *Sivatattva* as the Parama-Siva who is embodiment of *iccha*, *jñana* and *kriya*. *Sivatattva* is the first vibration (*spandana*) of Parama-Siva, and that vibration is the cause of creation. *Sivatattva* is followed by *Saktitattva*, because *Saktitattva* is dynamic, whereas *Sivatattva* is static. Bhatta-Bhaskara, Yogiraja and others define *Saktitattva* as the powers of *jñana* and *iccha* of Parama-Siva. Somananda defines *Sadasivatattva* as the state assumed by Parama-Siva when his power of *jñana* predominates. He also defines *Ishvaratattva* as the state of Parama-Siva. Kshemaraja, Utpaldeva and others have explained *Sadasivatattva* and *Ishvaratattva* in a similar way. While explaining *Ishvaratattva*, Kshemaraja has defined *Suddhavidyatattva* which is the knowledge of identification of *aham*-consciousness and *idam*-consciousness, and from this it is known that *Suddha-vidyatattva* is non-different from spirit and matter. Utpaldeva has defined *Suddha-vidyatattva* as co-existence of *aham-idam*-consciousness. As in the *Upanishad* we find that the Brahman assumes the form of the manifold world-appearance—*'eko'ham bahusyam'*, so Parama-Siva assumes the form of the manifold universal and is identified with it. Kshemaraja has also defined *mayatattva* and has said that *maya* or *mayasakti* is Siva's knowledge of difference among the existents, although he is of the nature of consciousness. In fact, *maya* veils the light of knowledge of identity with one universal knowledge or consciousness.<sup>3</sup> *Mayatattva* is rectified when *Sivatattva* is realized. Somananda defines *mayatattva* as *lila* or sportive play of Siva. *Mayatattva* is the embodiment of *kanchuka*, *kala*, *raga*, *kala*, and *niyati*. Abhinavagupta has fully defined and described them. *Kunchuka* is the covering by which *maya* covers the light of Siva. Kshemaraja has explained in this connection *Purushatattva* and *Prakrititattva*. Besides, he has explained liberation (*mukti*) which is the remover of all bondages. He says that non-apprehension of non-difference (between Siva and Sakti) is bondage, whereas apprehension of non-difference is liberation. Abhinavagupta defines liberation

<sup>3</sup> Vide, Dr. J. N. Sinha: *Schools of Saivism* (1970), p. 11.

"is the destruction of false conceit of 'I' in its mind-body-complex, and manifestation of a soul's own powers characterised by freedom of its Atman". A liberated soul is released from the darkness of egoism and is awakened to the consciousness of its identity with Siva or Parama-Brahman. Then all *parabdha-karmas* are removed.

The complete liberation in Saivism contains seven stages of experience. The stages are no other than the evolution or attainment of different centres or levels of consciousness formed in the course of expression (*abhi-vyakti*). The names of the seven stages are: *sakala*, *pralayakala*, *vijnanakala*, *pramata*, *mantra*, *mantresvara*, and *mantra-mahesvara*, and after these seven stages, the Sadhaka attains to the state of Siva, which is the be-all and end-all *Saiva-sadhana*.

Now, this state of liberation or *Siva-sarupya* (*mukti*) differs in Northern and Southern Saivism. In Srikantha, this liberation 'always presupposes consciousness of a relation between *Pasu*, the finite consciousness, and Siva, the infinite consciousness. But Kashmere Saivism has not this relational consciousness in liberation, because the liberated soul in Kashmere Saivism perceives nothing besides itself in liberation. It is a quietus in its indeterminate being. Here the experienced joy (*anandam*) is the joy of eternal Silence which is no other than an integral existence without an effort of comparison and division.

This liberation is the goal of the human life. All the Acharyas of *Saivasiddhanta* say that liberation or *mukti* is the goal of life, and this liberation means liberation from *anava* (*mala*), liberation from *maya*, liberation from action, and then merging in love of God. The souls who are merged in the boundless love of God, are known as the *Jivanmuktas*. There are different classes of *Jivan* in this phenomenal life and are recognized as 'man and God in one, and are useful to men in both capacities'.

### *Epistemology of the Saiva School*

Epistemology of Saivism is similar to that of *vishistadvaita* philosophy of Ramanuja, as knowledge or conscious-

of Linga, and because the *Jiva* is no other than Siva limited by His Sakti, he makes himself again free from the binding and becomes one with Siva or Linga.

In the Veerasaiva school, the Lingayats consider *Bhakti* superior to Sakti. *Bhakti* is known as *upasana* or *bhajan*. *Bhakti* is also known as *Seva*, and through the medium of *Seva* or meditation or *upasana*, *Jivas* are able to realize their identity with Siva, the supreme Reality. The *Lingarchanachandrika* has explained different kinds of Linga, such as Bhava-Linga, Prana-Linga, Ista-Linga, Mahā-Linga, Prasad-Linga, Siva-Linga, Guru-Linga, Achara-Linga, etc. It has been said that Linga is Siva or Brahman, so Linga (Ghana-Linga) being the theological synonym of Siva-Prama-Brahman, His Sakti, *Vimarsha*, can never be separate from Him. And therefore, with Sakti the conception of Linga or Siva is incomplete, and by a spiritual yearning or *sadhana*, *Jiva* or individual soul attains eternal freedom or *mukti*.

## CHAPTER XXVII

### SRI RAMAKRISHNA SCHOOL

Sri Ramakrishna was a God-intoxicated man. He realized the absolute Brahman which is the divine consummation of both the indeterminate and transcendent Brahman and the determinate and immanent Brahman, i.e. the Brahman which assumes both the indeterminate (*nirguna*) and the determinate (*saguna*) aspects and at the same time transcends them both. Swami Abhedananda says that Sri Ramakrishna's mission is to proclaim the eternal and universal truth that though the Brahman is one and without a second (*ekam* and *advitiyam*), yet He assumes many aspects and that the same stupendous One is worshipped by different nations under different names and forms. "The present upheaval of the spiritual tide, the waves of which, traversing nearly half of the world, have touched the shores of America, was produced by the Christlike character and divine personality of Bhagavan Ramakrishna, revered and worshipped in India today as an ideal manifestation of the Divine glory".<sup>1</sup>

As Sri Ramakrishna realized the universal Truth and preached to the whole world his universal doctrine of *yata mata tata patha*, we find that the *isms* like *dvaita*, *vishistadvaita* and *advaita* are regarded as *alternative* faiths in relation to three kinds of spiritual *sadhana*, which lead the sincere seekers after Truth to one and the same Godconsciousness. Sri Ramakrishna has not asked us to synthesise all the different *isms* (*vadas*) and spiritual practices (*sadhanas*) into one, but has instructed all to follow any one of the *alternative* spiritual *sadhanas* to reach the ultimate goal. It is also found from the marginal headings given by Swami Abhedananda in the American edition of the *Memoirs or Gospel*, that Sri Ramakrishna has dealt with

<sup>1</sup> Vide, *Memoirs of Ramakrishna* (Published by the Ramakrishna Mission Vedanta Math, Calcutta).

the doctrines of *jnana*, *karma*, *yoga*, and *bhakti*, and has said that these are the *alternative* religious or spiritual practices, and are not antagonistic to one another, but are suitable and helpful to different Sadhakas of different angles of vision and different faiths and tastes for reaching one and the same destination or goal, which is realization of the absolute Brahman.

Now from the phenomenal standpoint Sri Ramakrishna has sometimes shown some differences between *jnana* and *vijnana*, between *jnana* and *bhakti*, between the indeterminate (*nirguna*) Brahman and the determinate (*saguna*) Brahman, etc. As for example, when he speaks about *jnana* and *vijnana*, he has pointed out a distinction between *jnana* as incomplete and general knowledge and *vijnana* as complete and special or universal knowledge, which can be termed the *vishesa-jnana* and the *samanya-jnana*, as defined by the Nyaya philosophy of India. While discussing *jnana* and *vijnana*, Sri Ramakrishna has said that *jnana* leads to *vijnana* or *vishesa* (special) *jnana*. He has cited an illustration of the roof of a house and the stairs (*chhad* and *shiri*). He has said that when we climb or reach the roof of a house by climbing the stairs, we ordinarily say that the roof is higher than the stairs, but, in truth, the materials with which the roof and the stairs are constructed, are the same, brick dust and lime (*surki* and *chun*). The staircase is here regarded as *jnana* and the roof of the house as *vijnana*, and though the roof appears as higher than the levels of the stairs, yet the materials of the two are one and the same. Similarly *jnana* ordinarily appears to be lower than, or inferior to, *vijnana* (*vishesa-jnana*), but essentially they are one and the same knowledge or consciousness, as an individual soul (*jiva*) ordinarily appears different from the Brahman, but, in essence, is non-different from the Brahman. Sankara has explained in his different writings that when one makes *vichara* of the *mahavakyas*, he realizes first in an individual way: *aham brahmasmi*, and then in a universal way: *sarvam khalvidam brahma*, which has been repeated in the *Isha Upanishad* as: *ishavasyam idam sarvam yat-kincha jagatyam jagat*. Here the word 'then' means 'simul-

taneously', without the least difference of time. And it is a rule or common practice that in the way or process of Divine realization, though realization does not involve any process or disciplinary method. being self-revealing (*svayam-prakasha*) and self-shining (*svyam-ijyoti*), yet individual consciousness (*vyashti* and *vishesa-jnana*), in *aham brahmasmi*, dawns first and then dawns universal one (*samasti* and *samanya-jnana*). From this it is evident that individual knowledge or consciousness is not different from universal knowledge or consciousness, as a spark of fire is not different from fire. Regarding *jnana* and *vijnana*, Sri Ramakrishna says: "*Jnana* is to know the *Atman* through the path of discrimination (*vichara*), e.g. 'not this, not this' (*neti neti*). When this discrimination leads to *samadhi*, the *Atman* is apprehended. But *vijnana* is complete knowledge or realization. Some heard of milk, some have seen it, but others have tasted it. So with God. Those who have heard of Him, are still in ignorance; those who have seen Him, are the *janis*, but those who have tasted or realized Him, are the *vijnanis*. After seeing God when one makes acquaintance with Him and realizes Him as the nearest and dearest of all, then that is *vijnana*. At first it is necessary to discriminate rejecting what is not, saying: 'not this, not this', e.g. God is not the element of Nature, He is not the senses or the sense powers, He is not this mind, not this intellect, not this egoism, but is beyond all the categories of Nature. To go to the roof, one must climb step by step, leaving one step after another. The staircase is the same as the roof. After reaching the roof, however, one can easily see that both the roof and the staircase are of the same material. The same infinite Brahman appears as the personal God, *jiva*, and the twenty-four categories of Nature". Now, though this illustration of Sri Ramakrishna seems to be somewhat different from the former one, yet it gives a clear idea of non-difference of *jnana* and *vijnana*.

Sri Ramakrishna admits the existence of an eternal Energy which is known as Sakti or Kali, the Divine power of the absolute Brahman. He says that when right knowledge or Divine realization manifests, then it is known or



felt that the eternal Energy or Sakti or Kali and the absolute Brahman (*suddha Brahman*) are inseparable. If you admit the existence of fire, how can you deny its burning power (*dahika sakti*), which is inseparable or non-different from fire? So one cannot think of fire without thinking of its burning power. Similarly, we cannot think of the rays of the sun without thinking of the sun itself. "Therefore no one can think of the Brahman as apart from Sakti. The eternal Energy is creating, preserving, and destroying everything and that Energy is called Kali, the Divine Mother". Sri Ramakrishna has further said that Kali is the Brahman, the Brahman is Kali, Kali and the Brahman are one and the same. "I call Him the Brahman when He is absolutely inactive, that is, when He neither creates, nor preserves, nor destroys the phenomena; but when He performs all such actions, I call Him Kali, the eternal Energy and the Divine Mother. So the absolute Brahman and the Divine Mother are one and the same being, the difference is in their names and forms (*nama-rupa*), just as the same substance water is called by different names in different languages like *jal*, *pani*, *aqua*, water, etc."

In fact, Sri Ramakrishna has not discarded any of the *isms* or doctrines, rather he has regarded them as different paths or ways to reach the same goal. He says: "The Advaita Vedantist discriminates by saying 'not this, not this' (*neti neti*), i.e. the absolute Brahman is not this, not that, not any finite object, not the individual soul, and not the external world. When, as the result of this kind of reasoning (*vichara*), the heart ceases to be moved by desires, when, in fact, the mind is merged in the state of superconsciousness, the absolute Brahman is reached or realized, which is one without a second (*ekameva dvitīyam*). One who has truly attained to the *Brahmajnana*, realizes that the Brahman, the Absolute, alone is real and the world is unreal and that all names and forms (*nama-rupa*) are like the unreal dreams. What the Brahman is, cannot be described by words of mouth, nor can one even say that He is personal. Such is the viewpoint of a non-dualist (*Advaitavadi*). Here Sri Ramakrishna has represen-

ted the correct view of Advaita Vedanta for the *Jnanis*.

Sri Ramakrishna has given different interpretations of the words, *jnana* and *vijnana*, or of *jnani* and *vijnani*. He has said that some have heard about milk, some have seen milk and some have tasted it. Among them those who have heard about and seen milk, are *jnanis*, and those, who have tasted milk, are *vijnanis*. Those who know that with the friction of two wooden sticks fire originates are *jnanis*, and those who cause the fire to originate by the friction of two wooden sticks and cook rice with the help of that fire and feed men with the cooked rice are *vijnanis*. Those who have heard about Vrindavana are *jnanis*, and those who have visited Vrindavana and have gathered personal experiences about Vrindavana are *vijnanis*. The *vishesa* (partial) experience is *jnana* and the *samanya* (total) experience is *vijnana*. Similarly, experience or knowledge about the manifold (*nana*) is *ajnana*, and experience or knowledge about one (*eka*) is *jnana*. Sankaracharya has also used the terms, *jnana* and *vijnana*, sometimes in the phenomenal sense and sometimes in the transcendental sense ; sometimes in common sense and sometimes in divine sense, in his different commentaries and writings.<sup>2</sup> But Sri Ramakrishna has given the true meaning or significance of *jnana* and *vijnana*, by forwarding the example of the stairs and the roof of a house of bricks.

Sri Ramakrishna has further explained the doctrine of the qualified non-dualism (*vishistadvaitavada*) for the Jnani-Bhaktas who consider the Brahman as sum total of *Isvara*, *jiva*, and the phenomena (*jagat*). The Jnani-Bhaktas maintain, says Sri Ramakrishna, that the Brahman is not to be considered as apart from the world (*jagat*) and the individual soul (*jiva*), but *Isvara*, *jiva*, and *jagat*—these three come from one, the three are one, and one is the three. “Let us take a bael-fruit. Let the shell, the seeds, and the gernel be kept separate. Now suppose someone wished to know the weight of the fruit. Surely it would not

<sup>2</sup> Vide, Swami Prainanananda: *Philosophy of Progress and Perfection* (Chapter on “Jnana and Vijnana”), pp. 173-188.

be sufficient to weigh the kernel alone. The shell, the seeds, and the kernel are all weighed with a view to getting the real weight of the Bael fruit. No doubt, we reason at the outset that the all-important thing is the kernel and not either the shell or the seeds. In the next place, we go on reasoning that the shell and the seeds belong to the same substance to which the kernel belongs". Here Sri Ramakrishna has truly represented the doctrine of *vishita-dvaita*, as maintained and explained by Ramanuja and his followers. Because Sri Ramakrishna fully knows that all men are not of the same taste and temperament, and so different faiths and spiritual practices are necessary for men of different tastes to reach the same goal.

Similarly Sri Ramakrishna has supported the faiths and doctrines of the *Dvaitavadins*, *Saktivadins*, *Yogins*, and others. While explaining the doctrine of the dualistic devotees and the lovers of personal God, he says that the *Dvaitavadins* do not consider this external world as an unreal dream, but they say that this world is the glory of God. The individual souls are absolutely different from the all-merciful God, and they reach God through His mercy. In like manner, Sri Ramakrishna has supported the disciplines and practices of the *Yogis* who seek to commune with the infinite Spirit, the *Paramatman*. He says: "His (Yogi's) object is to bring the finite human soul into communion with the infinite Spirit. He tries first to collect his mind which is scattered in the external world of senses and seeks to fix or concentrate it on the universal Spirit".

So Sri Ramakrishna believes that all religions and spiritual practices are true and all of them lead the sincere seekers after Truth to the abode of eternal peace and absolute freedom, and they differ only in their names and forms. Therefore, he instructs all neither to combine them into one, nor to synthesize them into one system, but to consider them as *alternative* paths or method so as to realize the same absolute *Atman* which is not limited by any definite religion, creed, and practice. Sri Ramakrishna says: "But all these various ideals (preached and reached by various religious faiths and practices) are of one and the same Reality or *Brahman*, the difference being only in the

names. It is the same Being whom men call by the name of the Absolute (Brahman), the universal Spirit, the impersonal God, or the personal God with divine attributes". Sri Ramakrishna's religion or philosophy breaths therefore a new trend of thought and a new spirit to bring a harmony among all nations of the world.

Vijoy Goswami said: "If the Brahman, the Absolute, be the Divine Mother, then is She with form or without form—"

Sri Ramakrishna: "The Absolute Brahman and the Divine Mother of the universe are one and the same. Where there is no activity of any kind that is the state of the Absolute Brahman, but where there is evolution and involution, there is the manifestation of the Divine Mother. When the water of the ocean is calm without a wave or ripple, it is like the state of the Absolute, when the water is in motion and with waves, it is the state of the Creative Energy or Divine Mother. So the Divine Mother is both with form (*sakara*) and without form (*nirakara*)."

"You have faith in the formless Divinity. Therefore, you can think of my Mother as formless. When you have faith in form, the Divine Mother will show you how She is. Then you will know that it is not that She is merely the Absolute Existence; she will come to you and speak to you. Have faith and you will get everything. If you have faith in the formless Divinity, you must make that faith as firm as a rock. But do not be dogmatic; you must never dogmatize about God. You must not say that He is like this and not like anything else. . . . The Absolute Brahman and the Divine Mother are one and the same"

It is a common practice of belief or faith that when the Absolute Brahman is conceived with any form or any attribute, we call it the determinate or *saguna* Brahman and when the Absolute Brahman is conceived as formless or attributeless, it is called the indeterminate or *nirguna* Brahman. So we find that the attributes like form and formlessness (*sakara* and *nirakara*) are the determinative principles that make God the Absolute or the Absolute Brahman, as *saguna* or *nirguna*, and immanent or transcendent (*visvagata* or *visvatita*).

Now, there are different meanings or interpretations of categories, *nirakara* (formless) and *nirguna* (attributeless). The Advaitavadins say that *nirakara* or formlessness means that from which all forms evolved: '*nirgata akarah yasyam*'. So the *nirakara* Brahman means that the Brahman is the source or fountain-head of all forms, i.e. all forms come from the Brahman. But Acharya Ramanuja and his followers hold a different meaning. They interpret *nirakara* as that which has no definite form: "*nir-nasti nirdistah akarah yasya*", and that means the *nirakara* Brahman takes or assumes any form it likes. Some others again interpret *nirakara* as that which has no definite sense (*indriya*) and which does not exist in a definite place, but as it is all-pervading, it is possessed of many senses and exists at many places. But the Advaitavadins do not admit this kind of interpretation, nor do they admit the interpretation as given by the qualified non-dualists (i.e. by Ramanuja and his followers), but they say that as the quality or category is a limiting adjunct (*upadhi*), it limits the unlimited Brahman, if it is used to qualify the Brahman. So any kind of quality or category cannot be imagined of the immutable and unique secondless Brahman, because if we do that then the secondless Brahman will fall short of its essence (*svarupa*). The Brahman may assume different forms and different qualities, but the strict logic of the Advaitavadins all assumptions will appear as false or unreal.

Here Sri Ramakrishna differs from the Advaitavadins. Sri Ramakrishna says that the secondless Brahman can take many forms and many qualities for its sportive play (*lila*). The Brahman can either take forms and qualities, and for this acceptance or rejection, its pure and real essence is not lost or affected. The Brahman, in reality, is both transcendent and immanent and can manifest itself as two orders of Reality, but for that manifestation the Brahman in itself remains the same all the time.

Again, according to Sri Ramakrishna, the individual soul and the phenomenal world (*jiva* and *jagat*) are no other than the Absolute (*shuddha* Brahman). Sri Ramakrishna holds that the *two orders* of Reality are one and the same, they differ only in their names and forms. As for

example. Sri Ramakrishna says: "Brahman, the Absolute, is with the individual souls and the phenomenal world. First, when a person is discriminating by saying, 'not this, not this' (*neti neti*), he leaves the individual ego and the phenomenal world, and then after reaching the Absolute when he returns he realizes that the Absolute appears as the phenomenal world. In a wood-apple (*Bael* fruit) there are seeds, pulp, and the shell. When I take the pulp, I leave out the seeds and the shell, but when I speak of the weight of the wood-apple, the weight of the pulp alone would not be equal to it. You will have to weigh the pulp, the seeds, the shell and everything. That which has a the pulp has also seeds and a shell. Similarly, that which is the Absolute, has also all phenomena. Therefore, I take both the absolute Reality and the phenomenal reality. I do not discard the phenomenal world by calling it a dream, because then the weight will be less".

It has been said before that this illustration of harmony echoes the doctrine of qualified non-dualism (*vishista-dvaitavada*). But Sri Ramakrishna says: "I take both the absolute Reality and the phenomenal Reality. I do not discard one for the other". Now this idea of Sri Ramakrishna discloses the fact that the two *orders* of Reality, the absolute Reality and the phenomenal reality are, in essence, one and the same. They differ only in their names and forms or manifestations.

Sri Ramakrishna has further said about *nitya* and *lila*, i.e. about the Absolute and the relative phenomenal world: "If you accept *nitya*, you must also accept *lila*. It is the process of negation and affirmation. You realize *nitya* (the transcendental Reality, or the Absolute) by negating *lila* (the relative phenomenal world). Then you affirm *lila* seeing in it the manifestation of *nitya*. One attains this state after realizing Reality in both the aspects: Personal (*sakara*) and Impersonal (*nirakara*). The personal is the embodiment of *chit*, Consciousness and Bliss, and the Impersonal is the indivisible (*akhanda*) Sachchidananda". Further he says: "A man cannot live on the roof a long time. He comes down again. Those who realize the Brahman in *samadhi* come down also and find that it is

the Brahman that has become the universe and its living beings. In the musical scale there are the notes *sa, re, ga, ma, pa, dha*, and *ni*; but one cannot keep one's voice on 'ni' a long time. The ego does not vanish altogether. The man coming down from *samadhi* perceives that it is the Brahman that has become the ego, the universe, and all living beings. This is known as *vijnana*. \* \* \* The *vijnani* further sees that what is the Brahman, is the Bhagavan, the Personal God".

"He who is called the Brahman by the *jnanis*, is known as the *Atman* by the *Yogis* and as the *Bhagavan* by the *Bhaktas*. The same Brahman is called the priest, when worshipping in the temple, and the cook, when preparing a meal in the kitchen. The *jnani*, sticking to the path of knowledge, always reasons about the Reality, saying: 'not this, not this'. The Brahman is neither 'this' nor 'that'; It is neither the universe nor its living beings. Reasoning in this way, the mind becomes steady. Then it disappears and the aspirant goes into *samadhi*. This is the knowledge of the Brahman. It is the unwavering conviction of the *jnani* that the Brahman alone is real and the world illusory. All these names and forms are illusory, like a dream. What the Brahman is cannot be described. One cannot even say that the Brahman is a Person. This is the opinion of the *jnanis*, the followers of Vedanta philosophy."

The real contention of the sayings of Sri Ramakrishna lies in the fact that after Divine realization of the Absolute (*shuddha*) and indeterminate (*nirguna*) Brahman, one can stay some time in the transcendental *Brahma-bhava*, but for the welfare (*loka-samgrahartham*) of the world and the worldly people, he comes down to the phenomenal relative world which is known as the plane of nescience or *maya*.

So we find that though the determinate (*saguna*) Brahman, i.e. the Brahman with the world and the worldly beings and the indeterminate (*nirguna*) Brahman apparently appear as different, yet, in reality, the two orders of reality are one and the same. In fact, the real contention of Sri Ramakrishna's sayings is that the absolute Brahman (*nitya*), which transcends even the categories of deter-

minateness and indeterminateness (*sagunatva* and *nirgun-tva*), appears also as the cause of creation or manifestation (*lila*), the orders of reality, the phenomenal and the transcendental, being non-different.