

THE EXPOSITOR
(ATTHASĀLINĪ)



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
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TRANSLATION SERIES, No. 8
(EXTRA SUBSCRIPTION)

THE EXPOSITOR

(ATTHASĀLINĪ)

BUDDHAGHOSA'S
COMMENTARY ON THE DHAMMASANGAṆĪ
THE FIRST BOOK OF THE ABHI-
DHAMMA PIṬAKA

VOL. I.

TRANSLATED BY

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सत्यमेव जयते

EDITORIAL NOTE

It is now fully four years since the translation of this important Commentary was begun by Mr. Maung Tin, the representative of the Pali Text Society in Burma. Obstacles confronted him at the commencement, and many difficulties along the way. With a training and a diploma got at Calcutta University, and a proficiency in Pali, Burmese, and English, as well as in Sanskrit and Prakrit, he was anxious to prove himself in the field, yet so lacking in competent labourers, of the ancient classical literature adopted by his native land. Workers in other lands warned him off successively from making more accessible two or three notable works as well as the *Atthasālinī*, but on this work, not yet begun elsewhere, he took his stand, and during the last year of menace at sea the typescript came over piecemeal in safety. As to the many difficulties in the work itself, there was the lamentable need of revision in the PTS edition of the text, and the many obscurities and elliptical clauses (occurring amid a good deal of unnecessary redundancy) in Buddhaghosa's style. I do not say, nor would the translator claim, that the result is everywhere satisfactory. But we judge that we have made more possible, by this pioneer effort, the production of a really good translation in the future. It is no light effort, all who know the text will agree, for a man to have accomplished the pioneer translation of such a work into a foreign tongue. We should look around for long to find an Englishman capable of such a task. The translator is hoping soon to renew university study at Oxford, and I trust that there and thereafter much good work in Pali literature from his pen will come to aid our knowledge.

Of the *Atthasālinī* or *Atṭhasālinī* itself I have had my say elsewhere. The many interesting psychological disquisitions

in its pages I have also tried to deal with elsewhere, always feeling sorely the need of such a translation as is given below. Here I will only say that the title literally rendered—'abounding in meaning' or (for *attha* has many 'meanings') matter, or profit, etc.—baffled us and 'Expositor' (it should be *Expositrix*)¹ is a makeshift for which I plead guilty. And I add one more comment.

He has made allusion to terms, in my own 'prentice work on the text (of which this work is the Commentary), the Englishing of which I have since agreed to modify. He has himself altered other terms, and that is quite as it should be. If I ever revise for reprint that now exhausted edition, I shall have other such details to alter. On the word *celanā*: volition, I have already commented in the Compendium of Philosophy, p. 238, n. 3. Another term of great importance in Buddhist thought, and for the translator very elusive, is *rūpa*.

On this term another equally instructive note by Mr. Aung should also be studied (*op. cit.* pp. 271-3). We have followed him in not rendering *rūpa* by 'form.' 'Shape' or 'form' is no doubt the popular and the more archaic sense. If you make a 'likeness,' say a clay model of any person or thing, you would call it his or its *rūpa*. And the primeval factors employed by the creative Brahman in peopling the earth were called 'name' and 'shape' or 'form' (*nāmarūpa*).² But for the specialisation required in Abhidhamma these renderings are a little unwieldy. This may be seen more clearly by quoting from the following pages three sentences. '*Rūpa* is that which changes its state' (p. 69). 'The *rūpa* comes into the avenue of the mind-door' (p. 96). 'He develops the path for rebirth in the sphere of *rūpa*' (p. 216). It is fairly clear that no one English word would fit all three cases. They deal, taken in order, with (a) something essentially plastic and mutable as distinct from a relatively constant and rigid factor—the 'name' or, according to the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, mind and

¹ However, the translator would none of her!

² Cf. hereon 'Gestalt' in *Die Weltanschauung der Brāhmaṇa-Texte*, Göttingen, 1919, pp. 102 f., 114, by Hermann Oldenberg—the last contribution, I believe, to our Indological knowledge, by this great scholar whose loss to such studies it will be hard to make good.

Nibbāna¹; (b) that which the organ of sight is said to see²; (c) a world of intelligent beings that is, for some not obvious reason, called *rūpa*, but which is often called the world of brahmās. Hence we have rendered *rūpa* in (a) by 'matter' or 'material quality'; in (b) by 'visible object' ('sight' being applicable equally to organ and object of sight and therefore ambiguous); in (c) by 'sphere' (or realm) of attenuated matter.'

It is in (c) that we really feel the deprivation of the term 'form.' And although I am responsible for the clumsy periphrasis which the translator has been good enough to put up with, I am inclined to think that Pali translators will either revert to 'form,' or keep to the very adaptable word *rūpa*, *rūpalōka*. or use the nearly equivalent term 'Brahmā world.'

To the contradictory *a-rūpa* (p. 267) may be far more easily fitted our terms 'immaterial,' 'incorporeal.' Mental factors are often divided off from corporeal factors by the adjective *arūpino*. And albeit no denizen of any heaven classed as *arūpa* is recorded as having assumed corporeal shape to visit the *rūpalōka* or the lower kāma-worlds (which include the next world and the earth), yet that world was in Buddhist tradition a real Somewhere, described in terms of abstract thought. The world of Form, of the Formless, might still stand, as before, to signify these two departments of the Universe of Being, deriving, for the reader at least, what dignity they may from their capital letters.

But why the clumsy periphrasis 'of attenuated matter' ? Well, if neither 'form,' nor *rūpa* be approved, it is evident that neither 'matter,' nor 'visible object' is a more suitable term. *Rūpalōka*, whatever else it mean, does not, in this case, mean a world where matter or material shapes are its typical and preponderant content. Even the denizens—the devas (they are, of course, not 'gods' in any Western sense)—of the world next 'above' earth are shown as less subservient to matter than

¹ See *B.P.E.*, p. 341 f.

² We see directly only extended colour. We see symbolically, by suggestion or inference, much else that we have learned by touch.

we are. They can by an effort of volition transport themselves, mind and body, to this earth and back without inconvenience. But, to appear in that deva-world, a denizen of the 'higher' Rūpa (or Brahmā) world is represented as investing himself at will with a body of 'grosser' material qualities than those that make up his Rūpa-body.¹ This was therefore of a more sublimated, refined, subtle nature. The matter of it was attenuated in density. That this seems to be a Buddhist tradition taught in Burma may be seen from a letter recently received from the translator—I regret that absence on a holiday prevented him from quoting any authority.

'The lower sixteen out of the twenty brahmā worlds are called *rūpa* worlds. And the brahmās of these sixteen worlds are called *rūpāvacarā*,² because they are in worlds where *rūpa* arises. They have *rūpa*, but to say that they are so called because of their *rūpa* would not be a correct interpretation, grammatically speaking. Brahmās, it is true, are endowed with *rūpa*, but not with all the twenty-eight forms of *rūpa* characterizing beings of the *kāmaloka* (or *kāmāvacara*). They are without the *rūpa*'s (the material qualities) of femininity, masculinity, the sentient organisms of smell, taste, and touch. And though they are endowed with the elements of extension, heat, and mobility, they differ, even in this respect, from beings of the *kāmaloka*. For instance, a human body is either a present resisting solid, or it is absent. The bodies of brahmās are not so. Cut one with a knife and no harm is done. It is like cutting a flame. Generally speaking, the *rūpa* of brahmās is very refined or sublime, sublimated or, as you render it, attenuated, as distinguished from [the *kāmaloka* inhabitants on the one hand, and] the *arūpa* or spirit brahmās on the other. Their senses of sight and hearing are highly developed. Theirs it is to own the super-sensitive telepathic faculties entitled *dibbacakkhu*, *dibbasota*.³

In giving no authority for this doubtless hoary Abhidhamma tradition, Mr. Tin leaves me to conclude that *rūpaloka* is so called as a division of the *brahmāloka*. This world by his

¹ *Dialogues* ii. 244, 264.

² Denizens of the Rūpa sphere.

³ *Dibba*=*deva*. Usually rendered heavenly or celestial eye and ear.

account is four-fifths *rūpāvacara*, and one-fifth *arūpāvacara*. And that these four-fifths have been distinguished as *rūpa* has nothing to do, comparatively speaking, with the fact or nature of the *rūpa* in the humbler spheres of the earth or the purgatories, or the *sagga*, the next 'bright world' of the better folk who have passed (temporarily) from earth. I note that he uses the word *brahmās* with a more widely distributed denotation than is the case in either the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* (§ 1283), or the *Compendium of Philosophy* (p. 142), or *Childers's Dictionary* (s.v. *Sattaloko*). But this is, after all, of little importance. For the tradition he cites, *brahmās* include all beings, some having a refined corporeality, some being pure spirit, who have passed on either from the 'sagga' of the lower world beyond us, or, through eminent virtue, direct from earth-life.

Future translators will make their choice, as to a name for the former division, between 'world of form,' 'sphere, realm, of attenuated or subtle matter,' just 'Rūpa,' or some world better device. With the term we commend to them two reflections—one concerning the past, one the future. Whence and how did this Buddhist cosmology spring up, whereof we find the several spheres sporadically mentioned already in the *Nikāyas*,¹ partial classifications of them in the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*,² and full classification in medieval manuals—e.g., the *Compendium of Philosophy* (p. 142)? The other reflection, concerning the future—i.e., of human knowledge—is on the need of humanity, in its religion of to-morrow, of a cosmology, soberer and simpler than that built by the ancient mind of Buddhist India, to replace the vast mournful ignorance of the accredited religions of to-day concerning the other-where-ness of life, past, present, and future. It was only concerning the future of the Arahant that Gotama drew down the veil of his *Avyākata*—his 'things unrevealed'—because it was to no good purpose to seek to know.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

CHIPSTEAD, SURREY.

June, 1920.

¹ E.g., *Dialogues* ii. 39 f.; 280, 296; *Majjhima* i. 210; ii. 194; *Kindred Sayings* i. 48; *Pss. of the Sisters*, p. 100 f., etc.

² *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, § 1283; *Vibhaṅga*, last chapter.



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PREFACE

IN Burma, the *Atthasālinī*¹ is one of the best known works of Buddhaghosa. It is widely studied by student monks and is freely quoted by authors of *Abhidhamma* works. It is likely that a European reader, reading through the English translation now offered to the public, will not be favourable in his judgment. The plan of the work itself is enough to prejudice him, while a good knowledge of the cardinal doctrines of the Buddha and Buddhist philosophy is necessary, if Buddhaghosa is to be appreciated. And that is impossible for him unless he is eminently sympathetic towards Buddhist thought. In the present work it is not the aim of Buddhaghosa to expound any particular doctrine; he is only concerned with explaining the meanings of terms that occur in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*. In doing this he has freely scattered the gems of his thought at every opportunity, and has thus enhanced the value of the work. The word-definitions which may be very tedious (and sometimes pointless) to a Western scholar are all-important to the Buddhist student, who must know the meanings of conceptual terms before he can grasp ultimate truths. So one must wade through the word-definitions in this book before getting to the depths of its thought.

Abhidhamma studies have made such strides since Mrs. Rhys Davids translated the first *Abhidhamma* work—viz., *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* in 1900—that many of the psychological terms used by her in that translation have been altered by herself in other works in consultation with Mr. S. Z. Aung. I have availed myself of this improvement, and adopted in the present work such terms of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* translation

¹ Burmese scholars invariably spell *Atthasālinī*.

as have been approved of by these pioneers of Abhidhamma translation. I have indicated in footnotes other renderings used in that translation. In a few cases I have offered new meanings of my own.

I have nothing to add to what Mrs. Rhys Davids has said, in her Buddhist Psychological Ethics, about the Atthasālinī, its date and importance. But I take this opportunity of recording my appreciation of her scholarship that then enabled her, without aid from Burma, to draw upon the Atthasālinī for her suggestive footnotes. It is no small gain to Abhidhamma scholarship that the first English translator of the first of the Abhidhamma works and the leading Western authority on the subject should, after an interval of twenty years of progressive study, have edited and revised the present translation of the commentary.

The Atthasālinī, from the nature of its contents, is a difficult book to translate. I have therefore tried to be as literal as possible even to the extent of sometimes sacrificing style to clearness. In the course of the translation, I discovered many errors and omissions in the text edited for the Pali Text Society by Professor Edward Müller. I therefore based my translation on two Burmese texts, the one printed by the Sāsana-jotika Pitaka Press, Rangoon, 1913, and the other edited in the well-known Pyigyī-mandaing Press Series by Saya Pye, Aggamahāpaṇḍita. I have derived much help from the two Burmese translations of the Atthasālinī—namely, the Old Nissaya (MS. Bernard Free Library, Rangoon), by Ariyālaṅkāra of the early part of the eighteenth century, and the New Nissaya (printed at Kemmendine, Rangoon, in 1905), by Pyī Sadaw of the middle of the nineteenth century. I have also quoted the following Pali commentaries and sub-commentaries bearing on the Atthasālinī:

1. *Ṭīkā* or *Mūlatīkā*, by Ānanda of Ceylon.
2. *Anutīkā*, a sub-commentary on the *Mūlatīkā*, by Dhammapāla of Ceylon.
3. *Visuddhimagga Ṭīkā* (also called *Paramatthamañjūsā Ṭīkā* or *Mahātīkā*), by Dhammapāla of Ceylon.
4. *Sāratthadīpanī*, by Sāriputta of Ceylon.

5. *Atthasālinī Yojanā*, by Sirimaṅgala of Burma. Fourteenth century.

6. *Abhidhāna Tīkā*, by Minister Sirimahācaturaṅgabala of Burma. Fourteenth century.

7. *Maṇidīpa*, a sub-commentary on the *Mūlatīkā*, by Ariyavaṃsa of Burma. Fifteenth century.

8. *Vinayālaṅkāra*, by Tipiṭakālaṅkāra of Burma. Seventeenth century.

9. *Atthasālinī Gaṇṭhi(-pada)*, by Patamagyaw Aung Zan Hta Sayadaw. Eighteenth century.

The original MSS. of these works may be consulted at the Bernard Free Library, Rangoon. The first six have also been printed in Rangoon. I do not know whether the last three have ever been printed.


The quotations which I have made from them for the elucidation of the *Atthasālinī* will also serve to show the importance of studying the successive scholastic interpreters of a Pali text from the earliest times, that the value of the historical development of any doctrinal point may not be lost to us. Other quotations, which are purely of a lexicographical nature have been assigned, at the instance of Mrs. Rhys Davids, to an Appendix for the benefit of Pali students.¹

My thanks are due to Mr. Shwe Zan Aung, B.A., who was kind enough to go through my first draft translation as far as the end of the Discourse on 'Doors' (p. 140). And I tender my best thanks to Mrs. Rhys Davids, who first encouraged me to undertake this difficult work, for the rare courtesy she has shown me in a series of letters, embodying counsel and advice, criticisms and suggestions. Finally, my thanks are due to a kind friend who has helped me with the verse translations.

MAUNG TIN.

RANGOON COLLEGE,
May 4, 1920.

¹ A full general Index will appear with the second (and concluding) volume.



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- Udāna Comy.*

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CORRIGENDA. ETC.

- Page xi, line 17, transpose 'world' to follow 'realm' on preceding line.
- Page 6, note 3, read *Saṅgīṭisutta*.
- Page 11, line 15, read *Paṭṭhāna*.
- Page 11, note 1, read *I.e.*, of body . . .
- Page 16, read *Pāṭaliputta*.
- Page 17, omit the before *bandhujīvaka*.
- Page 21, note, read or facts, or . . .
- Page 24, read the prefix 'abhi' implies . . .
- Page 54, line 5, read *m-asukha*.
- Page 54, note 3, before 'The first' read *Vipākadhamma-dhammā*.
- Page 73, line 7, read The first [type of] moral thought.
- Page 75, line 18, read are dealt with.
- Page 78, last line but one, read for casual, causal.
- Page 83, line 18, read should thus be understood.
- Page 89, note, 'potential opportunity' in *Pali* is 'okāsa.'
- Page 93, line 3, read And this term 'thoroughly mixed with' (*samvatttha*) . . .
- Page 95, line 16, read for 'causes' (things), as above.
- Page 96, the last paragraph should begin with the preceding sentence : 'In the . . .
- Page 111, line 4, read 'by consciousness—that is not . . .'
- Page 113, line 9, read *phandana*.
- Page 118, *P.T.S. edition of Majjhima* reads *Potaliputta*.
- Page 118, line 29, add — after 'etc.'
- Page 156, note 4, read (*samādhippabbhārā*).
- Page 169, line 29, supply *v* in advantageous.
- Page 170, note 2, the reference number (2) should be transferred to 'clever in grasping the nature . . .'
- Page 175, note 3, So also *P.T.S. edition*. The *Burmese authorities* apparently read *niccala*.
- Page 217, line 14, 'develop,' and in line 15 'increase,' are in *Pali* both *vaḍḍhanti*.
- Page 217, last line, delete comma after preached.
- Page 237, line 26, read errors.
- Page 255, line 19, better perhaps to translate : It is said to be procedure in connection with the object . . .



सत्यमेव जयते

THE EXPOSITOR

(ATTILASALINĪ)

COMMENTARY ON THE DHAMMASAṄGAṆĪ
(COMPENDIUM OF PHENOMENA)

BY

BUDDHAGHOSA

INTRODUCTORY DISCOURSE

Honour be to that Blessed One, the Arahant, the Buddha
Supreme

*As on all beings his pity, rolled at will
The Sage's insight through all knowable things.
His heart by that world-pitying love inspired,
When, after the Twin Miracle,¹ he dwelt
At the high mansion of the Thirty-three,²
Throned—like the sun on Mount Yugandhara—
On Paṇḍukambala, his rocky seat,
Under the tree called Pāricchattaka,*

¹ See *Faṭṭisambhidāmagga*, i. 125 f.; *Jātaka*, i. 77, 88, 193.

² *Tidasālaye*. Lit., in the abode of the three-ten. *Tidasā*, frequently substituted, in verse, for the more usual *tāvatiṃsa* (e.g. *Therīg. ver.* 181; and in prose, *Mil.* 291), is explained by the *Abhidhānaṭīkā* as an elliptical form of *ti-tidasā* = *tāvatiṃsa*. This work sees an alternative explanation in *dasā* = *avattā*, divisions, namely, of life: birth, development, decay, or—according to the *Abhidhānappadīpikāsūci*—birth, being (*satta*), and destruction (*vināsa*), *dasā* being taken as *parimāṇā* (the three 'measures' of becoming).—*Tr.*

*He by that noble insight gave discourse
On the Abhidhamma to the spirits who came,
Led by his mother,¹ from the myriad worlds,
And compassed him about on every side.*

*I bow before the glorious Buddha's feet;
I reverence the Church, and the Good Law.
No evil falls on him who bends the knee
To those Three Jewels. That which the Spirit of spirits
Unto the spirits taught, he afterwards,
The Leader, told it all in form concise²
To Sāriputta Elder, when he waited on
The Sage at Anotatta lake.³ And what
The Elder heard, he brought to plains of earth
And taught it to the brethren. And they all
Remembered it. And when the Council met,
By the wise son of the Videhi Dame⁴
It was again rehearsed.*

*Being besought
By Buddhaghosa,⁵ bhikkhu pure in deed
And virtue, of subile insight without taint,
What Abhidhamma from the first hath meant
I shall expound, in many figures shown
And searched at all times by the greatly wise.
The ancient Commentary thereof was sung
By the first Council, Mahākassapa
Their leader, and later again by seers.
Mahinda brought it to the peerless isle,*

¹ Tradition in Burma makes her reborn as the devī Santussitā. The phrase *mātaram pamukham katvā* in line 11 may also be construed with the predicate, *sampavattayī*, thus: 'gave a discourse on the Abhidhamma, to the assembly of spirits, principally to his mother.'—*Tr.*

² *Desetrā nayato*, which may also mean, 'by way of showing the method.'—*Tr.*

³ A great lake located by tradition in the Himālayas. We have not traced this episode in any other work. Cf. *Vinaya Texts* i. 124.—*Ed.*

⁴ Or, 'the sage of wisdom or energy,' Ānanda the Thera. Cf. *Kindred Sayings*, p. 109, n. 1; 321.—*Ed.*

⁵ Not the Thera. author of this work. *Tr.*

*Ceylon, and in their tongue they wrote the book.*¹
 [2] *Rejecting from that ancient scroll the speech*
Of Tambapanni, I shall here inscribe
On the palmyra-leaf the faultless tongue
That disobeys no rule of holy script,
Illuminate the minds of those who dwell
In the Great Minster, suffering nor taint
*Nor base commixture of the heresies,*²
True meaning of the Abhidhamma show,
And satisfy the wise with chosen words
From expositions of the Sutta-lore.
In the Visuddhimagga I have told
The stations of religious exercise,
Right conduct, super-knowledge, insight true.
These therefore laying by, I shall declare
Precept by precept all the holy script.
Give ear obediently, while I expound
*The Abhidhamma-lore,*³ *for it is hard*
To hear such discourse as ye now may hear.

Herein what is meant by 'Abhidhamma'? That which exceeds and is distinguished from the Dhamma (the Suttas). The prefix 'Abhi,' like 'Ati,' is used in the sense of preponderance and distinction, as in such passages as, 'Severe pains overwhelm (*abhikkamantī*) me, brother; and do not abate',⁴ and 'of eminent (*abhikkantā*) beauty.'⁵ Again: 'Hence when many sunshades and flags are uplifted, the sunshade which excels the rest in size and is of distinguished colour and form is

¹ 450 years after the Parinibbāna, according to Burmese commentators; about 230 years, according to prevailing European computation.—*Tr.*

² *Nikāyantaraladdhi* = *nikāya*, a 'body' of people, + *antara*, different + *laddhi*, with the views. The *Maṇidīpa* says that the two other sects were the Abhayagirivāsī, and the Jetavanavāsī, dwellers at the Abhayagiri monastery, and the Jetavana monastery respectively. Some wrongly translate the expression as 'extreme views of the Nikāyas.'—*Tr.*

³ *Abhidhammakathāṃ* is short for *Abhidhamma-Aṭṭhakathāṃ*.—*Tr.*

⁴ *Saṃyutta* iv. 120.

⁵ *Id.* i. 1. etc.

called *atichattam*, 'the pre-eminent sunshade,' and the flag which is the largest and is replete with various distinguished paints and colours is called *atidhaja*, 'the pre-eminent flag.' And when many princes and gods are gathered together, the prince who is specially distinguished and surpasses others in birth, property, pomp, dominion, and other attainments is called *atirājakumāra*, 'the prince *par excellence*'; and the god who is specially distinguished and surpasses others in age, beauty, dominion, pomp, and other attainments is called *atideva*, or *abhideva*, 'the peerless god.' Similarly Brahmā is called *Atibrahmā*, 'the supreme Brahmā.' Even so this 'dhamma' is called Abhidhamma, because it excels and is distinguished by several qualities from the other Dhamma. In the Suttanta, the five 'aggregates' are classified partially and not fully. In the Abhidhamma they are classified fully by the methods of Suttanta-classification, Abhidhamma-classification, and catechism. Similarly with the twelve sense-organs, the eighteen elements, the Four Truths, the twenty-two controlling faculties, and the twelvefold Causal Genesis. [3] It is only in the *Indriya Vibhaṅga*¹ that there is no Suttanta-classification, and in the *Vibhaṅga on Causal Genesis*² the method of catechism is wanting. In the Suttantas the four Applications in Mindfulness are partially classified, not fully. But in the Abhidhamma they are classified in detail under the three methods. And the same with the Four Supreme Efforts, the Four Steps to Supernormal Potency, the Seven Factors of Wisdom, the Eight-fold Path, the Four Jhānas, the Four Infinitudes, the Five Precepts, the Four Analyses. Of these only in the *Sikkhāpada Vibhaṅga* is there no Suttanta-classification.³ In the Suttantas knowledge is partially classified, not fully. And so are the Corruptions (*kilesā*). But in the Abhidhamma there is a detailed classification of knowledge after the table of contents has been thus laid down: 'Under the unitary method the basis of knowledge is . . .'⁴ and so forth. Likewise the corruptions are classified in many ways

¹ *Vibh.* p. 122 f.

² *Ib.* p. 135 f.

³ *Ib.* p. 285 f.

Ib. p. 306 f.

beginning with the unitary method.¹ In the Suttantas cosmogony is partially classified, not fully; in the Abhidhamma by the threefold method it is classified fully.² Thus is it to be understood that the Abhidhamma exceeds and is distinguished from the Dhamma.

There is a consensus of opinion among teachers that the Abhidhamma is divided into seven books, viz., *Dhammasaṅgani*, *Vibhaṅga*, *Dhātukathā*, *Puggalapaiṇṇali*, *Kathāvatthu*, *Yamaka*, and *Paṭṭhāna*.

But the Viṇaya school³ say: 'Why bring in *Kathāvatthu*? Was it not settled by Tissa, Moggallā's son, two hundred and eighteen years after the Buddha's Parinibbāna? Hence it is [merely] the word of his disciples. Reject it.' [To whom we say:] 'Are there then only six books in the Abhidhamma?' 'I do not say so.' 'What do you say then?' 'Seven books.' 'How do you get the seven?' 'There is a book called *Mahādhammahadaya* (in the Great Commentary); with that I make the seven.' 'In the *Mahādhammahadaya* there is nothing which has not been said already in the *Dhammahadaya Vibhaṅga*.⁴ And the remaining catechetical section, which is peculiar to your *Mahādhammahadaya*, is not long enough to make up a treatise by itself. Hence it makes the seven only with the *Kathāvatthu*.' 'Nay, not with the *Kathāvatthu*. [4] There is the *Mahā-Dhātukathā*;⁵ with that I make the seven.' 'But there is nothing new in that either.'⁶ The remaining texts, peculiar to it, are not long enough to make up a treatise. Hence the *Kathāvatthu* makes the seventh.' When the Supreme Buddha, who taught us the seven treatises, came to the *Kathāvatthu*, he began with an eight-faced inquiry

¹ *Vibh.* 345 f.

² *Ib.* 404 f.

³ The Viṇaya-vādīs are explained by the *Maṇḍipā* to be the sectarians of Abhayagiri and Jetavana of the introductory verses.—*Tr.*

⁴ *Vibh.* p. 401 f.

⁵ Another book compiled in Ceylon. Hence it is uncanonical. The mal-editing in this dialogue in the P.T.S. ed. greatly obscures the meaning.—*Tr.*

⁶ Being repeated after such texts as *Dhammahadaya-vibhaṅga*, *Mahādhammahadaya*, *Dhātukathā*, and *Dhātuvibhaṅga* (*Majjh.* iii. 237).

into the theory of the person (or soul), in four questions each of two fivefold divisions¹ and laid down a table of contents in a text not quite as long as one recital, to be adopted in all the discourses: 'Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact? Yes. Is the person known in the same way as a real and ultimate fact is known? Nay, that cannot be. Acknowledge your refutation. Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact? Nay, it is not known. Is the person unknown in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known? Nay, it cannot be. Acknowledge your refutation. Is the person known *everywhere* in the sense of a real and ultimate fact? Or is it unknown? Is it known *always* in the sense of a real and ultimate fact? Or is it unknown? Is it known *in everything* in that sense, or is it unknown?'² Thus, showing the eight aspects and their respective refutations, the table of contents has been laid down³ by the Teacher.

Now when he laid down the table of contents he foresaw that, two hundred and eighteen years after his death, Tissa, Moggali's son, seated in the midst of one thousand bhikkhus, would elaborate the *Kathāvatthu* to the extent of the *Dīgha Nikāya*, bringing together five hundred orthodox and five hundred heterodox Suttas.

So Tissa, Moggali's son, expounded the book not by his own knowledge but according to the table of contents laid down, as well as by the method given, by the Teacher. Hence⁴ the entire book became the word of the Buddha. After which precedent? After the [5] *Madhupindika-suttanta*⁵ and others.⁶ In that Suttanta the Blessed one, after laying down heads of a discourse, ended thus: 'Bhikkhu, owing to such causes⁷

¹ See *Points of Controversy*, pp. 8-12.

² *Ib.* 1 f.

³ Construing *ṭhapitā* with *sa pan'esā* of paragraph 8.

⁴ *Iti* = *tasmā*. *Maṇidīpa*.

⁵ *Majjhima*, i. 108 f., expounded by Kaccāna.

⁶ Such as the *Subhasutta*, *Dīgha*, i. 204 f., expounded by Ānanda, and the *Saṅgītisutta*, *ib.* iii. 207 f., expounded by the Councillors.

⁷ *Nidānaṃ*, used in the plural sense of *kāraṇā*.

the factors of prolonged rebirth beset a man.¹ Here if there be nothing to be pleased withal, proud of, or assimilated, then it is the end of the latent bias of lust,' etc.—and then rose from his seat and entered the monastery. The bhikkhus, who received the doctrine, approached Mahākaccāna and questioned him as to the meaning of the heads laid down by the Buddha of the Ten Powers. The Elder, not replying direct to the question, said by way of paying homage to the Buddha: 'Sirs, a person desirous of and seeking pith should bear in mind this simile of pith—the Buddha is like the pith of a tree, his disciples are like the branches and leaves. For, Sirs, the Buddha, who knows all knowable things, discerns all discernible things,² is the eye of the world,³ the wisdom of the world,⁴ is like the constituents of wisdom⁵ to the world, is like the Ariyan Path⁶ to the world, is the speaker and originator of the Four Truths, the expounder of their meaning, the giver of the Deathless, the master of the Law, the Tathāgata.' After thus praising the Teacher he, at the repeated request of the bhikkhus, expounded in great detail the meaning of the heads of discourse laid down by the Buddha and sent them away saying: 'Sirs, if you are willing, approach the Buddha and ask him the meaning. And you should accept what he explains to you, so that if my explanation harmonizes with omniscience you should take it; if not, reject it.' They approached the Buddha and asked him. The Teacher, without referring to any (possibly) ill-spoken words of Kaccāna, raised his neck aloft like a golden drum and filling with breath his noble mouth, graceful as the full-blown lotus, emitted the Brahma voice,⁷ and saying, 'Well done, well done!' to the Elder,

¹ Craving, conceit, and wrong view are the three principles which prolong the evolutionary process of a being.—*Tr.*

² *Jāṇitū* and *passaṇi* may be taken in two ways; (a) as future passive participles—*Jāṇitabbam passitabbam*, as translated here—and (b) as present participles—*jāṇanto passanto*, in the sense of 'in knowing all things he knows, in seeing all things he sees.'—*Tr.*

³ Or, 'is the eye of wisdom.' ⁴ Or, 'is the embodiment of wisdom.'

⁵ *Dhamma* = *bodhipakkhiyadhammā*. Cf. *Compendium* 179, n. 1.

⁶ *Brahma* = *ariya magga*. *T'ikā*.

⁷ See *Dialogues of the Buddha* ii. 265.

added: ' Bhikkhus, learned is Mahākaccāna, profoundly wise is Mahākaccāna. If you had asked me the same question, I would have answered exactly as he has done.' Thus since the time when the Teacher gave his approval, the whole Suttanta became the word of the Buddha. And it is the same with the Suttas expounded by Ānanda and others.

Thus in teaching the seven books, when he came to the Kathāvatthu the Buddha laid down the table of contents in the way mentioned above. [6] In doing so he foresaw that two hundred and eighteen years after his death, Tissa, Moggallī's son, seated in the midst of one thousand bhikkhus, would elaborate the *Kathāvatthu* as is stated above. And Tissa, Moggallī's son, expounded the book not by his own knowledge but according to the table of contents laid down, as well as by the method given, by the Teacher. Hence the entire book became the word of the Buddha. Thus the Abhidhamma consists of seven books inclusive of the *Kathāvatthu*.

Now in the first of the seven books, the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, there are four divisions, viz., classification of consciousness, of matter, the summary, and the elucidation. In the classification of consciousness, there are eight classes of moral (states) arising in the sensuous universe, twelve classes of immoral (states), sixteen results of good, seven results of evil, eleven inoperatives;¹ five classes of moral states arising in the universe of (attenuated) matter, five results thereof, five corresponding inoperatives; four classes of moral states arising in the immaterial universe, four results thereof, four corresponding inoperatives, four transcendental states,² four results thereof: eighty-nine classes in all constituting the divisions of consciousness. It is also called the Chapter on states of consciousness. In extent of utterance, it exceeds six recitals,³ but is endless and immeasurable when expanded.

Next comes the classification of matter,⁴ otherwise known as the Chapter on Matter, in which matter is classified in detail

¹ *Kiriya*. ² *Lokuttara*. In *B.P.E.* 'higher ideal,' supramundane.

³ A 'recital' (*bhāṇavāra*) usually consists of 250 stanzas of thirty-two syllables, a stanza consisting of 4 feet of 8 syllables each.—*Tr.*

⁴ In *B.P.E.* 'form.'

after the table of contents, laid down under a unitary method, dual method and so on. In extent of utterance it exceeds two recitals, but is endless and immeasurable when expanded.

Next is a summary by way of roots, aggregates, doors, planes of existence, effect or meaning, cause or text, name, sex.

*It summarizes roots and aggregates,
And doors, planes of existence, meaning, text,
Name, sex—and therefore is called Summary.*

It is also called the Chapter on abstract categories.¹

In extent of utterance it is exactly three recitals, but is endless and immeasurable when expanded.

Next is a commentarial chapter ending with the couplet of the harmful (and the harmless), and explaining the meaning of the three Piṭakas, which constitute the Buddha's word. [7] Bhikkhus who cannot remember the numerical series in the Great Book have recourse to this section. In extent of utterance it occupies two recitals, but is endless and immeasurable when expanded.

Thus in extent of utterance the entire *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* exceeds thirteen recitals, but is endless and immeasurable when expanded. Such are

*The elements of Mind and Matter, and
The sum, the exposition of the whole—
Lore deep and subtle that the Buddha taught.*

Immediately following the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* is the *Vibhaṅga*, consisting of eighteen parts, viz., the classification of (mind and matter into) aggregates, sense-organs, elements, truths, controlling faculties, causal genesis, applications in mindfulness, supreme efforts, steps to supernormal potency, factors of wisdom, paths, jhānas, infinitudes, precepts, analyses, knowledge, the minor subjects and the essence of the Law. Of these, the aggregates are classified by the three methods: Suttanta-classification, Abhidhamma-classification, and catechism. In extent of utterance it occupies five recitals, but is endless and immeasurable when expanded. Next, the sense-

¹ *Nikkhepa*. In *B.P.E.* 'elimination.'

organs and others are classified also by the threefold method. Among them the classification of the sense-organs exceeds one recital in extent of utterance. The classification of the elements occupies two recitals. Likewise that of the Four [Facts or] Truths. There is no Suttanta method in the classification of the controlling faculties. In extent of utterance it exceeds one recital. The classification of the causal genesis occupies six recitals, but there is no catechism. The classification of the applications in mindfulness exceeds one recital. Likewise that of the supreme efforts, steps to supernormal potency, factors of wisdom and paths. The classification of the jhānas occupies two recitals; that of the infinitudes exceeds one. In the classification of the precepts there is no Suttanta method; in extent of utterance it exceeds one recital. [8] Likewise that of the analyses. That of knowledge is subdivided into ten parts. In extent of utterance it occupies three recitals. The classification of the minor subjects is also subdivided into ten parts. In extent of utterance it occupies three recitals. The classification of the 'heart of the Dhamma' is subdivided into three parts and exceeds two recitals in extent of utterance. But all are capable of endless and immeasurable expansion. Thus the *Vibhaṅga* in extent of utterance occupies thirty-five recitals, but when expanded it is endless and immeasurable.

Next comes the book named *Dhātukathā*, which comprises fourteen parts: (1) the grouped and the ungrouped, (2) the ungrouped by the ungrouped, (3) the grouped by the ungrouped, (4) the grouped by the grouped, (5) the ungrouped by the grouped, (6) the associated and the dissociated, (7) the dissociated by the associated, (8) the associated by the dissociated, (9) the associated by the associated, (10) the dissociated by the dissociated, (11) the associated and the dissociated by the grouped, (12) the grouped and the ungrouped by the associated, (13) the associated and the dissociated by the ungrouped, and (14) the grouped and the ungrouped by the dissociated. In extent of utterance it exceeds six recitals, but is endless and immeasurable when expanded.

Next comes the *Puggalapaññatti* under six heads: concepts

of aggregates, of sense-organs, of elements, of realities, of controlling faculties, of the person. In extent of utterance it exceeds five recitals, but is endless and immeasurable when expanded.

Next comes the *Kathāvatthu* bringing together one thousand Suttas: five hundred orthodox and five hundred heterodox. In extent of utterance, as rehearsed at the Councils and not as written now on palm-leaf, it was of the length of the *Dīgha Nikāya*, but it is endless and immeasurable when expanded.

Next comes the *Yamaka*, divided into ten parts: roots, aggregates, sense-organs, elements, truths, coefficients,¹ latent bias, consciousness, doctrine, and controlling faculties. [9] In extent of utterance it occupies one hundred and twenty recitals, but is endless and immeasurable when expanded.

Next comes the Great Book, otherwise called *Paṭṭhāna*, divided into twenty-four parts by way of relations, viz., of root-condition, of object, predominant principles, immediacy, direct immediacy, coexistence, reciprocity, dependence, sufficing condition, pre-existence, post-existence, repetition, kamma, result, nutriment, controlling faculties, jhāna, means, association, dissociation, existence, non-existence, abeyance, absence.

The following points in the *Paṭṭhāna* should be considered: The triplets of 'good,' etc., are twenty-two in number. 'Things (or mental properties) which are root-conditions, or not, down to harmful or harmless'; there are one hundred such couplets in all. 'States either partake of knowledge or not,' to 'are insight into destruction and insight into non-origination': these others are the forty-two Suttanta couplets. Of these the twenty-two triplets and the hundred couplets taught by the omniscient Buddha are the directly spoken words of the Conqueror and form the table of contents for the seven books.

Then whence arose the other forty-two couplets? By whom were they laid down and taught? They originated

¹ I.e., Body, speech, and thought. Breath is called *saṅkhāra* because it is accomplished by the body; initial and sustained applications of mind are called *saṅkhārā* because they are accomplished by speech; and the remaining mental coefficients are called *citta-saṅkhārā*.—Tr. Cf. *Majjhimo*, i. 301 (Vedalla-sutta).—Ed.

with Sāriputta, Generalissimo of the Law, having been laid down and taught by him. But he did not lay them down through his own self-evolved knowledge. They have been gathered from the *Eka-Nipāta* and *Duka-Nipāta* of the *Āṅguttara-Nikāya*, the *Saṅgīti* and *Dasuttarasuttantas* of the *Dīgha-Nikāya*, in order to help students of the Abhidhamma in their references to the Suttantas. These triplets and couplets are disposed of in one summarizing chapter. In the remaining chapters the Abhidhamma (proper) is expounded till the couplet of the 'harmful' (and the harmless) is reached.

The supreme Buddha taught in the way of right succession the *Tika-Paṭṭhāna*, based on the twenty-two triplets, and the *Duka-Paṭṭhāna*, based on the hundred couplets. He then taught the *Duka-tika-Paṭṭhāna*, taking the twenty-two triplets and inserting them among the hundred couplets.¹ Then again taking the hundred couplets and inserting them among the twenty-two triplets he taught the *Tika-duka-Paṭṭhāna*. [10] And inserting the triplets among the triplets he taught the *Tika-tika-Paṭṭhāna*. And inserting the couplets among the couplets he taught the *Duka-duka-Paṭṭhāna*. The text says: 'Celebrated and desirable are the Tika, Duka, Dukatika, Tikaduka, Tikatika, and Dukaduka. Profound are these six methods in the way of right succession.' In the converse Paṭṭhāna also the *Tika-Paṭṭhāna* is based on the twenty-two triplets.

The *Duka-Paṭṭhāna* is based on the hundred couplets. The *Dukatika-Paṭṭhāna* has been taught by inserting the twenty-two triplets among the hundred couplets; the *Tikaduka-Paṭṭhāna* by inserting the hundred couplets among the twenty-two triplets; the *Tikatika-Paṭṭhāna* by inserting the triplets among the triplets; the *Dukaduka-Paṭṭhāna* by inserting the couplets among the couplets. Thus in the converse order also the Paṭṭhāna is expounded in six ways. And so the text says: 'Celebrated and desirable are the Tika, Duka, Dukatika, Tikaduka, Tikatika, and Dukaduka. Profound are these six methods (of permutation to be understood)

¹ Combining the twenty-two triplets severally with each couplet.—Tr.

in the converse order.' Then again the same six ways have been shown in the combined method of right succession and converse order. Hence the text says: 'Celebrated and desirable are the Tika, Duka, Dukatika, Tikaduka, Tikatika, and Dukaduka. Profound are these six methods in the combined method of right succession and converse order.' Immediately after this the Buddha taught the same six ways in the combined method of the converse order and right succession. Hence the text says: 'Celebrated and desirable are the Tika, Duka, Dukatika, Tikaduka, Tikatika, and Dukatika. Profound are these six methods (of permutation to be understood) in the combined method of the converse order and right succession.' Thus six in the way of right succession, six in reverse order, six in the combined method of right succession and converse order, six in the combined method of the converse order and right succession—the twenty-four universal methods of *Paṭṭhāna* constitute the Great Book.

Now to understand the depth of the Abhidhamma, it must be understood that there are four oceans: the ocean of repeated births, the ocean of waters, the ocean of method, and the ocean of knowledge. Of these,

‘The unbroken line of organs, elements,
And aggregates—“*samsāra*” is its name.’

This is the ocean of repeated births. Inasmuch as the ultimate start in birth of these beings is not apparent—whether it was a hundred [11] or a thousand, or a hundred thousand years, or a hundred or a thousand or a hundred thousand cosmic periods ago prior to which they were not, or whether they were born in the time of a certain king or a certain Buddha—prior to which they were not, no limit can be set. ‘The ultimate starting-point, bhikkhus, of ignorance before which it did not exist, but after which it came into being is not revealed.’¹ In this way this ocean of repeated births is of an unknown beginning.

And there is the great ocean known as the ocean of waters. It is eighty-four yojanas in depth. There is no measurement

¹ *Anguttara*, v. 113. Cf. *Samyutta Nikāya*, ii 178; iii 149.

of the waters as hundred, thousand, ten thousand, or hundred thousand tins. It is incalculable and immeasurable. Verily it is only reckoned as a mass of water. This is the ocean of waters.

Which is the ocean of method? The three Piṭakas, the word of the Buddha. For in reflecting upon the two Piṭakas, infinite rapturous joy arises in the sons of clansmen who are faithful, abundantly believing and endowed with superior knowledge. Which are the two? The Vinaya and the Abhidhamma. Infinite rapturous joy arises in those bhikkhus who learn the Vinaya text and reflect that it is the province of the Buddhas, and not of others, to lay down the rule for each fault or transgression according to its gravity.

Infinite rapturous joy also arises in the brethren when reflecting on implications of things supernormal, of colours and of good conduct.¹

Again the bhikkhus, who study the Abhidhamma, experience infinite rapturous joy in reflecting. As though grouping the multitude of stars in the sky (into constellations), the Teacher taught things mental and material, dividing them into various parts and portions—things subtle and abstruse such as the unique² content of aggregates, sense-organs, elements, controlling faculties, powers, factors of wisdom, kamma and its result; and the distinction between mind and matter. Consider this story of such an experience. The Elder Mahā-gatigamiyatissa [12] crossed over to the opposite shore of India with the intention of paying homage to the Wisdom Tree. Seated on the upper deck of the boat he looked at the great ocean; but neither the thither nor the hither shore appeared to his vision. There appeared only the great ocean, strewn with foam thrown off by the breaking of the billows, and looking like a sheet of silver spread out on a bed of jasmine flowers. He thought to himself: which is more extraordinary

¹ See *Uttarimanussadhammasikkhāpadaṃ*, *Sukkavisatṭhi sikkhāpadaṃ*, and *Sāñcaritasikkhāpadaṃ*. *Vin.* iii. 92, 113, 139.—*Tr.*

² 'Antaram' here can only mean 'unique.' *Tikā*. Cf. Childers's *Dict. s.v.* 'peculiarity,' etc.—*Tr.*

—the heaving of the ocean waves, or the basis of the method of the twenty-four divisions in the Great Book? Then the limits of the great ocean became apparent to him. Indeed, he thought to himself, this ocean is limited, below by the earth, above by the sky, on one side by the mountain encircling the world-system, and on the other by the seashore. But the limits of the universal *Paṭṭhāna* are not apparent. And abundant rapture arose in him, as he reflected on the subtle and abstruse Law. Arresting his rapture and increasing his insight even while he was seated, he threw off all the corruptions, and being established in the topmost Fruition which is Arahantship, he exulted in this song of ecstasy:

*He is¹ the true disciple of the Sage
Who sees, like a bright jewel in his hand,
Root-causes, from which all becoming is—
Lore deep and hard to know, which the Great Sage
Intuited, and all² in order taught.³*

This is the ocean of method.

Which is the ocean of knowledge? Omniscience. It is not possible to distinguish the (different) oceans of repeated births, of waters, and of method except by omniscience.

¹ Read *atthema* = *atthi eva*. सत्यमेव जयते

² *Nikhilena*. If taken as an adjective qualifying the Sage, this word would mean 'free from the five *khilas*.'—*Tr.*

³ This translation follows the *Ṭikā*. Other ways of translation are:

'There is the profound and abstruse *Paṭṭhāna* taught in due order by the Great Sage free from the five "thorns," after intuiting the causal relations of things. And a disciple penetrates it even as one sees a material thing in the palm of one's hand'—*Pṛi Sadaw*. 'The Great Sage by his intuition has completely taught in due order things of the present in relation to causes such as condition, and there is the universal *Paṭṭhāna*, profound and very difficult to understand. The disciple penetrates it as easily as one sees a material thing in the palm of one's hand'—*M ṇidīpa*.

'There are the causal relations completely taught by the Great Sage in due order by his intuition. These causal relations of conditioned things of the present, profound and very difficult to understand, the Buddha's disciple sees as easily as a material thing in the palm of his hand'—*Gaṇṭhipada*.

Hence omniscience is called the ocean of knowledge. Of these four oceans that of method is here intended; for omniscient Buddhas penetrate it.¹ And our Blessed One, seated at the foot of the Wisdom Tree, penetrated it and thought: 'To this has my vision pierced! lo, even to this Law have I reached, who seeking and inquiring for more than a hundred thousand ages, for over four incalculable periods, here seated in this cross-legged posture (as on a throne) have expelled every conceivable corruption.' And he sat on the 'throne' for yet seven days, reflecting on the Law he had penetrated. Then after those seven days, he rose from the throne and stood gazing at it for seven days without blinking his eyes, thinking, 'On this throne I have indeed attained omniscience.' Hence this doubt occurred to the gods: 'Surely to-day Siddhattha [13] must still have something to accomplish, for he has not abandoned attachment to the throne.' The Teacher, knowing their doubt, in order to quiet it, rose immediately into the sky and displayed the Twin Miracle. The miracle performed at the throne under the Wisdom Tree and that performed at the assembly of his relatives and that performed at the assembly of the citizens of Pāṭaliputta² were all the same as the Twin Miracle performed at the foot of the white mango-tree in the garden of Kaṇḍa. Thus having displayed the Twin Miracle he descended from the sky and for seven days walked to and fro between the throne and the place where he had stood.

Now not even on a single day during the interval of twenty-one days were rays emitted from the Teacher's body. During the fourth week he sat in a jewel house in the north-west direction. The jewel house here does not mean a house made of the seven jewels but the place where he contemplated the seven books. And while he contemplated the contents of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, his body did not emit rays; and similarly

¹ *Sāvaka's* (disciples or 'hearers') knew it only through the Buddha's preaching.—*Tr.*

² The *Gaṇṭhipada* reads Pādhiyaputta. Since the miracle was performed for the subjugation of this ascetic at an assembly composed of the citizens of Pāṭaliputta, either reading is right.—*Tr.*

with the contemplation of the next five books. But when, coming to the Great Book, he began to contemplate the twenty-four universal causal relations of condition, of presentation, and so on, his omniscience certainly found its opportunity therein. For as the great fish Timiratipiṅgala finds room only in the great ocean eighty-four thousand yojanas in depth, so his omniscience truly finds room only in the Great Book. Rays of six colours—indigo, golden, red, white, tawny, and dazzling—issued from the Teacher's body, as he was contemplating the subtle and abstruse Law by his omniscience which had found such opportunity. The indigo rays issued from his hair and the blue portions of his eyes. Owing to them the surface of the sky appeared as though besprinkled with collyrium powder, or covered with flax and blue lotus-flowers, or like a jewelled fan swaying to and fro, or a piece of dark cloth fully spread out. The golden rays issued from his skin and the golden portions of his eyes. [14] Owing to them the different quarters of the globe shone as though besprinkled with some golden liquid, or overlaid with sheets of gold, or bestrewn with saffron powder and baubinia-flowers. The red rays issued from his flesh and blood and the red portions of his eyes. Owing to them the quarters of the globe were coloured as though painted with red-lead powder, or besprinkled with the liquid of molten lac, or wrapped round with red blankets, or bestrewn with the shoe-flower, the sea-coral, and the *bandhujīvaka* flowers. The white rays issued from his bones, teeth, and the white portions of his eyes. Owing to them the quarters of the globe were bright as though overflowing with streams of milk poured out of silver pots, or overspread with a canopy of silver plates, or like a silver fan swaying to and fro, or as though well covered with such flowers as the wild jasmine, water-lily, chaste flower, jasmine, and coffee-wort. The tawny and dazzling rays issued from the different parts of his body. Thus the six-coloured rays came forth and caught the great mass of earth. The great earth, having a thickness of two hundred and forty thousand yojanas, appeared like a burnished lump

of gold. The rays penetrated the earth and caught the water below. The water which supports the earth and has a depth of four hundred and eighty thousand yojanas appeared like gold dust poured out of golden jars. They penetrated the water and caught the atmosphere which, nine hundred and sixty thousand yojanas in thickness, appeared like well-erected columns of gold. Penetrating the atmosphere, they sprang forth into the open space beyond. Going upwards they caught the abodes of the four Regents of the world. Penetrating these, they caught the Tāvātimsa, and thence the Yāma, thence the Tusita, thence the Nimmānarati, thence the Paranimmita-vasavatti spheres, and thence the nine Brahmā worlds, thence the Vehapphala, thence the five Pure Abodes, and thence the four Āruppa heavens. Having penetrated the last of these, they sprang into the open space across to the infinite world-systems. In so many of these places, there was no light in the moon, nor in the sun, nor in the host of stars, nowhere was there lustre, neither in the parks, nor in the mansions, nor in the wish-yielding tree, nor in the bodies and ornaments of the gods. Even Great Brahmā, able to diffuse light throughout a billion world-systems, [15] became like a glow-worm at sunrise. There appeared only the mere outline of the moon, the sun, the host of stars, and the parks, mansions, and the wish-yielding tree of the gods. So much space was flooded by the Buddha's rays. Such power is not the potency of resolve nor of culture. But the blood of the Lord of the world became clear as he contemplated such a subtle and abstruse Law. Likewise the physical basis of his thought, and his complexion. The element of colour, produced by the caloric order, born of the mind, steadily established itself with a radius of eighty cubits. In this way, he contemplated for a whole week.

How wide is the Law, contemplated for seven nights and seven days? It is infinite and immeasurable. This, of course, refers to the discourse as thought out in the mind. And it should not be said that the Teacher was unable to finish preaching in a hundred or a thousand or ten thousand years the Law mentally worked out in a week. For subse-

quently the Tathāgata, seated in the midst of the gods from the ten thousand world-systems, at the Paṇḍukambala stone at the foot of the Pāricchattaka tree in Tāvātimsa, making his mother his chief witness, taught the Law, passing from one theme to another¹ in a hundred, a thousand, and a hundred thousand divisions. And infinite and immeasurable was the discourse, which went on ceaselessly for three months with the velocity of a waterfall, or streams of water issuing from water-pots turned mouth downwards. For a speech of the Buddha when thanking his host for entertainment, if elaborated a little, may reach the length of a Dīgha or Majjhima discourse. And a discourse given after a meal to the host of assembled people reaches the length of a discourse in the two great Nikāyas, *Saṃyutta* and *Anguttara*. Why should it be so? Because the Buddhas are but slightly occupied with the business of maintaining life, the lips close well, the mouth opens lightly,² the tongue is soft, the voice is sweet, the delivery of words is quick.³ Hence the Law, preached in such a short time, is of the length stated;⁴ when it was preached for three months it must have been infinite and immeasurable.

The Elder Ānanda was indeed of wide experience, a student of the Three Piṭakas, and could learn, recite and preach, as he stood, one thousand five hundred stanzas or sixty thousand feet, as easily as though he were gathering creepers and flowers. That was the Elder's single course of exposition. None but the Buddha was able to teach, or attain the distinction of teaching this Elder the actual text, word by word. Even a disciple of such surpassing mindfulness, intelligence [16] and fortitude would not be able to finish learning in a thousand years the sermons preached by the Teacher in three months in the way mentioned above.⁵

But how did the Tathāgata, preaching continuously for three months, sustain the body, which is the issue of grasping

¹ Or, 'special or unique themes.' Cf. p. 14, n. 2.

² Or, 'is well adjusted.' *Mukhādānam . mukhavivaraṇam . Tikā.*

³ Uttering 128 words to one of a worldling.

⁴ I.e., equal to the Dīgha and Majjhima Nikāyas.

⁵ Cf. *Pss. of the Brethren*, p. 351.

and depends on material food ? By nourishing it with food.¹ Now each particular interval of time is well marked, well divided and well observed by the Buddhas. Accordingly the Blessed One, in preaching the doctrine in the world of men, looked at the time. He noted that it was the time for going his begging rounds. So he created a Buddha after his own image and thus determined: 'Let this created Buddha hold the robe, the bowl, speak and assume his appearance in such and such a way; let him preach so much of the doctrine.' Then the (true) Buddha took his own bowl and robe and went to Anotatta Lake. The gods offered him a tooth-stick made of Nāga creepers. He used it, bathed in the lake, and stood on the top of the Maṇosilā rock. He put on the well-dyed undergarment and the robe, took the bowl made of blue stone and presented by the four Regents of the world, and went to Uttarakuru. Gathering alms thence he sat on the shore of Anotatta Lake, partook of his meal, and went to a sandalwood forest for the midday rest. Sāriputta, generalissimo of the Law, went there, served the Supreme Buddha, and sat aside. Then to him the Teacher gave the method saying, 'Sāriputta, so much doctrine has been shown.' Thus the giving of the method was to the chief disciple, who was endowed with analytical knowledge, as though the Buddha stood on the edge of the shore and pointed out the ocean with his open hand. To the Elder also the doctrine taught by the Blessed One in hundreds and thousands of methods became very clear. At what time did he, after his midday rest, take up (his bowl and robe) and go to Tāvatiṃsa to preach the Law ? He went about the time of showing the Law to the clansmen residents of Sāvattthī who had arrived. Which (spirits) knew of his going (to the world of men) or arrival at Tāvatiṃsa, after showing the Law, and which knew it not ? Spirits of greater power knew it; spirits of lesser power knew it not. Why did not these know it ? Because there was no difference between the Supreme Buddha and the created Buddha as regards their rays, voices, or words.

¹ Or, 'by relaxing the stiffened muscles and thus equalizing the four postures, walking, sitting, standing, and lying down.' *Ariyālaṅkāra's Nissaya*.

Now Sāriputta, having learnt the Law taught (by the Teacher) preached it to five hundred bhikkhus, his own pupils. The following is their connection with the past. [17] They, so it is said, were born as bats in the time of the Buddha Kassapa. Hanging from (the roof of) a cave, they heard the voice of two bhikkhus reciting the Abhidhamma and grasped a general idea that it was the Law, being unable to distinguish the good from the bad. They passed away with only the general idea suggested by the voice and were reborn in the world of gods. They dwelt there during a whole interval between the death of one Buddha and the appearance of the next, and in the time of this Buddha were reborn as men. Being convinced by the Twin Miracle, they renounced the world in the presence of the Elder who, having learnt the Law taught by the Teacher, preached it to them. Their acquirement of the seven books was simultaneous with the conclusion of the Abhidhamma teaching of the Buddha.

The textual order of the Abhidhamma originated with Sāriputta; the numerical series in the Great Book was also determined by him. In this way the Elder, without spoiling the unique doctrine, laid down the numerical series in order to make it easy to learn, remember, study and teach the Law. Such being the case, was the Elder the very first to understand the Abhidhamma? Nay, it was the Supreme Buddha who first understood the Abhidhamma. For he, seated on the throne under the Wisdom Tree, penetrated it and became the Buddha and, while seated for seven days in one position on the throne, uttered this song of ecstasy:

*Lo ! when appear true doctrines¹ to the saint
Zealous and thoughtful, all his doubts dissolve ;
He knows that all Becoming is through Cause.*

*Lo ! when appear true doctrines to the saint
Zealous and thoughtful, all his doubts dissolve ;
He knows the demolition of all Cause.*

¹ *Dhammā*. These may mean the four truths, facts, or the 37 factors of enlightenment. *Dhammapāla, Comy. on Udāna*.

*Lo ! when appear true doctrines to the saint
Zealous and thoughtful, all his doubts dissolve;
And he is as a light unto the world,
Having annihilated Māra's hosts,
Even as the sun illuminates the sky,
Having dispelled the darkness of the night.¹*

These were the first words of the Buddha.

[18] But the students of the Dhammapada say that the following were the first words spoken by the Buddha:

*Long I endured the circles of rebirth,
Seeking but finding not the architect.
Rebirth continual is continual pain.
But now have I espied thee, architect !
Behold, thou shalt not build the house again.
Broke are thy beams, thy pinnacle destroyed.
Now to Nibbāna² has my mind attained
And now in me all craving is destroyed.³*

The words spoken at the time of the Parinibbāna by the Buddha while lying down between the two Sāl-trees were his last:

‘Hearken now, bhikkhus, I tell you: Conditioned things are subject to decay; work out your salvation with diligence.’⁴

The good Law pointing to the Deathless and taught (by the Buddha) for forty-five years between these two events, as though he was wreathing a garland of flowers or composing a string of jewel beads, forms his middle sayings. Altogether they form three Piṭakas, five Nikāyas, nine Aṅgas, and eighty-four thousand Khandhas. How so ? The entire words of the

¹ *Vinaya Texts* i. 18; also translated in *Points of Controversy* 118. Cf. *Comp.*, p. 179.

² *Visaṅkhāra*.

³ *Dhp.* ver. 154; *Pss. of the Brethren* ver. 184, which ends differently. In the Introduction to the Jātaka stories, the verses are said to have been uttered by all the Buddhas when they attained omniscience under their Bodhi-tree. Cf. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Birthstories*, 103 f.—*Ed.*

⁴ *Dialogues* ii. 173.

Buddha are divided by way of Piṭaka into three parts: the Vinaya, Sutta and Abhidhamma. Herein both the Pātimokkhas (Bhikkhu and Bhikkhunī) and the two Vibhaṅgas (Bhikkhu and Bhikkhunī), the twenty-two Khandhakas, the sixteen Parivāras, constitute the Vinaya Piṭaka.

The collection of thirty-four suttas beginning with the *Brahmajāla sutta* forms the *Dīgha Nikāya*; the collection of one hundred and fifty-two suttas beginning with the *Mūlapariyāya sutta* forms the *Majjhima Nikāya*; the collection of seven thousand seven hundred and sixty-two suttas beginning with the *Oghatarāṇa sutta* forms the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*; the collection of nine thousand five hundred and fifty-seven suttas beginning with the *Cittapariyādāna sutta* forms the *Anguttara Nikāya*. Fifteen different treatises¹ to wit, *Khuddakapāṭha*, *Dhammapada*, *Udāna*, *Itivuttaka*, *Suttanipāta*, *Vimānavatthu*, *Petavatthu*, *Theragāthā-Therīgāthā*, *Jātaka*, *Niddesa*, *Paṭisambhidā*, *Apadāna*, *Buddhavaṃsa*, and *Cariyūpīṭaka* form the *Khuddaka Nikāya*. All these constitute the Sutta Piṭaka.

The seven books beginning with *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* form the Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

[19] Herein—

*Because it shows precepts and principles,
And governs both the body and the tongue,
Therefore men call this Scripture Vinaya,
For so is Vinaya interpreted.*

By 'principles' in this verse are meant the methods of the fivefold Pātimokkha ordinance, of the seven classes of offence beginning with the Pārājika of the Mātikā and of the Vibhaṅga. By 'precepts' are meant the methods of the additional enactments, resulting in the strengthening or the relaxing of the observance of original ordinances. It also regulates the body and the tongue by restraining them from transgression. Therefore on account of its principles and precepts and its regulation of the body and the tongue, it is called Vinaya.

¹ Cf. p. 32.

Hence it has been said to facilitate the study of the word-definition:

*Because it shows precepts and principles,
And governs both the body and the tongue,
Therefore men call this Scripture Vinaya,
For so is Vinaya interpreted.*

Further:

*This Scripture shows, expresses, fructifies,
Yields, guards the Good, and is unto the wise
A plumb-line; therefore Sutta¹ is its name.*

For it shows what is good for the good of self and others. It is well expressed to suit the wishes of the audience. It has been said that it fructifies the Good, as crops fructify their fruit; that it yields the Good as a cow yields milk; and that it well protects and guards the Good. It is a measure to the wise as the plumb-line is to carpenters. And just as flowers strung together are not scattered nor destroyed, so the Good strung together by it does not perish. Hence it has been said, to facilitate the study of the word-definition:

*This Scripture shows, expresses, fructifies,
Yields, guards the Good, and is unto the wise
A plumb-line; therefore Sutta is its name.*

The word-definition of Abhidhamma has been explained. But here is another:

*Because this book shows things that suffer growth,
Of proper attributes, to be revered,
Well-differentiated, and of worth
Surpassing, Abhidhamma is its name.*

[20] For the prefix, 'ābhi,' implies growth, proper attributes, reverence, clear differentiation, and surpassing worth. Thus in such sentences as, 'Sir, severe pains *grow* in me;' ² it expresses growth. In such sentences as, 'Those are *remarkable*' ³ and

¹ Sutta, a string or thread.

² Cf. p. 3.

³ Abhiññātā.

characterized¹ nights,' it expresses proper attributes. In such sentences as, 'king of kings² and conqueror of men,' it expresses reverence. In such sentences as, 'He is able to master the *Abhidhamma* and *Abhivinaya*,'³ it expresses differentiation; the sentence, that is to say, means, 'He is able to master the Dhamma and the Vinaya without confusing either with the other.' In such phrases as, 'with *surpassing*⁴ beauty,' it expresses worth. In the sentence, 'He develops the means for rebirth in the Rūpa-world,'⁵ he lives diffusing one quarter of the globe with thoughts of love,⁶ things capable of growth are referred to. In such phrases as, 'visible object, audible object,' things of proper attributes are referred to, because they are characterized as objects, etc. And things to be revered are referred to in such phrases as, 'things pertaining to students, things pertaining to adepts, and things transcendental' In such phrases as, 'this is touch, that is feeling, etc.,' things distinguishable as to their nature are referred to. And things of surpassing worth are referred to in such phrases as, 'states sublime, states immeasurable, states incomparable.' Hence it has been said to facilitate the study of the word-definition :

Because this book shows things that suffer growth, . . . etc.

The term 'Piṭaka' has a common meaning:

By 'Piṭaka' the learned signify

'Study' and 'basket'—with which word compound

These—Sutta, Abhidhamma, Vinaya.

'Piṭaka' is used in the sense of 'study' in such sentences as, 'Let us not [value doctrines] by proficiency⁷ in the Piṭaka.'

And it is used in the sense of a 'basket' in such sentences as, 'as if a man were to take a spade and basket and go. . . .'⁸

¹ Abhiṭakḥhitā.

² Rājābh-rājā. *Sutta-Nipāta*, ver. 553.

⁴ Abhikkanta. Cf. *Samyutta* i. 1, etc.

⁶ *Digha* i. 250, etc.

⁸ *Majjhima* i. 127.

³ *Vin.* i. 64.

⁵ *Dhs.* § 160.

⁷ *A.* i. 189.

Wherefore,

*By 'Piṭaka' the learned signify
'Study' and 'basket'—with which word compound
These—Sutta, Abhidhamma, Vinaya.'*

Thus 'Vinaya' forms a compound with 'Piṭaka' in its two senses and is called Vinaya-Piṭaka, because of its being at once a study and a basket of meaning. So also do 'Sutta-Piṭaka,' [21] and 'Abhidhamma-Piṭaka.' And having thus understood them, in order again to understand the various aspects of the three Piṭakas,

*In them, when need is, let the several kinds
Of sermon, teaching, discourse be explained:
And the profundity of precept-lore
And passion-purging laws. What each attains
In these three studies, how he may succeed,
Where in he fails, let this too be explained.*

To explain and elucidate we add: The three Piṭakas are respectively spoken of as teachings of authority, of popular philosophy, and of metaphysical truths; or as instruction according to misconduct, according to circumstance, and according to states; or again, as discourses of trivial or serious restraint, of the refutation of heretical views, and of the distinction between mind and matter. And herein the Vinaya-Piṭaka, taught generally with authority by the Blessed One who was fit to give authority, is said to be a teaching of authority; the Sutta-Piṭaka, taught generally concerning popular ethics by the Blessed One, who was skilled in popular ethics, is called teachings of popular philosophy; and the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka, taught generally concerning things in their ultimate sense by the Blessed One, who was skilled in ultimate truths, is called teaching in ultimate truths.

Likewise, the first, *i.e.*, Vinaya, instructs grave offenders according to their respective misdeeds, and is called instruction given concerning such: the second, *i.e.*, Sutta-Piṭaka, is adapted to various wishes, latent tendencies, traits of character,

resolutions, and is called instruction adapted to circumstance; and the third, i.e., Abhidhamma-Piṭaka, instructs, according to states, those persons who imagine a self in the ultimate sense in mere collocations of things, saying, 'This is I; that is mine,' and is called instruction given in accordance with states.

Similarly, the first is called a discourse of restraint and control, because therein are given discourses on grave or trivial restraint as opposed to transgression. 'Restraint and control' mean restraint big and small, like acts big and small; fruits big and small.¹ The second is called a discourse on the refutation of heretical views, because therein is unrolled the coil of the sixty-two heresies.² The third is called a discourse on the distinction between mind and matter, because therein is discourse of that distinction in its ethical connection, etc.

And in the three Piṭakas, the threefold riddance and the fourfold profundity are to be understood: morality treated specially in the Vinaya-Piṭaka is the unique training in virtue; consciousness treated specially in the Suttanta-Piṭaka is the unique training in higher mental training; philosophy treated specially in the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka is the unique training in higher or metaphysical understanding. In the Vinaya-Piṭaka [22] the riddance of transgression due to the corruptions is meant, because morality is opposed to transgressions; in the Suttanta-Piṭaka the riddance of the tyranny of the corruptions is meant, because concentration of thought is inimical to such tyranny; in the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka the riddance of latent bias is meant because understanding is opposed to it. In the first Piṭaka there is a temporary riddance of the corruptions (by means of various factors of morality); in the others their riddance is of the nature of discarding and extirpating by the Path. In the first Piṭaka the riddance is of the corruption of misconduct; in the others it is of the corruption of craving and wrong views. And in each of them, the fourfold profundity,

¹ 'Big' restraint includes the Pārājika's and Saṅghādisesa's of the Vinaya (vol. iii.); the rest are 'small.'—*Tr.*

² See *Dialogues* i., first Suttanta.

viz., of the doctrine, of the meaning, of the exposition, and of intuition, should be understood.

Herein 'doctrine' (*dhamma*) means the text; 'meaning' (*attha*) the sense of the text; 'exposition' (*desanā*) the verbal preaching of the text which has been borne in mind; and 'penetration' (*paṭivedha*) is the understanding of the text and its meaning as they really are. And in these three Piṭakas, inasmuch as it is difficult for the poor in understanding to comprehend or obtain a firm footing in these four things—just as it is difficult for hares and other small creatures to enter or obtain a firm footing in the great ocean—they are said to be profound. Thus in each Piṭaka the fourfold profundity should be understood.¹ Or again: 'Doctrine' means root-condition; for it has been said² that 'knowledge of a cause or condition is the analysis of doctrine.'³ 'Meaning' is the result of a condition; for it has been said that knowledge of the result of a condition is the analysis of meaning. 'Exposition' means statement* in the sense of verbal expression of the doctrine as it is, or it means a discourse given in the way of right succession or reverse order, in abstract or in detail, etc.

Penetration⁴ means comprehending⁵ It is either worldly or transcendental. It penetrates, by way of object and without confusion, into causes according to their effects, into effects according to their causes, into concepts according to circumstances giving rise to such notions. It also implies the irreversibility of the respective characteristics of such and such things (as the five aggregates and Nibbāna), taught in this or that Piṭaka.⁶ Now the meaning of such causes and effects

¹ The *Anuśikā* adds, that 'dhamma' is the original arrangement of words (*saddappabandho*) to be studied and understood with the help of various meanings given to them; that 'desanā' is the subsequent preaching of those words for the understanding of others.

² *Vibhaṅga* 293.

³ Cf. Ledi, as quoted in *Points of Controversy* 380.

* *Abhilāpo*.

⁴ The literal meaning of *paṭivedha*. —*Ed.*

⁵ *Abhisamayō*. Cf. *Sam. Vā.* i. 32.

⁶ In the first sense, *paṭivedha* has been taken in the active sense. Here it is in the passive.

as things taught under various aspects in the Pitakas is presented to the intellect of the hearers. Next there is the exposition which elucidates that meaning of things taught under those aspects; then there is intuition, called irreversible penetration of things taught therein, or the irreversible nature of the respective characteristics of things. All this is difficult for the uncultured, who are not well supported by accumulated merit, to grasp or obtain a firm footing, as has been stated above. Thus far [23] this verse:—

*In them, when need is, let the several kinds
Of sermon, teaching, discourse be explained,
And the profundity of precept-lore
And passion-purging laws—*

has now been explained.

Herein three kinds of study of the three Pitakas should be considered: study after the manner of one catching a snake, study for the purpose of salvation, and study as of a treasurer. Of these, that study which is badly acquired out of a desire to be vexatious to others, etc.,¹ is like catching a snake. Concerning which it is said: 'Just as, bhikkhus, a person desirous of catching a snake goes out in search of one. He sees a big snake and catches it either by the body or the tail. And the snake turning back bites him on the hand, the arm, or any other part of the body big or small. On that account he dies or suffers pain approaching death. And why? Because, bhikkhus, of his bad catching of the snake. In the same way, bhikkhus, in the religion some good-for-nothing persons improperly study the doctrine in its various branches. Having studied the doctrine they do not intelligently consider the meaning of the text. And the meaning not being considered with understanding, those acquired doctrines do not lend themselves to close insight. These people study the doctrine for the purpose of annoying others or of freeing themselves from the criticism or scoffing of others.* For whatever Good right-

¹ Or, 'to free oneself from the oppression of others.'

* *Itivādappamokkha.*

mindful people study the doctrine, that Good these good-for-nothing people do not experience; and the doctrines being badly acquired are conducive to their disadvantage and misery for a long time. Wherefore? Because, bhikkhus, of their being badly acquired.¹ But that study, which is well acquired by one desirous of fulfilling a body of precepts, etc., and not for the sake of annoying others, is for the sake of salvation, concerning which it is said: 'The doctrines being well acquired conduce to advantage and happiness for a long time. Wherefore? Because, bhikkhus, of their being well acquired.'² Finally, the saint, who has acquired a complete knowledge of the aggregates, got rid of the corruptions, developed the Path, [24] penetrated the Fruition of Arahantship, realized the Truth of Cessation, and extinguished the intoxicants, studies merely for the purpose of preserving the tradition, and of guarding the lineage of the doctrine. This is the study of the treasurer.

The bhikkhu, who is well practised in the Vinaya, arrives, by fulfilling the precepts, at the three kinds of knowledge, which are fully treated of therein. The bhikkhu, who is well versed in the Suttas, arrives, by his attainment of concentration, at the six branches of super-knowledge, which are fully treated of therein. The bhikkhu, who is well cultivated in the Abhidhamma, arrives, by his attainment of understanding, at the four analyses, which are fully treated of therein. Thus the bhikkhu, who is well trained in the three Piṭakas, in due course arrives at the attainment of the three kinds of knowledge, the six branches of super-knowledge, and the four analyses. But the bhikkhu, who is ill trained in the Vinaya, imagines that there is no fault in the forbidden sensations of touch, because the touch of these is similar to that of blankets and cloaks, etc., which are pleasurable and are permitted by the Buddha. And it has been said:³ 'I know the doctrine taught

¹ Alagaddūpamā-sutta. *Majjhima*, i. 133 f.

² *Ib.*, 134.

³ *Majjhima*, i. 130. Ariyālaṅkāra says that Ariṭṭha, a heretic, in some lonely spot gave way to sense-indulgence and, not knowing the Vinaya, said that average men might also be Sotāpanna's, Sakadāgāmi's, or Anāgāmi's. and that Arahants might indulge in the pleasures of the senses.

by the Blessed One, namely, that certain things are inimical (to progress), but that they are incapable of doing any harm to one who uses them in certain ways.' Consequently the bhikkhu arrives at evil practices. The bhikkhu, who is ill trained in the Sutta, gets a wrong idea, not knowing the meaning of such passages as, 'There are, bhikkhus, four persons¹ in the world,' concerning which it has been said, 'Owing to his wrong ideas,² he accuses us, harms himself and produces much demerit.' Consequently he arrives at wrong views. The bhikkhu, who is ill trained in the Abhidhamma, makes his mind run to excess in metaphysical abstractions and thinks of the unthinkable. Consequently he gets mental distraction. For it has been said, 'Bhikkhus, there are four unthinkables, things that should not be thought of. Madness or vexation will be the portion of him who does so.'³ Thus the bhikkhu, who is ill trained in the three Piṭakas, in due course arrives at failure of different sorts, such as evil principles, wrong views, mental derangement.

So far the import of the verse

— *what each attains*
In these three studies, how he may succeed,
Wherein he fails, let this too be explained'

has been explained.

Thus the three Piṭakas by the knowledge of the scriptures in various ways are to be known as the Buddha's word.

[25] How are the five Nikāyas grouped? The entire words of the Buddha are divided into *Dīgha Nikāya*, *Majjhima Nikāya*, *Saṃyutta*, *Aṅguttara*, and *Khuddaka Nikāyas*.

¹ One who lives for his own good, one who lives for the good of others, one who lives neither for his own nor others' good, one who lives both for his own and others' good. *D.* iii. 232; *M.* i. 341; *A.* ii. 205. This is said by the Buddha as a conventional truth. Not knowing it in the ultimate sense he gets the wrong idea. Discussed in *Points of Controversy*, p. 16.—*Ed.*

² Or, 'owing to his wrong nature or conduct,' says the *Sāratthadīpanī*, which also reads *duggahitena dhammena*.

³ *A.* ii. 80.

Which of these is the *Dīgha Nikāya*? The collection of thirty-four suttas beginning with *Brahmajāla*, forming three divisions.

*Suttantas thirty and four in chapters three—
Dīgha Nikāya, first and longest book.*

But why is it called *Dīgha Nikāya*? Because it is a group and a location of long suttas, and a group or a location is called *Nikāya*. 'I do not see, bhikkhus, any other single group so varied as the animal group';¹ 'the abode of Poṇika princes, of Cikkhalika princes'²—these are examples showing the meaning of the term both in the religious and the secular senses. Thus in the remaining *Nikāyas* also should this definition be understood.

Which is the *Majjhima Nikāya*? The collection of one hundred and fifty-two suttas of medium length beginning with the *Mūlapariyāya-Sutta*, forming fifteen divisions.

*Seven score and twelve Suttantas in fifteen
Chapters the Majjhima Nikāya holds.*

Which is the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*? The seven thousand seven hundred and sixty-two suttas beginning with the *Oghatarāṇa*, and arranged as *Devatāsāmyutta*, etc.

*Seventy-seven hundred suttas, sixty-two
Suttantas, Saṃyutta Nikāya holds.*

Which is the *Anguttara Nikāya*? The nine thousand five hundred and fifty-seven suttas beginning with *Cūṭṭhāpāyādāna*, arranged by way of an increase of the parts by one at a time.

*Nine thousand and five hundred and fifty-seven,
These are the suttas in Anguttara.*

[26] Which is the *Khuddaka Nikāya*?³ The whole of the *Vinaya-Piṭaka*, *Abhidhamma-Piṭaka*, and the fourteen divisions, as shown above,—beginning with *Khuddakapāṭha*, *Dhammapada*, all the remaining words of the Buddha, excluding the Four *Nikāyas*.

¹ *Saṃyutta*, iii. 152.

² Not traced.

³ Cf. p. 23.

*Save Dīgha and the three Nikāyas named,
The rest of Buddha's word is Khuddaka.*

Thus as to Nikāyas there are five.

Which are the 'nine parts'? The entire *Sutta*, *Geyya*, *Veyyākaraṇa*, *Gāthā*, *Udāna*, *Itivuttaka*, *Jāṭaka*, *Abbhuta*, *Vedalla*.¹

Herein, the dual *Sutta-Vibhaṅga*, the *Niddesa*, the *Khandhakas*, and *Parivāra*, the *Maṅgalasutta*, *Ratanasutta*, *Nālakasutta*, *Tuvaṭakasutta* of the *Sutta-Nipāta*, and any other words of the Tathāgata bearing the name of *Sutta* should be regarded as *Sutta*. All the *Suttas* with verses should be understood as *Geyya*. In particular, all the chapters with verses in the *Samyutta-Nikāya* form *Geyya*. The entire *Abhidhamma-Piṭaka*, *Suttas* without verses and any other words of the Buddha not included in the eight parts should be understood as *Veyyākaraṇa*,² or exposition. *Dhammapada*, *Theragāthā*, *Therīgāthā*, those pieces in the *Sutta-Nipāta* not called *Sutta*, and entirely in verse should be known as *Gāthā*. Eighty-two *Suttantas* connected with verses due to knowledge and joy should be understood as *Udāna*.

One hundred and twelve *Suttantas* taught in this wise: 'Thus was it said by the Blessed One,' etc., should be understood as *Itivuttaka* (the 'Thus-said'). Five hundred and fifty birth-stories beginning with the *Apaṇṇaka* constitute the *Jāṭaka*. All *Suttantas* connected with wonderful and marvellous things spoken in this wise: 'There are, bhikkhus, four wonderful and marvellous things in Ānanda,'³ should be understood as *Abbhuta*. All *Suttantas* in the form of questions asked through repeated attainment of delight and understanding, such as the *Suttas*: *Cullavedalla*, *Mahāvedalla*, *Sam-māditthi*, *Sukkapāṇhā*, *Sanṅkhārabhājanīya*, *Mahāpunṇama*,⁴

¹ The doctrine as compiled (if not as written) literature is thus enumerated in the *Piṭakas*, e.g., *Majjhima* i. 133.—*Ed.*

² As *Geyya* means *Suttas* with verses and *Veyyākaraṇa* means *Suttas* without verses, there seems to be no need of a separate part as *Suttas*, which are neither. In point of fact, *Veyyākaraṇa* is applied to those *Suttas* containing questions and answers.—*Tr.*

³ *Aṅguttara* ii. 132.

⁴ *Majjhima* i. 299; 292; 46; *Dīgha* ii. 263; *Majjhima* iii. 99; 15.

etc., should be understood as *Vedalla*. Such are the nine parts.

Which are the eighty-four thousand units of text ?

[27] *Eighty-two thousand from the Blessed One,
Two thousand from the bhikkhu Sāriputta—
Eighty-four thousand dhammas have I learned.*¹

Thus the whole of the Buddha's word is composed of eighty-four thousand units of text. Of these, the Sutta containing one theme² forms one unit of text. Where a Sutta contains more than one theme, its units of texts are determined by the number of such themes. In verses each query or question asked forms a unit, and each answer forms another. In the Abhidhamma each trinal or dual classification, as well as each classification of conscious intervals, forms one unit of text. In the Vinaya there are subjects, tables of contents, classification of terms, offence, innocence, interim offence, and division into triplets, wherein each portion should be understood as a unit of text. Such is the division of the Doctrine into eighty-four thousand units of text.

Thus at the time of the Rehearsal at the First Council, held by the five hundred, the company of the self-controlled who recited under the presidency of Mahākassapa did so after previous determination: '[This is the Doctrine, this is the Vinaya];³ these are the first words, these the middle words, these the later words of the Buddha; this is the Vinaya-Pitaka, this the Suttanta-Pitaka, this the Abhidhamma-Pitaka, this the Dīgha Nikāya. . . . Khuddaka Nikāya; these the nine parts, to wit, the Suttas, etc.; these the eighty-four thousand units of text.' And not only this: the various literary expedients appearing in the three Piṭakas such as the lists of contents (*uddāna*), chapters (*vaḡga*), elisions (*peyyāla*), sections (*nīpāta*) of single, double subjects, etc., groups (*saṃyutta*), fifties (*paññāsa*)—all this having been arranged, was rehearsed in seven months. And at the

¹ Verse spoken by Ānanda to Gopaka Moggallāna. Cf. *Majjhima* iii. 7 f.

² *Anusandhika*. *Anusandhi* is a logical sequence of subjects.

³ Not in P.T.F. ed.—*Ed.*

conclusion of the Rehearsal the great earth quaked (up to the limits of the water) repeatedly, violently, with a vertical upheaval everywhere; and various wonders manifested themselves, as though giving congratulations with well-felt delight at the thought: 'The religion of the Buddha of the Ten Powers has thus, by the Elder Mahākassapa, been made capable of lasting a period of five thousand years.'

Thus as rehearsed at the Council, the Abhidhamma is a Piṭaka by Piṭaka-classification, Khuddaka-Nikāya by Nikāya-classification, [28] Veyyākaraṇa by Part-classification and constitutes two or three thousand units of text by the classification of textual units. One of those bhikkhus who studied the Abhidhamma once sat in the midst of bhikkhus who knew all the five Nikāyas,¹ and quoting the text (*sutta*) from the Abhidhamma taught the Doctrine thus: 'The aggregate of matter is unmoral; of the four (mental) aggregates some are moral, some immoral, and some unmoral. Ten sense-organs are unmoral; the (remaining) two sense-organs may be moral, immoral, or unmoral. Sixteen elements are unmoral; the (remaining) two elements may be moral, immoral, or unmoral. The Fact of the Origination of Ill is immoral; the Fact of the Path is moral; the Fact of Cessation is unmoral; the Fact of Ill may be moral, immoral, or unmoral. Ten controlling powers are unmoral; the controlling power of grief is immoral; the controlling power of (intellect which prompts and inspires us)—"I shall come to know the unknown"—is moral; four controlling powers may be moral or unmoral; six controlling powers may be moral, immoral or unmoral.'² A bhikkhu, seated there, asked, 'Preacher, you quote a long text as though you were going to encircle Mount Sineru; what text is it?' 'Abhidhamma text, brother.' 'Why do you quote the Abhidhamma text? Does it not behove you to quote other texts spoken by the Buddha?' (Preacher) 'Brother, by whom was the Abhidhamma taught?' 'Not by the Buddha.'

¹ Thus the *Tikā* interprets sabbasāmayikaparisaṃsāya. 'Sat in the fourfold assembly' according to the *Gaṇṭhipada*.

² *Vibhaṅga*, 62; 73; 90; 112; 125.

(Preacher) 'But did you, brother, study the Vinaya-Piṭaka?' 'No, brother, I did not.' (Preacher) 'Methinks, because you have not studied the Vinaya-Piṭaka, you say so in ignorance.' 'I have, indeed, brother, studied some Vinaya.' (Preacher) 'Then that has been badly acquired. You must have been seated at one end of the assembly and dozing. A person who leaves the world under such teachers as yourself to give the Refuge-formula, or a person who receives the full ordination under a chapter of such teachers as yourself, who have badly studied the Vinaya, does amiss. And why? Because of this badly "studying some Vinaya." For it has been said by the Buddha:¹ "If without any intention of reviling the Vinaya one were to instigate another, saying, Pray study the Suttas or Gāthās or Abhidhamma first and afterwards you will learn the Vinaya—there is no offence in him." (Again, in the Bhikkhunī Vibhaṅga:² "A bhikkhunī is guilty of a minor offence) if she questions on the Abhidhamma or Vinaya after getting permission (to question) on the Suttanta, or on the Suttanta or Vinaya after getting permission (to question) on the Abhidhamma, or on the Suttanta or Abhidhamma after getting permission (to question) on the Vinaya." But you do not know even that much.³ With so much refutation was the heretic put down. The *Mahāgosīṅga Sutta* is even a stronger authority (to show that the Abhidhamma is the Buddha's word). For therein when Sāriputta, the Generalissimo of the Law, approached the Teacher to inform him of the reciprocal questions and answers that took place between Mahāmoggallāna and himself, and told how the former had answered, (the Master said) [29] 'Brother Sāriputta, in the religion the talk of two bhikkhus on the Abhidhamma, each asking and answering the other without faltering, is in accord with the Dhamma. Now such a bhikkhu, brother Sāriputta, might enhance the beauty of the Gosīṅga Sāla Forest.'⁴ The Teacher, far from saying that bhikkhus, who knew Abhidhamma, were outside his

¹ Vin. iv. 144.

² Vin. iv. 344.

³ Similarly, implies the preacher, there is no offence in me when I say you would do wrong to get ordained.—*Tr.* ⁴ *Majjhima*, i. 218.

religion, lifted his drum-like neck and filling (with breath) his mouth, fraught as the full-moon with blessings, emitted his godlike voice congratulating Moggallāna thus: 'Well done, well done, Sīriputta! One should answer rightly as Moggallāna has done; Moggallāna is indeed a preacher of the Dhamma.' And tradition has it that those bhikkhus only who know Abhidhamma are true preachers of the Dhamma; the rest, though they speak on the Dhamma, are not preachers thereof. And why? They, in speaking on the Dhamma, confuse the different kinds of Kamma and of its results, the distinction between mind and matter, and the different kinds of states. The students of Abhidhamma do not thus get confused; hence a bhikkhu who knows Abhidhamma, whether he preaches the Dhamma or not, will be able to answer questions whenever asked. He alone, therefore, is a true preacher of the Dhamma. To this the Teacher referred when he approvingly said, 'Moggallāna has well replied to questions.' He who prohibits (the teaching of) Abhidhamma gives a blow to the Wheel of the Conqueror, denies omniscience, subverts the Teacher's knowledge full of confidence, deceives the audience, obstructs the path of the Ariyas, manifests himself as advocating one¹ of the eighteen causes of dissension in the Order, is capable of doing acts for which the doer is liable to be excommunicated, or admonished,² or scorned (by the Order), and should be dismissed after the particular act of excommunication, admonition, or scorn, and reduced to living on scraps of food.

But if the heretic should say, had Abhidhamma been taught by the Buddha, there would have been an introduction prefatory to it, just as in many thousands of the Suttas the preface generally runs as, 'One day the Blessed One was staying in Rājagaha,' etc., he should be contradicted thus: 'The *Jātaka*, *Suttanipāta*, *Dhammapada*, and so on, have no

¹ *Bhedakāraṇatthu*, viz.: showing what has been spoken by the Buddha as not spoken. The eighteen are given in *Vinaya Texts* iii. 266, § 2.—*Tr.*

² See *Vin.* ii 7 (*Vin. Texts* iii. 343): the Nissayakamma administered to Seyyasaka.

such introductions, and yet they were spoken by the Buddha.¹ Furthermore he should be told, 'O wise one, this Abhidhamma is the province of the Buddhas, not of others; the descent of the Buddhas, their birth, their attainment of perfect wisdom, their turning of the Wheel of the Law, [30] their performance of the Twin Miracle, their visit to the devas,² their preaching in the deva-world, and their descent therefrom are all manifest. It would be unreasonable to steal the Treasure-elephant, or horse of the universal Monarch and yoke it to a cart and drive about, or the Treasure-Wheel and fix it to a hay cart and drive about, or to use the Treasure-jewel capable of shedding light to the distance of a yojana by putting it in a cotton basket—and why? Because they are royal property. Even so Abhidhamma is not the province of others; it is the province of the Buddhas only. Such a discourse as the Abhidhamma can be taught by them only; for their descent is manifest . . . likewise their return from the deva-world. There is, O wise one, no need for an introduction to Abhidhamma.' When this is so stated, the heterodox opponent would be unable to adduce an illustration in support of his cause.

The Elder Tissabhūti, resident at the Central Park, wishing to show that the place of the Great Enlightenment³ is an introduction to Abhidhamma, quoted the *Padesavihārasutta*—'Bhikkhus, by whatever mode of life I lived after I first attained Buddhahood, I have [these two weeks] lived by that mode of living.'⁴ This he expanded: There are ten positions: of the aggregates, the field of sense, the elements, the Truths, the controlling powers, the causal signs, applications of mindfulness, jhāna, mind, and states. Of these the Teacher at the foot of the great Wisdom Tree intuited the five aggregates fully; for three months he lived only by way of the

¹ The double negative *na . . . na* agrees with the reading in the *Maṇḍīpa*. Some read '*atthi, na ca tāni*,' etc.—'they have introductions and were not spoken by the Buddha.'

² Read *tidiṃkkama*, so explained in the *Yojanā*. Cf. *Dhammapada Commentary*, iii. 216.

³ The *Anuṭikā* takes '*mahābodhinidāno*' to be '*paṭivedhabhūmi*,' the place of intuition, and the *Yojanā*, the Wisdom Tree.

⁴ *Samyutta*, v. 12.

aggregate of feeling.¹ He intuited the twelve sense-organs and the eighteen elements fully; for three months he lived only, by way of feeling, in the field and in the element of mental presentations. He intuited the four Truths fully; for three months he lived only by way of feeling in the Truth of Ill. He intuited the twenty-two controlling faculties fully; for three months he lived only by way of the five emotional indriyas.² He fully intuited the chain³ of the causal genesis; for three months he lived by way of feeling with touch as its cause. He intuited the four applications in mindfulness fully; for three months he lived only by way of feeling to which mindfulness was intensely applied. [31] He intuited the four Jhānas fully; for three months he lived only by way of feeling among the factors of Jhāna. He intuited mind fully; for three months he lived by way of feeling mind only. He intuited (other) states fully; for three months he lived only by way of (one or other of) the triplet of feeling.⁴ Thus the Elder set forth an introduction to Abhidhamma by means of the *Padesa-vihārasutta*.

The Elder Sumanadeva, resident in a village, while translating the Scriptures⁵ at the base of the Brazen Palace, thought: 'This heterodox believer, who does not know the introduction (nidāna) to Abhidhamma, is just like one crying (helpless) with uplifted arms in the forest, or like one who has filed a lawsuit without witness.'⁶ And in order to show the introduction he said, 'At one time the Blessed One lived among the

¹ S. Z. Aung comments on this: *I.e.*, the Buddha *lived* his thoughts. He *felt* himself identical with himself. In the language of M. Bergson, the Buddha intuited his personality, the real considered by way of aggregate, sense-organ, etc., and actually experienced what he intuited.—*Tr.*

² *Vibhanga*, 123.

³ Reading °vattam.—*Tr.*

⁴ Good, bad, indifferent. 'It will be noticed that the feeling by which the Buddha *lived* his thoughts is only a part (*padesa*) of the whole of the object intuited in each case.'—S. Z. Aung.

⁵ *I.e.*, Abhidhamma and the Commentaries. So Pyi (reading *pari-* for *pavattento*). Ariyālaṅkāra interprets: 'reciting the Dhamma, to wit, *sīla*,' etc.

⁶ Instead of appealing to us, who can bear testimony to Abhidhamma having an introduction.—*Tr.*

gods on the Paṇḍukambala rock at the foot of the Pāricchattaka tree in Tāvātimsa. Then the Blessed One taught Abhidhamma to the Tāvātimsa gods thus: 'moral, immoral, and unmoral states of consciousness,' etc.¹

Whereas in the Sutta discourses there is but one introduction, in Abhidhamma there are two: one on the Career and its Goal, and one on the teaching. Of these the former comprises the events from the time of Dīpaṅkara of the Ten Powers up to the time of attaining the throne under the Wisdom Tree; the latter comprises the events between the last mentioned and the time of turning the Wheel of the Dhamma. Thus for proficiency in the introduction to Abhidhamma, which has both of these, the following questions should be asked: 1. From which source has this Abhidhamma originated? 2. Where has it matured? 3. Where, 4. when, and 5. by whom was it mastered? 6. Where, 7. when, and 8. by whom was it studied? 9. Where, 10. for whose benefit, and 11. for what purpose was it taught? 12. By whom was it accepted? 13. Who are learning it? 14. Who have learnt it? 15. Who know it by heart? 16. Whose word is it? And 17. by whom has it been handed down?

The reply to these is: 1. Faith which urges to enlightenment was the source. 2. In the five hundred and fifty Jātakas. 3. At the foot of the Wisdom Tree. 4. On the full-moonday of Visākha. 5. By the omniscient Buddha. 6. At the foot of the Wisdom Tree. [32] 7. During the seven days spent at the Jewel House. 8. By the omniscient Buddha. 9. Among the Tāvātimsa devas. 10. Of the devas. 11. For release from the four Floods. 12. By the devas. 13. Probationers and good worldlings. 14. Saints free from the Intoxicants. 15. Those who lay it to heart. 16. Of the Blessed the Arahant, the Buddha Supreme. 17. By the unbroken line of teachers. It was conveyed up till the time of the third Council by the Elders Sāriputta, Bhaddaji, Sobhita, Piyajāli, Piyapāla, Piyadassī, Kosiyaputta, Siggava, Sandeha, Moggaliputta, Visudatta, Dhammiya,² Dāsaka, Sonaka, Revata, and others. After that, it was conveyed by a succes-

¹ *Dhs.* Table of Contents.

² Or Dhammika—*Pyi*.

sion of their pupils. Thus in India it has been conveyed by an unbroken line of teachers. And to this island of Ceylon subsequently came Mahinda, Iddhiya,¹ Uttiya,² Bhaddanāma, and Sambala. These greatly wise ones brought it to this island from India, and thenceforward till to-day it has been conveyed by the line of teachers known as their pupils. Of Abhidhanma thus conveyed, the introduction of the Career and the Goal, from the time of Dīpaṅkara of the Ten Powers till the attainment of the throne under the Wisdom Tree, and the introduction of the Teaching till the turning of the Wheel of the Law will be clear from the tradition:

(Here follows the Dūrenidāna of the Jātaka Commentary, edited by Fausboll, vol. i., pp. 2-47, and translated by Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Birth Stories*, pp. 2-58.)

There in Tusita he surpassed other spirits in ten attributes; he enjoyed celestial pleasure till the end of life [33] for fifty-seven *koṭis* and sixty thousand years by human calculation. The spirits on being informed³ that he was to come to the end of his life among them in seven days, because of the manifestation of the five portents—namely, the clothes get soiled, the flowers fade,⁴ sweat exudes from the armpits, the body becomes uncomely, the spirit cannot remain in his seat—became agitated at the thought 'how empty our heavens will become!' They knew that the Great Being had fulfilled the perfections, and they thought: 'If he should get the Buddhahood now by taking birth in the world of men, then men who do meritorious deeds will pass away, and instead of going out to another world of spirits, will fill our world of spirits.'

(So the Buddha said to Sāriputta):

*When I in Tusita abode was called
Santusita, from all the myriad worlds
They came to me with supplicating hands*

¹ Or Ittiya—*Pyi*.

² Or Uttiya—*Pyi*.

³ *Pyi* supplies 'vattabbe' after 'pāpunissati ti.'

⁴ They get these clothes and flowers at their rebirth owing to the result of their Kamma. — *Yojanā*.

*Saying: Great Hero, now thy time is come.
Enter the womb, and know the Deathless Path,
Bringing salvation unto gods and men.'*

Thus requested to be the Buddha, he made the five great observations as to the time, island, locality, family, and life-term of his (future) mother. His resolution having been made, he passed away from Tusita and was reborn in the family of Sakya rajahs, and there in due course reached the prime of life without ever falling off from the full enjoyment of his splendid glory.

The details of his life during this interval should be gathered from such Sutta passages as: 'In the meantime, O Ānanda, the Bodhisat, mindful and knowing, passed away from Tusita heaven and descended into his mother's womb,'¹ and so on, as well as from their commentaries. Enjoying the glory of kingship comparable to that of the gods in the three palaces suitable respectively for the three seasons, one day, when he went out to disport himself in the garden, he saw one after another three divine messengers in the form of an old man, a sick man, and a dead man. He became greatly agitated and turned back. But at the fourth time he saw a monk, and took a fancy to monkhood, thinking, 'It is good to be a monk.' He then proceeded to the garden, spent the day there; and, seated on the bank of the lucky lotus-pond and dressed by the god Vissakamma, who came in the guise of a barber, [34] he heard the news of Rāhula-Bhadda's birth. He conceived a great paternal affection for his son and, thinking that he would cut the bond before it grew stronger, entered the city in the evening.

*'Does not that mother bear a tranquil heart,
Does not that father bear a tranquil heart,
Does not that spouse, to whom is such a lord?'*

Hearing this verse sung by Kisāgotamī, daughter to his aunt,² he took off from his neck a necklace of pearls worth a hundred thousand and sent it to her saying: 'She has declared the path of tranquillity to me.' He entered his own mansion,

¹ *Majjhima* iii. 119.

² *Pyī* takes *pitucchā-* to mean 'uncle.'

and seated on a glorious couch he saw the physical change that had come over the actresses during sleep. Disgusted at heart he woke up Channa, had his horse Kanthaka brought round, mounted it, and surrounded by spirits from the myriad world-systems went out with Channa on the Great Renunciation. During the remainder of that night he passed the three great kingdoms,¹ became a monk on the banks of the river Anomā, went in due course to Rājagaha. There after going round for alms, while seated in a cave at Mount Paṇḍava, he was offered the kingdom by the king of Magadha, and rejected the offer. However, he gave his promise to the king that he would visit the kingdom after he had attained omniscience. He next approached Ālāra and Kālāma-Uddaka. Dissatisfied with the special attainments acquired from them, he practised the mighty efforts for six years. On the full-moon day of Viśākhā, early in the morning he ate the meal offered by Sujātā in the suburban village of Senāni, floated the golden bowl in the River Nerañjarā, passed the day in various attainments in the dense Great Forest on the bank of the river, and in the evening, taking the eight handfuls of grass offered by the goatherd, Soṭṭhiya, he ascended the consecrated throne under the Wisdom Tree the while his praises were sung by Kāla, the Nāga king, and spread the grass, resolving: 'As long as my mind is not released from the intoxicants through the absence of grasping, I will not change my seat.' And he sat facing the East and, before sunset, dispersed Māra's forces. In the first watch of the night he won insight into former existences, in the middle watch insight into births and deaths, and at the end of the third watch intuited omniscience, adorned with all the qualities of a Buddha, such as the Ten Powers, the Four Confidences, [35] and arrived at the ocean of this Abhidhamma method.

This should be considered as the introduction to Abhidhamma which tells of the Career and the Goal.

He having thus attained Abhidhamma spent seven days in a single sitting posture; seven days in contemplating

¹ Viz. Kanilavattu, Devadaha, Koliva.—*Ariyālaṅkāra*.

the throne of wisdom without blinking his eyes; seven days in walking to and fro; and in the fourth week he contemplated the self-acquired Abhidhamma.¹ He spent another three weeks at the goatherds' (banyan) tree, the Mucalinda tree, and the Rājāyatana tree.² During the eighth week he sat at the foot of the goatherds' banyan tree. Reflecting on the profundity of the Dhamma, he was reluctant to preach it; but when entreated to do so by Sahampati, who came with a retinue of Mahābrahmās from the myriad world-systems, he surveyed the world with the Buddha's eye; and to comply with the wish of Mahābrahmā looked out for disciples, asking to himself. 'To whom shall I first preach the Dhamma?' He discerned that Ālāra and Uddaka were dead, but remembering the great services of the group of five monks, he rose from his seat and went to Kāśi-town. He fell in on the way with Upaka the wanderer, with whom he conversed, and on the full-moon day of Āsāhi he reached the abode of the group of five monks at the Deer Park at Isipatana. He convinced them (of his own Buddhahood), who were using a term of address³ unbecoming his new position, and turning the Wheel of the Dhamma he gave to them, headed by the Elder Añña-kondañña, and to the eighteen myriads of Brahmās, the nectar of the Deathless. Thus the introduction to Abhidhamma on the Teaching should be understood as leading up to the turning of the Wheel of the Dhamma.

This is the abstract. The detailed account should be understood from Suttas like *Ariyapariyesanā* and *Pabbajjā*⁴ with their commentaries.

These introductions to Abhidhamma on Career and Teaching may be divided into three periods according as the events are distant, not very distant, and proximate. Of these the Distant introduction should be understood as comprising events from Dipaṅkara till the Tusita abode. From the Tusita abode to the foot of the Wisdom Tree is the Near introduction.

¹ I.e., philosophy acquired through intuition. —Tr.


² The Kingstead Tree. So called because it is supposed to have been the residence of a king of fairies.

³ Āvuso.

⁴ *Majjhima* i. 160 ff.; *Sutta-Nipāta*, ver. 405-24.

Such a verbal introduction as, 'At one time the Blessed One lived among the Tāvātimsa devas on the Paṇḍukambala stone at the foot of the Pāricchattaka tree. There the Blessed One related the Abhidhamma discourse to the Tāvātimsa devas'—is the Proximate introduction.

This is the Introductory Discourse.



BOOK I

RISINGS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

PART I—THE TABLE OF CONTENTS

(MĀTIKA)

CHAPTER I

THE TRIPLETS

[36] Now has arrived the opportunity of discoursing on Abhidhamma according to the agreement made (in the Introductory verse):

*'Give ear obediently, while I expound
The Abhidhamma-lore, for it is hard
To hear such discourse as ye now may hear.'*

Now the venerable Abhidhamma consists of seven books beginning with *Dhammasaṅgani*. This book has four divisions: risings of Consciousness, and the rest. The division on risings of Consciousness is twofold: Table of contents and Classification of terms. Of these, the table of contents comes first and is divided into the table of triplets and the table of couplets. Of these, the table of triplets comes first and the triplet headed by moral states is the first therein. In the triplet headed by moral states, the words 'moral states' are the first. Hence,

*Ye faithful, with devout and single mind
This subtle Abhidhamma discourse hear,
Thus it begins:*

The triplet of 'moral states, immoral states, unmoral states'¹ is named the moral triplet after the opening

¹ *Dhs.* p. 1.

sentence. The triplet of 'states associated with pleasurable feeling, states associated with painful feeling, states associated with feeling neither pleasurable nor painful,' is named the triplet of feeling after the word 'feeling,' common to all the three members. Thus the names of all the triplets and couplets should be understood from either the first term, or the term common to all the members of each.

All these triplets and couplets have been marked off into fifteen divisions—one triplet and fourteen couplets.¹ Six couplets beginning with that of 'states which are conditions, states which are not conditions' may be called the Condition-group, because they stand together like the pericarp of a flower, or a bunch of flowers, by virtue of mutual connection both in text and sense. Next, seven other couplets, beginning with that of 'states with causal relations, states without causal relations,' are not so mutually connected, [37] and are to be understood as the Lesser Intermediate couplets, because they are simply selected as ordinary couplets and placed severally among 'Groups,' and because they are less than the Greater Intermediate ones.

Then the Intoxicant-group (is to be understood) by virtue of six couplets beginning with that of Intoxicants. Similarly with the Fetter-group (which is to be understood) by virtue of the couplet of the Fetters, etc.

And similarly the Knot-group,² the Flood-group, the Bond-group, the Hindrance-group are to be understood by virtue of the couplets of the Knots, the Floods, the Bonds, and the Hindrances.

The Reversion-group is to be understood by virtue of five couplets beginning with that of reversion.³ Thus altogether seven groups should be understood.

Further on come the fourteen Greater Intermediate couplets beginning with that of 'States with object.'

Next follows the Grasping-group of six couplets beginning with that of grasping.

¹ *Dhs.* pp. 2-8.

² *Gantha.* In *B.P.E.*: 'The Group of the Ties.'

³ *Parāmāsa.* In *B.P.E.*: 'The Group on Contagion.'

Thereafter, the Corruption-group of eight couplets beginning with that of the Corruptions.

Then eighteen couplets beginning with that of 'what should be got rid of by means of insight' are called the Final couplets, from being placed at the end of the Abhidhamma table of contents.

But forty-two couplets beginning with that of 'States which partake of knowledge and states which do not partake of knowledge' are called the Suttantika couplets.

Thus all the triplets and couplets have been marked off into fifteen divisions. Thus marked off, they form two portions, according as there is partial treatment or complete treatment. To expand: Of these, nine triplets and seventy-one couplets are termed 'partially treated' because the remaining and partially treated states, mental and material, have still to be taken into account. The remaining thirteen triplets and seventy-one couplets are 'complete' without a remainder. Therein, of the triplets, the nine triplets: those of feeling, initial application of mind, zest, resulting states, the past, and the four object-triplets, are 'partially treated.' Of the couplets are the three at the conclusion of the nine groups beginning with the Condition-group and ending with the Grasping-group.

[38] The four couplets at the end of the Corruption-group; the two Greater Intermediate couplets of 'states associated with consciousness and states dissociated therefrom, and states mixed with consciousness and states unmixed therewith'; the remaining thirty-eight couplets in the Suttantika couplets, with the exception of the four couplets of synonyms, concepts, word-definition, and mind and matter—all these are 'partially treated.' All the remaining triplets and couplets should be regarded as 'complete.'

Now comes the word-by-word comment on the terms in the table of contents, beginning with 'moral states.'

First of all, the word '*kusala*' (moral) means 'of good health,' 'faultless,' 'skilful,' 'productive of happy sentient results,' etc. In such passages as, 'Is your reverence *kusala*?'

Which have not been reckoned as triplets or couplets.

'Is your reverence free from ailment?'¹—*kusala* has the meaning of 'good health.' In such passages as, 'Which, sir, is *kusala* behaviour?' 'Great king, it is conduct that is blameless',² and again in, 'Sir, as the Blessed One has taught the Law verily incomparable with respect to *kusala* states'³—*kusala* means 'faultless.' In such passages as, 'You are *kusala* at the different parts of a chariot',⁴ 'Graceful women who have been trained and are *kusala* in singing and dancing,' etc.⁵—*kusala* means 'skilful.' In such passages as, 'Bhikkhus, (merit flows from) the cause that has built up *kusala* states',⁶ and ' (Visual cognition springs into existence) because it has been performed and accumulated by a kamma which is *kusala* '⁷—*kusala* means 'productive of happy results.' Now here, in the phrase 'moral states,' either 'wholesome,' or 'faultless,' or 'productive of happy results' is a suitable meaning.

And the word *dhamma* (state) is used in the sense of 'scriptural text,' 'root-condition,' 'virtue,' 'absence of an entity, living thing,' etc. In such passages as, 'This one studies the *Dhamma*, the Sutta and the Geyya'⁸—*dhamma* means 'the Scriptures.' In such passages as, 'Knowledge of root-conditions is analysis of *dhamma* '⁹—*dhamma* means 'root-condition, or cause.' In such passages as,

‘*Dhamma*, *adhamma* bear not equal fruit:
One leads to Heaven, the other leads to Hell’—

dhamma means 'virtue,' or 'good quality.'¹⁰

In such passages as, 'At the time of consciousness coming into existence, there occur *dhammas*','¹¹ and again, 'he abides watchful over certain *dhammas*'—*dhamma* implies 'absence of an entity or living soul.' [39] And in the *Dhammasaṅgāṇī* also it is proper to take it in this sense.

¹ *Dasaratha Jātaka*. *Jāt.* iv., No. 461.

² *Majjhima* ii. 115.

³ *Dīgha* iii. 102.

⁴ *Majjhima* ii. 94.

⁵ *Jāt.* vi. 25.

⁶ *Dīgha* iii. 58.

⁷ Commentary on the *Cakkavattisutta*, *Dīgha* iii. 58 ff. ; *Dhs.* § 43.

⁸ *Majjhima* i. 133.

⁹ *Vibhaṅga*, 293.

¹⁰ *Theragāthā* ver. 304.

¹¹ *Majjhima* i. 61.

But to come to word-definitions: *kusala's* are so called in that they cause contemptible things to tremble,¹ to shake, to be disturbed, destroyed. Or, *kusa* are those (vices) which lie in a person under contemptible conditions.² And *kusala's*³ are so called because they lop off, cut off what are known as immoralities (*a-kusala's*). Or, knowledge is called *kusa*⁴ because of the reduction or eradication of contemptible things, and *kusala*⁵ is so called because things should be taken, grasped, set in motion by that *kusa*. Or just as the *kusa* grass cuts a part of the hand with both edges, so also certain things cut off the corrupt part in two portions, either what has arisen, or what has not arisen. Therefore *kusala's* are so called because they cut off the corruptions like the *kusa* grass.

Dhamma's may be defined as those states which bear their own intrinsic natures, or which are borne by causes-in-relation, or which are borne according to their own characteristics.

'Immoral' (*akusala*) means 'not moral.' Just as the opposite to friendship is enmity, or the opposite to greed, etc., is disinterestedness, etc., so 'immoral' is opposed to moral.

'Unmoral' (*avyākata*) means 'undeclared.' The meaning is that the 'unmoral' cannot be pronounced to be either moral or immoral; it is indeterminate. Of these, moral states or things have the characteristics of 'faultlessness' and 'happy result,' immoral, of 'faultiness' and 'bad result,' and unmoral, of 'no result.'

Have the terms, 'moral' and 'state,' in the opening clause, one and the same meaning, or different meanings? (This query leaves) something (to be said) here.⁶ If 'moral' and 'state' had the same meaning, then it would be like saying

¹ From *ku*, 'bad,' + $\sqrt{\text{śal}}$, 'to tremble,' say the Commentaries.

² From *ku*, 'bad,' + $\sqrt{\text{śī}}$, to lie.

³ From *kusa*, so derived + $\sqrt{\text{lū}}$, to cut.

⁴ From *ku*, 'bad,' + $\sqrt{\text{śo}}$, to reduce.

⁵ From *kusa*, so defined, + $\sqrt{\text{lū}}$, to take.

⁶ Literally 'And what here?'—a commentarial device adopted to show that the query is incomplete.—*Tr.*

'moral moral.' And if they had different meanings, the triplets and couplets would make sextuplets and quadruplets, and there would be no connection between the terms. To illustrate: If one were to say, 'Moralities, matter, seer,' there would be no (logical) connection between the terms owing to a lack of mutual dependence in thought; so here also there would be an absence of connection (between 'moral' and 'state'). And terms without any connection between the antecedent and the consequent serve no useful purpose. The query would also contradict a later question: 'which states are moral?' For (in this view of different meanings) states can never be identical with moralities; hence the contradiction. But the question: 'which states are moral?' is quite possible.

Another method: If the terms 'state' and 'moral' had the same meaning (*i.e.*, denoted one and the same thing), the terms 'moral,' 'immoral,' and 'unmoral' would have one and the same meaning, because the three terms had the same meaning of 'state.' To expand: The word 'state' coming after 'moral,' etc., has one meaning in the sense of a 'state.' Therefore the (three) words 'moral,' etc., not differing from the thrice following word 'state,' would also have that one meaning; what is moral would be immoral and again unmoral. But if the oneness in the meaning of these three words comprised under 'state' be not accepted, and if it be urged that the word 'state' after 'moral' means [40] one thing, that after 'immoral' means another, and that after 'unmoral' means a third, then it may be said that by 'state' is meant existence; and anything different from existence is non-existent. Therefore existence as denoted by 'state' after 'immoral,' being different from that denoted by the same word after 'moral,' would become non-existent. So also with existence as denoted by 'state' when it comes after 'unmoral.' Moreover, existence as denoted by 'state' after 'moral' would be unreal, on the view that it differs from the other two in meaning. And the words 'moral,' etc., not being different from the word 'state,' which have thus become non-existent, would themselves become non-existent.

All this imaginary objection is not reasonable. And why?

Because the general usage is accomplished by, or in conformity with, convention. For 'usage' is accomplished by conventional signs, through which that 'usage' is accepted by the general consent to express or signify certain meanings. And so in 'moral states,' etc., the word 'state,' preceded by 'moral,' and the word 'moral,' followed by 'state,' have not been accepted by the wise as identical in meaning as in 'moral, moral,' nor as mutually independent in meaning as in 'moralities, matter, seer.' But here in this phrase 'moral states,' etc., the word 'moral' has been accepted as signifying 'faultlessness' and 'happy result'; and 'immoral' as signifying 'faultiness'; and 'unmoral' as signifying 'no result'; and 'state' as signifying 'bearing its own intrinsic nature.'

The word 'state,' uttered immediately after each of these words, reflects its own general meaning on them, inasmuch as they are all 'states' by the general characteristic of bearing their own intrinsic natures, etc. And the words 'moral,' etc., uttered before the word 'state,' reflect their special meaning on it, inasmuch as a 'state' is either moral, immoral, or unmoral. Thus these words being uttered separately indicate their mere meanings, and being uttered in conjunction with 'state,' they all indicate their own general and special meanings. And this usage the wise in the world have accepted. Therefore all that has been said (§§ 96-97) by way of fault-finding regarding identity and difference of meanings is unreasonable.

Thus far for the word-by-word explanation of terms in the triplet beginning with 'moral.' And the same method is to be understood in the remaining triplets and couplets. But henceforward we shall speak merely of what distinguishes those triplets from the foregoing.

The word *sukha* in 'associated with pleasurable feeling,' etc., first of all means 'pleasurable feeling,' 'root of happiness,' 'pleasurable object,' 'condition of happiness,' 'objective station occasioning pleasure,' 'freedom from cares,' and 'Nibbānic happiness,' etc. To expand: In such passages as, 'By getting rid of *sukha*¹—*sukha* means 'pleasurable feeling.' In such passages as, '*Sukha* is the appearance of

¹ From Fourth Jhāna formula; cf., e.g., *Dhs.* § 165. . . .

the Buddhas!¹ 'sukha is the state of freedom from lust in the world'²—*sukha* means 'root of happiness.' [41] In such passages as, 'Mahāli, inasmuch as matter is *sukha*, falls and descends on *sukha*'³—*sukha* means 'pleasurable object.' In such passages as, 'Bhikkhus, the word merit is the synonym of *sukha*'⁴—*sukha* means 'condition of happiness.' In such passages as, 'Not easy is it, bhikkhus, to succeed in describing how pleasant are the heavens,'⁵ again,

'They know not bliss who see not Nandana'⁶—

'bliss' (*sukha*) means 'place occasioning happiness.' In such passages as, 'these states (jhāna) constitute a *sukha* life in this very world'⁷ *sukha* means 'freedom from cares.' In such passages as, 'Nibbāna is the highest *sukha*'⁸—*sukha* means 'Nibbānic happiness.' But here 'pleasurable feeling' only is intended.

In such passages as, 'manifest *vedanā* occur to me'—the word *vedanā* should mean 'what is felt.'

The word *dukkha* signifies 'painful feeling,' 'basis of misery,' 'unpleasant object,' 'cause of evils,' 'station of evil as cause,' etc. To illustrate: In such passages as, 'By getting rid of *dukkha*,'⁹ *dukkha* means 'painful feeling.' In such passages as, 'Birth is *dukkha*,'¹⁰ *dukkha* means 'basis of misery.' In such passages as, 'Mahāli, inasmuch as matter is *dukkha*, falls and descends on *dukkha*,'¹¹ *dukkha* means 'painful object.' In such passages as, 'Dukkha it is to accumulate evil,'¹² *dukkha* means 'cause of misery or ill.' In such passages as, 'Not easy, bhikkhus, is it to succeed in describing how *dukkha* are the purgatories,'¹³ *dukkha* means 'place occasioning suffering.' But here

¹ *Dhp.* 194 ² *Udāna* ii, 1. ³ *S.* iii, 69. ⁴ *A.* iv, 89.

⁵ *M.* iii, 172; but upamā replaces akkhānena pāpunīti. Cf., however, below n. 5, where quotation and text *ibidem* agree.—Ed.

⁶ *S.* i, 5, 200.

⁷ Not traced.

⁸ *Dhp.* 203, 204.

⁹ From the formula for Fourth Jhāna; Cf., e.g., *Dhs.* § 165.

¹⁰ *Vin.* i, 10 (*Vin. Texts* i, 95).

¹¹ *S.* iii, 69.

¹² *Dhp.* 117.

¹³ *M.* iii, 169.

it should be understood to mean only 'painful feeling.' The word-definitions are as follows: That which gives happiness is pleasure or ease; and that which causes misery is pain or ill. That which is neither ill nor pleasure is 'neutral' (*adukkham-asukka*), where the letter 'm' is inserted by rules of [philological] combination. All these three kinds are termed 'feeling' because the taste of an object of sense is experienced or enjoyed.

Among them, pleasure has the characteristic of experiencing a desirable object of sense; pain, an undesirable object; that which is neither pain nor pleasure, a (neutral) object opposed to both.

The expression 'associated with' is used with all the three terms. It literally means 'joined equally or together in a variety of ways.' In what ways? 'In ways of a common origin,' etc. [42] (In the *Kathāvatthu* the question:)¹ 'Are there not some states associated with some (other) states?' being answered by 'No,' (the Theravādin goes on:) 'In denying it, are there not some states, accompanied by co-existent states, or mixed with some (other) states, having a common origin, a common cessation, a common basis and a common object of sense?' The meaning of 'association' is thus explained by means of having a common origin and so on. Hence 'associated with' means 'conjoined with in various ways of having a common origin,' etc.

In the triplet of 'results,'² the effects of moral and immoral (volitions) which are distinct from each other are called 'results,' a name given to certain mental states which have reached the state of maturity (through distinct causes called moral and immoral volitions).

'States that involve resultant states' mean 'states which bear their own intrinsic nature of causing results.'³ Just as beings who by their intrinsic nature are liable to birth and old

¹ *K. V.* vii. 2 (p. 337; trans. 196).

² *Dhs.* p. 1.

³ The first 'dhamma' in this expression is synonymous with 'sa-bhāva,' which is further explained by 'pakatika.' 'Vipākadhammā' by itself would mean 'results,' but the whole expression refers to causes effecting those results.—*Tr.*

age are said to be subject to birth and old age, so states by virtue of their producing results should be understood to mean 'state possessing the intrinsic nature of causing results.' The third term (viz., 'states which are neither results nor causes') is said by way of rejecting both.¹

In the triplet of 'Grasped and favourable to grasping,' 'grasped' means—seized-as-effect by a kamma, attended by craving and wrong view in the act of sensing or thinking of an object. *Uṇṇāyā* means 'favourable to grasping' because of the connection with grasping by having become objects. The term is applied to objects of grasping. 'Effects grasped and favourable to grasping' (*uṇṇāyā*) is a name given to material and mental states born of kamma attended by the 'intoxicants' (*āsava's*). In this way, but in the negative sense, the meaning of the remaining two terms should be understood.

In the triplet of 'Corrupt and corrupting,' 'corrupting' means 'that which corrupts' (i.e., oppresses or torments a being). 'Corrupt' means 'arisen or occurring together with the corruptions.' 'Corruptible' means—capable of becoming corrupt by attending to self as an object, or permanently conjoined with corruption owing to inability to get beyond the state of being objects of corruption. It is a name given to objects of corruption. Corrupt [states]² which are (at the same time) objects of corruption are called 'corrupt and corruptible.' The remaining two terms should be understood in the same way as in the preceding triplet (i.e., in the negative sense).

[43] In the triplet of 'Initial application of mind,' 'with initial application of mind' means 'occurring together with initial application of mind by virtue of conjunction therewith;' 'with sustained application of mind' means 'occurring with sustained application of mind.' 'With initial and sustained applications of mind' means 'occurring together with both initial and sustained applications of mind.' 'Without initial

¹ I.e., 'vipākabhāva,' state of being a result, and 'vipākāsubhāva,' a cause possessing the nature of producing results.—*Tr.*

² I.e., subject to corruption.—*Tr.*

and sustained applications of mind ' means ' devoid of both. ' ' Only with sustained application of mind ' means ' having the sustained application of mind alone out of the two kinds of application, initial and sustained, as its measure. ' The meaning is that such states are not conjoined with initial application over and above the sustained application of mind. ' Without initial and with sustained application of mind only ' means ' having the sustained application of mind as its measure without the initial application. ' .

In the triplet of ' zest, ' ' accompanied by zest ' means ' gone into a state of having a common origin, etc., with zest, ' i.e., ' associated with zest. ' The remaining two terms should be explained in the same way.

But in the third and last term ' hedonic indifference ' means neutral feeling. It may be verbally defined as ' that which views equably the occurrence of the aspects of pain and pleasure, and may be further amplified thus: ' proceeds under a medium condition by occupying a neutral position. ' Thus this triplet is described to show the distinction between pleasure with zest, and pleasure without zest by taking the two terms from the triplet of feeling.

In the triplet of ' insight, ' ' by insight ' means ' by the path of the stream-winner. ' For it is called insight because of the first glimpse of Nibbāna. *सत्यमेव जयते*

But although the ' son-by-adoption ' ¹ gets as such his first glimpse of Nibbāna, he is as a man come to the presence of the king on a certain business, who sees from far the king going about on elephant-back by a certain route and, on being asked whether he had seen the king, replies that he had not, because his business had not been transacted. In the same way although a man has seen Nibbāna, he cannot be said to have insight, because the corruptions to be got rid of have not been got rid of. That knowledge indeed stands at the point of the Path² where the mind turns toward [its goal].

¹ On this term (gotrabhū) see *Compendium*, pp. 55, 215. Childers's *Dict.*, s.v.

² I.e., it occupies the same position in the process of Path-thought as 'adverting' does in an ordinary process of thought.—*Tr.*

'By culture' means 'by the remaining three Paths,' for they arise by virtue of cultivating (or developing) the four Ariyan Truths already seen by the First Path. They do not see anything not already seen previously; hence they are called 'culture' or development. The third term is described by way of rejecting both.

In the immediately following triplet, the expression 'having root-conditions removable by insight' refers to those states the roots of which are so removable. The second phrase should be explained in the same way. But the third term: 'not having root-conditions removable either by insight or by culture' [requires a different treatment. It] must not be understood to mean those states the roots of which are removable neither by insight nor by culture.¹ It must be taken to mean those which have no roots removable either by insight or by culture.² [44] Otherwise, unconditional states would not be included. For these contain no roots removable by insight or culture. Moreover, it would imply the removal, by insight or culture, of states other than roots in the conditional states, not of the roots themselves.³ In point of fact, the expression 'not removable either by insight or by culture' was said with reference to the roots themselves, but not to those other states *which are not roots*. Neither of these interpretations is intended. Therefore the third term 'not having roots removable either by insight or by culture' should be understood to mean those states which *do not have* roots removable either by insight or by culture.

In the triplet of 'leading to accumulation,'⁴ 'accumulation' means 'that which is accumulated by kamma and corruptions. It is a name for the processes of rebirth and decease. 'Leading to accumulation' are 'those causes which by being accom-

¹ In other words, the phrase should not be rendered by 'having roots not removable by insight nor by culture.'—*Tr.*

² In other words, the phrase should be rendered by 'not having roots removable by insight or by culture.'—*Tr.*

³ The reasoning involved herein is that if roots are not removable something other than roots must be removable.—*Tr.*

⁴ *Dhs.* p. 2.

plished go to, or lead a man, in whom they arise, to that round of rebirth.' It is a name for co-intoxicant moral or immoral states. Nibbāna being free from 'cumulation,' which is another word for 'accumulation,' is called 'dispersion.'¹ 'Leading to dispersion' is 'going towards that dispersion which he has made his object.' It is a name for the Ariyan Paths. Or, 'leading to accumulation' are 'those states which go about severally arranging (births and deaths in) a round of destiny like a bricklayer who arranges bricks, layer by layer, in a wall.' 'Leading to dispersion' are those states which go about destroying that very round, like a man who continually removes the bricks as they are laid by the mason. The third term is spoken by way of rejecting both.

In the triplet of 'Appertaining to studentship,' this phrase means 'occurring among the three kinds of study.' These associated states are also called 'appertaining to studentship,' because they belong to the seven stages of study, and because they themselves form the subject of study by reason of the incompleted course of study. From there being no higher study to acquire, certain states are called 'Not appertaining to studentship.' Or, developed states of mature study are called by this name, which is a synonym for the things constituting the Fruition which is Arahanthship.² The third phrase is used in rejecting both.

In the triplet of 'Limited,' the word 'limited' is applied to a little mass, as in 'a small or little mass of cowdung,'³ etc., because of its being cut off all round. States which, because of their small power are like little objects, are called 'limited,' a name given to things pertaining to the universe of sense. 'Sublime' means 'having reached greatness,' from ability to discard corruptions, from the abundance of fruition, from the length of duration; or it means 'have been reached by great persons,' i.e., persons with noble intention, energy, impulse, and understanding.

[45] States such as lust, etc., which form a limit are called 'Finite.' 'Infinite' means 'having no such limit either by

¹ Namely, of the cumulative round of rebirth.

² Viz., the eighth stage.

³ *Samyutta* iii. 144.

way of objects of sense or of association,' or it means 'being opposed to limit.' In the triplet of 'limited objects of sense,' this expression means 'having limited states as objects.' Likewise in the two remaining terms.

In the triplet of 'Low,' this word means 'base' and is applied to immoral states; 'medium' means 'existing midway between low and exalted,' and is applied to the remaining states of the three planes. 'Exalted' has the meanings of 'excellent' and 'unstinted,' and is applied to transcendental states.

In the triplet of 'False,' this word means 'of false nature,' partly by reason of not realizing expectations, such as 'they will bring advantage and happiness to me,' and partly by reason of the reversibility of the beautiful, etc., by their opposites. When giving results of a false nature, certain states are called 'un-form,' as invariably giving the inevitable results immediately after the dissolution of the aggregates.¹ Therefore 'false and uniform' means 'both false in (nature) and uniform (in giving results).' Opposed to what has been said above, 'true' means 'of true nature.' 'True and uniform' means 'true and uniform by way of fructification immediately after themselves.' 'Not uniform' means 'not uniform in both ways.'

In the triplet of 'Object of the Path,' 'Path' means 'that which leads to, i.e., seeks for Nibbāna, or that which goes to Nibbāna destroying the corruptions.' 'Objects of the Path' are 'states having the Path as their object.' 'Conditioned by the Path' means (a) 'having the Eightfold Path as their special condition, in causal relation to root-conditions,' or (b) 'Conditions associated with, or occurring in, the Path.' Therefore the expression may mean 'having those associated root-conditions in the Path,' or, 'having the root-condition which is the Path,' since right views themselves are at once the Path and the condition. 'Dominated by the Path'

¹ I.e., at 'death.' When many acts having such results are done, that only which is strongest gives the result, and not the rest, which are ineffective.—*Tikkā*.

means 'having the dominance of the Path by reason of overwhelming (the dominated).'

In the triplet of 'Arisen,' this word means uprisen or happened, i.e., having reached (a state) from the nascent up till the cessant instant. 'Not arisen' means not yet appeared. 'Bound to arise' refers to states which will inevitably arise as part of a completed cause.

In the triplet of 'Past,' this word means passed beyond (a) their own characteristics, or (b) the momentary states beginning with the nascent instant. By 'future' is meant 'has not yet reached those two conditions.' By 'present' is meant 'uprisen in dependence upon this or that cause.'

In the immediately next triplet, 'their past object' means 'having a past object.' And the same with the remaining two terms.

[46] In the triplet of 'Personal,' this word refers to states which occur after making a locus of selves as though with the understanding 'we shall consider or take things thus existing to be we ourselves.' The word 'personal' (*ajjhatta*) has a fourfold content, namely, personal in field, in self-reference, (just) personal, personal in range.

In such sentences as, 'Ānanda, mind should be well focussed by that bhikkhu as *ajjhatta*, namely, only in that symbol of concentration which has been practised before'¹; 'inwardly rapt (*ajjhaturato*) and concentrated'² *ajjhatta* means 'personal in field.' In such passages as, 'He lives contemplating states, even among states which are pleasing as *ajjhatta*,'³ *ajjhatta* means 'subjective.' In such passages as 'The six *ajjhakkā* sense organs,'⁴ *ajjhatta* means 'personal.' In such passages as, 'This, Ānanda, is the life fully attained by the Tathāgata, to wit, that he, by disregarding all provocative signs and symbols, has reached the *ajjhatta* Void and therein abides,'⁵ *ajjhatta* means 'range' in the sense of 'dominion.' The attainment of Fruition is named the dominion of the Buddhas, but here the meaning

¹ *Majjhima* iii. 112.

² *Dīgha* ii. 107.

³ *Ibid.* ii. 301.

⁴ *Pattisambhidāmagga* i. 122.

⁵ *Majjhima* iii. 111.

of 'personal' is intended. Hence states occurring in one's own continuity and pertaining to each individual are to be understood as 'personal'.¹

But states outside that personality, whether bound up with the controlling faculties or not, are termed 'external.' The third term is spoken by virtue of both.

The immediately following triplet refers to states occurring in the act of attending to just these three kinds of states (*i.e.*, personal, external, externo-personal) as objects.

In the triplet of 'Visible,' states which arise together with sight, *i.e.*, visibility, are termed 'visible.' States which arise together with opposition called 'impact,'* are termed 'reacting.' Some states are termed 'both visible and reacting.' Unseen states are termed 'invisible.' Some invisible states react as described. The third term is used in rejecting both.

So far for the word-by-word commentary on the terms in the table of contents of the triplets.

CHAPTER II THE COUPLETS

IN the table of contents of the couplets we shall comment on those words which have not been found in the triplets.

First and foremost, in the condition-group,² *hetu-dhammā* (or *hetū dhammā*) are states called [special] conditions in the sense of roots. [47] The term 'non-condition' is used in

¹ 'We, who are but parts existing in such a unique manner by way of inclusion in an individual series of personalities through our characteristic functions of contact, etc., as well as through our sense-organs, etc., constitute the self (*attā*, *kāya*), being the totality of (the five aggregates, etc., called) the self-state (*attabhāva*), which is a whole. The term 'personal' is applied to states which make the self (*i.e.*, the totality of the five aggregates) a locus of parts or selves, or a locus of self-idea as though with this convention, "we shall understand thus," *i.e.*, in the aforesaid sense' — *Pyī Sadaw.* * *Patihanana.*

² *Hetu* rendered 'cause' in *B.P.E.*; cf. p. 274, n. 1; also S. Z. Aung in *Compendium* 279 f. *Dhs.* p. 2.

rejecting them. 'Conditional' means 'occurring together with roots by way of association.' 'Unconditional' means 'having no roots which occur in a similar way.' States conjoined with roots by way of a common origin, etc., are termed 'associated with root-conditions.' States disjoined from roots are termed 'dissociated from root-conditions.' Though there is no difference in meaning between the two couplets (viz., the 'conditional' and the 'associated with root-conditions'), they have been thus specified, partly by way of embellishment of the discourse and partly to meet the needs of those persons who thus gain enlightenment. Next, after the last-mentioned couplet, combining the first couplet with the second and the third couplets, the other three couplets are uttered as they ought to be, by virtue of such terms as 'condition' and 'not-condition,' etc. Therein, as the phrase 'conditions as well as conditional states' occurs in the text, so also 'conditions as well as unconditional states' may be formed on analogy; moreover, as 'conditional states but not conditions' occur, so also 'unconditional states but not conditions' may be formed anew. The same method should be followed in conjoining (root-conditions and not-root-conditions) with the couplet of 'associated with root-conditions.'

Though the expression, 'States which are not root-conditions are conditional as well as unconditional' would suffice, an extra phrase was used 'But indeed,' when it was said 'But indeed states which are not root-conditions,' etc., in the text. It may be understood that the following additional meaning is implied by its use. How? Not only states which are not root-conditions (*hetu's*) may be classified as conditional and unconditional, but others also are so classifiable. Nay, more. Not only may the former be so classified, but they may be classified also in other ways. The meaning intended here is: just as states which are not root-conditions are conditional and unconditional, so are states which are root-conditions. Again, just as the former are classified into conditional and unconditional, so may they be classified with 'associated with root-conditions' and 'dissociated from root-conditions.' Such is the extra-signification.

In the couplet of 'Lesser Intermediate,' states which occur together with their own completed cause in a relation are termed 'relative.' States without any causal relation either at the time of genesis or of duration are termed 'absolute' (or non-relative). 'Conditioned'¹ means made by a concurrence of causes-in-relation.' 'Unconditioned means not-made or conditioned.'

States [or bodies] which possess properties of matter in an inseparable state are termed 'material.'² States which have no such material properties or qualities are termed 'immaterial.' Or, states possessing matter which has the characteristic of physical change are termed 'material.' Those which are not so changeable are termed 'immaterial.'

In the expression 'worldly phenomena' the round of rebirth is called 'the world' (*loka*), because of its dissolving and crumbling (*lujjana*, etc.). States which are joined to the world by being included therein are termed 'worldly.'³ [48] To have passed beyond the 'worldly' is to be unworldly, lit., 'ulterior.' Things which have passed beyond the worldly, being not included therein, are termed 'transcendental' (lit., 'ultra-world').⁴

By 'knowable or known by anyone' is meant knowable, etc., by any one of the modes of cognition, visual, etc. The opposite follows, and completes the couplet.

In the Intoxicant-group, 'intoxicants' are 'things which flow,'⁵ i.e., flow or arise from the senses and the mind. Or Intoxicants may be defined as things which, as states, 'flow' up to the stage of adoption and which, as in space, 'flow' as far as the topmost plane of existence. The meaning is that they occur keeping these states⁶ within that extent of space. The prefix *ā* in *āsava* (intoxicant) is, indeed, used in the sense of 'keeping within.' Or, as the juices of the *madira*⁷ fruits, etc., become intoxicants by fermentation for a

¹ *Saṅkhata, asañkhata.* B.P.E.: 'compound, uncompounded.'

² *Dhs.* p. 3 ³ *Lokiya.* B.P.E.: 'mundane.'—Tr. ⁴ *Lokuttara.*

⁵ Like putridity, exuding from a wound.—*Pyi Sadaw.*

⁶ Henceforth the text usually takes *dhammā* (states) as understood.

⁷ *Bassia latifolia*, out of which monks are permitted to make sweet decoctions.—Tr.

length of time, so certain states which are like these intoxicants are termed *āsava's*. It is customary to call long-fermented *madira* wines, etc., intoxicants. If by long fermentation they are named intoxicants, then these mental states are also worthy of the name. For it has been said: 'No ultimate point of ignorance is apparent, bhikkhus, so that one may say, "once there was no ignorance."' ¹ Or, 'intoxicants' are those states which fructify or beget the pains of the ocean of births of long duration. States other than these are not intoxicants. The 'co-intoxicant' states are those which occur together with the arisen intoxicants, with themselves (co-intoxicants) as objects.² Those which have no intoxicants (as subjects) are 'non-intoxicant.' The remainder should be understood as explained in the condition-group, but with this difference: In that group the last couplet, to wit, 'But the states which are not root-conditions, indeed, are either conditional or unconditional,' was obtained by placing the second term of the first couplet at the beginning; but here in this group no such final couplet as 'Now the non-intoxicants are with or without intoxicants' has been explicitly stated. Although it has not been so expressed, this couplet and other divisions will be understood as in the foregoing.

In the Fetter-group the states which join or bind in repeated rounds of birth the person in whom they exist are termed 'fetters.' States other than these are termed 'not fetters.' States which, having become objects of sense, help the growth of the fetters by being bound up therewith are termed 'tending to fetters.'³ This is the name given to the objects, the fetters. Those which are not objects of sense are termed 'not tending to fetters.' [49] The remainder should be understood in the same way as in the condition-group.

In the Knot-group, states which knot or tie in repeated rounds of birth by way of birth and decease the person in whom they exist are termed 'knots.' States other than these

¹ *Anguttara* v. 113. Ignorance is one of the *āsavas*.

² Or, 'The objects of intoxicants, occurring together with their subjects are termed co-intoxicants.'—Tr.

³ *Samyojaniya*. *B.P.E.*: 'favourable to the Fetters.'

are termed 'non-knots.' States which are entangled in, or fastened by, the knots by virtue of being their objects are termed 'liable to knots.' The remainder should be understood in the same way as in the condition-group. The same method of understanding by implications is to be followed in what remains unsaid in the other pairs.

In the Flood-group,¹ states which sink, submerge in repeated rounds of birth the person in whom they exist are termed 'floods.' States which are liable as objects to be overwhelmed by the floods are termed 'subject to floods.' Only² those states which are the objects of floods should be taken.

In the Yoke-group, states which yoke to repeated rounds of birth the person in whom they exist are termed 'yokes.' The 'yokeable' should be understood in the same way as in the foregoing.

In the Hindrance-group states which hinder the mind are termed 'hindrances.' 'Liable to be hindered' should be understood in the same way as with the Fetters.

In the Reversion group³ states which, passing beyond the impermanence, etc., of things as they really are and, by assuming them to be permanent, etc., handle them reversely, are termed 'reversing.' Things which, as objects of sense, are handled in a reverse manner by the 'reversion' are termed 'reversed.'

In the Greater Intermediate couplet, states are termed 'objective'⁴ from arising together with objects, because they cannot exist without objects. States which have no objects are termed 'subjective.' 'Consciousness' (*citta*) is so called from thinking (*cit*) of an object, or because it is variegated (*citta*, *citra*). States which are inseparably joined to the mind are termed 'mental properties.'⁵ States which are thoroughly mixed up with consciousness from the nascent stage to the cessant are termed 'mixed with consciousness.' States which

¹ *Dhs.* p. 4.

² Reading *eva*. P.T.S. ed.: *evam*.

³ *Parāmiśa-gocchakaṇṇi*. *B.P.E.*: 'Group on Contagion.' *Dhs.* p. 5.

⁴ Lit. co-object. *B.P.E.*: 'having a concomitant object of thought.'

⁵ *Cetasika*. *B.P.E.*:—'involved in the life of sense.' *Compendium*—'mental properties.'

though arising simultaneously with consciousness, do so without being thoroughly mixed therewith, are termed 'unmixed with consciousness.'

States by which some things arise are termed 'origin.' Those states which have consciousness for origin are termed 'originated by consciousness.'¹

States which occur together are termed 'connate.' States which occur together with consciousness are termed 'connate with consciousness.'

States which always follow others are termed 'inevitable successors.' What do they follow? Consciousness. Those which follow consciousness are termed 'mental successors.'

States which are thoroughly mixed with consciousness and are originated by consciousness are termed 'mixed with and originated by consciousness.' [50] States which are thoroughly mixed with, originated by, and co-natal with consciousness are termed 'mixed with, originated by consciousness in co-nativity.' States which are thoroughly mixed with, originated by, and invariably follow consciousness are termed 'mixed with and originated by consciousness in succession.'

All the remaining terms are to be understood by way of contradiction of the terms explained.

By what has been said in the triplet of 'personal' with reference to the six subjective organs of sense, these subjective organs alone are termed 'internal.' States outside of these are termed 'external.'

[States or material qualities] which cling to the Four Essentials,² but which are not clung to as are the Essentials, are termed 'derived.' [States] which not only cling, but are also clung to³ are termed 'underived.'

In the Grasping-group, states which cling strongly (to objects of sense) in the sense of holding fast are termed 'grasping.' States other than these are termed 'non-grasping.'

In the Corruption-group the meaning should be understood in the same way as in the 'corrupt' triplet.

¹ *B.P.E.*: 'sprung from thought.'

² *B.P.E.*: 'The four great phenomena.'

³ The word *upādiyanti* is taken in both an active and a passive sense; as *nissayanti* and *nissiyanti*.—*Pyi*.

In the Final Couplets,¹ states which for the most part frequent the abodes of sense are termed *kāmāvacara*. Those that generally frequent the abodes of attenuated matter are termed *rūpāvacara*.² Those that frequent the immaterial abodes are termed *arūpāvacara*. This is but an abstract of the Final Couplets. The detailed account will appear hereafter. States which are limited by or included in the round of the triple plane of existence are termed 'Included.' Those not so limited are termed 'Unincluded.' States which, cutting the roots of the rounds of repeated births and making Nibbāna their object, go out from the rounds are termed 'leading out.' Those which do not go out in this manner are termed 'not leading-out.' From the certainty of yielding fruit immediately after decease, or after their own occurrence, states are termed 'certain.'³ From not being certain in like manner states are termed 'uncertain.'

States which outstrip others are termed 'ulterior.' States which arise together with 'ulterior states' capable of outstripping themselves are termed 'co-ulterior.' Those which have no such ulterior states (beyond themselves) are termed 'incomparable.'

States through which beings bewail are termed 'harm.'⁴ Beings overcome by lust and so on bewail in various ways. 'Harm' is the name given to such lust, etc. States which arise together with such harm (as causes of grief) by virtue of association, and a common establishment for riddance in one and the same individual are termed 'harmful.' States which have no such grievous causes are termed 'harmless.'

¹ *Dhs.* p. 6.

² *B.P.E.*: 'the world of form.' *Rūpa* may mean (a) material, (b) visible object. On *rūpa* as 'attenuated matter,' cf. *Dialogues* ii. 244, 264. — *Ed.*

³ The five *anantariyakammas* and *niyatamicchādīṭṭhi* yield fruit immediately after the next decease. The four Paths yield fruit immediately after their own occurrence. Cf. *Dhs.* § 1290; *Points of Controversy* 275, n. 2.

⁴ *Rapa* = (a) *reṇu* — 'dust,' or 'mist' of lust, etc.; (b) 'fight, war' against the Paths; (c) 'pain' (*dukkhavighāta*), anguish (*upāyāsa*) and distress (*pariṣāha*), which are the fruits of immoralities. — *Ṭīkā*. *B.P.E.*: 'concomitant with war.'

CHAPTER III

SUTTA PHRASES

IN the couplets drawn from the Suttas,¹ states which by virtue of association pertain to wisdom are termed 'partaking of wisdom,' also because they arise as parts and portions of wisdom. Herein eight modes of wisdom, viz., knowledge of insight, potency of the will-power, the six kinds of super-knowledge, belong to wisdom. [51] In the latter sense any one of these eight is wisdom, the rest being considered as parts thereof. Thus wisdom and its associated parts should be understood as 'belonging to wisdom.' But here only states associated with wisdom are meant.

States which by virtue of association belong to ignorance are termed 'belonging to ignorance'; also because they arise as parts and portions of ignorance. Herein ignorance is fourfold: intellectual darkness concealing the Fact of Ill, its origin, its cessation, and the Path leading to cessation.

By the first method, 'belonging to ignorance' also includes states associated with these four modes of ignorance. Any one of these is ignorance, the others being considered as 'belonging to ignorance.' Thus it should be understood that ignorance and states associated therewith 'belong to ignorance.' But here in this couplet only the associated states are meant.

Again, states, which from their powerlessness to overwhelm, their inability to destroy, the darkness of the corruptions, are like lightning flashes, are termed 'lightning-like.' States which, from their ability to destroy the darkness of their corruptions completely, are like the thunderbolt, are termed 'resembling the thunderbolt.'

States established in fools are termed 'foolish.' They are so called figuratively after the customary name of 'fools,' given to persons in whom they are established. From being established in the wise, states are called 'wise.' They are so called figuratively after the customary name of 'wise,' given

¹ *Dhs.* p. 7.

to persons in whom they are established. Or, 'foolish' from producing folly, 'wise' from producing wisdom.

By 'black' is meant 'dark,' *i.e.*, capable of causing absence of brightness of mind. 'White' means 'capable of causing mental brilliance.' Or, because of being the cause of rebirth in miserable planes, states are termed 'black'; and because of being the cause of rebirth in happy abodes, states are termed 'white.'

States which [figuratively] burn both here and hereafter are termed 'burning.' Those which do not so burn are termed 'not burning.'

The three couplets beginning with the 'synonymous' couplet have no difference whatsoever in meaning; the difference is only in the letter. With mere words made their bases, such expressions as 'luck-bringing,' and 'wealth-bringing,'¹ etc., are termed 'synonyms.'

'Etymology' is the derivation of words expressed together with the reason in word-definition as in the example, 'Bhikkhus, *sāṅkhārās* are those states which compose what is compound.'² The meanings of the derivation are termed *niruttīpathā*.

Terms, signifying (one and the same idea) in various ways, *e.g.*, *lakka*, *vitakka*, *sāṅkappa*,³ are called 'expressions.' The meanings of expressions are termed *paññuttīpathā*. [52] Of these three couplets, having uttered one couplet (not different in sense from the other two) the motive in uttering the other two should be understood from what has been said in the Condition-group (p. 62).

In the mind and matter group, the term 'mind' (*nāma*) is applied to mental properties, because 'names' once given to them are fixed, or because they bend (*namanti*) objects, or because as objects they bend the mind unto themselves. 'Matter' is that which changes its state or condition.⁴ This herein is the abstract; the detailed account will appear in the chapter on the Summary.

¹ Lit. luck-increasing.

² *Saṃyutta* iii. 87.

³ *I.e.*, calling a single thing, *viz.*, thought, by three names.

⁴ (According to heat or cold, etc.) Cf. *op. cit.*, iii. 50.

Nescience of the Truths of Ill, etc is termed 'ignorance.' The wish to live is termed 'craving for existence.'¹

The 'theories of becoming,' of 'eternalism,' 'non-becoming,'² and 'annihilation' refer respectively to the fact of renewed life, eternal life, extinction, and annihilation of life. The process-theories of eternalism, annihilationism, infinity, and finity refer respectively to the views that the soul and the world are eternal, will be annihilated, are infinite, are finite.

The view concerned with the ultimate beginning [of things] is termed 'the view of ultimate beginning.' The view concerned with the ultimate end is analogous.

'Unconscientiousness' is the state of a person who is not ashamed of doing shameful things; it is shamelessness in detail. 'Carelessness of blame' is the state of a person who does not fear what should be feared; it is recklessness in detail. Conscientiousness and discretion are the opposites.

In 'surliness,' etc., a man of conflicting views, who delights in opposition, is devoid of regard for the faith and speaks unpleasant words is said to be 'surly.' The act of such a man is termed 'surly speech'; the state of such a man is termed 'surliness.'

He who has evil friends, such as unbelievers, is termed 'in evil friendship.' 'Suavity' and 'in good friendship' should be understood as the opposite in sense to what has been said.

'The offences' are the five and also the seven classes of offence. 'Proficiency in dealing with the offences' thus declared and in the restoration from these offences [refer to canonical rules].

'Proficiency in attainments' is a name given to discernment of the stages of ecstasy.³ [53] 'Proficiency in emerging from attainments' is analogous.

'Proficiency in the elements,' . . . 'in attention,' . . . 'in the field of sense,' . . . 'in causal genesis,' . . . 'in occasions' refer respectively to the eighteen elements, to observation of the same, to the organs and objects of sense, to the twelve

¹ Lit. 'craving to become.'—*Ed.*

² Vibhava-ditthi.

³ Or, 'proficiency in determining the period of jhanic ecstasy induced or entered into.'—*Tr.*

factors in [the formula of] causal genesis, and to what is, or is not the occasion or cause of an event. A cause is described as 'occasion,' because in dependence on it result or fruition is established.

'Uprightness,' 'mildness,' refer to persons so qualified. The state of forbearance in a patient person is termed 'patience'; 'temperance,' the state of one delighting in good (*su-*).

The state of friendliness known as gentleness, causing equal happiness to all, is termed 'amity.' Just as the presence of others leaves no gap around us, so courtesy is a spreading out with things spiritual and material.

The state called 'door-unguardedness as to faculties' refers to lack of restraint of the five controlling powers [or senses] with mind as the sixth. The state of not knowing the measure of the accepting and the partaking of food is 'intemperance in food.' The following couplet should be understood as the contrary of the foregoing.

The state of a person with lapse of memory, known as absence of mind, is termed 'obliviousness.' 'Non-comprehension' is the state of not knowing adequately [or thoroughly].

The faculty which is mindful is termed 'mindfulness'; that which understands adequately is termed 'comprehension.'

'The power of reflection' is the not wavering on account of non-reflection. The strength arisen in one who, with energy as his principal means, develops the seven factors of enlightenment is termed 'the power of culture.'

That which hurls or quiets opposing influences is termed 'calm.'¹ That which sees things in various ways as impermanent, etc., is termed 'insight.' Calm which has taken an object, and again induces calm, becomes the causal symbol for the latter. Similarly for the term 'the mark of support.'² [54] That which upholds associated states is termed 'support.' That which does not oscillate about various objects is termed 'balance.'

Moral failure reckoned as non-restraint capable of destroying

¹ *Dhs.* p. 8.

² *Paggaha.* *B.P.E.*: 'grasp.'

virtue is termed 'moral depravity.' The failure of views called erroneous opinion capable of destroying right views is termed 'depravity of view.'

Perfection of morality is termed 'moral perfection,'¹ because the morality of one who delights in good deeds perfects or accomplishes virtue. Knowledge which has resulted in perfection of view is termed 'attainment' in theory.¹

The purity of virtue, namely, virtue which has arrived at a state of extraordinary purity, is termed 'moral purity.' The insight which is capable of reaching purity, *i.e.*, Nibbāna, is termed 'purity of view.' By the sayings:² (a) 'But now pure views,' as well as (b) 'the effort of one who has adequate views,' is meant (a) the pure theory which knows that we are owners of our kamma, etc.,³ and (b) the effort associated with that knowledge referring to views adequate to the effort.

The term 'agitation'⁴ refers to fear arisen in connection with birth, etc. The causes, namely, birth, etc., productive of agitation, are termed 'occasions for agitation.' By 'the proper effort of the agitated' is meant his adequate exertions. By 'discontent in good states' is meant want of content in the accomplishment thereof. By 'non-retreat in effort' is meant the not stepping back, the not faltering in effort without reaching Arahantship.

'Wisdom' (*vijjā*) is so called because of knowing; 'emancipation' is so called because of being free (from the corruptions).⁵

By 'knowledge in destruction' is meant such knowledge arising in the Ariyan Path as is capable of destroying the corruptions. By 'knowledge in non-origination' is meant such knowledge in the Ariyan Fruition, arisen at the terminus of the Path, as is capable of causing the non-origination of the corruptions, destroyed by this and that Path.

This is the word-by-word commentary on terms in the Table of Contents.

¹ *Sampadā*. B.P.E.: 'progress.'

² *Āṅguttara* i. 95.

³ *Majjhima* iii. 203.

Āṅguttara ii. 115.

⁵ Or. from directing the mind unrestrainedly towards the object (Nibbāna).—*Yojanā*.

PART II—ANALYSIS OF TERMS

CHAPTER I

OF THE MORAL TRIPLET

Now in order to explain the differences in the states grouped in the Table of Contents already laid down as above, there follows the classification of terms beginning with the question: Which are the moral states ?¹ Herein the first moral thought, experienced in the universe of sense, has been shown by the words: 'When a sensuous moral thought occurs.' In its exposition, first of all, [55] there are three main sections: the determination of states, the summary, and 'emptiness.' Of these the determination is twofold: outline and exposition. In the outline there are four divisions: question, exposition of the occasions, outline of states, and conclusion. Of these, 'which states are moral?' is the question. 'When the sensuous . . . then' is the exposition of the occasion. 'There is touch . . . non-distraction' is the outline of states. 'On that occasion [these], or whatever other mental states there may be, which have arisen in dependence upon (those expressly mentioned):—these states are moral' is the conclusion.

Thus as to the first division, *viz.*, the question: 'which are moral states?' is a question for the purpose of explanation. To expand: Questions are fivefold: to show something not seen before, to discuss what is already seen, to clear up doubts, to discover opinion, to explain. And this is how they differ: which is a question put to throw light on something not seen before? The question which is put for gaining knowledge, for seeing, weighing, accomplishing, perceiving, and revealing some point which has not already been understood, seen,

¹ *Dhṛ.* § 1.

weighed, accomplished, perceived, or revealed. What is a question for discussion of views ? The point has already been learnt, seen, weighed, accomplished, perceived, and revealed. But the question is put in order to discuss with other wise people. What is a question to clear up doubts ? When one has come to misgivings, doubt, dubiety: 'Is it thus, is it not thus, what is it, how is it ?' The question is put to remove those doubts. What is a question to discover opinion ? The Blessed One in order to discover the opinion of the bhikkhus asks the question: 'What do you think, bhikkhus? Is matter permanent or impermanent ?' 'Impermanent, lord.' 'And is that which is impermanent painful or pleasant ?' 'Painful, [56] lord.' 'And is it proper to contemplate that state which is impermanent, painful, and reversible as "This is mine, this am I, this is myself" ?' 'Nay, lord.' This is the question to discover opinion. What is a question for purposes of explanation ? The Blessed One asks the brethren a question in order to explain: 'Bhikkhus, there are four applications in mindfulness. Which are the four ?'² This is the question for purposes of explanation.

Of these, the first three questions do not arise in the case of the Buddhas. And why ? Because for the Buddhas there is nothing, whether conditioned in the three periods of time, or unconditioned and out of time, that has not been known, seen, weighed, accomplished, perceived and revealed. Hence for them there is no question for the illuminating of what is not seen. And there is no need for the Blessed One to discuss what has been intuited by his own knowledge with another monk or brahmin or spirit or Māra or Brahmā. Hence there can arise no question for a comparison of views. Inasmuch as the Blessed One is free from perplexity, has passed beyond doubt, and in all things is devoid of misgivings, there can arise for him no question to clear up doubts. But the other two questions occur to the Blessed One. And of these, the question: 'Which states are moral ?' should be understood as having been asked for purposes of explanation.

¹ *Majjhima* iii. 19 f.

² *D.* ii. 290 (slightly different).

Herein by the word 'which,' the question is asked regarding states to be expounded in detail. By the mere words—'States (are) moral,' it is not possible to know how the Blessed One had treated these states, or how they functioned. But when 'which' is uttered, inquiry concerning them is manifest. Hence I have said that the word 'which' refers to the states to be expounded in detail. By the two words 'states . . . moral,' together with the question, the Buddha shows which states are under inquiry. Their meaning has been explained above.

But why, without saying 'moral states,' as in the Table of Contents, is the order reversed as 'states . . . moral'? Because after the discourse, in the Table of Contents, on the distinctions of states, it is for the purpose of showing which states possess those distinctions. In Abhidhamma just states are to be dealt with, but these in turn should be taught in various distinctive aspects, as 'moral' and so forth. Therefore here, in which only states are dealt, is no popular discourse, and these states should be shown by way of distinctive aspects, and not merely as states in general. For a teaching on states by way of such distinctions carries with it the division of a mass, as well as the higher analytical knowledge.

Having enumerated the different classes of states (in the Table of Contents) as 'moral states' and so on, these states should now be explained by way of their distinctive aspects. [57] To show them by way of distinctions, the order of words has been reversed in 'which states are moral?' For when states have been shown to possess distinctions, it is logical and easy for the understanding to follow up the exposition with another on the distinctions.

Now as to the expression, 'when sensuous moral thought . . .': here he showed consciousness on a given occasion. The Sage first determined the occasion by the state of consciousness; then to show the specific phases of that consciousness, he showed the consciousness as being on a given occasion: 'when a sensuous moral thought, etc.' And why? Because it was by this consciousness [or thought], fixed amid the diversity of occasions by one given occasion that the Blessed

One undertook the difficult task of enlightening us as to the aspects of the content of that thought on an occasion determined by that thought, the aspects being its continuity, mass, function, object, solidarity.*

Now here is the word-by-word comment on terms in the passage 'when,' etc. 'When' is an indefinite locative. 'Occasion' (*samaya*) denotes the time indefinitely marked by 'when.' Thus far (by these two words) an indefinite time has been shown. The word *samaya*, however:

*Means harmony in antecedents, group,
Elimination, moment, penetration,
Condition, acquisition, time, opinion.*¹

E.g., in such passages as, 'Perhaps to-morrow we might approach, having regard to time and *samaya*,'² it means 'harmony in antecedents.' In such passages as 'Bhikkhus, there is but one moment, one *samaya* for the practice of the holy life'³—*samaya* means 'opportunity.' In such passages as 'Hot *samaya*,' 'fever-*samaya*'⁴—it means 'season.' In such passages as 'a large *samaya* in the great forest'⁵—*samaya* means 'assembly.' In the passage: 'Bhaddāli, you have not discerned the *samaya*: that the Blessed One is staying at Sāvattthī, and will know that the bhikkhu Bhaddāli has not perfected the training in the religion'⁶—*samaya* means 'conditions, *hetu*.' 'At that time a studious wanderer, [58] by name Māna, son of the nun Muṇḍikā, was staying in the Park of Queen Mallikā, surrounded by a fence of fig-trees and containing a hall for discussion in *samaya*'⁷—in such passages *samaya* means 'opinions'—

*Whatever 'good' be in the present world,
Whatever 'good' be in the world to come—
He only is called wise who has the skill
To compass abhisamaya of good*⁸—

* Santati (*sic lege* in P.T.S. ed.).

¹ *Sum.* V. i. 31 f.

² *Dīgha* i. 205.

³ *Anguttara* iv. 227. Cf. *Saṃyutta* iv. 126; *Jāt.* i. 381.

⁴ *Vin.* iv. 117 (*Vin. Texts* i. 44)

⁵ *Dīgha* ii. 254.

⁶ *Majjh.* i. 438.

⁷ *Ib.* ii. 22; *v.l.* Maṇḍikā.

⁸ *Saṃyutta* i. 87.

in such passages *saṃaya* means 'acquisition.' 'By the right *abhisamaya* of conceit he made an end of ill'¹—in such passages *saṃaya* means 'elimination.' 'The fact of ill has the sense of oppression, of being conditioned, of burning, of reversibility, of penetrability (*abhisamayatto*)'²—in such passages *saṃaya* means 'penetration.'

Thus among its many meanings,

*Time, harmony in antecedents, moment,
Condition, group—these five the wise should note,
These saṃaya here signifies.*

Thus, in the matter of moral consciousness, where 'when sensuous moral thought,' etc., is uttered, these five out of the nine meanings should be understood by the wise.

*Here 'harmony in antecedents' meaneth
Concurrency of causes: and by 'moment'
The four wheels, the unique 'ninth' is understood.*

To expand: 'Harmony in antecedents' should be understood as the concurrence of causal relations established by their bringing about a common result. Again, the precise ninth moment, declared by the Blessed One in the sentence, 'Bhikkhus, there is but one moment, one opportunity for the practice of the holy life,' should be known as the ninth, the sole moment.³

Again, 'Bhikkhus, there are these four wheels wherewith a fourfold wheel of gods and men so endowed rolls on, viz.: dwelling in a suitable place, association with the good, self-control, accumulation of merit in previous existences.'⁴ Thus four wheels have been declared, but should be classed as the one moment in the sense of occasion (or conjuncture), for they form the occasion for the production of merit.

Samaya having been shown to mean 'harmony in ante-

¹ *Āṅguttara* iv. 8.

² *Pts.* ii. 106 (but in P.T.S. ed. *abhisamayatto* is omitted).—*Ed.*

³ *Āṅguttara* iv. 227. *Pss. of the Brethren* 243, n. I.;

⁴ *Dīgha* iii. 276; *Āṅguttara* ii. 32.

cedents' and 'moment, or opportunity,' the following is the explanation of the other meanings of the word: 'Time' may be clearly shown as a notion abstracted by mere usage from this or that (event). A collection of states such as 'contact,' etc. may be clearly explained as 'a group' or 'mass.'

To expand: Time is only a concept derived from this or that phenomenon, such as (a) states expressed in such phrases as, 'temporal (aspect of) mind,' 'temporal (aspect of) matter'; (b) the phenomenal occurrence expressed by such phrases as 'the past' and 'the future'; (c) the phenomenal succession in an organism expressed by 'the time of seed-germination' and 'the time of sprouting'; [59] (d) the characteristic marks of phenomena expressed by 'the time of genesis' and 'the time of decay'; (e) the functions of phenomena expressed by 'the time of feeling,' and 'the time of cognizing'; (f) functions of beings expressed by 'the time of bathing' and 'the time of drinking'; (g) the modes of posture expressed by 'the time of going' and 'the time of stopping'; (h) the revolution of the moon, sun, etc., expressed by 'morning, evening, day, and night'; or (i) the grouping of days and nights, etc., into periods expressed by 'half-month,' 'month.' It should be understood that this (abstract time) is a mere concept, because it is not existing by its own nature.

The congeries of states such as contact, feeling, etc., is in our text displayed as 'groups.' *Samaya* having thus been shown to mean also 'time' and 'group,' the other meaning of 'condition' is to be understood: By 'condition' is meant 'causal relation.' That there are several conditions may be understood by way of their 'doors' or relations. To expand: In this connection a cause-in-relation is a condition. The multiplicity of conditions may be understood from their doors or relations. How so? The eye, object, light, attention, etc., are the many causes-in-relation of the sense of sight, etc., arising in the eye-door, etc. In the Great Book (the *Paṭṭhāna*) twenty-four causal relations have been taught, to wit, relation of condition, relation of object, and so forth. Excepting the casual relations of resultants and post-existence, the rest are causes-in-relation of moral states. All these two sets of

causes-in-relation are here (*i.e.*, in this connection) meant by the term 'condition. Thus the multiplicity of conditions should be understood by way of their doors or relations.

It should now be understood that these five meanings of 'harmony of antecedents' and so forth are comprehended under the word *samaya*. But why have all these five meanings instead of any one of them been so comprehended? Because the term is used to show various distinct meanings. To expand: Of these, *samaya* in the sense of 'harmony of antecedents' shows occurrence from many causes. By showing this, the view that there is one single cause¹ is contradicted. By 'harmony of antecedents' is meant the mutual contribution towards the production of a common result. Therefore this also shows that there is no single agent. For when there is a cause (adequate) in its own nature,² it is not fitting to look about for another cause. Thus by showing the non-existence of any one cause (the erroneous view) that pain and pleasure are created by oneself³ is contradicted.

Herein, it may be objected that the expression, 'it shows the occurrence from many causes,' is not proper. [60] And why? Because causes which are not conditions when they exist severally, would not become conditions when they act in harmony. When every one of a hundred blind men cannot see, it is impossible for all the hundred (collectively) to see. This argument is not unreasonable. (The answer is): Causes are said to be in concord when they accomplish a result in common, and not because of the mere combination of various antecedents. And the vision of the blind men is not a result in common. Why? Because of their inability to see though there may be a hundred of them. But vision by the eye, etc., is a result in common, because when the one exists, the other arises in consequence. It is quite clear that though states may be no causes when they are not in concord, they become causes when they are in concord. This may be understood

¹ Such as Brahman, Prajāpati, Purusa, Kāla, or Viṣṇu as creator (issarakāraṇavāda), or nature as cause (pakatikāraṇavāda).—*Tikā*.

² Such as the sentient organism, *e.g.*, sight and visible object.—*Pyī*.

³ *Samyutta* ii. 22.

by there being no results in the absence of concord and there being results when there is concord. The failure or otherwise of a sense, *e.g.* sight when the sensitive organism is lacking, or not, is clearly proved in this world. This first of all is to show the word *samaya* in the sense of 'harmony of antecedents.'

That 'ninth moment,' which is the inverse of the eight wrong occasions, and the four wheels (of conjuncture), such as 'dwelling in a suitable place,' and so forth, is termed 'moment' in the sense of 'occasion' or 'opportunity.' It does not occur without there being a concurrence of circumstances, such as existence as a human being, the rise of the Buddha, and the stability of the good Law, etc. The difficulty of getting reborn as man, etc., has been shown by the Buddha, in the *Samyutta Nikāya*, by the illustration of the blind tortoise, etc.¹ Morality which renders service to transcendental states and is connected with the most subtle moment—subtle, because of the difficulty of getting it—may be said to be difficult of achievement. Thus the word *samaya* in the sense of 'moment' or 'opportunity' makes clear the difficulty of the achievement of good. By thus illustrating opportunity, the negligent life of those who, though they have arrived at the right moment, turn it into a profitless moment, without repeatedly striving to achieve good connected with that moment, is condemned. *Samaya* has thus been shown in the sense of 'moment or opportunity.' Very small is the interval for exercising moral thoughts, and the extreme rarity of such moments may be understood from the Commentary on the Sutta (of *Dalhadhanuggaha*),² where it is said, 'Bhikkhus, there is the speed of this man; greater is the speed of the sun and the moon; greater is the speed of the Yama God who runs before the sun and the moon; swifter yet than that is the perishing of life's activities.'

Here, first of all, the short duration of the physical life-control is described. While (a unit of) matter which has arisen persists, sixteen thought-moments arise and break up. And no

¹ *M.* iii. 169; *S.* v. 455 f.

² *S.* ii. 266. Note the *v.l.* Yāma°.

illustration can convey the shortness of time they occupy. [61] Hence the Blessed One has said: Bhikkhus, it is no easy matter to illustrate the quickness of thoughts in their changing.¹ Thus the word *samaya* in its sense of time shows the extreme shortness of the time in the occurrence of a moral thought. By this term thus showing the shortness of time, advice has been given exhorting us to great strenuousness and earnestness in intuition,² albeit intuition is as difficult for the mind as stringing pearls in the dark by a lightning-flash, because of its extremely short duration. This is the exposition of *samaya* in the sense of time.

Samayo in the sense of 'group' shows the simultaneous occurrence of many states. For an aggregate of states, such as contact, etc., is said to be a 'group'; the consciousness arising in that group of states arises together with those states. Thus the co-occurrence of many states is shown. By this word showing the nature of the group, the occurrence of one 'state' only is contradicted. This is the setting forth of the meaning of *samaya* in the sense of 'group.'

Samaya in the sense of 'condition' shows the occurrence in dependence on another. The phrase 'at what time' connotes the occurrence of something when its condition exists, that is to say, of something on which it depends. By this word showing thus the condition, the conceit of one who believes that states unconditionally follow one's own will³ is subdued. This is the meaning of *samaya* in the sense of 'condition.'

Thus the phrase *yasmim samaye* when it denotes 'time,' means 'at what time'; when it denotes 'group,' it means 'in what group'; when it denotes 'opportunity,' 'harmony of antecedents,' and 'condition,' it means 'when the opportunity arrives,' 'when there is a concurrence of causes,' and 'when a condition exists,' respectively. *E.g.*, when sensual moral consciousness springs into being, on an opportunity arriving, a concurrence of causes, or a condition existing, then contact and so forth also arise. Thus should the meaning be under-

¹ *Āṅguttara* (henceforth indicated by A.) i. 10. ² Paṭivedha.

³ *Sa-vasa*. In other words, the theory of absolute free-will is denied.—*Tr.*

stood. Here *samaya* in the sense of time¹ and of group is used in the locative case, *i.e.*, as locality in the sense of basis of things taught here (in Abhidhamma). By the occurrence of *samaya* as opportunity, concurrence of causes, or condition, the occurrence of those states (contact, etc.) is marked. Therefore if understood in these senses, *samaya* in the locative marks state or existence.

By 'sensuous' is meant included in the sensuous states, namely, 'Between the Avīci purgatory below and the Paranimmitavasavatti heaven above,' etc.²—concerning which the question and answer are put. [62] Briefly, the literal definition of the term is as follows: sensuous experience is twofold: of basis and of corruption. The latter means passionate desire; the former means the round of the triple plane of existence. Of these the sensuousness of the corruptions is so termed because it desires, and the other, the sensuousness of basis, is so termed because it is desired by, the sensuousness of the corruptions. There are eleven localities, *viz.*: four purgatories, one world of men and six worlds of spirits, in which this twofold sensuousness prevails. And 'sensuous' is the term applied to them all because 'sensuousness' frequents them, like the battlefield resorted to by soldiers. As the place where armed men resort is called a battlefield because it is specially characterized by them, even though there may be other creatures, unarmed bipeds and quadrupeds, resorting to the same, so though things of other universes such as that of attenuated matter frequent it, the place still continues to be called 'sensuous,' because it has been specially characterized by these modes of sensuous experience. Just as '*rūpa*-sphere' is shortened into '*rūpa*,'³ so 'sensuous universe' is simply called 'sensuous' by eliding the latter term. Thus 'sensuous universe' means that this (first class of moral) consciousness frequents this eleven-

¹ How can time, being a concept, be a basis of things in Abhidhamma? Because states that occur in time marked by consciousness do not exist before or after that time.—*Tikā*. ² *Dhs.*, § 1281.

³ In such phrases as 'he develops the Path for the attainment of *rūpa*.'—*Tr.*

fold localized sensuousness, even though it also frequents the planes of 'attenuated *rūpa*' and of non-*rūpa*. Just as an elephant, which has earned the appellation of 'battle-experienced' from its frequenting the field of battle, continues to be known by that name although it also frequents the town; and just as living creatures whose habitat is land or water, though placed out of their own elements, are still called 'land-traversing' or 'water-traversing,' even so this (class of) consciousness, though occurring elsewhere, should be known as 'sensuous.'

Or (this consciousness is termed) sensuous because its sensuousness frequents, by way of attending to, objects of sense. Certainly it also frequents the universe of attenuated matter and that of non-matter. But a calf is so named because it 'calls' (*vaccha-vadati*=*vadyati*); and a buffalo is called '*mahiṣa*' because it lies on the ground (*mahi*). All other animals (although they also make noises and lie on the ground) do not get these names. The application of this illustration should be understood.

Or, this class of consciousness is called 'sensuous' because it causes rebirths to frequent the sensuous plane of existence.

By *kusala* is meant (moral) 'good' in the sense of destroying or disturbing contemptible states;¹ or in the sense of wholesomeness, faultlessness, and accomplishment by skill. To illustrate: in 'How are you? are you well, sir?' *kusa'a* is used to mean 'health,' i.e., not being ill or sick or unwell in body. So in mental states it should be understood in the sense of 'health,' i.e., absence of sickness, illness, or disease through the 'corruptions.' [63] Moreover, from the absence of the faultiness, hate, and torments of the 'corruptions,' *kusala* has the sense of 'faultlessness.' Understanding is described as skilfulness. 'Good' has the sense of 'brought about by skilfulness.'

Now consciousness 'associated with knowledge' may be called good (or moral). But how can consciousness 'dissociated from knowledge,' be called by that name?² (The

¹ Obtained by the scholastic word-play affected at one period by both East and West; *kacchitānaṃ saṃvādīhi*. This has been anticipated above. p. 48 f.—Ed.

² See *Dhs.* (or *B.P.E.*), §§ 147, 149.

reply is): It is also called good (or moral) by a figure of speech. As a fan made not of palmyra leaves but of mats, etc., is called, figuratively, a palmyra fan from its resemblance thereto, so consciousness though dissociated from knowledge is called good or moral.

But philosophically speaking, 'consciousness associated with knowledge' is called good in the three senses of health, faultlessness, and skill; and that 'dissociated from knowledge' is called good in two senses only. 'Good' as taught by the Jātaka method, by the Bāhitika Sutta method and by the Abhidhamma method¹ is applicable to this consciousness in all three senses.

Moral Good defined by way of characteristic, etc., has faultless, happy results as its characteristic; the destruction of immoralities as its essential property; purity as its recurring manifestation; and rational attention as its proximate cause. Or, by being opposed to fault it has the characteristic of faultlessness; the property of purity; the recurring manifestation of desirable results; and the proximate cause of rational attention as said above.

To expand: As regards characteristics, etc., the specific or generic attributes of these, or those states, are termed the 'characteristic' (*lakṣaṇam*).

Essential property (*rasa*) means function or achievement.

Recurring phenomenon (*paccupatthāna*) means mode of manifestation, or effect.

Immediate occasion (*padatthānam*) means proximate cause. Thus wherever we speak of characteristics, etc., their mutual difference should be understood in this wise.

By 'consciousness' (*citta*) is meant that which *thinks* of its object, is aware variously. Or, inasmuch as this word 'consciousness' is common to all states or classes of consciousness, that which is known as worldly, moral, immoral, or the great inoperative,² is termed 'consciousness,' because it arranges itself in a series (*cintīti*, or, its own series or continuity) by way of apperception in a process of thought. And the

¹ As shown by the examples quoted on p. 49.—*Ed.*

² On this term see below, pt. x., ch. vi.

resultant is also termed 'consciousness' because it is accumulated (*cito*) by kamma and the corruptions.

Moreover, all (four classes) are termed 'consciousness' because they are variegated (*citra*) according to circumstance. The meaning of consciousness may also be understood from its capacity of producing a variety or diversity of effects.

Herein consciousness with lust is one thing, [64] that with hate is another, that with delusion is another, that experienced in the universe of sense is another, and those experienced in the universe of attenuated matter, etc., are others. Different is consciousness with a visible object, with an auditory object, etc.; and in that with visible objects, varied is consciousness of a blue-green object, of a yellow object, etc. And the same is the case with the consciousness of auditory objects.

And of all this consciousness one class is low, another is medium, and a third is exalted. Among the low class again consciousness is different when dominated by desire-to-do, or when dominated by energy, or by investigation. Therefore the variegated nature of consciousness should be understood by way of these characteristics of association, locality, object, the three degrees of comparison and dominance.

Although any single one of these is verily not variegated in itself and by itself in the sense explained thus, it is nevertheless proper to say of any one of them, that it is so called from its variegated character, because it is included in consciousness as making up a variegated whole. Thus far the first explanation of consciousness is from its variegated nature.

How is consciousness (*i.e.*, mind) capable of producing a variety or diversity of effects in action? There is no art in the world more variegated than the art of painting. In painting, the painter's masterpiece¹ is more artistic than the rest of his pictures. An artistic design occurs to the painters of masterpieces that such and such pictures should be drawn in such and such a way. Through this artistic design there arise operations of the mind (or artistic operations) accomplishing

¹ Carapa.

such things as sketching the outline, putting on the paint, touching up, and embellishing. Then in the picture known as the masterpiece is effected a certain (central) artistic figure. Then the remaining portion of the picture is completed by the work of planning in mind as, 'Above this figure let this be; underneath, this; on both sides, this.' Thus all classes of arts in the world, specific or generic, are achieved by the mind. And owing to its capacity thus to produce a variety or diversity of effects in action, the mind, which achieves all these arts, is itself artistic like the arts themselves. Nay, it is even more artistic than the art itself, because the latter cannot execute every design perfectly. For that reason the Blessed One has said, 'Bhikkhus, have you seen a masterpiece of painting?' 'Yea, Lord.' 'Bhikkhus, that masterpiece of art is designed by the mind. Indeed, Bhikkhus, the mind is even more artistic than that masterpiece.'¹ Nay, more. All the factors of this diversified sentient organism, such as kamma, feature,* idea, language, etc., in the destinies of spirits, men, denizens of purgatories, lower animals, etc., are also wrought by the mind. Good and bad acts in various deeds, as charity, virtue, cruelty, deceit, etc., are accomplished by the mind. Hence there is a variety of kammās; and owing to this variety of kammās, there is in the various destinies [65] difference of features, *i.e.*, difference in hands, feet, ears,² stomachs, necks, faces, etc.; the difference in notion or idea is because of the difference in outward form, expressed by 'this is woman, this is man,' according to the form taken. The difference in the common usage of such terms as 'man,' 'woman' in language, according to ideas, is due to the difference in ideas. Because by virtue of the difference of usage in language, an act, productive (in rebirth) of this or that individuality, is performed (with the wish), 'May I be a woman, a man, a prince, a brahmin,' therefore the difference in effective action (kamma) results from the difference in usage. When the difference of actions effects a (future) existence as prayed for, because it does so through destiny, then from the

¹ *Saṃyutta* iii. 751.* *Liṅga*.² Not in P.T.S. ed.

difference in kamma results the difference in destiny. By the difference of kammās are manifested the typical or specific difference of animals without feet, of bipeds, etc., in this or that destiny of creatures; the hereditary difference of lowness or highness in the passive side of our existence; the difference of beauty, ugliness, etc., in the features of an individual; and the difference of profit and loss, etc., in worldly conditions. Hence, all the factors of this diversified sentient* organism such as character, outward appearance, idea, language, etc., in such destinies as spirits, men, denizens of purgatories, lower animals, etc., should thus be understood.

This explanation should be understood by a Sutta not rehearsed at the three Councils. For it is there said, 'By the analysis of the various divisions and subdivisions of mutually different kammās arises the determination of the various divisions and subdivisions of mutually different features. By the analysis of the various divisions and subdivisions of mutually different features various divisions and subdivisions of mutually different ideas are determined. By analyzing the various divisions and subdivisions of mutually different ideas, the discrimination of the various divisions and subdivisions of mutually different usages in language is effected. By analyzing the various divisions and subdivisions of mutually different usages in language, the various divisions and subdivisions of mutually different kammās are differentiated. In dependence on the difference in kamma appears the difference in the destiny of beings without legs, with two legs, four legs, many legs, vegetative,¹ spiritual, with perception, without perception, with neither perception nor without perception. Depending on the difference in kamma appears the difference in the births of beings, high and low, base and exalted, happy and miserable. Depending on the difference in kamma appears the difference in the individual features of beings as beautiful or ugly, high-born or low-born, well-built or deformed. Depending on the difference in kamma appears the difference in the worldly conditions of beings as gain and

* *Ajġhattikam*.

¹ *Rūpino*.

loss, fame and disgrace, blame and praise, happiness and misery.

Further it has been said:

[66] *From kamma and form form and perceptions come,
Perceptions differentiation cause
In things, as 'This is woman,' 'This is man.'*¹

*By kamma the world moves, by kamma men
Live, and by kamma are all beings bound
As by its pin the rolling chariot wheel.*²

*By kamma one attains glory and praise,
By kamma bondage, ruin, tyranny.
Knowing that kamma bears fruit manifold,
Why say ye, 'In the world no kamma is?'*¹

'O lad, beings have kamma as their property, they are its heirs, are originated by it, are its kin, are sheltered by it. Kamma divides beings into low and exalted.'³ By this capacity to produce a diversity of effects (in destiny) in a manner detailed above is the diversity of the mind to be understood. For all variations are done by the mind only.

Because a thought, which has no opportunity⁴ (of maturing its own effects) or which lacks the remaining conditions,⁵ does not produce any of the divers effects, (only) the factors of this manifold sentient organism⁶ effected by the (effectual) thought have been declared. The mind is even more diverse than these. Hence the Blessed One has said, 'Bhikkhus, I see no other class so variegated as creatures of the animal kingdom; even more variegated than those creatures, bhikkhus, is the mind.'⁷

In the phrase 'is arisen,'⁸ arisen (*uppanna*) has many meanings, as 'existing,' etc. Of these, all that is endowed

¹ Not traced.

² *Sutta-Nipāta*, 654.

³ *Majjhima* iii. 203.

⁴ Owing to prohibition by some superior kamma, or because the performer has done it in some place or at some time where no result is given.—*Tr.*

⁵ Time, destiny, motive, etc.—*Tr.*

⁶ *Ajjhattakam.*

⁷ *Saṃyutta* iii. 152.

⁸ *Dhs.*, § 1.

with (instants of) genesis, decay, and dissolution is termed 'arisen as existing at the present moment.'

The moral and immoral thoughts which have ceased after experiencing their objects and which are therefore known as 'experienced and gone,' as well as the remaining conditioned things which are known as 'become and gone,' because they have ceased after having arrived at the threefold moment of genesis, decay and dissolution, are termed 'arisen as having just gone after becoming.' Because the kamma in such expressions as, 'those kammās done by him in previous existences,' stands, though past, by preventing a different result and by giving occasion to its own result, and because the result though not yet arisen invariably takes place when an opportunity is given, it is called 'arisen as having given rise to a potential opportunity of its own fruition,' or 'arisen as possessing an effected potential opportunity of occurring.'

[67] Immorality not so removed (by the Path) as not to occur in various planes of existence is termed 'arisen as having got a plane for future existence.' Here the difference between 'a plane of existence' and 'a state which has obtained a plane for future existence' should be understood.

'Plane' means the five aggregates of the three planes, which are objects of insight. The body of corruptions fit to arise in those aggregates is said to have 'obtained a plane for future existence.' For that plane is obtainable by this corruption, therefore it (*i.e.*, the body of corruptions) is said to have 'obtained a plane for future existence.' Of these four meanings of *uppanna* described here, that of 'existing at the present' is intended. Herein its word-definition: 'present or existing' is called *uppanna*, because it has arrived at the portal, so to speak, of genesis, etc., after the end of the previous state. This word *uppanna* has many meanings: 'past,' 'getting,' 'uprisen,' 'not discarded,' 'not completely cut off,' 'the totality of the three instants.'¹ In such passages as, 'Bhikkhus, at that time Kakusandha, the Blessed One, the Saint, the Supreme Buddha had arisen in the world'²—

¹ *I.e.*, the life-unit of any living thing—nascent, static, cessant.—*Ed.*

² *Samyutta* (henceforth indicated by *S.*) ii. 191.

uppanna is used in the sense of 'past.' 'To the elder, Ānanda has *arisen* a superfluous robe'¹—here *uppanna* means 'getting.' 'Even, bhikkhus, as a strong wind at intervals disperses a great mass of clouds that have *arisen*'²—here *uppanna* means 'uprisen.' 'The wandering of the mind which has *arisen* is difficult to remove; (mindfulness on respiration) then and there causes evil, *i.e.*, immoral states, to disappear every time they have *arisen*'³—here *uppanna* means 'not discarded.' 'One who cultivates, practises many times the Ariyan Eightfold Path causes at intervals evil, *i.e.*, immoral, states to disappear then and there every time they have *arisen*'⁴—here *uppanna* means 'not cut off.' In the catechism, 'Is a thing arisen in the course of generation? Yes'⁵—*uppanna* has the meaning of 'reached the totality of the three instants.' Here too it means this; so that '(consciousness) has *arisen*'⁶ means: 'has reached the totality of the three instants,' 'is existing,' or 'is present.' This is the meaning in brief outline. 'Consciousness has arisen' is the heading of this discourse.

But consciousness does not arise singly. Just as in saying, 'the king has arrived,' it is clear that he does not come alone without his attendants, but comes attended by his retinue, so this consciousness should be understood to have arisen with more than fifty moral (mental) phenomena. But it may be said that consciousness has arisen in the sense of a forerunner. For in worldly phenomena consciousness is the chief, consciousness is the principal, consciousness is the forerunner. [68] In transcendental phenomena, however, understanding is the chief, understanding is the principal, understanding is the forerunner. Hence when the Blessed One came to the explanation of the Vinaya he, in asking a question, did not ask, 'What is your contact, what is your feeling, what is your perception, what is your volition?' but making consciousness the principal, he asked, 'What is your mind, brother?' When answered, 'I have no mind to steal, lord,' the reply is not, 'Abstaining from theft through contact is not an offence, bhikkhu,' etc.,

¹ *Vin. Texts* ii. 213.² *S.* v. 50.³ *A.* iii, 185; *S.* v. 50.⁴ *S.* v. 50.⁵ *Yam.* ii. 18.⁶ *Dhs.*, § 1.

but 'Abstaining from theft in intention is not an offence, bhikkhu.' Not merely in the explanation of the Vinaya, but also in some other lay discourses has he shown mind to be the principal. Even as he said, 'Bhikkhus, whatever states are immoral, pertain to the immoral, take sides with the immoral, all are led by mind; of these states mind arises first.'²

*'Consciousness leads, rules, makes all modes of mind.
And whoso speaks or acts with evil mind,
Him evil follows as the wheel the ox.
Consciousness leads, rules, makes all modes of mind.
And whoso speaks or acts with a good mind,
Bliss like a faithful shadow follows him.'*³

*By mind the world is led, by mind is drawn:
And all men own the sovereignty of mind.'*⁴

'Bhikkhu, through mental corruptions beings are corrupted; through mental purity beings are purified.'⁵ This mind, bhikkhus, is dazzling, and yet it is defiled by foreign corruptions.'⁶ 'Householder, when the mind is unguarded, bodily action is unguarded, speech also is unguarded, thought also is unguarded.' . . . Householder, when the mind is guarded . . . malevolent . . . not malevolent . . . saturated with lust . . . not saturated with lust . . . then acts, words and thoughts are in a corresponding state.'⁷ Thus in dealing with worldly matters mind is the chief, mind is the principal, mind is the forerunner. Thus it should be understood, [69] and further, that not only one or two of these Suttas, but all are to be taken collectively so that one may support the other.

In asking questions on transcendental matters, one says not 'What contact have you acquired, what feeling, perception, or volition?' but 'Bhikkhu, what understanding have you acquired?—understanding of the first Path or the second or the third or the fourth?' laying stress on understanding as

¹ Vin. iii. 58.

² A. i. 11.

³ Dh. ver. 1, 2.

⁴ S. i. 39. Cf. parikassati here, there parikissati.

⁵ A. i. 10.

⁶ S. iii. 151.

⁷ A. i. 261.

the chief and the principal. No moral states headed by understanding become degraded. But what is the purpose of understanding? 'Bhikkhus, in the Ariyan disciple endowed with understanding there are established faith which follows it, energy which follows it, and mindfulness and concentration which follow it.'¹

These and other Suttas should be noted here (as pointing to wisdom or understanding as the principal faculty). Thus when we come to transcendental matters, understanding is the chief, the principal, the forerunner. But we are here discussing secular matters. Hence, making mind the principal, he said, 'consciousness (*i.e.*, mind) has arisen.'

'Accompanied by joy': this means 'gone into the state of a common origin with joy, in the sense of enjoying pleasure like honey.' This word 'accompanied' (*sahagata*) has the meanings of 'corresponding nature,' 'mingled,' 'dependence,' 'object,' 'associated with.' 'This craving produces repeated births and is accompanied by passionate delight'²—here *sahagata* means 'of corresponding nature.' The meaning is that craving has become passionate delight. 'This investigation, bhikkhus, is accompanied by idleness, associated with idleness'³—here *sahagata* should be known in the sense of 'mingled,' 'mingled with idleness arising at intervals.' 'He develops that factor of wisdom called mindfulness, accompanied by the idea of the skeleton:'⁴—here *sahagata* should be understood as 'dependence.' The meaning is, 'depending on the notion of the skeleton and developing the idea, mindfulness as a factor of wisdom has been obtained.' In the passage, 'He has acquired the attainments accompanied by rūpa, or by the immaterial'⁵—*sahagata* is used in the sense of mental 'object.' In the passage, 'This happiness is accompanied by this zest, [70] is coexistent and associated with it'⁶—*sahagata* is used in the sense of combination. And in this expression, 'accompanied by joy,'

¹ S. v. 229.² S. iii. 158.³ S. v. 280⁴ S. v. 131.⁵ Not traced.⁶ Vibh. 258. . . . As of water and milk.—*Tikā*.

the last meaning is intended. For here 'accompanied by joy' is synonymous with 'thoroughly mixed with joy.'

And this word (*samsattha*) is seen with many meanings, such as 'similar,' 'saturated,' 'companionship,' 'coexistence.' 'Avoiding lean and fat horses, *samsattha* horses (in age, appearance and speed) have been yoked'¹—here the word *samsattha* means 'similar.' 'Ladies, you live *samsattha* with passion'²—here it means 'saturated with passion.' 'He lives in association with householders'³—here *samsattha* means 'mentally intimate.' 'This happiness is accompanied by this zest, is coexistent, *samsattha* and conjoined with it'—it means 'coexistent.' Here also in 'accompanied by joy'—*samsattha* means 'coexistence in association.' Herein there is no conjoining which is without coexistent, or accompaniment. But the coexistent may or may not be associated and conjoined. For in material and immaterial states which are produced together, matter is coexistent with non-matter, but is not associated or conjoined with it. Likewise non-matter with matter, and matter with matter. But non-matter is always accompanied by, coexistent, associated, and conjoined with non-matter. Bearing this coexistence in a state of mixture, so to speak and in association—this is meant when it is said, 'accompanied by joy.'

By 'associated with knowledge' is meant 'yoked evenly by way of a common origin,' etc. What should further be said here has been said in the triplet of feeling in the commentary on the Table of Contents. Thus it should be understood that this consciousness is associated (with knowledge) by the characteristics of a common origin, common cessation, common basis, common object. This exposition indicates a maximum limit. But in immaterial existence association without a common basis is obtained.

By this sentence (viz., 'sensuous . . . associated with knowledge'), which class of consciousness is being discussed? That main type in moral (consciousness), experienced in the universe of sense, which is accompanied by joy, thrice-

¹ *Jāt.* vi. 22.

² *Vin.* iv. 240.

³ *Vin.* ii. 4.

conditioned, associated with knowledge, and automatic. By the indefinite question, 'Which states are moral?' the morals of the four planes of life are taken.¹ By the words, 'sensuous moral thought has arisen,' the moral consciousness of the three (higher) planes is excluded, and only the eightfold sensuous moral consciousness is taken. By the expression, 'accompanied by joy,' that fourfold consciousness which is accompanied by hedonic indifference is excluded from these eight; only the fourfold consciousness accompanied by joy is taken. By the expression 'associated with knowledge,' from these four is excluded the twofold consciousness dissociated from knowledge; [71] only the twofold consciousness associated with knowledge is taken. Automatic (or unprompted)² consciousness should not be commented on, as it has not yet been uttered in the text itself. But though it has not been made explicit, yet because the next class of consciousness is said to be consciously prompted, it should be understood that this first type is automatic. For the Supreme Buddha from the very beginning intended to classify this main type of consciousness on this principle, and hence it should here be considered as carried out.

Now in order to show consciousness by way of object he said 'visible or,' etc.; thus the Blessed One in expounding immaterial states shows them by way of basis or object, or both basis and object, or by way of their own function or property.

To expand: In such passages as—'There is contact [having its basis] in the eye, ear . . . in the sense-mind; feeling born of visual contact . . . of sense-mind; visual cognition . . . sense-mind cognition'—immaterial states are shown by way of basis.³ 'Perception of visible object . . . of ideas; cognition of colour—of ideas'⁴—in such passages they are shown by way of objects. 'Visual cognition arises in dependence upon

¹ See *Dhs.* (or *B.P.E.*), §§ 1281-87.

² *Asankhāriyabhāvo*. Cf. *B.P.E.* § 146.

³ In visual contact, etc., the sensitive organ is the basis; in mind-consciousness, etc., the mind-door, as the cause, is the basis.—*Ṭīkā*.

⁴ *S.* ii. 251.

sensitive eye and visible object, contact arises from the concourse of these three . . . ; mental cognition arises in dependence upon mind-door and object of thought, contact arises from the concourse of the three ¹—in such passages they are shown by way of basis and object. ‘Volitions, bhikkhus, arise through ignorance; rebirth-consciousness arises through volitions’²—in such passages they are shown by way of their own functions or properties. But in this place, showing them by way of objects he said, ‘visible object or,’ etc.

Herein ‘visible object’ is just one that is past, present, or future arising from four (things);³ ‘audible object’ is just one that is sound, past, present, or future, due to two things;⁴ ‘olfactory object’ is odour, past, present or future, due to four (things);³ ‘gustatory object’ is taste, past, present, or future, due to four (things);³ ‘tangible object’ is touch, past, present, or future, due to four causes.³ ‘Cognizable objects’ include (a) states due to one, two, three, four, or to none of these causes⁵ (b) states past, present, or future; and (c) states which cannot be said to be either (a) or (b), *i.e.*, all states said to be the field of consciousness, but other than those five sensibles already described.⁶

[72] Those who say that ‘cognizable object’ includes also the five sensibles which have not come into the avenue of the senses should be refuted by the following Sutta, where it is said: ‘Mind, brother, is the true refuge (or, co-ordinating resort) of these five sense-faculties, which have several objects and fields of sense, incapable of experiencing one another. Mind experiences their several fields.’⁷ Visible objects, etc., are the objective fields of these five sense-faculties; though they are experienced by the mind, it is clear that they are still objects of sight, etc.⁸ And further the meaning is rendered

¹ *Majjhima* (henceforth indicated by *M.*) i. 11; *S.* iv. 32.

² *S.* ii. 2.

³ *Viz.*, past action, mind, physical inanimate causes, and nutriment.—*Tr.*

⁴ *Viz.*, the second and third of the foregoing.—*Tr.*

⁵ *E.g.*, old age and impermanence.—*Tr.*

⁶ Thus (c) refer to concepts and Nibbāna.—*Tr.*

⁷ *M.* i. 295.

⁸ Hence they are not objects of thought.—*Tr.*

clear from the fact of these sensibles being also the objects of the knowledge given by supernormal vision, etc. For the five objects of sense which have not come into the avenue of the ordinary senses are the objects of supernormal vision, etc., but they are not objects of sense-mind. By what has now been said the determination of objects should be understood.

Of the six objects each comes into the avenues of two 'doors': the visible object (light and colour) comes into the avenue of the mind-door the moment it strikes the sensitive organ, that is to say, it causes vibration of the life-continuum. The case with sound, odour, taste and touch as objects is similar. Just as a bird flying through the sky and alighting on a tree touches the branch of the tree and its shadow strikes the ground, the touching with the branch and the spreading of the shadow taking place in one moment, simultaneously, so the contact with the sensitive organ, etc., by the presented object of sense is simultaneous with its coming into the avenue of the mind-door through its ability to cause the life-continuum to vibrate. After that, the life-continuum is cut off by a process through the eye-door, etc., beginning with 'adverting' and ending with 'determining';¹ immediately after which a state of consciousness of the main type takes place with any one of those objects. In the purely representative process through the mind-door, however, there is no function of striking the sensitive organ.

These objects present themselves naturally by virtue of having been seen, heard, smelt, tasted and touched. How? Some one here below circumambulates a great shrine, which is well plastered, variegated by colours of orpiment, realgar, etc., beset with divers kinds of flags and banners, interlaced with flowers and wreaths, encircled by garlands, so to speak, of lights, illumined by an enchanting glory, and adorned in every respect. On the sixteen platforms he pays homage in the five-fold manner of contact.² With clasped hands raised in

¹ Cf. *Compendium* 27-30; 126 f.

² If standing by (a) keeping the two feet evenly together on the ground, (b) keeping the two palms evenly together in contact, (c) raising them to the forehead, (d) bowing or bending towards an object of

adoration he stands looking upwards [73] with rapture derived from the contemplation of the Buddha. Having thus derived rapture from the contemplation of the Buddha by looking at the shrine, wherever, subsequently, he may have gone and seated himself in places [reserved] for night or day, the well-decorated shrine seems to appear to his eye on reflection, as it did actually at the time when he circumambulated it. Thus, first of all, by previous sight, a visible object comes into the 'avenue.'¹ Hearing the sound of one who with a sweet voice lectures on the doctrine, or who with a sweet voice is merely reciting or reading the Text, wherever, subsequently, he sits thoughtful, the sermon expounded or the text recited is represented at his mind-door, as if it came into the avenue of his ear-door as when he listened and gave his approbation. Thus through previous hearing, the audible object comes into the avenue. Getting a fragrant perfume or flower he offers it with the scent as an object of mind either in his seat or in a shrine; then wherever he afterwards sits down thoughtful, the perfume is as if it came into the avenue of the nose-door as at the time of making the offering. Thus through previous smell the olfactory object comes into the avenue. He enjoys an excellent meal in common with his fellow-monks; subsequently wherever, on getting inferior food, he reflects on his having enjoyed an excellent meal on a certain previous occasion with his fellow-monks, that sapid object is as though it came into the avenue of the tongue-door as at the time when he enjoyed it. Thus the sapid object comes into the avenue through previous experience. He enjoys a soft bed or stool or carpet or covering pleasant to the touch, and subsequently wherever he feels a hard bed, and reflects that he has enjoyed a soft bed

adoration, (e) finally separating the palms and placing one on each side of the head. If seated by (a) letting fall the two knees evenly together on the ground, (b) letting fall the two elbows evenly together on the ground, (c) stretching the two forearms and spreading the palms out, (d) keeping them evenly together on the ground, (e) placing the head on the back of the two palms.—*Vinayālaṅkāra*.

¹ Āpātham. Cf. *Vin. Texts* ii. 12; *M.* i. 190. *Bud. Psy.* 66.

on a previous occasion, the tangible object comes into the avenue, as it was actually felt at the time when he enjoyed that pleasurable touch. Thus through previous touch a blanket as tangible object comes into the avenue. Thus in the mind-door as such there is no function of contact with the sensory organism. Through having been seen, heard, smelt, tasted, and touched, these objects should be understood as coming naturally into the avenue.

Now the following is another method of exposition, [74] not mentioned in the (earlier) Commentaries, of the natural representation of objects that have been seen, etc. First and foremost, what is seen, heard, and connected with both—these should be understood as such. Things 'seen' includes what has been seized through the five doors; things 'heard' is what has not been 'seen' directly, but what is learnt by hearsay about the five sensibles.¹ An idea connected with both sources of knowledge is termed 'connected with both.' Thus should it be understood that by virtue of the former these objects (*i.e.*, sensibles) come into the avenue of the mind-door. Herein the representation of them has been described above in five ways. But (as regards the latter class) some one hears that the figure of the Buddha, born of superior merit, is like this and that, that his voice is exceeding sweet, that the scent of certain flowers in a certain place is very delightful, that the taste of certain fruits in a certain place is very sweet, and that the touch of certain coverings, etc., is very pleasant. From mere hearsay, without actual contact with the sensory organs, these sensibles come into the avenue of (or are represented at) the mind-door. Then to such an one consciousness (of that first main type), having for its object that sight or sound described, arises by virtue of faith; or consciousness of the same type with that scent, etc., as its object, arises by virtue of a desire to present such (flowers, fruits, or coverings described) to Ariyans, or by virtue of moral approbation of their being offered by others. Thus these five sensibles come into the avenue at the

¹ These two fields might be rendered by 'experience' and 'information.' Cf. *Compendium of Phil.* 37.—*Tr.*

mind-door through what is 'heard.' Lastly, another person has either seen or heard about those things mentioned. To him the thought occurs: 'Of such and such a figure will be the Buddha who will arise in the future.' In this way visible objects, etc., come into the avenue at the mind-door by virtue of their connection with things seen or heard, without actual contact with the sensitive organism. Then to him consciousness (of this first main type), with one or other of the five sensibles as object, arises in the manner described above. Thus it is to be understood that by virtue of the connection with both (experience and information) objects of sight, etc., come into the avenue at the mind-door. This is only a hint.

By virtue of (a) (blind) faith, (b) approved criticism, (c) ratio-cination on aspects of things, (d) satisfaction at intuition into any reality, etc., the coming into the avenue of visible objects, etc., at the mind-door should be understood in detail. Inasmuch as these objects, which have been represented by faith, criticism, logic, intuition, etc., are both real and unreal, this method has not been adopted in the Commentary. It should be understood that an apperceptual thought¹ having any one of the objects arises through two doors in the manner described. Thus the apperception of a visible object arises at the eye-door and also at the mind-door. The same is the case with apperceptions of sound, etc. Of these doors the apperception of a visible object arising in the mind-door is of three kinds: accomplished by charity, virtue, or culture. [75] Of these again each is of three kinds: deed (body), word, and thought. And the same with apperceptions of sound, etc.

Of these objects, this moral consciousness of the first main type arises having as visible object a certain desirable, pleasing, agreeable, and captivating colour as a sign of beauty in blue-green, yellow, red, or white flowers, raiment, minerals, or metals. 'But is not this desirable object the fundamental cause of greed? How then is this consciousness good?'—(an objector might ask). (The answer is): It has become good by virtue of its being determined, bent,

¹ *Javanam. Cf. Compendium of Phil. 29.*

trained, and laid to heart.¹ To expand: A person thinking: 'I ought to do meritorious deeds,' has his mind 'determined' for moral acts, 'bent' only on moral acts by inhibiting immoral acts, well 'trained' by constant practice of good. And has 'laid to heart' through such sufficing conditions as residence in a suitable place, (assistance from or) dependence on good associates, hearing the good Law, merit performed in former existences, etc. Thus by virtue of determination, inclination, training, and idea, there occurs to him a moral thought.

The state of being 'accompanied by joy' should here be understood in virtue of the specific objects before the mind. For this first class of consciousness is accompanied by joy, because a desirable object having arisen, abundance of such factors as faith are reasons for joy. For in those without faith and of wrong views, joy does not arise even when they see the figure of the Tathāgata, which is a truly desirable object. Those, again, who do not see the advantage of producing merit do not experience joy, even though incited by others to do good. Therefore abundance of faith, purity of views, seeing advantage in merit, should be understood as factors of this consciousness in making it accompanied by joy.

Eleven states also conduce to the production of zest (or rapture) as a factor of wisdom, namely, recollection of the Buddha, of the Law, of the Order, of the precepts, of self-sacrifice, of spirits, of peace, avoidance of rough (*i.e.*, ill-tempered) persons, serving meek persons, reflection on a Suttanta which instils faith and a tendency to all this. [76] It is thus that 'accompanied by joy' should be understood. The more detailed account in the *Bojjhaṅgavibhaṅga*² will make this clear.

The association with knowledge mentioned in this class of consciousness may be inferred from such causes as kamma (in this existence), birth as determined by past kamma, maturity of the controlling faculties, and distance from the corruptions. For instance, one who preaches the Law to others, teaches the different kinds of blameless arts, manual labour and knowledge,

¹ *Abhujita*.

² *Vibhaṅga*, p. 227. See also p. 101.—*Ed.*

respectfully asks the preacher to preach the Law, and gives alms of divers kinds with the wish: 'in the future I shall become wise'—to him depending on such kamma, a moral thought (may be said to) arise in association with knowledge. To one born in a world free from ill-will (*i.e.*, the world of attenuated matter) a moral thought associated with knowledge also occurs. To that (spirit) happy therein, sentences of doctrine appear, *e.g.* 'Slow, bhikkhus, is the production of mindfulness; but when it is produced, that person quickly acquires special distinctions'¹—in this way, in dependence upon rebirth also, a moral thought arises in association with knowledge. Moreover, when a moral thought arises also in dependence on the maturity of faculties, it does so in association with knowledge in those who have arrived at the maturity of those faculties at the wisdom-decade.² And when a moral thought arises also in dependence on distance from the corruptions, it does so in association with knowledge in those who have discarded them.

Truly has it been said:

Wisdom³ the studious gain, the heedless lose.

Thus the association of a moral thought with knowledge may be inferred from such causes as kamma, re-birth, the maturity of controlling powers, distance from the corruptions.

Further, there are seven states conducive to investigation of the Law as a factor of enlightenment: frequent questionings (on elements, aggregates, etc.), cleansing of things or substances, equalizing of the faculties, avoiding of unintelligent persons, frequenting of wise persons, reflection on teachings of deep knowledge, inclination (of mind) towards this. For these reasons thought associated with knowledge can also be inferred. The detailed account in the *Bojjhaṅgavibhaṅga* will make this clear.

The main (type of) moral thought which has thus arisen

¹ A. ii. 185.

² Paññādasaka, *i.e.* the ten years (forty to fifty) of maturing wisdom. Cf. *Visuddhi-Magga*, ch. xx.—*Tr.*

³ Bhūrī, lit. abundance.—*Dhp.*, ver. 282.

in association with knowledge is called [77] automatic from its arising without external aid, instigation, or inducement. It has a captivating colour as its object, and arises in three fixed ways, being brought about by charity, virtue, or culture. How? The subject gets either flowers, clothes, or elements [of metals or minerals] such as are blue-green, yellow, red, or white, and bearing in mind a particular colour and thinking, 'This will be my gift of colour,' offers the object to the Three Jewels, namely, the Buddha, etc.; then the consciousness is brought about by charity. For here is a story which I have heard: The treasurer Saṅghamitta (of King Dutthagāmaṇi),¹ it is said, got a dress embroidered with gold and presented it at the great shrine, saying, 'This dress is golden in appearance, the Supreme Buddha also is golden in appearance; the golden cloth suits the Golden One, and it will be our gift of colour.' At such time it is to be understood that the thought is accomplished by charity. But when he gets such a gift and offers it to the Jewels: the Buddha, etc., saying, 'It (i.e., this act of gift) is my family custom, family tradition, family usage, it is my duty,' then the thought is accomplished by virtue.² But when he, presenting the three Jewels with such a cloth, establishes the (conviction of) perishing and transience, namely, that 'this colour will perish, will pass away,' then the thought is accomplished by culture.

When the thought, though accomplished by charity, occurs to one who offers the gift to the three Jewels with his own hands, then an act of body accompanies it. When he in offering it to the three Jewels, orders his son, wife, servants, etc., to present it, then there is an act of speech. When he thinks, 'I will make a gift of colour,' referring to the actual object spoken of in various ways, then an act of thought arises. As regards Vinaya exposition, when such words as 'I will give this, I will do this' are spoken, it amounts to a gift by this characteristic of spoken words. But as regards Abhidhamma exposition, a moral thought arises from the time

¹ So the *Yojanā*.

² *Sīla* is here *cāritasīla*, positive virtue, as opposed to *vārittasīla*, negative morality. Cf. *Visuddhi-Magga*, p. 11.—*Tr.*

when there is thinking in the mind of giving an existing object. It is said [in the Great Commentary] that afterwards by act or speech he will do what is necessary. Thus the consciousness which is accomplished by charity is threefold by virtue of acts of body, speech and thought.

But when, having got an object so spoken of, he offers it to the three Jewels with his own hands according to the traditions of his family, then the act of body is accomplished by virtue. When by family tradition he commands his family to make the offering, then the act of speech is accomplished by virtue. [78] When he thinks of offering as a gift of colour something actually existing according to family custom, family tradition, usage, as his duty, then it is an act of thought. Thus a thought accomplished by virtue is threefold by way of body, speech, and thought. But when he gets the object spoken of and offers it to the three Jewels, and while walking to and fro establishes (the conviction of) perishing and transience, then occurs an act of body accomplished by culture. To him who contemplates as above, accompanied by words, occurs an act of speech (accomplished by culture). To him who so contemplates, without moving the bodily or vocal organs, occurs an act of thought (accomplished by culture). Thus a thought accomplished by culture is threefold by way of body, speech and thought. Thus the Lord of the Law has shown this moral consciousness of a visible object as classified on the threefold basis of meritorious act, as well as by the nine doors of action. The classification applies to audible and other objects. For instance, making a mental object of a captivating sound by a drum or other instrument, this consciousness arises in the three ways as mentioned above. Herein it is not possible to pluck a sound like a bulb or root, and place it in the hand like a stalk of blue lotus and offer it. But a gift of it may be made, together with its basis, *i.e.* the musical instrument. Therefore with the intention of making a gift of sound, he makes a gift of one or other of the instruments, the drum, etc., to the three Jewels, or causes such instruments to be set up; he offers to the religious preachers oil and molasses, etc., as medicine to improve the voice, or announces the sermons and

lectures he has arranged;¹ he delivers votes of thanks; then the thought is accomplished by charity. When he does all this ceremony by family custom, etc., as his duty, then it is accomplished by virtue. When, having done all this, he contemplates that such a sound, even though it reaches the Brahmā world, will perish and pass away, then it is accomplished by culture.

Herein, first of all, a thought accomplished by charity becomes an act of body when, taking the drum, etc., he offers them with his own hands, or, though he places them for a perpetual offering, does so with his own hands, or when, with the intention of making a gift of sound, he goes to proclaim the hearing of the Law, to discourse on the Law, or to recite the text.

It is translated into an act of speech when he gives orders: 'Go, friends, make an offering to the three [79] Jewels of this our gift of sound,' and 'place this bheri-drum or this mutiṅga-drum in the precincts of that shrine,' or when he himself proclaims the hearing of the Law, makes a religious speech, or recites the text. But it remains a mere act of thought when, without moving the bodily and vocal organs, he mentally surrenders the actually existing object with the thought, 'I shall make a gift of sounds.' To him who, with the idea that the gift of sound is customary according to his family custom, family tradition, family usage, offers drums, etc., with his own hands or places them in the precincts of the shrine, etc., with his own hands, or gives with his own hands (to the religious preacher) the medicine for the improvement of the voice, or goes, duty bound, to proclaim the hearing of the Law, to discourse on the Law, or recite the text, the thought accomplished by virtue becomes an act of body. To one who gives an order, 'The gift of sound is in accordance with our family custom, family tradition, family usage; go, friends, to the three Jewels, the Buddha, etc., and make an offering'; or to him who himself speaks on the Law, or recites the text as

¹ *Upanisinnakakatham karoti* (cf. *Upaniṣad*). The Commentator (*ṭīkā*) explains this as: 'recites the Pali text, pronounces religious discourses, delivers lectures.'

a custom of his family, etc., it is translated into an act of speech. To one who thinks: 'The gift of sound is a custom of my family, I will make a gift of it,' and mentally sacrifices the existing object without moving the bodily and vocal organs, it remains a mere act of thought. When going to and fro he establishes (the conviction of) transience and passing away of sound, then the thought accomplished by culture becomes an act of body. To one who accompanies his contemplation with words, but without moving the bodily organs, it becomes an act of speech. But to one who so contemplates the sound in mind only, without moving the bodily and vocal organs, it becomes an act of thought. Thus the Lord of the Law has shown consciousness of an audible object as classified on the threefold basis of meritorious act by means of the nine doors of action.

Selecting, as an object of sense, a captivating scent out of perfumes from roots, etc., a moral thought arises in three fixed ways as said above. Therein when, on getting any one of the scented roots, etc., he, considering it by virtue of the scent and saying, 'my gift of perfume shall take place,' honours the Buddha-Jewel, etc. therewith, then the moral thought is accomplished by charity. All should be understood in detail as was said in the case of a gift of colour. Thus the Lord of the Law has shown consciousness of a scent as an object classified on the threefold basis of meritorious act by means of the nine doors of action.

Making an object of sense of a captivating taste among tastes of roots, etc., a moral thought arises in three fixed ways as was said above. Therein when he gets any object of a captivating taste among roots, etc., [80] and considers it by virtue of the taste, saying, 'my gift of taste shall take place,' and makes an offering, a giving up, then the moral thought is accomplished by charity. All should be understood in detail as was said in the case of a gift of colour.

But here there is a difference in the case of a thought accomplished by virtue. Stories occur in the Great Commentary beginning with that of king *Dutthagāmaṇi Abhaya*, who ate an excellent meal after offering (the like) to twelve

thousand bhikkhus, saying, 'It is not our custom to partake of food without (first) giving it to the Order.' Thus the Lord of the Law has shown consciousness of a taste as an object classified under the threefold basis of meritorious act by means of the nine doors of action.

When the object is something tangible, it consists of the three Great Essentials (or Elements), viz.: extension, heat, mobility. In this connection reference is not to these, but to such things as beds, stools, etc. To expand: When on getting, among furniture, any captivating tangible object he considers it by virtue of the touch and surrenders it with the thought, 'This is my gift of touch,' then the thought is accomplished by charity. All should be understood in detail as was said in the case of a gift of colour. Thus the Lord of the Law has shown consciousness of a tangible object classified under the threefold basis of meritorious act by means of the nine doors of action.


In the case of an object of thought, the six internal sense-organs, the three characteristic marks, the three immaterial aggregates, the fifteen material subtle qualities of matter, Nibbāna and concepts, whether included in the given object or not, form the object of thought. In this connection there is reference not to these, but to gifts of food, drink and life. A moral thought with a captivating object from among nutritive substances, etc., arises in the three fixed ways as said above. Therein when he offers butter, ghee, etc., as his gift of food, the eight drinks¹ as a gift of drink, and when as a gift of life he offers a meal by lot, a meal for a party, a meal for the Order, etc., gives medicine to indisposed monks, or gets a physician to attend to the sick, has the net destroyed, the fish-trap broken, the bird-cage spoiled, effects the release of the fettered, prescribes by beat of drum the non-taking of life and does such other acts to protect life, then the thought in question is accomplished by charity. And when by reason of principal or sacred duty he makes these gifts of food, drink, and life because of his family custom, family tradition, family usage, the moral thought under discussion is accomplished by

virtue. When he establishes the conviction of transience and passing away in an object of thought, [81] then the thought in question is accomplished by culture. When with his own hands he makes the gifts of food, drink and life, then the thought accomplished by charity becomes also an act of body. When he does so by ordering his family, then it becomes an act of speech. When, without moving his bodily and vocal organs, he thinks of giving an actually existing object as a gift of food, drink and life, then it becomes an act of thought. But when with his own hands he gives an existing object of various kinds as described above according to the custom or tradition of his family, etc., then the thought accomplished by virtue becomes an act of body. When he does so by ordering his family it becomes an act of speech. When he thinks of giving an existing object of divers kinds as said above according to the custom or tradition of his family, etc., then it becomes an act of thought. When walking to and fro he establishes the conviction of transience and passing away in an object of thought, then the thought accomplished by culture becomes an act of body. To one who establishes by words that conviction without moving his limbs, it becomes an act of speech. Without moving his bodily limbs and vocal organs, to him who in mind only establishes that conviction, it becomes an act of thought. Thus the thought accomplished by culture is threefold by virtue of body, speech, and thought. Thus the Lord of the Law has classified consciousness of an object of thought on the threefold basis of meritorious act by means of the nine doors of action.

This kind of consciousness (viz., the first moral thought of the main type) in connection with various physical bases and various objects of sense has now been elucidated. And it can be obtained by way of various objects of sense also in connection with any subject of discourse. How? Take the robe among the four requisites of a *religieux*—six objects of sense and thought are obtained. For example, the colour of a newly dyed robe is agreeable and comely: this is colour as object. When used it makes a rustling sound—*patta, patta*—it is then an audible object. What scent there is in it of dye-

stuffs such as bastard sandal wood or aloes, gives odour as object. Taste as an object in a robe may be spoken of figuratively as taste in usage. The pleasant touch there may be in it is tangible object. The pleasurable feeling arising because of the robe is object of thought. In the almsfood an object of taste in the literal sense is obtained. Thus among the four requisites (food, clothing, lodging, medicine) the various objects of sense taking their place, we must classify [our thought] according to charitable giving and so on.

Now of this kind of consciousness the object is a constant concomitant, because without it that consciousness does not arise. But the 'door' is not a constant concomitant. Why? Because of the variableness in previous actions (kamma). Action being not always predictable, the door is equally unpredictable.



PART III—DISCOURSE ON DOORS (OR GATES) (DVĀRAKATHĀ)

CHAPTER I

DOOR OF AN ACT OF BODY

To explain the meaning of this variableness of both *kamma* and door [82], the Great Commentary sets out a discourse on Doors (or Gates).

In this the following subject-heads, viz., the three kinds of action (*kamma*), three doors of action, five kinds of consciousness, five doors of consciousness, six kinds of contact, six doors of contact, eight [modes of] non-restraint, eight doors of non-restraint, eight [modes of] restraint, eight doors of restraint, ten courses of immoral acts, ten courses of moral acts, have been laid down in the Table of Contents (Pt. I.). Although the three actions are described first in that Table, we may leave these till later and take the three doors of action for classification. Which are the 'three doors of action'? Door of an act of body, door of an act of speech, and door of an act of thought.

In the expression 'act of body,' body is fourfold: that which is grasped at,¹ that which is produced by food, by the caloric order, by mind. Of these, eight material qualities produced by *kamma*, namely, those beginning with the organ of sight and ending with life-control, and the eight material qualities produced by *kamma*, viz., the four elements, colour, odour, taste and nourishing essence constitute the body as that which has been 'grasped at' (by desire, etc., attending the *kamma* in question). These eight qualities born of food constitute the body as produced by food; the same eight born of the caloric order constitute the body as produced by heat; and the same eight born of consciousness constitute the body as produced by mind.

¹ Or "laid hold of" (*upādinnaka-kāyo*). See p. 55.

Of these three doors, 'door of an act of body' is not (the aspect of) body as grasped at by kamma, nor as otherwise produced. But among the eight qualities of body produced by mind, one is (capacity of) intimation, and it is this that is meant by 'door of an act of body.' Concerning that door, it has been said, 'Which quality of body is called body-intimation? It is that particular quality of body which informs, intimates, or communicates in a unique manner, and which aids, supports, or strengthens the body of a person who, with a moral or immoral or unmoral thought, moves forward, or steps back, looks straight ahead or obliquely, bends or extends his limbs.'¹

To expand: When a thought, 'I will move forward or step back' occurs, it sets up bodily qualities (born of mind). Now there are eight groups of these bodily qualities: the four primaries: extension, cohesion, heat, mobility, and four depending on these: colour, odour, taste, nutritive essence (*ojā*). Among these, mobility strengthens, supports, agitates, moves forward or backward the coexisting physical body. Now in a cognitive process of simple 'adverting' (of attention), when the seven moments of apperception (*javana*) are set up, the first six cause to arise only such [83] mobility as can strengthen and support the coexisting body, but cannot move it. In consequence, however, of this work of the first six moments, the seventh moment sets up mobility able both to move the body forward and backward and to cause the act of looking straight ahead or obliquely, of bending and extending the limbs. Hence there results an act of going or coming or both; (by repetition more than a thousand times) it enables us to say that a man 'has gone a yojana, gone as far as ten yojanas.' As when a cart is drawn by seven yokes, the bullocks at the first yoke are able to bear the yoke but not to turn the wheels. And the same with the bullocks yoked to the second . . . and sixth yokes. But by harnessing bullocks to a seventh yoke a clever driver sitting in the forepart of the cart takes the reins and urges the bullocks with the goad, beginning from the foremost of all; then all the bullocks being of

¹ *Dhs.* § 636.

united strength steady the yoke, turn the wheels, draw the cart, enabling us to say that it has gone ten or twenty yojanas. Thus the completeness of this process should be understood.

Now the body produced by consciousness that is not 'intimation.' But there is a certain peculiar, unique mode of change in the primaries when set up by mind, through which, as a condition, mobility is able to strengthen, support and agitate the coexistent body. This is intimation. It is not set up by consciousness as are the eight qualities. But as has been said, 'From the decay and death of things that are impermanent, etc., bhikkhus, decay and death is impermanent and conditioned.' etc.;¹ so because of the communicableness of qualities set up by consciousness, intimation may also be said to be produced by consciousness. Because it is a capacity of communicating, it is called 'intimation.' What does it communicate? A certain wish communicable by an act of the body. If anyone stands in the path of the eye, raises his hands or feet, shakes his head or brow, the movements of his hands, etc. are visible. Intimation, however, is not so visible; it is only knowable by mind. For one sees by the eye a colour-surface moving by virtue of the change of position in hands, etc. But by reflecting on it as intimation, one knows it by mind-door-consciousness, thus: 'I imagine that this man wishes me to do this or that act.' For just as during the hot season, where there is water they tie the palm leaves, etc., on the top of a tree in a forest saying, 'By this sign men will know the existence here of water;' or on the door of a liquor-shop they raise a flag; [84] and just as the wind striking the tree blows it about; and the fish disturbing the water, bubbles appear on the surface; just as, again, at the edges of the course where a great flood has been are tangled grasses, leaves and rubbish, and thus in the palm-leaves, in the flag, in the waving foliage, in the bubbles, the grasses, the leaves, and the rubbish, even though they see not the actual objects thought of, men know by mind as follows: 'Here must be water, here liquor, thus the tree must be struck by the wind, there must be fish in the water,

¹ S. ii. 26.

the flood must have run its course overflowing to this extent,' even so intimation is not visible but knowable. One sees with the eye only the colour-object moving by virtue of change of position in hands,¹ etc. But by reflecting on intimation one knows it by knowing the wish thus: 'Methinks he wishes me to do this or that act.'

And intimation is so called not only because of communicating, but also because of being communicated. Communication by sign is intelligible to others, even to the lower animals. Wherever dogs, foxes, crows and cattle are assembled, and when they see the gesture of striking, on a stick or a stone being seized, they know, 'He wishes to strike us' and flee helter-skelter. There is a time when intimation is not manifest, the object being separated by a wall, enclosure, etc. But though not manifest at that moment to him, yet from its being manifest to those who are in its presence it is called intimation.

When the body set up by mind moves, does the body set up by the other three causes move or not? The latter moves likewise, goes with the former, and invariably follows it. Just as dry sticks, grass, etc., fallen in the flowing water go with the water or stop with it, so should the complete process be understood. Thus intimation among material qualities set up by mind should be understood as a door of an act of body.

By volition manifest in that door one takes life, commits thefts, commits adultery; or else refrains from life-taking, etc.; this volition is said to be an act of body.

There is a heretical view, that body being the door, the volition manifesting itself in that door is an act of body, which should be classed as moral or immoral. But putting this view aside, unmoral acts should also be included, thus making up the triplet.

Herein, as the city-gate stands in the place where it has been made and does not move to and fro even one finger-breadth, and people go about by that door, so while the 'door' does not change place with another, action which arises in this or that door does. Hence the Ancients say:

*Acts pass through doors, not doors through doors; by doors
One may distinguish well these acts from those.*

[85] Of these a 'door' receives its name from the act and *vice versa*. As the places where consciousness, etc., is set up, are known as the 'door' of consciousness, 'door' of contact, 'door' of non-restraint, 'door' of restraint, so the place where an act of body arises is known by the name of 'door of a bodily act.' And the same with the 'doors' of speech and thought. As a fairy residing in this or that tree gets its name from that tree, as the cotton-tree fairy, the butea-tree fairy, the nimba-tree fairy, or the phandāna fairy, so the place where the bodily act arises gets its name of 'door of the bodily act.' And the same with acts of speech and thought.

Of these body is one thing and action another. But from being performed by the body it is called bodily act. Hence the teachers of the Commentaries said:

*Work by a needle done is needle-work;
Needle and needle-work are things distinct.
Work by a hatchet done is hatchet-work;
Hatchet and hatchet-work are things distinct.
Work that by man is done is called man's work;
The man and the man's work are things distinct.
An act by body done is body-act;
Body and body-act are things distinct.*

(It may be objected that) if this is so, then the doors are not rightly determined, nor the acts. How? In body-intimation, in that it has been said,

*'Acts pass through doors, . . .'*¹

an act of speech may also arise; therefore to determine body-intimation as 'door of an act of body' (only) is not right. Again, an act of body may arise in speech-intimation; therefore to determine this as an act of body is not right. (We reply) —It is right. And why? Because of frequency and great preponderance. For usually an act of body and not speech or

¹ Whereas in a representative process there is only one kind of adverting to an object of thought at mind-door, in a presentative process, there are two kinds of adverting, first to a sensible external object at the outer door and then to the percept at the inner door.—*Tr.*

thought arises in body-intimation; and therefore intimation by gesture may be called door of an act of body. The acts are rightly determined just as the terms: Brahmin village, mango forest, and iron-wood forest are rightly applied. An act of body arises preponderantly in the body-door, slightly in the vocal door. Therefore from its arising chiefly in the body door, [86] the state of an act of body is (said to be there) accomplished; as we say 'woodmen' for those who frequent the forest, and 'lusty maids' (in general), in the same way are these acts rightly so allocated.¹

Here ends the Discourse on the door of an act of body.

CHAPTER II

DOOR OF AN ACT OF SPEECH

In this theory of the speech-door, speech may be considered under the three aspects of volition, abstinence and sound. For instance, 'words endowed with four factors, O bhikkhus, are well-spoken, not ill-spoken, faultless and unblamed by the wise'²—here speech is voluntary. 'Avoidance of and abstinence from the fourfold misconduct in speech . . . is called right speech'³—this is speech by way of abstinence. 'Speech, voice, enunciation, utterance, noise, making noises, speech, articulate speech-sounds'⁴—this is speech as sound. Now of these, 'door of an act of speech' is not the name of speech by way of volition nor of abstinence. But there is a certain intimation accompanying sounds (or words):—this is the door of an act of speech. Concerning this it is said: 'Which is that which is called intimation by speech? That speech, voice, enunciation, utterance, noise, making noises, speech,

¹ A village is called Brahmin village, though there are other people than Brahmins in it. Likewise with a mango grove. Brahmins refer to the act of body, village to door; just as the village is full of Brahmins, so the door is of acts.—*Ariyālaṅkāra*. On 'lusty maids' see *Jāt.* iv. 220.—*Ed.*

² *Sn.* ver. 78; *S.* i. 189 (cf. *Kindred Sayings* i., p. 239). The 'four' are well-spoken, righteous, kindly and truthful speech.—*Ed.*

³ *Vibhaṅga* 287.

⁴ *Dhs.* § 637.

articulation of one who has a moral, immoral or unmoral thought is called speech. By this speech there is intimation, information, communication; this quality is intimation by speech.¹ 'I will speak this, I will speak that'—for one thus thinking arises a sound produced by the diffusion of the initial application of mind. This is cognizable, not by the ear, but by the mind. This view is set forth in the Great Commentary. But in the traditional Commentaries on the Suttas, the expression 'sound produced by the diffusion of the initial application of mind' is explained as the sound arisen for one who reflects when he hears the words which, through diffusion of initial application of mind, are muttered in sleep or in swoon. In connection with those words he thinks: 'So that is what you think; so that is what your mind reveals!' and so thinking tells explanatory stories.²

In the *Paṭṭhāna* also occurs this sentence, 'Sound born of mind causally relates itself to the sense of hearing by way of an object.' Therefore there is no sound, due to diffusion of initial application of mind, which arises without an impact of intimation, and which is not cognizable by the ear.³ The thought, 'This will I speak, that will I speak,' sets up the eight material qualities—extension, [87] cohesion, heat, mobility, colour, odour, taste and nutritive essence. Among these, extension produced by consciousness arises impinging on, or striking the element of hardness grasped at by kamma. Sound arises together with that impact between the elements. It is sound set up by consciousness; it is not intimation. But there is a certain unique change (in the primaries set up by consciousness) which is the cause of bringing about the impact of the element, grasped at by kamma, on that set up by mind. This is speech-intimation. This should be followed by what has been said just above, namely: 'This is not produced by consciousness like the eight qualities,' etc.

But here, *i.e.*, in the case of the door of an act of speech, or speech-intimation, if we hear the sound of another calling

¹ *Dhs.*, § 637.

² Cf. *Dialogues* i. 278 (*Kevaddha Sutta*).

³ Cf. *Points of Controversy* ix. 9.

our name, 'Tissa,' 'Datta,' or 'Mitta,' and think of the intimation, we know it as this: 'Methinks he wishes me to do this or that act.' As in intimation by gesture this also is intelligible to the lower animals. Hearing such sounds as come, 'go,' they know, 'He wishes me to do this, methinks,' and accordingly come or go. But the alternative 'moves or does not move the body produced by three causes' does not hold here. Neither is there the strengthening function (of extension or of impact) produced by the first moment of apperception. It is by the volition which is accomplished in that speech-door that we speak falsehood, calumniate, speak harsh words, frivolous speech, or refrain from all these. This is an act of speech. Henceforward all determination of action and of door should be understood as said above.

Here ends the Discourse on the door of an act of speech.

CHAPTER III

DOOR OF AN ACT OF THOUGHT

IN the discourse on the door of an act of thought, mind is considered as fourfold by way of the planes of life.

Of these, the plane of sensuous consciousness is of fifty-four classes; that pertaining to the universe of attenuated matter is of fifteen classes; that pertaining to the immaterial universe is of twelve classes; the transcendental is of eight classes—in all eighty-nine.¹

Of these, it cannot be said that what is called mind is not mind-door, any more than it can be said that what is volition is not kamma. Just as even the volition associated with the fivefold cognition (*i.e.*, of the five external senses) has been shown in the Great Book to be kamma, even so it should not be said that mind is not mind-door.

Here a question might be asked: what does this (mind-) kamma do? It harmonizes, arranges, co-ordinates, thinks, stimulates and decides. This being so, what does the volition of the fivefold external sense harmonize, arrange, [88] co-ordi-

¹ Cf. *Comp. of Phil.* 92.

nate ? The co-existent factors. For it harmonizes, arranges, co-ordinates, thinks, stimulates and decides the associated aggregates that are co-existent. This section is generally discoursed on (by teachers) by way of a compendium. What does it amount to ? The following is the answer decided upon here:— Mind having twenty-nine phases, which is moral or immoral, and is common to life in the three planes, is the door of an act of thought. The volition which is accomplished in that door, by which we take up covetousness, ill-will, wrong views, or non-covetousness, good-will and right views:—this volition is an act of thought. Henceforward all determination of action and of door should be understood as said above.

Here ends the Discourse on the door of an act of thought. These are the three doors of action.

CHAPTER IV

DISCOURSE ON KAMMA (VOLUNTARY ACTION)

THEY (*i.e.*, the three doors of action) have been shown without first considering the three kammās.¹ We now, making a beginning with these three kammās, shall give a detailed account of the table of contents of the remaining portion of the discourse on the doors.

These are the three kammās: bodily kamma, vocal kamma, mental kamma. And what is this kamma ? Volition, as well as some states associated therewith. The following Suttas illustrate that volition is a state of kamma. ‘I declare, bhikkhus, that volition is kamma. Having willed, one acts by body, speech and thought.’² ‘When, Ānanda, there is bodily action, speech or thought, pleasure and pain to the self arise by reason of volition capable of causing an act, speech or thought.’³ ‘Bhikkhus, threefold volition capable of causing an act constitutes the bodily kamma, immoral, increasing pain and having a painful result; fourfold volition capable of causing speech, bhikkhus, constitutes the

¹ Cf. above, p. 109.

² *A.* iii. 415.

³ *S.* ii. 20 f. *A.* ii. 157 f.

vocal kamma, immoral, etc.; bhikkhus, threefold volition capable of causing thought constitutes the mental kamma, immoral,' etc.¹ Similarly with the bodily, vocal or mental kamma which is moral, increasing pain and having a pleasurable result.² 'If, Ānanda, this futile man Samiddhi, on being questioned, were to reply to the Wanderer, Pātaliputta, "Friend Pātaliputta, one who has done a voluntary and pleasurable action by body, speech and thought, experiences pleasure, one who has done a . . . pain-bringing . . . a . . . neutral action . . . experiences neither pleasure nor pain," then the futile man Samiddhi would reply rightly to the Wanderer Pātaliputta, O Ānanda,³—these are the Suttas which show first of all that volition is kamma.'

And that states associated with volition are also kamma has been shown by the fourfold classification of kamma. It has been said, 'Bhikkhus, there are four, [89] which I have realized and understood by my own higher (intuitive) knowledge. Which are the four? There is, bhikkhus, kamma which is impure and productive of impurity; there is, bhikkhus, kamma which is pure and productive of purity; there is bhikkhus, kamma which is both impure and pure, and productive of both impurity and purity; there is, bhikkhus, kamma which is neither impure nor pure, productive of neither impurity nor purity, and which, though itself kamma, conduces to the destruction of kammās. And which, bhikkhus, is kamma which is neither impure nor pure, and is productive of neither impurity nor purity? How does it, though itself kamma, lead to the destruction of kammās? The seven factors of wisdom:—mindfulness, etc., may be said to be kamma, which, being neither impure nor pure, productive of neither impurity nor purity, lead to the destruction of kammās.' *The same is repeated substituting the Ariyan eightfold path for the seven factors of wisdom.*⁴ Thus these fifteen states, factors of wisdom and of the Path, have been shown by the fourfold classification of kamma.

The twenty-one states, viz., these fifteen together with

¹ Not traced.

² Sentence omitted in P.T.S. ed.

³ *Majjhima*, iii. 208 f.

⁴ *Aṅguttara*, ii. 230 f.

the six:—covetousness, ill-will, wrong view, non-covetousness, good-will, right view—should be understood as states associated with volition.

Of these, the transcendental Path may be included in, and classified under, the three forms of kamma (bodily, vocal, mental). To expand: Restraint of the wickedness of transgression by body should be understood as bodily; restraint of the wickedness of transgression in speech, as vocal. Thus right act is bodily kamma and right speech is vocal kamma. When this pair is taken, right living, because it consists of each, is included. Restraint of the wickedness of transgression in thought is mental. This act of thought is fivefold by virtue of (right) view, intention, exertion, mindfulness and concentration. Thus the transcendental Path, if classified, is classifiable under the three forms of kamma. Here comes the subject of inclusion under doors. There is such a thing as kamma which has not run its full course, though movements of bodily and vocal organs may have taken place and though it is generated at the mind-door. [90] Such kammas have been included under doors. Here is an illustration:

He who, thinking 'I will go a-hunting deer,' gets his bow ready, twists¹ the bow-strings, sharpens his spear, eats his meal, arranges his garments—so far he has moved his bodily limbs. After he has roamed the forest the whole day he does not get even a hare or a cat. Does this amount to immoral bodily kamma or not? It does not. And why? From its not having reached the full course of action. It should be understood as a mere misconduct of the body. And the same with such motives for catching fish, etc.

In the case of vocal doors, he gives an order, 'I will go a-hunting; quickly get my bow ready and the rest.' And as before, he does not get anything in the forest. In this case, though there is a movement of the vocal organs, it does not amount to bodily kamma from not having run through the full course of action. [Thus it should be understood as a mere misconduct in speech.]²

¹ *Lege vutteti*.

² Omitted in P.T.S. ed.

But in the case of mind-door there is this distinction: The mere harbouring of criminal intent to kill amounts to kamma, and that by ill-will, not by actual life-taking. For immoral bodily kamma arises in the bodily and vocal doors, but not in the mind-door. Likewise immoral vocal kamma. But immoral mental kamma arises in the three doors. Likewise moral bodily, vocal and mental kammās. How? One who takes life with his own hands, steals what is not given, and commits adultery, commits bodily kamma through the bodily door. Thus, first of all, immoral bodily kamma arises in the body-door. Covetousness, ill-will and wrong view, which are co-existent with those thoughts, pertain to volition and [as bodily kamma] are negligible.¹ To one ordering specifically, "Go, deprive such and such an one of life, steal such and such property," there is bodily kamma through the vocal door. Thus immoral bodily kamma arises in the vocal door. But covetousness, ill-will, wrong view, which are co-existent with these thoughts, pertain to volition and [as vocal kamma] are negligible. So far the teachers are in commentarial agreement.

But the sectary says that immoral bodily action may arise also in the mind-door. On being pressed to cite any Sutta adopted at the Three Councils, he quotes this Sutta called *Kuḷumpa* :— 'Furthermore, [91] bhikkhus, here in this world, someone, recluse or brahmin, who is endowed with supernormal potency and has attained a mastery of his will, repeatedly contemplates with evil intention the embryo of which some woman is pregnant thus: would that that embryo were not born in safety! Thus, bhikkhus, was the infanticide of Kuḷumpa committed.' After quoting this Sutta he says, 'In this way by mere intention the embryo was crushed like a mass of foam. Herein where is the movement of either bodily or vocal organs? It is in the mind-door that this immoral bodily kamma arises.' After saying, 'We shall weigh the meaning of your² Sutta,' the teachers weigh it thus: 'You have affirmed the killing of

¹ Because there is no directing oneself to what belongs to others, nor is there a command to kill.—*Anuṭṭikā*. On 'negligible' (*abboḥārikā*) see *Points of Controversy* 361, n. 4.

² Implying that the Sutta was not adopted at the Councils.—*Tr.*

another by potency [or mental force].’ Now potency is ten-fold: (1) of resolve, (2) of transformation, (3) accomplished by mind, (4) of diffusion by insight, (5) of the Ariyas, (6) inborn with the result of kamma, (7) of the meritorious, (8) accomplished through art, (9) accomplished by culture, (10) accomplished through industrial processes in this or that work.¹ Of these, to which potency did you refer?’ ‘That which is accomplished by culture.’ ‘What! is there an act of killing another by potency accomplished by culture?’ ‘Yes, there is.’ [Some teachers say that the act can be done only once. As when a jar full of water is thrown by one wishing to hurt another, the jar is broken and the water is lost, so by potency accomplished by culture the act of killing another can be done only once. Henceforward it is lost.] On this, after declaring that by potency accomplished by culture, the act of killing another is done neither once nor twice, the teachers question the antagonistic speaker on concepts, ‘Is potency accomplished by culture moral, immoral or unmoral; associated with a feeling, pleasurable, painful or neutral; connected with both initial and sustained application of mind; connected not with initial, but merely with sustained application of mind; unconnected with both initial and sustained application of mind; experienced in the universe of sense, of attenuated matter or of non-matter?’ The sectary who knows the question will answer thus, ‘Potency accomplished by culture is either moral or unmoral, but is associated only with a neutral feeling, is without initial and sustained application of mind, and is only experienced in the universe of attenuated matter.’ [He should be asked,] ‘In which category of moralities, etc., is the intention of life-taking included?’ If he knows he will reply, ‘The intention of life-taking is immoral only, and is connected only with painful feeling, occurs only with initial and sustained application of mind and is experienced only in the universe of sense.’ The rejoinder to this is, ‘If this be so, your meaning does not harmonize with the triplet of morality, nor [92] with that of feeling,

¹ *Pts.* ii. 205 f.; *Vis. Mag.* xii.; *Compendium* 60 f.

nor with that of initial application of mind, nor with cosmology.' 'What, then, is such a great Sutta useless?' The orthodox answer is, 'Not useless, but you do not know its meaning.' To explain:—here the expression 'endowed with potency and attained mastery of his will' does not refer to potency accomplished by culture, but to the potency treated of in the Atharvaveda.¹ This is indeed obtainable in this passage. And it is not possible to achieve it without bodily and vocal organ or doors. For those who desire this Atharva potency have to practise for seven days such austerities as eating food without salt, and lying on the *dabba* grass spread on the ground, and on the seventh day have to go through a certain procedure within the cemetery ground by standing, after taking the seventh step, and swinging the hand round and round while repeating certain formulas; then is their work accomplished. Thus this potency cannot be acquired without bodily and vocal doors. And the conclusion which should be arrived at herein is that bodily kamma does not appear at mind-door.

The action of one speaking falsehood, etc., by a sign of the hand is an act of speech, but the door is that of body. Thus an immoral act of speech also arises in the body-door. But covetousness, ill-will and wrong view co-existent with those thoughts pertain to volition, and [as bodily acts] are negligible. But the action of one speaking falsehood, etc., by speech is an act of speech, and the door also is vocal. Thus an immoral act of speech arises in the vocal door. But covetousness, ill-will, wrong view co-existent with those thoughts pertain to volition and [as vocal acts] are negligible. So far the teachers agree.

But the sectary says: 'An immoral act of speech also arises in the mind-door.' On being asked to quote a Sutta adopted at the Three Councils he quotes the *Uposathakkhandha-sutta*:— 'If a bhikkhu, after being thrice summoned to make a confession, would not confess a real offence, which he recollects,

¹ Potency spoken of in this, the fourth book of the Veda, is called potency accomplished by art or knowledge (*vijjāmayiddhi*).—*Pyi*.

then he lies knowingly.¹ In quoting this Sutta he says, 'Thus not confessing his offence, being silent he commits another offence. Herein whence is the movement of his physical limbs or vocal organs? It is in the mind-door that this immoral act of speech arises.'

He should thus be answered:—'How now? has your Sutta a meaning to be inferred, or a direct meaning?' 'My Sutta has a direct meaning.' He should be told, 'Do not say so; we shall weigh the meaning of it,' and he should be questioned, 'What kind of sin is committed by one who knowingly speaks falsehood? A well-informed antagonist will say that there is the sin of *dukkata* in conscious falsehood.² Further he should be told, [93] 'The body and speech are the two roots of discipline. For all kinds of offence have been declared by the Supreme Buddha with reference to these two doors only. There is no enactment of laws of offence with reference to the mind-door. You are acquainted far too much with the nature of the discipline in that you have enacted laws of offence in matters not enacted by the Teacher. You have accused the Perfect Buddha (of being imperfect); you have given a blow to the Conqueror's sphere of authority.' Having thus put him down with these words, he should be asked the following further question:—

'Does conscious falsehood arise from commission or omission?' If he is well-informed he will say: 'From omission.' Then he should be confronted with this question, 'What act has been done by one, who does not confess his sin?' Not seeing any particular act, he would surely be in distress. Hence he should be convinced of the meaning of this Sutta. What will be said is its meaning: what by way of offence is that conscious falsehood, described by the Buddha? In other words, which kind of offence is it? It is an offence of *dukkata*, and it is so not on account of the characteristic of false speech,

¹ *Vinaya Texts* i. 243 (*Vin.* i. 103).

² *Vin. Texts* i. 32. It is really *pācittiya*, but the sectary names that because, for the man who is consciously a liar, *remembers* it and does not confess it, it is *dukkata*.—*Ariyālaṅkāra*.

but by the Buddha's words it should be understood as that offence which arises from omission in the vocal door.

And it has been said,

*If he should not converse with any man,
Nor even to another use his voice,
He would offend by word and not by deed:—
Of able judges here so runs the rede.¹*

Thus the right conclusion is that immoral vocal action does not arise in the mind-door.

But when, by moving the limbs, with thought accompanied by covetousness, one takes a [woman's] hands, etc.; with ill-will handles sticks, etc.; with wrong views makes reverence, salutation, worship, preparations for an offering at an altar, saying, 'Khandha,² Siva or other (gods) are the highest,' then the act is that of thought and the door is that of body. Thus an immoral act of thought arises in the body-door, but the volition here cannot be called an act of body (lit. is negligible).

When by moving the vocal organs with the thought accompanied by covetousness one covets another's property thinking, 'Would that what belongs to others were mine!'; by ill-will declares, 'Let these beings be killed, imprisoned, cut into pieces, or let them not be'; by wrong view says, 'There is no use in gift, in offering,'³ etc.; then the act is that of thought and the door is that of speech. Thus an immoral act of thought arises in the speech-door, but the volition herein is not called an act of speech (lit. is negligible).

But when without moving his physical limbs or vocal organs he is seated in seclusion, entertains thoughts accompanied by covetousness, ill-will and wrong view, [94] then the act is that of thought and the door also is that of mind. Thus an immoral mental act arises in the door of mind. But in this place volition and states associated with it arise in the mind-

¹ *Vin. v. 216 f.*, by which the very faulty reading in the P.T.S. ed. may be corrected.—*Ed.*

² *I.e.*, Skanda. On this late Saivite god see Hopkins: *Religions of India*, 410, 414.—*Ed.*

³ See *Dialogues* i. 73.

door. Thus it should be understood that an immoral act of thought arises in all three doors.

And in what has been said [above], 'Likewise moral bodily, vocal and mental kammās,'¹ this is the method:—When by any cause one who is unable to speak takes the precepts:— 'I abstain from life-taking, from theft, from wrong conduct in sensual pleasure,' by mere signs of the hands, then the act is that of body and the door is that of body only. Thus a moral act of body arises in the body-door. And the disinterestedness, love, right views accompanied by those thoughts pertain to volition, but are not called acts of thought.² But when he takes those three precepts by word of mouth, then the act is that of body but the door is vocal. Thus a moral act of body arises in the speech-door. And the disinterestedness, etc., accompanied by those thoughts pertain to volition, but are not called acts of thought.² But when such precepts are being given, and he takes them without moving his physical limbs or vocal organs, saying mentally:— 'I abstain from life-taking, from theft, from wrong conduct in sensual pleasure,' then the act is that of body and the door is mental. Thus a moral act of body arises in the mind-door. And the disinterestedness, etc., accompanied by those thoughts pertain to volition, but are not called acts of thought.²

A moral act of speech of one who takes the four precepts of abstention from falsehood, etc., by body, etc., in the way described above should be understood to arise in the three doors. Here also disinterestedness, etc., pertain to volition, but are not called acts of thought.² But the action of one moving his physical limbs by thoughts accompanied by disinterestedness, etc., and doing such acts as sweeping the platform of a shrine and honouring the shrine by offerings of scent and flowers, is an act of thought and the door is that of body. Thus a moral act of thought arises in the body-door, but the volition herein is not called an act of thought.² Of one who, moving the vocal organs by consciousness accompanied by disinterestedness, etc., says, 'Would that what

¹ See above, p. 120, l. 6.

² Abbobhārikā: are negligible.

belongs to others were not mine'; or who with consciousness accompanied by love thinks, 'May all [95] beings be free from enmity, from ill-will, from distress; may they bear themselves happily'; or who by right views thinks, 'There is use in giving,' etc.; the action is that of thought but the door is vocal. Thus a moral act of thought arises in the speech-door, but the volition herein is not called an act of thought—*i.e.*, is negligible. When, without moving the limbs or vocal organs, one seated alone mentally entertains thought accompanied by disinterestedness, etc., the action is that of thought and the door mental. Thus a moral act of thought arises in the mind-door.

But in this place volition and states associated with it arise only in the mind-door. Herein one who says that action in life-taking and theft, instigated by command, is an act of body, and that the door, by virtue of that action, is the body-door, 'preserves' the act, but 'breaks' the door. He who says that the door of falsehood, etc., produced by a sign of the hand is the body-door, and the action, by virtue of that door, is an act of body, 'preserves' the door, but 'breaks' the act. Therefore, with the intention of 'preserving' the act, one should not 'break' the door; nor with that of 'preserving' the door, should one 'break' the act. Action and door should be understood as has been said. Thus speaking one will not 'break' either the action or the door.

Here ends the Discourse on Kamma (action).

CHAPTER V

DISCOURSE ON COURSES OF IMMORAL ACTION

Now in the terms (a) 'five external senses,' (b) 'five sense-doors,' (a) is consciousness on occasion of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching; (b) are the doors of sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The volition which arises by virtue of these five doors should be understood as an act neither of body nor of speech, but of thought.

The 'contact' of the eye, of the ear, the nose, the tongue,

the body and the mind are called the 'six contacts.' The 'six doors of contact' are those of eye-contact, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind-contact. The eight 'non-restraints' are those of the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the sensitive body, the motor-body, speech and mind.

As to their content, these eight non-restraints are reducible to five states, namely: immorality, forgetfulness, absence of knowledge, absence of patience, laziness. Not one of these [96] arises in the five-doored cognitive process till after the [instant of] determining. It arises only in the moment when apperception begins. Unrestrained consciousness arisen in apperception is called non-restraint in five doors. Contact co-existent with sight is called sight-contact and the volition is an act of thought. And that consciousness (*i.e.*, of sight) is called the door of an act of thought. In sight proper there is no fivefold non-restraint; contact co-existent with [the moment of] 'reception' is mind-contact, and the volition is an act of thought. That consciousness (*i.e.*, the receptive) is the door of an act of thought. Herein also there is no fivefold non-restraint. And the same is the case with 'examination' and 'determination'.¹ Contact co-existent with apperception is mind-contact; the volition is an act of thought and that (apperceptual) consciousness is the door of an act of thought. Herein the non-restraint is that of sight, and the same is the method to be adopted in the door of the ear, of the nose, of the tongue, of the sensitive skin. But when mind-door apperception arises, having as object one or other of the objects of sense, resulting in the movement (of body) called body-door simply (*i.e.*, even without the aid of the vocal door), then the contact co-existent with that (apperceptual) consciousness is mind-contact.

Volition is an act leading to deed. But that (apperceptual) consciousness is not usually spoken of² as mind-door. (That is to say) because of the arising of (bodily) movement it does not go under the name of mind-door. The non-restraint here is that of the moving body. When such apper-

¹ Cf. text, p. 271; *Compendium* 28 f.

² *Abbohārika*. Cf. p. 120.

ception arises, resulting in the movement of the vocal door, pure and simple, without the body-door, then the contact co-existent with that consciousness is mind-contact.

Volition is an act giving rise to speech. But that (apperceptual) consciousness is not usually called mind-door. Because of the arising of the movement (of the vocal organs) it does not go under the name of mind-door. The non-restraint here is that of speech. But when such apperceptive consciousness arises, without the aid of physical limbs and vocal organs, as pure mind-door, then the contact co-existent with that consciousness is mind-contact.

Volition is a mental act; that consciousness is the door of mental act. The non-restraint here is that of mind.

The doors of non-restraint of the eye, of the ear, of the nose, of the tongue, of the sensitive part of the body, of the motor-body, of speech and of mind, by virtue of these eight non-restraints, should be understood as the eight doors of non-restraint.

The eight 'restraints' are those of the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the skin, the moving body, speech and mind. In the ultimate sense they are five principles, namely: virtue, mindfulness, knowledge, patience and energy. None of these [97] arises in conscious processes up to the end of the determination-moment, but only in the moment of apperception. Though arisen in apperception restraint is referred to the doors. The arising of all these restraints should be understood in the same way as by the method described in the case of non-restraints: 'Contact co-existent with visual cognition is eye-contact,' etc. Thus by virtue of these eight restraints, the door of the restraint of the eye and so on should be understood as the eight doors of restraint.

The ten courses of immoral action are life-taking, theft, wrong conduct in sensual pleasure, falsehood, calumnious speech, harsh speech, frivolous talk, covetousness, ill-will, wrong views.

Of these, 'life-taking' means taking life quickly or by violence. Slaughtering or killing of beings is meant. 'Life' here (literally breathing thing), in common parlance, means a being;

in its ultimate sense, living force.¹ And the term 'life-taking' is applied to the bodily and vocal doors of one who is conscious that a being is living, and who produces an effort to cut off the living force in that being. Among animals devoid of virtues (*guṇa*), it is a slight misdeed in the case of a small creature, and a great misdeed in that of a large one. Why? Owing to the greatness of effort, and owing to the great size of the object, even though the effort may be the same. Among men, etc., they being capable of virtue, it entails a small misdeed in the case of a being of small virtue, and a great misdeed in that of a being of great virtue. And it should be understood that when physical virtues are equal, the sin is smaller or greater according as the corruptions and efforts (of the criminal) are weaker or stronger. There are five constituent factors in the crime of murder:—a being, consciousness of there being a living creature, intention of killing, effort and consequent death. And the six means of carrying out the effort are:—one's own hands, instigation, missiles, permanent devices, art and potency. As it will be too lengthy to treat of them here in detail, we shall pass over them as well as other explanations. Those desirous of details should look up the *Sāmantapāsālikā*, the Commentary on the Vinaya.²

'Theft' (*adinnādāna*) means the 'taking of what is not given'; the taking of what is another's property, robbery, or the state of being a thief is meant. Here 'not given' applies to property possessed by another. A property concerning which another has arrived at the state of doing whatever he likes, without incurring punishment or blame, is said to belong to another. The intention of stealing, producing the effort to take something [98] with the consciousness that it belongs to another is termed 'theft.' And that entails a small sin if what belongs to another is mean, and a great sin if it be of excellence. And why? Owing to the excellence of the object. If they are of equal value, stealing objects which belong to those distinguished for virtue entails a greater crime than the

¹ *Jīvitindriyaṃ*. Or, 'controlling power which is life.'—Ed.

² Professor J. Takakusu has prepared an edition of this work for the PTS.—Ed

theft of objects belonging to one inferior in virtue. There are five constituent factors (in theft):—another's property, awareness that it is so, the thieving mind, effort, and consequent removal—and six means:—taking with one's own hands, etc. One or other of these means may be carried out according to circumstances, in stealing by false measures and weights, by force, by concealment, by design or by forgery. This is an outlined account of theft. The detailed account is in the *Sāmantapāsādikā*.

In the expression 'wrong conduct in sensual pleasures,' 'in sensual pleasures' means 'in matters of sexual intercourse'; 'wrong conduct' means 'base and truly blameworthy conduct.' The characteristic of 'wrong conduct in sensual pleasures' is the volition arising in the body-door, through the unlawful intention of trespassing upon a person to whom one has no right of going. Herein persons to whom men have no right to go are (a) ten classes of unmarried women:—a woman under the guardianship (1) of her mother, (2) of her father, (3) of her parents, (4) of her brother, (5) of her sister, (6) of her relations, (7) of her clan, (8) of her spiritual guide, (9) a woman under an engagement and (10) a woman undergoing punishment; and (b) ten classes of married women, namely: (1) one bought by wealth, (2) one who becomes a wife through her free-will, or (3) through love of property, or (4) of clothes, (5) one lawfully wedded by parents after the ceremony of dipping the hands of the couple in a bowl of water, (6) one who is taken from the poorer classes, (7) a slave-wife, (8) a servant-wife, (9) a wife captured in war and (10) a mistress kept for a time.

Of these a woman under an engagement and one under punishment together with (b) the latter ten:—these twelve it is not allowable for other men to approach. And the sin is smaller or greater according as the forbidden object is devoid of or endowed with virtues, such as the precepts. There are four constituent factors of this crime: the mind to enjoy the forbidden object, the effort to enjoy, devices to obtain, and possession. And only one means: personal experience.

'Lying' is applied to the effort of the body and speech, on

the part of one who is deceitful, to destroy the good of others. The volition setting up the bodily and vocal effort to deceive, with the intention of cheating others, [99] is termed 'false speech.' Another definition:—'lying' is applied to a thing which is not genuine or does not exist, and 'speech' means the representation of that as real, true. The characteristic of 'lying speech or falsehood' is the volition of one desirous of representing to others an untrue thing as true, which sets up a corresponding intimation. It is more or less an offence according as the welfare destroyed is greater or smaller. Or to put it in another way: It is a small offence in laymen if they tell an untruth:—'I have it not'—out of a desire not to give something belonging to themselves; and a great offence if they, as witnesses, perjure themselves in order to cause loss (to others). In recluses it is a small offence if, by way of an ironical joke, on getting but little oil or butter, they say:—'To-day, methinks, a river of oil flows in the village.' It is, however, a great offence in those who say that they have seen something which they have not. There are four constituent factors of this [offence]: an untrue thing, intention to deceive, corresponding effort, the communication of the matter to others. There is only one means: personal action; and that should be understood as the act of deceiving others either by body, or by something connected with the body,¹ or by speech. If by that act another knows that meaning, the volition producing that action is at that moment bound up with the act of lying. In the same way, as one deceives another by deed, by something connected therewith, or by speech, so a person who instigates another, 'Say thus to him,' or who lays a written leaf before another, or who records a permanent writing on walls, etc., to this effect, 'This meaning should be understood thus,' equally deceives others. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that instigation, transmission and permanent records are also involved in this form of immorality. But as the Commentaries have not admitted this, it should be adopted only after a critical examination.

¹ As an umbrella or a stick.—*Ariyāṭṭakāra*.

'Slander' means calumnious speech which, by being said to another, reduces to nothing the love which that person, or the speaker bears at his own heart to a third person.

A word which makes one's self harsh,¹ or causes another to be harsh, is in itself harsh, neither agreeable to the ear nor appealing to the heart. Such a word is termed 'abuse.'²

'Frivolous talk' is speaking senseless, useless things. The volition which is at the root of all speech of this sort, and is named calumnious, etc., is here alone to be understood. The volition of one with a corrupt mind, producing the bodily and vocal effort to sow the seed of discord among others, or to endear oneself to others is termed the volition of calumnious speech. It [100] is a smaller or greater offence, according as the virtue of the person whom he separates is smaller or greater. There are four constituent factors of this crime: (1) Other persons to be divided; (2) the purpose: 'they will be separated,' or the desire to endear oneself to another: 'I shall become dear and intimate'; (3) the corresponding effort; (4) the communication. But when there is no rupture among others, the offence does not amount to a complete course; it does so only when there is a rupture.

By 'harsh speech'² is meant the entirely harsh volition which produces a bodily and vocal effort, stabbing another as with a mortal wound.³ The following story is an illustration: It is related that a certain boy, without listening to his mother's word, went to a forest. The mother, being unable to prevent him, cursed him, saying, 'May a wild she-buffalo chase thee!' And accordingly a she-buffalo appeared in the forest. The boy made an asseveration of truth, 'May what my mother said happen not; what she thought in her mind, may that happen!' The buffalo stood as if there transfixed.⁴ Thus though her vocal effort was mortally wounding, yet her speech was not

¹ Like the edge of a saw.—*Tikkā*.

² This paragraph should apparently precede the previous one.

³ Mamma=maranti anenāti, Yasmiṃ tālīte na jīvati, taṃ ṭhānaṃ mammaṃ nāma=that place is called 'mamma,' which, being struck, one does not live.—*Yojanā*.

⁴ *Maṇḍā viya*; Burm. ed.: baddhā, or bandhā viya.

really harsh, because of her tender heart. For though parents sometimes say thus to their children: 'May thieves cut you up into pieces!' yet they do not wish even a lotus leaf to fall on them. Teachers and spiritual guides sometimes say of their pupils: 'What are we to do with these shameless, reckless lads? Turn them out!' and yet they wish that they may attain and accomplish. But as words are not harsh if the heart be tender, so are they not gentle, just because speech is soft. The words of one desirous of killing: 'Let him sleep in comfort!' are not soft; because of the harshness of thought the words are harsh. Harsh speech is proportionate to the virtue of one concerning whom harsh words are spoken. The three constituent factors of this offence are: Another to be abused, angry thought, and the abuse.

Immoral volition producing the bodily and vocal effort to communicate useless things, is termed 'frivolous talk.' Its offence is great or small according as it is practised repeatedly or not. The two constituent factors of this offence are: the inclination towards useless talk—like the stories of the fight of the Bhāratas and of the abduction of Sītā, etc.¹—and the narration of such themes. But the offence does not run through the full course of action when others [101] do not accept the story; it does so only when they accept it.

'Covetousness' means coveting: a process of inclining towards another's property when confronted with it. It has the characteristic mark of thinking, 'Ah! would this were mine!' As offence it is small or great as in the case of theft. Its two constituent factors are: Another's property, and the bending over of oneself. Though greed for an object which is another's property has arisen, it does not receive the distinction of being a full course of action so long as one does not bend over to it saying, 'Ah, would this were mine!'

That which destroys welfare and happiness is 'ill-will.' It has the characteristic mark of the mental fault of injury to others. The degree of offence is as in the case of harsh speech. Its two constituent factors are: another being, and the thought

¹ *Sumangala-Vilāsinī*, i, 76; Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, 183.

of doing harm. Mere anger with another being does not reach that distinctive stage of the course of action, so long as there is no destructive thought, such as: 'Would he were cut off and destroyed!'

'Wrong view' is that which sees wrongly by not taking the right view. It has the characteristic of perverted views, such as: 'There is no[use in a] gift.' And the offence is small or great as in the case of frivolous talk, or according as the wrong view is of a temporary or permanent character. Its two constituent factors are: perversion of the manner in which an object should be taken, and its manifestation according to the contrary view held of it. Here the distinctive stage of the course of action is reached by the views: (1) there is no *result* (in a moral act); (2) there are no *causes* (in happening); (3) there is no such thing as (moral) *action*,¹ and not by other views.

As regards these ten courses of immoral action, we may come to decisions respecting them under five aspects, to wit: (1) as ultimate psychological factors, (2) as groups, (3) as objects, (4) as feelings and (5) as roots.² (1) The first seven in order out of the courses of action are volitions only; the three beginning with covetousness are factors associated with volition. (2) The first seven and wrong views—these eight are courses of action, not roots. But covetousness and ill-will are both courses of action and roots. Covetousness as a root is the immoral root of greed, ill-will as a root is the immoral root of hate. (3) Life-taking has a conditioned thing for object, from its having the life-force as object. Theft has a living being or a thing for object. Wrong conduct has a conditioned thing for object by virtue of touch, or, as some say, a living being. Falsehood has either a living being or a conditioned thing for object. So has calumnious speech. Harsh speech [102] has only a living being for object. Frivolous talk has either a living being or a conditioned thing for object by way of things seen, heard, felt and thought. So

¹ (1) Denies the result of kamma; (2) denies both the cause and the result; (3) denies kamma.—*Tr.* Cf. *Dialogues of the Buddha* i. 73.

² Or springs of action, as our tradition would say.—*Ed.*

has covetousness. Ill-will has a living being for object, and wrong views have for object a conditioned thing in the three planes of existence. (4) Life-taking is associated with a painful feeling. For although kings on seeing a thief may say, laughing, 'Go, kill him,' the volition of decision is associated with pain only. Theft may be associated with the three kinds of feeling. He who on seeing another's property takes it with delight has a pleasurable feeling; if he steals it with fright, his feeling is painful; likewise if he does so while he reflects on the consequent fruits. If he takes it with indifference, the feeling is neutral. Wrong conduct is associated with two kinds of feeling, pleasurable and neutral; but in the thought of decision there is no neutral feeling. Falsehood has all three kinds of feeling as with theft; likewise calumnious speech. Harsh speech is associated with a painful feeling; frivolous talk has all three kinds of feeling. To illustrate:—When the story of the abduction of Sītā, or of the fight of the Bhāratas, etc., is recited, and the hearers applaud him and throw up their turbans, etc., there is to the performer a delighted pleasurable feeling. When one who has thus rewarded him comes up later and says: 'Tell us from the beginning,' the narrator is displeased at the idea and thinks: 'Shall I say something irrelevant and miscellaneous or not?' In such a case there is a painful feeling at the time of reciting; if he is indifferent during the recital, then there is a neutral feeling. Covetousness has two feelings, pleasurable and neutral; likewise wrong views. Ill-will has a painful feeling. (5) Life-taking has two roots by virtue of hate and delusion; theft has also two by virtue of hate and delusion or of greed and delusion; wrong conduct also has two by virtue of greed and delusion; likewise falsehood by virtue of either hate and delusion or greed and delusion; likewise calumnious speech and frivolous talk. Harsh speech by virtue of hate and delusion, and covetousness by virtue of delusion, have a single root; likewise ill-will. Wrong view has a double root by virtue of greed and delusion.

Here ends the Discourse on the Courses of Immoral Action,

CHAPTER VI

COURSES OF MORAL ACTION

THE ten courses of moral action are:—abstinence from life-taking, etc., and disinterestedness, good-will and right views.

Of these, life-taking, etc.,¹ have been explained. 'Abstinence' is that by which people abstain from life-taking, etc.; or that which itself abstains; or that which is the mere abstaining. In the passage where it says:—'That avoidance and abstinence from life-taking that there is, at that time, in one who abstains from taking life'²—that abstinence which is associated with moral consciousness is threefold: (1) [in spite of] opportunity obtained, (2) because of observance, (3) eradication.

(1) When they who have not undertaken to observe any particular precept, but who, reflecting on their own birth, age, experience, etc., and saying, 'It is not fit for us to do such a bad thing,' do not transgress concerning an object actually met with, the abstinence is to be considered as 'in spite of opportunity,' like that of Cakkana,³ a lay-disciple in Ceylon. It is said that when he was young his mother suffered from a disease, and the doctor recommended fresh hare-flesh. Cakkana's brother then said to him, 'Go, dear, roam the field,' and sent him. He went there, and at that time a hare came to eat the tender crops. On seeing him it ran with speed, and was caught in the creepers, making the cry *kiri ! kiri !* Cakkana went after the sound, caught the hare and thought, 'I shall make a medicine for mother.' Again he thought, 'It is not proper that for the sake of my mother's life I should take the life of another.' He then freed the hare, saying, 'Go, enjoy grass and water with other hares in the jungle,' and when asked by the brother, 'Well, dear, did you get a hare ?' he told him what had happened. For that his brother scolded him.

¹ *I.e.*, theft, sexual misconduct, and four kinds of wrong speech. See Ch. V.

² *Vibh.* 285.

³ In Burmese editions, *Jaggana*.

But he went to the mother's presence and stood averring a truth: 'Since I was born, I declare that I have not intentionally taken the life of any creature.' And straightway the mother recovered.

(2) The abstinence of those who have observed the precepts, both during and after the time-limit, without transgressing against the object even on pain of death, is to be considered as 'by way of observance,' like that of the lay-disciple dwelling in the mountain Uttaravaddhamāna. It is said that, after taking the precepts in the presence of the Elder Piṅgalabuddharakkhita, who dwelt in the Ambariya monastery, he was ploughing his field. His ox got lost. While looking for it he ascended the Uttaravaddhamāna mountain, where a great serpent seized him. He thought, 'I will cut off its head with my sharp axe.' Again he thought, 'It is not proper that I, who have taken the precepts from my teacher of culture, should break them.' And for the third time he thought, 'I will sacrifice my life, but not the precepts,' and threw away in the forest the sharp axe with its shaft from his shoulder. Immediately the boa-constrictor released him and went away.

[104] (3) Abstinence 'by way of eradication' should be understood as that associated with the Ariyan Path. When that Path has once arisen, not even the thought, 'we will kill a creature,' arises in Ariyans. Now, as with immoral states, so with those that are moral, there are five aspects under which decisions respecting them may be reached—namely, (1) as ultimate psychological factors, (2) as groups, (3) as objects, (4) as feeling and (5) as roots.

(1) Of the ten, the first seven are fit to be called volitions as well as abstinences; the last three are factors associated with volition.

(2) The first seven are courses of action and not roots; the last three are courses of action and roots. Disinterestedness, good-will and right view as roots become the moral roots: the opposites of greed, hate and delusion.

(3) These are the same as those of life-taking, etc. For abstention is from (the transgression against) the object to be transgressed against. As the Ariyan Path with Nibbāna as

its object abandons the corruptions, so these courses of action, having the faculty of life, etc., as their object, abandon the wickedness of life-taking and so forth.

(4) All are pleasurable feeling or neutral feeling, for with the attainment of good there is no painful feeling.

(5) The (first) seven are threefold, namely, disinterestedness, love, intelligence, in one abstaining with a consciousness associated with knowledge; twofold in one abstaining with a consciousness dissociated from knowledge. Disinterestedness is twofold in one abstaining with a consciousness associated with knowledge, and single when consciousness is dissociated from knowledge. Disinterestedness by itself is not its own root. Nor is good-will. Right view is twofold, as disinterestedness and as love. These are the ten courses of moral action.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

To the foregoing discussion should be added a consideration of courses of action in connection with self-restraint, etc. Want of self-restraint arisen through the five doors of contact is an immoral mental act. That which has arisen through mind, the door of internal contact, is threefold in action. For when movement of the body-door is reached, it is an immoral act of body; when that of the vocal door is reached, it is an immoral act of speech. When movement of neither is reached, it is an immoral act of thought.

Want of self-restraint which has arisen through the five doors is also only an immoral act of body; that which has arisen through the unrestrained door of the moving body is only an immoral act of body; that which has arisen by the door of speech or by the door of mind [105] is only an immoral act of speech or of thought respectively.¹ The threefold misconduct of body is only an immoral act of body; the fourfold miscon-

¹ The P.T.S. ed. has here a different reading.

duct of speech is only an immoral act of speech; the threefold misconduct of mind is only an immoral act of thought.

Self-restraint which has arisen through the five doors of (external) contact is only a moral act of thought; if it has arisen through the door of mental contact, it is threefold in action, as in the case of non-restraint. Self-restraint arisen through the five doors is only a moral act of thought; if it has arisen by the door of the moving body, or through the door of speech, or through the door of mind, it is only a moral act of body, speech, or thought respectively.

Threefold good conduct of body is a moral act; fourfold good conduct of speech is a moral act of speech; threefold good conduct of mind is a moral act of thought.

An immoral act of body does not arise through the five doors of (external) contact, but through the door of mind-contact only; similarly with an immoral act of speech. But an immoral act of thought arises through the six doors of contact. If it results in movement in body and vocal doors, it is an immoral act of body and of speech;¹ not attaining such movement, it is an immoral act of thought. As it does not arise through the contact-door, no immoral act of body takes place through the five unrestrained doors. But it arises through the unrestrained doors of the moving body and the moving vocal organ; it does not arise through the unrestrained door of mind. Nor does an immoral act of speech arise through the five doors when unrestrained; it arises through the door of the moving body when unrestrained and the moving vocal organ; it does not arise through the unrestrained door of mind.

An immoral act of thought arises even through eight unrestrained doors; and the same method holds in moral acts of body, etc., but with this difference:—Immoral acts of body and of speech do not arise through the unrestrained door of mind, but these are not so; without moving bodily limbs or vocal organs, they arise in the self-restrained door of the mind of one who is taking the precepts.

¹ "It is mental action in these doors"—*Pyī*.

In such a case moral consciousness in the realm of sense arises through the threefold door of action, and not through the five (external) sense-doors. The feeling, pleasurable, painful, or neutral, is conditioned by eye-contact. It does so by means of the six doors of contact, but not through the eight doors when unrestrained; it arises through the eight doors when restrained; [106] it does not arise through the ten courses of immoral action; it arises through the ten courses of moral action. Therefore, whether this (first main type of moral) consciousness¹ has arisen through the doors of threefold action, or through the six doors of contact, or through the eight restraint-doors, or the ten courses of moral action, it was said with reference to all classes of sensuous consciousness that 'the sensuous moral consciousness that has arisen has either a visible or an audible object, etc., or an idea for its object.'¹

Here ends the Discourse on 'Doors.'

¹ *Dhs.* § 1.



PART IV.—OF MORAL CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE IN THE WORLDS OF SENSE

CHAPTER I

OF THE SUMMARY OF CONSCIOUS STATES

WHATEVER be the object with which consciousness is concerned¹—in other words, the consciousness in question has arisen concerning, that is, has made an object of, any of the objects of sense or ideas of sense specified above. Up to this clause it might seem as though any one object only among these objects is permitted to this consciousness; so that it (*i.e.*, this consciousness) arises on one occasion in one person attending to a visible object; and again it arises on another occasion in another person with a sound, and so forth as object. But there is no such order as its coming into being in any one existence first with a visible object, afterwards with sound as object. Nor is there any such uniformity as its coming into being first with a blue-green object, afterwards with a yellow object among objects. And it was in order to show that it can arise with *all* objects, and that there is neither order in them nor, in the absence of order, any uniformity in respect of specific sensations, that he said:—‘Whatever be the object, etc.’ Consciousness arises not only with a certain, say, visible object among these objects, but in reality with any one of them as object. It does not first attend to a visible object and then to sound. It arises with any one of the objects whatsoever by way of passing over one or two or more intermediate terms either in the reverse order or in the way of right succession. Moreover, in the case of a visible object it does not arise with such a uniformity as attending first to a blue-green object, afterwards to a yellow object, but with

¹ *Dhs.* § 1.

any one of them. Such is the meaning. And the same with sound as object. This is one construction of the phrase in question.

Another is as follows:—Consciousness is termed visual, auditory, etc., or cogitative, because it has a visible, audible, etc., object, [107] or has an idea as its object. After having said that such consciousness arises with its corresponding object, he added the phrase ‘whatever be the object,’ etc. The meaning of this phrase is that consciousness may arise with any one of those objects in the manner explained above. The Great Commentary, however, explains as follows:—‘There is nothing *new* implied by the expression “whatever be the object”; what has already been enumerated is to be taken.’ And it goes on:—‘This expression was used in order to teach that consciousness comes into being with this or that object, *i.e.*, visible object . . . or idea.’ Thus much only is in the Great Commentary.

‘At that time’¹ is an expression which definitely fixes the time shown indefinitely by the expression ‘at what time.’ Hence this matter should be regarded thus:—*When moral consciousness in the realm of sense arises, then only there is contact, etc., down to absence of distraction.*

Here, just as there is consciousness, so also is there contact, etc. What kind of contact? It is that experienced in the realm of sense; it is moral; it has arisen, and it is accompanied by pleasure—in this way the construction should be made by means of such terms as are obtainable. That the expression, ‘as are obtainable,’ is used because, in the case of feeling, the phrase, ‘accompanied by pleasure’ is not obtainable, and in the case of insight, ‘associated with knowledge’ is not obtainable, is an opinion of teachers² out of touch with the Commentaries, and should not be regarded as possessing any value.

But why is contact mentioned here first? Because of its being the first incidence of consciousness on an object, and arises touching the object. Therefore it is mentioned first.

¹ *Dhs.* § 1.

² Such as Revata.—*Ṭikā.*

Touching by contact, consciousness experiences by feeling, perceives by perception, wills by volition. Hence it has been said:—‘Bhikkhus, touched one feels, touched one perceives, touched one wills.’¹ Further: Just as in a palace a pillar is the strong support to the rest of the structure, just as beams, cross-beams, wing-supports, roof, rafters, cross rafters, neck-pieces are bound to the pillar, fixed on to the pillar, so is contact a strong support to the co-existent and associated states. It is like the pillar, and the remaining states are like the rest of the structure.

But why, again, is it mentioned first? for the foregoing gives no reason. For of states which have arisen in one conscious moment it is not valid to say that ‘this’ arises first, ‘that’ afterwards. The reason is not because contact is a strong support. Contact is just mentioned [108] first in the order of teaching, but it were also permissible to bring it in thus:—There are feeling and contact, perception and contact, volition and contact; there is consciousness and contact, feeling, perception, volition, initial application of mind. In the order of teaching, however, contact is mentioned first. Nor is the sequence of words among the remaining states of any special significance. [Inquiry should be conducted as follows:—] Contact means ‘it touches.’ It has touching as its *salient characteristic*, impact as its *function*,² ‘coinciding’ (of the physical basis, object and consciousness) as its *manifestation*,³ and the object which has entered the avenue [of awareness] as *proximate cause*.

Though it is an immaterial state, it proceeds with respect to objects after the mode of ‘touching.’ Hence touch is its *characteristic*.

There is no in-pinging on one side of the object [as in physical contact], nevertheless contact causes consciousness and object to be in collision, as visible object and visual organs, sound and hearing; thus impact is its *function*; or it has impact as its *essential property* in the sense of attainment, owing to the

¹ *Samyutta* iv. 68; words in different order.

² Or ‘essential property.’ Cf. *Comp. of Phil.* 13, 213.

³ Or ‘resulting phenomenon.’ *Ibid.*

impact of the physical basis with the mental object. For it is said in the Commentary:—‘Contact in the four planes of existence is never without the characteristic of touch with the object; but the function of impact takes place in the five doors. For to sense, or five-door contact is given the name: “having the characteristic of touch,” as well as “having the function of impact.” But to contact in the mind-door there is only the characteristic of touch, but not the function of impact.’ And then this Sutta is quoted: ‘As if, sire, two rams were to fight, one ram to represent the eye, the second the visible object; and their collision, contact. And as if, sire, two cymbals were to strike against each other, or two hands were to clap against each other; one hand would represent the eye, the second the visible object, and their collision contact. Thus contact has the characteristic of touch and the function of impact.’¹ Such is the detailed account.

Just as in such phrases as ‘seeing a visible object with the eye,’² sense-cognition is spoken of by the name of eye, etc., so here it is spoken of as ‘eye,’ etc. Therefore should the meaning of ‘to represent the eye,’ etc., be understood as ‘to represent visual cognition,’ etc. This being so, [109] the function, in the sense of performance, of impact is accomplished, according to this Sutta, in the impact of consciousness with object.

Contact has coinciding as *manifestation*, because it is revealed through its own cause, known as the coinciding of three (basis, object, and consciousness). This is shown here and there by the Sutta-phrase:—‘contact is the collision of three.’³ And in this phrase the meaning is that it is contact because of the collision of the three, but it should not be understood that the mere collision is contact. Thus because it was declared that contact mani-

¹ *Milinda* i. 92 f.

² Quoted in *Dhs.* § 1345.

³ *Majjhima*, i, 111; *Saṃyutta*, ii, 72; etc. The sense is brought up to the object, there is attention or adverting to the object, the object is prepared, and there is cognition of the object by consciousness.—*Ṭīkā*.

feels itself in this wise, therefore its manifestation is called coinciding. But if manifestation be taken in the sense of effect, contact has feeling as effect. That is, contact produces feeling, causes it to arise. Just as it is the heat in heated lac, and not the coals, or external cause, which produces softness, so albeit there is another cause, viz., the mental object and the basis, it is the consciousness in which feeling inheres which produces it, and not that [external] cause.

Because contact arises by means of suitable attention, or 'adverting,' and through some faculty (i.e., eye, etc.), and immediately in the object that has been prepared by consciousness, therefore contact has as its *proximate cause* an object that has entered the avenue of thought.

'Feeling'¹ is that which feels. It has (1) experiencing as characteristic, (2) enjoying as function, or possessing the desirable portion of an object as function, (3) taste of the mental properties as manifestation, and (4) tranquillity as proximate cause.

(1) There is no such thing as feeling in the four planes of existence without the characteristic of experiencing.

(2) If it be said that the function of enjoying the object is obtained only in pleasurable feeling, we reject that opinion, and say:—'Let it be pleasurable feeling or painful feeling or neutral feeling—all have the function of enjoying (*anubhavana*) the object.'

As regards enjoying the taste of an object, the remaining associated states enjoy it only partially. Of contact there is (the function of) the mere touching, of perception the mere noting or perceiving, of volition the mere co-ordinating (the associated states, or exerting or being active), of consciousness the mere cognizing. But feeling alone, through governance, proficiency, mastery, enjoys the taste of an object. For feeling is like the king, the remaining states are like the cook. As the cook, when he has prepared food of divers tastes, puts it in a basket, seals it, takes it to the king, breaks the seal,

¹ *Dhs.* § 3.

opens the basket, [110] takes the best of all the soup and curries, puts them in a dish, swallows [a portion] to find out whether they are faulty or not, and afterwards offers the food of various excellent tastes to the king, and the king, being lord, expert, and master, eats whatever he likes, even so the mere testing of the food by the cook is like the partial enjoyment of the object by the remaining states, and as the cook tests a portion of the food, so the remaining states enjoy a portion of the object, and as the king, being lord, expert, and master, eats the meal according to his pleasure, so feeling, being lord, expert and master, enjoys the taste of the object, and therefore it is said that enjoyment or experience is its function.

In that second definition¹ feeling is understood as the enjoyment only of the desirable portion of an object 'in any manner' (*i.e.*, by its nature or intention). Thus it is said to have the function of enjoying the desired portion of the object

(3) The mere presence of feeling, as such, is referred to by calling its manifestation 'tasting a mental property (*cetasika*).'

(4) And inasmuch as a tranquillized body enjoys bliss or happiness, feeling has tranquillity as its proximate cause.

The noting of an object as blue-green, etc., is perception.² It has the characteristic of noting and the function of recognizing what has been previously noted. There is no such thing as perception in the four planes of existence without the characteristic of noting. All perceptions have the characteristic of noting. Of them, that perceiving which knows by specialized knowledge has the function of recognizing what has been noted previously. We may see this procedure when the carpenter recognizes a piece of wood which he has marked by specialized knowledge; when we recognize a man by his sectarian mark on the forehead, which we have noted by our specialized knowledge, and say: 'He is so and so'; or when the king's treasurer, in charge of the royal wardrobe,

¹ Namely, that only joyful feeling enjoys.—*Pyi*. See preceding page.

² *Dhs.* § 4. 'Perception,' 'noting' = *saññā*, *sañjānanā*.

having had a label bound on each dress and, being asked to bring a certain one, lights the lamp, enters the jewel chamber, reads the label, and brings the dress. According to another method, perception has the characteristic of noting by an act of general inclusion, and the function of [assigning] 'mark-reasons' for this inclusive noting, as when woodcutters 'perceive' logs, and so forth.

Its manifestation is an inclining [of the attention], as in the case of blind persons who 'see' an elephant.¹ Or, it has briefness as manifestation, like lightning, owing to its inability to penetrate the object.

[111] Its proximate cause is whatever object has appeared, like the perception which arises in young deer mistaking scarecrows for men. Of the perceptions, that which is associated with knowledge follows it, just as, among the elements of extension, etc., with their constituents, the remaining constituents follow the element of extension, etc.²

Volition is that which co-ordinates, that is, it binds closely* to itself associated states as objects. This is its characteristic; its function is conation. There is no such thing as volition in the four planes of existence without the characteristic of co-ordinating; all volition has it. But the function of conation is only in moral and immoral states; as regards activity in moral and immoral acts, the remaining associated states play only a restricted part. But volition is exceedingly energetic. It makes a double effort, a double exertion. Hence the Ancients said:

¹ Like the blind who imagine an elephant by the particular characteristic of the part touched--e.g., he who has touched the tail says that the elephant is like a broom-handle, and he who has touched the leg says it is like a pestle, etc.--*Pyñ*. Or like one who, though now blind, can say what an elephant is like.--*Ariyāṭṭhāra*. Cf. *Udāna*, VI. 4.

² The element of extension has stability and support as characteristic, yet it cannot appear by itself; it appears with its seven constituents--viz.: colour, odour, taste, essence (*ajā*), moisture, heat, motion. Although this is so, at whatever time its state is stable, it is called extension. Thus the constituents follow the element.--*Ariyāṭṭhāra*.

* *Abhisandahati*.

' Volition is like the nature of a landowner,¹ a cultivator who, taking fifty-five strong men, went down to the fields to reap. He was exceedingly energetic and exceedingly strenuous; he doubled his strength, he doubled his effort, and said, "Take your sickles," and so forth, pointed out the portion to be reaped, offered them drink, food, scent, flowers, etc., and took an equal share of the work.' The simile should be thus applied: Volition is like the cultivator; the fifty-five moral states which arise as factors of consciousness are like the fifty-five strong men; like the time of doubling strength, doubling effort by the cultivator is the doubled strength, double effort of volition as regards activity in moral and immoral acts. Thus should conation as its function be understood.

It has directing as manifestation. It arises directing associated states, like the chief disciple, the chief carpenter, etc., who fulfil their own and others' duties. As the chief disciple seeing the teacher come from afar, himself recites his lessons and makes other pupils recite each his own lesson; when he begins the recitation, the rest follow; and as the head woodcutter, hewing the wood, himself makes other woodcutters do each [112] his own work; for when he begins, the others follow; and as the general, fighting himself, makes other soldiers take part in the battle, for when he begins, the others follow his example without turning back; even so, when volition starts work on its object, it sets associated states to do each its own work. For when it puts forth energy, they also put forth energy. Hence the statement that it accomplishes its own and others' work, like the chief pupil or the head carpenter. It is also evident that it arises by causing associated states to be energetic in such things as recollecting an urgent work, and so forth.

[Mind or] consciousness² is that which thinks of its object. A definition of the word has been given.³ As to its characteristics, etc., cognizing object is its characteristic, forerunning

¹ Reading not *vācāriyā*, but *thāvāriyā* = *khetasāmi* or landowner. But some read *Pāvāriya*, as the cultivator's name.—Tr.

² *Dhs.* § 6.

³ Above, p. 84.

is its function, connecting is its manifestation, a mental and material organism¹ is its proximate cause. There is no such thing as consciousness in the four planes of existence without the characteristic of cognizing. All consciousness has it. But when a 'door' is reached at the place² where the 'object' is evolved, consciousness is the forerunner, the precursor. A visible object seen by the eye is cognized by consciousness, etc. . . . an idea known by the mind is cognized by consciousness. For just as the town-guard, seated at cross-roads in the middle of the town, ascertains and notes each comer:—'This is a townsman, this is a stranger,' and so forth, so should this matter be understood. So, too, it was said by the Elder (Nāgasena).—³ 'Just, sire, as the town-guard, seated at the cross-roads in the middle of the town, would see a man coming from the east, would see a man coming from the west, the south, the north: so, your majesty, the object seen by the eye, the sound heard by the ear, the smell smelt by the nose, the taste tasted by the tongue, the tangible touched by the body, the idea cognized by the mind, is cognized by consciousness.' [113] Therefore it is said to have the function of forerunning.

The consciousness which arises next does so immediately after the preceding consciousness, forming a connected series. Thus it has connection as manifestation.

Where there are all five aggregates, a mental and material organism is always its proximate cause; where there are four aggregates,⁴ mind only is its proximate cause. Therefore it is said that mind-and-matter is its proximate cause.

But is this consciousness the same as the former consciousness, or is it different? The same. Then wherefore is that which was previously dealt with mentioned again? This has not been considered in the Commentary. But it is suitable to do so here. The sun and other things, as terms and concepts, derived from material or other data, are

¹ Nāmarūpam.

² Thāne.

³ *Milinda* i. 92.

⁴ As in ideation. - *Ed.*

actually not different from those *Āta*, so that when the sun arises its material quality, viz.: heat, also arises, albeit there is no sun different from the material quality. Consciousness also appears as a derivative from such phenomena as contact, etc.; but actually it is different from them. Hence, when consciousness arises, certainly then it is actually different from contact, etc. To show this meaning the mention of consciousness is repeated, and should thus be regarded.¹

In such passages as:² 'When for the attainment of the Rūpa world one cultivates the path thereto and, aloof from sensualities and from immoral states, by means of the earth-device, attains and abides in the first Jhāna . . . then there arises contact,' etc., he who 'then'—at a fixed time—is practising is not the identical he who is reborn. And therefore in this passage it is only said 'there is contact . . . feeling'; it is not said:³ he who is practising, *he* is reborn. But in our passage also:—'when moral consciousness . . . arises,' etc.,⁴ the consciousness assigned to the given time is not actually identical in its arising with the consciousness which assigned that given time. Hence it is that, when it is said: 'then there is contact, feeling,' it is also said: 'there is consciousness.' And hence the repetition of the word 'consciousness' must be regarded as showing what actually happens.

This is [our] judgment as to the repetition of 'consciousness.' In the section on the outline, the meaning was condensed;⁵ in the section of exposition it is detailed. For by the first word consciousness the time has merely been fixed. But in order to show, at the time fixed by consciousness, what states are present, a beginning is made with 'there is contact,' consciousness being also [named as] present; hence the repetition to include that consciousness.

¹ The simile holds good so far as the arising goes; the emphasis is on the actual arising of consciousness together with contact, etc., as the sun always rises with, *e.g.*, its rays.—*Tr.* Cf. *Dhs.* § 1, lines 2, 7.

² *Dhs.* § 160.

³ In P.T.S. ed. read *so hotīti na vuttam*.—*Ed.*

⁴ *Dhs.* § 1.

⁵ P. 84.

[114] In this place, if the word 'that' were not mentioned, it would not be possible in the section of exposition¹ to classify the consciousness (arising) at that time. Thus would its classification suffer. Therefore to classify consciousness in this section it has been repeated.

Or, because in the phrase 'has arisen' this, namely, 'consciousness which has arisen,' is the principal term in the teaching, the Commentary considers that, since consciousness does not arise in isolation, it is not in the word 'arisen' taken by itself, but in conjunction with the fifty-five moral [concomitant] states. And thus 'consciousness' is first used inclusively as involving both itself and these, and secondly as distinct from these and with them classified according to their nature in detail, beginning with 'contact,' consciousness being here considered as one of them.

'Initial application of mind'² is literally 'one thinks about,' or a 'thinking about.' It is said to be the pre-scinding [of the mind].³ Its [main] *characteristic* is the lifting of consciousness on to the object: having an object, it lifts consciousness up to it. As someone depending on a relative or friend dear to the king ascends the king's palace, so depending on initial application the mind ascends the object. Therefore it has been said that initial application lifts the mind on to the object. And the Elder Nāgasena said that 'initial application of mind has the characteristic of the initial knocking. As, sire, when a drum is struck, it goes on reverberating and emitting a continuous sound, so initial application of mind should be looked upon as the initial stroke; and sustained application of the mind as the after-reverberation and continuous emission of sound.'⁴ It has the *function* of impinging, of circumimpinging. By initial application of mind the aspirant is said to strike at and around the object. Its *manifestation* is bringing the mind near to the object.

¹ *Dhs.* § 6.

² *Dhs.* § 7.

³ Cf. *Mil.* i. 51, where this characteristic (*ūhana*) is assigned to 'wisdom' (*paññā*).—*Ed.*

⁴ Cf. *ib.* i. 96, where the simile actually used is a copper vessel, not a drum.—*Ed.*

'Sustained application of mind'¹ i discursive work upon, or traversing of the object. It has threshing out (or contemplation)² of object as *characteristic*, the linking of co-existent states to the object as *function*, and continuous binding as *manifestation*. Although there is in some consciousness³ the non-separation of initial and sustained applications of mind, the former is the first incidence of the mind on the object, as it were the striking of a bell, because it is more gross than, and runs before, (the latter). [115] The latter is the consequent binding of consciousness on the object, as it were the reverberation of the bell, because it is more subtle and of the nature of repeated threshing of the object.

Of the two, initial application of mind possesses vibration.⁴ When it first arises, it is as a state of mental thrill, like the flapping of the wings of a bird about to fly up in the air, and like the alighting in front of the lotus of a bee with mind intent on the perfume; sustained application of mind is of a calmer tenour, without much mental thrill, like the planing movement of the wings of a bird in the sky, and the gyrating of the bee about the lotus on which it has alighted. But in the Commentary⁵ initial application, as a lifting of the mind on to the object, is likened to the movement of a big bird in the sky, taking the wind with both wings and keeping them steadily in a line. For it advances bent on a single object. Sustained application, on the other hand, should be understood as a state of contemplating which is like the movement of that flying bird flapping its wings to take the wind. For it has been called a threshing of the object. It is a very fitting term to use for a continuous occurrence. The difference between initial and sustained application of mind is plain in the first and second Jhānas.⁶ Further, as when a man holds

¹ *Dhs.* § 8.

² *Anumajjana*. Morris derived it from *mṛj.*, *J.P.T.S.*, 1886, p. 118.—*Ed.*

³ *E.g.*, in First Jhāna, fourfold system.

⁴ On *vipphāra*, Cf. *Points of Controversy*, 239 § 9.—*Ed.*

⁵ *I.e.*, on the *Āṅguttara* N. i. 171 § 5.—*Ed.*

⁶ Fivefold system.

firmly by one hand & dirty copper bowl, and with the other scrubs it with brush (or husk), initial application of mind is like the firmly holding hand, and sustained application of mind the scrubbing hand. So, too, as the potter whirls the wheel by the stroke of the handle and makes the pot, initial application is like the hand pressing the clay down, sustained application the hand turning it to and fro. Again, in making a circle the applying initial application of mind is like the thorn fixed in the middle and the contemplating sustained application of mind the revolving thorn outside.

'Zest,' 'rapture,' is literally that which satisfies, develops.¹ It has satisfaction as *characteristic*, the thrilling of body and mind (or suffusion) as *function*, and elation as *manifestation*. Rapture is of five kinds:—the lesser thrill, momentary rapture, flooding rapture, all-pervading rapture and transporting rapture. Of these, the lesser thrill is only able to raise the hairs of the body; the momentary rapture is like the production of lightning moment by moment; [116] like waves breaking on the seashore, the flooding rapture descends on the body and breaks; the transporting rapture is strong, and lifts the body up to the extent of launching it in the air.

As the Elder Mahātissa residing at Punnāvallika on the full-moon day at eventide went into the courtyard of the shrine, saw the moonlight, and turning to the Great Shrine,² he called up the transporting rapture, with the Buddha as object of thought, and by virtue of having habitually dwelt upon the vision, at the thought:—'In such an hour, lo! the four assemblies salute the Great Shrine'—on the cemented floor he rose in the sky like a ball with mind entranced, and stood even in the courtyard of the Shrine. Likewise a certain daughter of noble family in Vattakālaka village, the support of Girikaṇḍaka monastery, soared into the sky also by strong transporting rapture when thinking of the Buddha. It is said that her parents, going in the evening to the monastery to hear the Doctrine, said, 'Dear, you are heavily burdened; it is

¹ *Dhs.* § 9. *Piṇayatīti pīti*.

² At Anurādhapura.—*Tr.*

not the time for you to be walking; you are not able. We shall hear the Doctrine, and make merit for you,' and went. Although desirous of going, she was not able to disregard their words, and remained behind in the house. She stood at the door and, looking by moonlight at the courtyard of the Shrine against the sky at Girikaṇḍaka, saw the offering of lamps to the shrine and the four assemblies doing honour to the shrine by garlands and scented perfumes, etc., and circumambulating it, and heard the sound of the mass-chanting of the Brotherhood. Then to her occurred the thought: 'Blessed indeed must be these who can get to the monastery and walk in such a courtyard, and hear such a sweet religious discourse,' and to her, looking at the Shrine rising like a mass of pearls, arose transporting rapture. She soared into the sky, and descended therefrom to the courtyard earlier than her parents, saluted the Shrine, and stood listening to the Doctrine. Then her parents coming asked her: 'Dear, by which way did you come?' 'Dear parents, I came by the sky, and not by the road.' 'Dear, by the sky only saints can go; how could you have come?' Thus questioned, she said, 'As I was standing looking at the shrine in the moonlight, there arose in me a strong rapture while thinking on the Buddha. Then I knew not whether I stood or sat, but I laid hold of a sign, and sprang into the sky, and stood in the courtyard.' So far can transporting rapture work.

[117] When all-pervading rapture arises, the whole body is completely surcharged, blown like a full bladder or like a mountain cavern pouring forth a mighty flood of water. This fivefold rapture, becoming pregnant and maturing, begets the twofold repose of mental factors and of consciousness; repose, becoming pregnant and maturing, begets the twofold bliss, bodily and mental; bliss, becoming pregnant and maturing, begets the threefold concentration:—momentary concentration, access-concentration and ecstatic concentration. Of these, the first two belong here.

Bliss¹ or ease¹ is that which gives pleasure.² In whom it

¹ *Sukham*.

² *Dhs.* § 10.

arises it makes him happy, is its meaning. It is a synonym for joyous feeling. Its *characteristic*, etc., are the same as in feeling.¹ According to another method, bliss or ease has the *characteristic* of being pleasant, the development of associated states as its *function*, and showing favour² to the same as its *manifestation*. Although in some kinds of consciousness³ rapture and bliss are not dissociated, rapture (or zest) is delight in the attaining of the desired object, bliss or ease is the enjoyment of the taste of what is acquired. Where rapture is, there is ease; but where ease is, there is not always rapture. Rapture is classed under the aggregate of mental co-efficients, ease under the aggregate of feeling. Rapture is like a weary traveller in the desert in summer, who hears of, or sees water or a shady wood. Ease is like his enjoying the water or entering the forest shade. For a man who, travelling along the path through a great desert and overcome by the heat, is thirsty and desirous of drink, if he saw a man on the way, would ask, 'Where is water?' The other would say, 'Beyond the wood is a dense forest with a natural lake. Go there, and you will get some.' He hearing these words would be glad and delighted, and as he went would see lotus leaves, etc., fallen on the ground and become more glad and delighted. Going onwards, he would see men with wet clothes and hair, hear the sounds of wild fowl and pea-fowl, etc., see the dense forest of green like a net of jewels growing by the edge of the natural lake, he would see the water lily, the lotus, the white lily, etc., growing in the lake, he would see the clear transparent water, he would be all the more glad and delighted, [118] would descend into the natural lake, bathe and drink at pleasure and, his oppression being allayed, he would eat the fibres and stalks of the lilies, adorn himself with the blue lotus, carry on his shoulders the roots of the mandālaka, ascend from the lake, put on his clothes, dry the bathing cloth in the sun, and in the cool shade where the breeze blew ever so gently lay himself down and say:

¹ P. 145 f.

² Anuggahana. Pyī interprets this as 'repeated grasping'—i.e., of the mental object.

³ Cf. First Jhāna.—Tr.

' O bliss ! O bliss ! ' Thus should this illustration be applied :— The time of gladness and delight from when he heard of the natural lake and the dense forest till he saw the water is like rapture having the manner of gladness and delight at the object in view. The time when, after his bath and drink he laid himself down in the cool shade, saying, ' O bliss ! O bliss ! ' etc., is the sense of ease grown strong,¹ established in that mode of enjoying the taste of the object. In fact, the description (of the two terms) is repeatedly illustrated,² and so is the fact that where there is rapture or zest, there also is happiness.

*Cittakaggatā*³ is one-pointedness of mind, another name for concentration. Regarding its characteristic, etc., the Commentary has the following:—Concentration has the characteristic of leadership, also of non-distraction. As the dome of a gabled house from binding the remaining constituents of the building is the leader, so concentration is the leader of all those states from their being accomplished by consciousness associated with concentration. Hence has it been said: ' As, your majesty, all the rafters of a gabled house go to the ridgepole, incline towards, meet at the ridgepole, the ridgepole is called the chief among them; so, your majesty, all moral states incline towards concentration, slope towards concentration, take refuge in concentration; concentration is called the chief among them.'⁴ And as the king in battle goes wherever the army is giving way, and the army wherever he has gone becomes reinforced and—the hostile army being broken—follows the king,⁵ so concentration, from not allowing the co-existent states to be thrown out and scattered, has non-distraction as its characteristic.

¹ *Balappattaṃ*. The 'Mandalay' MS. (India Office) has *phalapattaṃ*, 'which has won fruition.'—*Ed.*

² As the hearing and seeing of the lake and forest, etc.—*Yojanā*.

³ *Dhs.* § 11.

⁴ *Mil.* i. 60. 'Refuge in' (*samādhippathārā*), as in a cave. The three figures occur in the *Nikāyas*, applied to the sea (*S.* iv. 79) and to *Nibbāna* (*ib.* 180, etc.). The text of the Burmese translation reads *pāmokkha*.—*Ed.*

⁵ This simile is also in *Mil.*, *ib.*, but is here slightly altered and made more telling.—*Ed.*

Here is another explanation: This concentration, known as one-pointedness of mind, has non-scattering (of itself) or non-distractedness (of associated states) as *characteristic*, the welding together of the co-existent states as *function*, as water kneads bath-powder into a paste, and peace of mind or knowledge as *manifestation*. [119] For it has been said: 'He who is concentrated knows, sees according to the truth.'¹ It is distinguished by having ease as *proximate cause*. Like the steadiness of the flame of a lamp in the absence of wind, so should steadfastness of mind be understood.

By it persons or associated states believe, or one believes, or the mere believing—this is *saddhā* (faith).² From the overcoming of unfaith, faith is a controlling faculty in the sense of predominance, or in its characteristic of decision it exercises lordship (over associated states). Faith and *indriya*, or controlling faculty, give the compound 'faith-faculty.' It has purifying, or aspiring as its characteristic. As the water-purifying gem of the universal monarch thrown into water causes solids, alluvia, waterweeds and mud to subside and makes the water clear, transparent and undisturbed, so faith arising discards the hindrances, causes the corruptions to subside, purifies the mind and makes it undisturbed; the mind being purified, the aspirant of noble family gives gifts, observes the precepts, performs the sabbath duties and commences his culture. Thus faith should be known to have purifying as its characteristic. Hence has it been said by the venerable Nāgascena: 'As if, your majesty, a universal monarch were to cross a small stream with his fourfold army, and the water would be perturbed, dirty, stirred up and muddy by the elephants, horses, chariots and infantry. And the king, when he had crossed, were to give an order to the men, "Bring me water, I say. I will drink." Now supposing the water-purifying gem of the king would be with them, they would reply, "Even so, lord," and throw the gem into the water. Then at once the solids, alluvia, water-weeds and mud would subside, and the water would become clear, transparent and

¹ A. v. 3.

² *Dh.s.* § 12.

undisturbed, and they would offer the water to the king saying, "May the lord drink." As, your majesty, the water, so should the mind be regarded; as those men, so the aspirant; as the solids, alluvia, water-weeds and mud, so the corruptions; as the water-purifying gem, so faith; as the moment when the water-purifying gem is thrown, and the solids, alluvia, etc., subsiding, the water becomes clear, transparent and undisturbed, so, your majesty, faith arising discards the hindrances, [120] and the mind being free from them becomes clear, transparent and undisturbed.¹

It is, again, as though a timid crowd stood on both banks of a great river full of all sorts of crocodiles, monsters, sharks, ogres, etc. And a great warrior, the hero of battles, came and inquired, 'Why do you stand still?' And they would reply, 'We dare not cross on account of the dangers.' But he, grasping his sharpened sword and saying, 'Follow me and have no fear,' crossed the river and repelled the oncoming crocodiles, etc. And making it safe for those folk he led them from this bank to that, and from that bank he led them in safety to the hither bank.² So faith is the forerunner, the precursor to one who is giving gifts, observing the precepts, performing sabbath duties and commencing culture. Hence has it been said: Faith has purifying and aspiring as its characteristic.

Yet another view:—Faith has confiding as its characteristic; purifying as its function, like the water-purifying gem, or aspiring faith as function, like the crossing of the floods; freedom from pollution or decision as its manifestation; an object worthy of faith or factors of stream-winning³ as its proximate cause. It should be regarded as at once hand, property and seed.⁴

Viriya is the state of an energetic man, or it is the action of the energetic, or it is that which should be effected, carried

¹ *Mil.* i. 54.

² Cf. *ibid.* 55, where the danger lies in the river being in flood.—*Ed.*

³ *D.* iii. 227; *S.* ii. 68-71, etc.

⁴ *I.e.*, as emblems of agency, fulfilment, and condition of good thoughts—*Ariyāṅkārā*.

out by method or suitable means. From its overcoming idleness it is a controlling faculty in the sense of predominance. Or, it exercises government with the characteristic of grasp. Combined with faculty we get the compound: 'energy-faculty.' Its characteristic is strengthening, and grasp, or support. As an old house stands when strengthened by new pillars, so the aspirant, when strengthened by energy, does not fall off, or deteriorate as to moral states. Thus should the characteristic of strengthening be understood. Hence it was said by Nāga-sena: 'As, your majesty, when a house is falling one should strengthen it with other pieces of wood; being thus strengthened, the house would not fall, so, your majesty, [121] energy has the characteristic of strengthening; all moral states when strengthened by energy do not fall away.'¹ And as a small army going to battle might be repulsed; then they would tell the king; the king would send a strong reinforcement; the king's army, being thus supported, would defeat the hostile army:—thus energy does not allow associated states to recede, to retreat; it uplifts, supports them. Hence has it been said that energy has the characteristic of supporting.

Another view is that energy has exerting as its characteristic, strengthening the co-existent states as function, and opposition to giving way as manifestation. It has been said: 'He being agitated, makes a rational effort,'² hence it has agitation, or the basic condition of making energy as proximate cause. Right energy should be regarded as the root of all attainments.

*Sati*³—by this they remember the object, or one remembers the object, or the mere remembering of the object—this is mindfulness. From overcoming confused memory, it is a faculty in the sense of predominance. It exercises government (over associated states) by the characteristic of 'being present in.'⁴ hence it is a controlling faculty, and hence the

¹ *Mil.* i. 37. Viriya and paggāha are in that translation rendered 'perseverance' and 'tension' respectively.—*Ed.*

² *Mil.* i. 57; here again the simile is not cited *verbatim*.—*Ed.*

³ *Dhs.* § 14.

⁴ Namely: in any object of the past.—*Pyi.*

compound 'mindfulness-faculty.' Its characteristic is 'not floating away,'¹ and acquirement. As the young treasurer of the king, in charge of the tenfold treasure, both early and late causes the king to take note of and remember the royal possession, so mindfulness takes note of, remembers a moral act. Hence the Elder said: 'As, your majesty, the king's confidential adviser early and late makes the universal monarch remember: so many, lord, are your elephants, so many horses, so many chariots, so much infantry, so much bullion, so much gold, so much property; let your majesty remember it—even so, your majesty, mindfulness does not allow the floating away of moral states, such as the four applications of mindfulness, the four supreme efforts, the four bases of supernatural potency, the five controlling faculties, the five powers, the seven factors of wisdom, the Ariyan eightfold path, calm, insight, knowledge, emancipation, the transcendent states:—thus, your majesty, mindfulness has non-floating away as its characteristic.'² And as that jewel, the confidential adviser of the universal monarch, knowing what is disadvantageous and what is advantageous, removes the disadvantageous and promotes the advantageous, so mindfulness, searching well the courses of advantageous and disadvantageous states:—'these are disadvantageous states, misconduct in body,' etc., removes the disadvantageous states, and [122] acquires the advantageous ones:—'these are advantageous states, good conduct as regards body,' etc. Hence the Elder said: 'As, your majesty, that king's jewel, the confidential adviser, knows what is advantageous and what is disadvantageous to the king:—"these are advantageous to the king, those disadvantageous; these are serviceable, those not serviceable"—and then removes the disadvantageous and acquires the advantageous, even so, your majesty, mindfulness as it arises searches well the courses of states, advantageous and disadvantageous:—"these states are advan-

¹ Not allowing any floating away, as of a pumpkin in a stream. It does not suffer the object to slip, but keeps it steady as a rock.—*Tīkā*.

² *Mil.* i. 59. 'Transcendent' (lit. supramundane) states is not in the cited work. It sums up the foregoing 41.—*Ed.*

tageous, those disadvantageous; these states are serviceable, those not serviceable"—and then removes the disadvantageous and acquires the advantageous. Thus, your majesty, mindfulness has acquirement as its characteristic.¹

Here is another method: mindfulness has 'not floating away' as its characteristic, unforgetfulness as its function, guarding, or the state of facing the object, as its manifestation, firm perception, or application in mindfulness as regards the body, etc., as proximate cause. It should be regarded as a door-post from being firmly established in the object, and as a door-keeper from guarding the door of the senses.

'Concentration'² is that state which sets and places the mind in the object. From overcoming distraction of mind, it is a controlling faculty in the sense of predominance. It exercises government (over associated states) by the characteristic of imperturbability; thus it is a controlling faculty, and gives the compound 'concentration-faculty.' Its characteristic, etc., are those of 'one-pointedness of mind' (p. 156).

*Paññā*³ means one understands (*pajānāti*). What does one understand? The Ariyan Facts (or Truths) by the method: This is ill, etc. But in the Great Commentary understanding is defined as 'it causes to know (or understand). What does it cause to know? Impermanence, ill, soullessness.' Through overcoming ignorance, it is a controlling faculty in the sense of predominance. It exercises government (over associated states) by the characteristic of vision, hence it is a controlling faculty and gives the compound 'understanding-faculty.' It has illuminating and understanding as characteristic. As when a lamp burns at night in a four-walled house the darkness ceases, light manifests itself, so understanding has illuminating as its characteristic. There is no illumination equal to the illumination of understanding. To the wise at a single sitting the ten thousand world-spheres appear as of one light. Hence the Elder has said: 'Just as when a man, your majesty,

¹ *Mil.* i. 59.

² *Dhs.* § 15. Samādhī.

³ *Ibid.* § 16.

introduces an oil-lamp into a dark house, the lamp so introduced disperses the darkness, produces light, [123] sheds lustre, makes objects visible, so, your majesty, understanding as it arises dispels the darkness of ignorance, produces the light of wisdom, sheds the lustre of knowledge, makes plain the Ariyan Facts. Thus, your majesty, understanding has illuminating as its characteristic.¹

And as a clever surgeon knows which food is suitable, and which is not, so understanding as it arises knows states as moral or immoral, serviceable or unserviceable, low or exalted, black or pure, similar or dissimilar. And this was said by the Generalissimo of the Law (Sāriputta): 'It knows; thus, brother, it is in consequence called understanding. And what does it know? This is ill,' etc.² Thus it should be expanded. And thus knowing should be regarded as the characteristic of understanding.

Here is another view:—Understanding has the penetration of intrinsic nature, unfaltering penetration as its characteristic, like the penetration of an arrow shot by a skilled archer; illumination of the object as its function, as it were a lamp; non-perplexity as its proximate cause, as it were a good guide in the forest.

Mind (*mano*)³ is minding, that is, it discerns (cognizes). But the authors of the Commentary say: like measuring by the *nālī* or balancing by a great weight, mind knows the object. It exercises government (over associated states) by the characteristic of measuring, hence it is a controlling faculty, giving the compound 'mind-faculty.' It is just a synonym for consciousness (*citta*) mentioned above.⁴

Sumano, 'joyous,'⁵ means that one's mind, being associated with zest and joy, is beautiful; and the state of being joyous is joy. It exercises government (over associated states) by the characteristic of pleasantness, hence it is a controlling faculty, and gives the compound 'joy-faculty.' It is another term for happiness, ease, mentioned above.⁶

¹ *Mil.* i. 61.

² *Majjhima* i. 292.

³ *Dhs.* § 17

⁴ P. 148.

⁵ *Dhs.* § 18.

⁶ P. 145 f.

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'Life'¹ is that by which associated states live. It exercises government (over associated states) by the characteristic of ceaseless watching, hence it is a controlling faculty, and gives the compound 'life-faculty.' It is the dominant influence over continuity in [organic] processes. As regards its characteristic, etc., it has the ceaseless watching over states undivided from itself as its characteristic; the processes of such states or co-existent states as function; the placing of them as manifestation; states that have to be kept going as proximate cause. And although there is orderly arrangement in life's essential properties, etc., it watches over those states only in the moment of (their and its) existence, [124] as water over lotuses, etc. And although it watches over them, arisen as its own property, as a nurse over the infant, life goes on only by being bound up with these states that have gone on, as the pilot on the boat. Beyond the cessant instant it does not go on, owing to the non-being both of itself and of the states which should have been kept going. At the cessant instant it does not maintain them, owing to its own destruction, as the spent oil in the wick cannot maintain the flame of the lamp. Its effective power is as its duration.

As to the next five terms,² right view conveys the meaning of vision; right intention, that of mental application;³ right endeavour, that of support; right mindfulness, that of presence (or being at hand); right concentration, that of absence of distraction. As regards word-definitions:—that which sees rightly, or by which beings see objects rightly—this is right view. That which plans rightly, or by which beings plan rightly—this is right intention. That which rightly endeavours, or by which beings rightly endeavour—this is right endeavour. That which remembers rightly, or by

¹ *Dhs.* § 19. *Jīvitam*.

² *Dhs.* §§ 20-24. 'Right' (*sammā*) has here the sense of irreversibility and escape from the succession of rebirths.—*Pyā*.

³ Cf. above, p. 151. Cf. *Dhs.* §§ 7, 21: 'application of mind' and 'intention' are described in identical terms.—*Ed.*

which beings remember objects rightly—this is right mindfulness. That which evenly keeps the consciousness on the object, or by which associated states evenly keep the consciousness on the object—this is right concentration. Again, a praiseworthy or beautiful view is right view. In this way the word-definition should be understood. Their characteristics, etc., have been stated above.

As to the seven 'strengths'¹ 'faith' and so forth have been already described. And 'strength' (*bala*) should be understood in the sense of 'not shaking.' Of these seven, that which does not shake because of unbelief is the strength of faith. It does not shake because of idleness—this is strength of energy. It does not shake because of obliviousness—this is strength of mindfulness. It does not shake because of distraction—this is strength of concentration. It does not shake because of ignorance—this is strength of understanding. It does not shake because of shamelessness—this is strength of conscientiousness. It does not shake because of carelessness of blame—this is strength of fear of blame. Such is the explanation of the meaning by way of both terms.

The first five 'strengths' have been described above as regards their characteristics, etc. In the last pair,² conscientiousness is that which abominates or shrinks from. It is a synonym for shame. Fear of blame is [lit.] glowing [*i.e.*, with nervous heat]. It is a synonym for agitation at evil. In the table of contents shame was stated to be the characteristic. In the following detailed discourse will be shown their mutual difference, their origin and how they are influenced. [125] Conscientiousness has a subjective origin, fear of blame has an external cause. Conscientiousness is influenced by the self, fear of blame is influenced by the world. Conscientiousness is rooted in the intrinsic nature of shame, fear of blame in the intrinsic nature of fear. Conscientiousness has the characteristic of respectful obedience, fear of blame that of viewing a fault with timidity and fear. Of the two, conscientiousness

¹ *Dhs.* §§ 25-31

² *Ibid.* §§ 30, 31.

with its subjective origin arises from four causes: consideration of birth, of age, of heroism, of wide experience. How? 'This evil act is not such as would be done by those of [good] birth; it is such as those of low birth, fishermen and the like, would do; it is not fitting that such as I who am well-born should do it':—thus considering one's birth, and not committing evil such as life-taking, etc., one maintains [a standard of] conscientiousness. Again, 'this evil act is only worthy of boys; it is not fitting that one of my years should do it'—thus considering age, conscientiousness is maintained.' Again, 'this evil act is an act for the weak; it is not fitting that I, who have courage and strength, should do it':—thus considering, one refrains and maintains conscientiousness. Again, 'this evil act is an act for blind fools and not for the wise; it is not fitting that I, endowed with wisdom and wide experience, should do it':—thus considering one's wide experience, one refrains and maintains conscientiousness. Having thus set up conscientiousness by introducing it into the mind, one does not do evil acts, and thus conscientiousness has a subjective origin. How has fear of blame an external origin? 'If you do an evil act, you will get blame among the four assemblies.

*The wise will blame you. As the citizen
Shuns all impurity, the good shun you.
How, bhikkhu, will you do that which is wrong?*

Thus considering, one does not do evil owing to fear of blame from without. Thus fear of blame has an external origin.

How is conscientiousness influenced by the self? Take a certain son of noble family [126] who makes self the chief influence, and so refrains from evil:—'It is not fit that such a man as I, who left the world through faith, endowed with wide experience, believing in the ascetic life, should do evil.' Thus is conscientiousness influenced by the self. Hence the Blessed One has said: 'He makes self the chief influence, and abandons immorality, develops morality, abandons faults and develops faultlessness, and keeps himself pure.'¹

¹ *Anguttara* i. 148, slightly different.

How is fear of blame influenced by the world? Here a certain son of noble family makes the world the chief influence and does not do evil. As the Blessed One has said: 'Wide indeed is the world; in the wide world are monks and brahmins of supernormal potency, with clairvoyance and knowledge of others' thoughts. They see afar, although near at hand they are not seen; mentally they know the thoughts of others, me also (he thinks) they will know thus: "Look at this son of noble family. Though he has become a monk by faith, leaving his home for the homeless state, he lives mixed with evil immoral things. There are spirits with supernormal potency, clairvoyance, knowing the thoughts of others. They see afar," etc. Thus he makes the world the chief influence, abandons immorality, develops morality, abandons faults and develops faultlessness, and keeps himself pure.'¹ Thus fear of blame is influenced by the world.

Conscientiousness is rooted in the intrinsic nature of shame, fear of blame in that of dread. Herein shame means the manner of being ashamed, and conscientiousness is rooted in the intrinsic nature of that. Dread means the fear of purgatory, and fear of blame is rooted in the intrinsic nature of that. And both are manifested in the avoiding of evil. For a certain son of noble family, in obeying the calls of nature, on seeing a certain person worthy of respect, would manifest shame, would be ashamed. In the same way, sunken in an internal sense of shame he does not do evil. A certain man frightened by the fear of purgatory does not commit sin. Here is an illustration: As of two iron balls, one being cold and besmeared with dung, the other being hot and burning, a wise man does not catch the cold one from loathing its being smeared with dung, nor the other one for fear of getting burnt. Here the not grasping the cold ball from loathing its being smeared with dung is like the not doing wrong from being sunk in an internal sense of shame. [127] The not grasping the hot ball from fear of being burnt should be considered as the not doing evil from fear of purgatory.

¹ *Āṅguttara* i. 148.

Conscientiousness has the characteristic of respectful obedience, fear of blame that of viewing with timidity the fearful aspect of wrong-doing. This duality is manifested in the avoiding of evil. A certain man, indeed, from the four causes of consideration for his high birth, for the dignity of his Teacher, for the greatness of his inheritance, for the honour of his fellow-brethren, produces conscientiousness with the characteristic of respectful obedience and does not do evil. A certain man, from the four causes of self-accusation, of accusation by others, of punishment, of evil destiny, produces fear of blame with the characteristic of viewing with timidity the fearful aspect of wrong-doing and does not do evil. Herein considerations for high birth, etc., and fear of self-accusation, etc., can [as above] be explained in detail.

By this they do not lust, or itself does not lust, or the mere act of not lusting—this is ‘absence of greed’ (or disinterestedness). And the same for ‘absence of hate’ and ‘of delusion.’¹ Of these three, absence of greed has the characteristic of the mind being free from cupidity for an object of thought, or of its being detached, like a drop of water on a lotus leaf. It has the function of not appropriating, like an emancipated monk, and the manifestation of detachment, like a man fallen into a foul place. Absence of hate has the characteristic of freedom from churlishness or resentment, like an agreeable friend; the function of destroying vexation, or dispelling distress, like sandal wood; the manifestation of being pleasing, like the full moon. Absence of delusion has been explained according to characteristic, etc., in connexion with the term ‘faculty of understanding.’²

Of these three, again, absence of greed³ is opposed to the taint of grudging, absence of hate to that of wickedness, absence of delusion to [that of] not developing the moral qualities. And absence of greed is the condition of giving, absence of hate that of virtue, and absence of delusion that of culture. Moreover, through disinterestedness³ the excessive estimates of the covetous are avoided; through amity the

¹ *Dhs.* §§ 32-34.

² P. 161.

³ *Alabbo.*

one-sidedness of the hater is avoided; through clear-headedness the perversions of delusion are avoided. And, again, when he detects an actual fault, the disinterested man discloses it, for the greedy man hides a fault; similarly, the man of amity discloses a virtue when detected, for the hater [128] effaces a virtue; and the wise man reveals what he finds is really true, while the dull man holds truth false and the false true. And again, through absence of greed one does not feel the pain of separation from that which is beloved, affection being the intrinsic nature of the greedy man as well as inability to bear the pain of separation from the beloved. Through absence of hate one does not feel the pain of association with the unloved, hatred being the intrinsic nature of the man of hate as well as inability to bear the pain of association with the unloved. Through absence of delusion one does not feel the pain of not getting what is desired, such considerations made by one without delusion as: 'How were it possible?'¹ And, again, through absence of greed the pain of rebirth is not experienced, since the former is opposed to craving and the latter has its root in craving. Through absence of hate the pain of old age is not felt, since the keen hater becomes quickly aged. Through absence of delusion the pain of death is not experienced, for verily to die with the mind baffled is a pain which does not come over the undeluded. And, finally, a harmonious life of happy people among laymen is due to absence of greed, among monks to absence of delusion, and among all to absence of hate.

To distinguish:—through absence of greed there is no rebirth in the sphere of the Petas;² for verily beings generally are born there through craving, and absence of greed is opposed to craving. Through absence of hate there is no rebirth in purgatory; for verily it is through hate and churlishness that we are reborn in a purgatory resembling hate, and absence of hate is opposed to hate. Through absence of delusion rebirth as a lower animal does not take place; for verily on

¹ Cf. *Dialogues* ii. 177, which has not *labbhati*, but *labbhā*, 'possible'—namely, that that which is impermanent should not decay.—*Ed.*

² Ghosts or shades.

account of delusion persons are reborn among the always deluded lower animals, and absence of delusion is opposed to delusion. Of the three, absence of greed inhibits lusting enterprise; absence of hate inhibits separation due to hate; absence of delusion inhibits that indifference which is due to ignorance.¹

Moreover, according to the order of these three, there are three perceptions: emancipation (associated with the First Jhāna), good-will (associated with love) and non-cruelty (associated with mercy). There are also these three perceptions: the foul, the immeasurable and the elements. Through absence of greed the extreme course of devotion to the pleasure of sense is avoided; through absence of hate the opposite extreme of self-mortification is avoided; and through absence of delusion the Middle Course is reached. Similarly, absence of greed breaks the physical knot of covetousness; absence of hate breaks the physical knot of ill-will; and absence of delusion breaks the remaining pair of knots.² Again, the two first applications in mindfulness are accomplished by the power of the preceding two (*i.e.*, absence of greed and of hate); and the two latter applications in mindfulness are accomplished by the power of the last (*i.e.*, absence of delusion). Again, absence of greed is the cause of good health, for the ungreedy man does not resort to what is attractive but unsuitable; hence his good health. [129] Absence of hate is the cause of youthfulness, for the man of no hate, not being burnt by the fire of hate, which brings wrinkles and grey hairs, remains young for a long time. Absence of delusion is the cause of long life, for the undeluded man knows what is advantageous and not disadvantageous, and avoiding what is not advantageous and practising what is advantageous, lives a long life. Again, absence of greed is the cause of the production of wealth, for wealth is obtained through liberality. Absence of hate is the cause of the production of friends, for through love friends are obtained and not lost. Absence of delusion is the cause of personal attainments, for the undeluded man, doing

¹ Cf. *Majjhima* i. 3 with 364; *Visuddhi Maṅga*, ch. ix.—*Ed.*

² Namely, practice of mere ritual and adherence to dogma.—*Dhs.*
§§ 1135 *f.*

only that which is good for himself, perfects himself. Again, absence of greed brings about life in deva-heavens, absence of hate brings about life in Brahma-heavens, and absence of delusion brings about the Ariyan life. Moreover, through absence of greed one is at peace¹ among beings and things belonging to one's party, inasmuch as, if disaster befall them, the sorrow which depends on excessive attachment to them is absent. Through absence of hate one is happy among beings and things belonging to a hostile party, inasmuch as in the man of no hate inimical thoughts are absent. Through absence of delusion one is happy among beings and things belonging to a neutral party, inasmuch as for the undeluded there is no excessive attachment to all beings and things belonging to a neutral party. Again, by absence of greed one has insight into impermanence, for the greedy man, owing to his desire for wealth and property, does not regard impermanent conditioned things as impermanent. By absence of hate one has insight into ill, for one inclined to amity has, in possessing, abandoned the acquirement of the basis of vexation² and regards conditioned things as ill. By absence of delusion one has insight into soullessness, for the undeluded man is clever in grasping the nature of reality and knows the five aggregates which have no adviser³ as such. As insight into impermanence, ill and soullessness is brought about by these three states, so they too are brought about by insight into impermanence, ill and soullessness. Through insight into impermanence arises absence of greed; through insight into ill arises absence of hate; through insight into soullessness arises absence of delusion. For who, knowing aright that this is impermanent, would cause affection to arise for the sake of it? Who, knowing conditioned things to be ill, would cause the further ill of anger exceedingly violent to arise for them? And who, knowing things as empty of soul, would again fall into delusion?

¹ *Nibbuto*; at peace, because detached.—*Tr.*

² In P.T.S. ed. read *yathāvagahanakusalo*.

³ Cf. *Dialogues* ii. 208, n. 1: *parināyako*.

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'Non-covetousness'¹ is that which does not covet others' property.

Good-will² is that which does not ruin one's own or another's bodily or mental happiness, worldly or future advantage and good report.

That which sees aright or is a beautiful view:—this is right view.³ This and the last two terms, viz.: non-covetousness, etc., are other names for absence of greed, hate and delusion. Above, these three were taken by way of roots, here they should be understood by way of courses of action.

The sense of shame (conscientiousness) and fear of blame, taken above⁴ as 'strengths,' are here [repeated] in the sense of guardians of the world. For these two states do indeed guard the world, as he said: 'Bhikkhus, these two pure states guard the world. Which are the two? The sense of shame and fear of blame. If, bhikkhus, [130] these two pure states did not guard the world, there would be no regard paid to mother, or mother's sister, or uncle's wife, nor teacher's wife, nor wife of honourable men. The world would be full of promiscuous births, as among goats, sheep, fowls, pigs, dogs and jackals. Because, bhikkhus, these two pure states guard the world, therefore regard is paid to the mother and the rest.'⁵

'Tranquillity of the *kāya*'⁶ is the calming of the three groups of mental factors (concomitant with consciousness); tranquillity of consciousness is the calming of mind. *Kāya* here refers to the three aggregates—feeling, perception and mental activities.⁷ These two states being taken together have the characteristic of pacifying the suffering of both mental factors and of consciousness; the function of crushing the suffering of both; the manifestation of an unwavering and cool state of both; and have mental factors and consciousness as proxi-

¹ *Dhs.* § 35.

² *Dhs.* § 36.

³ *Dhs.* § 37.

⁴ See p. 164 f.

⁵ *Āṅguttara* i. 51= *Iti-vuttaka* § 42.

⁶ *Dhs.* §§ 40, 41.

⁷ *Kāya* may mean (1) the body (*S.* i. 156); (2) the tactile sense; (3) bodily action; (4) any group, as here.—*Ed.*

mate cause. They are the opponents of the corruptions, such as distraction, which cause the disturbance of mental factors and of consciousness.

'*Kāya*-lightness' is buoyancy of mental factors; *citta*-lightness is buoyancy of consciousness.¹ They have the characteristic of suppressing the heaviness of the one and the other; the function of crushing heaviness in both; the manifestation of opposition to sluggishness in both, and have mental factors and consciousness as proximate cause. They are the opponents of the corruptions, such as sloth and torpor, which cause heaviness and rigidity in mental factors and consciousness.

'*Kāya*-plasticity' is plasticity of mental factors; *citta*-plasticity is plasticity of consciousness.² They have the characteristic of suppressing the rigidity of mental factors and of consciousness; the function of crushing the same in both; the manifestation or effect of setting up no resistance; and have mental factors and consciousness as proximate cause. They are the opponents of the corruptions, such as opinionativeness and conceit, which cause mental rigidity.

'*Kāya*-wieldiness' is wieldiness of mental factors; *citta*-wieldiness is that of mind.³ They have the characteristic of suppressing unwieldiness in both; the function of crushing the same; the effect of success or attainment of both in making objects of thought; they have mental factors and consciousness as proximate cause; and are the opponents of the remaining hindrances⁴ which cause unwieldiness in mental factors and consciousness. [131] They should be regarded as bringing faith in objects of faith, and patient application in works of advantage, and are like purity of gold.

'*Kāya*-fitness' is fitness of mental factors; *citta*-fitness is that of consciousness.⁴ They have the characteristic of the freedom of mental factors and of consciousness from illness; the function of crushing illness in both; the manifesta-

¹ *Dhs.* §§ 42, 43.

² *Ibid.* §§ 44, 45.

³ *Dhs.* §§ 46, 47.

⁴ *Ibid.* §§ 48, 49.

tion of freedom from evil; they have mental factors and consciousness as proximate cause, and are the opponents of the corruptions, such as diffidence, which cause illness in both.

'*Kāya*-rectitude' is rectitude of mental factors; *citta*-rectitude is that of consciousness.¹ They have the characteristic of straightness in both; the function of crushing crookedness in both; the manifestation of non-deflection; they have mental factors and mind as proximate cause, and are the opponents of the corruptions, such as deception and craftiness, which cause crookedness in mental factors and consciousness.

'Mindfulness'² is that which remembers. 'Comprehension'³ is that which comprehends. The meaning is to know a thing all round, in different ways. Knowledge of a thing according to its usefulness, its expediency, its scope, and to know it without confusion:—these are its four divisions. For their characteristics, etc., see either term mentioned above as faculties.⁴ They are again mentioned in this place under the aspect of serviceableness.

'Calm'⁵ is that which calms adverse states, such as sensual desire. 'Insight' is that which views states in their various aspects as impermanent. In meaning it is understanding. The characteristics, etc., of these two have been mentioned above.⁶ And here they are given as forming a well-yoked pair.⁷

'Uplift' is that which upholds co-existent states.⁸ 'Balance' is the opposite of distraction called excitement.⁹ Their characteristics, etc., have been mentioned above.¹⁰ The pair is treated here in order to show the union between energy and concentration.

'Or whatever other immaterial states causally linked there are on that occasion—these are moral'¹¹ means that these

¹ *Dhs.* §§ 50, 51.

² *Ibid.* § 52.

³ *Ibid.* § 53.

⁴ P. 159; 161.

⁵ *Dhs.* §§ 54, 55.

⁶ P. 156; 161.

⁷ Like an even pair of thoroughbreds drawing in friendly union the carriage of the mind.—*Anuśikā*.

⁸ *Paṅgāha*.—*Dhs.* § 56, or 'grasp' (*B.P.E.*).

⁹ *Ibid.* § 57.

¹⁰ Under 'energy' and 'concentration,' pp. 158, 161.

¹¹ *Dhs.* § 1.

fifty states and more (six) which have been explained as 'This is contact,' down to 'This is non-distraction,' in due order of the terms, are not the only (moral states). In point of fact, [132] on the occasion when the first main type of automatic consciousness, accompanied by joy, thrice-conditioned and experienced in the realm of sense arises, there arise on that occasion states other than contact and the rest, but associated with them, each state being produced from its suitable cause, and, by the absence of material quality, in its intrinsic nature incorporeal. And all these states are moral. Having hitherto shown the fifty and more states fixed in the text as factors of consciousness, the King of the Law has indicated nine other states by the phrase 'Or whatever,' etc.

These nine states appear in various passages of the Suttas as desire, resolve, attention, equanimity, pity, sympathy, abstinence from misconduct of body and of speech, and from wrong livelihood. And in this main type of consciousness there is orthodox desire, that is, good in its conational aspect, which is not fixed in the text as a factor of consciousness, but is here included by the 'Or whatever. . . .' Likewise there is resolve, attention, equanimity, and the preparatory stage of amity.¹ This is taken only with absence of hate. There are also the preparatory stages of pity and of sympathy and of hedonic indifference. But this last is taken only with equanimity. There are also right speech, right work, right livelihood. This last is not fixed in the text as a factor of consciousness, but is included here in the 'Or whatever.'

Of these nine states these four:—desire, resolve, attention and equanimity—are acquired simultaneously, the rest at different moments. For when by the (first type of) consciousness one abandons wrong speech and by abstinence therefrom fulfils right speech, then the five, to wit, right speech, together with the four beginning with desire, are acquired simultaneously. When one abandons wrong work and by abstinence therefrom fulfils right work, abandons wrong livelihood and by abstinence therefrom fulfils right livelihood, and

¹ *I.e.* which has not reached Jhāna-ecstasy.—*Pyī*.

attains the preparatory stage of pity and of sympathy, then the five, to wit, each of these actions, together with the four beginning with desire, are acquired simultaneously. Passing beyond these five states, one who gives charity, fulfils the precepts and applies himself to work (*i.e.*, stations of religious exercise) acquires the four universal factors. Thus of these nine 'Or whatever' states 'desire' is synonymous with wish to act. Hence its characteristic is wish-to-act, its function is searching for an object, [133] its manifestation, having the object at its disposal, which object is also its proximate cause. In the taking of an object by the mind, desire should be regarded as the stretching forth of the hand.¹

'Resolution' regarding an object is choice of the same. Its characteristic is determination, its function, opposition to slinking along,² its manifestation, unshakableness,³ its proximate cause, an object fit to be decided. Owing to its unshakable nature it should be regarded as a stone pillar.

'Attention' is a mode of work, working in the mind. It makes mind, so to speak, different from the previous mind. It is of three kinds: Attention which regulates the object, attention which regulates process-consciousness, attention which regulates apperception. Of these, (a) that which regulates the object is called attention because it makes [the object] in the mind. It has the characteristic of driving associated states towards the object, the function of joining associated states to the object, the manifestation of facing the object. It is included in the aggregate of mental coefficients, and should be regarded as the charioteer of associated states because it regulates the object. (b) Attention which regulates process-consciousness is a synonym for the adverting of mind at the five doors⁴; and (c) attention which regulates

¹ As by thieves to grasp an object in the dark.—*Pyi*. Cf. Greek *δρεξίς*.—*Ed.*

² *Asamsappana*. As of an irresolute child thinking, Shall I do it, shall I not do it?—*Tiki*. Cf. *Anguttara* v. 288 f., 291.

³ *Pyi* reads *nicchayapaccupatṭhāna*—'judging is its manifestation.'

⁴ Or 'presentative consciousness,' (c) being 'representative consciousness.'

apperception is a synonym for mind-door-adverting. These two (b) (c) kinds of attention are not intended here.

'Equanimity' (or balance of mind)¹ is neutrality regarding various states. It has the characteristic of carrying on consciousness and mental properties equally, the function of checking deficiency and excess, or of cutting off partisanship; it has the manifestation of neutrality. By virtue of its indifference regarding consciousness and mental properties it should be regarded as a charioteer who treats with impartiality the well-trained horses he is driving.

'Pity' and 'sympathy' will be explained in the exposition of the Divine States.² There is only this difference—pity and sympathy have there attained to ecstasy, and are experienced as in the realm of attenuated matter;³ here they are experienced in the realm of sense.

'Kāya-misconduct-abstinence' means abstinence from misconduct in bodily action. The remaining two sentences are analogous. As regards characteristic, etc., it has been said that each of these three does not trespass nor tread on objects of the other two. They have the function of shrinking from the same; and they have faith, sense of shame, fear of blame, contentment and more, as proximate antecedents. They should be regarded as produced by the averted state of the mind from evil action.

The fifty-six states beginning with contact and the nine 'Or whatever' states form, in this outline section of states, altogether sixty-five groups. Of these, sixty-one sometimes occur in a single moment, and sometimes full sixty. The sixty-one occur on five occasions when they arise in their capacity to fulfil right speech, right work, right livelihood, pity, and sympathy; the sixty occur on a single occasion, quite apart from these five (*i.e.*, in charity or virtue). [134] And excepting the 'Or whatever' states there are fifty-six states mentioned in the text. Moreover, of the fifty-six, by taking what has not been taken, there are fully thirty states, *to wit* :

¹ *Tatra-majjhataṭṭā* is lit. 'there-middleness.'—*Ed.*

² *Dhs.* § 251 *f.* and below.

³ The Rūpa heavens.

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the fivefold contact-group,¹ initial application, sustained application, zest, one-pointedness of mind, the five controlling faculties, the two strengths of sense of shame and of fear of blame, the two roots of absence of greed and of absence of hate, the twelve states beginning with repose of mental factors and of mind,²

Of these thirty states, eighteen cannot be classified, twelve can be classified. Which are the eighteen? Contact, perception, volition, sustained application, zest, life-faculty, and the twelve beginning with 'repose of mental factors' are unclassifiable. Feeling, consciousness, initial application, one-pointedness of mind, the faculties of faith, energy, mindfulness, understanding, the strengths:—sense of shame, fear of blame, absence of greed, absence of hate—these twelve are classifiable (*sa-vibhattikā*).

Of these, seven states are classified in two places, one in three places, two in four places, one in six places, and one in seven places. How? Consciousness, initial application of mind, faith, sense of shame, fear of blame, absence of greed and absence of hate—these seven are classified in two places. For of these, consciousness (*cittaṃ*) is spoken of as such when it has attained³ fivefold contact; and as faculty of mind (*mano*) by way of³ faculties. Initial application is spoken of as such by way of jhāna-factors; and as right intention by way of Path-factors. Faith is spoken of as faculty of faith by way of faculties; and as strength by way of strengths. Sense of shame is spoken of as the strength 'sense of shame' by way of strengths; and as sense of shame under the aspect of the two guardians of the world.⁴ And the same with fear of blame. Absence of greed is spoken of as such by way of root;

¹ *I.e.*, contact, feeling, perception, volition and consciousness.—*Dhs.* § 1.

² The states which have been left out are included in these 30; *e.g.*, 'happy ease' and the 'faculty of joy' are included in 'feeling,' the 'faculty of mind' in 'consciousness,' and the three aspects of Samādhi as well as 'balance' are included in 'one-pointedness of mind,' and so on.—*Ariyāṭṭhāṅga*.

³ Patvā, having reached, won.

⁴ See p. 171.

and as disinterestedness by way of course of action. Absence of hate is spoken of as such by way of root; and as good-will by way of course of action. Thus these seven states are classified in two places. Feeling is spoken of as such by way of the five-fold contact-group, as bliss or ease by way of jhāna-factors, as faculty of joy by way of faculties. Thus one state is classified in three places. Energy is spoken of as faculty of energy by way of faculties, as right endeavour by way of Path-factors, as the strength 'energy' by way of strengths, as 'uplift' by way of the later couplet.¹ Mindfulness is spoken of as faculty of mindfulness by way of faculties, as right mindfulness by way of Path-factors, as the strength 'mindfulness' by way of strengths, [135] as mindfulness by way of the later couplet. Thus two states are classified in four places. Concentration is spoken of as one-pointedness of mind by way of jhāna-factors, as faculty of concentration by way of faculties, as right concentration by way of Path-factors, as the strength 'concentration' by way of strengths, as 'calm and non-distraction' by way of the later couplet. Thus this single state is classified in six places. Understanding is spoken of as the understanding faculty by way of faculties, as 'right views' by way of Path-factors, as the strength 'understanding' by way of strengths, as 'absence of delusion' by way of roots, as right views by way of course of action, as 'comprehension' [by way of the even pair of states, as²] 'insight' by way of the later couplet. Thus this single state is classified in seven places.

But if someone should say: — 'Therein is nothing new; it only fills up words in various places by taking what has already been taken; it forms a discourse of neither connection nor order, like goods stolen by thieves, an unintelligent discourse, like grass disturbed in the path of a herd of cattle' — he should be checked by our saying, 'Not so!' No discourse of the Buddhas³ is without connection; there is always a connection. Neither is there an unintelligent discourse. All has been spoken with intelligence. For the supreme Buddha knows

¹ See p. 173.

² Omitted in P.T.S. ed.

³ Read *Buddhānam desanā*, and correct what follows *ibid*.

the function of each of the states, knowing which, in making the classification by function, he has classified, each in one place, the eighteen single-functioned states. Knowing the seven states to have a double function, he has classified each in two places. Knowing feeling to have a triple function, he has classified it in three places. Knowing energy and mindfulness to have a fourfold function, he has classified them in four places. Knowing concentration to have a sixfold function, he has classified it in six places. Knowing understanding to have a sevenfold function, he has classified it in seven places.

Here is a simile:—A wise king, they say, goes into solitude and thinks, 'This property, the heritage of royalty, should not be used up anyhow. I will increase the income by suitable arts.' He assembles all his artisans and declares, 'Summon those who know a single art.' Thus summoned, eighteen men stand up. He assigns each his portion and sends them away. When he declares, 'Let those who know two arts come forward,' seven men approach him. To each he entrusts two portions. When he declares, 'Let those who know three arts come forward,' one man approaches him. To him he entrusts three portions. When he declares, 'Let those who know four arts come forward,' two men approach him. To them he entrusts four portions. When he declares, 'Let those who know five arts come forward,' none¹ approaches him. When he declares, 'Let those who know six arts come forward,' one man approaches him. To him he entrusts six portions. When he declares, 'Let those who know seven arts [136] come forward,' one man approaches him. To him he entrusts seven portions. The wise king here is like the incomparable King of the Law, the artisans are like the states which have arisen as factors of consciousness, the increasing of the income by suitable arts is like the classification of the various states according to their functions. And all these states form seventeen groups according to the contact-quintet, jhāna-factors, controlling faculties, Path-factors, strengths, roots, courses of action, guardians of the

¹ P.T.S. ed. should read *nāgacchi*. Cf. context above.

world, repose, buoyancy, plasticity, wieldiness, fitness, rectitude, mindfulness and comprehension, calm and insight, uplift and non-distraction.

End of the Discourse on the Section of the Summary of Conscious States.

CHAPTER II

DISCOURSE ON THE SECTION OF EXPOSITION

Now in order to show the classification of the fifty-six words which have been fixed as the Text in this Section of the Outline of States, the Section of Exposition has been begun on this wise: 'What on that occasion is contact?'¹

The meaning of this question is:—It has been said that on the occasion when the main class of automatic consciousness as experienced in the realm of sense, moral, accompanied by joy and thrice-conditioned, arises, there arises on that occasion contact. And which is that contact? In this way the meaning of all the following questions should be considered.

'That which on that occasion is contact' refers to that contact which on that occasion arises as a fact of touching. The word in its simple form² expresses the intrinsic nature of touch.³ *Phusanā* is the act of touching. *Samphusanā*, increased by the prefix, is the way of touching [viz.: to unite with the object]. *Samphusitattam* is the state of so touching. And this is the construction: There is on that occasion contact by virtue of touching; there is on that occasion that which is the act of touching; there is that which, on that occasion, is the act of touching to unite with; there is that which, on that occasion, is the state of touching to unite with. Or that which, on that occasion, is contact by virtue of touching is, in other different ways, said to be the act of touching, the act of touching to unite with, and the state of touching to

¹ *Dhs.* § 2.

² I.e., without the aid of prefixes or suffixes.—*Ariyālaṅkāra*.

³ Or, because it shows the intrinsic nature of touch, free from figures of speech, this word implies an ultimate reality (*sabhāvapadaṃ*), i.e., absence of a living entity.—*Anuṭṭikā*.

unite with. This contact there is on that occasion. And the same construction of the words in the expositions of feeling and the rest should be understood.

The following is a decision by classification common to all: In showing the classification of the first main type of consciousness experienced in the realm of sense, the Blessed One [137] has placed the fifty and more words in a table of contents and, taking up each, has made the classification. And they are thus classified according to three causes, are different according to four causes. And in this main type the explanation of the same terms in other ways is twofold. How? They are classified on these three grounds:—the letter, the prefix, and the meaning.

Of these, e.g., 'anger, fuming, irascibility, hate, hating, hatred,¹ is a classification according to the letter.'² For here a single thing, that is, anger, is classified according to the letter. In 'application, sustained application, progressive application of mind,'³ the classification is according to the prefix.⁴ In 'erudition, skill, subtlety, criticism, reflection, investigation,'⁵ the classification is according to the meaning.

Three kinds of classification are obtained in the exposition of the word contact. *Phassaphusanā* (touch, touching) is a classification according to the letter; *samphusanā* (the touching to unite with) is according to the prefix; *samphusitatta* (the state of touching to unite with) is according to the meaning. In this way the classification in the exposition of all the remaining words should be understood.

Again, they are different for other four reasons:—(1) name, (2) characteristic, (3) function and (4) opposition. (1) Take the passage:—'What on that occasion is ill-will? That which on that occasion is hate, hating'⁶. . . here ill-will and hate are only different names for anger. Thus should the difference in the difference of *names* be regarded.

(2) In the sense of group the five aggregates form one

¹ *Dhs.* § 1060.

² *Vyaññanavasenā*, i.e., 'verbal form'—e.g., *kodho*, *kujjhanā*, etc.

³ *Dhs.* § 8.

⁴ Thus *cāro*, augmented by *vi-*, *anu-*.

⁵ *Dhs.* § 16

⁶ *Ib.* § 419

aggregate. And of these, 'matter' has the characteristic of [changing or] transforming, 'feeling' of experiencing, 'perception' of noting, 'volition' of co-ordinating, 'consciousness' of cognizing. Thus these five aggregates have different characteristics. Thus should the difference according to *characteristic* be understood.

(3) There are four supreme efforts: 'a bhikkhu in this religion sustaining his mind strives for the non-arising of evil, [138] immoral states which have not arisen,' etc.,¹ thus a single thing, that is, energy, by difference in function has arrived at four places, and [thus] difference according to difference in *function* should be understood.

(4) The four bad states: they give weight to anger and not to good states, they give weight to hypocrisy and not to the good Law, they give weight to gain and not to the good Law, they give weight to honours and not to the good Law—in such ways difference according to difference by *opposition* should be understood.

And this fourfold difference is obtained not only in contact, but also in all the fivefold contact-group. Contact, indeed, is the name of contact. . . . Consciousness is the name of consciousness. Thus should the difference be understood by means of the different *names*. And contact has the characteristic of touching, feeling of being experienced, perception of noting, volition of co-ordinating, consciousness of cognizing—thus should be understood the difference in *characteristics*. So contact has the function of touching, feeling of enjoying, perception of noting, volition of co-ordinating, consciousness of cognizing—thus the difference according to different *functions* should be understood. Difference by opposition is not obtained in the fivefold contact-group. But in the exposition of absence of greed or lust, etc., there is this passage: 'Absence of lust, of lusting, of lustfulness'²—thus should difference by *opposition* be understood.

¹ *B.P.E.*, p. 358 (v.)—viz., (1) prevention of evil, (2) ejection of evil, (3) induction of good, (4) maintenance of good. *Dhs.* § 32.—*Ed.*

² *Dhs.* § 32.

Thus, in the exposition of all these words, should the difference obtainable in these four ways be understood.

There is a different twofold explanation: embellishment of the term, and strengthening or intensification.¹ For when *phassa* is uttered once only as if just pressing with the end of a stick, then the word is not decorated, adorned, embellished. When it is repeated as *phassa*, *phusanā*, *samphusanā*, *samphusitatta*, according to the letter, the prefix and the meaning, then there is decoration, adornment, embellishment. As if they were to bathe a young boy, dress him in a beautiful dress, adorn him with flowers, smear his eye (-lids) and make only one mark of vermilion on his forehead, then his forehead-decoration would not be complete unless it were surrounded by various colours and forehead marks were made. Thus should this point be illustrated. This is the word-embellishment. And the repetition by virtue of the letter, the prefix and the sense is known as intensification. As when we say 'brother!' or 'Reverend Sir!' or 'ogre,' or 'snake' [139] there is no intensification till we repeat—*brother! brother!* and so on, so when *phassa* is uttered once only as if just pressing with the end of a stick, there is no intensification. But when it is repeated as *phassa*, *phusanā*, *samphusanā*, *samphusitatta*, according to the letter, the prefix and the meaning, then there is intensification. Thus this different explanation is twofold, and the meaning everywhere obtainable by that difference in the exposition of the words should be taken into account.

'This contact is on that occasion'² means: on the occasion when the first main [type of] moral consciousness experienced in the realm of sense arises, this is the contact that there is on that occasion. This is the elucidation of the exposition of contact. We shall now elucidate only what is special in the exposition of the other words, feeling, and so on. And the rest is to be understood in the same manner as what has been said (with reference to contact).

In the reply, 'That which on that occasion is . . .'³ [the

¹ Pyī reads (a) elucidation of one term by another; (b) confirmation by means of embellishment or emphasis.

² *Dhs.* § 2.

³ *Ib.* § 3.

neuter gender] ‘*yam*’ (‘that which’) is used through the influence of the [neuter] word ‘*sāla*’ (happiness),¹ albeit in the question [the feminine gender] ‘*katamā*’ (what) is used:—‘what (*katamā*) on that occasion is feeling?’

In ‘born of contact with the appropriate element of mind-consciousness’² ‘appropriate’ means ‘suitable, fit for pleasantness and pleasure.’ For the word ‘*tajjā*’ (appropriate) means ‘suitable.’ As the Buddha has said: ‘He speaks words appropriate and suitable to it.’³ And the mind-consciousness is said to be appropriate in that it has been produced by visible objects, etc., which render service to pleasure.

‘Mind-consciousness’ is an element in the sense of being free from an entity; hence ‘mind-consciousness.’ ‘Born of contact’ means that it has been produced from, or in contact;⁴ hence ‘born of contact.’

‘Mental’ is dependent on the mind. ‘Happy’ is used in the sense of sweet (like honey).

‘That which on that occasion is’—according to the meaning already given—‘born of contact with the appropriate element of mind-consciousness, a mental happiness—this is the feeling that there is on that occasion’—on this wise all the terms should be construed.

Now, by the word ‘*cetasika*’ included in the text—‘the mental pleasure’⁵ etc.—bodily pleasure is inhibited. By the word ‘pleasure,’ mental ill is inhibited. *Ceto-samphassajam* is born of mind-contact. ‘The happy pleasurable feeling’ is happy feeling, not unhappy; pleasurable [140] feeling, not painful. The three following words are spoken in the feminine gender.⁶ And the meaning is happy feeling, not unhappy; pleasurable feeling, not painful.

In the exposition of perception,⁷ ‘born of contact with the appropriate element of mind-consciousness’ means the perception which is born of contact with the element of mind-consciousness, suitable to the perception that is moral.

¹ *B.P.E.* : ‘pleasure.’ See n. 6.

² *Dhs.* § 3. *B.P.E.* : ‘representative intellection.’

³ *Majjhima* iii. 163.

⁴ *Lege samphasse.*

⁵ *Sukham.*

⁶ *Vedanā* (feeling) is *f.* gender.

⁷ *Dhs.* § 4

Saññā (perception) is the name of a real thing;¹ *sañjānanā* is the act of perceiving by noting; *sañjānitattaṃ* shows the state of having perceived by noting.

The same is to be understood in the exposition of volition.²

In the exposition of consciousness,³ 'consciousness' (*citta*) is so called because of its variegated (*citta*) nature. 'Mind' (*mano*) is so called because it knows the measure of an object. 'Mental action' (*mānasa*) is just 'mind.'

The tale of sense-impressions is a snare

*That weaves its fetters to and fro in air. . .*⁴

—here *mānasa* (sense-impressions) is [an adjunct of] *mano*.

Wherefore should thy disciple, Blessed One,

Delighting in thy Rule, O thou well-known

To men, as undergraduate set term

*To life unconsummated in his mind?*⁵

—here 'mind' is Arahantship, but *mānasa* is identical there with *mano*, merely augmented in form.

'Heart' is the same as mind (*citta*). In the passage, 'I will either scatter your mind or break your heart,'⁶ the breast is meant. In the passage, 'Methinks he chops with a heart that knows hearts,'⁷ the mind is meant. In the passage 'the *vakka* is the heart,'⁸ the basis of heart is meant. But here the mind is called 'heart' in the sense of inwardness.

Mind also is said to be 'clear' in the sense of 'exceedingly pure,' with reference to the subconscious life-continuum.⁹ So the Buddha has said:—'Bhikkhus, the mind is luminous, but is corrupted by adventitious corruptions.'¹⁰ Though immoral, it is called 'clear' because it issues [from subcon-

¹ *Sabbhāva*.

² *Dhs.* § 5: *cetanā*. *B.P.E.* 'thinking.' See this corrected, *Compendium*, p. 235 f. — *Ed.*

³ *Dhs.* § 6.

⁴ *S.* i. 111 (*Kindred Sayings* i. 140).

⁵ *Ib.* 121 (*ib.* 151).

⁶ *Ib.* 207 (*ib.* 265).

⁷ *Majjhima* i. 32, which reads *tacehati*. *Pyi* reads *gacchati*.

⁸ Not traced.

⁹ *Bhavanga*. Cf. *Compendium*, p. 266. *B. Psy.*, pp. 171, 178. 'The Buddhist Philosophy of Change,' *Quest Review*, October, 1917, p. 16.

¹⁰ *Aṅguttara* i. 10.

scious vital conditions] just as a tributary of the Ganges is like the Ganges and a tributary of the Godhāvārī is like the Godhāvārī.

‘Mind as organ of mind’—here as [an act of grasping]¹ ‘mind’ (*mano*) is declared to be a sense-organ (*āyatana*). This it shows, not in the sense that *devāyatana* means ‘sphere of spirits,’ but because *mano* itself is a sphere of sense. The word *āyatana* may mean either abode, mine, meeting-place, [141] birth-place, or reason. To expand:—Among mankind, in such passages as ‘the abode of the lord,’² the abode of Vāsudeva³—*āyatana* means ‘abode.’ In such passages as ‘an *āyatana* of gold, or of silver,’ it means ‘mine.’ In such religious passages as,

*In pleasant trysting place the passengers of air
Together flock . . .*⁴

it means ‘meeting-place.’ And in such passages as: If there be any *āyatana*, then he attains the ability of testifying . . .,⁵ it means ‘reason’ (or ground for).

Here three of these meanings are suitable, viz.: birth-place, meeting-place, reason. For mind is *āyatana* in the sense of birth-place as in the passage:—‘states such as “contact” and so on, are born in the mind.’⁴ And mind is *āyatana* in the sense of a meeting-place, as in the passage:—‘External objects, visible, audible, olfactory, gustatory and tangible assemble there as objects in the mind.’⁶ And mind is *āyatana* in the sense of reason (or ground), because of its being the cause-in-relation of the co-existence, etc., of contact and so on.

The meaning of ‘faculty of mind’ has been discussed.

Viññāna is cognizing. *Viññāna-khandha* is consciousness as an aggregate. The meaning of *khandha* (aggregate) should be taken as group or mass, etc. ‘It goes by the name of a large *khandha* of water’⁷—here *khandha* is used in the sense

¹ Manogahanaṃ. The conception of sensation as a grasping, or being seized, is classic in Indian thought. Cf. *B. Psy.* 59.—*Ed.*

² Issara.

³ Cf. *Jāt.* iv. 82.

⁴ *Anguttara* iii. 43.

⁵ *Majjhima* i. 494.

⁶ Not traced.

⁷ Not traced.

of mass. In such passages as, 'The *khandha* of virtue, or of concentration,'¹ it is used in the sense of good quality. 'The Blessed One saw a large *piece* of wood'²—here it is used as mere designation. But in the present connexion it is called 'aggregate' symbolically. For in the sense of mass, one (unit of) consciousness is a part (only) of consciousness. Therefore, as one cutting a portion of a tree is said to 'cut the tree,' so one consciousness, which is only a portion of the aggregate of consciousness, is said symbolically to be the aggregate of consciousness.

Tajjā manoviññāṇadhātu means the element of mind-consciousness suitable to states such as 'contact,' etc. In this expression a single [moment of] consciousness is called by three names: *mano* (mind), in the sense of measuring; *viññāṇa* (consciousness), in the sense of discrimination; *dhātu* (element) in the philosophical sense of ultimate reality, or of absence of a living entity. In this fivefold contact-group, because *phassa* is contact, and is *not* called 'born of contact with the appropriate element of mind-consciousness,' and because consciousness is the element of mind-consciousness (and is *not* called 'born of contact with the appropriate element of mind-consciousness'); therefore in this [142] couplet the expression, 'born of contact with the appropriate element of mind-consciousness' has not been adopted.

But in the terms 'initial application of mind,' etc., although this expression is obtainable, it is not brought out in this exposition of consciousness because it has been cut off. And a difficult thing has been accomplished by the Blessed One, who has brought out the expression after making an individual classification of these states of the fivefold contact group. True, it would be possible to find out by sight, or by smell, or by taste the difference in the colour, smell and taste of a variety of waters or a variety of oils which have been placed in a jar and churned the whole day, yet it would be called a difficult thing to do. But a thing of greater difficulty has been accomplished by the supreme Buddha, who has brought out

¹ *Anguttara* i. 125 f.

² *Samyutta* iv. 179.

their designation after making an individual classification of the immaterial states, viz., consciousness and its co-efficients which have arisen in one object. Hence it was said by the Elder Nāgasena: 'A difficult thing, your majesty, has been done by the Blessed One.' 'What difficult thing, Venerable Nāgasena, has been done by the Blessed One?' 'A difficult thing, your majesty, has been done by the Blessed One when he declared the determination of these immaterial states, consciousness and its co-efficients, which have arisen in one object, saying this is contact, this is feeling, this is perception, this is volition, this is mind.'

'Give an illustration.' 'As if, your majesty, a certain man were to go down in a boat to sea, and taking some water in the hollow of his hand taste it with the tongue; would he know, your majesty—this is Ganges water, this is Aciravati water, this is Sarabhū water, this is Mahī water?' 'It would be difficult, venerable Nāgasena.' 'A more difficult thing than that, your majesty, was done when the Blessed One declared the determination of these immaterial states, consciousness and its co-efficients, which have arisen in one object saying, this is contact, this is feeling, this is perception, this is volition, this is mind.'¹

In the exposition of initial application of mind,² this is [called] ap-ply-ing in virtue of 'plying' [the mind with objects]. 'To what extent is it plied?' [*Vitakka*] 'supplies' a pot, a cart, a league, half a league—this is what goes on in 'application.' This is the primary [notion] in the word *takka*. *Vitakka*, 'initial application' in virtue of ap-plying [sup-plying], is an emphatic term for 'plying.'³

¹ *Milinda* i. 133. B. found this passage very useful, quoting it also in the *Visuddhi Magga*, ch. xvii., and in the *Papañca Sūdanī*. He here omits the Jumna river.—*Ed.*

² *Dhs.* § 7.

³ *Takka*, Sanskrit *tarka*, is the Indian term for logic, or dialectic, or reasoning. The root *tark* signifies to turn or twist. We only approach this in our 'controvert' from *wart*, *vt*, to turn. Hence it has only been possible (once the decision was made to follow S. Z. Aung's rendering of *vitakka*) to imitate B.'s play on the word by a parallel play in 'ply.'—*Ed.* B.'s commentators have the following: 'As the draw-

[Among the equivalent terms] 'intention' (*sankappa*) conveys the sense of thorough-designing. And 'fixation' is the applying the selective¹ mind to the object. Next [143], 'focussing' is the term for 'fixation,' intensified by a prefix. Then, 'uplift of mind' is the elevating or setting up of consciousness on to an object. And 'right intention' is intention which is praiseworthy, has won to a moral state because of its veracity and progressiveness.

In the exposition of 'investigation,'² the [kernel] of the word *cāro* expresses a going-about the object. This is the primary meaning. 'Investigation' indicates general scrutiny. The next terms with prefixes—*anu-upa-vicāro*—indicate order and closeness in the investigation. Next, 'mental adjustment' indicates the mind being fitted to its object as an archer fixes his arrow to the bowstring, and 'examination' is either a sustained consideration, or the opposite of want-of-consideration (*anu-pekkhatā, an-upekkhatā*).

In the next exposition, zest (rapture)³ is a word of primary meaning. The next two equivalents are developments of the word joy ($\sqrt{\text{mud}}$, $\sqrt{\text{mod}}$), augmented by their prepositions *ā-*, *pa-*. Or, as the act of blending medicinal herbs, or oils, or hot and cold water is called *mōdanā*, so also zest is a *mōdanā* (blending), because of its making one blend out of co-existent states.

To make merry—this is 'mirth.' To make very merry—this is 'merriment.' They are synonyms for the behaviour of mind in laughing and abundant laughing. 'Felicity' implies wealth, a name for riches. And zest is wealth from being the cause of joy and from its resemblance to wealth. For as joy arises in a rich man on account of his wealth, so it arises in one possessing zest on account of zest. Therefore wealth is a name for zest or rapture which is established in the intrinsic nature of delight. And a rapturous person is said

ing, dragging up, withdrawing of water in a pit, so is the *takkamaṃ, ākaḍḍhanaṃ, vitakkaṃ* of object in consciousness.'—*Tīkā*. 'The *vitakka* which arises as if mind were brought to object is really a dragging of object to mind.'—*Anuṭīkā*.

¹ Lit., one-pointed.

² *Dhs.* § 8.

³ *Ib.* § 9.

to be elated from the exaltation of body and mind. 'Elation' is the state of an elated man. '*Attamanatā*' is one's own delight. The mind of a ruffled or angry man,* from being a proximate cause of ill or pain, is not said to be his own mind; the mind of one who has appeased his anger, from being the proximate cause of happiness or bliss, is said to be his own mind. Hence the term 'one's own delight,' referring to the state of one's own mind. And because it is not the mentality of any other self and is a property of consciousness, therefore we read 'one's own mental delight.'¹

In the exposition on one-pointedness of mind² it stands unshaken in the object—this is 'stability.' The two following words are the same augmented by prepositions. Another explanation is:—It stands combining associated states [144] in the object—this is 'solidity.' It stands having dived and entered into the object—this is 'steadfastness.' In the moral portion four states dive into the object—to wit, faith, mindfulness, concentration, understanding. Hence faith has been said to be the downward plunge, mindfulness to be the non-floating, concentration to be the grounded stand and understanding to be the sounding penetration. And in the immoral portion three states dive into the object—to wit, craving, opinionativeness and ignorance. Hence they are called the down-plungers [or floods]. But one-pointedness of mind is not strong enough to enter (in the immoral portion). As by sprinkling a dusty place with water and smoothing it, the dust subsides only for a short time and again resumes its original condition whenever it is dry, so in the immoral portion, one-pointedness of mind is not strong.³ And as when we sprinkle a place with water poured from pots and dig it up with spades and cement it by beating, pounding and kneading, an image is reflected there as in a burnished glass, and the reflection is true any moment though a hundred years were to pass, so in moral [consciousness], one-pointedness of mind is strong.

* Anabhiraddho.

¹ Attamanatā.

² Dhs. § II.

³ Yet it is called 'steadfastness,' not because of its strength, but because it is intent on one action—for instance, murder—till that is accomplished.—*Tīkā*

'Absence of distraction' is that which is opposed to the 'scattering' which arises by virtue of flurry and perplexity. Consciousness, going [to and fro] through flurry and perplexity, is distracted. But in 'poise' such distraction is absent. By flurry and perplexity consciousness is said to be scattered; it is drawn here and there. But the state of mind called 'unscattered mentality' is just the opposite.

'Calm' is of three kinds—calm of the mind, calm when settling [disputes], calm of all conditioned things. Of these, the first is one-pointedness of mind in the eight attainments. For, owing to one-pointedness of mind the wavering, the trepidation of the mind ceases, stops; therefore it is called calm of the mind. Calm, when settling [disputes] is the seven Vinaya Rules beginning with 'Procedure in presence.'¹ For through those rules cases of dispute are settled, pacified; therefore it is called calm when settling [disputes]. And because all conditioned things, at the advent of Nibbāna, are put to rest and pacified, therefore that Nibbāna is called calm of all conditioned things. It is in this sense that calm of the mind in the exposition of one-pointedness of mind is meant. The 'faculty [controlling power] of concentration' is that which effects governance in the characteristic of concentration. The 'strength of concentration' is that which does not shake through distraction. 'Right concentration' is threefold—irreversible concentration, emancipating concentration,² and moral concentration.

[145] In the exposition of the 'faculty of faith'³—it is 'faith' as belief in the virtues of the Buddha, etc.; or faith is the habit of believing in the Three Jewels, the Buddha (the Order, the Law). 'Trust' is [the behaviour of mind which] has faith. It dives into the virtues of the Buddha, etc., as though breaking them and entering into them—this is 'confidence.' By this beings have abundant assurance in the virtues of the Buddha, etc.—this is 'assurance.' Or, it itself has great assurance in

¹ See *Vinaya Texts* i. 68; iii. 45 f. (*S.B.E.* xiii., xviii.). *Adhikaraṇa-samatha*.

² Supply *niyyānikasamādhī* in P.T.S. text.

³ *Dhs.* § 12.

them¹—this is ‘assurance.’ Now, when a different method of explanation is adopted because of compound terms, as faith-faculty, etc., the classification of terms is made by taking the first member—and this is the rule in the Abhidhamma—therefore the word ‘faith’ is repeated. Or, here it is not like the term *ilhindriya*, which is equivalent to faculty of femininity; this faith *as* a faculty is the term ‘faculty of faith.’ Thus the word ‘faith’ has been repeated to show the equality between the two members. And thus the need of repeating the first member in the expositions of all the words is to be understood. It makes government (over associated states) in the characteristic of choosing—this is the ‘faculty of faith.’ It does not waver on account of unbelief—this is ‘strength of faith.’

In the exposition of the ‘faculty of energy’² the word ‘mental’ is said to show that energy is always mental. ‘Bhikkhus, that which is bodily energy is always energy as a factor of wisdom; that which is mental energy is always energy as a factor of wisdom. Thus energy is outlined.’³ Thus, in such Suttas, even though this energy may be said to be bodily from its arising in one walking to and fro, etc., yet it is not so called as in the term ‘body-consciousness.’⁴ Verily there is only mental energy. It is to show this that ‘mental’ has been said.

By the term ‘initial putting forth of energy’ (*viriyārambho*) the Blessed One rejects the putting forth of other than energy. For the word *ārambha* (putting forth) comes with the different meanings of kamma, offence, work, energy, cruelty, destruction, etc. For instance:—

*Whatever suffering comes to pass, ārambha is the cause thereof. And if ārambha takes an end, there is no happening of ill:—*⁵

here *ārambha* means [our] kamma.

¹ Abhippasādo.

² Dhs. § 13.

³ *Saṃyutta* v. 111. P.T.S. ed. there reads āgacchati.

⁴ In this term the organ of touch is meant.—Ed.

⁵ *Sutta-Nipāta*, ver. 744.

‘There is both *ārambha* and repentance’¹:—here it is offence.

Great sacrifices, all the mighty ārambha;

*These are not rites that bring a rich result!*²

Here it is the labour over sacrificial pillars, etc.

[146] *Bestir yourselves, rise up, renounce, come forth*
*And yield yourselves unto the Buddha's rule!*³

Here ‘bestir’ (*ārabhatha*) is energy.

‘They work against (put to death, *ārabhanti*) creatures with the recluse Gotama’s authority’⁴:—here the word means cruelty.

‘He refrains from *samārambha* of seeds or plants’⁵:—here it is destruction in the sense of cutting, breaking, etc.

But here the interpretation [of the word] is energy. Hence *viriyārambha* means the putting forth which is energy. *Viriya* indeed has been declared to be *ārambha* by virtue of a putting forth. And this is the primary fact in *virīya*.

Next, ‘striving’ is by way of escaping from idleness. ‘Onward effort’ is so called by virtue of reaching a higher and higher place.⁶ ‘Exertion’⁷ is so called by virtue of rising up and keeping going. ‘Endeavour’ is so called by virtue of special exertion; ‘zeal,’ of being zealous;⁸ ‘ardour,’ of being exceedingly zealous; ‘vigour,’ of firmness; ‘fortitude,’ of bearing consciousness and its concomitants, or of bearing the continuity of morality by unbroken procedure.

Another method of exposition:—This *viriyārambha* is ‘striving’ in expelling lust, ‘onward effort’ in cutting the bonds, ‘exertion’ in escaping from the floods, ‘endeavour’ in reaching the opposite shore, ‘zeal’ in being a forerunner, ‘ardour’ in exceeding the limit, ‘vigour’ in lifting the bolt

¹ Not traced.

² Cf. *S. i. 15* (*Kindred Sayings* i. 102), which omits the first two words.

³ *Ib.* 157 (*ib.* 195). ⁴ *Majjhima* i. 368. ⁵ *Dialogues* i. 5, § 10.

⁶ Or, stepping over each station of idleness.—*Tr.*

⁷ *Uddham yamanam niyyāmo* (exertion is a striving upward).—*‘īkā.*

⁸ Zeal (*ussāha*) is endurance over against misery, or one’s own burden.—*Abhiñhānatikā.*

[of ignorance], and 'fortitude' in producing steadfastness. 'Verily, let the skin, veins and bones dry up'¹—thus by virtue of unfaltering effort at such a time is the 'state of a man of unfaltering effort.' The meaning is firm effort, steadfast effort. Moreover, inasmuch as this energy does not put down the desire-to-do, does not put down, let go, set free the charge to do moral acts, but carries an unflinching mind, therefore it is said to be of 'sustained conation,' 'sustained burden.' Just as if they were to say, 'Get a beast of burden, an ox, to draw a burden from a marshy place not beyond the bullock's strength,' and the bullock, pressing the ground with its knees, were to carry the burden and would not allow it to drop on the ground, so energy lifts up and seizes the burden in the matter of doing moral acts. Hence it is said to be 'support of burden.'

It exercises government (over associated states) in the characteristic of supporting them or carrying out the accepted work—this is 'faculty of energy.' [147] It does not fluctuate on account of idleness—this is 'strength of energy.' 'Right endeavour' is irreversible, emancipating, moral endeavour.

In the exposition of the 'faculty of mindfulness'² mindfulness is so called by virtue of calling to mind. This is the primary word. It is 'recollection' by virtue of repeated calling to mind, 'calling back to mind' by virtue of calling to mind as though gone to the presence of the object. These two words merely show increase on account of the preposition. 'Remembrance' (*sarāṇā*) is mental behaviour in remembering. Inasmuch as it is a name for the Three Refuges (*saraṇa*), the word mindfulness is repeated to inhibit that meaning. Here remembrance means mindfulness.

Mindfulness is called 'bearing in mind' from its nature of bearing in mind a lesson heard or learnt; 'non-superficiality' (in the sense of diving or entering into the object) is the state of not letting the object float away. Not as pumpkins and pots, etc., which float on the water and do not sink therein,

¹ *Samyutta* ii. 28, etc.

² *Dhs.* § 14.

does mindfulness sink into the object. Hence it is said to be non-superficiality. From not forgetting a thing done or spoken long ago, mindfulness is called 'non-obliviousness.' It exercises government (over associated states) in the characteristic of presenting or illuminating the object—this is the 'faculty of mindfulness.' It does not fluctuate on account of negligence—this is 'strength of mindfulness.' 'Right mindfulness' is irreversible, emancipating, moral mindfulness.

In the exposition of the 'faculty of understanding'¹ understanding is so called in the sense of knowing plainly, *i.e.*, making plain the meaning of various things. Or, understanding is that which knows states under various aspects as impermanent, etc. This is the primary word. The behaviour of mind in knowing widely is 'wisdom.' That which investigates impermanence, etc., is 'search' (*vicaya*). 'Research' (*paricaya*) shows increase by means of the preposition. 'Search for doctrine' is that which investigates the doctrine of the Four Truths. Understanding is 'discernment' by virtue of discerning impermanence, etc. By means of the different prepositions understanding is called 'discrimination,' 'differentiation.'

The state of a learned man is 'erudition.' The state of an expert is 'proficiency.' The state of a subtle man is 'subtlety.' 'Criticism' [here] is critical knowledge respecting impermanence and kindred subjects. 'Reflection,' or, in whom it arises it makes him think of impermanence—this is 'reflection.' 'It examines impermanence,' etc.—this is 'examination.' The next term, *bhūrī* (breadth), is a name for the earth; understanding is like the earth in the sense of both subtlety² and amplitude; hence 'breadth.' [148] And it has been said that the earth is broad, and that a man endowed with understanding, having richness and abundance like the earth, is of 'broad' understanding. Further, this *bhūrī* is a synonym for under-

¹ *Dhs.* § 16.

² As the earth, apart from rocks, stones and sand, etc., is called subtle earth (*bhūmi sapphā*), so understanding, apart from the rocks of corruptions, is *subtle*.—*Gayāthi*. Another reading is 'saṇṭhavitattāthena' = 'in the sense of stability and amplitude.'

standing, because this delights in the true [or revealed] meaning.¹

'It slays the corruptions and destroys them, as lightning destroys stone-pillars'—this is 'sagacity'; or, it is 'sagacity' in the sense of quickly grasping and bearing the meaning. Next, 'in whom it arises it bends or inclines him to practise that which is his personal advantage,' or 'it inclines associated states to the penetration of the irreversible characteristic marks'—this is 'guide.' 'It discerns states under various aspects such as impermanence,' etc.—this is 'insight.' 'Comprehension' is that which knows impermanence, etc., in right ways. In order to put the wicked mind which has run off the track on to the right track, understanding urges it, just as a 'goad' urges horses of Sindh who are off the track in order to put them on the right track. It is like a goad, and is called 'incitement.'² As a controlling faculty understanding exercises government in the characteristic of 'seeing impermanence,' etc. It does not vacillate through ignorance—this is 'strength of understanding.' As a weapon, in the sense of cutting off the corruptions, understanding is the 'sword of understanding.' In the sense of rising high into the sky like a lofty building it is the 'height of understanding.' In the sense of illuminating it is the 'light of understanding.' In the sense of shedding lustre it is the 'lustre of understanding.' In the sense of being splendid it is the 'splendour of understanding.' For to the Wise Man,³ possessed of understanding and seated, at one sitting the ten thousand world elements become of one light, one lustre, one splendour. Hence it has been said that understanding is light, etc. In these three words, though the sense is accomplished by any one of them, the teaching is made to meet the inclinations of [various] persons—for instance, in such Suttas as 'Bhikkhus, there are four kinds of light; which are the four?—the light of the moon, of the sun,

¹ An unreproduceable word-play of the 'buried city' species: *bhūrīti bhūte atthe ramatī ti.*—*Ed.*

² Badly punctuated in P.T.S. ed.

³ *I.e.*, the Bodhisat.—*Ariyāṇakāra.*

of fire, and of understanding. These are the four kinds of light. Of these, the light of understanding is the best. Likewise, bhikkhus, the four kinds of lustre . . . of splendour.¹ For the meaning has been well analyzed in various ways, and others understand it in different ways. The 'treasure of understanding' is meant in the sense of causing, giving, and producing delight,² of being worthy of respect (or being varied), of the difficulty of getting, or of manifesting it, of incomparableness, and of being the property of illustrious beings.

Beings are not, on its account, deluded in the object, or itself is not deluded in the object--this is 'non-delusion.' The expression 'search for the doctrine' has been already explained.³ Why is it repeated?--in order to show the antithesis between non-delusion [149] and delusion. By that expression non-delusion shows its antithesis to delusion. And non-delusion is not a thing altogether different from delusion; but what is meant here is that the non-delusion known as 'search for the doctrine' is opposed to delusion. Finally, 'right views' are irreversible, emancipating, moral views.

In the exposition of the 'faculty of life'⁴ 'that persistence which is in the immaterial states' means the persistence which, in the sense of establishing them, is in the associated immaterial states. For when it is present, the immaterial states occur, go on, continue; hence it is called 'persistence.'⁵ This word gives the nature of the faculty of life. And inasmuch as these associated immaterial states--when there is persistence--subsist, occur, maintain themselves, progress, continue, preserve themselves, the terms subsistence, etc., are given. As to the definition of the other terms:--by this the co-existent states subsist--this is 'subsistence'; they occur--this is 'occurrence.' So with 'establishment.' The [stem] vowel in the first word, *yapanā* (occurrence), has been shortened, owing to the influence of scholars.⁶ By this the co-

¹ *Anguttara* ii. 139 f. Cf. S. i. 14, 47 (*Kindred Sayings* i. 22, 67).

² Read *rati-kā-katthana* in P.T.S. ed.

³ Above, p. 195.

⁴ *Dhs.* § 19.

⁵ *Āyu.* *Aya*, causative of *i*, to go.—*Ed.*

⁶ *Yapanā*, *yāpanā*. *B.P.E.*, 'going on, being kept going on.'

existent states progress—this is ‘progress’; they continue—this is ‘continuance’; they preserve themselves—this is ‘preservation’; they live—this is ‘life.’ It makes government (over associated states) in the characteristic of ceaseless watching over the co-existent states—this is ‘the faculty of life.’

In the exposition of the ‘strength’ called ‘sense of shame,’¹ ‘that which on that occasion’ means ‘by which state at the time (of the first type of moral consciousness).’ Or, by change of gender (masculine for neuter), ‘that state which arises at the time (of the first main type of moral consciousness)’—thus should the meaning be known. ‘*Hiriyilabbena*’ is the instrumentive case used in the sense of employment.² The meaning is:—it abominates, loathes misconduct of body and other immoral states fit to be abominated. ‘Of bad (states)’ means of low (states). ‘Of immoral states’ means of states not produced by understanding (*i.e.*, produced by ignorance); ‘*sampattiyyā*’ is also in the instrumentive case in the sense of employment. The meaning is:—it abominates, loathes the attainment of, the endowment with these immoral states.

In the exposition of the strength called ‘fear of blame,’³ this is in the instrumentive case in the sense of root-condition. [One fears]⁴ on account of misconduct in deed, word, or thought, where is fear of blame as root-condition, and which is fit to be feared. On account of the attainment of bad states of the kinds stated, and having fear of blame as root-condition—such is the meaning.

In the exposition of ‘non-greed’⁵ non-greed works by not-lusting. Disinterestedness is that which does not lust. This is a word showing its own nature. ‘Not-lusting’ is behaviour in not lusting. A person possessed by lust is ‘lustful,’ the not being which is ‘not lustful.’ [150] The state of a person not lustful is ‘absence of lustfulness.’ ‘Absence of infatuation’ is the opposite to infatuation. The

¹ *Dhs.* § 30.

² Or, of cause or condition.—*Tīkā*.

³ *Dhs.* § 31.

⁴ Consequences—*e.g.*, purgatory.—*Tīkā*.

⁵ *Dhs.* § 32. Or ‘disinterestedness.’

other terms are behaviour in 'not being infatuated,' and the state of one not infatuated.

That which does not covet is 'non-covetousness.' 'Disinterestedness as the root of what is moral' means that root considered as disinterestedness, for this is that root—*i.e.*, cause of moral states. It is moral and a root in the sense of causal relation; hence 'moral root.'

In the exposition of non-hate,¹ 'non-hate' works by not hating. 'It does not hate'—this is non-hate. This is a word showing its own nature. 'Not hating' is behaviour in not hating. The state of a person not hating is 'non-hatred.'

That which, from being opposed to ill-will, is not ill-will is 'good-will.' That which is not spleen from being opposed to the pain of anger is 'absence of spleen.' Non-hate is considered as a moral root—the meaning has already been declared.

In the exposition of 'repose of mental factors,' etc.,² because the word *kāyo* means the three aggregates mentioned, therefore it is said, 'Of the aggregate of feeling,' etc. By it those three factors are in repose, freed from suffering, have attained relief—this is 'repose of mental factors.' The second word (*patipassaddhi*—composure) has been increased by the preposition. 'Calming' is the behaviour of mind in calming. The second word (*patipassambhānā*—tranquillizing) has been increased by the preposition. By the endowment of repose, the state of the three aggregates which have been tranquillized is 'tranquillity.' All these words describe the composure of suffering caused by the corruptions of the three aggregates. By the second method³ the composure of the suffering of the aggregate of consciousness is described.

Ease in change⁴ is buoyant behaviour, the lightly changing in those three factors, their state in thus changing. As has been said, it is the capacity for quickly revolving. 'Non-sluggishness' is a word contrasting with heaviness. It means the being not-burdened. 'Non-inertia' is the not being stiff⁵

¹ *Dhs* § 33.

² *Ib.* § 40 ff.

³ *Ib.* § 41.

⁴ *Ib.* § 42.

⁵ Like a python that has swallowed an iron stick.—*Pṛjñā*

owing to the absence of the burden of sloth and torpor. These describe buoyancy of behaviour in the three aggregates. By the second section¹ buoyancy of behaviour in the aggregate of consciousness is described.

[151] 'Plasticity' means soft state. Herein fine smoothness is called soft. The state of that is 'suavity.' 'Non-roughness' means the state of being not rough. 'Non-rigidity' means the state of being not rigid (hard). Here also the plasticity of the three aggregates and that of the aggregate of consciousness are discussed consecutively.²

'Wieldiness'³ means soundness of action. Serviceableness for moral action is the meaning. The remaining pair of words (*kammaññattaṃ kammaññabhāvo*—tractableness, pliancy) have been increased in verbal form.⁴ Here again the three aggregates and consciousness are taken consecutively.

'Fitness'⁵ means the fitting state. Absence of disease and sickness is the meaning. The remaining pair of words have been increased in verbal form, and here also is consecutive description.

'Rectitude'⁶ is the upright state. The state of procedure with an upright behaviour is the meaning. The state of the three upright aggregates and of the aggregate of consciousness is 'rectitude.' 'Non-deflection' is opposed to crookedness in flow, as of ox-urine; 'non-crookedness,' to that of the crescent moon; 'non-twist' to that of a ploughshare.

¹ *Dhs.* § 43.

² The absence of resistance in acting morally on the part of these states, which are not devoid of buoyancy, like those associated with delusion, is 'plasticity' (*mudītā*). The plasticity of immaterial states, from resemblance to matter, etc., which are said to be plastic on account of non-resistance, is 'suavity' (*maddavatā*).—*Tikā*.

³ *Dhs.* § 46 f.

⁴ The mind, exceedingly soft (*mudu*), being wet with craving, is unwieldy for moral action, like powdered gold. The mind, very rigid with conceit, etc., is unwieldy, like unheated gold. The mind which is soft to the right extent for morality is wieldy, like properly tempered gold. Thus wieldiness depends on the right softness.—*Tikā*.

⁵ *Dhs.* § 48 f.

⁶ *Ib.* § 50.

He who, having done evil, says, 'I have not done it,' is said to be crooked like ox-urine from having proceeded and backed out. He who, while doing evil, says, 'I fear evil,' is said to be crooked like the crescent moon from being crooked in general. He who, while doing evil, says: 'Who may not fear evil?' is said to be crooked like the ploughshare from being but slightly crooked. Or again, whoever has the three doors of action impure is said to be crooked 'like ox-urine'; whoever has any two doors of action impure is said to be crooked 'like the crescent moon'; and whoever has one door of action impure is said to be crooked like the ploughshare. But the reciters of the Dīgha-Nikāya say: One, who in the whole of his life practises the twenty-one things not to be pursued¹ and the six things not to be practised² is said to be crooked like ox-urine. One who during the first portion of his life fulfils the four Purity Precepts,³ abominates evil, is sensitive, is observant of the precepts, and is like the preceding person [152] in the middle and last portions of his life is said to be crooked like the crescent moon. One who during the first and middle portions of his life fulfils the four Purity Precepts, abominates evil, is sensitive, is observant of the precepts, and is like the preceding two types of persons in the last portion of his life is said to be crooked like the

सत्यमेव जयते

¹ The *Tikā* has the following enumeration of these: doctoring, carrying messages, going on (other) errands, excision of tumours and abscesses, anointing scars, giving emetics or aperients, cooking secretions, preparing oil for the eyes (why are these five not included in the first?), giving of bamboos, leaves, flowers, fruits, bath-powder, tooth-picks, water for face-bathing, medical powders, or chalk; cajolery, idle talk (lit. pea-soup talk), petting children. Cf. a partly identical list in *Miṇḍa* 370.

² These are: *vesiyāgocara*, asking alms from a prostitute's house through friendship; *vidhavagocara*, or from a divorced woman's house; *thullakumārīgocara*, or from an old maid's house; *paṇḍakagocara*, or from an eunuch's house; *pāyāgāragocara*, or from the house of dealers in drink; *bhikkhunīgocara*, or from nuns' premises.—*Tikā*.

³ I.e., restraint according to the *Pātimokkha* (*Vin. Texts* i. 1-69), restraint of sense and other faculties, purity of livelihood, restraint connected with the four requisites. Cf. *Vis. Magga*, ch. i.

ploughshare. And the state of a man crooked by virtue of the corruptions is called 'deflection,' 'crookedness,' 'twist.' By way of opposition to these, non-deflection, etc., have been discussed. The teaching given has been determined by the aggregates. For the non-deflection, etc., are of the aggregates and not of the person. Thus by means of all these terms behaviour in straightness of the three aggregates and of the aggregate of consciousness has been consecutively discussed—that is to say, of these immaterial states in the absence of the corruptions.

Now in the words 'Or whatever' this section of the conclusion has already been discussed. By it the exposition in brief of the 'Or-whatever' states shown in the section of the outline of states is now finished.

End of the Discourse on the Section of the Exposition

CHAPTER III

ON THE SECTION OF THE SUMMARY¹

Thus far is finished the section of the determination of states adorned by its eight divisions, to wit, four in the section of outline (questions, exposition of occasion, outline of states,² conclusion) and the same four in the section of exposition. Now the section of the summary is begun with, 'On that occasion there are four aggregates.'³ It is threefold by virtue of outline, exposition and further exposition. Of these, 'Now on that occasion there are four aggregates,' etc., gives the outline. 'What on that occasion are the four aggregates?' etc., is the exposition. 'What on that occasion is the aggregate of feeling?' etc., is the further exposition.

Of these, in the section of the outline, there are twenty-three portions beginning with the four aggregates. Their meaning should be taken thus:

At what time the first main type of moral consciousness,

¹ Saṅgaha. *Dhs.* §§ 58-120.

² *Dhs.* § 58 ff. (koṭṭhāsavāra), etc.

³ Reading in P.T.S. ed. dhammuddeso as before.—*Tr.*

experienced in the realm of sense, arises, those states exceeding fifty¹ which, excepting the 'Or whatever,' have been included in the text, and which have arisen at that time as factors of consciousness— all these being gathered together make four aggregates in the sense of groups: [153] two sense-organs in the sense of 'āyatana' given above, two elements in the sense of intrinsic nature, emptiness of self, absence of a living entity. Further, three of these states are called nutriments in the sense of causal relation. The rest are not nutriments.

What then? Are these fifty-three (other than the three nutriments) in a causal relation either one with another, or with matter originated by themselves, or are they not? [They are.] But the 'three nutriment' states, in one way² or another,³ as causes surpass the fifty-three states; hence they are spoken of as nutriments. How? To whatever present states the remaining [factors of] mind and mentals are causal relations, to those three contact also, as a nutriment, is in causal relation and sustains [or induces] the three feelings. The volition of mind as a nutriment is also in causal relation to them and sustains the three existences. Consciousness as a nutriment is also in causal relation to them and sustains the organism of mind and matter in reconception. (Thus as nutriments they surpass the fifty-three states.)

But is not this [consciousness as nutriment] merely a result, while this first main type of consciousness is a moral consciousness? [We reply:—] Although it is a moral consciousness, it has been called consciousness as nutriment because of its resemblance to the consciousness which is a result. Or, these three states are called nutriments in the sense of strengthening the associated states, as material food strengthens the body. Hence it is said: 'The immaterial nutriments are causally related, as nutriments, to their associated states and to the material qualities produced by them.'⁴

¹ Fifty-six in all.

² They render service as co-existent states. This is the expansion of *tathā* (*Tikā*).

³ This is the expansion of *aññathā* (*Anuñikā*).

⁴ *Paṭṭhāna*.

Another explanation: -Because they are in a special causal relation in the subjective continuity, material food and the three states are said to be nutriments. Material food is specially correlated to the material body of beings who partake of it; so is contact to feeling in the immaterial group; so is mental volition to consciousness, and consciousness to the dual organism. As the Blessed One has said, 'Just as, bhikkhus, this body is established on material food, stands in dependence on it, does not stand without it, so from contact as cause arises feeling, from feeling as cause arise activities, from activities as cause arises consciousness, from consciousness as cause arises the mental and material organism.'¹

Next, eight states are controlling faculties, in the sense of dominant influence and not the rest. Hence it is here said: 'there are eight controlling faculties.' Again, five states are Jhāna-factors, in the sense of viewing the object closely. Hence it is here said: 'there is fivefold Jhāna.' [154] Next, five states are Path-factors, in the sense of means of escape from the round of existence, and of being the condition of reaching Nibbāna. Hence it is here said: 'there is a fivefold Path.' For although the Path is eightfold, yet, in the worldly consciousness,² the three abstinences³ are not obtained at one and the same instant. Therefore it is said to be fivefold only. But [it may be objected] there is this scripture: 'The Path by which they came is a phrase for the Eightfold Ariyan Path.'⁴ In this Sutta the Path of insight preceding the Transcendental Path is eightfold, just as the latter is eightfold. Now, since the mundane Path, as implied by the term 'path by which they came,' is eightfold, should it not be eightfold here also?

Nay, it should not be. This Suttanta teaching is [carried out by] expounding. In this way he said, for instance,

¹ Not traced. Cf. *Saṃyutta* v. 64 f.

² As represented in this first main type.—*Ariyāṭṭhāṅgāra*.

³ A scholastic term for the factors in the Eightfold Path called 'right speech, action and livelihood. Abstinence from the opposites of these.'
—*Compendium*, p. 97, n. 2.—*Ed.*

⁴ *Saṃyutta* iv. 195.

'Verily, before this happened, his bodily acts, vocal acts and life were quite pure.'¹ But this [Abhidhamma] is bare teaching without exposition. In the worldly consciousness the three abstinences are not² obtained at one and the same instant, and therefore the Path is said to be fivefold.

Seven states are 'strengths' in the sense of not shaking³; three states are root-conditions in the sense of roots; one state is contact in the sense of touching the object; one state is feeling in the sense of experiencing the object; one state is perception in the sense of noting the object; one state is volition in the sense of planning; one state is consciousness in the sense of (a) being aware and (b) being variegated; one state is the aggregate of feeling⁴ in the sense of a group and experiencing the object⁵; one state is the aggregate of perception in the sense of a group and noting the object; one state is the aggregate of mental co-efficients in the sense of a group and planning; one state is the aggregate of consciousness in the sense of a group and being aware and variegated; one state is the sense-organ of mind in the sense of knowing the object and an abode, as was said above; one state is the controlling faculty of mind in the sense of knowing and being dominant; one state is the element of mind-consciousness in the sense of knowing and of being intrinsic in nature, void [of personality] and without a living entity. The remaining states are not like this last. Moreover, excepting consciousness, all the remaining states form one sphere of (mental) states according to the meanings already given; and one state is the element of (mental) states. By the section of the conclusion: 'or whatever at that time,' the 'or-whatevers' discussed above are taken here also. So everywhere should also the 'or-whatevers' be taken. [155] After this section we shall not discuss at such length. And in the sections of the exposition and further exposition the meaning should be understood as given above.

End of the Section of the Summary, otherwise called the Section of (Groups).

¹ *Majjhima* iii. 289. ² *Sic lege* in P.T.S. ed. ³ *Dhs.* §§ 95 ff.

⁴ *Sic lege* in P.T.S. ed.

⁵ *Dhs.* §§ 112-120.

CHAPTER IV

OF THE SECTION ON THE VOID, OR EMPTINESS¹

Now, 'At that time there are states,' thus the section of the Void begins. It stands in two ways—outline and exposition.

In the former section, with the words, 'states there are,' there are twenty portions, but in none of them is there a division made, as above, into four, two, three. And why? Because such a division was made in the section of the summary. The states classified there are spoken of here. And here there are only states; no permanent being, no soul is known.² These (fifty-six states) are mere states without essence, without a guiding principle. And it is to show the emptiness of this that they are stated here also. Therefore the meaning should here be thus regarded.

At what time the first main type of moral consciousness experienced in the realm of sense arises, at that time, by virtue of being factors in consciousness, the fifty and more states which have arisen are ultimate things. There is nothing else whatever, neither a being, nor an individuality, nor a man, nor a person. Likewise they are aggregates in the sense of groups. Thus by the former method the connexion of the matter should be understood in all the words. *मेव जयते*

And because there is no Jhāna factor different from Jhāna, no Path-factor different from the Path, therefore here it is said merely: 'there is Jhāna, there is the Path.' There is Jhāna in the sense of viewing the object closely; there is Path in the sense of condition [for getting Nibbāna]; there is no other, neither a being nor an individuality—thus should the connexion of the meaning be understood in all the words. The meaning of the section of the exposition is evident.

Here ends the section of the Void.

Here ends the Commentary on the First Type of Consciousness set forth as adorned with the three main sections.

¹ *Dhs.* § 121.

² *Bhāvo ti satto, yo koci vā attho.*—*Tīkā*.

CHAPTER V

THE SECOND TYPE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Now to show the second class of consciousness, etc., the beginning is thus: 'which are the states?'¹ In all of them the main sections should be understood as given in the first class.

[156] And not only the main sections, but the meaning of all the words which have been analogously stated in the first type of consciousness should be understood in the manner already given. After this second class of consciousness we shall comment on new words only.

In the exposition of the second class, '*sasaṅkhārena*'² is a new word, meaning 'with *saṅkhāra*.' The import is 'with external plan, effort, instigation, expedient, totality of causes.' By what totality of causes, viz., an object, etc., the first main type of consciousness arises, with that instigation, that expedient the second type arises. Thus should its arising be understood. For instance, in this dispensation a certain bhikkhu, dwelling in a border monastery, when the time has arrived to sweep the courtyard of the shrine, or to attend to the Elder or to listen to the Law, thinks thus: 'It is too far to go and come back. I will not go.' He thinks again, 'It is improper for a bhikkhu not to sweep the courtyard, not to attend to the Elder, not to listen to the Law. I will go,' and goes. Now whether it is from self-instigation, or whether he has been admonished by another pointing out the disadvantage in not doing one's duty, etc., and the advantage in doing it, or whether he has done his duty by being impelled thereto by such words as, 'Come and do this,' his moral consciousness is said to have arisen by external plan, by the totality of causes.

¹ *Dhs.* § 146.

² *Dhs.* § 147.

CHAPTER VI

THE THIRD TYPE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

IN the third class of consciousness *ñānavippayutta* means 'dissociated from knowledge.' This consciousness also takes pleasure in the object, but here there is no discriminating knowledge. It should be regarded as the consciousness arising in young boys who, when they see and greet a bhikkhu, say, 'This is my Elder,' and show respect when saluting the shrine and listening to the Law. But in the text here understanding is lacking in seven places.¹ The remaining contents need no comment.

CHAPTER VII

THE FOURTH TYPE OF CONSCIOUSNESS.²

IN the fourth class of consciousness also the same method should be taken. Because it is said to be with external plan, we may regard it as obtained, *e.g.*, at such a time when parents catch hold of young boys by the head and make them pay homage to the shrine, etc., and the boys, although it was not their aim, do so with pleasure.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FIFTH, SIXTH, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH TYPES OF CONSCIOUSNESS³

IN the fifth class of consciousness, *upekkhāsahagata* means 'accompanied by hedonic indifference.' [157] For this fifth class is neutral towards the object, and there is also a discriminating knowledge. It is stated here in the text that in fivefold Jhāna there is indifference, in the eight controlling faculties there is indifference. Accordingly, in the exposition of all

¹ *I.e.*, understanding as controlling faculty, strength, path, root, course of action, and one of the pairs is omitted. Cf. *Dhs.* §§ 16, 20, 29, 34, 37, 53, 55.—*Tr.*

² *Ib.* §§ 148 *f.*

³ *Ib.* §§ 150 *f.*

hedonistic terms, neutral feeling has been discussed in a doctrine which eliminates both the happy and the unhappy, the pleasurable and the painful. The state of indifference as a controlling faculty should be understood as making government (over associated states) in the characteristic of neutrality.

In one place, in the serial order of words, 'rapture' is wanting. Therefore the states established in the text as factors of consciousness are only fifty-five. It is with reference to these fifty-five states that the decision in all the groups in all the sections should be understood. The sixth, seventh and eighth classes of consciousness should be understood in the same way as the second, third and fourth. For in these classes there is only change of feeling and lack of rapture. And the remainder of the words, together with the manner of arising, is like the second, third and fourth classes of consciousness. Again, when the preamble of Pity and Sympathy¹ [is being practised], these classes, according to the Great Commentary, arise.

Now these are the eight types of moral consciousness experienced in the realm of sense. And all of them should be set forth by the ten bases of meritorious acts. How? Bases of meritorious acts, consisting of (1) charity, (2) of virtue, (3) of culture, (4) of respect for elders,² (5) of dutifulness,² (6) of sharing of one's merit, (7) of thanksgiving, (8) of teaching, (9) of listening to the Law, (10) of rectification of opinion—these are the ten bases of meritorious acts.

Of these, (1) charity is the charitable meritorious act, which is the basis of various advantages. And the same holds good with the remaining words; for instance, when one has made a gift of the four requisites, such as a robe, or of any object of sense, or of the ten bases of giving, such as food, etc., the volition that arises in the giver on the three occasions of producing the articles prior to the gift, of making the gift, and of recollection with a joyful heart after the gift, is the basis of charitable meritorious action.

(2) The volition that arises in one who takes the fivefold

¹ Cf. *Dhs.* §§ 258-61.

² *Sahagata* has no meaning here except 'accompanied by intimation through act and speech [of respect for elders and of dutifulness].—*Pyī.*

precept, the eightfold precept or the tenfold precept; or who goes to the monastery thinking, 'I will become a recluse'; who becomes a recluse and reflects, 'I have fulfilled my wish, I am indeed a recluse; that is good and well done'; who observes the Pāṭimokkha and reflects on the four requisites, such as a robe, etc.; who guards the eye-door, etc., regarding objects of sense which have presented themselves; [158] who purifies his mode of life—all such volition is the basis of virtuous meritorious action.

(3) In one who cultivates himself, regarding both the eye as impermanent, ill and selfless, and the other senses and the mind, also visible and other sense-objects, objects of thought, sense-cognition with mental cognition, sense-contact, feeling born of sense-contact, perception of sense-objects, old age and death all in the same way as is taught in analytical knowledge¹ by the path of insight, all his volitions that have not attained ecstasy in the thirty-eight objects of consciousness² constitute the basis of meritorious action in culture.

(4) Respect as a basis of meritorious action should be known in such acts as going to meet an elderly person, taking his bowl and robe for him, saluting him, showing him the way.

(5) Dutifulness as basis of meritorious action should be known in those acts by which we carry out duties great and small towards our elders, when, for instance, we take the bowl from a bhikkhu who has been seen to enter the village for alms and fill it with food in the village, and present it to him, or go quickly and take the bowl, etc., on hearing the summons, 'Go and bring the bhikkhus' bowl.'³

(6) The sharing of one's merit as basis of meritorious action should be recognized in the case of one who, having made a gift and an offering of perfume, etc., gives part of his merit thus: 'Let this share be for such an one!' or, 'Let it be for all beings!' What then, will there be loss of merit to him who thus shares what he has attained? No. As when from a burning lamp

¹ Paṭisambhidā.

² Viz., 40 Kammāṭṭhāna minus āloka and ākāsa. Cf. *Compend.* 202 f.

³ Reading bhikkhūnaṃ pattāṃ. P.T.S. ed. reads: 'Go, bhikkhu, and fetch that bowl.'

a thousand lamps were lit, it would not be said that the original lamp was exhausted; the latter light, being one with the former [added] lights, becomes increased, thus there is no decrease in our sharing what we have attained; on the contrary, there is an increase. Thus it should be understood.

(7) Thanksgiving as basis of meritorious action is to be understood as giving thanks with the words, 'Good, well done!' when, for instance, others share their merit with us, or when they perform another meritorious act.

(8) From a desire for gain, thinking, 'Thus they will know me to be a preacher,' someone preaches a sermon. That sermon is not of much fruit. One who makes the attainment of emancipation the chief motive, not a desire for honour, and so preaches to others the doctrine in which he is proficient—this is the basis of meritorious action consisting of teaching.

(9) One who listens to the doctrine, thinking, 'They will take me, thus listening, for one of the faithful'—this does not yield much fruit. Another, out of the softness of heart, suffusing good,¹ listens, thinking, 'There will be much fruit for me.' This is the basis of meritorious action consisting of listening to the Doctrine.

[159] (10) To correct one's own views is the basis of meritorious action of rectified opinion. But the reciters of the *Dīgha-Nikāya* say that rectified opinion is the characteristic of assurance respecting all things.² For by it there is much fruit to one doing any sort of merit.

Of these bases of meritorious action, (1) charity arises with the thought 'I will give charity,' when he is making the gift, and when he reflects 'I have given it.' Thus the three volitions—preliminary volition, volition at the time of making the gift, subsequent volition—become one, and constitute the basis of meritorious act consisting of charity.

(2) That which consists of virtue also arises with the thought, 'I will fulfil the precepts,' when he is fulfilling them, and when he reflects: 'I have fulfilled the precepts.' All the

¹ Either to himself or others.—*Pyī*.

² I.e., all courses of moral action, or bases of meritorious action.—*Pyī*.

three volitions, becoming one, constitute the basis of meritorious act consisting of virtue.

So for the remaining eight.

In the Suttas there are only three bases of meritorious action—charity, virtue and culture. The other bases should be understood as included in these three. Respect and dutifulness are thus included in that which consists of virtue. Sharing of merit and thanksgiving¹ are included in that which consists of charity; teaching, hearing the Law and rectification of opinion in that which consists of culture. Rectification of opinion, in the doctrine of those teachers who say that it has the characteristic of assurance in all the bases, is comprehended in the three bases of charity, virtue and culture. Thus these bases of meritorious act form three in abstract and are ten when expanded.

Now, as to these bases, when we think 'I will give in charity,' thought works by one or other of those eight classes of moral consciousness experienced in the realm of sense; in making the gift we give by one of them; in reflecting 'I have given charity,' we reflect by one of them; in thinking 'I will fulfil the precepts,' we think by one of them; in fulfilling the precepts we fulfil by one of them; in reflecting 'I will develop culture,' we think by one of them; in developing it, we develop by one of them; in reflecting 'I have developed culture,' we reflect by one of them. [160] In thinking 'I will pay homage to my elders,' in paying it, in reflecting 'I have paid it,' we think, reverence, and reflect by them. In thinking 'I will do my duty by the body,' in doing it, in reflecting 'I have done it,' we think and reflect by them. In thinking 'I will share my merit,' in doing it, in reflecting 'I have shared it'; in thinking 'I will give thanks for a gift of merit by another, or for the merit acquired by others'; in giving thanks; in reflecting 'I have given thanks,' we work by those eight classes. In thinking 'I will preach the doctrine'; in preaching

¹ This is included in charity because, as a loving giver, sacrificing a faultless thing, rejoices at the gain of another, so one who gives thanks rejoices at another's possessions.—*Tikā*.

it; in reflecting 'I have preached it,' we think, preach, reflect by them. In thinking 'I will listen to the doctrine'; in doing so; in reflecting 'I have listened,' we do likewise. Likewise in thinking 'I will rectify my opinion.' But in rectifying our opinion we do so only by one or other of the four main classes of moral consciousness associated with knowledge. In reflecting 'I have rectified my opinion,' we do so by one or other of all the eight.

In this connexion¹ there are four Infinities, to wit, (1) space, (2) world-systems, (3) groups of sentient beings, (4) the knowledge of a Buddha.

(1) There is, indeed, no limit to space reckoned as so many hundreds, thousands, or hundred thousands of *yojanas* to east, west, north, or south. If an iron peak of the size of Mount Meru were to be thrown downwards, dividing the earth in twain, it would go on falling and would not get a footing. Thus infinite is space.

(2) There is no limit to the world-systems reckoning by hundreds or thousands of *yojanas*. If the four [161] Great Brahmās, born in the Akāmittha mansion, endowed with speed, and capable of traversing a hundred thousand world-systems during the time that a light arrow shot by a strong archer would take to travel across the shadow of a palmyra tree, were with such speed to run in order to see the limit of the world-systems, they would pass away without accomplishing their purpose. Thus the world-systems are infinite.

(3) In so many world-systems there is no limit to beings, belonging to land and water. Thus infinite are the groups of beings.

(4) More infinite than these is a Buddha's knowledge.

Thus of the countless beings in the countless world-systems, many kinds of moral consciousness experienced in the realm of sense, accompanied by joy, associated with knowledge, and with external aid, arise to one and many to many. And all of these in the sense of being experienced in the realm

¹ Or place. *phāṇe*, explained by the commentaries as referring to the Great Commentary.—*Tr.*

of sense, of being accompanied by joy, of being associated with knowledge, of being without external aid, may be classified in one group—namely, the main class of consciousness accompanied by joy, thrice-conditioned and automatic. And the same with the main class of consciousness ‘with external aid,’ and so on down to the eighth class, accompanied by hedonic indifference, dissociated from knowledge, twice-conditioned, with external aid. Now, all these classes of moral consciousness experienced in the realm of sense, arising in the countless beings in the countless world-systems, the Supreme Buddha, as though weighing them in a great balance, or measuring them by putting them in a measure, has classified by means of his omniscience, and has shown them to be eight, making them into eight similar groups. Again, in this connexion¹ the striving for merit has been taken in six ways. There is merit done by one’s own nature, merit done after the example of another, merit done by one’s own hands, merit done by ordering (another), merit done with knowledge of the result of kamma, merit done without knowledge of the result of kamma.² And anyone working merit by any of the first four methods does so by one or other of these eight classes of moral consciousness. One working merit by the fifth does so by the four classes ‘associated with knowledge’; one working it by the sixth does so by the four classes ‘dissociated from knowledge.’

Further, in this connexion the four purities of gift have been reckoned, to wit: lawful acquisition of the requisites, greatness or nobleness of volition, properties of the basis,³ consummate virtue. Of these, requisites obtained through righteousness and equity are lawful requisites. [162] Greatness of volition is his who gives with faith and confidence in kamma and its result. The state of freedom from the Four Intoxicants is fulfilment of right virtues in the recipient. The state of the saint purged of the intoxicants, when he emerges from jhāna, is

¹ See preceding note.

² Or, merit done with comprehensive knowledge and that done without it.—*Tr.*

³ *I.e.*, virtue in the recipient.—*Tr.*

consummate virtue. The moral consciousness experienced in the realm of sense of one who is able to make gifts connecting these four factors yields fruit even in this bodily existence, like that of Puṇṇakasetṭhi, Kālavalliya, Sumana the flower-seller, etc.

Considered in abstract, the whole of this moral consciousness experienced in the realm of sense is one, being grouped as consciousness (*citta*) in the sense of knowing the object and of being varied. By way of feeling it is twofold: accompanied by joy, or by hedonic indifference. By way of teaching showing the classification of knowledge it is fourfold: (a) type of consciousness, without external aid, accompanied by joy, associated with knowledge; and type of consciousness, without external aid, accompanied by hedonic indifference, associated with knowledge;¹ (b) the same associated with knowledge and with external aid; (c) the same without external aid and dissociated from knowledge; and (d) the same with external aid and dissociated from knowledge. Thus it is according to the teaching on the classification of knowledge. Thus in this fourfold division there are eight kinds of moral consciousness, to wit, four without external aid and four with external aid considered under this head. Knowing these truly, the Blessed One, the omniscient, most excellent of leaders, best of sages has declared, taught, regulated, established, discussed, analyzed, and expounded them.

End of the Exposition of Moral Consciousness in the world of sense-experience, [a portion] of 'The Expositor,' the Commentary on the 'Compendium of States.'

¹ In the sense of association with knowledge and of being without external aid, these two are one.—*Tr.*

PART V—DISCOURSE ON MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE REALM OF ATTENUATED MATTER¹

CHAPTER I

JHĀNA—THE FOURFOLD SYSTEM

Now the beginning of this division: 'Which are the states that are moral?'² proceeds to show the nature of moral consciousness in the realm of attenuated matter. In the reply, by [attenuated] matter, life under those conditions is meant. 'That he may attain to'—*i.e.*, may obtain rebirth, renewed existence, be produced there. 'Way thereto'—*i.e.*, a means. The import is:—He traces out, seeks after, engenders, effects that rebirth. And this is what has been said: 'He develops the path (*maggā*) by means of which there is birth, existence, production in that sphere of life.' What then? By this path is there assuredly rebirth in that sphere? Not so. By such utterances as 'Bhikkhus, develop [ecstatic] concentration; in such a state one knows, one sees as things really are,'³ we see that there is a transcending even of that sphere by penetration [of insight]. Nevertheless, for rebirth in that sphere there is no path other than this. [163] Hence the words:— 'he develops the path for rebirth in the sphere of attenuated matter.'

In its meaning, this path is volition, or states associated

¹ *Rūpāvacara*, lit. sphere of matter or material qualities, or sphere where rūpa's or objects of sight are the principal medium of experience. —*Comp.*, p. 12. Actually, the material environment and the corporeal frames in those realms seem to have been as varied in kind as in the lower planes of the *Kāṃāvacara* 'heavens,' but more refined or sublimated. Cf., e.g., *Dialogues* ii. 244, § 17. Rendered 'form' in *B.P.E.*, whereon cf. *Comp.* 271.—*Ed.*

² *Dhs.* §§ 160 ff.

³ *Samyutta* iii. 13; v. 414.

with volition, or both. In the passage: 'Sāriputta, I know purgatory and the path leading to purgatory,'¹ the 'path' is the volition [the will that leads thereto]. In the lines:

*Faith, modesty and meritorious giving—
These are the things that men of worth pursue ;
This, say they, is the path celestial ;
Hereby we pass into the dera-world,*²

states associated with volition are the 'path.' Volition and states associated with volition are the 'path' in the *Saṅkhārū-papatti Sutta*, etc.:—'This, bhikkhus, is the path, this is the way.'³ In the present connection, from its being said to be jhāna, the states associated with volition are intended. And inasmuch as volition in jhāna drags in rebirth, therefore both volition and the associated states develop.

'Develops'⁴ means to beget, produce, increase. This is the meaning of *bhāvanā* here. Elsewhere the meaning is different according to the preposition, as *sambhāvanā*, *paribhāvanā*, *vibhāvanā*. Of these, *sambhāvanā* means religious confidence, thus:—'In my Order, Udāyi, my disciples believe in the higher ethics, knowing that the recluse Gotama is virtuous and is endowed with the higher ethics.'⁵ 'Concentration perfected by virtue is of much fruit, of great advantage; understanding perfected by concentration is of much fruit, of great advantage; the mind perfected by understanding is well freed from the Intoxicants'⁶—here *paribhāvanā* means perfecting. *Vibhāvanā* means disappearance in: 'cause matter, cause feeling, perception, activities, consciousness to disappear.'⁷

Again, *bhāvanā* is used in the sense of producing and increasing, e.g. :—'Udāyi, I have preached, to the disciples

¹ *Majjhima* i. 73.

² *Anguttara* iv. 236. Burmese texts, for *diviyaṃ* (celestial) read *virīyaṃ*. Cf. *Points of Controversy*, 199.

³ *Majjhima* iii. 100.

⁴ *B.P.E.* : 'cultivates' (*bhāveti*). Cf. *B. Psy.* 107 n. 1, 133, 158.

⁵ *Majjhima* ii. 9.

⁶ *Dīgha* ii. 81 (*Dialogues* ii. 85 f.).

⁷ Not traced.

the practice according to which they develop the four applications in mindfulness.¹ And such is its meaning here also. Hence it has been said that *bhāveti* means to beget, produce, increase. But why is the teaching here on the moral consciousness of the realm of attenuated matter initiated by the personal agent, and not by taking the conscious state (*dhamma*), as in the exposition of the moral consciousness of the sensuous realm ? [164] Because it should be accomplished by practice. For the moral consciousness of this realm is to be accomplished by one or other of the four Modes of Progressive Practice.² It does not arise without progressive practice like that of the sensuous realm. And progress arises when there is a person to attain it. To show this meaning the Blessed One, in giving the teaching introducing first the person, has said: 'he develops the path for rebirth in the Rūpa sphere.'

Next, the phrase 'aloof, indeed, from sensuous desires'³ means being separated from, being without, having parted from the pleasures of sense. And the word 'indeed' (*eva*) here is to be understood as having the meaning of assurance.⁴ Because it has this meaning the Blessed One shows the opposition of the First Jhāna to the pleasures of sense which do not exist in the interval when one has attained it (First Jhāna), and its attainment only by the rejecting of them. How ? When thus, by being aloof from sensuous desires, assurance is given, this meaning is made clear:—as where darkness exists, there is no lamp-light, so this Jhāna does not arise in the presence of sensuous desires, which, indeed, are opposed to it. As by abandoning the hither bank, the thither bank is obtained, so by abandoning sensuous desires this Jhāna is attained. Therefore he made this a matter of assurance.

Herein one might object: 'But why is this "indeed" spoken with the preceding term (*i.e.*, sensuous desires) and not with the following term (*i.e.*, immoral states) ? What ? should one live attaining to this Jhāna without being aloof from immoral states ?' Not thus should the matter be understood.

¹ *Majjhima* ii. 11.

³ *Dhs.* § 160.

² *Dhs.* §§ 176 ff.

⁴ *Niyamattho*.

Eva, it is true, is spoken with the preceding term, because jhāna is an escape from sensuous desires; and jhāna is that because it has passed beyond all sensuous conditions, and is opposed to the lust of sense-desires. Accordingly he said: 'From sensuous desires this [jhāna] is the escape, this is the exit.'¹ Yet the word 'indeed' may also be used with the following term, as it is in 'Indeed, bhikkhus, in my dispensation . . . the first class of recluse is to be found, the second class of recluse is to be found.'² For it is not possible to live in the attainment of this jhāna without being aloof from those immoral states, known as the Hindrances, which are so different from it. Thus assurance should be understood in both the terms. And although, in this pair of terms, by the common word 'aloof' all kinds of aloofness are included, such as that of the corresponding part and so on, yet here only aloofness of body, aloofness of mind and by aloofness arrest [of the Hindrances] are to be understood.

By the term 'sense-desires' the desires based on objects of sense are referred to, as in the *Mahāniddesa*:—'What are the desires based on objects, delightful and lovely?'³ And in the *Mahāniddesa* and the *Vibhanga* these are said to be sense-desires of our lower nature,⁴ e.g., 'The desire that is will, [165] lust, lust of the will, lustful intentions.'⁵ All the sense-desires of our lower nature also should be understood as included. This being so, the meaning of 'aloof indeed from sensualities' ought also to be 'aloof indeed from sense-desires based on objects,' by which bodily aloofness is meant.

[In the next clause:—] 'aloof from immoral states,' the proper meaning is 'separated from the sense-desires based on our lower nature, or all immoral states,' by which mental aloofness is expressed.

By the former clause (i.e., aloof indeed from sense-desires), because it has been said to be aloof from the sense-desires

¹ *Dīgha* iii. 275 (vii.).

² *Anguttara* ii. 238.

³ *Mahā-Niddesa* 1.

⁴ Specified as the ten *kilesa*'s. On this term see *B.P.E.*, p. 327 f.

⁵ *Vibhanga* 256.

based on objects, therefore it is clear that the pleasure of enjoying such sense-desires has been given up. By the second clause (*i.e.*, aloof from immoral states), because it has been said to be aloof from the sense-desires based on our lower nature, it is clear that the bliss of jhāna-emancipation has been comprehended.¹ Thus from their being said to be aloof from sense-desires based on objects and on our lower nature, by the first of the two phrases is shown clearly the relinquishment of the basis of the lower nature itself, by the second, that of our lower nature; by the first, the giving up of frivolity,² by the second, that of foolishness; by the first is shown the purity of motive, by the second, the nourishment of the wish (for Nibbāna).³

Thus far, in the clause 'from sense-desires,' we have the method for the portion including sense-desires based on objects. In the portion including sense-desires of our lower nature, 'sensuous desires,' variously considered as will, lust, etc., is the will of those desires. This sensuous desire, though included among immoral states, is taken separately, as being opposed to jhāna in the same way as it is said in the *Vibhaṅga*:— 'Herein what is the sensuous desire which is the will thereof?'⁴ Or it is taken in the first phrase as being sensuous desires of our lower nature, and in the second phrase as being included in things immoral. And the plural 'from sense-desires,' not the singular, is used to show its manifold nature. And although other states are immoral, only the Hindrances are spoken of as showing the opposition to, hostility of the higher jhāna factors in the same way as is said in the *Vibhaṅga*:— 'Herein which are the immoral states? Sensuous desire,' etc.⁵ For it is said that the Hindrances are opposed to the jhāna-factors, which are hostile to them and dispel and destroy them.

¹ This sentence is omitted in the P.T.S. ed.—*Ed.*

² *I.e.*, to lust after any and every visible object met with.—*Pyi.*

³ By being pure from the corruptions.—*Tikā.* Or, *āsayauposana* means the fulfilment of one's wish, which consists in the accomplishment, by means of good deeds done in former existences, of antecedent conditions for the development of jhāna.—*Anuṅikā.*

⁴ Cf. *Vibhaṅga*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

Likewise it is said, in the *Petaḥkopadesa*,¹ that concentration is opposed to sensuous desire, rapture to ill-will, initial application of mind to sloth and torpor, bliss to flurry and worry, sustained application of mind to perplexity. Thus the former clause—‘aloof indeed from sensualities’—expresses separation from, by the discarding of, sensuous desire, the latter clause—‘aloof from immoral states’—separation from the five Hindrances. And if we include what has not been [explicitly] included, the separation by discarding is stated, in the first and second clauses, respectively, of sensuous desire and of the remaining Hindrances; of greed (one of the three immoral roots, with the five pleasures of sense for object) and of hate and delusion [the other immoral roots] with the bases of vexation, etc. [166] for object; of sensuality as ‘flood,’ ‘bond,’ ‘intoxicant,’ ‘grasping,’ ‘the physical knot’ of covetousness, the lust of desire as ‘a fetter’ among the ‘floods,’ etc., and of the remaining floods, bonds, intoxicants, graspings, knots and fetters of craving and states associated with it, and of ignorance and states associated with it; and also of the eight states of consciousness associated with greed and of the remaining four immoral states of consciousness.

So much, then, for the setting forth of the meaning of ‘aloof indeed from sensualities and aloof from immoral states.’ Now, having so far shown the factor eliminated in the First Jhāna, the clause—‘with initial and with sustained application of mind’—is next stated to show the factors associated with it.

In this phrase jhāna is said to arise, together with initial and sustained application, classified according to the characteristics, etc., already given above [in connection with the realm of sense, a mental state which] has arrived at the realm of attenuated matter through association with ecstasy. It has been said that, as a tree is found with its flowers and fruits, so this Jhāna occurs with initial and sustained application. And in the *Vibhanga*, the teaching, as determined in a personal way, is given thus:—‘One is endowed with, possessed of, this

¹ Here called ‘Petaḥake.’

initial application, this sustained application,' etc.¹ But the meaning there is to be understood as in this passage.

In the term 'born of solitude' the meaning is separation, solitude, freedom from the Hindrances. Or it means 'solitary,' 'separated.' The group of states associated with jhāna and separated from the Hindrances is the meaning. And 'born of solitude' is born from that solitude, or in that solitude.

Next, 'full of rapture-bliss':—these terms have been set forth above. Of the fivefold rapture this is the 'all-pervading rapture,'² which, being the root of ecstatic concentration, goes on increasing and has reached association with concentration. This is the rapture meant here. And this rapture and this bliss are obtainable in this jhāna; hence it is said to be 'full of rapture and bliss.' *Pīṭisukhaṃ* means rapture and bliss, like 'Dhamma-Vinaya,' etc. There is the rapture and bliss born of solitude of, or in, this jhāna; hence 'born of solitude, full of rapture-bliss.' For verily as the jhāna is born of solitude, so in it the rapture and bliss are also born of solitude and are obtainable in it. Therefore it is proper to say 'born of solitude and full of rapture-bliss' as one term. But in the *Vibhaṅga* it has been said in this way: 'This bliss is accompanied by this rapture,' etc.³ The meaning, however, is to be understood as in this passage.

[167] 'First Jhāna'—this is the numerical order. 'First' is the first to have arisen⁴; and also that it is the first to be entered into. But this last meaning is not a sure characteristic. For an aspirant who is of practised self-control, and has attained the eight attainments, is able to enter into jhāna from the beginning to the end, and from the end to the beginning, and also to fall into it at intermediate stages. Thus this jhāna is first in the sense of arising first.

Jhāna is twofold: that which (views or) examines closely the object and that which examines closely the characteristic marks. Of these two, 'object-scrutinizing' jhāna examines

¹ *Vibhaṅga* 257, l. 12 f.

² See above, p. 153.

³ *Vibhaṅga* 258.

⁴ *Uppannaṃ ti*. Or, to be attained.

closely those devices [for self-hypnotism]¹ as mental objects. Insight, the Path and Fruition are called 'characteristic-examining jhāna.' Of these three, insight is so called from its examining closely the characteristics of impermanence, etc. Because the work to be done by insight is accomplished through the Path, the Path is also so called. And because Fruition examines closely the Truth of cessation, and possesses the characteristic of truth, it also is called 'characteristic-examining jhāna.' Of these two kinds of jhāna, the 'object-examining' mode is here intended. Hence, from its examining the object and extinguishing the opposing Hindrances,² jhāna is to be thus understood.

'Having attained' is said to mean 'having approached,' 'having reached,' or, 'having fulfilled,' 'having accomplished.' In the *Vibhaṅga*, 'having attained' is said to mean the getting, gaining, attainment, full attainment, touching, realizing, fulfilling of the First Jhāna.³ There the meaning is to be understood in the same way.

'He lives' means to be endowed with the Jhāna, the various kinds of which have been distinguished above by the mode of behaviour corresponding to that Jhāna, and to accomplish the progress or function, continuance, preservation, maintenance, regulation, living of a personality. Indeed, it has been said in the *Vibhaṅga*, that 'he lives' means to progress, continue, preserve, maintain, regulate, live.⁴ Hence 'he lives.'

In the term 'earth-device,' the circular [portion of] earth is called earth-device as representing the entire earth. The image of the mark, or the after-image obtained in dependence on that disc of earth, is also called the 'earth-device'; so also is the jhāna obtained in that image. Of these three meanings, the last is to be understood here. The meaning in abstract is that he is living in the attainment of the First Jhāna known as that of the earth-device. [168] With this earth-

¹ See *B.P.E.*, p. 43, n. 4, 57.

² On this, as preceding Jhāna, cf. *Dialogues* i. 82-84; *Compendium* 54.—Ed.

³ *Loc. cit.*

⁴ *Vibhaṅga*, *loc. cit.* *B.P.E.*, 'abides in (*viharati*).

device, what ought to be done by a clansman's son who has done the preamble, induced the fourfold and fivefold Jhānas, increased insight with jhāna as proximate cause, and who is desirous of attaining Arahantship? At first, having purified the Four Precepts of restraint known as the *Pātimokkha*, restraint of controlling faculties, purity of life and dependence on requisites; he should establish himself in the sublimer Precepts; he should cut off any impediment, which exists in him, among the ten impediments beginning¹ with 'house-life'; he should approach that good friend, who gives him stations of exercise; he should study that exercise befitting his own practice among the thirty-eight stations of exercise as given in the Text,² and if the earth-device is suitable he should take that up; he should reject an unsuitable monastery,³ living in one that is suitable for his jhāna culture; he should sever the minor impediments; and by not slackening the arrangement of the entire process of culture, comprising the different stages of preamble, guarding of the image, avoiding of the seven unsuitable things, pursuing the seven suitable things, and proficiency in the tenfold ecstasy, he should practise with a view to the attainment of jhāna.

This is an abstract; the detailed account is to be learnt from the account given in the *Visuddhi-Magga*.⁴ The same remark holds good in the case of the following Jhānas. The entire process of culture of all the stations of exercise has been detailed in the *Visuddhi-Magga*, where the method of all the Commentaries has been followed. What good is there in repeating what has been said in various places? We shall therefore not explain it in detail again. Without spoiling the meaning, we shall without break give the explanation of the Pali Text in order due, without repeating ourselves.

Finally, the phrase 'at that time' means the time of his life when he has attained the First Jhāna. 'There is contact . . . there is non-distraction'—these are the fifty-six states, the various kinds of which have been distinguished as to the order

¹ *Mahā-Niddesa*, 156.

² *Compendium*, 202.

³ Reading gahetvā bhāvanāya na anurūpaṃ . . .

⁴ Chs. iii. ff.

of terms in the first class of moral consciousness of the realm of sense. In reality, only these are of the realm of sense. Those discussed here, as to plane, are sublime and experienced in the realm of attenuated matter. This is the distinction here. The remaining words are the same. But here are obtained the four 'Or-whatever' states beginning with will.¹ The sections of the Groups and of the Void have been explained.

End of the First Jhāna.

CHAPTER II

THE SECOND JHĀNA²

IN the exposition of the Second Jhāna, the clause:—'from the suppression of initial and sustained application' [169] means 'owing to the suppression, the transcending of these two: initial application and sustained application, they not being manifested from the moment when Second Jhāna begins.' Not only are all the mental factors of First Jhāna not present in Second Jhāna, but even those that are present—contact, and so on—are different. It is through the transcending of the gross element that there is the attainment of other Jhānas, the second from the First and so on. And it should be understood that it was to show this meaning that the words 'from the suppression of initial and sustained application' were said.

'Subjective' (*ajjhata*) here means 'personal.' But in the *Vibhaṅga* just this is said:—"Subjective" means self-referring.³ And because 'personal' is intended, therefore that which is one's own, produced in one's continuity, is to be here understood.

Next, 'tranquillizing':—faith is said to be tranquillizing. Through connection with it, the jhāna also is said to be tranquillizing, as a cloth when steeped in indigo is called indigo. Or, because this jhāna tranquillizes the mind owing to its union with faith and the suppression of the disturbing initial

¹ Or 'desire-to-do' (*chanda*).

² *Dhs.* § 161.

³ *Vibhaṅga* 258—*paccattaṃ*; 'personal' is *niyakaṃ*. Cf. below.—*Ed.*

and sustained application, therefore it is called 'tranquillizing.' In this second sense the construction is to be understood as 'the tranquillizing of mind.'

In the former sense, 'of mind' is to be construed as 'with supreme exaltation,' this being the connected meaning:—alone (*lit.* one, *eko*) it rises above (*udeti*)—this is *ekôdi* (exalted). 'No longer overgrown by initial and sustained application, it rises up at the top, as the best' is the meaning; for in the world what is best is also called unique (*eko*). Or, it may also be said that,¹ as deprived of initial and sustained application, it rises up (*udeti*) single, or companionless; hence 'rising alone.' Or, again, it raises associated states, or causes them to rise. 'One' in the sense of 'best,' and exalted in the sense of 'raising,' give us *ekodī*:—'supremely exalted'—which is a synonym for concentration. And this Second Jhāna develops this exaltation, therefore it is called *ekodībhāva*—'pre-eminent,' 'single,' 'best to produce associated states.' And as it is of mind and not of an entity, or a living principle, it has been said to be 'unique exaltation of mind (*cetaso*).'

[It may here be objected:—] is not this faith and this concentration called 'uniquely exalting' present in First Jhāna also? Why *this* tranquillizing only, and unique exaltation of mind? The answer is:—That First Jhāna, being disturbed by initial and sustained application, is not *quite* clear, but is like water full of big and small waves, therefore [170] it is not said to be tranquillizing, though there be faith in it. And because it is not *quite* clear, concentration in it is not well manifested,² therefore unique exaltation is not ascribed to it. But in the Second Jhāna, owing to the non-existence of the impediments of initial and sustained application, faith, having got its opportunity, is strong, and concentration, by attaining intimate alliance with strong faith, is manifested. Therefore in this way should the formula be understood.

In the *Vibhaṅga* only this much is said, that tranquillity is faith, believing, confiding, assuring; and that unique exalta-

¹ Reading *iti pi vattum vattati*.

² Like fish in muddy water.—*Tīkā*.

tion of mind is [defined as right concentration:—] 'that mental persistence . . . right concentration, which, etc.'¹ The explanation given above, however, should be understood as not going against, but indeed coinciding, concurring with the meaning given in the *Vibhaṅga*.

'Without initial and sustained application.' From being removed by culture, there is no initial application in this Jhāna; hence 'without initial application.' Similarly, it is 'without sustained application.' And in the *Vibhaṅga* it has been said that this initial application and this sustained application are calmed, quieted, suppressed, terminated, exterminated, destroyed, completely destroyed, dried up, quite dried up, finished; hence 'without initial and sustained application.'²

Here it may be said:—Is not this meaning determined by the phrase 'from the suppression of initial and sustained application'? Then why is it repeated as 'without initial and sustained application'? True, this latter meaning has already been determined. Yet the repetition does not show merely the meaning of the former phrase. Have we not said, that from the transcending of the gross factor there is the attainment of other Jhānas beyond the First?³ To show this, it is said that the Second Jhāna tranquilizes the mind because of the suppression of initial and sustained application, and not because of the slough of our lower nature (as at the moment of access). Because of the suppression of initial and sustained application it develops unique exaltation, and not, like the access in jhāna, because of the removal of the Hindrances, and also not, like the First Jhāna, because of the manifestation of the factors. Thus this phrase shows the condition of tranquillity and unique exaltation. Moreover this Second Jhāna is without initial and sustained application, because they are suppressed, unlike the third and fourth Jhānas, and visual cognition, etc., which are without initial and sustained application, because they do not exist. Thus

¹ *Vibhaṅga* 258, l. 10. The abbreviated definition there is given in full, *ibid.* 217, and in this work is discussed on p. 157 f.

² *Loc. cit.*

³ *Supra*, p. 225.

it also shows the effect, and not merely the fact of the non-existence of initial and sustained application. But the phrase 'without initial and sustained application' merely shows their non-existence. Therefore, having said the former phrase, we may also say this latter phrase.

'Born of concentration' means born of the concentration of the First Jhāna, or of the associated concentration. [171] Of the two, although the First Jhāna is also born of the associated concentration, yet only the Second Jhāna is worthy of being called concentration, from its freedom from the disturbing initial and sustained application, from being quite unshakable and from being well clarified. Therefore, to speak its praises, it is said to be born of concentration.

'Full of rapture-bliss'—this is as said above. 'Second' is by numerical sequence. The meaning also is that he enters into this Second Jhāna.

[In the list:—] 'At that time there is contact,' etc.—this being fivefold Jhāna, the words 'initial and sustained application' have been left out; so in the fivefold Path the words 'right intention' have been left out. By their influence the decision as to the classifiable and unclassifiable terms should be understood.

In the section of the Groups¹ also occur the threefold Jhāna and the fourfold Path. The rest is the same as in the first Jhānas.

End of the Second Jhāna.

CHAPTER III

THE THIRD JHĀNA

IN the exposition of the Third Jhāna,² in the clause 'because of distaste for rapture,' the distaste is the revulsion from, or transcending of, the kind of rapture mentioned. The word 'and' between the two words, rapture and distaste, has

¹ Cf. above section, pp. 202-5.

² *Dhs.* § 163

simply a conjunctive meaning. It combines the suppression of rapture with that of initial and sustained application.

When the work of suppression only is added, then the construction should be understood as 'because of distaste for rapture, nay more, because of its suppression.' And in this construction distaste has the meaning of 'revulsion from. Therefore the meaning should be taken as 'because of revulsion from, and suppression of, rapture.' But when the suppression of initial and sustained application is added, then the construction should be understood as 'because of distaste for rapture, nay more, because of the suppression of initial and sustained application.' And in this construction distaste has the meaning of 'transcending.' Therefore the meaning should be taken as 'because of the transcending of rapture and of the suppression of initial and sustained application.'

Although the initial and the sustained application has been suppressed even in the Second Jhāna, the suppression of both has been said to show the way to, and to extol the praises of, the Third Jhāna. For when 'because of the suppression of initial and sustained application' is said, is not the meaning plain that the suppression is the way to this Jhāna? And albeit they are not removed in the Third Ariyan Path, yet the five lower [172] Fetters beginning with the theory of individuality are said to be removed by way of extolling the Path, so that those striving for its attainment may put forth effort. Even although they have not been suppressed, their removal has been mentioned for purposes of commendation. Hence the meaning has been said to be 'from the transcending of rapture and from the suppression of initial and sustained application.'

In 'one lives indifferent,' 'indifferent' means he looks on disinterestedly; the meaning is: he looks evenly, not taking any side.¹ One who is possessed of the Third Jhāna is called indifferent from being endowed with that indifference, pure, abundant, and strong.

¹ I.e., from any feeling of pleasure or pain.-Pyī.

Indifference is of ten kinds: (1) sixfold, (2) of the Divine States, (3) of the Factors of Wisdom, (4) of energy, (5) of complexes of activity, (6) of feeling, (7) of insight, (8) of equanimity, (9) of jhāna, and (10) of purity. (1) Of these, 'the bhikkhu who in this life is purged of the Intoxicants sees with the eye a visible object, and is neither joyful nor sad, but lives indifferent, mindful and comprehending.'¹ Thus the indifference which comes to such a saint, in such a way that he does not abandon the pure original state, when the six kinds of objects, whether desirable or undesirable, are presented at the six doors, is known as the sixfold indifference. (2) The indifference which takes up the neutral position regarding beings² thus: 'He continues to diffuse one quarter [of any region] with a mind accompanied by equanimity'³ is known as that of the Divine States. (3) The indifference arising with the mode of neutrality among co-existent states thus: 'He develops indifference as a factor of wisdom and dependent on detachment'⁴ is known as that of the Factors of Wisdom. (4) The indifference which arises thus in the text: 'The indifference which from time to time attends to the [so-called] "mark of indifference,"'⁵ and is neither too intense nor too slack, is known as that of energy. (5) The indifference which is a state of equanimity derived from the estimate that the Hindrances, etc. [are to be put away], in such texts as 'How many kinds of equanimity arise by means of concentration, how many by means of insight? Eight arise by means of concentration; ten by means of insight'⁶ is known as that of the complexes. (6) The indifference which

¹ *Āṅguttara* ii. 198.

² Viz., that they are 'owned by their kamma.'—*Pyī*. Cf. *Majjhima* iii. 203.

³ *Dialogues* i. 318, etc.

⁴ *Saṃyutta* iv. 367; v. 91.

⁵ 'Neutral energy,' being free from contraction and expansion, is called indifference, and this, under the aspect of such neutrality, is called the 'mark of indifference,' because it is a condition of the production of similar energy.—*Tikā*.

⁶ *Pts.* i. 64. I.e., by means of the eight worldly attainments (*samāpatti*) and by means of the ten composed of the Four Paths, Four Fruitions—the Void and the Signless.—*Tikā*.

is neither painful nor pleasurable, as in 'When sensuous moral consciousness arises accompanied by indifference,'¹ is known as that of feeling. (7) The indifference which arises as equanimity in respect of [intellectual] investigation; thus: 'He puts aside the "is," the "has come to be," and acquires indifference,'² [173] is known as that of insight. (8) The indifference which balances co-existent states equally, and which comes among the 'Or whatever states,' beginning with will, is known as that of equanimity. (9) The indifference which comes as 'He lives indifferent,'³ and which does not beget partisanship with the bliss, excellent though it may be, of the Third Jhāna, is known as that of jhāna. (10) The indifference which comes as 'indifference of the Fourth Jhāna in its utter purity of mindfulness,'⁴ and which is purified of all opposing states, and has no business in their suppression, is known as that of purity.

Of these, the sixfold indifference and that of the Divine States, of the Factors of Wisdom, of equanimity, of jhāna, and of purity are one in sense, as being equanimity. But they are distinguished under six heads owing to the different states or conditions corresponding to the classification, though there is only one kind of being, just as in boys, lads, elders, generals, kings, etc. Therefore among them, where there is the sixfold indifference, there is nothing of the Factor of Wisdom, etc. And where there is the indifference which is a Factor of Wisdom there is no sixfold indifference, etc.

As these six are one in sense, so is the indifference of the (mental) complexes and of insight one in sense—namely, understanding, which is twofold in function. As a man, holding a stick cleft like a goat's hoof, searches for a snake, which has entered the house late in the day, and seeing it lying on the heap of husks, looks down, thinking, 'Is it a snake, or not?'

¹ *Dhs.* §§ 150, 156.

² As to the five aggregates. Not traced. He becomes indifferent on contemplating the three characteristics of the five aggregates, just as a man is no longer curious when he is satisfied that a snake is poisonous by seeing the three rings on the neck.—*Tikā*.

³ *Dhs.* § 163.

⁴ *Dhs.* § 163

but on seeing the three rings on the neck is no more doubtful, but becomes indifferent as to search, so the aspirant, who has worked at insight, on seeing the three characteristic signs by means of insight, becomes indifferent as to search for the impermanence, etc., of the complexes. This is the indifference of insight.

As when the man firmly catches hold of the snake by his goat's-hoof-cleft stick and, seeking to release it, thinking, 'How shall I free it, so that I may not hurt it and I myself be not bitten?' becomes indifferent as to catching it, so from looking upon the three existences as though on fire, as a result of his seeing the three characteristic signs, a man becomes indifferent as to seizing the complexes. This is the indifference of the complexes. Thus when the indifference of insight is accomplished that of the complexes is also accomplished. In this way the twofold function of neutrality consists in searching and seizing. [174] But the indifference of energy and that of feeling are different from each other and from the others.

Thus, of the ten kinds, it is the indifference of *jhāna* that is here intended. It has the characteristic of middleness, the function of not enjoying (even the excellent bliss of the Third *Jhāna*), the manifestation of absence of activity, the proximate cause of distaste for rapture. १११

Here one might object: 'Is not this *jhāna*-indifference the same in sense as that equanimity-indifference, which is obtainable in the First and Second *Jhānas*? If so, then, in those two *Jhānas* also, it should be said that "he abides indifferent." Why has this not been said?'

Because there is no distinct function. Indeed, the function of equanimity is not distinct in the First and Second *Jhānas*, because it is overwhelmed by initial application, etc. But in the Third *Jhāna*, because it is not overwhelmed by initial and sustained application and rapture, it has lifted up its head, so to speak, and has a positive distinct function. Here ends the full explanation of the sentence 'He abides indifferent.'

Now as to 'mindful and comprehending,' we think or

remember and are 'mindful.' We know fully and are 'comprehending.' Thus the mindfulness and the comprehension are stated in connexion with the person.

Of these, mindfulness has the characteristic of remembering, the function of opposition to forgetfulness, the manifestation of watchfulness; comprehension has the characteristic of opposition to delusion, the function of overcoming doubt, or of bringing a work to completion, and the manifestation of examination. Although this phrase is obtainable in the preceding Jhānas—indeed, to one of forgetful memory and without comprehension there does not arise even the access stage of jhāna, much less ecstasy—yet from their grossness the process of consciousness is easy, like the movement of a man on the earth, and in them the function of being mindful and comprehending is not revealed. But from the putting away of the gross factor and the fineness of this Third Jhāna, it is desirable that the process of consciousness be maintained by the function of being mindful and comprehending like the movement of a man on the edges of razors. Hence it has been mentioned here only.

Is there anything more to say? As the suckling calf, being removed from the cow and left unguarded, again approaches the cow, so the blissful ease of the Third Jhāna, being removed from rapture, if unguarded by mindfulness and comprehension, would again approach rapture and be associated with it. Indeed, beings long for happiness; and the blissful ease of the Third Jhāna is exceedingly sweet, than which there is no greater bliss. But owing to the power of mindfulness and comprehension, there is no longing present for this bliss, and this condition does not change. It is to show this distinctive meaning that the phrase has here been said.

Now in the clause 'he experiences blissful ease by the mental factors,' [175] although to one endowed with the Third Jhāna there is no thought of such experience, yet he may experience that bliss which is associated with his mental factors, or, though he has emerged from jhāna, he may still experience that bodily bliss, because his material body has been suffused by the exceedingly refined mind-born matter produced by that

associated bliss. Hence the phrase has been said to show this meaning.

Now in the clause 'of which the Ariyans declare: he, indifferent and mindful, abides in blissful ease,' the meaning is that by reason of, on account of, the Third Jhāna the Ariyans, that is, the Buddhas, etc., declare, point out, designate, establish, reveal, disclose, explain, set forth, praise a person who has mastered that jhāna.

And how? [By saying:] 'he indifferent and mindful abides in blissful ease,' and having entered into the Third Jhāna he so abides—thus should the sequence in the meaning be understood. But why do they praise him so? Because he is worthy of praise. To expand: Because he is indifferent even in the Third Jhāna which has reached the perfection of bliss of exceeding sweetness, because he is not dragged along by the contagion of the bliss of it, and is mindful with an established mindfulness, so that rapture may not arise, and because he experiences by his mental factors that bliss which is not corrupt and which gives delight to, and is followed by, the Ariyans, therefore is he worthy of praise. Him praiseworthy the Ariyans praise, setting forth his merits as the condition of their praise: 'Indifferent and mindful he abides in blissful ease.'

'Third' is by numerical sequence; this is the Third Jhāna he enters into.

In 'at that time there is contact,' etc., in the fivefold Jhāna the word 'rapture' is wanting, and by its influence the decision of the terms, both classifiable and unclassifiable, should be understood.

In the section also of the Groups mention of the twofold Jhāna is made. The rest is the same as in the Second Jhāna.

End of the Third Jhāna.

CHAPTER IV

THE FOURTH JHĀNA

IN the exposition of the Fourth Jhāna, the clause 'from the putting away of pleasure and from the putting away of pain'¹ means the putting away of pleasure and pain in the mental factors.

'Previous' means that the putting away of pleasure and pain took place before, and not at the moment of the Fourth Jhāna.

The clause 'from the passing away of joy and grief,' namely, of mental pleasure and mental pain, has been said [176] because of the previous passing away, the putting away of these two. When are they put away? At the 'access'-moments² of the four Jhānas. For joy is put away at the access-moment of the Fourth Jhāna; pain, grief and pleasure are put away [respectively] at the access-moments of the First, Second and Third Jhānas. Thus, although they have not been stated according to the sequence of their removal, yet their removal should be understood even by the sequence of the summary of controlling faculties both in the *Indriya-Vibhaṅga*³ and here.

But if they are put away at the access-moments preceding this or that Jhāna, then why is it said [that their cessation is in the Jhānas themselves] thus: 'Where does the uprisen controlling faculty of pain cease completely? Bhikkhus, in this case the bhikkhu, aloof indeed from sense-desires . . . enters into and abides in the First Jhāna. Here the controlling faculty of pain which has arisen ceases completely. . . . Where do the controlling faculties of grief, . . . of pleasure, . . . and of joy which have arisen cease completely? Bhikkhus, in this case the bhikkhu from the putting away of joy . . . enters into and abides in the Fourth Jhāna. Here the controlling faculty of joy which has arisen ceases completely.'⁴

¹ *Dhs.* § 165.

² On this term see *Comp. of Phil.* 55.

³ *Vibhaṅga* 122.

⁴ *Saṃy.* v. 213 f.

This is said because of their complete cessation. For in the Jhānas their cessation is completed, not merely begun; at the access-moments their cessation is not completed. True, though there is cessation in the access to the First Jhāna, with a different adverting of the mind, yet there the controlling faculty of pain may be produced through contact with gad-flies, mosquitoes, etc., or by falling on to an uneven seat; but there is no such production within the ecstasy; or this controlling faculty of pain which ceases at the access does not thoroughly cease, because it is not killed by its opposite (faculty). But within the ecstasy, owing to the diffusion of rapture, the whole body is surcharged with pleasure. And the controlling faculty of pain of the pleasure-suffused body has thoroughly ceased, being killed by its opposite. Moreover, although it has been put away, the controlling faculty of grief may arise at the access to the Second Jhāna with a different adverting of the mind. Why does this arise when there is bodily suffering and mental distress, with initial and sustained application of mind as its cause, and does not arise in the absence of initial and sustained application? Where it arises, it does so when there is initial and sustained application; and at the access to the Second Jhāna initial and sustained applications have not been put away; hence the possibility of its arising. But there is no such possibility owing to the removal of the cause in the Second Jhāna. Similarly, although it has been put away, the controlling faculty of pleasure may arise at the access to the Third Jhāna in one whose body has been suffused by refined matter produced by rapture; but it may not arise in the Third Jhāna itself, because rapture, the cause of pleasure, has completely ceased therein.

[177] Similarly, although it has been put away, the controlling faculty of joy may arise at the access to the Fourth Jhāna because it is near and has not been well transcended, owing to the non-existence of indifference which has attained to ecstasy; but it may not arise in the Fourth Jhāna itself. Hence in various places the word 'complete' has been taken as 'Here the uprisen controlling faculty of pain ceases *completely*.'

Why [it may be objected] are these feelings, which have thus been put away at the access to the various Jhānas, gathered together in the Fourth Jhāna ?

For the purpose of apprehending them easily. In other words:—in 'neither painful nor pleasurable' this neutral feeling is [revealed as] subtle and hard to understand. It is not possible to apprehend it easily. Therefore, as, in order to catch a vicious bull that may not be caught by approaching it anyhow, the cowherd brings together all the cows in a pen, lets them out one by one, and, when the bull comes out in its turn, orders its capture: 'catch it!' so the Blessed One, to make easy the comprehending of the neutral feeling, has brought forth all the feelings. By showing all the feelings it is possible to comprehend neutral feeling as that which is neither pleasure nor pain, neither joy nor grief.

Further, these feelings should be understood to have been stated to show the cause of the mental emancipation of the Fourth Jhāna, which is neutral feeling. The preceding Jhānas which have put away pleasure and pain are indeed the causes of this mental emancipation. As has been said: 'Four, Sir, are the causes of the attainment of mental emancipation which is neutral feeling. In this case, Sir, a bhikkhu from the putting away of pleasure . . . enters into and abides in the Fourth Jhāna. These, Sir, are the four causes of the attainment of mental emancipation, which is neutral feeling.'¹

As, although they are put away elsewhere, the error of individuality, etc., are said to be put away in the Third Path with a view to extol its praises, so, in order to praise the Fourth Jhāna, these feelings should be understood to be mentioned in connection with it. Or they should be understood to be mentioned to show the great remoteness of lust and hate here, owing to the destruction of their causes. For as to these pleasure is the cause of joy, joy of lust, pain of grief, grief of hate. And by the destruction of pleasure, etc., lust and hate are destroyed with their causes. Thus they are very distant.²

¹ *Majjhīma* i. 296.

² From the Fourth Jhāna.—*Tīkā*.

The clause 'neither pain nor pleasure' means not pain by the absence of pain; not pleasure by the absence of pleasure. By this the Buddha shows the third [kind of] feeling as opposed to pain and pleasure, and not merely the absence of pain and pleasure. The third feeling is neither pain nor pleasure, and is also called hedonic indifference. [178] It has the characteristic of enjoying an object midway between the desirable and the undesirable, the function of middlelessness, the manifestation of not being apparent, the proximate cause of the cessation of pleasure.

Then as to the clause:—'Purity of mindfulness born of indifference,' in this Jhāna, because of the purity of the mindfulness which has been produced, mindfulness is pure. Such purity is made by indifference, not by any other; hence this Jhāna is called 'purity of mindfulness, born of indifference.'

In the *Vibhaṅga* it has been said that mindfulness is cleansed,¹ purified and burnished by indifference; hence 'purity of mindfulness born of indifference.' That indifference by which there is here purity of mindfulness should be understood as equanimity. And not merely mindfulness has been purified by indifference, but also the associated states have been purified. The teaching, however, has put mindfulness at the head.

Although this indifference exists also in the first three Jhānas, yet as the crescent moon, being overpowered by the sun by day, and not getting the favourable night which makes it cool and renders service to it, is not clear, not radiant, though it exists by day, so the crescent moon of equanimity, being overpowered by the night of opposing states, such as initial application of mind, and not getting the favourable night of indifferent feeling, is not clear in the first three Jhānas, even though in them it is present. And when indifference is not clear, the co-existent states, such as mindfulness, like the light of the indistinct crescent moon by day, are not clear. Therefore in the three Jhānas not one is said to be 'purity of mindfulness born of indifference.' But in the Fourth Jhāna the crescent moon of equanimity, not being overpowered by the night

¹ Or 'diffused,' reading *visadā* for *vivatā*.—Tr.

of opposing states, such as initial application of mind, and getting the favourable night of indifferent feeling, is exceedingly clear. Owing to its clearness the co-existent states, such as mindfulness, like the light of the clear crescent moon, become clear, radiant. Hence the Fourth Jhāna is said to be 'purity of mindfulness born of indifference.'

'Fourth' is by numerical sequence; he enters into this Jhāna as fourth.

In 'there is contact,' etc., in the fivefold contact, indifferent feeling should be understood as the only 'feeling.'

Moreover, in the fivefold Jhāna, in the eight controlling faculties [179], this has been said: 'There is indifference; there is the controlling faculty of indifference.' The remaining words, wanting in the Third, are also wanting in the Fourth Jhāna.

In the section of the Groups also, the Jhāna should be understood to be twofold by virtue of indifference and one-pointedness of mind. All the remaining words are the same as in the Third Jhāna.

End of the Fourfold system.

CHAPTER V

THE FIVEFOLD SYSTEM

Now with the words:--'which are the states that are moral,'¹ the fivefold system begins.

Why [is there a fivefold system]? There are two reasons:-- [to satisfy some] persons' inclinations, and to adorn the teaching. To expand:--In the assembled gathering of the spirits, to some spirits only initial application of mind appeared gross, and sustained application of mind, rapture, pleasure, one-pointedness of mind appeared good. To them in a fitting manner the Teacher divided the fourfold Second Jhāna as without initial, and with only sustained, application. To some spirits sustained application appeared gross, and rapture, pleasure and one-pointedness of mind appeared good. To

¹ *Dhs.* § 167.

them in a fitting manner he classified the threefold Third Jhāna. To some spirits rapture appeared gross and pleasure and one-pointedness of mind appeared good. To them in a fitting manner he classified the twofold Fourth Jhāna. To some spirits pleasure appeared gross and indifference and one-pointedness of mind appeared good. To them in a fitting manner he classified the twofold Fifth Jhāna. Thus far for [the appeal to different] personal inclinations. Again, those conditions of the Law by which, because they have been thoroughly penetrated, the teaching is adorned—those conditions were thoroughly penetrated by the Tathāgata. Hence, because of the vastness of his knowledge, the Teacher, who is skilful in arranging his teaching, and who has attained the [art of] embellishing it, fixes that teaching by whatever factor that has come to hand, and in any way he chooses. Thus here he has classified a First Jhāna of five factors, a fourfold Second Jhāna 'without initial and with only sustained application of mind,' a threefold Third Jhāna, a twofold Fourth Jhāna and a twofold Fifth Jhāna. This we have called embellishing the teaching.

Further, the Blessed One taught three kinds of concentration in the Suttanta passage: 'Bhikkhus, the three kinds of concentration are: with initial and sustained application of mind, without initial and with only sustained application, without initial and without sustained application.'¹ Of these, that with initial and sustained application, and that without initial and sustained application have been classified and shown above; [180] but not that concentration without initial and with only sustained application. And it should be understood that the Fivefold System has been begun to show that concentration.

In the list:—'contact,' and so on, belonging to the exposition of the second Jhāna of the Fivefold System,² only 'initial application of mind' is wanting. And in the section of the Groups this also is special: 'There is the fourfold Jhāna, there is the fourfold Path.' All the rest are the same as in

¹ *Anguttara* iv 310 f. Cf. *Saṃyutta* iv. 360, 362; *Questions of Milinda* ii. 222.

² *Dhs.* § 161.

the First Jhāna. And the Second, Third and Fourth Jhānas in the Fourfold System are the Third, Fourth and Fifth Jhānas here. It is to show the order of their attainment that this system should be understood.

It is said that a minister's son came to town from the district to attend on the king. He saw the king for one day only, then wasted all his wealth by the vice of drink. One day, when he was drunk, they stripped off his clothes, covered him with worn-out mats and hauled him out of the liquor-shop. A certain man who could read the signs on a man's limbs saw him asleep on a rubbish heap and came to this conclusion: 'This man will be a protection to the people; he ought to be looked after.' So he had him bathed with powdered earth, had him clothed in a pair of thick robes, had him again bathed in scented water, had him dressed in a suit of fine clothes, made him ascend his palace, fed him with delicious food, gave him to the care of his servants, saying: 'Tend him,' and went away. Then they brought him to bed, and, in order to prevent his going to the liquor-shop, four strong men stood pressing his hands and feet: one of the servants shampooed his feet, a second took a fan and fanned him, a third sat playing the lute and singing. By getting to bed fatigue left him and he slept awhile. On waking he was unable to bear the pressure on his hands and feet, and threatened them, saying, 'Who presses my hands and feet? Go away!' They went away at the first word. Then again he slept awhile, and on waking, being unable to bear the shampooing of his feet, said: 'Who shampoos my feet? Go away!' The man went away at the first word. Then again he slept awhile, and on waking, being unable to bear the wind of the fan, he said: 'Who is this? Go away!' The man went away at the first word. Again he slept awhile, and on waking, being as unable to bear the sound of music as if it were a dart in his ear, threatened the musician, who also went away at the first word. [181] Then in due course the nuisance of fatigue, pressing, shampooing, fanning, and music being removed, he slept soundly, rose and went into the presence of the king. And the king gave him high authority. He became a helper of the people.

In this simile, the minister's son who comes to ruin by drink represents a householder of the clansmen who has in many ways come to loss and ruin. The reader of signs on the limbs represents the Tathāgata. The conclusion that this man will be a helper of the people, and that he is worthy of attendance, represents the resolution of the Tathāgata that such and such an one will be a helper of the people, and that he is worthy of ordination. The cleansing of the minister's son by powdered earth is the clansman's attainment of ordination. The former's being wrapped in thick robes is the latter's putting on the dress of the ten moral precepts; again, as the bath of the former in perfumed water, so is the latter's bath in the perfumed water of the Pātimokkha self-restraint, etc.; as the former's dressing in a suit of fine clothes is the latter's dressing in the fine clothes of the fulfilment of the purity of the said precepts. Again, as the ascending into the palace by the former dressed in fine clothes, so is the ascending into the palace of concentration and culture by the latter dressed in the fine cloth of the purity of virtue. Then the partaking of delicious food by the one is as the partaking of the deathlessness of such states as mindfulness and comprehension, which renders service to concentration. Again, as the putting to bed of the one by the attendants after his meal, so is the putting of the other to the 'access'-Jhāna by initial application of mind, etc. Again, as the group of four men who pressed the hands and feet of the minister's son in order to prevent his going to the liquor-shop, so is the emancipated initial application of mind which presses the mind on the object to prevent its going in the direction of sensuous perceptions. The shampooer of the one represents the sustained application of the other, causing the repeated contemplation of the object by the mind. As he who produces a breeze by fanning, so is rapture bringing coolness to the mind. As the musician gratifying the ear, so is joy gratifying the mind. As the former's going off to sleep in bed for awhile getting rid of fatigue, so is the latter's approach to the First Jhāna getting rid of the fatigue of the hindrances through dependence upon 'access'-jhāna. Then, as to the former's inability to bear the pressure on his hands

and feet on his waking from sleep, his threatening the men, and his subsequent sleep awhile after their departure, [182] so is the seeing defect in initial application of mind through inability to bear its pressing on the mind, when he rises from the First Jhāna, and his subsequent approach to the Second Jhāna, initial application being removed, and with only sustained application. The threatening the shampooers of feet, etc., one by one, through inability to bear the shampooing, as said in due course above at his waking from repeated sleep, and his going off to sleep awhile at their departure should be regarded as the other's seeing defect in sustained application of mind, etc., one by one, through inability to bear them with their defects already mentioned on his rising repeatedly from the Second Jhāna, etc., and his repeated approach, these faults being removed to the Third Jhāna without initial and sustained application, the Fourth Jhāna free from rapture and the Fifth Jhāna where joy has been put away. As the rising from sleep, going to the king's presence and attaining to authority should be understood the attainment of Arahantship by the clansman who has risen from the Fifth Jhāna and followed the Path of Insight. And as the attaining to power by the minister's son and his being a helper to many a man should be understood the attaining to Arahantship by the clansman, and his being a helper to many. For all this it is that he is called the incomparable field of merit.¹

End of the Fivefold System.

CHAPTER VI

THE FOURFOLD PROGRESS

By so much has the double classification, called the Ninefold Scheme, comprising the fourfold and fivefold systems, been set forth. But in its contents this classification should be

¹ *Samyutta* i. 220, etc. (*Kindred Sayings* 282).

known as the Fivefold Jhāna, the fourfold system being included in the fivefold system.

Now because this jhāna is accomplished also with a certain rate of progress, therefore, in order to show the classification of progress, the text again begins with 'which are the states that are moral?'¹

Herein, when this jhāna has a painful progress, we get the clause 'progress being painful'; when there is sluggish intuition, we get 'intuition being sluggish.' Thus there are three names to this jhāna, to wit: 'painful progress,' 'sluggish intuition,' and 'earth-device.' And the same method is observed in 'painful progress, quick intuition.'²

Herein, from the first resolve till the access of the particular jhāna arises, the jhāna-development which occurs is called progress. And the insight which occurs from the access till the ecstasy is called intuition.³ And this progress is painful to some. The meaning is that, [183] from the abundant production of such opposing states as the Hindrances, it is difficult, not pleasant to carry on. To some, from there being no such opposition, it is easy.

To some, again, intuition is sluggish, weak and of slow occurrence; to others it is quick, strong and of swift occurrence. Hence he who from the beginning, in discarding his lower nature, does so with fatigue, painfully, by means of external aid, of instigation, to him progress is painful. And he who, having discarded the lower nature, abiding round about the ecstasy, takes long to attain to the manifestation of the jhāna-factors, is of sluggish intuition. He who quickly attains to the manifestation of the jhāna-factor is of quick intuition. He who in discarding the lower nature does so with ease, without fatigue, is one to whom progress is easy.

Details concerning what is fitting and is not fitting, preliminary works such as cutting off the impediments, skilfulness in ecstasy, etc., have been explained⁴ in the exposition of mental

¹ *Dhs.* § 176.

² *Ib.* § 177.

³ *Abhiññā*, more lit. superknowledge. —*Ed.*

⁴ *Vis. Mag.* p. 90 f.

culture in the *Visuddhi Magga*. Of them, he who pursues what is not fitting is of painful progress and sluggish intuition. He who pursues what is fitting is of easy progress and quick intuition. And he who in the preliminary stage to access pursues what is not fitting, and in the subsequent stage to access pursues what is fitting, or who in the preliminary stage pursues what is fitting, and in the subsequent stage pursues what is not fitting, is of mixed progress and intuition. Further, the progress of one who, without accomplishing the preliminary work of cutting off the impediments, applies himself to culture is painful. The reverse is easy progress. Again, the intuition of one who does not perfect skilfulness in ecstasy is sluggish; and it is quick in one who perfects skilfulness in ecstasy.

Moreover, the classification according to craving and ignorance, and the chief reason of calm and insight should be understood. To expand: To one overcome by craving the progress is painful; to one not overcome by craving it is easy. And to one overcome by ignorance the intuition is sluggish; to one not so overcome it is quick. And he who has no past conditions for calm makes painful progress; one who has such makes easy progress. And one who has no past conditions for insight is of sluggish intuition; one who has such is of quick intuition.


Classification by virtue of our lower nature and controlling faculties should also be understood. To expand: To one whose nature is acutely corrupt and whose controlling faculty is soft, progress is painful and intuition sluggish. But to one of keen controlling faculty, intuition is quick. To one with a mild lower nature and soft controlling faculty, progress is easy and intuition sluggish. But to one of keen controlling faculty intuition is quick. Thus in progress and intuition the person who attains to *jhāna* [184] by means of painful progress and sluggish intuition, that *jhāna* is said to be of painful progress and sluggish intuition. In the remaining *Jhānas* also the same method is to be understood. In these progress should be understood as [lying] in the arrest either of that mindfulness of which it is said thus: 'The mindfulness

corresponding to that [of the first Jhānas]¹ is firmly established, understanding partakes of firmness'; or of the desire for the various Jhānas. The intuition in abiding round about the ecstasy of one who has attained to the access of these Jhānas is also to be understood [as here involved].

And the progress and the intuition are just according to how they come.² In other words, the Second Jhāna which arises following the attainment of a First Jhāna, where progress is painful and intuition sluggish, is even like the First Jhāna (its condition). And the same with the Third and Fourth Jhānas.

As in the fourfold method, so in the fivefold method the progress should be understood as of four kinds. Thus we get in all nine groups of four combinations with respect to progress. In these, according to the text, there are thirty-six classes of consciousness. Actually, however, from the inclusion of the fourfold method in the fivefold method, there are only twenty classes of consciousness.

End of the fourfold Progress.



CHAPTER VII

THE FOUR OBJECTS OF THOUGHT

Now because this Jhāna is fourfold by object-classification, as well as by progress-classification, therefore, to show the former classification, we have again the beginning: 'which are the states that are moral?'³

In this clause:—'limited and with a limited object of

¹ Tadanudhammatā=false mindfulness as an aggregate (khandha) associated with craving which lusts after the various Jhānas. Or that mindfulness which bears the various Jhānas and which is not free from lusting after them.—*Tikā*.

² I.e., the progress of the Second and other Jhānas depends sometimes, but not always, on the attainment of the First Jhāna.—*Tikā*.

³ *Dhs.* § 181.

thought'—'limited' refers to that Jhāna which has not been practised and is not able to become a cause of the next higher Jhāna. Again, that Jhāna which arises in respect of an object of the size of a small sieve, or the cover of a cooking-pot, and which has a small object, is said to be 'with a limited object of thought.'

That Jhāna [on the other hand] which has been practised and well developed, and is able to become the cause of the next higher Jhāna, is called 'immeasurable.'¹ That Jhāna which arises in respect of an extensive object and which has an immeasurable object due to its growth in size is said to be 'with an immeasurable object of thought.' And from the combination of the characteristics already mentioned the combined method should be understood. Thus in respect of objects also the four ninefold methods have been discussed. And the classes of consciousness here are the same in number as in the preceding fourfold progress.

End of the fourfold Object of Thought.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SIXTEENFOLD COMBINATION

Now in order to show the sixteenfold method of combined object and progress [185] we have again in the beginning:— 'which are the states that are moral?'² Therein the jhāna spoken of in the first system is low for four reasons: painfulness of progress, sluggishness of intuition, limitedness, limitedness of object. The jhāna spoken of in the sixteenth method is exalted for four reasons: ease of progress, quickness of intuition, immeasurableness, immeasurableness of object. In the remaining fourteen methods the lowness and exaltedness should be known for one, two and three reasons.

¹ *Dha.* § 182.

² *Ib.* § 186.

CHAPTER IX

DISCOURSE ON THE DEVICES (OR ARTIFICES,
KASINĀ)

BUT why was this method taught? Because it led to the production of *jhāna*. To expand: the supreme Buddha, in connection with the 'earth-device,' taught schematized¹ *jhāna* by the fourfold and the fivefold methods; likewise schematized progress and object. Of the two *jhāna*-series also, to those spirits who were able to understand schematized *jhāna* by the earth-device as it is taught by the fourfold method, this fourfold method was taught in a fitting manner. To those spirits who were able to understand it as it was taught by the fivefold method, the fivefold method was taught in a fitting manner. To those spirits who were able to understand it as it is taught by the fourfold method, with schematized progress and object, the fourfold method in bare progress and bare object was taught in a fitting manner. To those spirits who were able to understand it as it was taught by the fivefold method, the fivefold method was taught in a fitting manner. Thus the teaching has been taught above with reference to people's [various] inclinations.

And the Supreme Buddha, who was capable of adorning the teaching, had divided the four branches of analytical knowledge, and had a clear knowledge of the ten 'strengths,' the four grounds of confidence, etc., was able, owing to his having well penetrated the irreversible functions and characteristics² of states, and his skill in concepts of things, to fix the teaching by any method whatever. Therefore, by means of his proficiency in elaborating the teaching, he made a discourse on the bare fourfold method in connection with the 'earth-artifice.' And because those persons who bring up *jhāna* cannot do so without object and progress, therefore, because it is certain to produce *jhāna*, this sixteenfold method was set forth.

¹ *Suddhika*-, lit. pur-ish. Cf. *Points of Controversy*, 14, n. 2.

² Or, the characteristics known in their own irreversible nature.—*Yojanā*.

So far the bare set of nine, the four progress sets of nine, the four object-sets of nine, these sixteen sets of nine, in all, twenty-five sets of nine, have been set forth. In each set of nine are two methods, namely, the fourfold and the fivefold methods. Thus there are fifty methods. In the text are two hundred and twenty-five kinds of jhāna-consciousness: one hundred in the twenty-five fourfold methods, [186] one hundred and twenty-five in the fivefold methods. But from the fourfold method being included in the fivefold method, there are only one hundred and twenty-five modes of consciousness. And of these two hundred and twenty-five modes of consciousness which are in the text, in the exposition of each are three main sections beginning with the determination of states. But they have been abridged after the schematized method in each exposition had been shown.

End of the Earth-device.

CHAPTER X THE OTHER DEVICES¹

Now inasmuch as these Jhānas arise also through the water-device, etc., in order to show these devices we have again as opening question, 'Which are the states that are moral?'² In them the textual method, elucidation of meaning, classes of consciousness and abridgment of sections are all to be understood as given under the earth-device. But the whole of this method of culture, beginning with the preamble of the device, has been set forth in the *Visuddhi Magga*.³

In the *Mahāsakuludāyi-Sutta*⁴ ten devices are mentioned. Of them, the 'consciousness'-device is the same as the sublime consciousness produced with respect to space, and as the attainment of the sphere of infinite consciousness produced after the preamble of the sublime consciousness. Thus it follows the

¹ Or artifices (*kaṣiṇa*)—namely, for inducing jhāna.

² *Dhs.* § 203.

³ *Chs.* iv., v.

⁴ *M.* ii. 14.

teaching on the immaterial in all its aspects. Hence it is not mentioned in this place. And the 'space'-device is the same as the space obtained by separating the device, as the aggregate produced by making that space the object, as that separated space which ought to be taken as the mark in any hole in a wall, etc., and as the Fourth and Fifth Jhānas produced by making that separated space the object.

Of these two, the first method (of space separated from the device and the aggregate) follows the teaching on the immaterial; the last method (including the remainder) follows the teaching on the Rūpa realm. Thus, owing to its mixed nature, it has not been mentioned in the teaching on the material realm. The jhāna produced in the separated space, however, is the path to the attainment of the Rūpa planes. Hence it should be taken into account. But in it only the Fourth and Fifth Jhānas arise, but not the Immaterial Jhāna. Why? Because the separation of the device is not obtained. For though it is repeatedly separated, it remains just space, and thus in it the separation of the device is not obtained.¹ Therefore the jhāna which arises from it is conducive to a happy abode under present conditions; is a basis of super-knowledge, of insight, but not of cessation. But here graduated cessation is not obtained as far as the Fifth Jhāna; [187] on the contrary, it is a basis of the round of births. And as this Jhāna (of separated space) is the basis of super-knowledge, so also are the Jhānas arising in the previous device. But in these Jhānas their distinction lies in their being bases of cessation. All that remains to be said on the space-device has been said in the *Visuddhi Magga*.²

By the aspirant who wishes for the potency of transformation, such as 'being one yet many',³ and producing the eight attainments in the previous eight devices, the mind should be tamed in these fourteen ways: (1) in the way of right succession of the devices; (2) in the reverse order of the devices; (3) in the way of right succession and the reverse order of the devices; (4) in the way of right succession of the Jhānas;

¹ Reading *naṭṭabbhati*.

² Ch. v.

³ *Dialogues* i. 88.

(5) in the reverse order of the Jhānas; (6) in the way of right succession and the reverse order of the Jhānas; (7) by passing over Jhānas; (8) by passing over devices; (9) by passing over Jhānas and devices; (10) by change of factors; (11) change of objects; (12) change of factors and objects; (13) specification of factors; (14) specification of objects. The detailed discourse is given in the *Visuddhi Magga*.¹

It is impossible that the aspirant as a beginner, without such a previously developed culture, taming his mind in the fourteen ways, should fulfil by any means the potency of transformation. For the preamble of the device is burdensome to the beginner; one in a hundred, a thousand, might be able to perform it. To him who has performed the preamble of the device the production of the mark is burdensome; one in a hundred, a thousand, might be able to produce it. When the mark has been produced, the attainment of ecstasy after increasing the mark is burdensome; one in a hundred, a thousand, might be able to attain it. To one who has attained ecstasy the taming of the mind in the fourteen ways is burdensome; one in a hundred, a thousand, might be able to tame it. To one who has tamed the mind in the fourteen ways, the potency of transformation is burdensome; one in a hundred, a thousand, might be able to acquire it. To one who has attained the potency of transformation, quickness of intuition* is burdensome; one in a hundred, a thousand, might be able to get it, like the Elder Rakkhita of eight years' full ordination among the thirty thousand elders of supernormal potency, who had come to minister to the sick Elder Mahārohanagutta at the Therambatthala.² The story has been told in the *Visuddhi Magga*.

End of the Discourse on the Devices.

¹ Ch. xiii. < Iddhividhā-niddeso. >

* *Khippanisanti*.

² I.e., the mango tree where Mahinda first alighted in Ceylon.—*Yojanā*. See *Mahāvamsa*, xxxvi. 106. Name of one of the peaks of the Missaka mountain in Ceylon *Sāmantapāsādikā*. J.P.T.S., 1888, 7.

CHAPTER XI

DISCOURSE ON THE POSITIONS OF MASTERY

HAVING shown thus the moral consciousness of the realm of attenuated matter in the eight devices, because there occurs more of the same among those eight devices which are called the Position of Mastery,¹ [188] a system which is dissimilar in culture, though similar in object, it is here set forth once more with the beginning, 'Which are the states that are moral?'²

Therein 'not perceiving material quality in himself' means devoid of the perception of the preamble in his own bodily frame, either from not getting it, or from not wishing it.

'Sees material qualities external to himself' means, from having performed the preamble externally in the eight devices, he sees with jhāna-eyes the external objects of these eight devices by virtue of the preamble and the ecstasy.

'Limited' means not growing.

In 'having mastered them': just as a man of vigorous digestion getting a spoonful of food makes a lump of it and swallows it, saying, 'Call that eating anything?' so a person of transcendent and clear knowledge masters the device-objects and attains jhāna, saying, 'What is there to attain in this limited object? This is not burdensome to me.' The meaning is that he produces ecstasy together with the production of the image of the mark in this limited object.

And by 'I know, I see,' his former correct ideas are stated. But in the Four Nikāya Commentaries³ it is said that by this sentence his correct ideas are meant, and that they are indeed the correct ideas of him who has arisen from, and is not still within, the attainment.

'Immeasurable'⁴ means growing in size. In 'having mastered,' just as a great eater getting a plate of food will

¹ Abhibhāyatana is jhāna with an overpowering (abhibhū) preamble, or knowledge as cause (āyatana), or jhāna with an abode or locus (āyatana) called the object to be overpowered (abhibhavitabbam Abhibhāyatana).—*Tikā*.

² *Dhs.* § 204.

³ *Agam'att'hekathesu*.

⁴ *Dhs.* § 212.

not look at it because of his large appetite, saying, 'Let another come ! let another come ! what will this one plate do for me ?' so a person of transcending and clear knowledge masters those immeasurable objects and attains jhāna, saying, 'What is there to attain in this immeasurable object ? This is not burdensome to me in making one-pointedness of mind.' The meaning is that he produces ecstasy together with the production of the image of the mark in the immeasurable object.

'Limited, limited object; immeasurable, limited object': here in this object-couplet of the first and second positions of mastery,¹ because the word 'limited' is mentioned, the immeasurableness of object has not been included. In the second method of the following third and fourth positions of mastery,² because the word 'immeasurable' is mentioned, the limitedness of object has not been included. But in the Great Commentary it is said that, in this place, the objects have been taken by twos, not by fours. [189] And why ? Because if the four objects were taken, the teaching would be sixteenfold. And the sixteenfold teaching has already been uttered at length by the Teacher, as though he was scattering sesamum seeds on a mat. It is his wish to make an eightfold discourse in this place. Hence the objects have been taken by twos.

'Beautiful or ugly'³ means pure or impure colours. Pure objects of blue-green, etc., indeed, are called beautiful, and impure objects of blue-green, etc., are called ugly. Thus it is here intended. But it is said in the Nikāya Commentaries that these positions of mastery have been shown as beautiful or ugly by way of limited and immeasurable. But in these four devices the limited comes by virtue of the frequency of initial application of mind, the immeasurable by virtue of the frequency of delusion, the beautiful by virtue of the frequency of hate, the ugly by virtue of the frequency of lust. For to these persons walking in initial application,⁴ etc., these devices, limited, etc., are suitable. And this suitable

¹ *Dhs.* §§ 204-224.

² *Ib.* §§ 225-245.

³ *Ib.* § 244.

⁴ P.T.S. ed. omits part of this sentence.—*Tr.*

bility has been declared at length in the exposition of conduct in the *Visuddhi Magga*.¹

But why, without saying 'a man perceiving material quality in himself sees external forms limited,' etc., is it said here in the four positions of mastery, 'without perceiving material quality in himself'? Because his own body is not to be mastered. For there, as well as here, it is only external objects that are to be mastered; hence they should always be mentioned. Thus in both places they have been declared. And the expression: 'without perceiving material quality in himself,' is merely an embellishment of the discourse by the Teacher. This, so far, is an exposition of the new terms in the four positions of mastery.

Moreover, schematized method and classification by progress are to be understood in each position of mastery in the same way as was said in connection with the earth-device, except that here the fourfold object is the object-couplet; and the sixteenfold method is the eightfold. The rest is the same. Thus here in each position of mastery are fifteen sets of nine: one scheme of nine, four progress-sets of nine, two object-sets of nine, eight sets of nine in the combination of object and progress. Thus in the four positions of mastery the (15 × 4) full sixty sets of nine should be understood.

[190] In the fifth and other positions of mastery the term 'blue-green'² has been used as summarizing all such devices. The term 'indigo colours' is said in speaking of blue-green as colour. The term 'indigo appearances' is said by way of blue-green in appearance. Objects of opaque blue-green are seen without the faintest sign of a flaw, and unbroken in colour—so it is stated. 'Shimmering indigo' is said with reference to their radiance, meaning irradiating, associated with, indigo. It shows the special purity of colour of these four 'positions of mastery'.³

In 'yellow,' etc., also the meaning is to be understood in the same way. And one taking up the blue-green device here seizes the mark (of upholding and its image) in a blue

¹ P. 101 f: *Cariyā-niddesa*.

² *Dhs.* §§ 246 f.

³ P.T.S. ed. omits half the sentence.—*Tr.*

(-green) flower, or cloth, or colour-element. The work of the device, the preamble, the arrangement of the ecstasy—all has been discussed at length in the *Visuddhi Magga*.

And as in the earth device, so here twenty-five sets of nine should be understood in each position of mastery,

End of the Discourse on the Positions of Mastery.

CHAPTER XII

DISCOURSE ON THE DELIVERANCES

Now because this moral consciousness of the realm of attenuated matter arises, not merely as positions of mastery, by mastering the positions called objects, but also as deliverance, therefore, in showing that method, again the beginning has been made with 'Which are the states that are moral?'¹

Now in what sense should 'deliverance' be understood? In the sense of *adhimuccana*.² And what does this mean? *Adhimuccana* means being 'well freed' from opposing states, or it means sustained attention by way of taking delight in the object. It is said to be the occurrence in the object without oppression and without hesitation, like the sleep of a child on the hip of the father with its limbs, big and small, quite free. It is to show the moral consciousness of the realm of attenuated matter with such characteristics, and as having attained to deliverance, that this method has been begun.

Therein 'one having material qualities' (*rūpī*) refers to the possession of material quality (*rūpaṇi*), which means the *rūpañhāna*, produced with reference to the hairs, etc., of one's own body. For in doing the preamble of blue-green as to one's own body, one does it with reference to the hair, or the bile, or the pupil of the eye. In doing the preamble of yellow, it is done with reference to the fat, the skin, [191] or the yellow spot of the eyes. In doing the preamble of red, it is done

¹ *Dhs.* § 248.

² Pronounce *adhimuc'chānā* (*u* as in 'put').—*Ed.*

with reference to the flesh, the blood, the tongue, the palms of the hands and feet, or the red of the eyes. In doing the preamble of white, it is done with reference to the bones, the teeth, the nails, or the white of the eye. Thus it is with reference to a person who has done the preamble, and is possessed of the jhāna induced, that this has been said.

'Sees visible objects' means he sees with jhāna-vision the external device-objects, blue-green, etc., also. By this sentence the jhāna-attainment is shown with reference to the devices of both the internal and the external bases.

'Unaware of his own material qualities.'¹ The meaning is to be without the jhāna produced with reference to one's own hairs, etc. By this phrase is shown the state of the jhāna obtained through external [objects] by performing the preamble externally.

By the phrase 'How beautiful!'² the Jhānas are shown in colour-devices, such as blue-green, of thorough purity. In such jhāna it is true that there is no discernment of the beautiful within (*anto*) the ecstasy. Nevertheless, one who, maintaining as object of his thought a thoroughly pure and beautiful device, may abide in the attainment of First Jhāna, with the thought, 'How beautiful!' and of the other Jhānas likewise. Such an one is indicated in the teaching.

Now in the *Paṭisambhidā-magga* [the question is asked]:³—'By the mere laying to heart that "it is beautiful!" how is there deliverance?'⁴ Here in this case the bhikkhu continues to diffuse one quarter of a [given] region with thoughts of love. . . . Owing to this culture in love, persons become free from aversion. Again, he continues to diffuse one quarter of a [given] region with thoughts of pity, of sympathy . . . of indifference. Owing to this culture in . . . indifference, persons become free from aversion. Thus he lays to heart that it is beautiful. And for this reason there is deliverance.'

But here, because it is dealt with further on in the text of the Divine States,⁵ that method has been rejected, and

¹ *Dhs.* § 249.

² *Ib.* § 250.

³ *Pts.* ii. 39.

⁴ P.T.S.: *adhimatto*; *v.l.* *adhimokkho*, for *adhimutto*.

⁵ *Dhs.* § 251.

only the æsthetic deliverance by way of the colours, very blue-green, very yellow, very red, very white, pure blue-green, pure yellow, pure red and pure white, has been allowed. Thus the jhāna of the realm of attenuated matter is said to be device, or position of mastery, or deliverance. For this jhāna is called 'device' in the sense of the entirety of the object, 'position of mastery' in the sense of mastering the object, 'deliverance' in the sense of bending towards or attending to the object, or of being set free from opposing states. [192] Of these, be it known that the teaching of the device was uttered as Abhidhamma, but the other two discourses on position of mastery and deliverance were uttered as Suttanta teaching (*Dīgha* ii, 110 f.).

This, so far, is the exposition of the new terms. Moreover, taking twenty-five in each deliverance, as in the Earth-device, seventy-five sets of nine should be understood.

End of the Discourse on the Deliverances.

CHAPTER XIII

THE DIVINE STATES

Now to show the moral consciousness of the realm of attenuated matter occurring by way of the Divine States of love, etc., again the beginning is made with 'What are the states that are moral?'¹

Therein 'accompanied by love' means possessed of love. And the same with the following 'accompanied by pity,' etc. Now by whatever arrangement one practises and lives in the attainment of the Jhānas accompanied by love, etc., all that arrangement of culture has been explained at length in the *Visuddhi Magga*.² The meaning of the remaining text should be understood by the method given in the earth-device. It is only in the earth-device that there are twenty-five sets of nine. Here in the first three of the Divine States

¹ *Dhs.* § 251. 'Divine' = brahma-.

² Chapter IX.

are twenty-five sets of seven by virtue of threefold and fourfold jhāna. In hedonic indifference by virtue of fourfold jhāna there is a single set of twenty-five. In pity and sympathy, these two together with the four, to wit, will and the rest, are obtained as 'or whatever's' (p. 174). And here painfulness of progress, etc., should be understood by discarding ill-will from love, cruelty from pity, dislike from sympathy, lust and hatred from hedonic indifference.

Whereas the limitedness of object is by having not many beings as object, immeasurableness is by having many beings as object. This is the distinction. The remainder is the same as in the earth-device.

Now that these four divine (*brahma*-) states as taught by the Best of Brahmas [the Buddha] have been understood by way of the Text, the following particular comments concerning them should be known. Thus: of love, pity, sympathy, equanimity, 'love' means 'one loves.'¹ It signifies 'one wishes well.' Or love is so called because it goes on concerning a loved one (*mettā*, *mitte*), or because of the state of being a loved one.

That which makes² the heart of the good quiver at the pain of others is pity. Or it crushes,³ destroys the pain of others, thus it is [193] pity. Or it is pity because it is scattered over⁴ the afflicted, stretched out over them by diffusion.

(Thirdly) sympathetic joy (*muditā*) means those endowed therewith, or with the co-existent states, rejoice, or one's self rejoices, or just 'rejoicing.' (Fourthly) 'may they be without enmity!'—thus, by the removal of such ill-will, one contemplates with disinterestedness by attaining to a condition of centrality—this is hedonic indifference.

As to characteristic marks, etc., first among them, love has the characteristic of being a procedure of modes of beneficence;

¹ *Mettā* (love) is thus derived from $\sqrt{mīd}$ —to love. It is implied that it is a *dharmma* that loves, and not a person; therefore the view of the heresy of the self is inhibited.—*Visuddhi Magga Tīkā*.

² I.e., *karuṇā* (pity) is derived from \sqrt{kar} —to make.—*Tr.*

³ I.e., the derivation is from \sqrt{ki} —to destroy, kill.—*Tr.*

⁴ The derivation is from \sqrt{kir} —to scatter.—*Tr.*

the function or property of bringing good; the manifestation or effect of taking hatred away; the proximate cause of seeing the lovable-ness of beings. Its consummation is the quieting of ill-will; its failure is the production of lust. *Pity* has the characteristic of evolving the mode of removing pain; the property of not being able to bear [seeing] others suffer; the manifestation of kindness; the proximate cause of seeing the need of those overcome by pain. Its consummation is the quieting of cruelty; its failure is the production of sorrow. *Sympathy* has the characteristic of gladness; its property is the absence of envying; its manifestation is the destruction of disaffection; its proximate cause is seeing the prosperous state of other beings. Its consummation is the quieting of dislike; its failure is the production of derision. *Equanimity* has the characteristic of evolving the mode of centrality as regards beings; its function is appreciation of others; its manifestation is quieting both aversion and sycophancy; its proximate cause is seeing the heritage of the occurring kamma as 'Beings are the property of their kamma. By its influence they will attain to pleasure, or be free from pain, or not fall from the prosperity already acquired.'¹ Its consummation is the quieting of aversion and of sycophancy; its failure is the production of a profane and unintelligent indifference.²

These four Divine States have the bliss of insight and the attainment of a happy existence as their common result. Their several results are the destruction of ill-will, etc. Love, for instance, has the destruction of ill-will as result. The others have the destruction of cruelty, of dislike, and of lust as respective results. As it has been said: 'Friends, that mental emancipation called love is the escape from ill-will . . . that mental emancipation called pity is the escape from cruelty. . . that mental emancipation called sympathetic joy is the escape from dislike . . . that mental emancipation called equanimity is the escape from lust.'³

¹ Cf. *Vis.-Magga*, ch. ix.

² I.e., absence of knowledge (*aññāṇa*), may also be taken to be devoid of joy and grief.—*Mūlaṭṭhā*. Cf. another pseudo-equanimity in *Majjhima* i. 364.—*Ed.*

³ *Aṅguttara* iii. 291.

Each of them has two enemies, near and distant. To expand: of the Divine State of love the near enemy is lust, because, like love, it sees merits. It is like a foe lurking near a man. Quickly it finds access. Hence love should be well protected from lust. Ill-will is its distant enemy. From its dissimilarity in nature it is like a man's foe dwelling in a mountain fastness, etc. [194] Hence love should be cultivated secure from ill-will. It is impossible that one should cultivate love and at the same time get angry.

As to pity, one who views visible objects, desirable, lovable, endearing, delightful, associated with craving, objects which have not been obtained *as* not obtained, or who remembers what has been obtained formerly as now past, ceased, changed, is filled with the sorrow called worldly (or profane).¹ This, because it also contemplates adversity, is the near enemy of the Divine State of pity. From its dissimilarity in nature cruelty is the distant enemy. Hence pity should be cultivated secure from cruelty. It is impossible that one should cultivate pity and at the same time strike with the hand, etc.

As to sympathy, one who views visible objects, desirable, etc., is filled with the joy called worldly. This, because it also contemplates prosperity, is the near enemy of the Divine State of sympathy. From its dissimilarity in nature dislike is its distant enemy. Hence sympathy should be cultivated secure from it. It is impossible that one should be sympathetic and at the same time be discontented with secluded monasteries or with the higher moral states.²

The fool who has seen a visible object and who is deluded, an average man who has not overcome the limits of his lower nature and the result of former births, who does not see the evils of all conditioned things, is unacquainted with the teaching—this average man is filled with such indifference as is not able to transcend the visible object. Hence it is called worldly (or profane), and is mere delusion. Owing to its similarity in not considering faults and merits, it is the near enemy of

¹ *Gehasita* is lit. domestic, of the 'house-life.'—*Ed.* *Kāma*, being the abode of craving, is called *geha*.—*Pyī*. Cf. *Milinda* i. 71.

² *Adhikusaladhammesu*. Omitted in P.T.S. ed.

the Divine State of equanimity. From their dissimilarity in nature, both lust and aversion are its distant enemies. Hence equanimity should be cultivated secure from them. It is impossible that one should cultivate equanimity, and at the same time be enamoured with, or hurt another.

Of all of these four Divine States, will, *i.e.*, the will-to-do, is the beginning; the discarding of the Hindrances is the middle; ecstasy is the end. [195] One being or many beings as concepts are the objects of those states. There is development of the object on attaining to the 'access' or the 'ecstasy.' This is the order of the development:--As a good cultivator marks off the portion to be ploughed, and then ploughs it, so, marking off one dwelling, one should develop love towards the beings therein on this wise: 'May the beings in this dwelling be free from enmity!'

Having made the mind soft and workable as to one dwelling, two dwellings should be marked off, then in order three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten dwellings, a highway, half a village, the whole village, a district, a kingdom, one quarter of the globe--thus a world-system and more should be marked off, and love should be developed as to the beings in them. Likewise pity, and the rest. This herein is the order in the development of the object.

And just as concentration on the immaterial may be considered as the result of the devices, concentration on the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception as the result of concentration on the immaterial, the attainment of fruition as the result of insight, the attainment of cessation as the result of calm and insight, so here equanimity is the result of the preceding three Divine States.

As without raising the pillars and hoisting the cross-beams and wall-plates it is not possible to place aloft the peak and the rafters, so without the Third Jhāna obtainable in the first [three Divine States] it is not possible to develop the fourth state, even though that state does not arise in dependence on the Third Jhāna produced in the devices, owing to dissimilarity of the objects.

[Herein one might ponder in this wise:--]' Why are love,

pity, sympathy and indifference called the Divine States? why are there four? what is their order? And why in the *Vibhaṅga* are they called the "Immeasurables"?¹

First, they are to be understood as divine in the sense of 'best' (or highest—*setṭha*), and by their faultless nature. For these states are best as constituting a superlative mode of conduct towards others. And as Brahmā divinities live with faultless thoughts, so aspirants associated with these four states live like the Brahmās. Thus because of the meaning of 'divine' and of their faultless nature, they are called the Divine States.

*There are Four Powers leading to Purity ;
These are the Modes that start with Amity.
Limit unto their onward sweep is none.
By range as the Immeas'urables they're known.*²

Namely, inasmuch as love is the way to purity for him who abounds in ill-will, as pity is the way if he abound in cruelty, sympathy if he abound in repulsion, equanimity if he abound in lust; again, because the fourfold work of the mind in relation to others is the conveyance of good, the removal of harm, [196] gladness over their success, and absence of preoccupation; and inasmuch as he who practises the Immeasurables should cultivate the four states towards all beings like a mother, who in midst of four sons, one a babe, one ailing, one adolescent, one managing his own affairs, desires for the babe growth, for the sick riddance of illness, for the adolescent persistence in the good things of adolescence, and is in no way anxious for the son who manages his own affairs, therefore is the order of the influences leading to Purity thus.

And because a person desirous of cultivating them should first practise them on beings by way of working good, and love has the characteristic of proceeding by way of working advantage; and because he then, pondering* on what he has seen or heard, of beings praying for welfare when overcome by

¹ *Vibhaṅga*, ch. xiii.

² *Visuddhi-magga*, ch. ix.

* *Sambhāvetvā*.

sufferings, should practise them by way of taking away suffering, and pity has the characteristic of proceeding by way of taking away suffering; next because he, seeing the prosperity of those beings who had prayed for welfare and the removal of suffering, should practise them by way of rejoicing at prosperity, and sympathy has the characteristic of profuse gladness; and lastly, because he should practise them by the mode of centrality called equanimity, owing to there being no work to be done, and equanimity having the characteristic of proceeding by the mode of centrality, therefore love has been mentioned first by way of working good, etc., then pity, sympathy, equanimity—thus the order should be understood.

And because all of them arise in an immeasurable field, therefore are they called the Immeasurables. For beings without limit constitute their field. 'Though it be but a single being, in such a portion should love, etc., be developed,' thus without making any limit they evolve by way of thoroughgoing diffusion. Hence it has been said that they are four by reason of the way to purity, etc.; their order is by reason of the modes of working good; and they are also called the Immeasurables as arising with respect to an immeasurable field of objects.

And of these having the characteristic of immeasurableness in their field of objects, the first three are of the Third and Fourth Jhānas.¹ Why? Because they are not dissociated from joy. But why should they not be dissociated from joy? Because of their being the escape of such qualities as ill-will, which spring from melancholy. The last Divine State is of the remaining (Fifth) Jhāna. Why? Because of association with neutral feeling. For the Divine State of equanimity which arises in the mode of centrality [197] does not arise without neutral feeling.

End of the Discourse on the Divine States.

¹ Fivefold system.

CHAPTER XIV

THE DISCOURSE ON THE FOUL

Now in order to show a class of moral consciousness of the realm of attenuated matter¹ certainly beneficial to beings who walk in lust and which proceeds by virtue of each of the Jhānas among [certain] various objects, once more we have the beginning 'which are the states that are moral?'²

Herein 'accompanied by the perception of a swollen thing,' 'swollen' is said of a corpse bloated by degrees from the time of the loss of life onwards, like a bather's inflated bag. Or, 'swollen thing' refers to its loathsomeness from its abominable state, and is a synonym for such a corpse. 'Discoloured thing' is a corpse of a predominating blue-green colour, mixed with white and red; or just a corpse of blue-green colour corrupted from its original state; or it is a corpse discoloured and loathsome from its abominable state. It is an equivalent term for a corpse of a red colour in the fleshy parts, white where matter gathers, and generally of a blue-green colour in blue-green parts, as though covered by a blue-green sheet. 'Festering thing' is a corpse with matter flowing in lacerated places; or it is a corpse loathsome from its abominable state and is festering. It is an equivalent term for such a corpse. 'Fissured thing' is a corpse split in two, or a corpse fissured and loathsome from its abominable state. It is an equivalent term for a corpse cut in the middle. 'Mangled thing' is a corpse torn here and there in various ways by dogs and jackals, etc., or it is a corpse mangled and loathsome from its abominable state. It is an equivalent term for such a corpse. 'Dismembered thing' is a corpse of which the parts have been scattered, or it is just a dismembered corpse and loathsome from its abominable state. It is an equivalent term for a corpse dismembered here and there, in one place a hand, in another a leg, in a third place the head. 'Cut and dismembered thing' is a corpse cut in pieces and dismembered in the way just given, a name for a corpse cut by a knife

¹ Rūpāvacara,

² *Dhs.* § 263.

in the limbs, big and small, after the pattern of a crow's foot [198] and dismembered in the above sense. 'Bloody thing' is that which scatters, pours out blood, causing it to trickle here and there—an equivalent term for a corpse besmeared with trickling blood. 'Worm-foul' is worm-infested. It pours forth worms; hence a name for a corpse full of worms. 'Bone' refers to skeleton, or to its being loathsome from its abominable state. It is an equivalent term both for a group of bones linked like a chain, and for a single bone.

And these foul things are the names both of the marks (of upholding and image of the mark¹) arisen in dependence on them, and also of the Jhānas obtained with reference to the marks. Therein the perception arisen by way of ecstasy with reference to the mark of a swollen corpse is the 'perception of the swollen thing.' And 'accompanied by the perception of the swollen thing' is in the sense of association with such perception. So for the perception of the other nine.

Whatever arrangement for practice should be said here has been said in all respects in the *Visuddhi Magga*.² The remaining exposition of the text should be understood by the method given above. But, as in the Divine State of equanimity alone, by virtue of the Fourth Jhāna, there are twenty-five sets of one, so here by virtue of the First Jhāna in each foul thing there are twenty-five sets of one. And the Jhāna having as its object the mark produced in a limited part of the swollen corpse should be understood as having a limited object from its inability to develop the foul object; and that in respect of a large portion of the swollen corpse should be understood as having an infinite object. So for the remaining nine.

*Thus the 'Impurities' the Man of virtue pure,
By [Sakka] thousand-eyed extolled, of Tensfold Power,
Named as conditions of this Jhāna and of that.*³

Now that we know all the foul things according to the method of the text, this particular discourse on them should

¹ Cf. *Compendium* 54.

² Chapter vi.

³ *I.*, p. 193. Cf. *Dialogues*, S^{ta} xxi., esp. p. 320.

further be learnt. For he who has attained Jhāna, with reference to any one whatsoever of the ten 'foul things' becomes sober in behaviour, because, like a passionless saint, he has well discarded lust. 'And this being so, this classification of the "foul" has been declared, and is to be understood by virtue of the corpse developing its intrinsic nature,¹ and of the different kinds of lustful behaviour. To expand: a corpse which has arrived at the loathsome state may also reach the intrinsic nature of the swollen corpse or of any of the others; discoloured corpse, etc. [199] Thus the mark of upholding, "this is the loathsomeness of the swollen corpse; this is the loathsomeness of the discoloured corpse," etc., should be caught in whatever corpse he is able to catch it. Thus the tenfold classification of the Foul should be understood by virtue of the corpse developing its intrinsic nature.

'And of them, in particular, the swollen corpse, as making clear the decay of the form of the body, is suitable for one lusting after the form of the body. The discoloured corpse, as making clear the decay of the beauty of skin, is suitable for one lusting after the complexion of the body. The festering corpse, as making clear the stench connected with the sores of the body, is suitable for one lusting after the smell of the body produced by means of flowers, perfumes, etc. The fissured corpse, as making clear the existence of a hollow within, is suitable for one lusting after the solid state (of limbs) in the body. The mangled corpse, as making clear the decay in the perfection of the fulness of flesh, is suitable for one lusting after the fulness of flesh in such parts of the body as the breasts, etc. The dismembered corpse, as making clear the scattering of the limbs, big and small, is suitable for one lusting after their gracefulness. The cut and scattered corpse, as making clear the change that has come over the different joints, is suitable for one lusting after the perfection of the joints, of the body. The bloody corpse, as making clear the abominable state of

¹ *Vis. Mag.* 193 f. The *V. M. Tikā* says that the body, under insight, is regarded in its intrinsic nature like a disguised ogre seen in his true nature. Some read *sarīrasabhāva-vipatti-vasena*—'by virtue of the false manifestation of the intrinsic nature of the body.'—*Tr.*

being besmeared with blood, is suitable for one lusting after beauty produced by adornment. The worm-foul corpse, as making clear the state of the body in common with various kinds of worms, is suitable for one lusting after the idea that the body is his own. The skeleton, as making clear the abominable state of the bones of the body, is suitable for one lusting after the perfection of the teeth. Thus it should be understood that the classification of the Foul has been declared to be tenfold also by means of the different kinds of lustful behaviour.

'And because, in this tenfold classification of the Foul, just as in a river of swift current with flowing waters a boat is steady by means of the rudder, and cannot stop without the help of the rudder, so from the weakness of the object¹ the mind is collected by the strength of initial application of mind, without which it cannot be steady; therefore here is obtainable the First Jhāna (with initial application of mind), and not the Second and other Jhānas. Though there is abomination, yet because he has seen benefit in this foul object: "surely by such progress I shall be freed from old age and death," and because of the removal of the torments of the hindrances, rapturous joy arises in him, like the flower-rubbish remover [200] who feels joy over the rubbish heap in seeing benefit, and thinks: "Now I shall get much wages," and like the sick man at the alleviation of the misery of sickness when vomiting and purging.

'The foul thing, though tenfold, is one in characteristic, which is the impure, evil-smelling, disgusting and abominable state. Not only in the dead body does it appear with this characteristic, but, as in the case of the Elder Mahātissa, resident at Mount Cetiya, seeing the teeth of a laughing woman, and of the attendant novice of the Elder Saṅgharakkhita looking up at the king on an elephant's back, it may also appear in a living body. Indeed, the living body is as foul as the dead body. But in the former the characteristic of the foul, being covered by temporary adornments, does not appear.'


End of the Discourse on the Foul.

¹ The inability of the object to draw the concentration of the mind on itself owing to its abominable state is its weakness.—*Pyī*.

But is this all the ecstasy belonging to the [consciousness of the] realm of attenuated matter, beginning with the earth-device and ending in the perception of the skeleton? Or is there something more? Yes, there is. There is the respiration-Jhāna, and the culture of mindfulness regarding the body, which have not been spoken of here. Why not? The respiration-Jhāna is included in the air-device; the culture of mindfulness regarding the body arisen by virtue of the fourfold and fivefold Jhānas with reference to the hair, etc., is included in the colour-devices; the mindfulness regarding the body produced by virtue of the Jhānas attending to the abomination in the thirty-two parts of the body, and that of the Jhāna attending to the colours of the nine¹ sorts of corpses in the charnel field is included in the ten foul things. Thus all the ecstasies of [consciousness connected with] the realm of matter have been included attenuated here.

End of the Discourse on moral consciousness of the realm of attenuated matter.

¹ As, one-day-old, two-day-old, etc.—*Tr.*



PART VI—MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE IMMATERIAL WORLD

Now to show the moral consciousness of the immaterial realm, again the beginning runs:—‘ which are the states that are moral ?’¹

Here, in the phrase:— ‘ for the attainment of the immaterial abodes,’ ‘*arūpa*’ is the immaterial ‘abode’; and the term ‘immaterial uprising’ means rebirth in the immaterial abode. ‘He cultivates the path’ means he produces and develops the means, condition, cause. ‘Wholly’ means ‘in all respects’; or ‘of all, without remainder.’

[Beyond all] ‘perceptions of material qualities’² (*rūpa-saññānam*) means the aforesaid Jhānas [201] of the realm of attenuated matter and the registered objects (in the ‘devices’). Such Jhāna is symbolized by the designation ‘matter’ (or ‘material,’ *rūpa*). Such is the case in the foregoing phrases ‘aware of his bodily frame he sees material objects’;³ again, ‘externally he sees objects beautiful or ugly.’⁴ Hence in this passage ‘perception of material qualities,’ that is, perception with respect to material qualities is an equivalent term for such Jhāna of the realm of attenuated matter symbolized by the perception. That such Jhāna is called ‘matter-perceptioned’ (*rūpa-saññānam*) means that ‘matter’ (material quality) is a name for it, and should be understood as an equivalent term for the devices and the registered mental objects.

‘By having passed beyond,’ namely, through distaste for and cessation. What is this saying? It means he, having attained, abides in [the Jhāna of] the infinity of space conditioned by distaste and cessation, to wit, the distaste for

¹ *Dhs.* § 265.

² *B.P.E.*, ‘consciousness of form.’

³ *Ib.* § 248.

⁴ *Ib.* § 223.

and cessation in all respects of, all perceptions of material qualities, of those which are known as the fifteen perceptions of jhāna by virtue of moral, of resultant and of inoperative consciousness, and of those which are known as the eight perceptions of object by virtue of the earth-device etc. It is not possible to live in the attainment of that without wholly passing beyond the perception of matter. And on this point, because one lusting after the object cannot possibly transcend such perception, and because when the perceptions are transcended the object is transcended, therefore without speaking of the latter process the *Vibhaṅga* mentions only the transcending of the perception:—‘Herein, what is the perception of matter? To one who has reached the attainment of the realm of attenuated matter, or who is born in a material abode, or to one who lives in happiness under present conditions, there are perception, the perceiving, the state of having perceived. These are called perceptions of matter. There is the passing beyond, the surpassing, the transcending of these perceptions. Hence it has been said “by wholly passing beyond all perceptions of form.”’¹ And because these attainments are to be acquired by transcending ‘object,’ and not a single object as in the First Jhāna, etc., therefore this exposition of the meaning has been made also by way of transcending ‘object.’ नयने

‘By the dying out of the perception of impact’²:—the perception, that is, which is produced by the impact between eye, etc., as physical bases, and visible things, etc., as objects, is called the perception of impact. It is an equivalent term for the perceptions of visible things, etc. As he said:—‘The perceptions of visible object, of sound, smell, taste, tangible object—these are called the perceptions of impact.’³ The stated clause implies, by the dying out, putting away, not arising, not occurring of the whole ten impact-perceptions, of the five good results and five bad results. [202] Surely [it may be said] these are not obtained by one who has attained to the First and other Jhānas, since, at the time of attaining these, consciousness is not arising by way of the five doors.

¹ *Vibhaṅga* 261.² *Dhs.* § 265.³ *Vibhaṅga* 261.

Nevertheless, just as pleasure and pain are mentioned in the Fourth Jhāna and just as the theory of individuality, etc., is mentioned in the Third Path,¹ although they are removed at another stage, so these impact-perceptions are to be understood as mentioned here by way of praising this jhāna, so that people may strive for it. Or, although they are not obtained by one who has attained the [consciousness of] the realm of attenuated matter, it is not because they have been removed; for the culture of the jhāna of that realm is not conducive to distaste for matter; rather the occurrence of these impact-perceptions is in conjunction with matter. But this culture of 'the immaterial' is conducive to distaste for matter. Hence it is proper to speak of their removal here. It is proper not only to speak of them, but also to bear in mind that they have actually been removed. Verily, it has been said by the Blessed One that, because of the non-removal of these impact-perceptions prior to the jhāna of the immaterial, sound is a thorn to one attaining the First Jhāna.² But owing to their removal, here the imperturbability of the immaterial attainments and peacefulness of emancipation have been declared. And when Kālāma Ālāra entered on the attainment of 'the immaterial,' he did not see, nor did he hear the sound of five hundred carts passing close by him.³

'By not attending to perceptions of difference' means either 'to perceptions going on in a different field,' or 'to perceptions of differences' (or multiformity). This term 'perception of difference' is mentioned for two reasons:—The *Vibhaṅga* analyzes it as follows:—'What herein is perception of difference? The perception, perceiving, state of having perceived, in one who has not attained jhāna and who is endowed with the datum of mind, or with that of mental awareness—these are called perceptions of difference.'⁴ In other words, the perception of such an one, comprising

¹ The Path of 'the Never-Returner, for whom the five lower Fetters are done away with.'—*Points of Controversy*, 74. The 'theory of individuality' or soul was the first Fetter.

² *Points of Controversy*, 331, quoting *Anguttara* v. 133-35.

³ *Dialogues* ii. 141 f.

⁴ *Vibhaṅga*, p. 261 f.

the data of his mind and mental awareness, goes on in a field of diverse nature with reference to difference in sights, sounds and so on. In the next place, there are forty-four [classes of perceptions] which are mutually unlike, being diverse in their intrinsic nature. These are the eight classes of moral perceptions,¹ the twelve immoral, the eleven of moral results, the two of immoral results, and the eleven 'inoperative'—all of the realm of sensuous experience. And the 'entire inattention to these perceptions of difference' implies not adverting to, not considering, not reflecting upon. And because he does not advert in mind to them, does not attend to, does not reflect upon them, [203] therefore the expression [commented on] was used.

And because the preceding perceptions of matter and of impact do not exist in the immaterial plane produced by this jhāna, much less in that plane at the time of abiding in the attainment of this jhāna, therefore is their non-existence said thus to be due to the two causes of transcending and dying out. But among the different perceptions, because twenty-seven perceptions, to wit, eight moral perceptions of the sensuous realm, nine inoperative perceptions, ten immoral perceptions exist in the plane produced by this jhāna, therefore the cause of not attending to them was mentioned. And because one abiding in the attainment of this jhāna in that plane of existence does so by not attending to those perceptions, one who attends to them has not attained the jhāna.

Briefly, 'by passing beyond the perceptions of matter' implies the removal of all states of the realm of attenuated matter. 'By the dying out of the perceptions of impact, by inattention to perceptions of difference,' implies the removal of, and inattention to, all consciousness and mental properties of the sensuous realm.

Thus by these three clauses:—transcending the perceptions of matter, the dying out of the ten perceptions of impact, the not attending to the forty-four different perceptions, the Blessed One has spoken the praises of the attainment of the

¹ As discussed above, Part IV., pp 141 ff. The remainder are discussed in succession below.

infinity of space. For what reason? For the purpose of rousing the audience to activity and to persuade them, lest some unlearned people should say: 'The Teacher declared, "Get the attainment of the infinity of space." But what is the use, what is the benefit of this?' To prevent them from so speaking, he praised this attainment in such wise. For they, hearing its praises extolled, will reflect thus: 'So calm, they say, is this attainment and so exalted; we will get it.' Then they will endeavour to get it. And he has praised it to them for the purpose of persuasion, like a dealer in molasses [who is called a dealer] in 'visakaṇṭaka'.¹ He, it is said, took in a cart hard molasses, soft molasses, lumps of molasses, treacle, etc., went to the border village and shouted, 'Buy visakaṇṭaka, buy visakaṇṭaka!' (*lit.*: poison-thorn). The villagers, hearing him, shut the doors of their houses and made the children run away, saying, 'Poison is cruel; he who eats it dies; a thorn pierces, kills you. Both are cruel; what is the use of them?' Seeing this circumstance, the merchant thought, 'They are unskilled as to names in vogue, [204] these villagers. I will make them buy the toffee by a stratagem.' So he shouted, 'Buy a very sweet thing, buy a very delicious thing; hard molasses, soft molasses, treacle may be got at a low price, even for bad farthings, for bad pennies,' etc. Hearing him, the villagers, glad and delighted, came out and bought them, giving him much money. Now here, like the shout of the merchant's 'Buy visakaṇṭaka!' is the saying of the Blessed One, 'Produce the attainment of the infinity of space'; like the thought of the villagers: 'Both are cruel; what is the use?' is the thought of the audience:—'The Blessed One has told us to produce the sphere of the infinity of space. What benefit is there? We do not know its merits.' Then, like the words of the merchant, 'Buy a very sweet thing,' etc., is the Blessed One's showing the benefit, beginning with the transcending of the perceptions of matter. As the villagers giving much money and taking the molasses, so is the thought:—by hearing of the benefit, those whose hearts

¹ A name for a species of sugar. *Abhidhānapadīpikā*. Cf. our 'bull's eyes,' or the Lancashire equivalent 'humbugs.' —Ed.

have been persuaded will make a great endeavour to get this attainment. Thus the Blessed One has spoken for the purpose of producing endeavour and so as to persuade.

[Next we have] 'accompanied by the space-infinity-realm-perception.' Here 'infinite' means 'it has no end.' 'Space-infinity realm' means realm of infinite space or of infinity of space, in the sense of abode of the associated jhāna,* like a spirit-realm of spirits. It is an equivalent term for the space separated off by the [space]-device. 'Accompanied by the perception of the sphere of infinite space' means accompanied by the perception which has reached ecstasy with reference to infinite space as object. But the words given elsewhere -- 'Infinite is space!'¹ -- are not included here in reference to space as being either infinite or limited. Why? When it is infinite it cannot be taken to be limited, when limited it cannot be infinite. This being so, the fourfold object would not be complete and the discourse would not be sixteenfold. And it was the Supreme Buddha's wish to make the discourse in this place sixteenfold. Hence without saying 'infinite' or 'limited' he said 'accompanied by the perception of the sphere of the infinity of space.' Indeed, by this expression, both the words are included, the fourfold object is completed, and the discourse becomes sixteenfold. The meaning of the remaining text should be understood as said above.

And in this jhāna, sorrow at the destruction of desire for the Fourth Jhāna of the realm of attenuated matter makes [205] progress painful.² Sluggishness of entrance into ecstasy, on the part of one who has destroyed desire, makes intuition sluggish. The reverse should be understood as easy progress and quick intuition. And the jhāna which arises in space divided off by a limited device is called 'limited object,' that

* *Akāsānañca*.

¹ When this Jhāna is stated as a stage of Deliverance (fourth in the eight), the formula runs thus (instead of as in the *Dhs.*): 'thinking "space is infinite!" he reaches and remains in,' etc. *Dialogues* ii. 119. Cf. *B.P.E.* 71, n.

² Cf. above, p. 246, The Four Objects of Thought.'

which arises in space divided off by an extensive device is called 'immeasurable object.' As in the divine state of equanimity, so here also by virtue of the Fourth Jhāna there are twenty-five sets of one, and as here, so also in the following Jhānas. And we shall explain only what is specific in these latter.

In the next stage, to the clause 'by passing beyond the sphere of infinite space,'¹ the previous method should be applied, showing both the realm of infinite space, in the sense of abode, and the jhāna to be so called. Both are united in the one term, and show that by not proceeding with them, by not attending to them, both the jhāna and its object are transcended, and he attains and abides in the sphere of infinite consciousness.

In the clause 'accompanied by the perception of the consciousness-infinity-sphere,' infinite means that in attending to it, one thinks there is no end to it. 'Infinity' is just 'infinite.' Instead of using *viññānānañcam* for 'consciousness-infinity,' the shorter term (*viññānāñcam*) has been used, an instance of the elision of a syllable. This consciousness is the sphere, in the sense of abode, of this perception—hence 'the sphere of infinite consciousness.' 'Accompanied by the perception of the sphere of infinite consciousness' means accompanied by the perception arising with reference to that sphere of infinite consciousness. It is a name for the jhāna which has as its object consciousness as proceeding in space. In this jhāna, from the pain of the destruction of desire for the attainment of the sphere of infinite space, progress should be understood as painful; from a sluggish entrance into ecstasy on the part of one who has destroyed one's desire, a sluggish intuition should be understood. The reverse should be understood as easy progress and quick intuition. 'Limitedness of the object' should be understood as procedure with reference to attainment which has for its object space divided off in a limited 'device'. The reverse should be understood as the immeasurableness of object.

The rest is the same as in the preceding Jhāna.

¹ *Dhs.* § 266.

In the clause:—‘by passing beyond the sphere of infinite consciousness’¹ the previous method should be applied, showing both the sphere of infinite consciousness, in the sense of abode, and the jhāna to be so called. Both are united in the one term, and [206] show that by not proceeding with them, by not attending to them, both the jhāna and its object are transcended, and one attains and abides in the sphere of nothingness.

In the clause ‘accompanied by the perception of the sphere of nothingness,’ here ‘nothing’ signifies ‘there is nothing of it.’ The statement is, that not even disruption remains of it. Nothingness is the state of having nothing left, an equivalent term for the disappearance of the consciousness of the sphere of infinite space. ‘Sphere of nothingness’ is the sphere, in the sense of abode, of the perception of that nothingness. ‘Accompanied by the perception of the sphere of nothingness’ means accompanied by the perception proceeding with reference to that sphere of nothingness, and is a name for the jhāna having as its object the disappearance of consciousness proceeding with reference to space.

In this jhāna, where there is pain from the destruction of desire for the attainment of the sphere of infinite consciousness, progress is painful; where there is sluggishness of entrance into ecstasy on the part of one who has destroyed one’s desire, intuition is sluggish. The reverse should be understood as easy progress and quick intuition. ‘Limitedness of object’ should be understood as being the object, the disappearance of the consciousness proceeding with reference to space divided off by a limited device. The reverse should be understood as immeasurableness of object. The rest is the same as the first.

In the phrase:—‘by passing beyond the sphere of nothingness,’² by applying the previous method, the jhāna with the sphere (in the sense of abode) of nothingness is shown to be itself called the sphere of nothingness; so also, by the aforesaid method, is its object. Both are united in the one term, and show that, by not proceeding with them, by not attending to them, both the jhāna and its object are transcended, and

¹ *Dhs.* § 267.

² *Ib.* § 268.

one attains and abides in the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception.

In the clause:—‘accompanied by the perception (idea) of the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception,’ the *jhāna* is so called because of the real existence of such perception. In order to show this perception and its progress* arising in one who practises accordingly, the *Vibhaṅga* elaborates the phrase, ‘neither perceptual nor non-perceptual,’ and says that ‘one attends to the sphere of nothingness as peace, [207] and cultivates the attainment of the residuum of mental coefficients; therefore it is said to be neither perceptual nor non-perceptual.’¹ In that text the sentence ‘attends . . . as peace’ means that he attends to the sphere of nothingness as peace from the peacefulness of the object, thinking:—‘Verily this attainment is peace; since it will hold with non-existence itself as its object.’ If he attends to it as peace, he is no longer in a state of desire for [further] attainment when he would be thinking, ‘How can I transcend this?’ His mind is considering its peace, but as to regarding, contemplating, attending how ‘I shall attain, I shall sustain, I shall emerge from, I shall reflect upon [what I have gone through],’ he does nothing of all this. Why? Because the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception is more peaceful, more excellent than the sphere of nothingness. As a king riding his elephant in great state, and going about the city streets, might see craftsmen such as carvers in ivory, tightly swathed in one garment, their heads covered with another, their limbs besprinkled with ivory dust, making various forms out of ivory, etc. And he, being pleased with their skill, might say: ‘O sirs, how clever are these masters who can do such things!’ But the thought does not arise in him: ‘Good indeed would it be were I to give up my kingdom and become such a craftsman!’ And why is that? Because of the great advantage of the glory of kingship. Now just as the king goes past the craftsmen, so although the aspirant attends to that attainment as peace, he does not consider, ponder, attend thus: ‘I will attain it, sustain it, emerge from it, reflect

* *Taṇṇ tāva*.

¹ *Vibh.* 263. Cf. *Sum.* V. on *D.* ii. 69, § 33.

upon it.' Attending to it as peace by the previous method, he arrives at exceedingly subtle perception with the attainment of ecstasy. By means of that perception he becomes neither perceptive nor non-perceptive. And he is said to have cultivated the attainment of the residuum of mental coefficients, that is, the fourth 'immaterial' attainment of mental coefficients of exceeding subtleness.

Now in order to show the meaning of that sphere of neither perception nor non-perception, which by virtue of the thus acquired perception is so called, the states of mind and mental properties are here stated of one who has entered into that sphere of consciousness, or of one who is born in that plane of existence,¹ or of one who lives in happiness under present conditions. Of these three the states of mind and mental properties of one who has entered on that conscious experience are here intended. The literal definition is that, owing to the absence of gross perception and the presence of subtle perception in this jhāna, with its associated states, there is neither perception nor is there the absence of perception. This jhāna of neither perception nor non-perception is [classed as] a sphere included in the [conscious] 'spheres' of mind and of ideas, [208] hence the name 'sphere of neither perception nor non-perception.' Or, again, the perception here is non-perceptual in so far as it is incapable of effective functioning; and owing to the presence of the subtle residuum of mental coefficients it is not non-perceptual—hence 'neither perception nor non-perception.' And 'sphere of neither perception nor non-perception' means that it is a sphere in the sense of abode of the remaining states.

And not only perception is of such a kind. Feeling also is neither feeling nor non-feeling, consciousness also is neither consciousness nor non-consciousness, contact also is neither contact nor non-contact. It should be understood that this discourse has been made with perception as representative of the other associated states.

¹ The four 'immaterial' Jhānas were supposed to be tastes of the presumably normal consciousness experienced, respectively, by one reborn on the four planes of the immaterial worlds.—*Ed.*

This meaning can be made plain by the similes of oil for besmearing bowls, etc. It is said that a novice besmeared a bowl with oil and put it by. At the time of drinking rice gruel the Elder said to him, 'Bring the bowl.' He answered: 'There is oil in the bowl, sir.' Then, when the Elder said, 'Novice, fetch it; we will fill an oil-tube,' he answered, 'There is no oil, sir.' In this simile, as from the said [quantum] of oil inside, there is oil in the sense of the bowl's being unfit for rice gruel, and yet there is not sufficient oil for the filling of the oil-tube, even so that perception, from its incapacity for effective functioning, is not perception, and from the presence of the subtle residuum of mental coefficients is not non-perception.

But what is the function of perception here? The noting of the object, and the engendering of repulsion through extraordinary insight. As the element of heat cannot perform its function of burning in cold water, so this perception cannot manifest the function of noting. And in the remaining attainments it is not possible to engender repulsion through extraordinary¹ insight as perception can. Indeed, a bhikkhu, who has not accomplished his contemplation in other groups [of exercises], cannot attain to repulsion after he has grasped the groups of the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception, albeit perhaps the venerable Sāriputta, or a greatly wise man of matured insight like Sāriputta might be able to. 'These states (of neither perception nor non-perception) not having been, have come to be; having become, they perish'—thus he might be able by way of contemplating the group as a whole, but not by means of insight into individual states. Such is the subtleness of this attainment.

As by the simile of oil for besmearing the bowl, so by the following simile of water in one's path this meaning is to be made plain. [209] They say a novice, going on a journey ahead of his Elder, saw a little water and said, 'Water, Sir; take off your shoes.' Then when the Elder said, 'If so, bring the bathing cloth; we will bathe,' he replied, 'There is no water.' In this simile, as there is water in the sense of being

¹ Read *visesa-* for *visaya-*.

just enough to wet the shoes, and no water in the sense of being enough for bathing, so this perception from its incapacity for effective function is not perception, and from the presence of the subtle residuum of mental coefficients is not non-perception. Not only by these, but also by other fitting similes, should this meaning be made clear.

'Accompanied by the perception of the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception' means accompanied by this perception which proceeds in, or which is the sphere of, neither perception nor non-perception. It is an equivalent term for *jhāna* which has the attainment of the sphere of nothingness for object. Where there is pain at the destruction of desire for the attainment of the sphere of nothingness, progress here is painful; where there is sluggishness of entrance into ecstasy on the part of one who has destroyed desire, intuition is sluggish. The reverse should be understood as easy progress and quick intuition. 'Limitedness of the object' should be understood as referring to attainment when space is divided off in a limited device as object. The reverse should be understood as the immeasurableness of object. The rest is the same as the first.

*The fourfold consciousness of immaterial spheres
Th' incomparable Lord hath [here] declared. And now
That these we've learnt, we must go on to know thereof
Some teaching in detail. These four do come to pass
If one transcend th' object experienced. But the wise
Believe the jhāna qualities are not surpassed.*

Of the four attainments, the first is from transcending the image of the mark or the device-object, the second is from transcending space, the third is from transcending the consciousness proceeding with reference to space, the fourth is from transcending the disappearance of consciousness proceeding with reference to space. Thus these four immaterial attainments should be understood in all respects to have transcended the object. But in them the wise do not hold with the transcending of the factors. In them there is no transcending of the factors as in the attainments of the

realm of attenuated matter, because in all of them there are just two jhāna-factors: hedonic indifference and one-pointedness of mind. Yet though there is no transcending of the factors, the subsequent attainments here (in the immaterial) are more exalted than the preceding.

Here each latter one is nobler: understand

The similes of dress and storeys thus:—

[210] As in the lowest storey of a four-storeyed palace there might be available the highest of the five pleasures of sense in the form of celestial dancing, singing, music, fragrant scent, garlands, sweet drinks and eatables, couches, etc.; in the second storey the pleasures available might be higher than those in the first; those in the third storey might be higher still; those in the fourth storey might be the highest of all; although herein the four are all palace-storeys, and there is no distinction in them as such, yet owing to the difference in the performance of the pleasures, the higher storey is more excellent than the lower. . . .

And as a woman might possess two garments of a texture four, three, two, or one in weight, spun thick, soft, very soft, most soft, and of the same dimensions in length and breadth; although herein the four garments are the same in length and breadth, and there is no difference in respect of size, yet the last named are more excellent than the former as regards the coarseness or smoothness of touch, fineness of texture and value, so also in these four immaterial attainments, although there are only two factors: indifference and one-pointedness of mind, yet owing to the distinction in culture and the degree of excellence of the factors, the subsequent attainments here are more exalted. Thus they are of graduated excellence.

Where a pavilion stands with filth around

One clinging hangs, another on him leans.

Another stands without and leaning not.

On him a fourth man leans. The wise should see

In these four men those Four respectively.¹

¹ See *Visuddhi-magga*, chap. x. 'Āruppaniddeso.'

This is how the meaning is connected:—They say that there was a pavilion in an unclean place. A certain man on arriving there, loathing the dirt, hung on to the pavilion with both hands and remained there as though fixed. Another man having come remained leaning on the first man who had hung on to the pavilion. Then a third man having come thought, 'He who hangs on to the pavilion and he who leans on him—both of them are badly situated. Their fall with the fall of the pavilion is certain. Now I stand outside,' and stood apart without depending on them. Then a fourth man came, and considered the unsafe position of the man who hung on to the pavilion, and of the man who leant on him, and considering the safe position of the man who stood apart stood leaning on him.

Herein the device of marked off space should be regarded as the pavilion in an unclean place; the sphere of infinite space, with space for object and a contempt for the device-object, as the man who, loathing the impurity, hung on to the pavilion; [211] the sphere of infinite consciousness arising in dependence on the sphere of infinite space, with space for object, as the man who leant on him who hung on to the pavilion; the sphere of nothingness, which does not make the sphere of infinite space its object, but has the absence (of the first immaterial consciousness) for its object, as the man who thought of the unsafe position of both those men, and who without leaning on him who hung on to the pavilion stood apart; the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception proceeding in dependence on the sphere of nothingness established in the exterior position called the absence of the (first immaterial) consciousness, as the man who thought of the unsafe positions of the men who hung on to the pavilion and of the man who leant on him, and who, considering the man who stood without as 'he is well placed!' stood leaning on him.

Though this be so,

'This' takes just 'that' as object, for it finds

No other; even so, that they may live,

Men [take] a king whose faults lie bare to view.

'This sphere of neither perception nor non-perception takes 'that' sphere of nothingness for its object for want of another, in spite of the latter's fault of having the sphere of infinite consciousness as its 'near enemy.' Like what? Like the people who, for the sake of their livelihood, lean upon the king though they see his faults. For although the people see his faults, to wit, 'his conduct is harsh,' they would not get their livelihood save under this king who, though unrestrained, harsh in act, speech and thought, is lord of all the quarters of the country. Even so this sphere of neither perception nor non-perception takes that sphere of nothingness for its object, in spite of its fault, from inability to get any other. Still,

*Who climbs a stairway grasps the stairway rail ;
 Who climbs a hill sees steadfastly the peak ;
 Who climbs a rock may seek a kneehold firm ;
 So doth a man just on this jhāna lean,
 And as he leans upon it, carries on.*

End of the Discourse on the Immaterial Moral Consciousness.

सत्यमेव जयते

PART VII—DISCOURSE ON MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AS THREE-PLANED

Now, in order to show all the moral consciousness of the three planes of existence as divided into 'low,' etc., again the beginning is made with, 'Which are the states that are moral?'¹ Herein 'low' should be understood as 'base' (or paltry) by way of putting forth (or heaping up). [212] 'Medium' is a state between low and high or (excellent). 'Exalted' means led up to *ex-treme altitude* or supreme state²; the meaning is 'excellent.'

They are to be understood as referring to putting forth effort. When, at the moment of putting forth any effort, desire, energy, awareness, or investigation is low, that [moral consciousness] is known as 'low.' When these four states are medium, and again exalted, it is medium and exalted respectively. That moral consciousness which is put forth, with desire in the sense of will-to-do as its principal, its chief, its leader, is said to be dominated by desire as coming from such dominant influence. And the same with the dominant influence of energy, and the other two factors.

Halting at this place, we should count the methods thus:—One method the foremost classification of all, one low, one medium, one exalted, one method dominated by desire-to-do—these are the five methods in moral consciousness dominated by desire-to-do. So also there are five methods in each of the dominant influences of energy, etc., and four times five gives twenty. Or, the first is the bare method; the low, etc., amount to three more; four are the dominant influences of desire-

¹ *Dhs.* §§ 269-76.

² A 'buried city' word-play only—*pa-dhānaṃ bhāvaṃ nūtaṃ paṇītaṃ*.—*Ed*

[to-do]; twelve are these four considered as low, medium and exalted, in all twenty methods. Where are these twenty great methods classified? They are classified in the chapter entitled 'Low Triplet' of the Great Book.¹ And in this place, taking the middle group from the Low Triplet, three portions as low, medium, exalted should be made. From these three, excepting the middle group, and taking the low and the exalted, sets of nine portions should be made. For in low moral consciousness there are low, medium, exalted; and in the exalted moral consciousness there are low, medium, exalted. Likewise in the low, by low moral consciousness there are low, medium, exalted; likewise in the low, by the medium moral consciousness; and likewise in the low, by the exalted moral consciousness. This is one set of nine.

In the exalted, by low moral consciousness, there are also low, medium, exalted; likewise in the exalted, by medium moral consciousness; and likewise in the exalted, by exalted moral consciousness. This is the second set of nine. The two sets make eighteen doors of action.² [213] From being

¹ *Paṭṭhāna*. The 'Low Triplet' is one of the chapters in the First Book, or *Tika-paṭṭhāna*.—*Ed.*

² In the middle group of the Low Triplet those moral thoughts which, with their results, are produced by way of gifts, etc., which depend on the round of rebirths, are done as 'low'; those which, with their results, are produced by way of gifts, etc., which depend on the release from the round of rebirths, are done as 'exalted'; those which give no results are done as 'medium.' Of these three groups, excepting the middle group, because of its not giving results and taking the other two, nine kinds of moral consciousness certainly depending on the round of rebirths, and nine kinds depending on the release from the round of rebirths, form eighteen doors of action. These actions are also doors in the sense of being causes of the various results, hence doors of actions. Or the Buddha has declared the consciousness in various places to be so many doors of action; or the body-intimation, etc., to be doors of action. And the eighteen princes should be known according to their actions to be the worthless nine from the standpoint of sanctity consisting of the 'low by the low' trio, etc., and the worthy nine consisting of the 'exalted by the exalted' trio, etc. Likewise the priests, etc., and the devas. The forty-eight family customs are their different customs.—*Tikā*.

Or, that which is done without reverence is low; that which is done

developed by, and by virtue of them, eighteen princes, eighteen¹ priests, eighteen merchants, eighteen workmen and forty-eight family customs¹ should be understood. But among these three-planed moral thoughts, that of the realm of sense is thrice-conditioned by way of association with and dissociation from knowledge; it is also twice-conditioned; that of attenuated matter and the immaterial realms is thrice-conditioned only, and associated with knowledge. And of them the moral consciousness of the sensuous realm arises, together with or without the dominant influence; that of attenuated matter and of the immaterial realm is replete with the dominant influence. And of them, in the moral consciousness of the sensuous realm, two dominant influences, viz.; object and co-existence, are obtained; in the other two realms the dominant influence of object is not obtained, only that of co-existence is obtained. In the text 'moral consciousness of the sensuous realm arising . . . with the dominant influence of awareness (*citta*),'² awareness as the dominant influence is said by way of associated states. On the other hand, owing to the absence of the union of two types of consciousness, awareness cannot be the dominant influence of an associated consciousness. And the same with desire, etc., as dominant influences.

with indifference is medium; that which is done with reverence is exalted. Or, that which is done for the sake of some worldly gain is low; out of a desire for a meritorious result is medium; from a sense of propriety by one established in Ariyanship is exalted. Or that which occurs through lust for the fulfilment of existence is low; out of a desire for absence of greed is medium; for the good of others is exalted. A limited moral consciousness is low; that which is done by measure is medium; that which is done in excess is exalted. The moral consciousness which is just obtainable among the sublime morals is low; that which has not been exceedingly well cultivated is medium; that which is well cultivated and acquired by men of control is exalted.—*Anuṭṭikā*.

¹ Leaving out the low by the medium trio from the set of nine beginning with the low by the low trio, a set of six is obtained. Leaving out the exalted by the medium trio from the set of nine beginning with the exalted by the exalted trio, a set of six is obtained. These two give 12, which with the 4 'castes' make 48 family customs.—*Tr.*

² *Dhs.* § 289.

But if morality arises in one who is aware and who, making any consciousness the principal, the chief, has put forth another moral consciousness:—‘it will arise in me,’ some hold that his first consciousness should be called the dominant influence of awareness, and the second, as coming from such dominant influence, should be said to be dominated by it. This method, however, does not appear in the Text, nor in the Commentary. Hence the state of being the dominant influence is to be understood by the method given.

In these nineteen main methods are the types of consciousness of the extent given in the first main method, as formulated, with the sets of nine and the sections of the text. Therefore among the types of consciousness ‘associated with knowledge’ according to the extent given, the twentyfold classification of ‘consciousness,’ ‘set of nine,’ ‘section’ should be understood. Among the four types ‘dissociated from knowledge,’ the sixteenfold classification of the same should be reckoned. This is known as the Particular Discourse on the moral consciousness of the three planes.

End of ‘Moral Consciousness as Three-planed.’

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APPENDIX

SOME PALI WORDS DISCUSSED IN THE COMMENTARIES

(Indicated by an asterisk in the Translation. The figures in brackets refer to the page of the Expositor)

- Ajjhattikaṃ (87)—indriyabaddhasantānaṃ.—*Tīkā*.
 Anabhiraddho (190)—anabhirato, kuddho.—*Yojanā*.
 Abhilāpo (28): etena desanā ti paññattī ti etam vacanaṃ dhammaniruttābhihāpanaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ.—*Tīkā*.
 Abhisandahati (147)=pabandhati.—*Tīkā*,=sampayuttadhamme sakasakakicce paṭṭhapeti.—*Anuṭīkā*.
 Ākāśānañca (274): ākāśānanta—ākāśānantya=ākāśānanca=ākāśānaṃca=ākāśānañca.—*Pyī*.
 Itivādappamokkha (29): iti evaṃ etāya paripattiyā vādappamokkhānisamsa. Or, so so vādo iti vādo iti vādappamokkha.—*Sāratthadīpanī*.
 Khippanisanti (251)=khippadassanaṃ khippābhiññatā (nisanti is from sam—to look).—*Tīkā*.
 Tam tāva (277): tan ti taṃ saññā paṭipadam; yathāvuttasaññaṃ tassāca adhiḡamūpāyaṇaṃ ti attho.—*Visuddhi-magga Tīkā*.
 Paṭihanana (61)=paṭimukhībhāva.—*Tīkā*.
 Liṅga (86)=saṅghāna.—*Tīkā*.
 Santati (*continuity*) (76) means the solidarity of individual mass by virtue of the continuous procedure of past moments of consciousness (like a chain of moving ants). Samūha (*mass*) means the solidarity of things such as contact, etc. Kicca (*function*) means the solidarity of single moments of consciousness having the same characteristics or states of single moments of consciousness by virtue of the resemblance of functions. Ārammaṇa (*object*) means the solidarity of single moments of consciousness by virtue of the aspect of difference between consciousness and object.—*Pyī*.
 Sambhāvetvā (262): vā ti imāya paṭipattiyā ayaṃ nirayādisu nibbatteyyā ti parikkappetvā vā.—*Visuddhi-magga Tīkā*.