

Author's Dedication

Dedicated

To the Memory of

Eduard Zeller

Translator's Dedication

To

The Memory of

My late revered Father

Who devoted his life to the cause of Education

in this country,

This translation

is humbly dedicated

By

His unworthy Son

Philosophical Currents

of the

Present Day

By

DR. LUDWIG STEIN


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Translator's Preface

Eight years ago, when I first read "Die Philosophischen Strömungen der Gegenwart," I was struck by the wonderful mass of information contained in it, most of which was altogether new to me. This mass of information it handles in such a lucid manner that the reader passes by imperceptible stages from one mode of thinking to another, till on looking back, he is surprised to find how many different systems of thought he has been able to master. This is due to the circumstance that the different modes of thinking are not presented in their isolation but are woven in the texture of the whole work. The author, moreover, has always a distinct position of his own from which he surveys all philosophical movements.

This work has the great merit of introducing to the public many comparatively unfamiliar systems of thought. The systems of Houston Stewart-Chamberlain and Count Keyserling occur chiefly to one's mind in this connexion. When one reflects how important their share in the philosophical movements of the present day is, one cannot but be grateful to the author for having given so much prominence in his book to their thoughts.

"Die Philosophischen Strömungen der Gegenwart" is probably the most comprehensive survey that exists of the philosophical position of the present day. It is much more thorough than either Külpe or Aliotta's work. When, therefore, both Külpe's "Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland" and Aliotta's "La Reazione Idealistica Contro la Scienza" have been translated into English, no apology is needed for bringing out an English edition of the much more important work of Professor Ludwig Stein.

Lest some disappointment should be felt at the non-inclusion in the work of many familiar systems of English

philosophers, it is well to bear in mind what the author says in his Preface, that he intends to supplement this work by three others, one devoted to English, one to French and the third, to Italian philosophical systems. The more important philosophical systems in England and America, however, find a place in this work.

The “Philosophischen Strömungen” has been my best teacher and companion for the last eight years. If my translation helps in any way to make it similarly useful to my countrymen and to the English-speaking public, I shall feel content.

<i>72, Lansdowne Road,</i>	}	SHISHIRKUMAR MAITRA.
<i>Calcutta.</i>		
<i>The 15th November, 1917.</i>		

Author's Preface

The struggle for a new content of life has again been revived. It agitates people's minds. As life moves up-stream people seek, as in all times, answers from philosophy of those enigmas, which were once solved by theology and which were finally referred to natural science. As neither the interpretations of theologians nor the explanations of scientists gave complete satisfaction, one has again to go to the philosopher. With the twentieth century a philosophical movement has begun which has brought new life to the once discarded "nature-philosophy."

It is necessary here to take stock of "the philosophical currents of the present day". In the breathless haste and restless confusion of philosophical system-building of our days, there arises the danger of philosophising past one another. It becomes necessary, therefore, to stop for breath and look round. Introspection and self-instruction require very much an historical glance and a systematic view.

The sketch of the "philosophical currents of the present day" which is offered here, wants to make an attempt to grasp out of the suffocating fulness of the new philosophical world-explanations with which we are burdened, those whose character as types or whose powerful influence upon the philosophical thought of the present day must be acknowledged. Neither all lines and schools, nor all nations and literatures are considered with equal care. I rather reserve for a later occasion, as a continuation of this sketch of the philosophical currents of the present day in a second series, the consideration of the French, English and Italian movements. The ten philosophical movements which the first part of the book seeks to examine critically, are for this reason placed in the foreground, that in my opinion they represent the characteristic phenomena of modern thought. I have, however, omitted such currents of

the present day as have been examined critically in previous works. Isolated articles on the ten herein mentioned philosophical movements have appeared already in journals, but I have in many ways revised and altered them for the purpose of this sketch and have made them adapted to the present position of philosophical inquiry. All learned apparatus has been avoided. Remarks and literary references have been cut down to a minimum. Indeed, the object has been far less to give an exhaustive account or attempt a decisive refutation of the world-views which strive for supremacy than to make a survey, give a presentation of the most conspicuous "philosophical currents of the present day" in the most intelligible form possible. Although here and there important analyses crop up which presuppose a thorough grounding in methodology and especially, familiarity with philosophical terminology, this should not prevent the intelligent reader from looking upon the book as an introduction to the movement of philosophical thought in these days.

The historical "Introduction" in the first ten chapters forms the sub-structure, the systematic analysis in the last six chapters of the book, in which I have treated of the most important problems of the present day from the standpoint of evolutionistic criticism and social optimism which I represent, is the main structure. The first part makes a longitudinal, the second, a cross-section of the philosophy of the present day. Even in the six systematic chapters, completeness or exhaustive treatment is not attempted, far less attained. There are certainly many more problems which at this moment stand on the debating-ground and many more currents which strive for supremacy, than have been represented by us. But our "Introduction" does not claim to offer a complete panorama but confines itself to pointing to the most generally accepted view-points.

From the ten philosophical movements of the present day which I have tried to describe and examine critically in

the first part of this work, isolated paths lead to those six systematically treated philosophical problems in which I see the weightiest questions of the philosophy of the present day. From Eduard Zeller, to whom this work is dedicated, many of us have learnt that one has to employ a description in the domain of the history of philosophy in the service of systematic thinking. The historical orientation shown here will therefore not only give an account of what exists or takes place philosophically, but will at the same time explain how we can arrive, by way of our knowledge of what has happened or what is operative, at a solution of the questions with which we are troubled.

Bern, Middle of September 1908.

LUDWIG STEIN

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CHAPTER I

THE NEO-IDEALISTIC MOVEMENT

The apparently dead philosophy has again been revived and idealism which was pronounced dead, is born again. Idealism is the phoenix among the views of the world. Only, there is this difference, that while the sacred mythological bird required five hundred years to burn and renew itself, the philosophical phoenix celebrates in every generation and every system of culture its temporary renaissance, and out of dialectical ashes comes again to life. The psychological grounds of the movement and the logical *motifs* of thought of neo-idealism, I have explained in a separate essay, entitled "Der Neuidealismus unserer Tage" in *Sinn des Daseins* (Tübingen, Mohr pp. 84-143). The varying fortunes of changeful idealism have been sketched by Otto Willmann in a way which exhibits as much force as insight. Willmann describes the need for Catholicism of the neo-idealistic movement of the present day. In visionary prophecies he tells us at the end of his work of the rejuvenation of the Church which will become the ark that will carry Science and Culture over the flood. According to an old, extremely beautiful saying of the East, the snake possesses the power of looking the sun in the face and soaring up to it. Only, says Willmann, it happens from time to time that its sight fails and its wings refuse to carry it and then it must plunge into a magic fountain which will restore its strength. Consequently, the history of idealism is only a round-about path of the human intellect for finishing, after many errors and confusions, after falling into naturalistic quicksands and spiritualistic shoals, the Odyssey of the spirit and landing in the safe port of Rome.

A more Protestant colouring has been given to the neo-idealistic movement by Ferdinand Jakob Schmidt, the well-known contributor on philosophical subjects to the "Preussische Jahrbücher", in his collection of works entitled "Zur Wiedergeburt des Idealismus" (Leipzig, Dürr, 1908). Like Willmann he also fights against the "gods of our age," against psychologism, historicism and positivism. The demarcation line is Kant whom Paulsen has dubbed the typical philosopher of Protestantism. Whilst Willmann has degraded Kant into a mouthpiece of the spirit of the age, into a toy of the surging waves which rush towards the cataracts of revolution, nay, has even made Kant a preacher of a revolution in beliefs, morals and science, Schmidt preaches orthodox Kantianism, in opposition to all the psychologising conceptions on the part of the neo-Kantians. Every time the strictly philosophical studies are taken up, one must begin, according to Schmidt, with the task of mastering the orthodox critical ways of thinking of Kant. By *rebirth of idealism* Schmidt understands frank acceptance of Kant and the classical philosophy of Germany. The criticism of Kant, the theory of knowledge of Fichte, the doctrine of identity of Schelling, and lastly, the speculative philosophy of Hegel, show that wonderful progress comes in the wake of the spirit which absolutely determines itself. The all-creative logos has begun to unravel its mysteries before human thought. The fundamental problem of true idealism is, consequently, the higher problem of totality-thinking. In the region of practice Schmidt sees in the social laws of our days "the first significant indication of the rebirth of idealism" (p. 4).

If what this orthodox Kantian thought were true, then the philosophical catchword of the neo-idealistic movement would be, not as before, "Back to Kant" but "Back to the German classical philosophers." Just as for Windelband, Rickert, Eucken, Lipps, Münsterberg, Fichte is still a living personality, just as for Eduard von Hartmann, Arthur Drews, Ostwald,

Reinke and the nature-philosophers of to-day, Schelling has risen from the grave, so Schmidt has called back to life the philosophical trio after Kant, especially, however, Hegel. It is a remarkable coincidence that the same year 1908 witnessed the publication of Schmidt's work "Zur Wiedergeburt des Idealismus" as well as the appearance of the rectoral address of the psychologist Karl Stumpf, entitled "The re-birth of philosophy." Whilst Schmidt in his narrow adherence to the idealistically conceived Kant celebrates as the rebirth of philosophy the classical German idealism, on account of its discovery of totality-thinking, the Berlin philosopher Stumpf, who inclines to Leibniz, explains with regard to Fichte's "Wissenschaftslehre" that one considers oneself separated from it not by a hundred but by a thousand years. The same must, however, be said also of the nature philosophy of Schelling and the Hegelian logic.

Is it a wonder, then, that another Berlin philosopher, Max Frischeisen-Köhler, speaks of the historical anarchy of the philosophical systems in his introduction to "Moderne Philosophie" (Stuttgart, Enke, 1907)? The great systems, complains Frischeisen-Köhler, do not attract people any more, the confused view of their kingdom weakens the capacity for construction, the titanic courage which inspired Fichte and Hegel seems altogether dead. Hence arises the longing for unsystematic philosophy. The theory of knowledge which was once the reliance of all exact thinkers has resolved itself into a metaphysics of knowledge and has thereby shown its scientific bankruptcy, for with its formal reference to metaphysics, philosophy again falls into the anarchy of personal convictions.

Another shade of neo-idealism is represented by the Berlin philosopher Alois Riehl. Riehl rejects scientific monism in both its forms, the Haeckelian naturalism as well as the energistic monism of Ostwald, but Riehl also is a monist, a philosophical and not a scientific monist. The world, says

Riehl (*Philosophie der Gegenwart*), exists only *once*, but it is given to objective consciousness which refers to external things as a connexion of quantitative physical events and objects, whilst a portion of it is given to a determinate organic individual as his conscious functions and their connexion. Also for Riehl, the representative of philosophical criticism, Kant is the *rocher de bronze* of philosophy. But he keeps aloof from the Fichte-Schopenhauerian subjectivising of Kant very carefully, whilst Schmidt takes pride in this subjectivising tendency. In the second edition of his "Der philosophische Kritizismus" (Vol. I Leipzig, Engelmann 1908), Riehl states emphatically that the mistake of his first edition was not that it laid too much stress upon the realistic side of Kantian phenomenalism; its mistake was rather that it did not make it the principal topic. The genuine Kantian philosophy, explains Riehl in the preface, is greatly opposed to the subjective view of the Kantian philosophy from which Fichte started and which was made popular by Schopenhauer.

To those who are acquainted with philosophical movements, it is a well-known fact that the logical questions which were placed in the foreground of philosophical discussion by Benno Erdmann, Edmund Husserl, Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert come very near the problems of the theory of knowledge which form the proper domain of Riehl's philosophy. In spite of his great esteem for Hume which clearly appears in his "Philosophie der Gegenwart," he is absolutely free from any leanings towards the so-called "pure induction" of Bacon and Mill. Even with regard to the theory of induction, Riehl places the work of Aristotle above that of the "schemer" and "dilettante" Bacon, for Aristotle knew that the inductive inference is the opposite of the deductive. The analytical method Plato discovered and Galileo in his "metodo risolutivo" perfected, whilst he added an essential element, namely, experiment. What Hume in vain attempted had already been accomplished in the works

of Galileo. Without deduction no induction is possible (Kultur der Gegenwart: Volume containing a variety of Essays entitled *Systematische Philosophie* 2nd Edition, 1907, p. 87). Logic which has remained stationary according to Kant ever since the days of Aristotle, may have made some progress in the doctrine of method, but none in the doctrine of elements. That reform of the doctrine of method, however, for which Windelband and Rickert fought, is utterly rejected by Riehl. His standpoint is thus stated with precision by Riehl: Sense-experience as the outlet, experimental knowledge widened by theory as the conclusion—between these two extreme points runs induction and the intermediate stages are of a deductive nature.

In his "Erkenntnistheorie" Riehl fights on behalf of criticism, the rightly understood Kant, who cannot be explained subjectively. For this purpose he enters into a polemical discussion with the positivists, the representatives of "pure experience" (Hume, Avenarius, Mach), whilst the opposite side, the neo-Kantianism of Cohen and Natorp is, to our great surprise, not taken notice of. For Riehl, nature in general and possible experience are convertible terms, and the most effective argument against positivism is thus formulated by him: The principle of causality is more universal than that of the uniformity of nature. The principles of our experiential knowledge are with him, as with Kant, unchangeable; only the experiences under the control of these principles are progressive—so runs the last sentence of his doctrine relating to the theory of knowledge. The *a priori* principles, for which Riehl with Kant rejected all "preformation system" of the spirit, must be appealed to in the last instance. The *a priori* expresses, according to Riehl, (Kultur der Gegenwart, p. 89) only a conceptual and not a temporal relation to experience. Here was an important point which imperatively demanded a settlement with the Marburg School. This intentional omission is

silence that speaks. Those who follow Windelband are at least shown their proper position, the followers of Cohen are totally ignored. In the next place, Riehl feels that there is an affinity of ideas between him and the French mathematician Poincaré (*La Science et L'Hypothèse; La Valeur de la Science*) to whom he dedicates a criticism which is as refined as it is beautiful.

And so shines the neo-idealism of our days in all its colours. Beginning with the phenomenalism of the type found in Mach, the 'pure' logic and critique of knowledge of Hermann Cohen, the immanence philosophy of Schuppe, the ethical idealism of Theodor Lipps, the philosophy of norms of Windelband, and ending in the philosophical monism of Alois Riehl and the orthodox Kantianism of Ferdinand Jacob Schmidt, the neo-idealistic prism shows very well all the colours of the rainbow. The neo-Kantians, whose philosophy a generation ago was the ruling philosophy of the School or the pulpit, spread out in as many directions as their philosophy produced "leading personalities". They are now divided into Neo-Fichteans, Neo-Schellingians and Neo-Hegelians. The Marburg School of Cohen and Natorp takes hardly any notice of the Greifswaldian School of Schuppe and Rehmke. The Berlin School of Riehl, Dilthey and Stumpf makes silent opposition to the Heidelberg School of Windelband and Rickert, but treats the Marburgians and Greifswaldians with contempt. The followers of Eucken in Jena are recruited mostly from theology. The psychological school which owes its origin to Brentano and which not long ago flocked to the standard of Lipps in Munich, has fallen into decay ever since Lipps turned towards ethical idealism and approached the standpoint of Wundt. Removed from all philosophical intercourse live the "object-philosophers" and their chief Meinong in Graz. The correlationists begin first to gather round Erhard, round Busee who died recently, and Oswald Külpe. The pure psychologists, especially, experimental

psychologists have completely severed their connexion. They have their own congresses and have very little touch with philosophers proper. The relations of the thinkers of the present day are in this way extremely loose. *People philosophise past one another.* The philosophical army of the present age is without a captain and consequently without any discipline; we may have distinguished men, but no man, big heads, but no head. The neo-idealism of our days has able officers but neither a Chief of the General Staff nor soldiers. We have to-day heads of schools without schools, leaders without followers, societies without members. None of the numerous neo-idealistic systems has such a power of wooing as the "interpreter of the riddle of the universe". Should it not be our fault if an incomparably weaker thing, such as the monism of Haeckel, ignites, kindles and excites, whilst the scientifically better grounded and logically unquestionably superior neo-idealistic movement is carried, lifeless and weak, behind the triumphant car of Haeckel, muttering reproaches? Why does not any of the neo-idealists succeed in formulating his doctrine as clearly and concisely, as transparently and compactly, as Haeckel and Bölsche formulate theirs? That the grounds of the neo-idealists are better—about this there can be no two opinions. But the neo-idealists are wanting in the courage to formulate doctrines. Instead of uniting and striking a powerful blow at materialism they dissipate their energies in amusements and waste their strength in fighting with one another, whereas if they had been at peace with one another, they could have made short work of their common enemy. "Devotion to trifles" has its season. The present is the time for great constructive work. The supreme indifference of one idealist towards another has served only to strengthen the position of the common materialistic enemy. If the rebirth

unite and overlook the elements that separate them from one another, in order the more to emphasise the uniting elements. The strength of the materialistic opponent lies only in the weakness and want of discipline of the neo-idealists, in the petty policy of those petty princes of philosophy who loom as largely on the philosophical horizon as once did the small dynasties in Italy and Germany on the political horizon before the establishment of the national States. There helped Cavour and Bismarck. We require a central personality—a Leibniz or a Kant.

Of philosophical catch-words that have got a hold upon people there is no lack. We are very resourceful in coining marketable and attractive formulas, but idle in creating fully developed systems and views of the world.

One world-formula follows another in such quick succession as to cause confusion. But none of these formulas has succeeded in gathering round it a crowd of intellectualists, as, a generation ago, Darwin and Spencer, two generations ago, the Schellingian nature-philosophers, three generations ago, the Hegelians, or four generations ago, the Encyclopædists and the German Enlightenment or the English deism did. *Tot capita, tot sensus*. Indeed, we have not to-day a philosophical current which governs all other currents or takes them up as its tributaries and conveys them into a strong channel, but numerous streams of thought which, disregarding their source and mouth, take their own courses as if they were alone in the world.

And yet there are two principal streams which rule the history of modern philosophy as the Rhine and the Danube rule the southern parts of Germany and Austria: these are

strong fundamental conviction of persons of all callings. What in the Middle Ages the Church, Revelation, the three Testaments, the Councils, the Pope and the "civitas dei" were as sources of "eternal truths," "lumen naturale" of human reason with its two eyes, logic and mathematics, has been since the days of Humanism, Renaissance and Reformation. Nicolaus Von Cues, Leonardo da Vinci and Galileo Galilei are the three great milestones on the route of the spiritual evolution of Europe from supernatural to natural light, from revelation in the Scripture to revelation in Nature, from *codex scriptus* to *codex vivus*. Philosophy, says Galileo in *Saggiatore*, is written in that great book which lies ever open before our eyes, that is, the universe—which, however, one cannot understand without first learning the language and the characters in which it is written. This book is written in mathematical language and the characters are the triangle, circle and other geometrical figures without the aid of which it is impossible to understand a single word of it in the way in which human beings understand things. The whole apparatus of the logico-mathematical view of the world which was unlocked by Spinoza, which was called upon to supplant the teleologico-theological view, lies locked in the "Saggiatore" "Discorsi" and the "Dialogi" of Galileo. Instead of the Platonic "ideas" he requires with Kepler "laws"; instead of the *qualitates occultae* of the Scholastics, the *verae causae* of the "philosophical" astronomers, Copernicus and Kepler; instead of empty knowledge of words, experimental knowledge of things; instead of authority, the autonomy of human reason; instead of syllogism and deduction, free use of induction; instead of Aristotelian teleology, Democritic mechanism of atoms; instead of qualities, their reduction into quantities (through his distinction of primary and secondary qualities). Matter is rationalised, as is afterwards done by Spinoza ("Mathematics of Nature"). Thereby, certainly the idea of God is not removed, but on the contrary, as it appears later

in Descartes, who owes a good deal to him, placed on a logico-mathematical basis. Through our logical forms of thought, which also for Galileo are given *a priori*, we reach that intuitive godly spirit which is merged in the highest form of knowledge for Spinoza, the *Scientia intuitiva*. For with Galileo Science is necessity of law, which means this, that everywhere in Nature rule identity, simplicity and uniformity. Galileo, however, teaches not only the logical grounding of the whole of Nature, but also the logical grounding of the human spirit. God knows these forms of order intuitively; we men, however, know them only discursively. Galileo develops therefore the principles of that rationalism which later Descartes and Spinoza bring to perfection.

Out of the wreck of the world-view of the Middle Ages which seemed to bury with it completely all "eternal truths," rationalism saved the advanced portion of thinking mankind and saved it from sceptical doubt by the discovery that those eternal truths, the confirmation of which by the Church was called in question, rested upon a much deeper and stronger foundation, because they, as mathematical and logical axioms, are immovably fixed in the reason of the human race. The impossibility of giving up these eternal truths means for us their necessity for thought. What we regard as necessary, universal and unrelinquishable—that and that only is for us a fixed truth which cannot be contaminated by any kind of doubt. Nature, which appears to be regulated mathematically, is the real ground, God who is determined logico-axiomatically is the ground of knowledge of the "eternal truths." According to Spinoza's doctrine of parallelism, the real ground (extension) and the ground of knowledge (thought) are eternally parallel. Thought and being are identical in the Absolute (*deus sive natura*) And so flows this majestic stream of rationalism with its victorious, unswerving trust in the aristocracy and autonomy of the reason of the human race

through the great seventeenth century and branches off into numerous channels in the eighteenth century, in order, after many windings and zigzag movements, to fall into the criticism of Kant. From Plato, through Spinoza and Leibniz, to Hegel runs this fundamental dogma of rationalism: The world is a system of thoughts that have existence, *i.e.* eternal ideas. The universe is thoroughly logicised. It is the self-revelation of the world-spirit.

But from Kant branches off the second great stream of thought which runs through the whole of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, the voluntaristic counter-current which makes the world not a matter for logic but for will. The human spirit forgets its rationalistic autocracy and goes about granting supremacy, primacy and logical predominance to the irrational portion of the spiritual life, whether it is the feeling, as with the English and German feeling-philosophers, or the will; with Kant's doctrine that practical reason is superior to theoretical reason, that will is superior to logical thought, the tide of rationalism was stemmed and the waters of voluntarism rushed with terrific force into the nineteenth century. From the categorical imperative, the "thou canst, therefore thou shouldst" of Kant, followed the voluntaristic programme of life of Fichte, "Being follows from doing". The "World as act" which J. Reinke has again brought to our consciousness is only Fichte put into the biological forms of the twentieth century, to whom the whole of Nature is only the sensible material of duty. Indeed, even the "Mathematics of Nature", the logic which manifests itself in the laws of Nature, is only Intelligence in order that it may become Will. The romanticism of nature-philosophy under the lead of Schelling conceded, it is true, to the aesthetic element in the world-conception equal rank with the ethico-voluntaristic element, but the particular forces of Nature are according to it transformed anthropomorphically into that "will of Nature" which in the arch-romanticist Schopenhauer

produces such wonderful results. But the crass voluntarism of Schopenhauer has just obtained decisive victory for this type of thought, to which Kant assigned primacy but not absolute authority. Ribot and his French followers, in Germany, A. Horwicz, Th. Ziegler (*Das Gefühl*, 4th Edition 1908) and H. Gomperz (*Weltanschauungslehre* 2nd Volume Part I, 1908) make themselves too intimate with the English "feeling philosophy" which Hamann and Jakobi have planted on the German soil. Eduard von Hartmann coins in place of Schopenhauer's *will to live* the formula: Will to be conscious; Friedrich Nietzsche formulates with the old philosophers whose doctrine was "*Might is right*" (Thucydides, Epicurus, Macchiavelli, Hobbes Spinoza) the principle, *Will to power*; Wilhelm Wundt and his school, *will to humanity*, to progress, to culture, Spencer and Ostwald require *will to equalisation* (The law of entropy of Clausius), Windelband and his followers require *will to norm, to value*. Lastly, Münsterberg formulates in an altogether new fashion the general principle of voluntarism as *will to the world*.

Voluntarism, whether concealed or open, covert or straightforward, is, as one sees, peculiar to all neo-idealistic conceptions of the world in these days. Practical reason, the world of values and aims, the kingdom of human action and historical evolution, has, since the days of Kant, at least historical primacy, although the strict intellectualists of the school of Ebbinghaus and the representatives of the "standpoint of reality" whose leader is O. Külpe, question not only the logical supremacy of voluntarism but also its right to exist. The philosophy of values is uppermost to-day even in "pure logic". E. Husserl's system-building "logical inquiries". (Two volumes, 1900-1901) have created schools and established a "theory of value" the outlines of which were recently drawn by Theodor Lessing in the February and May numbers of the *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*, edited by me. As against the whole psychologism of the disciples of

Brentano and the whole positivism of the followers of Mach, the logical school of Husserl inquires not only into the nature but also into the claims of the judgment of value with subtle precision and penetrating intelligence. As the representatives of the "standpoint of reality" and the correlativists attached themselves several times to Herbart and Lotze, as the psychologists of the school of Lipps formerly attached themselves to Hume, as those of the Friesian School flocked to the standard of Beneke and Fries, so did the logicians follow Kant, whom Riehl interprets differently from Cohen, Simmel differently from Paulsen, Chamberlain in a different way from Külpe, Husserl differently from Liebmann, Windelband differently from Eucken. But most of the psychologists, no less than most of the logicians are philosophers of value. Only, the value is by the first *genetically* deduced, by the second, *critically* determined, demanded and grounded *a priori*. If we overlook the strict and consistent rationalists of the school of H. Ebbinghaus, who like Külpe do not at all recognise a special power called will—"Outside of sensations, feelings of pain and pleasure, representations, there exists nothing" said Ebbinghaus in *Kultur der Gegenwart* (Volume containing a variety of essays called *Systematische Philosophie*, p. 205)—we find psychologists as well as logicians united under the flag of voluntarism. The placing of voluntarism in the front rank by Wundt has secured success for this mode of thinking. Wundt's voluntarism is undoubtedly milder, more yielding and consequently, more flexible than Schopenhauer's, with which it only shares a common name. With superior humour Wilhelm Wundt has characterised the three possible types of philosophical conceptions of the world.

Wilhelm Wundt's sketch of metaphysics (*Metaphysik*, pp. 103-137) is a specimen of clearness and close argumentation. Wundt defines metaphysics, as Comte defines philosophy in general, i.e., as the view of the world which combines the elements of particular bits of knowledge. But the three

stages of Comte he explains very happily and in an original manner. Instead of the Comtean religious, metaphysical and positive stages of mankind, Wundt puts three stages of metaphysics, the poetical, the dialectical and the critical. Haeckel's "Welträtsel" belongs to the oldest phase of Greek thought, to the primitive, poetico-mythological metaphysics, Ostwald's "Naturphilosophie," on the other hand, comes near the second, i.e., the dialectical stage of evolution which has got two peaks—the Eleatics and Spinoza. He regards himself naturally as belonging to the third, i.e., the critical stage of evolution. And on the fundamental question of Kant: Is metaphysics as science in general possible?, he finds himself in agreement with the strict answer which in reality is also approved by Kant and Schopenhauer, in so far as they recognise metaphysical necessity. If metaphysics, as history has shown in a hundred ways, is necessary, then must it also be possible. And so walks the eternal Cinderella of philosophy, metaphysics, precisely as in Dilthey (as we shall see later), only more confidently, into the backdoor, after it has been driven out of the front door. It is true that the neo-idealism of Wundt has had its origin in Kant whose criticism it is as little possible to pass over as it is possible for astronomers not to come in contact with Copernicus, but it is not the Kant of the "Critique of Pure Reason" but the Kant of the "Critique of Practical Reason" who has left distinct marks in Wundt's voluntaristic neo-idealism. This voluntaristic neo-idealism of Wundt is harshly and mercilessly criticised by the Greifswaldian school (Schuppe, Rehmke). A disciple of this school, Dr. Theodor Skribanowitz, comes in his critical monograph "Wilhelm Wundt's voluntarism examined in its principles" (Greifswald, Abel 1906) to the conclusion that what Wundt understands by will is not the will we experience, but a pseudo-will introduced by Wundt who has given this name to his principle. Against the severe criticisms of the immanence-philosophers one of the most gifted of Wundt's

disciples, the Vienna philosopher, Rud. Esler, defends the doctrine of his master as bravely and as successfully as Wundt himself meets all his opponents, especially, the positivists of the school of Avenarius and the school of Würzburg.

Theodor Lipps who was once the leader of the psychologists, is not to be counted to-day among the positivists or the psychologists but rather among the opposite party, the logicists. Yet in the year 1895, he wrote in the preface to the translation of Hume's "Treatise" the words: Which of the two philosophers (Hume and Kant) has conceived the problem of knowledge with greater penetration and depth, which of the two is to be considered the greater discoverer in this province, from whom can we yet the most learn—this may remain here undecided, although I think I can predict that in the future men will judge this question differently from the way in which they are accustomed to judge it and will judge it in a manner which perhaps can claim self-evidence. Meanwhile the honour of Hume is vindicated. The process from Kant to Hume has been reversed (for the literature on the subject, see my *Social Optimism* pp. 126-155). In the recent accounts of modern philosophy by Busse, Külpe, etc. Hume appears no more as the "sceptic" but as the positivist, and as such Windelband regarded Hume long ago. Alois Riehl devotes in the second edition of his *Philosophical Criticism* a separate chapter to the proof of the proposition that Hume is not a sceptic but a positivist. Yes, Riehl speaks of the "critical positivism" of Hume. Thus Lipps's prophecies have been completely fulfilled. Only Lipps himself has turned his back upon the critical positivism of Hume and has gone over to the opposite party. The change is completed somewhat abruptly. In the Festschrift in honour of Kuno Fischer, Lipps made known in his essay on "the philosophy of nature" his present standpoint, and in his stirring speech at the assembly of scientists (1907) he openly professed ethical idealism. The ethical idealism of Lipps is, nevertheless, as far

removed from the line of thought of Hume as it clearly and unmistakably leads to Fichte. After much struggle and hesitation, Lipps falls under the charm of Fichte, just as Rudolf Eucken, Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert and lastly, Hugo Münsterberg did long before him.

The ethical idealism of Lipps places itself decidedly on the side of the transcendental idealism of the type of that of Fichte, according to whom the entire world of appearances has its origin in the subject, the 'I'. To pronounce laws, forces or energies as simple realities is looked upon by Lipps as the 'mythology' of nature-philosophy. Nature is spirit and in fact absolute spirit, the unity of reality, or rather, the unity of the world-spirit regarded as absolute ego. Mechanism holds good in Nature so far as it means the Nature of Science, *i.e.* Nature as extended in and conceived under, the concept of space. The opposite view is true of reality. This contradiction disappears when we separate from the world as it is in itself the perceptual form of space which makes it "Nature". If Nature is always extended in space and thus given as matter, then the subject to whom it is given is not given in space, as Lotze has shown against materialism. With Descartes Lipps therefore regards the self-consciousness of the ego as an undisputed and unimpeachable certainty. The "sum cogitans" stands on the threshold of all idealism, of the Berkeleyan, no less than the Fichtean idealism. Spinoza was wrecked on the problem of self-consciousness for which he could not indicate a corresponding mode on the side of extension. The "ego" remains the last anchorage of certainty in the midst of a series of phenomena. If Hume with Spinoza resolved this 'ego' into a bundle of representations or Mach into a complex of sensations, what does it matter? The isolation of the atoms that press against one another must be checked. The constancy in the flow of our sensations, the connecting function of unity, which creates first order in the head, then order in the world, cannot be given externally like

space or sensible perceptual image, but must lie *a priori* in us as a function of unity. Only "things" can be given to us, not functions of elaboration, of logical connection. These we must ourselves put into the objects. Thus the philosopher of feeling, Lipps, comes near Kant. But he does not rest in Kant; on the contrary, he steers bravely towards Fichte when he calls his standpoint itself "absolute ethical idealism". (See the penetrating critique of Arthur Drews, "Lipps as a nature-philosopher," *Propyläen*, Vol. V. Nos. 32-33 of the 6th and 13th May 1908). For Lipps the dualism of thing and appearance, of appearance and function (Stumpf), of object and representation is overcome. The object goes without a remainder in the subject. The individual ego knows itself as a part of the world-spirit and as the being of the appearance of even this world-spirit which falls to its lot. This is the decisive surrender of psychologism to logicism. Only fragments and ruins serve as a pathetic reminder of the fact that in Lipps we have to-day to do with the remnants of psychologism.

The psychological philosophers of value of the school of Brentano form a small separate group in Austria which, if we ignore its remoteness, divides itself into two branches. E. Meinong ["*Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie*" (1894)] forms the right wing. On the aesthetic side, his disciple Witasek, the colleague at Graz, has boldly supported his doctrine, whilst Chr. v. Ehrenfels in his two-volumed "*System der Werttheorie*" represents the left radical psychological wing and Kriebig's "*Psychologische Grundlegung eines Systems der Werttheorie*" (1902) occupies an intermediate position.

The division into the enquiry into causes (Nature) and the enquiry into values (history) has often been accepted, since Wilhelm Windelband in his rectoral address of the year 1894, entitled "*Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft*" (now printed in the third edition of his *Präludien*, Tübingen, Mohr 1907) laid the foundation of the philosophy of norms and expounded

the fundamental difference between nomo-thetic and idio-graphic methods with that clearness which all his writings exhibit. What Windelband in this school-forming speech has thrown out as an outline, apparently, as a sketch, in reality, however, as the most decisive *motif* of his philosophical view of life, his disciple, Heinrich Rickert in "Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung: Eine logische Einleitung in die historischen Wissenschaften" (Tübingen 1902) has built upon firm ground and has developed, to the great joy of his master, with a strictly architectonic compactness. The "philosophy of norms" presents itself in the architectural finish which Rickert gave it, as a magnificent structure of thought with two side-wings, of which the first runs through the science of history and the second logically establishes political economy and the social sciences. The science of history especially—so says Windelband again in a speech entitled "On the present position and problem of Philosophy" which he delivered before two grand-dukes in the Castle of Karlsruhe (*Präludien* p. 20)—the science of history, which ought to represent the conceptually formed universal collective memory of our race, requires, as its chief aim and chosen principle, a system of universal values. The philosopher of to-day requires therefore "a critical theory of the value of culture". For it is only as an historical being that man, according to Windelband, reaches the world of spiritual values. The "philosophy of norms" has before it the final problem which Windelband clearly and concisely formulates: As the world of laws and the world of values, the kingdom of *must* and the kingdom of *ought* are united in a highest spiritual unity (*Präludien* 1907 p. 23).

The point of coincidence of nature and history is consequently just as much the highest problem of philosophy as was the agreement of the two substances in Descartes, of the two attributes in Spinoza, of the external and internal senses in Locke, of the window-less monads in Leibniz, of the

phenomenal and noumenal worlds in Kant. The occasionalistic solution of Geulinx and Malebranche, to which Spinoza gave the setting of the theory of parallelism and Leibniz that of pre-established harmony, Kant rejects, as is well known, as "amphiboly of reflective concepts," whilst Lotze again accepts it in a modified form. And Lotze maintained his point against Kant. For apart from the fact that Kant himself accepted the teleological view of history, which was not justified by the theory of knowledge from the standpoint of the "Critique of Pure Reason," nay, apart from the fact that Kant himself points out in the (Critique of) "Judgment" that there might be between Nature, which moves according to the mechanico-causal plan and which is regulated according to constitutive laws, and the teleological process of history; which seems to be regulated according to regulative principles, a hidden connection—strictly speaking, this is the problem of Windelband—we cannot get rid of the question, Whence arises the anticipation of reality through our logical functions? How is it that the forms of our perception or thought, no matter whether they are the originators, products or conditions of the interpretation of the world from the standpoint of identity, suddenly have the power, if not to portray the world, at least so to anticipate it that the sum, world, goes without a remainder in our logical functions? Why does the concrete reality of the world of things conform to the logical truth of our world of representations? Where does the common region of knowledge in logic and mathematics come in contact with the region of reality in physics and biology? If the contents of our representations were given generally to us simultaneously with the unchangeable laws of their logical connection, then we should all have the same forms of connection as well as the same contents, which is absurd. Or, conversely, if the contents of representations and the form of their connection were given individually,

then it would not be conceivable how two individuals could be affected by the same objects in the same way. Here we are threatened with the Charybdis of innate ideas, there with the Scylla of solipsism. From the constancy of the activities in the subject we are therefore forced to conclude that even in objects something regular must go on, as otherwise it would not be possible to conceive why we are affected by the same objects always in the same way and by different objects in a different but constant way. If the subject can change the contents, and can stamp upon them its form of connection, the contents cannot arise from an arbitrary formless stuff, a lawless "thing in itself" but from a regular orderly agent, which owing to the constancy of the manner in which it affects us, produces a constant effect upon our central nervous system.

This regular correspondence of the inner and the outer, of the world in the head with the world outside the head, is the strongest counter-argument which the correlativists (Erhardt, Busse), modern occasionalists and the representatives of the "standpoint of reality" (Külpe, Dürr) advance against all one-sided phenomenalism and against all shades of neo-idealism. Psychology and history, Külpe thinks, are a living protest against every one-sided idealistic view of the world. Against the phenomenalism of Mach, O. Külpe (*Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland*, 3rd Edition 1905, Teubner, p. 25) makes the following objection: The sensations as such are a *rudis indigestaque moles* out of which everything or nothing can arise, which, however in itself is neither solid truth nor a falsehood and deception. O. Külpe treats neo-idealism, even the voluntaristic neo-idealism of his master Wundt, no more generously than the phenomenalism of Mach. It is not quite clear, says O. Külpe, even in Wundt what the relation is between the unrestrained reality of experiences, occurrences, objects of representation and the rationally conceived reality of

the objects or things of thought. Still there cannot be two such realities lying side by side so far as they relate to the same facts. Either that only which is found in experience is true—in this case all metaphysical efforts are manifestly in vain—or our thought has really the power to create and determine reality—in that case experience, although the starting-point of, and guide to, inquiry is not in itself real. In any case, we have here the problem of reality which requires a thorough treatment before the being of the world can be determined in the manner of idealistic metaphysics by reference to the permanent reality of consciousness and the sciences of reality. Külpe's book on Kant (Leipzig, Teubner 1907) is inspired by the same spirit.

Külpe's *Kant* occupies a mean position between Paulsen's popular work on Kant (*Fromann's Klassiker der Philosophie* 4th Edition 1907), H. St. Chamberlain's capricious work *Immanuel Kant. The personality as introduction to his works*, (Munich, Bruckmann 1905) and G. Simmel's more profound monograph on Kant (Sixteen Lectures). In popularity Külpe rivals Paulsen and Kronenberg (3rd Edition 1905), in the height to which his thoughts soar, he equals sometimes Chamberlain, in penetration and depth, he comes, especially so far as the critical faculty is concerned, near Simmel. The gist of Kant's thought is given briefly and correctly (at p. 152), everything essential is cleverly and precisely stated and thereby the *Æsthetic* of Kant which is elsewhere treated with scant justice, by Paulsen, for instance, treated most cursorily, is described and critically examined without compromising in the least his own standpoint. Thereby, the book is made so far different from an apologetic of Kant that it goes to the root of the fundamental axioms of Kant's thought, the doctrine of space, time and the categories through a critical and in some places destructive examination. Strict Kantians, like Ludwig Goldschmidt, fall therefore under the judgment of Külpe's book on Kant. Külpe's criticism of Kant's statements

on space, time and the *a priori* nature of the categories, as also on the subjectivity of the forms of thought, cannot be ignored by any expert. Külpe shows that Kant's theory of knowledge suffices for a theory of formal knowledge but does not succeed in explaining reality. Kant has neither said that the *a priori* character of certain factors of knowledge signifies their subjectivity nor shown that this subjectivity constitutes their proper condition of reality. Very cautiously Külpe points out the necessity of the reality-standpoint represented by him. It is only in our days that the theory of the sciences dealing with reality and their peculiar methods and principles is first handled. A great part of it, however, still lies before us as an uncultivated land. My intimate colleague at Bern, Ernst Dürr, Külpe's former assistant, has treated of this *terra incognita* in his *Grundzüge einer realistischen Weltanschauung* " (Leipzig, Thomas 1907). Külpe feels that his standpoint is akin to that of Stern's work *Person und Sache* which will be mentioned presently, and that of Eduard V. Hartmann since the appearance of his book "*Kategorienlehre*," but he strikes out his own path which lies in the direction of the "problem of reality" which Külpe places in the front. Here the reader is to be referred to the convincing argument against one-sided idealism at pp. 28-43 of the book mentioned above. Dürr's work is an indication that Külpe and his school of the "reality-standpoint" have begun to build a system. To the personality of Kant Külpe dedicates the concluding chapter which in the warmth of feeling and delicacy of perception cannot easily be surpassed by the Neo-Kantians of the Marburgian school. The school of Cohen has, besides, to fight against several armies for its existence. The strong, but unfortunately extremely personal attacks of the young and even somewhat boyish Friesians in Göttingen (Nelson, Grelling) ought to be mentioned as symptoms of a movement of philosophical thought of our days that excites the passions. Cohen's influence upon neo-idealism I have already

sketched several times in *Sinn des Daseins*, so that I have no need to return to the ways of thought of the Marburgian school whose value has already been estimated by me.

The reality-standpoint of Külpe, the correlativism of Erhardt and Busse (about which the study of my pupil Dr. J. Sinnreich, called "Der transcendente Realismus oder Korrelativismus unserer Tage" in my "Berner Studien zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte," Vol. 40 Bern, 1905 gives information) and the transcendental realism of Eduard v. Hartmann as also of his zealous champion Arthur Drews in Karlsruhe, come in contact with one another, as we shall show later in a more detailed manner, and with the "philosophy of norms" in this, that they all go beyond observation and the natural causality of the external world in the same manner, in order, with the help of an inductive speculation, such as, according to Dühring's statement, Galileo used, to effect a connexion with the world of values and purposes. For the results of the sciences of reality, especially, the exact ones, they have all great respect. If Külpe says, "Philosophy moves not past the sciences but through them," Windelband thinks that the metaphysical doctrine of philosophy can only move through the totality of the remaining scientific work and arise from it (*Präudien* 1907, p. 9). The norms in the world of values and purposes may be different from those of the natural world, but they are not opposed to them as something remote and foreign. A norm is for Windelband rather a definite form of psychical movement and a form that has been introduced through the natural laws of the life of the soul. All norms are, consequently, special forms of realisation of the laws of nature. They are those forms of the realisation of the laws of nature which, under the assumption of universal purposes, should be sanctioned. "Reason," so Windelband concludes his essay "Normen and Naturgesetze," (*Ibid* p. 317) "is not created, but is contained in the endless manifoldness of the process having the

necessity that nature has; the only point is that it is known and determined by consciousness."

The fundamental relation of the idiographic to the nomothetic method, of the science of history to the science of nature, is thus conceived by the "philosophy of norms." There the question is of a connection among values, here, of their conformity to law. The problem of the "philosophy of norms" is, on the one hand, the determination of the value of axioms, which alone make natural science possible, on the other, the determination of the value of teleological necessity which alone can explain history. Those universal values or norms without which the fulfilment of our purposes cannot be imagined, are: truth in thought, goodness in the will and action, and beauty in feeling. These Windelband calls (*Präludien* 1907 p. 350) "the immanent necessity of the teleological connection." The critical method of Windelband which had its origin in Kant and Fichte, differs from the genetic method of the psychologists chiefly and essentially in this, that it recognises something necessary and absolute, a logical and historical *a priori*. All axioms, all norms are to him only means to the attainment of objects of universal validity. The lasting greatness, as well as the historical importance of Fichte lies in this, that he recognised clearly the teleological character of the critical method and so determined the problems of philosophy as to create a system of necessary (in the teleological sense) actions of reason. Fichte "deduced normal consciousness as a teleological system."

This teleological view of Windelband also runs through the repeatedly-quoted work of his most famous follower Heinrich Rickert. For Rickert nature is a system of universal concepts. The logical distinction between the universal and the particular underlies the distinction between Nature and History. Nature, according to Rickert, is, methodologically, reality with reference to the universal as opposed to the particular, and on the other hand, so far as its actuality is concerned, reality, viewed

apart from all question of "value" as opposed to culture Rickert understands by "value" acceptance or rejection, approval or disapproval, longing or abhorrence. As in Windelband and Fichte, so in Rickert's "Philosophy of Norms" the teleological standpoint of history predominates. The Kantian problem, Are there objects *a priori*?, transforms itself into the question, Are there *a priori* values? More strictly, the question is, Are there *a priori* culture-values? Rickert speaks of the historical individuals as "teleological unities" and finds culture-values only where there is also a teleologico-historical evolution considered from the philosophical point of view of history, "Nature" itself is to him only a product of human culture-work. For every judgment of approval has value only for him who wills truth. This will is therefore the last *a priori* of every science (p. 673). Consequently, Rickert thinks, just as Fichte and before him Berkeley did, that it is not possible to dispense with the conception of the over-individual valuing subject. Not upon an *is* but upon an *ought* rests therefore all knowledge. Openly and frankly runs Rickert's acceptance of the philosophy of Fichte. The standpoint of epistemological subjectivism (that is to say, the theory of knowledge of Fichte) makes it possible to obtain values as the basis of all knowledge.

From this Neo-Fichteanism which also Rudolf Eucken, especially in the writings on the subject of the philosophy of religion accepts, two branches diverge. Eduard v. Hartmann in his last writings and his successful disciple Arthur Drews in the preface to his new work on Schelling (Publication in 3 Vols. Leipzig 1907) pronounce the watch-word of neo-Schellingianism with which, as we shall see later, the evolutionism of Spencer, the energism of Ostwald and the whole of neo-vitalism are in sympathy. As these branches are treated separately, it is unnecessary in this place to discuss them in detail. A second direction of neo-idealism which turns towards Hegel and tends towards resolving

the neo-Kantianism of the Cohen-Natorp type, which in its final shape surely met Hegel half-way, into neo-Hegelianism, proceeds from two recent psychologists. The Breslau thinker L. William Stern, whose works had hitherto been of much service to psychology, published in the year 1906 the first volume (Introduction and fundamental principles) of a grand system of philosophy completed through several volumes, to which he gave the characteristic title *Person and Thing* (Leipzig, Barth). And Hugo Münsterberg, the well-known German-American psychologist at the Harvard University, where he works with the pragmatist (or better, neo-positivist) James and the strict theist Josiah Royce (to the latter his work is, moreover, dedicated) publishes likewise his "outlines of a world view" under the title "Philosophy of Values"* (Leipzig, Barth, 1908). Whilst Stern sets forth as a prelude the chief thoughts of his system in an introductory volume in which, however, he admits frankly all that he owes to Leibniz and Hegel, Münsterberg presents his whole system, in the brief space of 481 pages (as against 434 pages of the introductory volume of Stern) in a strictly schematic form and in the shape of that triadic rhythm which Kant's table of categories brought into existence but which was greatly developed by the constructive *finesse* of Hegel. Münsterberg formerly started, like Windelband and Rickert, from Fichte who has left unmistakable marks in his *Psychology* which are not completely erased in his *Philosophy of Values*, but the more he proceeded with his construction, the more irresistibly did he move, perhaps without suspecting it, surely without intending it, in the grooves of Hegel. The Italian, the Englishman and especially, the Dutchman and the American have clung tenaciously and steadfastly to their Hegel. In

* This book has also been published in America under the title, "The Eternal Values" (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1909). The references that occur here as well as in the pages that follow are to the German Edition—Translator.

America they have special magazines devoted to Hegel, they have made standard translations of Hegel's works, nay, have established for the time being a well-formed Hegel-cult, whereas in Germany people were so far from accepting the Hegelian cult that no dog would take a crumb of bread from him.

The old guardians of Hegelianism, Michelet, Werder and Lasson in Berlin, made great efforts to keep Hegel's name living, but their efforts were in vain. The verdict of death was pronounced; Hegel and his school were dead, as dead as a doornail. The cries of his last heralds died away without being heard. Even a first class funeral was denied him. The scientists boycotted him, because Hegel was guilty of mistakes in the region of physics, and the verdict ran—Guilty. Scorn and ridicule were the thistles which were placed in the second half of the nineteenth century upon the grave of the great magician of thought who as a dialectical Pied Piper of Hamelin once electrified and hypnotised the world. And now this resurrection. The Dutch philosopher Boland rendered great service to Hegel in his misfortune. The most funny thing about the tendency of the twentieth century in favour of the Hegelian philosophy is the caprice of history that the revival of Hegel had its origin in such a radical psychological Titan as Münsterberg was in his youthful days and in exact experimental psychology which smiles scornfully at all metaphysics, and treats Hegel with a half-compassionate, half-contemptuous shrugging of the shoulders. That Germany gave birth to two experimental psychologists who began like Balaam by cursing and now have to bless, is just a stroke of genius of the Hegelian world-spirit which in the twentieth century—enriched by experimental psychology—returns to itself. That is the way in which world-history jokes at neo-Hegelianism which only the gods of Olympus can appreciate and reward with Homeric glee.

Stern frankly accepts metaphysics, whilst Münsterberg

approaches it stealthily and timidly. To the old "horror vacui" there was united, since the reign of positivism, a horror of all that is called metaphysics, and Münsterberg has not yet completely overcome it. Stern and Münsterberg are no less teleologically inclined than Windelband and Rickert. The telephobia of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from which suffered the greatest thinkers from the time of Descartes, has diminished since the appearance of K. Ernst V. Baer's "Zielstrebigkeitslehre" and has at last given away to a telephilism. The enquiry into causes whose method was already shown by Bacon (*vere scire est per causas scire*) and which Spinoza placed on the throne of philosophy, inasmuch as he characterised the "causa sui," the metaphysical twin sister of Aristotle's 'unmoved moveable' as substance, as God or Nature, makes room for the enquiry into values. Mechanism, the recognised autocrat from the time of Descartes to that of Leibniz, must share its rule with its born-enemy, teleology, if not abandon its rule in its favour. If, namely, mechanism meant with Leibniz and Eduard v. Hartmann a special case of an enveloping (transcendental) teleology, then teleology is raised to the rank of the highest generic notion or factor of explanation of the occurrences of the world, and mechanical causality becomes subsumed under this highest generic notion as a subordinate conception. As since Spinoza, the cause, so since Leibniz, telos, has been substantialised. Conformity to the laws of the world is conceived as a special case of a transcendental conformity to the purpose of the world. *Causae efficientes* are the species, and *causae finales* the genus. Aristotle gains victory over Democritus, Leibniz over Spinoza. And this is the character of the philosophy of the twentieth century. Neo-idealism in all its shades, especially, comes near the line of thought of Aristotle and Leibniz, while it keeps at a distance from the one-sidedness of strictly naturalistic thought, the pure causal method of explanation of Democritus, Galileo and Spinoza. It is not without reason that Karl

Stumpf in his rectoral address in Berlin of the year 1907, called "Die Wiedergeburt der Philosophie" repeatedly asserts that Leibniz is in touch with the great advance of mathematics and the natural sciences. Leibniz was in closest touch with the great advance made by mathematics and natural science in his days, nay, he himself took part in it as one of the greatest scientists. For this and no other reason Leibniz is still living. That the modern logicists, with Couturat at their head, return to Leibniz, we have already clearly pointed out. But even the modern nature-philosophers with Ostwald at their head and the modern vitalists under the lead of Driesch accept Leibniz, as does the modern metaphysician of the type of L. William Stern.

The personal share of Stern in the philosophical debate consists in his contrast between things and persons. By *the standpoint of things*, Stern understands the mechanico-materialistic, by *the standpoint of person*, the teleologico-spiritual view. Under *person* Stern conceives such an existence as, in spite of the multitude of its parts, in spite of the multitude of the functions of its parts, produces an identical, purposive self-efficiency. Person has reality, spontaneity, individuality, activity and claims a separate value among the values of the world. Person is teleological and is an end in itself. *Thing*, however, is the opposite of person. It consists of several parts, whose aggregate it is, it forms no real, individual and individually valuable unity; it is quantity; it is mechanical; it serves a foreign purpose, and thus does away with the "identical, purposive, self-efficiency" of the person. Stern's problem is the relation between the person and the thing, or, expressed in traditional terminology, between teleology and mechanism. This problem is resolved by Stern into the old problem of the universals. Regarded from the standpoint of the whole work, the synthetic method is the method which is indicated and the universe is viewed teleologically and from the standpoint of person

from the standpoint of the parts, however, the logical method is analytic, and the explanation so given an explanation of things. Person and thing (these are with Stern the names of the two Spinozistic attributes, thought and extension) do not run parallel, as they did in Spinoza, but everything mechanical has with Stern, just as it had with Leibniz, a teleological meaning. Leibniz says: Everything in nature happens necessarily, but the laws of mechanics themselves arise from a higher law of purpose. Mechanism and teleology are not arranged similarly, do not run parallel like the attributes of Spinoza, but mechanism is subordinate to teleology. The same is true of the *pantelism* and the *teleomechanism* of Stern who characterises his position as that of 'critical personalism'. It would be very tempting to follow the neo-idealistic line of thought of Stern whose power of building a system has been proved by an excellent synthesis of Leibniz and Hegel where the abundant crop of scientific theories and psychological views is suitably and quietly built into the logical frame of his construction. As Stern's first volume, however, shows only the groundwork of a comprehensive system and not the system in its totality, we had better betake ourselves to Münsterberg's "Philosophy of Values" (1908) whose system lies before us clinched and riveted. If Stern gives a preliminary sketch of his principal ideas in his introduction, we can follow Münsterberg step by step to his final conclusion, from which it becomes manifest that in the conception of his system, Münsterberg could not have referred to Stern's work, even if he knew it at all. Münsterberg quotes almost nothing, not even the philosophers of his way of thinking, Fichte and Hegel, and his method is to omit all express mention of the names of the philosophers who are of the opposite way of thinking to him, but discreetly to make them known to those who are familiar with these things. Thus, he repeatedly sets himself in opposition to Husserl, Simmel and Rickert without expressly mentioning their names. An examination of, or even a reference to,

the person-thing-theory of Stern I have nowhere found in Münsterberg. And yet in their fundamental teleological conviction, the two thinkers are closely allied, however different their starting-points and however divergent their results may be. Only, Stern teaches the primacy of "person" over "thing" *i.e.*, of the teleological over the purely mechanical view, whilst Münsterberg seeks to revive the primacy of the pure values over 'valueless' nature in all the regions of thought, feeling and will. As with Fichte the ego opposes to itself a non-ego (nature), so with Stern the standpoint of person opposes to itself that of thing. With Münsterberg, who separates the world of facts from the world of eternal values, in order to construct a 'self-contained system of pure values,' the over-individual or universal values stand opposed to nature which for him is only another name for the aggregate of valueless fundamental things. The fundamental scheme of neo-idealism is therefore: science and spirit with Dilthey, nature and history with Windelband, nature and culture with Rickert, person and thing with Stern, nature and value with Münsterberg.

By *philosophy of values* we have to understand an absolutising or substantialising of the conception of value. Whilst James and the neo-positivists distinguish themselves by a relativising of value, Münsterberg seeks, in clear contrast to pragmatism, to make a *priori* the conception of value. In the teleological view, Münsterberg sets himself in opposition to the pragmatists, on the one hand, and the phenomenologists of the type of Mach, on the other. For with Münsterberg and Rickert everything logical is in its deepest essence teleological, as it is with the pragmatist, James, who sees in all ideas only the useful devices or constructions, and the phenomenologist of Mach, who sees even in the unity of the ego a sort of Aristotelian entelechy, a 'unity of purpose'. While on this subject I cannot forbear making the historical observation that the theory of thought-economy of Mach and Avenarius,

whose deepest meaning lies in the reference of the logical to the teleological, is set forth in the third book of Locke's *Essay concerning human understanding*, the book dealing with the philosophy of language, in great detail. The theories of knowledge of Mach and James are contained in the third book of Locke's fundamental work which Riehl in the second edition of the first volume of his *Philosophischer Kritizismus* has occasionally called the English "Critique of pure reason," whilst Münsterberg fast approaches the standpoint of Locke, as depicted in the fourth book of his *Essay* where Locke's change is completed and he passes from empiricism to rationalism, from the *verités de fait* to the *verités éternelles*. James has remained the same psychologico-empirical philosopher of value that Münsterberg was in his youth before his destiny ordained otherwise. Münsterberg, that is, has burnt all bridges behind him and with waving flags has gone over to the side of the a-priorists and logicians. He keeps as much at a distance from James as he turns energetically towards Royce. Münsterberg is to-day by far the best logician among the philosophers of value. His "philosophy of values" transforms itself greatly into a "metaphysical system of values". Münsterberg's arguments against scepticism, positivism, psychologism and pragmatism are not unknown to us. Both the historians of scepticism, Goedeckemeyer and Richter, who have kindled anew the dispute between the Pyrrhonic sceptics and their opponents, especially, the Stoics, show clearly that the older scepticism represents a strong arsenal of finely polished and sharp dialectical weapons. Deeper insight into the nature of scepticism, says Raoul Richter (*Der Skeptizismus in der Philosophie und seine Überwindung*, Leipzig 1908 p. 527), leads to its conquest and greater familiarity with it means not a nice determination of its nature but the abandonment of this idea so far as systematic philosophy is concerned. What is novel in Münsterberg's fight with scepticism and psychologism is the adaptation of

the old arguments to the customary thoughts and scientific views of the twentieth century and his fight becomes interesting through this, that it is directed against the Münsterberg of former days. He who dived so deep into psychologism as the author of *Willenshandlung* and *Der Ursprung der Sittlichkeit* knows the logical weakness of empiricism so thoroughly that after he developed a leaning towards Fichte and the "philosophy of norms", a leaning already exhibited in his *Grundzüge der Psychologie* (Leipzig 1900), he became a merciless critic of the philosophy of his earlier years as no other man had become. The temperament of Münsterberg cannot tolerate either lukewarmness or superficiality. As he once was an out-and-out psychologist, so he is now the most radical logicist who goes beyond the moderate and cautious logicism of Husserl and does not yield even to Cohen in firmness and consistency.

Münsterberg's 'philosophy of values' requires a "teleological structure of the world", after the model of that of Aristotle and consequently, the completion of the teleological pyramid, just as the strict rationalists of Descartes' school, especially of the type of Spinoza, have postulated the completion of the logical pyramid. Thus the God of Spinoza conceived through the *ratio intuitiva* is no other than the logical premiss of the world. Even the reasoning of Münsterberg is similar to that of Cartesianism. The celebrated dream of Descartes which Calderon in *Leben ein Traum* depicted so well and so poetically, returns stereotyped in Münsterberg. His metaphysical formula, "will to the world" places before us several times in his work the alternative—either an experience or a world. If you wish to escape from the "senseless chaotic confusion" of the psychologist and to distinguish your waking consciousness from dream-consciousness, then you must recognise unconditional, over-personal and over-causal values. We are forced, says Münsterberg (p. 38), to believe that there is a world. This will to the world he calls (with Fichte, but without

referring to him) the original act which gives an eternal meaning to our existence and without which our life is an empty dream, a chaos, a non-entity. Whoever does not follow this step is for Münsterberg an "advocate of meditation." Either the will to the world or dream, *tertium non datur*. For the true world fulfils itself in "pure values" and pure value is the only *a priori* in the world. He who does not accept this will-act does not take part in our common world, decrees Münsterberg.

Here the voluntaristic neo-idealist Münsterberg is caught in the net of logical conception whose prisoner he now becomes. It is true that the disquieting possibility "that it may be an illusion that we assume unconditional values" occurs to him, but he very soon lapses into silence and with the help of opiatives taken from the dispensary of logic lulls to sleep his psychological conscience which continues to live in a latent condition on the threshold of his consciousness and bursts into an eruption in innumerable places in his works. But Münsterberg does not reflect that with his arguments he has fallen completely into Cartesian ontologism. Only while the rationalistic Cartesius, by giving an epistemological turn to the old ontological proof of God's existence, derives the necessity of existence from the necessity of thought, Münsterberg, as true voluntarist, deduces the necessity of being from the necessity of placing, consequently, being from doing (Fichte), necessity of the world from the necessity of our values. What is this but voluntaristic ontologism? As Descartes makes use of the conception of God as the highest perfection, by which the ineradicable individual imperfection is to be measured, so Münsterberg requires a highest value as standard of objective comparison to which all particular values are to be referred. Here, as there, the path is from the personal to the overpersonal, from the relative to the absolute, from psychological dream-life to logical waking life, from the arbitrariness of

individual existence to the "imaginary ideal existence," which according to Descartes, the world, and according to Münsterberg, simply the judgments of value, have created out of themselves. There is only this difference, that whereas the conclusion of Descartes and more specially of Spinoza, the strict rationalist, is that God consummates the logical pyramid of thought, for Münsterberg, the strict voluntarist, God consummates the pyramid of values. The rationalists resolve the world into "pure logic," the voluntarists, on the other hand, into pure values.

Has, then, for Münsterberg, Kant lived in vain? Can one to-day pass over Kant's destructive critique of the ontological argument, to which, besides Spinoza attached so little importance that he did not prove or demonstrate his Substance (*deus sive natura*) but 'laid it down' or 'determined' it as axiomatically as Fichte did his ego? Or do Kant's reflections hold good more as against the value of the ontological proof of God's existence in the form in which Cartesius puts it, than as against that of the voluntaristic proof of Münsterberg? Does the necessity of being of the world follow with greater right from our over-personal necessity of values than from our over-individual necessity of thought? The opposite seems to me the truth. Rationalistic ontologism with its logico-mathematical axioms, its *verités éternelles* as logical postulates, such as appear in Descartes, Locke (in the fourth book of his Essay), Spinoza and Leibniz, stands the critique of Kant better than the voluntaristic ontologism of the "philosophy of values." For the *petitio principii* of Münsterberg, as of all voluntarists and philosophers of value, namely, that of a "pure" will, be it the individual will, the world-will (Schopenhauer) or the will of values (Münsterberg) can be got rid of by the rationalists as it is actually done by Ebbinghaus and Külpe, who deny that the individual will is a special power of the soul, and finally oppose, to the extent of negating it completely, a world-will or a value-will. But the same

possibility is not open to the voluntarists. They cannot deny the *petitio principii* of the intellectualists, namely reason, for to deny it they must already have it. The existence of a will can justly be questioned but ever since the formulation of the *sum cogitans* of Descartes, the existence of thought cannot be doubted. Consequently, the voluntaristic ontologism of Münsterberg appears to me to feel the sting of Kant's "hundred thalers argument" more than Descartes.

In no way could Münsterberg's "metaphysics of values" ignore the Kantian critique of all ontologism, the more so, as he himself claims to be a "critical metaphysician" in Kant's sense. Only he puts in place of the Kantian question, which Windelband and Rickert approach, Is there any *a priori* 'ought,' the extremely voluntaristic one, Is there an *a priori* will? Can there be pure will acts? Yes, replies Münsterberg. The world of values is the only true world, the only world which proves its own existence. It exhibits a triadic rhythm which Münsterberg adopts (from Hegel) and develops as accurately as Hegel. There is a "system of triple values," the value of preservation, the value of agreement and the value of practice. As the fourth element there is added to this, perfection of the world which contains in itself the Münsterbergian philosophy of religion.

The framework in the "structure" of Münsterberg's "Philosophy of Values" shows a system-building power and constructive elegance joined to an energy of thought which places the experimental psychologist Münsterberg in the front rank of our scientific metaphysicians. That we require an inductive or empirical metaphysics which takes into itself the sciences of reality, is admitted to-day in many quarters, even by Külpe. That Münsterberg not only has his views of the results of natural as well as of spiritual sciences, but has put them systematically and with considerable descriptive skill in his "system" cannot be doubted by anybody who is familiar with philosophical movements. His "system of

eightfold three groups of values" by which each of the twenty-four values is shown to be a branch of one and the same value possesses architectonic beauty and the transparency of a crystal. The "table of pure values" which Münsterberg introduces before elaborating his system is formed according to the threefold measure of external world, fellow-world and inner world. The values are divided into values of life and values of culture, which are each further resolved into four principal groups, namely, into logical, aesthetical, ethical and metaphysical values. It is this attempt at a classification of the sciences from the standpoint of "the philosophy of values" which can claim equal rank with the similar attempts of the positivists (D' Alembert's "Discours preliminaire" in the great "Encyclopaedia," Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer). If one grants Münsterberg's fundamental formula, "will to the world" and takes with him, as with his model, Fichte, the fatal leap from the individual to the universal ego, or, more correctly, from individual will to the pure will or willing ego, there is considerable logical sequence in the subsequent development of the system.

Münsterberg diverges from Rickert and Windelband. With him nature is "the world of things with reference to its identity," while he understands by history, "the world of willing beings from the point of view of identity" (p. 121). He thus removes not only the 'ought' of the philosophy of norms by the strict adoption of the 'will' but he also does away with Windelband's fundamental distinction of idiographic and nomothetic methods. He distinguishes, on the other hand, three regions, nature, history and reason, which give rise to three groups of knowledge, natural sciences, historical sciences and the sciences relating to value. Without directly mentioning Rickert, as Münsterberg proceeds without making any quotation whatever, he directs his exposition straight against Rickert whose standpoint is attacked by several persons, especially severely, by Riehl in the collection of isolated essays called

Systematische Philosophie. Rickert is for him still too rationalistic. Münsterberg has become the most extreme advocate of voluntarism. Even thought is for him, will; this was also what Berkeley taught. Spinoza's proposition, *voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt*, holds good with Münsterberg; only, Spinoza resolves the *voluntas* into *ratio*, whilst Münsterberg resolves the *ratio* into *voluntas*. Nature which is the object of thought is the only nature which is true. The 'mythology of the scientist' does not contribute anything to the true values of nature. Nature is the "connection of things," history the "connection of beings (men)" (p. 149). To discover historical connections means to work out the identities of the will. Thereby there is secured for us the charm of seeing the author of *Willenshandlung* defend indeterminism as strongly to-day as does his pragmatist oponent, William James, whose indeterminism even Friedrich Paulsen (in his preface to the German translation of Jame's *Will to Believe*) does not like. The deterministic Saul of former days whose bold act once caused a thoughtful shake of the head but who on account of his freshness and self-confidence was greeted as a man of promise, has changed into an indeterministic Paul. The 'willing' being, who appears in history, is for Münsterberg now "a free being"; he teaches therefore the "freedom of the will in history". The absolute connection of values through identity in history is for him now "real history," as the mechanical connection is "true nature". This "will to the world" is beyond time and space. We get in this way a system of identity of will-atoms (p. 168). The Leibnizian monadology seems here to translate the rationalistic into the voluntaristic. With Münsterberg the unities (atoms, monads) are no unities of representation, but unities of the will in the Schopenhauerian-Indian sense of identity, *tat twam asi*. It is not individual positing but over-personal requirements which bind individuals.

The voluntaristic logic of Münsterberg flows into a

Hegelian realism of ideas. Ideas live. They form a system. The connections of ideas constitute the "system of reason". The values are referred to the formal background of the Absolute, the values of truth, no less than the values of beauty. Into the voluntaristic logic fits a voluntaristic aesthetics just as well as a voluntaristic ethics and mathematics.

Happiness as the feeling of pleasure has naturally no place for Münsterberg in the region of "pure" values. Happiness is will, but only happiness that is "over-personal happiness". As Kant demanded as criteria, necessity, and universality, so Münsterberg demands over-personality. The world is for him in the "over-personal sense" the more full of values for this, that happiness shines in men's souls. Only, happiness is with him no ethical but an aesthetic value. Leaning towards neo-idealism which he calls "logically devoid of conscience" he reaches metaphysical evolution-values in the sense of the logical evolutionist Hegel, whom Münsterberg in the concluding portion of his *Philosophy of Values* approaches. Even the anthropocentric standpoint of Hegel has lost its horror for him. Man is for him "the aim of nature" which will pass from man to the over-man. Only he who assists in this serves the striving of nature for its objects. Nature exists that the free man may rule over it. "It will be its own theatre and tool," for the "fundamental will" of the world tends to become more than a mere experience. The object of all values relating to action, as indeed of all culture, is "the over-personal universality of the will". Thereby light is thrown upon the "value of domestic economy". It is not in vain that Münsterberg has lived in America and written in his leisure hours a much-talked-of work on America. He includes domestic economy along with science and art in the "pure" culture-values, and even says, "Nature fulfils in the light of consciousness its own mission; it is the meaning of domestic economy" Domestic economy is the purposive evolution of the outer world, law, the purposive

evolution of the fellow-world and ethics is the purposive evolution of the inner world. The triadic rhythm of Hegel is strictly adopted. And if an impulsive scoffer says of the Hegelian tripartite division that it suffers from "gout," one must admit that Münsterberg's threefold division is employed much more naturally and developed much more clearly than the many-sided system of Hegel. Only while the Hegelian *logos*, the worldspirit, marches like a god, with measured steps and solemn grandeur through the stages of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, indicated in the self-unfolding of *logos* as measured by the time of three crotchets, Münsterberg's "will to the world" gallops spiritedly, though not with such impetuosity and unruliness as the blind "world-will" of Schopenhauer, through the three regions, nature, history and reason, in order finally to return to itself much enriched, as once did the *logos* of Hegel.

And so has Münsterberg departed from Fichte and approached Hegel. His "act of conviction" through which the 'I' has expanded into the 'all,' from which the "kingdom of values" has sprung, stands firmly on Fichte's ground. Also that values are missions which will be fulfilled and that all "original being" signifies life, effectiveness, action, and finally, that the 'I' which expands into the 'all' is regarded as the fundamental ego or super-ego—all this is as strict Fichteanism—if we ignore the Nietzschean phraseology—as is the original striving of the all-ego, that is, the metaphysical idea of conation. We seem almost to be listening to the very words of Fichte and his *ordo ordinans* when Münsterberg says that the ego posits by an act of conviction the super-ego, because it is a simply necessary value for every thinkable ego. "The world is an act"—so ends Münsterberg's work with a Fichtean refrain which has become very familiar to our ears through J. Reinke's *Welt als Tat*. But the Hegelian tendency in Münsterberg is stronger and rules the whole construction of his system

of values. His philosophy of religion, moreover, falls completely under the charm of Hegel. The over-personal value of God, the development of a fundamental agreement between religion as the value of life, and philosophy as the value of culture, the justification of creation, revelation and miracle, of the inspired holy Scripture (p. 427) of the thought of a future life, of the longing for emancipation, immortality, "emancipation through timeless bliss"—all this is as much a paraphrase of the strict Hegelian philosophy of religion as the metaphysics of Münsterberg is a running commentary of Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* in its final form and a commentary that takes up and properly works out the results of all the scientific views of our age. One can ridicule the system, thus, after a celebrated model: "If you accept Fichte's voluntaristico-energetic conception of substance and follow it up with the dialectical method of Hegel with the help of the empirical enquiry, through the three regions, nature, history and reason, you obtain Münsterberg's 'philoeophy of values'."

We do no injustice to the neo-idealism of Münsterberg if we attempt to expound it historically and deduce it from the philosophical movements of our days. The "return to our great men" is the catchword of our days. Philosophy is not a land of "unlimited possibilities." The number of logically permissible world-pictures is a limited one. And as the greatest thinkers of all ages have preferred to expound an idealistic view of the world, it is no wonder that neo-idealism turns again towards its old established gods and especially, that iconoclastic materialism breaks up logically. The rhythm of world-history evidently demands that the false deities of materialism be resolved into the gods of idealism, or as Münsterberg nicely puts it, in all ages Platonic idealism has demanded its over-historical and evidently valuable right.

If Avenarius and Mach, James and Schiller, along with Protagoras and Hume, have restored the dignity of "pure" experience, the reaction was not long in setting in. To the "pure" experience of the positivists and psychologists opposes Hermann Cohen "pure", logic, Windelband "pure" norms, Münsterberg "pure" values. Democritus or Plato; Protagoras or Aristotle; Spinoza or Leibniz, naturalism or idealism—so will the catchword of philosophy run as long as there are thinkers. Since the connections of the world as they are given to us by mathematics and natural science in a sort of Cartesian "universal mathematics of the cosmos" cannot be given or deduced completely, we must fill up clearly the remaining portion, the hiatus in nature and history. If we interpret this connection in the world metaphorically and fancifully, there arises a poetic view of the world. If we view it in its connection with our feelings, desires, longings, hopes and strivings, there arises a religious view of the world. If we view it, however, in relation to ideas, we get a philosophico-metaphysical view of the world. The classical philosophers expound the connection in the world according to their nature either in the form of an epic or didactically; the romanticists, on the contrary, the emotional thinkers, explain it lyrically or dramatically. As there are only a few types of poetry and a comparatively small number (6) of great types of religion, so there is a small number of metaphysical views of the world which can be consistently developed and into which the results of the sciences of experience can be easily fitted. In every age, therefore, the same eternal problems are investigated with changing views and worked out thoughtfully. It is thus not for lack of a philosophical creative power that we return again and again either to idealism or to positivism. But the strong conviction that the possible types of views of the world have been essentially exhausted in the grand systems of our great minds, led the neo-idealists first back to Kant, then to Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. We can from the scientific

knowledge of a given age always add new concepts to the permanent views of the world, but we can do this only by working upon the already present material of knowledge. Idealism has always been and will always remain the most ornamental frame for the views of the world. And so it is psychologically perfectly conceivable and justifiable that our neo-idealists are ready, in close or loose connection with the heroes of thought, to fill up the gaps of our knowledge by means of conceptual poetry and to put their views of the world once more into the idealistic frame.

CHAPTER II

THE NEO-POSITIVISTIC MOVEMENT

(*The "pragmatism" of William James.*)

Motto:—What is fruitful is alone true.

(Goethe).

As neo-idealism finally returns to Kant and Plato, so the neo-positivism of to-day, especially, in its American form, goes back to Hume and Protagoras. Also positivism has been revived and made to bloom again. We have again coined a favourite philosophical expression which has become the war-cry of a new line of philosophical thought, a new philosophical movement that has drifted powerfully to the old hemisphere and begun to let loose the waters of our native thought. It calls itself pragmatism whereas we call it neo-positivism. The "re-birth of philosophy" which this year's rectoral address of the Berlin philosopher, Karl Stumpf, has brought clearly into view, produces a powerful echo on the other side of the ocean, where for the last few decades philosophy has begun rapidly to advance. We are accustomed to look upon the New World as a philosophical colony of the old world, especially, of German philosophy. But just as this former English colony freed itself from its mother-country in order to grow into an important nation in the world, so again the American spirit begins in right earnest not only to demand, in the region of philosophy, as in all departments of knowledge, its intellectual equality and recognition of its having come of age, but also to claim a certain leadership. The country which was formerly the most important market for our goods is in intellectual things, as in agriculture and industry, in commerce and technique, now ready not only to

import but also in great measure to export. The new generation is not content with a passive balance of trade. It seeks to colonise, makes a fatal opposition to the English mother-country, treads under foot German industry, blows the Spanish Armada to atoms and puts a check upon the youngest of the rising nations in the Far East. But in spiritual things also the nation holds a powerful competition. The learner wants to become the teacher. The United States maintains at the suggestion of the German Emperor a connection with Germany, the classical land of Science, and specially, of philosophy, that is, it stands on a footing of intellectual equality with it. America sends to the Berlin University philosophers (Peabody, Adler) whose discourses not only evoke a certain amount of attention but are received very warmly.

A systematic philosophy the Americans do not yet possess. Malebranche and Berkeley, the Scots and Locke were their first teachers. The first American thinker of original power, Jonathan Edwards, stands as much under the influence of Malebranche as Benjamin Franklin stood under that of the English utilitarians of the old type, especially, Bacon. Between utilitarianism and spiritualism oscillates American thought, just as much as English thought has oscillated from the thirteenth century between nominalism and realism. To the great nominalists from the time of Duns Scotus, Alexander von Hales, Roger Bacon and William Occam, there stood in opposition as a solid phalanx the realistic Dominican thinkers. But Francis Bacon and Hobbes, Locke and Berkeley, Smith and Hume had also their realistic opponents in the Neo-Platonists of the Cambridge School and in Scottish philosophy (Reid, Stewart, Brown). Lastly, the pronounced English utilitarianism, which, considered in the light of the theory of knowledge, shows itself as the nominalistic doctrine as applied to ethics, has produced, under men like Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, an idealistico-spiritual counter-movement which has

its centre in the school of Thomas Hill Green whom Bradley and Caird follow. The American branch of this "transcendental" or spiritualistic current which begins with Ralph Waldo Emerson and finds in William T. Harris (in the "Journal of Speculative Philosophy" which he founded in 1867) true dialectical representation, flows into the premier university of America, the Harvard University, in which forthwith the typical representatives of modern nominalism and realism (they are called to-day pragmatism and transcendentalism or idealism) cross their well-sharpened swords. On the side of the idealists at Harvard stands Josiah Royce, the leading spirit of American spiritualism, whom, as we have already seen, his German-American colleague, Hugo Münsterberg, closely approached in his *Philosophie der Werte, Grundzüge einer Weltanschauung* (Leipzig, Barth 1908). And just as in the thirteenth century at Oxford the Franciscans under the lead of Alexander Hales, who with Duns Scotus and later with William Occam supported nominalism, opposed the Dominicans who represented, with Albertius Magnus and later, Thomas Aquinas, the realistic view of universals, so fights to-day the universally acknowledged premier psychologist of America, the pragmatist William James, who also is a professor (emeritus) of the Harvard University (in which University Peabody also works) with his idealistic colleagues, Royce and Münsterberg.

Ben Akiba's saying that there is nothing new under the sun is true with regard to pragmatism. Neither the name nor the thing is new. And William James who, though not in point of time the first to propound this doctrine, is yet by far the most effective preacher of this mode of thinking, has the good taste to add an apologetic sub-title *A new name for old ways of thinking* to his lectures on "Pragmatism", an excellent translation of which by the Vienna philosopher, Wilhelm Jerusalem has appeared (as the first volume of a collection called *Philosophico-sociologica works* edited by Dr. Rudolf

Eisler with Dr. Werner Klinckhardt in Leipzig in 1908). This has silenced all criticism. For a new name, especially in the modest garb of popular lectures, does not excite any special interest. But the matter lies deeper. We see in "pragmatism" the signs of a neo-positivistic movement in the twentieth century. James's popular work is its herald. From the days of Helmholtz, Huxley and Mach we have been accustomed to listen with rapt attention to the popular scientific lectures of important persons and to expect from them fundamental principles. In James's *Pragmatism* the question, when closely examined, is not of a book which has by chance come before us in a German garb—Peabody's lectures, too, have now been translated into German—but of a great spiritual wave which has struck us from beyond the ocean for the first time and calls for timely notice. Pragmatism may provoke opposition. Just for this reason an analysis is necessary. The question is of a real movement started by a man whom as a psychologist and philosopher of religion we do not for a moment hesitate to place in the front rank of contemporary thinkers. If the new volume of "American philosophy" which J. Woodbridge Riley has recently edited, does not contain any notice of the pragmatic method (it quotes James only once, namely, at p. 157) and if, as it restricts itself to the "early schools", it does not value pragmatism at all, every new number of American philosophical magazines (and not only American) shows that pragmatism is at this moment in everybody's mouth. At Harvard it has become a shibboleth of academic philosophers and we predict for this fashion in philosophy not certainly a long life, but a life which is all the more intensive for its not being long. For this movement has kindled the national temper to a white heat. It flashes in the minds of all. Powerful sparks are kindled by this tournament of American thinkers. The Americans introduce a new ingredient into philosophical prolema which it has greatly missed since the Renaissance, namely, humour. Not with personal attacks and

bitter invectives should one fight, as formerly the Byzantine humanists fought with one another, but with excellent wit and brilliant satire. Instead of the club which the humanist and the Renaissance philosopher rudely and mercilessly used, there appears now the pliant and flexible Damascus blade.

Already in his two-volumed work "Psychology" William James has struck this note. It is an eminently personal book and that without any detriment to its strict scientific character. Humour bursts in sometimes in the middle of serious arguments. I have in mind especially his words on the "dear old man" and "German Gelehrter" in his fine account of Fechner (*Principles of Psychology* 2 Vols. 1890 Vol. I., p. 549) James's theory of the stream of consciousness, as well as his refutation of Herbert Spencer's mind-stuff theory are among the most important contributions to contemporary psychological literature. Everywhere James is an artist and actor of great power. Since the time of Schopenhauer there have not been struck notes of such power. The Mephistophelian element of the characteristic Schopenhauerian humour, the corroding and wounding elements of his biting sarcasm we find as little in the optimist or rather as he calls himself, the "meliorist"—William James, as the enthusiastic raptures in the prophesying oracles of the philosophical apocalypst Nietzsche. But James's method of description has also a good measure of that compelling force which has its origin in the incomparable writers, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. The humour reminds one of Schopenhauer and the enthusiasm, of Nietzsche, and a happy combination of these two ingredients explains the lasting effect which this American philosopher has begun to produce, first in America, then in England, France and Italy, and finally, in Germany.

If the catchword of the pragmatic method is activity, effectiveness, power, then the neo-positivistic movement has very well stood the pragmatic test. It works. It

creates unrest in people's minds, provokes strong opposition, finds, however, also strong agreement, in short, it puts life and movement into the philosophical discussions of our days. This neither John Dewey in Chicago, nor the logician, C. S. Peirce of the John Hopkins University, nor lastly, the representative of "Humanism," F. C. S. Schiller, men whom James himself claims as the fathers or godfathers of pragmatism, could have done without the aid of the propagandist power of such a vigorous, strong-minded and stout-hearted writer as William James. As a method William James had long employed pragmatism before he accepted the name *pragmatism*. Ten years ago (1898) he first introduced the title *pragmatism*, though he had been acquainted with it, as I learn from Schiller, since 1875. But the acceptance of this title and the proclamation of it as a philosophical war-cry were things that took shape at once in the bold temperament of William James. In his *Varieties of Religious Experience* James gives an account of the history of the origin of pragmatism. Already in his *Will to believe* (New York 1897) and in his brilliant and sympathetic *Talks to Teachers* (New York 1899) he employed generally the pragmatic method. James brought a hornet's nest about his ears. He became the target of American, English and French Journals. Dialectical sarcasms were hurled right and left, from all quarters. Even the aristocratic "Revue Philosophique" broke its reserve. In the number for February 1906 it contained a spirited critical essay by Lalande. Besides, the "Revue Philosophique" had already in the number for December 1878 and January 1879 brought out a French version of that important essay of the American logician Ch. S. Peirce which Peirce a short time ago had published in the American magazine "Popular Science Monthly" under the title, How to make our ideas clear. But Peirce himself used only the method of pragmatism without introducing the name. In oral conversation with James he indeed often

used the term, but in public he used it first in 1902 and has been using it since, as he himself narrates in the "Monist" for April 1905 and in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy* Vol. I. p. 321.

In the centre of the philosophical discussion of our days, however, pragmatism has first been placed by James's latest book *Pragmatism. A new name for some old ways of thinking. Lectures delivered at the Lowell Institute in Boston in November and December 1906 and in January 1907 at the Columbia University in New York*. These spirited lectures, full of the humour of a Dickens, James has dedicated to John Stuart Mill with the following characteristic words: From whom I first learned the pragmatic openness of mind and whom my fancy likes to picture as our leader were he alive to-day. These dedicatory words we shall have for the present to keep before us if we enter into a critical examination of pragmatism. James's book met with success. With a truly American speed this book has travelled to the old world. In April 1907 James writes the preface to his *Pragmatism* and in the November of the same year Wilhelm Jerusalem, the Vienna translator of his book, publishes his preface. We think and act with a quickness which would have seemed monstrous to our idyllic philosophical ancestors. At the end of the same year, whilst James delivered his lectures on pragmatism at the Columbia University in the State of New York there was in everybody's hands not only the English text but also the German translation. That, however, pragmatism is in everybody's mouth will appear from the following array of facts. The first two January numbers of the American magazine "The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods" namely, the numbers for the 2nd and 16th January, 1908 contain a very important critical examination of pragmatism by Arthur O. Lovejoy, entitled *The Thirteen pragmatisms*. And as if James meant to forestall these thirteen

attacks by counter-criticism, he published in the January number (1908) of the American "Philosophical Review" (Vol. XVII, No. 1) an essay called "The pragmatist account of truth and its misunderstanders," in which he dealt with seven mistaken views and meanings of pragmatism with perfect composure. Of *rabies philologica* and *furor teutonicus* which are unfortunately apt to accompany such polemic discussions in the Old Continent, no trace is happily to be found in the dialectical tournaments of this land. People are and always remain gentlemen. Differences of opinion are treated with a gentlemanly laugh, but never with an ill-humoured criticism or denunciation. The good tone on both sides works beneficially. The January number (1908) of Xavier Leon's "Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale" (Vol. XVI, No. 1) gives not only the first place to an essay by Emile Boutroux, the esteemed leader of French philosophers, called "*William James et l'expérience religieuse*," but contains also an essay by D. Parodi, entitled *Le Pragmatisme d'après W. James et Schiller*. In the opening pages of the January number of Ribot's "Revue Philosophique" of this year we find a second essay by A. Lalande, called *Pragmatisme, Humanisme et Vérité*. In the January number of the English Journal "Mind" (New Series No. 65), I. Ellis Mac Taggart examines James's pragmatism (pp. 104-110). In Italy Papini takes up warmly the propaganda of pragmatism in the magazine "Leonardo". Only in Germany people take up everything hesitatingly and half-heartedly. People offer "passive resistance". The latest edition of Ueberweg-Heinze (10th Edition, Part IV, 1906) has no doubt taken cognizance of pragmatism. Professor Mattoon Monroe Curtis, the compiler of the book on American philosophy, writes correctly: Psychologically expressed, pragmatism is the belief that ideas always strive for realisation and that spiritual life is always teleological. Logically expressed: Logic formulates schematically what regulates life, for concrete experience, for

practical purposes. Its philosophical meaning is the belief that all facts of nature physically as well as spiritually find their expression in will. Will and Energy are identical. This view agrees with the practical tendencies of American life and thought, whilst it sets a definite limit to idealism. The January of 1908 which was so fruitful for pragmatism brought also two publications in Germany. In the "Philosophische Wochenschrift" Dr. Richard Müller-Freienfels writes a good instructive essay called *William James and pragmatism*. Lastly, Wilhelm Jerusalem, the translator of *Pragmatism* and the energetic supporter of this mode of thinking, published in the "Deutsche Literaturzeitung" of January 25, 1908 (Vol. XXIX, No. 4) an instructive introduction to pragmatism. If we now consider in their totality all the phenomena that have been produced by pragmatism, it appears that it has produced effects as no other philosophical system has done, since the time of Nietzsche.

II

OF THE HISTORY OF THE TERM PRAGMATISM.

In the "Archiv für systematische Philosophie" (vol. XIV No. 2 of May 25, 1908 pp. 143-155) I have tried to give a history of the term *pragmatism*, to which I can only refer and which I cannot repeat here, as it goes very much into details and possesses interest rather for the specialist. Only that which is of general interest will find a place here in the form of extracts.

In Aristotle the expression *πραγμα* has the meaning which Peirce and James give it. Aristotle understands by this term sometimes the real, given in accordance with experience, as opposed to mere thought or the pure objects of thought (*entia rationis*). In his logical writings and in his "Metaphysics" Aristotle repeatedly distinguishes between thought (*διανοια*) and reality (*πραγμασι*). It is not without reason that James

counts Socrates and especially, Aristotle, among the fathers of the pragmatic method. "Pragmatism," says James, "is absolutely nothing new. Socrates was a follower of it. Aristotle made a methodical use of it. Locke, Berkeley and Hume made with its help important contributions to truth." But it is not the method only, the empirico-inductive method which Aristotle employed greatly along with syllogism and deduction, that goes back to Aristotle, but the use of the terminology and the naturalisation of "pragmatism" have their origin in the Stagirite. In Socrates and Plato the expression occurs only incidentally and occasionally and only in opposition to *ὄνομα*; in Aristotle it first gets the colouring of logic and of the theory of knowledge. It means now the concrete, as opposed to the abstract, the real as opposed to mere thought, the individual psychological experience, as opposed to the logical connection, in short, the *vérité de fait* as opposed to the *vérité de raison*. What we regard as thing-in-itself, object, fact, experience, representation, (in one word, the real) is psychological reality, whilst the *διανοία* is an eternal logical truth. The teaching of James with Locke and the English sensualists, namely, that judgments which have no reference to things but only to representations are either true or false, is a piece of the old Aristotelian furniture. Things or objects, Aristotle has already said, are real or unreal, representations are only true or false. Ethically viewed, this truism of the theory of knowledge means in Shakespeare's Hamlet as in old Heraclitus and Giordano Bruno that the good and the bad are the same. Things are in themselves neither good nor bad; understanding makes them so.

Pragmatism, so far as its object, if not perhaps its effect, is concerned, is nothing else than a theory of truth. The search for a new criterion of truth lends life and colour to this brilliant philosophical movement which has spread with lightning speed. The sixth lecture of James's *pragmatism* bears the title: Pragmatism's conception of truth. The direct

entrance to this movement, the article of Charles Peirce in the American magazine "Popular Science Monthly" for January 1878, bearing the title "How to make our ideas clear" (French translation in Ribot's "Revue philosophique" of December 1878 and January 1879 under the title: *Comment rendre nos idées claires*) is nothing else than a programmatic announcement of a new criterion which was not yet christened *pragmatism*. This criterion of truth of pragmatism—the usefulness of knowledge, its utility, its effectiveness or power to work, C. S. Peirce himself in a later essay (*What pragmatism is*, *Monist*, April 1905, p. 171) has formulated clearly and compactly: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." Before this, Georg Simmel, whom James certainly claims as a typical pragmatist—with incomparably greater right, moreover, than R. Eucken, whose doctrine of activity is directed far more towards Fichte than towards Mill and Spencer—has formulated the doctrine in a still more compact form without knowing the name *pragmatism* or even without thinking of this view which was then in an embryonic state. The essay "Über eine Beziehung der Selektionstheorie zur Erkenntnistheorie" concludes with the words which might stand as a motto for pragmatism: The utility of knowledge creates for us at the same time the objects of knowledge (p. 45).

Simmel saw already in the utility of knowledge the primary factor which develops modes of action, so that originally knowledge is not first true and then useful, but it is first useful and then called true. From Simmel this criterion of truth, so far as it points to a selective act, gets that biological turn which from the time of Avenarius and Mach has become the ruling idea. The thought itself is pure Leibnizianism. Leibniz admits existence only of that which works (*quod non agit, non existit*. *Quod agit, est substantia singularis*). In

England and America this criterion of truth is given the surname *instrumental* (as opposed to 'normative').

The American logician, John Dewey (*Studies in Logical Theory*, Chicago 1903), gives a turn to this empirico-inductive or instrumental logic, whilst the Oxford philosopher F. C. S. Schiller in a series of works (*Axioms as postulates* in the collection *Personal Idealism*, 1902; *Humanism*, 1903; *Studies in Humanism* 1907; *Humanism and Humanism*, 1907, *Plato or Protagoras?* 1908) seeks a more rigorous presentation and attempts to extend the instrumental method, which up to now held good only in the province of logic, to all departments of knowledge, and, with the help of an impressive and forcible style, to bring it before a wider circle of readers. Schiller stands philosophico-historically on firm ground and sees like myself in Hume and Protagoras the forerunner of pragmatism which he, moreover, regards not as a separate philosophy, but as a separate method. At first pragmatism sailed under different colours. Pragmatists of a more logical turn of mind called it at first 'intentional' or 'instrumental.' James was a radical empiricist before his acceptance in the year 1898, in his lecture before Professor Harrison's philosophical society at the University of California, of the term 'pragmatism' and before his application of it in the province of religion (Compare *Pragmatism* page 47). Schiller was in favour of the title *Humanist*. And thus, considering the whole movement, we can say: The same struggle which raged in the last decade in Germany between psychologists and logicians—the polemic treatise of Melchior Palagyi gives the best account of the nature of the problem—takes on the other side of the ocean the form of a skirmish between pragmatists and pure spiritualists or idealists. Protagoras is the model of the first (Schiller follows Protagoras and Hume just as much as Laas and Mach), Plato of the second. A new wine put into old bottles! The feeling-element in James's pragmatism owes its origin to Protagoras; method and expression, on the other

hand, owe their origin to Aristotle. In his letter of the 4th June, 1908, F. C. S. Schiller writes to me promising that he will prove that the Aristotelian doctrine of *φρόνησις* is pure pragmatism.

James himself states as follows regarding the history of pragmatism : 'The name comes from the Greek word *πραγμα* which means action, from which root have come our words *practice* and *practical*. This etymological derivation of James is, to say the least, one-sided. We have shown with the help of the terminology of Plato and Aristotle that *πραγμα* meant originally matter, things, object, reality, and thus smelt more of the theory of knowledge than anything else. The "object itself" was a favourite expression. Pragmatism originally had not the meaning which James attached to it, namely, that of being "practical," "useful," "willed," "striven," "intentional." The word *πραγμα* first received the meaning attached to it by James at the hands of the Stoics, the typical representatives of pragmatism in the modern sense of the term, that is to say, the meaning of 'intentional,' 'useful,' 'extremely teleological.' As is well-known, the Stoics were the representatives of that cosmico-anthropocentric utilitarianism, which took the needs of men as the measure of reality and truth.

The more the word *πραγμα* is used, the more is emphasis laid on the practical significance which was placed in the foreground by James and Peirce, just as the post-Aristotelian philosophy shifted the centre of gravity of thought from theory to practice, from logic and physics to ethics. It is not the good that is referred to the true, but the true is now referred back to the good. And this is the central thought of the pragmatism of Peirce and James. The important point in the theory of knowledge of Peirce and James is *consequences*. As we learn from the first utilitarians of importance, the Cyrenaics or Hedonists, a morality of consequences, *viz.*, that which was later called by Bentham and Mill utilitarian morality, so it is reserved for pragmatism to formulate a logic

of consequences. The definition of James should therefore be placed by the side of the above-mentioned definition of Peirce (Peirce has, moreover, repeated his definition in Baldwin's Dictionary under the heading "Pragmatism"). Pragmatism, according to James, is the doctrine that the whole "meaning" of a conception expresses itself in *practical consequences* (the italics are mine), consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to be expected, if the conception be true.

It is very remarkable that according to his own statement, Peirce received the stimulus to his pragmatic method through reading "Kritik der reinen Vernunft" (*Dictionary of Philosophy* Vol. II p. 322). As once Kant was roused from his dogmatic slumber by Hume, so was Peirce by Kant. But Peirce adds: The same way of dealing with ontology seems to have been practised by the Stoics. Yet for him who was from the beginning a mathematician of the school of Weierstrass, whose doctrines he in the same place accepts, the logical formulation of the pragmatic problem was the proper stimulus, whereas James strikes a predominantly psychological line and is interested philosophico-religiously, so that the true fertilisation of the "new method" owes its origin to Kant. With the charming modesty of a perfect gentleman, Peirce states, as James did in the year 1896 in *Will to Believe*, that his method is well-grounded and fixed in the practice of mankind, without employing the term 'pragmatism'. "The doctrine appears to assume that the end of man is action—a *Stoical axiom* (The italics are mine) which, to the present writer at the age of sixty, does not recommend itself so forcibly as it did at thirty".

Thus the historical genesis of pragmatism, which was admitted by its founder himself, runs clearly thus: The expression comes from the language of Plato and Aristotle, whilst the theory itself owes its origin to a leaning towards the "Stoical axiom". The kernel of the whole problem is the

primacy of the will, the practical reason, as Kant would call it, over thought. Consequently James is a much more strict voluntarist or activist than even Wundt; he comes rather close to the doctrine of the primacy of feeling over the understanding, as this occurred in the English feeling-philosophy of the eighteenth century and celebrates its recurrence to-day in the psychological school of Th. Ribot in France with Horowicz and Ziegler in Germany and lastly, in the "Weltanschauungslehre" of H. Gomperz in Vienna (1908). The Schopenhauerian voluntarism receives at the hands of James, as at those of Ribot, a Hamann-Jakobian turn which Goethe once stated in the compact form: Feeling is everything.

If pragmatism owes thus its theories to the Stoics and the necessary stimulus to Kant, who likewise gives practical reason primacy over theoretical. Kant is also the innocent cause that has made the word *pragmatism* obtain currency in the daily philosophical transactions. I am thinking here less of the title of Kant's anthropology to which Kant himself has given the name *in the pragmatic view*, than of Kant's preface to this work in which he contrasts the pragmatic with the physiological view. "Man's physiological knowledge rests upon the inquiry into that which nature makes out of men, the pragmatic, upon that which he as a free being out of himself makes or can and shall make". Thus, for example according to Kant, all rules dictated by prudence are pragmatic. (*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* p. 42 Rosenkranz's edition). Everything practical which secures man's welfare he calls pragmatic. "The practical law arising from the motive of happiness I call pragmatic". (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 611). Pragmatism would thus be with Kant a rule of wisdom or a formula of utility having by chance the power of convincing people. The important characteristics of necessity and universality are found wanting in pragmatism; it is only a belief and not knowledge

(Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 623). And this belief is not a necessary but an accidental belief. "I call such accidental beliefs as, however, are essential to the true use of the means to certain actions, pragmatic beliefs" (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 628). It is seen that according to Kant a pragmatic conception of truth as James and Schiller represent it to-day, represents almost the lowest stage of the knowledge of truth. James made much of the expression "pragmatic" for which Kant shows always a touch of contempt, to which at all events is assigned a low place in his scale of values, because Kant rejects absolutely all utilitarian calculation, as once the Gueux and the Sans-culottes did. The term of contempt has been changed into a title of honour—a complete inversion of Kantian values. Utilitarianism is just the undertone of pragmatism. And this practico-utilitarian presupposition is as much jarring to the ear of the German idealist of Königsberg as it is pleasing to the "smart" Americans. Utility is for Kant a counter-argument against absolute moral values, and thus a pragmatic-utilitarian way of thinking or acting has value only as showing the direction, as signboards or the alphabetical order of librarians, dictated as they are by practical considerations, are better than absolute want of order. But such a pragmatical arrangement is at best an artificial one, and although a very useful scholastic classification, is no natural classification. The difference between the pragmatical scholastic classification and natural classification is, according to Kant, a fundamental one. Scholastic classification seeks to bring creatures *under a name*, natural classification *under a law*.

Here is the whole difference between the pragmatism of to-day and the Kantian view. The pragmatical method of James and Schiller holds good, according to Kant, for a "physics of morals," for "anthropology," but not for the "critique of practical reason." For the pragmatic method may give us only prudential laws or instructions as to how to behave, but

never binding, compelling principles, categorical imperatives. It confines itself within the kingdom of the relative, but it fails as regards the absolute. This is, however, just what James wants. The absolute is for him a purely limiting conception. He consciously abandons the idea of a metaphysics of morals in order to confine himself to a physics of morals (empirico-inductive sociology). If Kant objects that with the help of the pragmatic method one obtains at best a scholastic order which shows the direction, but no natural order that commands, James will reply "It is just what I want. I am a dialectical democrat. I hate therefore everything absolute, an absolute idea, not less than an absolute monarch. Both tyrannise and I hate tyranny of every kind, including the tyranny of ideas. I allow myself to come under a *suprema lex* as a prudential imperative, but never as a categorical imperative of the *voluntas regis*—whether this is called 'rex' (King, Kaiser, Czar) or being, substance, God; I resign myself, however, in the true interest of the 'suprema lex,' to the *salus publica* because I thereby become a partner, a fellow-constituent, a sharer of happiness. If the scholastic orders have such far-reaching effects and power to work that they can guide constitutional kingdoms with hundreds of millions of men, as has happened in the case of all the western culture-systems—parliaments, constitutions, republics or monarchies are still surely nothing else than scholastic orders—then such a pragmatic scholastic order can hold its own against the so-called absolute natural order under all circumstances. The absolute 'idea' and the 'categorical imperative' are only twin sisters of the absolute monarch and absolute Jehovah." Here pragmatic relativism and the Plato-Kantian doctrine of absolute idea cross their swords.

The expression "pragmatic" had a historical note long before the time of Peirce. The pragmatic sanction of Charles VI fixed the Austrian succession according to utilitarian considerations, and has thereby given currency

to the expression *pragmatic*. And in the German language, too, a prudent, calculating, clever man is called—without any evil suggestion—a pragmatic head. In historical works, especially, the word “pragmatic method” has obtained a wider currency than Peirce and James ever dreamt. The “Lehrbuch der historischen Methode” (Text-book of historical method) of Ernst Bernheim devotes a whole chapter to the pragmatic method in history. Bernheim characterises the pragmatic method of treating history in the following way: Here a substance has value not only in itself but for definite utilitarian purposes, one must learn something for practical purposes from events. The first representative of repute of pragmatism is Thucydides. Polybius actually introduced the term *πραγματικὴ ἱστορία* (Historien lib. I Chapter 2). The defect of the pragmatistical method in history is its subjectivity and the tendency of its being employed at the cost of reality. And these are also the rocks by which the philosophical pragmatism of James and Schiller, as we shall show later, will have to steer.

But since the days of Thucydides pragmatism has not only had full civil rights but it has been in use for the last fifty years in philosophico-historical descriptions. Whence Peirce got the word *pragmatism*, whether it was from Kant or from Aristotle, he himself cannot say. The expression was in the air. Peirce himself says (What pragmatism is, *Monist* April, 1905) that thirty years ago he first introduced in his already-mentioned work the thing, but not the name *pragmatism*. Only in oral conversation did he use this expression, till James, who in his *Will to believe* had not at all used the word, took up the word and made it a philosophical catch-word. I have stated in my book *Leibniz and Spinoza* (Berlin, Reimer, 1890) that it was the same with Leibniz with his word *monad*. He discovered it, it is true, accidentally in Plato and Bruno, but it was first during his joint stay with his disciple, van Helmont, with Queen

Charlotte that he definitely adopted and introduced this name, which was raised to great importance by van Helmont. Besides, Pierce is not the only one who has adopted the term *pragmatism* to denote his theory of activity, but simultaneously with, and independently of, him, the French thinker, Maurice Blondel, the representative of a "philosophie de l'action" accepted it. André Lalande states in his article "Pragmatisme et Pragmaticisme" (*Revue philosophique*, 1906, p. 126) that Blondel in reply to his question, how he arrived at the term *pragmatism*, answered in the following way: "Je me suis proposé à moi même le nom de pragmatisme en 1888 et j'ai eu la conscience nette de le forger, n'ayant jamais rencontré ce mot, etc." He explained in his book *Action* the difference between *πραξις* *πραγμα* and *ποησις* and decided in favour of "*pragmatisme*" for a time, whereas Peirce used it only in oral conversation. There is, however, nothing wonderful in this "doubling" of the phenomenon, rather this character is explained by the pragmatic way of writing history which was then in vogue. Conrad Hermann had already written in the year 1867 a *History of philosophy treated pragmatically* (Leipzig, Fischer). There Hermann says with regard to the pragmatic method of writing the history of philosophy that the "pragmatic expression seemed to him the most proper" for a historical narrative like his own (Preface, p. VII). The pragmatic expression indicates in itself only the simply actual or the properly real in things, and so far as it indicates this, it is apparently identical with the conception of a simply descriptive or purely empirical exposition of history (Ibid, p. VIII) Hermann, consequently, places himself as he says at p. 463 sq., in conscious opposition to the speculative method of Hegel. "Pragmatism is the only true scientific principle for the treatment of historical matters. The essence of all historical pragmatism is this, that it eliminates the accidental from history and places

causal necessity in its stead. The pragmatic method has to bind the given particulars into a whole series. The pragmatic method does not operate with principles but with facts." In a separate work *Der pragmatische Zusammenhang in der Geschichte der Philosophie* Conrad Hermann had already sketched his programme, according to which all historical pragmatism must have a determinate practical object. It is precisely this practical point of view which has manifestly charmed James. He had no need after all to give the old method a new name. Moreover, the method is evident in Thucydides and the moralists who hold that might is right; the name itself, however, has from the time of Polybius a historical, from that of Plato and Aristotle, a philosophical note.

III

THE PRAGMATIC METHOD.

Pragmatism offers us no new theory of the world but gives a new colouring, a new appearance to that positivism which has been current from the days of Protagoras.

The essence of the pragmatic method lies in the reference of the logical to the teleological. Every method of classifying things, says James, (*The Will to believe* p. 70) is a method of employing it for particular purposes. Concepts, classes are teleological instruments. An abstract concept can only be equivalent to a concrete reality if it satisfies the special interest of the man who thinks it. Gustav Ratzenhofer speaks thus of an "inherent interest" which not only represents in the world of social forms the foundation of all events and actions, but also claims along with it metaphysical significance. The pragmatic method recognises the primacy of practical over theoretical reason, of action over being. As with Fichte, and later with Leibniz, so with pragmatism, all "being" arises from "doing." James gives the following description of this primacy which is

characteristic of his style: The fundamental question regarding things which first arises in the mind is not the theoretical one "What is that?" but the practical one, "Hold! who goes there?", or better, as Horowicz has beautifully expressed, "What do I seize?"

If a new experience can be placed in satisfactory connection with other parts of our previous experience then it is true. Still more strict is the view of pragmatism advanced by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce in his essay, "How to make our ideas clear" (Vide James's *Varieties of religious experience* p. 444) namely, that beliefs are the laws of our actions. The mode of action suggested by a thought constitutes its whole meaning. In order to get a clear understanding of a problem, we need only inquire what sensations this or that hypothesis—sooner or later—would cause to be experienced by us and how how we should have to arrange our actions if it were true. Lastly, James adds his own formula. Theories are not answers to riddles but only instruments. Pragmatism will establish no definite results but claims to be a radical empirical method. It removes from "all theories their angularities and makes them smooth and workable." As it is nothing essentially new, it harmonises with many old philosophical theories. Thus it agrees with nominalism in this, that it clings everywhere to the particular, with utilitarianism in this, that it everywhere takes the practical standpoint, with positivism in the contempt it has for all merely verbal solutions of problems, superfluous questions and metaphysical abstractions. In the last James clearly accepts positivism.

The voluntarist James would, however, go a step further and place among his predecessors the great voluntarists and energists, from the followers of Duns Scotas to Fichte with his formula "Being arises from doing" and Nietzsche with that of "will to power." In reality, in pragmatism the question is of nothing else than a consistent development of

the doctrine of the primacy of practical reason, not, it is true, in the sense of the Plato-Kantian realism of ideas but in the style of that pure nominalism which made its appearance in England in the thirteenth century and has since settled there. For in these English nominalists, as in James to-day, extreme voluntarism was joined to the doctrine of the primacy of practical reason, an epistemological nominalism to ethical individualism. English positivism is the true foster-father of American neo-positivism.

Viewed correctly, positivism, radical empiricism, nominalism, voluntarism, ethical individualism and political liberalism are logically most closely connected with one another. It is also not an accident that this doctrine has its origin in England, the land of haughty sailors with their theory, "My house is my castle," their Habeas Corpus Act and their Magna Charta. Everywhere the individual is the central point. If the question is one relating to knowledge, personal conviction is the criterion of truth and this arises from things, from objects, experiences, individual facts. Hence that cult of facts which the English have always held, and to which they have made offerings of innumerable theories and metaphysical systems. Only the individual is real (*universalia post rem*). For knowledge this individual is fact, experience; for the will, individual action; for religion and morality, individual conscience; for the State, finally, individual citizens. For the "*vérités éternelles*," in the Platonic sense the English have only a poorly developed organ. The "Cambridge School," the English Neo-Platonists (in whom Arthur O. Lovejoy in *Kant and the English Platonists*, 1908, sees the ancestors of Kant), the Scots and the Neo-Hegelians of to-day, like Green, Caird and Bradley, form only branch-streams in England, while the main stream of English thought flows from the days of Duns Scotus, Alexander of Hales, Roger Bacon, Sir William Temple and Francis Bacon into the nominalistic-utilitarian

bed. And this riverbed has been called for more than six centuries *matter of fact*.

It is not to no purpose that James refers to John Stuart Mill as his patron-saint. Pragmatism puts nominalism, which was the old English tradition and which had its greatest triumph in Berkeley and Hume and reached its maturity in Mill's inductive logic, into the frame of that biological method which has been the ruling method from the time of Darwin and Spencer. The coincidence of the pragmatic method with the results of Avenarius and Mach is not an accidental one, however Mach may have arrived, independently of Avenarius, at his principle of thought-economy which Locke had already asserted. If one looks, for instance, at the old problems in the age of the evolutionary view of the world which has come into being from the days of Lamarck, Erasmus Darwin and Lyell, from the standpoint of biology which has become the authoritative one from the time of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer, one must expect similar solutions, as the assumptions required by thought are of the same nature. There is here no question of priority but only a natural coincidence of similarly conditioned, positive-minded thinkers who think again the old riddles of philosophy. Owing to the close resemblance of their starting-points, the unintentional coincidence of purpose in neo-positivism is not only conceivable but inevitable.

Just as the energists of to-day cling through Leibniz to Aristotle who was the first to promulgate a dynamico-energetic view of the world (he even made the term *ενεργεια* popular) based upon a theory of evolution, and just as the neo-vitalists of to-day under the lead of Driesch and Reinke hold the Aristotelian conception of entelechy and place it in the centre of their system, so the pragmatists of to-day hold to the conception of object of Aristotle who first advanced the doctrine of "practical reason" and claimed for it primacy long before Duns Scotus and Kant. Schiller states clearly the connection between pragmatism as a method and the

doctrine of Aristotle. Heinrich v. Stein in his "seven books on the history of Platonism" has brought out the significant fact that for two thousand years philosophical thought oscillated between Plato and Aristotle. This is as much true of the twentieth century as of those which preceded it. Half a century ago Trendelenburg revived Aristotle. Neo-Kantianism under the lead of Cohen, on the other hand, helped Plato to gain ascendancy. To-day Aristotle has again indirectly triumphed through Leibniz. The thinkers who are interested in biology group themselves round Aristotle, just as the mathematicians and logicians attach themselves to Plato. On the German soil this division appears under the war-cry: Psychologism versus logicism, vitalism versus mechanism, neo-positivism versus idealism. In England and America it has coined the formula: Pragmatism versus transcendentalism. That is only another form of the same thing. Also of philosophical disputes, schools, party designations, catchwords, the French saying holds good: *plus que ça change, plus c'est la même chose* (the more it changes the more is it the same thing.)

If one sees the essence of the pragmatic method in the application and reference of the practical to the theoretical, of the useful (the power to work) to the knowable, of the teleological to the logical, in short, in the transformation of value in the region of utility into that in the region of truth, this "new method" can point to a highly honoured tradition. Its founder, as James James rightly perceived, is Socrates. "The most beautiful word" said Plato (State V p. 4576), "which ever was spoken and ever will be spoken is that the useful is beautiful and the injurious, ugly". In vulgar, yet compact and clear form Xenophon comments thus upon this Socratic thought, according to which, the useful should be the criterion of aesthetic value: A dung-basket which fulfils its object is more beautiful than an unsuitable gold shield (III 8, 3-7 and IV 6, 9). The useful and the good coincide with each other.

Eudaemonism, the weaving together of virtue, knowledge and happiness, the modelling of practical everyday life upon the theory of knowledge, was the thing greatly desired by Socrates, of whom it is said that he cursed those who for the first time separated the beautiful from the useful. As in the Greek *calocagathy* the coincidence of the aesthetic with the ethical was silently assumed, so there has arisen since the days of Socrates a kind of *alethagathy* which Simmel expressed briefly as follows: Utility of knowledge creates for us the objects of knowledge. And so would James after the example of the first pragmatist (Socrates) have cursed those who had first separated the useful from the true if his temperament and education had made it at all possible for him to curse.

Kant's doctrine of "practical reason" refers back as Brandis and Trendelenburg rightly observed, to the *νοῦς πραχτικὸς* of Aristotle who makes this theory, if not literally, at least in substance, underlie his whole theory of truth. For Aristotle is also a typical pragmatist in this, that he makes practical reason refer only to a purpose. Aristotle's whole conception of nature is yet so thoroughly teleological that he maintains the extreme position that nature does nothing purposeless or in vain. He also does not hesitate to build the teleological, which ruled his conception, of nature, into the logical, into the *νοῦς*

Practical reason, according to Aristotle, has its essence in its reference to a purpose. For this reason, he calls it sometimes "practical reason which thinks of a purpose" (*νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἐνέχων τοῦ λογιζομένου καὶ ὁ πραχτικὸς* de an. 10,433,14). The end (*τέλος*) is fixed once for all. It is not the end but the means that is to be considered. The doctor does not consider whether he should cure, the orator does not consider whether he should persuade, finally, the politician does not consider whether he should make good laws, but after an end is fixed, one seeks the means with which it is to be attained (Eth. Nic. 8, 1112, b. 12). For among all animals, as indeed among

all living beings in general, the striving for happiness, for pleasure, is universal (de an. β 414, b, 3). The end is the leading conception of all practical reason. And just as every particular occurrence must, according to the materialists, be subsumed under the highest concept of mechanical regularity, so in the view of the arch-teleologist, Aristotle, every particular action must be subsumed under the concept of end as the highest generic notion of action (de an. γ . 10, 433, 15). The end is therefore for Aristotle the major premiss, the *conditio sine qua non* of action (this view originated no doubt with Plato), as law or the idea, according to Plato, is the absolutely necessary condition of all occurrences. Consequently, Aristotle, strange as it may seem, is as much an indeterminist as James who in his *Will to believe* (pp. 145-183) treats of the "dilemma of determinism" and arrives at a theory of the freedom of the will which Friedrich Paulsen, the writer of the preface to the German edition of the book, refuses to accept for himself (p. VIII). James's doctrine of chance exhibits striking similarity with the Aristotelian doctrine of "the possible". Aristotle argues (de interpr. 9, 19, 7): If there were no freedom there would be no practical reason. As there is, however, practical reason, there is also freedom. Aristotle, like James, ignores the difficulty that after the determination of an end—the leading generic notion of action, according to Aristotle, limiting notion, according to James—a man is as little free in the face of this leading generic concept as he is with regard to his anatomical structure or his bio-chemical processes in the face of natural laws. If the notion of an end be the ruling notion for all actions, whether it is called entelechy, as in Aristotle and Driesch, or the dominant as in Reinke, then every particular action of men is as much under its sway as each of their physiological actions is governed by the law of causality. Out of this dilemma of individual and race, of individual will and collective will, of personal freedom and equality or obligation

to the interests of the human race, of chance and necessity, of self-preservation and preservation of the race, neither Aristotle nor James can extricate us. It is the eternal crux of philosophy—one of the great antinomies of the world.

The primacy of practical reason which characterises James and the representatives of an "instrumental" logic lies at the root of the post-Aristotelian philosophy in Greece. After the death of Aristotle ethics becomes synonymous with knowledge. Theoretical interests yield everywhere to the practical. And if the hedonistic school of Socrates already developed a strong utilitarian tendency, in all the three schools after Aristotle utility rules not only as the criterion of action but also as that of truth. Pragmatism is no less the ruling doctrine of the Stoa than it is the ruling idea in the pronounced utilitarian doctrine of Epicurus. As we have shown, Peirce had already pointed out his dependence upon the Stoa. Virtue and knowledge are with the Stoics, as with Socrates, identical. If they fall under the term "practical reason" they all the more clearly denote utility. In their anthropocentric boldness, they look upon the whole of nature as the profitable end of man and carry this view to absurd excess. The æsthetic is referred back to the ethical as in Socrates. Only the beautiful is good, says the leader of the school of Chrysippus (*Lærtius Diogenes VII, 101*), and in other places he says: Good acts are beautiful, bad acts, ugly; the beautiful is to be praised, the bad to be blamed. With the Epicureans, especially, the standpoint of utility succeeds very well. Still they are deserters of that 'might is right'-theory which begins with Thucydides and reaches its highest point in Plato's "Gorgias" in the figure of Calicles. According to this, customs and laws, society and States, religion and morality are nothing else than products of public utility. Even the conceptions of God find their motive in utility, and from the days of Prodicus—even in the older doctrine of the Sophists—have been traced genetically to utilitarian considerations.

The pragmatic method proves itself to be one of the oldest modes of thinking known to us. The neo-positivism of the pragmatists is a dialectical revival of the positivism which has been in existence from the time of Protagoras. In the ancient opposition between *physis* and *theoria*, between nature and dogma, of which Democritus was first fully conscious and which he first placed in strong opposition to each other, the pragmatic method finds clear expression; it is the theory of "thesis" applied to logic and the theory of knowledge. If James characterises as the essence of pragmatism that it is in the first place a method, in the second place, a genetic theory of truth (see *Pragmatism* pp. 65-66), then I believe I have shown that it is as old as the name *pragmatism*. Both stand at the entrance of that "pantheon of eternal thoughts" which was the title once given to philosophy by Hegel. The discovery of the age of this newest direction in philosophy can in no way pronounce a judgment of value upon its spiritual contents. This we can rather first pronounce when we have turned to its genetic theory of truth.

IV

THE "GENETIC THEORY OF TRUTH" OF PRAGMATISM.

The neo-positivism of James and Schiller feels at home only in the region of facts but out of its element in the region of abstractions. Truth is for it only "a class name for all sorts of definite working-values in experience" (*Pragmatism* p. 63). The "vérités éternelles" of the logicians leave it very cold, while the "vérités de fait" are its proper domain. In the endless striving of logicians, rationalists, epistemological conceptual realists, for ideas, highest formulas, laws and absolute criteria of value, possessing necessity and universality, the nominalistic pragmatist sees only the expression of a soul which seeks rest and which longs for a final conclusion, for a sort of "*nirvana* of consciousness". The type of thought

which is the opposite of this logical classicism is the irrationalism founded upon feeling. As the former longs for the rest which comes with the final answer, so the latter longs for the eternal unrest of endless questions. Parmenides there, Heraclitus here. I have examined these two types of thought in philosophy in my book *Sinn des Daseins* (Tübingen, Mohr 1904) in the chapter *Knower and Believer* (pp. 65—71, which first appeared in Harden's "Zukunft") and have recognised the claim of a psychology of philosophical systems. I distinguish the type, thinkers of the understanding, from the type represented by the thinkers of feeling, the knowledge-philosophers from the philosophers of belief, the classicists from the romanticists. Only I go one step further than pragmatism, inasmuch as in the article *Der Neo-Idealismus unserer Tage* (which appeared in the "Archiv" in 1903), which one should consult for the purpose of forming a correct view of my attitude towards pragmatism and neo-idealism, I have tried to deduce genetically even the logical categories. That I was on the right track is shown me by the beautiful inquiry of Harald Höffding, entitled *Über Kategorien, Annalen der Naturphilosophie*, Vol. VII, 1908, p. 124, where Höffding says that history shows how categories come and go through changes in their basal principles.

The genetic theory of truth of pragmatism denies so little a criterion of truth that it recognises hardly any effort other than that of giving truth a biological basis. It will work with the help of facts and in closest touch with the ruling discipline of knowledge of our days, biology, in order to arrive at a solution of the question, "why men follow, and always ought to follow truth" (Pragmatism p. 68). Only we cannot accept, if we follow the pragmatic method, the so-called "eternal" truths as absolutely given from above, but as constructed from below with the help of experience on strict democratical lines and as demonstrated by inductive generalisations (Wundt calls these *Empeireme*). Every new

experience is true only when it helps and only so far as it helps us to place ourselves in suitable connection with other parts of our experience. Laws are nothing but universal experiences put by us in the form of conceptual abbreviations. *Universalia post rem*. Such conceptual abbreviations form an excellent "memorandum for helping the memory", as, according to Mill, every deduction is only an inverted induction, but is still, at least for registering purposes, a valuable logical aid. It is certain that concepts are only symbols for abbreviated experiences, as Galileo and Locke (in the third book of his *Essays*) saw correctly long before Avenarius and Mach, and as such, only empty words, (*flatus vocis*, as the mediaeval nominalist said). But, adds the pragmatist, they are not unimportant since they are not worthless. The justification of every theory lies in its applicability to practical life. Every process of thought is true, so far as it binds suitably the parts of our experience together, and expresses it in the briefest possible manner or (to use the words of Avenarius and Mach) gives it the most economical expression. The concepts *true* and *good* are built into each other. Here pragmatism comes in the immediate neighbourhood of empirio-criticism. "Everything is true which proves itself good in the region of belief, and, good, too, for definite, assignable reasons" (Pragmatism p. 76). Everything, however, is good which favourably influences the conduct of man's life, improves the tone of life, elevates the manner of life, in short, improves the life of the typical man in breadth and depth. Pragmatism knows neither a rationalistic nor a sensualistic dogma, but only the dogma of "utility", of "effectiveness" in raising the tone of life, in short, only the dogma of activity, of the "power to work". "If theological ideas should do this, if the notion of God, in particular, should prove to do it, how could pragmatism possibly deny God's existence"? (Pragmatism p. 80). We thus get a view of the inner nature of James's philosophy of religion.

James has no horror of the "Absolute". It has the comfortable effect of giving us "moral holidays". And if such candidates for the position of the supreme generic concept, as "Something", "Substance", "Being" or the "Thinkable", which represent the summit of the logical pyramid, can prove their essential usefulness for the shaping of life, then, though not perhaps the logician and the epistemologist, but certainly the psychologist of religion, James, would enter into an alliance with the "Absolute" and "the unity of the world," although he is inwardly a pluralist. For the genetic theory of truth does not hide the view that the tendency towards unity, towards the "transcendental unity of apperception," as Kant calls it, is ultimately rooted in the human nature. The question is only whether it is immovably fixed, as Parmenides, Spinoza and Hegel, the three great teachers of unity, appear to say. Pragmatism does not even deny a "generic unity of objects". I cannot therefore understand why James (in the "Philosophical Review" for January 1908, Vol. XVII, p. 17) in his essay *The pragmatist account of truth and its misunderstanders* has made the following concession to solipsism :

It must be confessed that pragmatism, worked in this humanistic way, is compatible with solipsism.

Here I must ask James for protection against James. As apt as his following characterisation of pragmatism:—"It joins friendly hands with the agnostic part of Kantism, with contemporary agnosticism, and with idealism generally." — is, so carefully must pragmatism guard against any epistemological association with solipsism or even any connection with solipsism whatever. Here Schopenhauer's word is now as true as ever. Solipsism cannot be refuted. But cold-water treatment could do it good. James himself says (*Pragmatism*, p. 139.), "The most important sort of union that obtains among things, pragmatically speaking, is their *generic unity*." Things are united to their genera, there are

several species in every genus, and what can be inferred from the genus as pertaining to a species is true of every species contained in the genus. We can very well imagine that every fact exists isolated in the world, that is, that it is different from every other fact and is the only one of its kind. In such a world of pronounced singularities our logic would be useless, for the usefulness of logic lies in this, that it predicates of species what is true of the genus. If no two things in the world were similar, we could not infer anything about the future from our past experiences. Therefore James as a pragmatist has set limits to solipsism and overcome it scientifically. Solipsism means destruction of all science and its instrument, logic, whilst pragmatism, on the contrary, means the construction of science on a biologically-grounded logic.

This biological foundation James would perhaps have made more strong and firm if he had known Richard Semon's work *Mneme* (2nd Edition, 1908.) Semon, that is, has built a big system upon Hering's well-known theory of instincts as "experiences of the race" which I recommend to the pragmatists as much as the work of E. Von Cyon, entitled *Das Ohrlobyrinth als Organ der mathematischen Sinne für Raum und Zeit*. (The labyrinth of the ear as the organ of the mathematical perception of space and time) (Berlin, Julius Spinoza, 1908). The experimental researches of Von Cyon are directed against all nativism and apriorism of the Kantian theory of space and time. The cry "Back to Leibniz," which I in *Sinn des Daseins* and in a host of other writings have repeatedly raised, von Cyon finds more natural and more acceptable to the scientist than *Back to Kant*. "Leibniz" says Von Cyon (Preface, p. XV), "stands nearer the age of entropy of Clausius, the cell theory of Schwann and the bacteriology of Pasteur and Koch than Kant." Quite possible. We think to-day throughout *more biologico*. Hence a teleological view of things. And as Leibniz, as I have shown

in my *Leibniz and Spinoza* (Berlin, Reimer 1890), has certainly verified, if not constructed, his monadology with the help of the discoveries of micro-organisms of Swammerdam, Leeuwenhoek and Malpighi, the energist and vitalist, Leibniz, stands nearer to us than the thinker *more geometrico*, Spinoza, or the thinker *more critico* Kant. Not the mathematical point, as with Spinoza, but the living cell is for us the starting-point of our conception of the world.

Pragmatism belongs, willingly or unwillingly, to that group of the philosophy of to-day which with Leibniz strives again for the Aristotelian conception of entelechy. nature-philosophers like Ostwald, biologists like Reinke, epistemologists like Avenarius and Mach, all lean towards teleology, evolutionism and energism. Very fine differences only separate them, what unites them is the fundamental tone, the basal philosophical principle of that Heraclitism which has its greatest triumph in the evolutionism of Herbert Spencer. Everything flies, everything is in a state of becoming, not even excepting truth. For rationalism, James says (Pragmatism, p. 257) very appropriately, reality is complete and perfect from all eternity, whereas for pragmatism, it is always in the making and awaits part of its complexion from the future. This says nothing against old experiences, for which James has rather the highest respect. From the time of Avenarius, as is well-known, naïve realism, the view of reality of the average man who constructs a theory of knowledge, has again gained the upper hand. What Avenarius does for the vindication of naïve realism, the genetic theory of truth of James and Schiller does for the "commonsense of mankind" in general. Here steps in neopositivism. The old English commonsense theory, a form of the *communes notitiæ* (*sensus communis*, *χοιναι ἐννοιαί*) of the Stoa, has been revived by pragmatism. As once in the Stoa, the words *προληψεις*, *ὁπρος λογος* and *χοιναι ἐννοιαί* signified criteria of truth against which were directed the critical writings of

Plutarch and the army of the Pyrrhonic sceptics, so James explains: Our fundamental ways of thinking are discoveries of exceedingly remote ancestors and have been able to preserve themselves throughout the experience of all subsequent time (*Pragmatism*, p. 170). Consequently, he requires with Mach, Ostwald and Duhem (why not Avenarius?): Return to commonsense. The criterion of the genetic theory of truth is, on the one hand, fruitfulness, on the other, verifiability through new experiences. True ideas, James says, are such as we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those in which all this is impossible (p. 201). Truth is nothing else than that which pushes us forward on the road of thinking. We live *forward*, James says with a Danish thinker, but we understand *backwards*. The sum of the condensed race experiences of our ancestors—Hering calls it *instinct*, Semon *mneme*—creates always those beliefs which determine our actions. Truth does not exist, “it holds or obtains” (*Pragmatism*, p. 226) and so James condenses the *a priori* theory of truth in the following two sentences:—

1. Truth is the system of propositions which have an unconditional claim to be recognised as valid.

2. Truth is a name for all those judgments which we find ourselves under obligation to make by a kind of imperative duty. (*Pragmatism* p. 227).

If we lastly add to this that Schiller defines truth as that which possesses value in the realm of knowledge and Dewey as that which gives satisfaction, then we have expressed the fundamental propositions of the genetic theory of truth (Dewey, moreover, protests against the view, “Truth is what gives satisfaction” in “The Journal of Philosophy” for February 1908). Moreover, Englishmen and Americans do not alone accept the pragmatistical criterion of truth. German scientists cling to it. Thus the Vienna physicist and philosopher Boltzmann thought, “Only such conclusions as have practical results are correct”. And the Vienna botanist and

philosopher v. Wiesner agrees not only completely with Boltzmann, but also appeals to a great authority, namely, Goethe (vide his article *Naturwissenschaft und Naturphilosophie*. Oester. Rundschau Vol. 15, No. 4 for May 1908, p. 265).

As Nietzsche always and everywhere chooses the most happy expression and possesses the most pointed style, so also he has anticipated the theory of truth of pragmatism in the concise formula: That is true which has for its end the existence of man. Compare the chapter on biological scepticism in Raoul Richter's *Der Skepticismus in der Philosophie und seine Überwindung* (*Scepticism in philosophy and its refutation*), Leipzig 1908 p. 470 sq).

Has truth no terminus? Is the idea of truth, viewed backwards a *regressus*, and viewed forwards, a *progressus in infinitum*, as the idea of end and the thought of evolution were in Aristotle? From a biological scepticism in Nietzsche's sense, the neo-positivism of James is far removed. As according to Spencer, the state of absolute equilibrium of the world will one day be reached, and according to Clausius, the entropy of the world always tends towards a maximum, so there is for James also, in a fit of eschatology and apocalypse, in the distant future, at the end of time, an absolute rest, a logical *nirvana*. "The absolutely true, meaning what no further experience will ever alter, is that ideal vanishing point towards which we imagine that all our temporary truths will some day converge" (*Pragmatism* p. 223). And so falls James in his logic and theory of knowledge as much as in his *Will to believe* into Messianism and prophetism. The absolute, which the "transcendentalists" project *backwards*, place in the remote past or even immortalise, as they have done in Plato's kingdom of ideas, James will feel *forwards* from pragmatical considerations, from teleological motives, and will project into the most distant future as a remote illuminating ideal of a "melioristic" method and conduct of life.

The "effect" and "conduct of life" are for the pragmatist the tests of the vitality of a truth. The Darwinian "struggle for existence"-formula and the Spencerian "selection"-formula James applies to the struggle for existence among ideas. Philosophical truths also are engaged in a life-and-death-struggle with one another. If an hypothesis shows itself as effective, living and as having stood the test of time, then it has through this selective action proved its right to exist; where it has not done this, it is a dead hypothesis and as such will be consigned to the rubbish heap. With such an hypothesis pragmatism classes the academic metaphysical question whether the world has reality in the brain of man and so is mental, or has reality outside the brain of man and so is extra-mental. The conduct of life is not affected by the solution of this problem—down with this old hypothesis then! Indeed, James cannot help taking up the ontological hypothesis, namely, that of noëtic pluralism to which he concedes a high degree of probability ("Pragmatism," p. 166), but he is ready to throw it also away as soon as it is proved to be ineffective.

A scientific, and especially a philosophical hypothesis James considers only then convincing when it has a heuristic value, when it opens a new vista, widens the horizon and promises also something for the future. Truth is a teleological process of adaptation. The past has value so far as it contains indication of the future. All logic has meaning only as a purposive reaction upon life, as all religion has its deepest foundation in this, that we can react upon life as a totality with our feeling—in this James completely follows Schleiermacher, as Wobbermin has shown. The intellect is the most powerful weapon that man has perfected in his struggle with the world, because with the help of intellect and its organ, logic, man can best react upon the destroying influences that stream upon him from the external world and can handle in the most economical way the helping influences. Logic is above all a product of selection—a result of that most useful

weapon which man has made for himself in the struggle for the preservation of self or the species. There are therefore no timeless or eternal truths but relative, effective, teleologically-grounded truths for the age and for man. For knowledge, as Mach says (*Erkenntnis und Irrtum*, 2nd edition, 1907), is the adaptation of thoughts to facts or adaptation of thoughts to one another. And Avenarius gives the definition: Knowledge is that which can remove a vital difference. This and nothing else is the purport of Schiller's *Humanism* (Personal Idealism, London, 1902, p. 60): The world, so far as its essence is concerned, is, *in sich*, that is, that which we make of it. It is meaningless to define it by that which it has been from the beginning, or by that which it is when detached from us: it is what man has made of it. For the world is plastic. That we in this way return to Protagoras, Schiller knows well. In his most recent work (*Studies in Humanism*, 1907) he expounds the *homo mensura* doctrine as the essence of the pragmatic doctrine. In his vindication of Protagoras whom, however, Ernst Laas had vindicated long before Schiller in his work which had not been valued at all at its true worth, Schiller compares Protagoras with Paul. Schiller's speech *Plato or Protagoras?* (Oxford, 1908) concludes with the remark that Plato has in no point successfully refuted Protagoras.

Here criticism must step in. The resistance offered to the attempt to unite pragmatism with positivism, relativism, psychologism and phenomenalism does not help pragmatism. Pragmatism is indeed nothing else than neo-positivism. All serious critics (Lalande, Lovejoy, Calderoni, McTaggart) have pointed out this agreement. Schiller brought into prominence, as we saw, the historical connection with Hume and Protagoras. Obviously, there are fine lines of demarcation which separate pragmatism from positivism, as James pointed out in the January number of the American magazine "The Philosophical Review" (p. 2). But what separates pragmatism from positivism and

psychologism is the colouring, what unites them is the whole tendency.

Pragmatism unites all the neo-positivistic tendencies of our feverish age which under the names, *nature-philosophy*, *energetics*, *psychologism*, *phenomenalism*, *Friesian empiricism* and *relativism*, wage a general war against the thing-in-itself, against all metaphysics, all transcendence, all idealism, in short, against that Platonising Kantianism which is most correctly represented and bravely upheld by the Marburgian School (Cohen, Natorp). Once more, to use an expression of James, the tender-minded fall out with the tough-minded. As in every generation, rationalists and irrationalists, classicists and romanticists, philosophers of reason and philosophers of feeling, logicians and mystics are armed cap-a-pie against each other, so under the protection of the ancient, but newly polished shield, pragmatism, the warm philosophy of feeling has again raised its head against the "mathematical" intellectual philosophy of the rationalists, logicians and idealists. The biological method makes a revolt against the mathematical, as once Leibniz did against Spinoza. The perennial suit, feeling versus reason, which to the end is only a necessary reflection of that doubleness of the soul consisting in feeling (as also in will) and the understanding, against which every man has to fight in himself, should once more be brought before the bar of the twentieth century.

It is not to no purpose that pragmatism maintains with Schiller that the question is neither of a new name nor of a new method of thinking but essentially and principally of a development of that ancient anti-metaphysical and anti-rationalistic tendency of our biologically interested age, which begins with Protagoras and reaches its zenith in Hume and which is thus historically neo-positivism. And as we now live in an age of dialectical galvanising attempts—neo-Kantianism, neo-Fichteanism, neo-Schellingianism, neo-Hegelianism,—as formerly, it was an age of neo-Platonism and

neo-Pythagoreanism, I should think the designation *neo-humanism* or *neo-positivism* much more suitable than the old name *pragmatism*, with which, moreover, James is not quite satisfied. And as James in his dedication to Mill himself indicates how closely his thought approaches that of Mill, he cannot fail to observe that properly speaking, it is Hume and always Hume who speaks through pragmatism, and especially, that Mill is only Hume pushed to his logical extremity, Hume put into the paragraphs of an inductive logic. In this point also Schiller proves himself (*Humism and Humanism*, 1907) a true upholder of neo-positivism in the style of Hume.

For many years I defended with some of my pupils the thesis: Kant has not refuted Hume. In my book *Der Soziale Optimismus* (Jena, Costenoble, 1905) I have stated that Hume is not a sceptic but the leader of pragmatism, as Riehl and Lipps have admitted, and that Kant has not refuted him in any point. The suit is not yet over. Documents are still exhibited. Let us begin our defence of the case once more (p. 145).

Such a *plaidoyer* of the Hume party against the Kant party is found in James's *Pragmatism*, a *plaidoyer* also in that less happy meaning of the word which far from excluding rhetorical exaggeration and the vehemence of lawyers, rather includes these. As is obviously the case in feeling-philosophy—one should think of Hamann and Jacobi—emotion rules, but with such a dose of humour that pragmatism, as James presents it, pricking, animating, kindling and igniting, is sure to succeed in its propagandist work. The presentation is characterised by diatribes in the manner of the later Cynics and Stoics and lay-sermons in the manner of Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Emerson and Hilty, without the violent pathos of a Carlyle, but it is just in this personal note of the specifically Jamesian pragmatism that its "power to work" lies.

James is so well versed in the history of human thought that he certainly cannot have failed to notice that the

pragmatic formula "power to work," as well as his former one, "power to believe" represents only a form of that formula which Hegel calls *will to think*, Schopenhauer, *will to live* and Nietzsche *will to power*. The "will to power," especially, is inherent in English thought from the time of Francis Bacon. His "tantum enim possumus quantum scimus" one can safely place upon the shoulders of James's *Pragmatism*. The will to power, as it appears in the "might is right"-philosophers among the Sophists (especially Callicles in Plato's *Gorgias*, who is probably the model for Nietzsche's "over-man") in the Epicureans and in Hobbes and Spinoza, is also the last word of that doctrine of the primacy of practical reason which the genetic theory of truth preaches. Also James is true to the old English tradition in this, that he unites the doctrine of the primacy of practical reason with nominalism and utilitarianism. Long before Schopenhauer, Spencer and James, the nominalist Duns Scotus literally held the view: The will is the lord and arbiter, and intellect, the servant (*voluntas imperans intellectui est causa superior respectu actus ejus Opera ed. Ven. 1597 p. 165a*). William of Occam follows blindly the doctrine of the primacy of will. And Berkeley says "All thought is will" (*Commonplace-book* p. 460). Thus in the pragmatism of Peirce, Dewey, James and Schiller, the three pragmatistical tendencies of English thought from the thirteenth century coincide; epistemological nominalism leads through Locke, Berkeley and Hume directly to Mill and James. What is called there nominalism, Locke calls empiricism, Hume, phenomenalism, and Mill and James, radical empiricism, cult of fact, fetishism of "matter of fact." What the primacy of will over intellect meant for Duns Scotus, is contained in Hobbes's *Leviathan* as motive of thought, as the centre of the kingdom of will, as the sacrosanct authority of the State, as the fundamental motive for self-preservation, as that *ἐπὶ τοῦ τηρεῖν ἑαυτοῦ* of the Stoa which meets us again as the *sum esse conservare* of Spinoza

in connexion with Hobbes and the Stoa. This primacy of will which was taught distinctly by Berkeley and advanced in Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*, and which was brought into prominence through Fichte's "being follows from doing," and placed through Schopenhauer's substantialisation of will in the centre of philosophical discussion, receives at the hands of James the following modification: Instead of blind Höder, the purblind world-will of Schopenhauer, there appears in James the primacy of feeling, of those "moral sentiments" whose system has been constructed by Adam Smith with the co-operation of his bosom friend, Hume, but in close connection with the English feeling-philosophy of the eighteenth century. This feeling, however, receives at the hands of James that biological basis which Hume demanded in theory, but could not carry out, as the state of biology in the days of Hume did not allow this to be done. It is first in the time of Spencer and the new doctrine of heredity, whether in the Spencerian or in the Weismannian form, that we are in a position to make the biological foundation as strong as Hume thought of doing, and this is done by James's pragmatism. Lastly, there lies in the English thought from the thirteenth century a third tendency which first rings clearly in pragmatism, namely, utilitarianism. Here Roger Bacon had laid the foundation just as in ancient times the sophists and the hedonists did. Only, whereas the ancient utilitarians preached a *morality* of consequences, the pragmatists to-day preach a *logic* of consequences. Truth is with the pragmatists (especially, Schiller) the same as the good or the beautiful. It is on account of their utility that sciences are cultivated and truths preached—this is the essence of pragmatism. This utilitarian "theory of knowledge" and its foundation we owe among the modern philosophers to Roger Bacon. Like James, Roger Bacon wanted "fruits" more than anything else, as his namesake Francis Bacon later did. In *Opus Majus* Bacon says: Aristotle and others have planted the tree of knowledge, which,

however, is far from shooting forth all its branches or bearing all its fruits. These fruits he expected from experiment. To quote the exact words of Roger Bacon (Works II 167), there are two paths of knowledge, argument and experiment. The first draws conclusions of reason and makes these conclusions agree. It gives no certainty and does not remove doubt so far as to make the spirit content with this view of truth. The spirit is only content when truth is proved through experience. Thus science must rest upon experience; without it one can know nothing with certainty. These words might as well have occurred in the radical empiricist James's *Pragmatism* as in Roger Bacon.

Does all this historical account serve the purpose of under-rating pragmatism, under-valuing, if not altogether denying, its claim to originality, or of accusing it of gross eclecticism? Is pragmatism, as its opponents say, only a receptacle for old empirical rubbish and sensualistic dreams? Or is it a medley of various kinds of utilitarian theories and of old obsolete coins from a dialectical collection of curiosities? Certainly not. When I discover the ancestors and spiritual kinsmen of pragmatism, find out the people of to-day who are of the same way of thinking with it and discover its roots in the past as well as in the present, I have no intention to undervalue it or hold it in contempt, but simply to explain it. It is the last representative of that great tendency of human thought which begins with Protagoras and which has been represented and defended in a hundred different ways by the nominalists of all grades and shades, all climes and times, from the days of the Cynics, the Cyrenaics, the Stoics, the Epicureans and the Sceptics. I see in pragmatism no more eclecticism than I do in Leibniz, if I follow Dühring. I intend neither to refute pragmatism nor to defend it, but only to explain it, when I trace it to its historical antecedents and conditions. It seems to me that this account not only does not say anything that may be injurious to

pragmatism, but that it contributes rather to the recognition of pragmatism as a powerful current of thought of our days. How strong and deep must be the total tendency in human nature which is represented by pragmatism with great energy of thought and force of style under the guidance of the ruling biological methods, if this "latest" mode of thought can always for two thousand years find warm adherents and strong support, when it seeks only to do what Protagoras wanted!

It is certain that pragmatism is nominalism, so far as the theory of knowledge is concerned, voluntarism so far as psychology is concerned, energism (power to work) so far as the philosophy of nature is concerned, and ethically, meliorism resting on the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill. But these elements of thought are not mechanically and carelessly placed one upon the other, but organically united with one another, internally joined—nay, intertwined. In such an organic union of separate elements of thought, Goethe sees the work of a genius. In the last analysis every theory of the world is only a synthesis of existing elements of thought. And if, moreover, such a synthesis unites great tendencies, as is the case with pragmatism in its combination of empiricism, voluntarism and utilitarianism, and succeeds in finding for its view of the world such a compact, if not tempting, expression as James has done in his *Pragmatism* ("I do not like the name but it is apparently too late to change it" James says in the preface to his *Pragmatism*), then one cannot reasonably deny that such a theory of the world has a scientific right of existence.

The criticism of pragmatism must proceed from within, from its own assumptions and not from the standpoint of idealism, as Münsterberg's criticism does. Idealism and positivism represent two different temperaments, as James has correctly noticed. Temperaments, however, are not things to be refuted. "As I see it"—this is now an inscription upon every temple, not only upon the pantheon of art but also upon

the stern cathedral of science. No one can quarrel with a person for seeing in his own fashion. The question is only whether he has correctly seen it from his own standpoint. And here steps in *our* criticism of pragmatism.

The Comtean “voir pour prévoir” is the basis of pragmatism. All knowledge has a teleological background. It should teach us to shape our future course of life. Coarsely expressed: *ipsissima res sunt veritas et utilitas*—so speaks the arch-pragmatist, Francis Bacon. Feuerbach’s “Be content with the given world” receives from James the following interpretation: So far as the given world at present and in the past contains indications for the future, “directions for the blessed life,” as Fichte would say.

Instead of the two criteria of truth of Plato (as well as Aristotle) and Kant, necessity and universality, there occur here the hedonistic-utilitarian criteria of truth, individual utility and general usefulness. The true is identical with the good—hence the necessity of a biological basis of logic which pragmatism preaches, it is true, along with the old methods of thinking, but with a strongly pronounced personal note.

Against this biological logic, however, there arises, even from the pragmatic point of view, a host of considerations, regarding which I declare emphatically that I shall not repeat the arguments heaped against psychologism in an imposing manner either by Husserl in his basal “Logical Inquiries” or by Münsterberg in his *Philosophy of Values*. Nor shall I employ for my purpose the rich polemical literature of England, France and Italy (with the last G. Vailati’s article *De quelques caractères du mouvement philosophique contemporain en Italie*, *Revue de Mois*, 1907, Separate edition p. 5, deals excellently). The question for me is rather of the difficulties of thought regarding the basal assumptions of pragmatism which, in spite of my sympathetic attitude, I cannot pass over. Lest James and Schiller should convert

me, as they have done William Jerusalem, to pragmatism, I must set down here my observations. Friendly as I am to the teleological way of thinking, I cannot help remarking against it that one sees more in teleology than it contains. On this point Kant has for me said the last word. Teleology is a heuristic and regulative, but never a constitutive principle like causality. For this reason I reject transcendental teleology at which Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza aimed their deadly arrows, as absolutely as I maintain with Leibniz (rightly understood, even with Kant) immanent teleology. In my article *Causality, teleology and freedom* (which appeared first in Ostwald's "Annalen der Naturphilosophie" and was later published in my *Sinn des Daseins*), I have clearly indicated my attitude towards this problem and secured for this doctrine of freedom a footing which will be welcome to the indeterminist James. In my book *Die sozialen Fragen im Lichte der Philosophie* (Social questions in the light of philosophy, Stuttgart, Enke, 2nd Edition 1903 p. 55) I have explained clearly what I understand by immanent teleology.

By "immanent teleology" is meant the necessary purposive setting of the universals of human will. Every social organisation which expresses itself in institutions of morals, law, religion etc. shows itself as an emanation of a determinate purposive direction of the universals of human will. All social causality receives, consequently, a teleological note. All occurrences have nature-necessity, all logic, thought-necessity, all action, however, teleological necessity. If causality holds good as a constitutive principle absolutely, that is, even for organic nature, immanent teleology holds good only for the organic world of life, so far as it has the power of producing will-acts, that is, movements directed towards an end. Causality holds good of all occurrences, immanent teleology, only of all actions. Nature is a system of laws, society, a system of ends. But these

human ends have also their laws: these are called teleological laws. All social institutions go back in the last analysis to such teleological laws. Physical causality moves along cause and effect, psychological, along stimulation and sensation, logical, along premises and conclusions, sociological, finally, along ends and means.

What is new in pragmatism in its genetic theory of truth is that it reveals itself as logical evolutionism. Truth is placed in the stream of practical things in the making. As once the disciples of the Heraclitean Cratylos, the teacher of Plato, to whom Plato dedicated a dialogue of the same name, who were styled contemptuously "drifting men", did, the pragmatist knows only an evolving truth which by graduated steps should strive against absolute truth or its ideal point. It is thus the old idea of conation which in the history of human thought does not play a small part—the *ορεγερσιαι* of Aristotle, the *ηγεμονιχον* of the Stoa, the "momentum" of Galileo, the 'endeavour' of the English, the "impetus" of Spinoza, the "tendance" of Leibniz, the "antithesis" of Kant, the "opposition" of Fichte, the "contradiction" of Hegel, the "striving for an end" of K. Ernst v. Baer, the "inherent interest" of Ratzenhofer, the "dominants" of Reinke, the "direction-concept" (*Richtungsbegriff*) of Goldscheid—but by James all this has been transferred from physics to logic. As the mystics who project everything forwards say, "God does not exist, but He becomes; He realises Himself in us and through us" or as in Fichte in his first period, God is no being, but a gradual self-perfection and self-realisation, an *ordo ordinans*, so the absolute truth of James and Schiller is no being, but an *ought*, and logic is not the end but the beginning—an instrument for the gradual realisation of unconditional truth. Our formal logic of to-day and its central point, the categories, are, consequently, only partially satisfactory instruments, provisional aids to thinking, whereas truth itself is the final end,

an ideal which is always to be striven for but never to be attained. As according to the Jesuit's maxim, the end should sanctify the means, so in pragmatism the end justifies knowledge and the means to it, namely, our present instruments of thought or categories with their imperfect capacity for truth.

Against the relativising of all *present* knowledge but absolutising of all knowledge *in the distant future*, the following considerations which flow from within must be advanced. If the criterion of present knowledge be its usefulness and effectiveness, with what justice does James discard scepticism ('The Philos. Review. Jan 1908, p. 9)? Against strong superstitions and deeply-rooted prejudices scepticism has proved itself one of the most powerful instruments for deepening our insight into the working of nature. All dogmatism works by producing sleep, by paralysing scientific certainty and checking the progress towards absolute truth which indeed should be our distant ideal. The relativist James has not only no right to disown haughtily his relationship with scepticism, but on the contrary, it is his duty to make it his companion in arms, so far as it rejects the old, the *passé* and the unstable. Where scepticism is negative, there pragmatism has to follow it. Only where it acts depressingly, as in its doctrine of *εποχή*, in its logical asceticism, and only there, ought pragmatism to break off its alliance with it. In his work *Der Skeptizismus in der Philosophie und seine Überwindung* (Scepticism in philosophy and its refutation) Raoul Richter says most appositely, "Deep insight into the nature of scepticism results in its conquest. Only in this way will it be possible to associate "cheerful philosophy and even cheerful metaphysics with a pure, intellectual conscience."

In the positive structure of the genetic concept of truth there is a difficulty which cannot be ruled out but must be consciously overcome. How, namely, can the sensations, which

are given to us as isolated marks, and consequently, as accidental, disconnected and in chaotic confusion, suddenly form in the head successions, series, functions of order, associations or categories? How does the psychological chaos of sensations form a logical cosmos in the head? How do facts become causes, isolated fragmentary occurrences a truth which, though a relative one, can still very well explain the connections in the external world? I shall first pass over the fact that the danger of the genetic theory of truth lies in its hollow subjectivism which is separated from solipsism only by a thin veil. In fact, I have shown how James can escape and must escape solipsism. He escapes the Scylla of logicism with its "eternal forms of thought"—a great grandchild in the theory of knowledge of the "qualitates occultae" of the Scholastics—while he as a strict psychologist appeals to teleology. Such is the effect of the age. The psychologist of former times, Th. Lipps, has now drifted towards a "pantelism" (c.f. his article on the Philosophy of Nature in the collection of essays called *Philosophie im Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts* 2nd Edition 1907 Heidelberg, Winter), just as, quite independently of him, L. William Stern has done in his big work *Person und Sache* (Person and Thing, Leipzig, Barth 1906) consisting of several volumes. Stern reaches the result that on the one hand, there must be a mechanical equivalent of every personal quality, and on the other, "every mechanism must at the same time have a teleological meaning" (Vol. I, p. 348). Therefore Stern, as we have already seen, puts in the place of the psychophysical parallelism of Spinoza and Wundt a more Leibnizian "teleo-mechanism."

The old "telephobia," the undisguised hatred of all teleological explanation cherished by Descartes, Spinoza and the materialists, is obviously disappearing. Since K. Ernst v. Baer with the approval of Lotze and the modern nature-philosophers helped the old Aristotelian "striving for an end" (*ᾠρεσις*) to obtain currency once more, it has overcome, and

the more successfully the longer it has been in existence, the mechanical causality of the materialists. With Lotze and Eduard v. Hartmann we are accustomed to see in all mechanism only a special case of the all-embracing purposiveness of the world, as nothing can obviously be more purposive than mechanism.

But is the pragmatic method, the cult of facts, the thinking which is free from all hypothesis, entitled to make this use of the teleological principle? David Koigen states in his *Jahresbericht über die Literatur zur Metaphysik* (1908, p. 131) "Teleology preceeds always from the whole to the parts, and thus always deductively. For wholes and the the aims of existence which are contained in them are of a deductive nature. In all teleological, as opposed to causal modes of thinking, the whole comes first and then the parts." Trendelenburg in his *Logische Untersuchungen* (Logical Inquiries) has, with reference to Aristotle's placing of the teleological view in the front, pointed out this opposition very clearly. The idea of entelechy of Aristotle and the monads of Leibniz—it should be remembered that Leibniz before he took the term "monad" from his disciple, van Helmont, called his substance an entelechy—have their origin in the thought that final causes take precedence of material causes, if not in time, at least in rank and value. The systems of Fichte, Schelling and early romanticism (Fr. Schlegel) exhibit the same teleological character. The empirical teleology of P. N. Cossmann and the immanent teleology of our philosophers of nature in these days (Ostwald, Reinke, Driesch) avowedly lead back to the Aristotelian entelechy, as Driesch says repeatedly. But Mach's definition of the ego as "unity of end" and James's doctrine of concepts or "classes" as teleological instruments proceed from the common fundamental conviction, that all spiritual life is teleological. The "philosophy of norms" of Windelband and Rickert and "the philosophy of values" of Hugo Münsterberg

stand essentially on the same teleological base as James, and this base is that the logical in its deepest root is teleologically grounded. The teleological unity of the ego rests, according to Mach, upon an "unanalysed constancy." The ego is, consequently, a practical unity for a preliminary provincial view. So also are concepts of substance—being, doing, matter, spirit—short symbols for making the entrance into the "Umwelt" (the world around us) easier. All science shrivels up into a simplified rule of conduct, as all deduction, according to Mill, is only a method of abbreviation, an inverted induction, a memorandum for helping the memory.

Here we have before us the *πρωτον ψευδος* of the positivism of Hume as well as of the neo-positivism of James and all kindred theories. Passing over the fact that the biological method which James and his followers wish to make useful to logic fails for this reason that biology is still in the making and is in a most imperfect state, and that consequently, it is not competent to lay the foundation of the most perfect of all sciences, namely, formal logic, pragmatism moves round the same vicious circle as that which even Hume could not escape. Hume leads substance and causality back to habits of thinking and laws of association. How, however, have the laws of association entered into men's brain? Through exercise, frequency of connection, clearing of the path and removal of the obstacles to transmission in the central nervous system, in a word, habit? Why have all men and beasts the same laws of association, namely, contiguity and similarity of contents? Above all, why are the laws of association taken for realities which we with their help overcome, rule, govern? Hume infers the reality of the laws of association *with the help* of the laws of association which are working within him. He will surely answer with Kant and Hegel: One cannot learn to swim without going into water. The circle is unavoidable. And James himself has severely criticised associational psychology. So far so good; but should

one then also admit that the laws of association represent such a *psychologico-genetical a priori* as the Kantian categories, the constancy of the ego, the transcendental unity of apperception represent a *logical a priori*. Without an *a priori* Hume can manage as little as James, who is a great opponent of association psychology—a fact which Wundt in his *Grundriss der Psychologie* (Outlines of Psychology) has failed to notice, inasmuch as he wrongly counts James among the adherents of the principle of association. But whether with or without the principle of association, James falls into the circle explained here. For whether we base all forms of thought with Avenarius and Mach on the principle of economy, on the theory of the “smallest degree of force,” on *parsimonium naturae*, as the criterion of judgment of all thought-forms, or accept with James the principle of selection, the principle of utility, the “power to work” as the criterion of all values of reality and truth, this principle is an *a priori* principle from which the particular appearances can be deduced. I can therefore only in this way reconcile the opposition between the psychologists and the logicians, that the former are right so far as the origin of our ideas is concerned, the latter, so far as their reality is concerned, as they are acquired functions for our semi-savage forefathers but inherited functions for us. The alternative runs thus: without a supreme principle of explanation, be it causality or teleology, we have only unconnected pieces, and no systematic survey of the connections of the world, that is to say, no science. If, however, the “voir pour prévoir” of Comte be true, we must have some fixed principle, whether it is Mach’s “unanalysed constancy” of the ego, the principle of economy of Avenarius, the laws of association of Hume, the pragmatic teleology of concepts of James, the pure norms of Windelband, the pure will of Cohen or the transcendental unity of apperception of Kant and the “consciousness in general” of the post-Kantians. If the future did not resemble the past, it would be

beyond all calculation and consequently, beyond all scientific comprehension. Out of disorderly variables no satisfactory world-theory can be evolved. Some fixed principle—whether it is, when seen from within, the ego, or, when projected externally, being or the world—we must through the necessity of thought demand, posit or use as a basal principle, in order to have a resting-place in the midst of the stream of appearances, or we must inevitably fall into solipsism, which in its turn means nothing else than epistemological fetishism.

Through our logical principles of order, through the formation of concepts, categories, methodical classifications and divisions, we have overcome fetishism in religion as well as in the theory of knowledge. It would indeed be a wonderful circumlocution if after travelling over the whole realm of science we were to have an atavistic regression to that crass individualism of the later sophists who caricature their master Protagoras and have given birth to the motto: Not *man* but *the* man is the measure of all things. In the same way must the pragmatist who lays stress on the utility of knowledge, put an end to such a confusion of knowledge as led to a divergence of scientific insight and foresight into isolated centres of force. The utilitarian logic—and pragmatism as a method and as a genetic theory of truth is nothing else—must at least have an assumption of unquestioned value, namely, that of a constant in a world of disorderly variables. With Mach and Avenarius this constant is economy of thought ; with James and Schiller it is economy of action. Their meeting point is the teleological mode of thinking. Their fixed principle is not called, as in Spinoza and the rationalists, *causa*, but as in Aristotle and Leibniz, *telos*. This teleological principle of order is acquired by the human race and stored in its “mneme,” in the “memory of the race” of what is useful and what is hurtful, and inherited by the individual. Naturally, then, *telos* is not the *consequence*, but the *reason* of all our actions, and consequently becomes a

constitutive factor of all knowledge, and thus with Avenarius and Mach, of all logic, and with James and Schiller, of all actions. And as in Hume, imagination, belief, as well as the laws of association represent the constitutive elements of our scientific view of the world, so we have in the pragmatists, activity (power to work), economy of thought and economy of action—with the help of biological principles and especially, the Darwin-Spencerian selection-theories as positive factors of our conception of the world. This, however, shows clearly that pragmatism also has an *a priori*, namely, *telos*. And when one ridicules the logicism of Kant as telling us that men come into the world with a complete table of categories, one ought to think of what one does oneself. We are all *a priori* sinners. In other words, it is very much the same whether men come into the world, as in Kant, with a table of categories, or, as in Hume, with complete laws of association, or, as in Avenarius and Mach, with an automatic economy of thought, or, as in James and Schiller, with an apparatus of utility and selection and, as it were, a scale of values. Let us be faithful above all to ourselves. Pragmatism does nothing but offer us a teleology of consciousness, instead of a mechanism of consciousness, as did Hobbes, Spinoza, Hartley, Priestley, Hume, the naturalists, the materialists and association psychologists. Pragmatism follows, consequently, only that common bent of the age which expresses itself in the allied efforts of the energists, neo-romanticists, neo-vitalists and nature-philosophers to give materialism a first-class funeral, while it gives up the primacy of the mechanical explanation of nature and the world and recognises the teleological view of the world. Democritus or Aristotle—so runs the catch-word in ancient times, Spinoza or Leibniz in the great seventeenth century, Kant or Mach to-day. Here are Cohen and the Marburgian School, Platonism and Kantianism, here, neo-positivism, which so far as the theory of knowledge is concerned, continues the line of Protagoras, and so far as

biology is concerned, the line of Aristotle. In the middle stand Eduard v. Hartmann and his pupils, who with Leibniz and the Stoa explain the mechanical as a special case of an all-embracing purposiveness of the world. For the evolutionary criticism which I represent there is frankly only one way out of the dilemma: the empiricists and psychologists have in view the natural man, the logicians and nativists, the cultured man.

What is extremely necessary for us is a critical examination of the limits of admissibility of a teleological view of the world. P. N. Cossmann in his *Elemente einer empirischen Teleologie* (Elements of an empirical teleology) has taken a bold position. Here must pragmatism build further. Psychologism and logicism, genetic and critical methods must supplement each other; the former gives us the origin, the latter the value of our thought-processes, whether they are laws of association or logical categories. Neo-positivism should not also fall into that absurd utilitarian theory which once formed the doctrine of Chrysippus and was hated by all who were acquainted with it. It will have further to supplement the genetico-psychological method, which is valuable, so far as the origin and the criteria of truth are concerned, by a critico-logical inquiry into the question of the value of our criteria of truth. It will have, lastly, to keep aloof from "rotten" teleology which Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza rightly drove out of the temple of science. Precisely because it has to admit that the teleological must be *a priori*, it will have to express itself on the value, applicability and limits of the teleological theory of truth and reality. Lastly, pragmatism must accept the Kantian inclusion of teleology in the "faculty of judgment," if and so far as it puts an ontological meaning into its teleological derivation of logic. Have we only to do in pragmatism with heuristic or regulative principles or have we to do also with constitutive ones? The difference between

a regulative and a constitutive principle is fundamental. The former relates to an *is*, the latter to an *ought*. Constitutive principles bring out the fact that unities arise through the mutual action of the whole and the parts, regulative ideas, however, contain the consciousness of an end, a reference to what should be. If the kingdom of nature is the kingdom of laws, and the kingdom of history the kingdom of ends, then teleology can maintain its position as a means of knowing history. But is it also effective as a means of knowing nature which is only an 'is' and not an 'ought'? Can we from the position of the pragmatist explanation of the world endow nature and history with the character of law, or can we only bring forth rhythms, regularities, grand agreements, in short, rules and not laws, tendencies and not categories? If teleological explanations of the world have only a provisional hypothetical character, as James wants them to have, the question arises, whether one's longing for knowledge is satisfied with it or whether one has not rather to go to the causal explanations with their specific legal character, and consequently, to constitutive principles. And so ends the keen struggle between pragmatism and transcendentalism in the ancient dispute: Teleology versus Mechanism.

Can we reconcile this ancient opposition with the help of pragmatism? In its elastic programme, pragmatism, which unites the great tendencies of our age and gathers together with the help of an attractive formula all similar tendencies, possesses in its corridor-philosophy (as Papini wittily calls it) the art of gaining access to all problems and all gates of philosophy. It is a mantle of such rich drapery that it gives shelter to all movements and tendencies. In the first place, it will have to concentrate itself and discipline its troops of thought logically. Attention is to be directed more to that which unites similar tendencies than to that which separates the innumerable philosophical sects in these days. Its importance lies in its happy propagandist cry which James uttered

and which has been powerfully echoed. That "anarchy of philosophical systems" of which Max Frischeisen-Köhler has complained very much in *Moderne Philosophie* (Stuttgart, Enke 1907 Introduction), must be put an end to, and the keen philosophical interest of our days should be awakened and not allowed again to remain dormant. Consequently, we welcome pragmatism or neo-positivism, disregarding all critical considerations. In the first place, it should only collect and sift, draw together the kindred spirits and unite the similar ones. The words of the leading pragmatist John Dewey ("What pragmatism means by practical" *Journal of Philosophy* Vol. V-4, February 13, 1908, No. 99), "Possibly pragmatism as a holding company for allied, yet separated interests and problems, might be dissolved and reverted to its original constituents" are premature. We require to-day not analysts but synthesists, not demolishers but builders, not critics but constructive philosophers. Through our endless "critiques" we have come very near the edge of the abyss of degeneration, of universal contempt. As the signs of the times are favourable to us, as Carl Stumpf in his rectoral address named *Die Wiedergeburt der Philosophie* (Rebirth of Philosophy, Leipzig, 1908) has clearly pointed out, and as out of the ruins of philosophy which represented in the post-Hegelian materialism a rugged heap of broken pieces, new life has sprung, so we will again construct. There is really no want of destroyers. But it is constructive philosophical imagination such as James possesses that we seek.

It is of little importance that after all Fichte is right in thinking that what one has for philosophy depends entirely upon what one is for man. We penetrate into the heart of things, nay, we require exactly that psychology of the formation of system which gives us a peep into the ins and outs of the formation of the current philosophical concepts. I regard with Xenophanes and Feuerbach every conception of the world as anthropomorphism, or, to use the terminology of Lipps, as an

Einführung. Only, I add that this anthropomorphic tendency belongs to the very nature of man, that it cannot be abrogated or relinquished. Francis Bacon set down this tendency of human nature to mould its conception of the world after the beloved inner nature of man, to *idola tribus*. The view was correct, what was false was only the idea that we could ever get rid of these idols of the race. Born logicians or mathematicians are as much inclined to a rationalistic and causal explanation of the world as emotional men, dreamers or sensation-alists give the preference to an aesthetico-teleological meaning, or lastly, as men with a strong will feel themselves drawn towards an energistic-voluntaristic view of the world. Conformably to the three fundamental functions of our soul, namely, sensation, feeling and will, there must be at least three types of conception of the world—rationalism, romanticism and voluntarism. The first rationalises, the second sentimentalises, the third voluntarises the world according to its own image. Pragmatism is a new collective name for the voluntaristic type of thought that has become the ruling one from the time of Schopenhauer, Ribot, Wundt and Ostwald. Only, the stress here is not laid upon will but upon feeling, a thing which appears sometimes (especially, in the essay on “Will in Nature”) even in Schopenhauer, when he says “will” but means “feeling.” James represents the highest voluntarism of our days in the neo-Humean or neo-positivistic style.

CHAPTER III

THE RECENT MOVEMENT OF NATURE-PHILOSOPHY

(Wilhelm Ostwald's "Energetics").

There are again men who openly profess nature-philosophy. For the man of culture, Melanchthon's saying that every educated person must be as much a follower of a proper system of philosophy as he is a citizen of a civilised State, has long become a moral postulate. The age which Friedrich Albert Lange ridiculed as one in which no apothecary in the land of poets, thinkers and dreamers could write a prescription without being conscious of the connection between this skill of his and whole world, is past. Political imperialism, combined with international commerce, technical arts and industries, have since the rebirth of the German Empire perfected a type of humanity which no longer obtains spiritual satisfaction from intuition and desireless dreaming, but boldly strives for expansion and makes a powerful attempt, where an attempt is likely to be successful, to solve problems and overcome resistance. The highly sentimental but somewhat dull and flabby nervous man has transformed himself into a strong-willed, active and methodical muscular man. If the watchword of German culture was formerly : Will to think, it has during the last generation changed into Will to act. The speculative nature-philosophy which was once rightly prohibited is absolutely abandoned to-day, but the flag of inductive nature-philosophy is now hoisted by the energists.

As Feuerbach, by extending Schiller's well-known principle and building upon it a world-theory, says, man's nature is reflected not only in his gods, but also in his concepts of substance. If people long for peace, their

metaphysics will favour the view of substance as passive matter, as inert mass, if they long, however, for movement, for life, then their metaphysics will place in the front rank action, force, the dynamical. The new "nature-philosophy" of Wilhelm Ostwald and his school characterises itself as an energetic movement against the materialism and naturalism of Häckel. Let us enquire first into the relation of the new nature-philosophy of Ostwald to the older view of Schelling and his school.

In January, 1799 appeared Schelling's *Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie* (First sketch of a system of nature-philosophy) and in January 1800, his *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*. At that time Schelling's proposition: The infinite world is nothing else than our creative spirit in its endless production and reproduction: was the philosophical catchword. Nature was completely spiritualised. From the epistemological discovery of Kant that the laws of nature finally resolve themselves into laws of thought, Schelling, and with him the nature-philosophers, draw the logically inadmissible conclusion that the laws of thought realize themselves, objectify themselves in nature. German philosophy was caught in a whirlwind which in its terrific force carried away even the choicest spirits. People tumbled in imaginative excess from one construction to another, and proclaimed in the conceit resulting from self-adoration, that the secret of the world is revealed completely in "nature-philosophy."

The calming of this speculative frenzy first began in the middle of the century with Ludwig Feuerbach. His inversion of the value of the concept of God, according to which, it is not God who has created man according to His own model, but it is man who has created his gods according to his own pattern, laid the axe to the root of all nature-philosophy. For people spoke, according to Spinoza's formula, indifferently of God or nature (*deus sive natura*), as the nature-philosophers were especially glad to do, and so there came also the attempt

to join to the inversion of the value of the concept of God an inversion of the concept of nature. It is the same anthropomorphism whether one spiritualises nature with Schelling or God with Aristotle. Through subjective duplication, the quality which men value most in themselves is projected here upon God, there upon nature. Zeus becomes more and more abstract and spiritual, till finally with Aristotle the concepts God and spirit coincide.

The same development one can observe in the nature-philosophy of the first half of the nineteenth century. Schelling found the tendency of all nature-philosophy to be "to pass from nature to intelligence." It is first when it succeeds in resolving the whole of nature into a single intelligence that the final object of all nature philosophy is attained. The finest intellect among the nature-philosophers, Lorenz Oken, values all philosophy only so far as it is nature-philosophy, and defines it as the doctrine of the "eternal transformation of God in the world." As now nature from the time of the physicists and Rousseau—in the general refrain, "Let us go back to nature" which was borrowed from the Cynic-Stoic moral philosophy—has become the highest standard of value, it is now as much anthropomorphised as the Greeks once humanized their gods. And as with the Greeks God was finally conceived as spirit, so the nature philosophers of the last century more and more consciously changed nature into spirit. Consequently, the nature-philosophers have placed Kant at their head. Kant's Copernican discovery was that our knowledge does not conform to objects but that on the contrary objects conform to our knowledge, that natural laws are only laws of thought and so only human interpretations of the manifoldness of natural phenomena in a unifying act of consciousness. The nature-philosophers maintain, however, conversely: Laws of thought are laws of nature. To Kant the thing-in-itself, that is, the objective being of nature, was unknowable. The great metaphysicians announce to us in a

rapturous eureka that they know the unknowable, have discovered the undiscoverable, conceived the inconceivable ; the only pity is that every one of them has discovered something different. Fichte discovered the ego ; Schelling, the absolute identity of the subject and the object ; Hegel, the self-evolution of logos ; Herbart, the real ; Schopenhauer the will ; Hartmann, the unconscious ; Nietzsche, the will to power ; Wundt, the will to spirit ; Riehl, the will to personality ; Lotze, the monad ; Fechner and Paulsen, the universal soul.

Had all these thinkers arrived at the same solution and had they—independently of one another—discovered the same formula, one could have attached scientific importance to an extraordinary unanimity among important men, even if one could not always admit that such a unanimity carried conviction with it. If their unanimity could be no decisive argument for the correctness of their solution, their universal disageement seems to me a very important argument against the correctness of each of these solutions. As there can be but one truth, whereas metaphysical solutions presuppose several truths, Kant's non-acceptance of all specific answers to the fundamental questions of metaphysics seems to me to-day as proper as it was at the end of the eighteenth century. An empirico-inductive metaphysics which takes up and works the sciences of reality, such as perhaps Külpe to-day advocates, we must sanction. The "metaphysical necessity" cannot be done away with. Consequently, speculative nature-philosophy is to-day detached from empirical nature-philosophy.

Our highly developed culture-system can in the long run manage as little without philosophy as without religion or art—so well do our feeling-elements find their satisfaction in religion and our imaginative power its expression in the creations and in the enjoyment of art, and so well does our process of thought require a rule and a philosophical formula of unity which gives adequate expression to the scientific conscience of

the age. This formula of unity conforms to the fundamental scientific beliefs of an age. So philosophy received at the hands of Descartes, Newton, Spinoza and Leibniz a predominantly mathematical stamp and its doctrines had therefore to be proved *more geometrico*, because the ruling science of the age was mathematics. For the same reason the Schellingian nature-philosophy led the fashion in philosophy as the doctrine of nature was then the most important science. One should think of Lavoisier, Lagrange, Lalande, Laplace, Dalton, Kant. From the middle of the nineteenth century the biological sciences, the path of which was cleared at the beginning of the century by Lamarck, Cuvier, Bichat, K. E. v. Baer, Goethe and Erasmus Darwin, have assumed through Charles Darwin so much importance that they stand in the centre of scientific interest. At once philosophers appear who take note of this change of tone and clothe philosophical thoughts in biological formulas:—Auguste Comte on the side of Lamarck, Herbert Spencer along with Charles Darwin, and lastly, in Germany Ernst Laas, Ernst Haeckel and Richard Avenarius. The second half of the last century is finally characterised by a gradual strengthening of the social conscience. The social problems now stand in the foreground of scientific interest.

Of course, philosophy must take note of this new change of tone of science. As it formerly attempted to combine harmoniously the achievements of physics and chemistry into the unity of total knowledge, and as it later discovered biological formulas in order to harmonise the newly acquired insight into the being of the phenomena of life with the totality of all knowledge, so it attempts now-a-days to adapt itself to the social science. Nature-philosophy now-a-days recedes further and further in order to make room for social and culture-philosophy. Comte and Spencer created a sociology but it was Marx and Nietzsche who first aroused great interest in these problems. The last decade of the nineteenth century belonged scientifically to the theories which were

pushed to the socialistic extreme by Marx and to the individualistic extreme by Nietzsche. Of course, through the preponderance of social and culture-problems the remaining philosophical interests have not come to a standstill, they rather move a little more slowly than formerly. As there is in individual consciousness a phenomenon which we call from the time of Herbart the "edge of consciousness," so the scientific consciousness of an age has a certain edge. Every generation has a predominant scientific interest which fills its consciousness at that time. During its predominance the remaining sciences continue at the threshold of the philosophical consciousness of the age.

The tendency towards analogical thinking and metaphor, the motive for anthropomorphising, that is, for the "attribution" of human qualities to, and "reading" them in the All, God, the world, Nature, in short, the motive for "introjection," as Avenarius calls it, or "Einfühlen," as Lipps calls it, is manifestly what hereditarily belongs to the human nature. Somewhat crassly Count Hermann Keyserling in *Unsterblichkeit* (*Immortality*), 1907 p. 20) expresses this thought as follows: It seems to me that in the last instance every belief in God—no matter how one conceives God—is fetishism—people believe and adore that which they themselves have created.

The doubling projection of his own qualities is an inseparable permanent characteristic of man's original nature. As we are anatomically made of two halves, so also are we spiritually. The sensations corresponding to the two sides of the brain are on one side, feeling and will are on the other. If onehalf, namely, sensation, preponderates, we are logically inclined and are consequently content with science, especially in its most exact form, mathematics. If on the contrary, the life of feeling or will preponderates, we belong to the emotional type which does not feel at home in the sunlight of consciousness but in the twilight of gloomy dawn and impulsive force of construction.

Our views of the world are, consequently, natural reflections of our spiritual habit. Tradition and training, disposition and inclination, *faculté maîtresse* and *milieu*, as Taine calls them, are the natural components of our individual view of the world. We may in virtue of our inner nature and environment incline to this or that type of thinking, but a philosophy of the world educated people will only then have when the traditional view held by the Church not only does not suit their inner nature but is even repugnant to them. An educated man without a philosophy of the world is like a man without a shadow — a Peter Schlemihl of logic. The savage has in fetishism a readymade philosophy of the world perfectly suitable to his grade of knowledge, just as the orthodox believer in Church doctrines, no matter of what confession, possesses in the doctrine and life of his religion a consistent view of the world. And he who is satisfied in these days with these requires no philosophical compensation. Those, however, who cannot rest content with the traditional view of the world held by their Church, because it shows holes, which can be hidden, but not removed by theological patchwork, cannot help looking about for a philosophical view of the world which suits the inner man in them. As little as we can live in these days in a house, the glass panes of which are replaced by pieces of paper or of which the leaky roof is patched up with paste boards, which lets in every drop of rain, so little can we spiritually remain long at a view of the world which is scientifically loose or logically weak. Natural science has from the time of Copernicus always broken the windows of the world-structure of the great historical religions and caused its roofs to leak. The scientific theology of all faiths has striven hard to repair the breaches and to cover up skilfully the rotten places. This repair satisfies very well the dialectically modest people. They are glad of the sunlight which shines through the roof-leaks and cheerfully endure the

moisture which comes through the imperfectly patched-up breaches. The sensitive people, however, cannot bear any draught. They stir themselves on the least irritation. If the explanation of things offered by the Church is not attainable through knowledge, then they don't accept it. And yet they must find shelter. Their indispensable necessity for unity, a doubling reflection of their consciousness of the ego, presses for the recognition of a highest principle of order, an explanation of the world from the standpoint of identity, a logically conceived picture of the world. They must therefore seek shelter in a philosophical system. For nothing cripples our creative power, our happiness of life, our impulse for organization so much as spiritual homelessness.

Materialism was such an asylum before the rise of energetics, on the one hand, and of neo-idealism, on the other. Popular philosophers like Büchner, Vogt or Moleschott, gave, above all things satisfactory information. As one, however, was about to settle comfortably, one was reminded critically by Friedrich Albert Lange that materialism, though no doubt it represented a tolerably satisfactory, and for the time being, soothing view of the world, could not at all be raised to the rank of a definitive philosophy of the world. Lange himself clung back to Kant and pronounced—perhaps simultaneously with Eduard Zeller and Otto Liebmann—that catchword “Back to Kant” which is powerfully echoed by the Marburgian school. The Neo-Kantians began to occupy the philosophical chair; especially, no less a man than Hermann Helmholtz as an epistemological philosopher sided with them. The synthesis of Kant and Plato which Hermann Cohen, the most important leader of the neo-Kantian movement, has completed in a series of profound and thoughtful works, gave neo-idealism, which Eucken and Windelband, Schmidt and Lipps, Husserl and Münsterberg to-day so powerfully represent, a new turn. For whether one with Windelband

and Rickert, Lipps and Münsterberg leans towards Fichte, or with some modern philosophers (Schmidt, Boland, Stern) comes closer to Hegel, is more a question of dialectical *nuance* than of principle. Neo-idealism has in the German academical philosophers, as we have seen in the first chapter, again become the ruling school-philosophy, The German positivists of the type of Ernst Laas, Göring or of the nature of Richard Avenarius, have not only found no equal following but they have to-day hardly any academical representative. German positivism has a great many followers, but no worthy, universally recognised leader. The neo-positivism of James rather immediately wins the field. A straggler of the positivism of the old type is J. Petzoldt, a fairly good interpreter of Avenarius. J. Petzoldt's *Weltproblem vom positivistischen Standpunkt* is, according to its plan and intention, a fighting work, a polemical book. And in fact it is a windmill-fight clothed in the garb of philosophy with a substance which Petzoldt can only interpret as a shell, as animistic atavism. He asks himself whether "a fool has ever conceived a more foolish thing than what the normal metaphysics has done with its claim of strict scientific precision". *Tu te fâches, donc tu as tort* (You are angry, therefore, you are wrong). Petzoldt has struck such a wrong note that everything important and valuable which he as the recognised best exponent of the doctrine of Avenarius has to offer has been affected by it. A fine and delicate web, as all philosophical thought is, requires to be woven with silk thread. Nobody who understands things will find fault with him for his trying to justify the line Protagoras, Hobbes, Hume, Comte, Mach, Avenarius, philosophico-historically. And if his presentation is one-sided, still his fighting qualities will enable him to make many an argument work. I cannot, however, see why Petzoldt has not come into close contact with such valuable supporters of positivism as Dühring, Göhring, and especially, Laas. His contemptuous rejection of Cornelius,

Kleinpeter, Verworn and Ziehen (P. 137) as "psychomonists" cannot be justified. A thorough relativist of the type of Petzoldt, according to whom there was never pronounced a deeper thought than that of Protagoras, namely, that the world is for everyone what it *appears* to be to him, ought to be hostile to all orthodoxy, not even excepting the orthodoxy of Avenarius. Whoever starts from positivism gathers round the flag of the phenomenalist Ernst Mach. In his fight against materialism and the conception of the world of the mechanical world-philosophy that has grown into a dogma, Mach is at one with idealists of all shades and grades. With the German-American physicist J. B. Stallo, he absolutely rejects the mechanico-atomistic theory. In his preface to the German translation of Stallo's work, entitled *Begriffe und Theorien der modernen Physik*" (Leipzig 1901), Mach says that he does not reject the mechanico-atomistic theory as an aid to physical research and exposition, but he rejects its claim to be the universal principle of physics and to be a world-view. Concepts like *mass* or *force* are, for Mach as for Stallo, no realities but pure relations, "connections of certain elements of appearances with other elements". Mach has in common with idealism the starting-point of the theory of knowledge, namely, consciousness. Consequently, he is related to the immanence-philosophy of Schuppe or Rehmke. What now separates him from orthodox idealists, especially, from the Marburgian School is his horror of all metaphysics in which he can see only a crude remnant of fetishism or "nature-mythology". What for Cohen Kant and Plato signify, Hume and Protagoras do for Mach and his numerous followers. The dispute here is about the concept of substance, the last remnant of which was the Kantian "thing-in-itself"—which is for Petzoldt a "perfect nothing, an imaginary thing". The phenomenism which is free from metaphysics and the subjectless objectivism of Mach, know no gulf between the psychical and the physical, between the inward and the outward. Our life, says Mach in his *Analyse*

der Empfindungen (*Analysis of sensations*), is a part of the sensuous world like other parts. The boundary between the physical and the psychical is a purely practical, conventional boundary. The whole world is for him a great connected sensation-complex. The philosopher of Göttingen, Max Verworn (*Naturwissenschaft und Weltanschauung* (Natural Science and Philosophy,) Leipzig, 1904) found for this conception of the world the expression *Psychomonism* which he first introduced in the second edition of his *Allgemeine Physiologie* (*Universal Physiology*) Jena, 1897. Mach formerly liked Verworn's expression, but he explained in his latest work *Erkenntnis und Irrtum* (Knowledge and Error), 1905, "Verworn's expression *psychomonism* seems to me to-day less suitable than in an older idealistic phase of my thought". Verworn himself, however, as he says at page 47, has reached his psychomonism independently of Mach, Avenarius and Ziehen. Of this psychomonism he gives the following account: The opposition between the material world and the psychical does not at all exist in reality, but the entire material world is only the contents of the psychical. There is only one thing and that is the rich contents of the psychical. To this psychomonism, the psycho-physiological theory of knowledge of Ziehen and later, H. Kleinpeter's views in *Die Erkenntnistheorie der Naturforschung der Gegenwart*. (*The theory of knowledge of the scientific enquiry of to-day*), Leipzig 1905 and Hans Cornelius's in *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (*Introduction to Philosophy*), Leipzig, 1903, are akin. Strict disciples of Avenarius like Petzoldt reject psychomonism as a mistaken view of Avenarius and Mach, and Mach himself has recently in *Erkenntnis und Irrtum* (*Knowledge and Error*), Leipzig, 1905, taken their side. One may well say, says Mach in a note to page 131, that simple sensations are abstractions, but one cannot yet maintain that no actual fact underlies them. And so Petzoldt could triumphantly exclaim: In its crusade against the *fata morgana* of a theory of knowledge,

the second epoch which stands under the influence of Kant cannot also go beyond Hume. The positivistic line of thought which led from Protagoras to Hume continued in France among the disciples of Auguste Comte, in England in Mill and Spencer, in order to be received to-day by Ernst Mach under the flag of "phenomenalism" and by the American William James, under the new philosophical catchword "pragmatism".

An energistic world-philosophy begins, especially, in scientific circles to emerge clearly, namely, the nature-philosophy powerfully represented by Wilhelm Ostwald which he first proclaimed in his celebrated Lübeck lecture under the title *The refutation of scientific materialism* (1895), then developed in his *Naturphilosophie* and bravely defended on all sides in the "Annalen der Naturphilosophie" founded by him in 1900. If matter resolves itself for Mach into sensation-complexes, which as ultimate data are not further deducible, Ostwald reduces not only matter but also sensation-complexes into a neutral third, into a highest generic concept, namely, energy. Matter is for Ostwald nothing but a group of energies, spatially arranged and whatever can be said of it can be said only of these energies. The anti-metaphysician Mach maintains a neutral, if not a hostile attitude, towards this substantialisation of the principle of energy. As Mach is fundamentally opposed to all polemic, he remarks once in passing that the conception of the principle of energy as substance, like Black's conception of heat as a substance, has its natural limits in the facts concerning which it can only be maintained artificially. Nevertheless, the energists adore Mach as their master, especially as the chief idea of Mach, the conception of the economy of thought, which Mach developed simultaneously with, but independently of Avenarius, comes in the theory of knowledge near energism, although Mach, on account of his anti-metaphysical tendency, receives the energists very coldly. The energists, moreover, have their

patron-saints. If they chiefly follow Schelling, still the proper founder of energism is no other than Leibniz. As the monists of the type of Häckel swear allegiance to Spinoza, so energists of all grades and conditions, willingly or unwillingly, consciously or unconsciously, belong in thought to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The line of thought, Aristotle—Leibniz is to-day further developed by energists of the school of Ostwald. As the painter can only use a few fundamental colours, as the writer of a tragedy has before him only a few fundamental real tragic motives, as the composer has only a few fundamental notes at his disposal, so the philosopher has before him only a limited, comparatively small number of logically possible types of thought or world-views. Perhaps no more than the number of temperaments that we possess, according to folk-psychology, or the number of categories that we have, according to the teachers of formal logic. Aristotle was in favour of a fourfold division which plays the same rôle of a system-building factor in the structure of his world-philosophy that the tripartite division does in the dialectical structure of his master, Plato. And one of the most sober thinkers of to-day, the Dane Harald Höffding, finds that the whole philosophical enquiry turns in the last analysis upon four principal problems: the problem of knowledge (the logical problem), the problem of existence (cosmological problem), the problem of value (the ethico-religious problem) and the problem of consciousness (the psychological problem). As there are four principal types of problems, so there are four admissible, logically sound solutions of problems. The history of philosophy is not a chaos of small incidents, but, as Hegel said, a pantheon of eternal thoughts. The number of rival views of the world is in the last analysis a very limited one. The countless pearls of thought can be easily strung on four threads which lead from the beginning of strictly philosophical thought to the immediate present. The type of thought that has the greatest influence and that is

even to-day the most important type, is the idealism of Plato which Kant revives in the first edition of his Critique of Pure Reason and weaves into the fabric of his critique. The most eloquent spokesmen of this mode of thinking which has satisfied the choicest spirits and convinced sceptic minds, are to-day Hermann Cohen and Alois Riehl of whose basal work on philosophical criticism which had appeared in 1876 but which was long out of print, a second edition appeared in 1908 (at first only the first volume). There is only this difference between them that while Cohen brings more into prominence the idealistic side, Riehl emphasises the realistic element in Kantian criticism. The second type of thought is naturalism with its manifold shades and grades. If with the idealists nature arises from spirit (from the idea, according to Plato), so on the contrary, with the naturalists, reason proceeds from nature. It does not matter whether this nature is pluralistic, as it is with Democritus (atoms) and Hobbes (corpuscles), or monistic, as it is in the pantheism of Spinoza. The emphasis is put here, as there, on nature, on the attribute of extension, on mass, on the material world, in short, on the external, and not, as with the idealists, on the internal. And even if the spirit runs parallel to the body, still the primacy, the scientific predominance, is given to the material side of nature, to extension. The most zealous, though not certainly the most consistent supporter of this mode of thinking is to-day Ernst Häckel.

The third type of thought is the organic-aesthetic type. It appears imperfectly in the most ancient thinkers, the hylozoists, but most clearly in Aristotle. According to this, the world is neither a cosmos of eternal ideas (Plato) nor a kingdom of eternal atoms (Democritus), but a stage of eternal forms or ends developing according to eternal laws of evolution. That is the world of Aristotle which Leibniz revives after the model of Giordano Bruno and Ostwald recasts in his energism. Not dead matter,—but the growth that has life is here the type

of all order. Otherwise expressed : the constants or invariables which all philosophers and physicists seek, lie not in being but in happening, not in co-existence in space but in succession in time, not in remaining stationary, but in acting. The ancient form of this type of thought was called therefore force (dynamical view of the world), whilst its present form which is in keeping with the present position of our knowledge of nature is called energism.

Lastly, there is a fourth type of thought which in ancient times the sophists with Protagoras at their head represented, whilst David Hume developed it most logically in the eighteenth century. This is positivism which gives up all claim to absolute knowledge and limits itself to the relative. *Tout est relatif et seul le relatif est absolu* (Everything is relative and only the relative is absolute). This relativism sees in substance—"the constant" or "invariable" of philosophical thinkers and scientists—either with Nietzsche a grammatical prejudice or, with orthodox positivists, an animistic ascription or introjection (Avenarius). Since Berkeley and Hume's biting criticism of the concept of substance, it occupies for positivists the lumber-room of metaphysical mythology. A milder form of this Protagoras-Humean relativism is the phenomenalism of Ernst Mach and the pragmatism of William James. A special form of Machian phenomenalism is represented in these days by the Vienna botanist, J. Wiesner, who proves himself in his treatise "Philosophy of Botany" a good thinker. His friendly relation with Houston Stewart Chamberlain is not after all due to a community of philosophical interests. J. Wiesner represents the standpoint of a metaphenomenal nature-philosophy in opposition to a more speculative one represented by Reinke or Ostwald (The expression *metaphenomenal* he owes to the physician Breuer and to the philosopher Al. Höfler, cf. *Österr. Rundschau* Vol. XV Number 4 for May 15, 1908, p. 263). Wiesner calls that metaphenomenal which can be represented materially—atoms,

molecules, although they are not perceivable by the senses—on the other hand, he calls that metaphysical (and rejects that as such) which as immaterial is placed beyond all perception. As pure metaphysical concepts Wiesner indicates: God, soul, entelechy, the dominant.

Between these four great lines of thought, the “fight for a world-philosophy” is once more fought, although not brought to a decisive issue. I lay stress upon the word “once more.” In reality, this struggle for a world-philosophy has never ceased. Every age must think out, live out, fight out these problems with its scientific knowledge and historical insight in one of these four fundamental forms of views of the world. What lies between these is mixture. Ever since philosophy ceased to be dictated from above, as it had been in the feudal system of the Middle Ages, and began with the advent of humanism, Renaissance and Reformation, to be formed like the State from within, our feeling of logical responsibility has been greatly strengthened. Our indispensable requisite of unity—the “transcendental unity of apperception,” as it is called in the school-terminology of Kant, or “consciousness of the ego,” as it is called the language of all times—demands emphatically the recognition of the highest principles of order in nature, spirit and history, in short, a unitary system of the order of the world, whether it is called God or nature, atom or monad, will or the unconscious. As every individual organism through the dictates of its motive for self-preservation strives for its physical equilibrium, so will every culture-system have to maintain for its own preservation its logical equilibrium, Philosophical systems are therefore nothing else than indispensably necessary struggles for the logical equilibrium of a given culture-system. In the midst of this struggle we stand.

Energistic monism struggles at present—especially in scientific circles—for logical predominance. Materialism everywhere sounds the retreat. A psychology of systembuilding

has to investigate the causes of the movement which has led to the obvious decline of materialism as a world-philosophy and has allowed the energetic view of the world to gain ground and accelerated its progress. What is new in energism is properly only the activity shown in its appearance and the consciousness of its inner superiority. The tendency towards energism is almost as old as philosophy itself. Georg Helm has in his work "*Die Energetik nach ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*" (*Energism according to its historical evolution*) which appeared in the year 1898, traced the tendency towards the energistic view of the world to its roots in the past, and along with Rühlmann (*Mechanische Wärmetheorie* 1885 *Mechanical theory of heat*) has seen in Heraclitus, and seen rightly, the proper forefather of energism. The bases of energism in the history of philosophy have been investigated in my work entitled "*Berner Studien zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte*" (Vol. XXX). Under the title of a "dynamical" view of the world, especially, under the Robert Mayer-Helmholtzian law of conservation of force, it long concealed that account of the world which appears under the name "*energism*" and claims to overthrow once for all the materialistic view of the world.

The well-known speech of Wilhelm Ostwald at the Congress of Scientists at Lübeck delivered on the 20th September 1875 on "the refutation of scientific materialism" was only the fuse which led to the explosion of the already contained powder. Long before Ostwald eminent scientists showed the scientific untenability, and especially the epistemological untenability of the mechanico-materialistic view of the world. The English mathematician William Kingdon Clifford (1845-1879) had already before the British assembly of scientists at Brighton expressed his views on "the ends and implements of scientific thought" which come very near those anti-materialistic principles which were simultaneously developed by the physicist Ernst Mach. In his essay *on the*

nature of the thing-in-itself, Clifford, the representative of that mind-stuff theory, which Herbert Spencer raised to a position of honour till its logical weakness was exposed by the pragmatist William James, formulates his novel theory as follows :—"Matter is an idea in which mind-stuff is the thing represented. Reason, understanding and will are properties of a complex which consists in itself neither of rational and intelligent, nor of conscious elements." This leads directly to the "analysis of sensations" of Ernst Mach.

Independently of Clifford, the German-American physicist and mathematician, John Bernard Stallo (1823-1900), who originally started from Hegel reached the same anti-materialistic, anti-metaphysical results as Clifford and Mach. In the preface to Stallo's principal work *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics*, Ernst Mach explains : "It would have been of great help and use to me when I began my critical work in the middle of the sixties if I had been familiar with the similar efforts of an acquaintance like Stallo." Force, so Stallo sums up, is nothing else than mass, and mass is nothing else than force.....Mass, inertia or matter in itself cannot be distinguished from absolute nothing, for mass reveals its presence or proves its reality purely through its effects, its power, (whether or not it is counter-balanced by another mass), its extension or motion. On the other hand, pure force is also nothing. It is impossible to construct matter from a synthesis of forces. The opposition to materialistic metaphysics did not thus come alone from the neo-Kantians to whom Friedrich Albert Lange supplied the dialectical implements against materialism, inasmuch as he understood it historically and thereby overcame it, but it emanated from the class of exact scientists themselves. People refused to trust the academic philosophers, as they made the imputation against them that they were *ex professo* opposed to materialism. But in the disinterested scientists one must repose implicit confidence. Hence that great change among

educated people who a generation ago held the materialistic dogma, whilst they in great numbers flock to-day to the standard of "nature-philosophy" in its energistic form and leave the metaphysical dogmatism of the "worldriddle" to the half-and quarter-educated people.

No less a man than Emil du Bois-Reymond, the last pillar of the mechanico-materialistic philosophy of the old type, foresaw this change. In a lecture on "Leibnizian ideas in modern natural science" he announced the signs of a neo-Leibnizianism that was manifesting itself in scientific circles. The French have been, moreover, accustomed during the last ten years to look upon Leibniz as the great reformer of formal logic [The labours of Couturat (*Le Logique de Leibniz*) have cleared the path here].

The German energists have rediscovered the metaphysician Leibniz, to whom Herbart and Lotze accorded the front rank. The neo-vitalists and energists are as much under the sway of Leibniz and finally, under that of Aristotle, as the strict naturalists of the school of Haeckel come under that of Spinoza. It was Leibniz who once more introduced the "forces actives" and formulated the law of their conservation before Bernoulli and long before Robert Mayer. It is not the total motion as Descartes thought, but the total living force that remains constant. Forces cannot be annihilated but only exchanged with one another, "just as a sum of money can always be converted into small coin". (*Opp. philos.* Ed. Erdmann, p. 775; the view, moreover has its origin, like the Leibnizian idea of evolution, in Heraclitus). It is no wonder that our pendulum swings to-day between Spinoza and Leibniz as it did for about two hundred years between Plato and Aristotle. As the number of logically possible views of the world, as we have already said, is very limited, the balance always inclines where the present position of our scientific views gravitates. Consequently, Leibniz now triumphs. So said Karl Stumpf in his Berlin

rectoral address, "Die Wiedergeburt der Philosophie" (*The rebirth of philosophy*) Leipzig, 1905, p. 5:—A Leibnizian inheritance, a spirit of his spirit, runs through modern natural science. Leibnizian ideas of substance and causality, of free-will and determination, of consciousness and the unconscious agree with the most advanced researches of to-day. In the logical movement of our days, especially, so says Stumpf, even Kant retreats before Leibniz. And just as Leibniz himself in reality was led through two moments, his discovery of the infinitely small (the infinitesimal) and the differential calculus, on the one hand, and that of the smallest creatures, the micro-organisms by Swammerdam, Loeuwenhoek and Malpighi on the other, if not to the conception, at least to the construction of his monadologico-energetic view of the world, so there were in the last generation, two scientific discoveries which the scientists traced back to Leibniz, namely, bacteriology from the time of Robert Koch and the revolution in physics through the discovery of the X-rays by Röntgen. Now as then, here as there, the discovery of the "infinitely small has given the death-blow to atomistic materialism and the mechanical world-philosophy connected with it". The bacteria-theory, combined with Haeckel and Verworn's studies of protists, has completely destroyed the Schwann-Schleidenian mythology, the cell-theory sanctioned by Virchow that in the cell we had to do with an ultimate elementary form which could not further be analysed—just as the Röntgen and Becquerel rays, the ion and electron theories drove out the atom as the ultimate unity of matter. The electrons are some thousand times smaller than the smallest atoms, and in the world of life the cell decomposes into a number of viscous protoplasm masses, the cell-kernel (nucleus), the nucleus-ingredients and other components. The cell is therefore in the world of life in no way the last unit but at most the last unit but one, just as in the world of physical

events the atom is not the last, indivisible, irreducible element, but at most only a last unit but one, a unit hypos-tatised for research and didactic purposes. And so the Röntgen rays have not only exhibited for the first time the whole of our skeleton, but they have revealed the mechanico-materialistic structure of the world in all its logical untenability.

The concept *mass*, the central concept of the materialistic account of the world, does not claim in the age of ions and electrons to be the bearer of the unity of the universe. The Bern physicist, Paul Gruner, says in the preface to his work "Die radioactiven Substanzen und die Theorie des Atomzerfalls" (Radio-active substances and the theory of the disintegration of atoms) that to-day the electron and not the atom represents the ultimate unit of matter. The atom always shows itself as an "aggregate of thousands of minute bodies; it is similar to the stellar system *en miniature* in which innumerable electrons revolve round one another in well-régulated paths". If, again, the electron itself, so adds Gruner, is a massless structure having an electro-magnetic nature, then matter itself will be nothing else than a form of energy. The evolutionistic thought is therefore carried over to the inorganic world, nay, put into the atom itself, because the hypothesis satisfies "our scientific necessity for unity" (*Grenzen* p. 97). For the same reasons the physicist Erich Marx (*Grenzen in der Natur und in der Wahrnehmung, Leipzig 1908*) advocates the substitution of the electro-magnetic view of the world for the mechanical.

One understands now why the view of the world of the energists is so anxious to dethrone the mechanico-atomistic materialism. Our need for unification which is wont to put at the top of the pyramid of phenomena God or nature, urgently requires a common denominator, a constant or invariable, in short, a highest generic principle or a highest principle of order, under which the manifold of phenomena of all movement

and change in space and time, all confusion and disorder in the apparent chaos of the kaleidoscopically mixed phenomena of the world can be brought, that is logically subsumed. One principle of order after another is discovered in Nature and history. Can now all these individual, apparently unconnected principles of order—natural laws, laws of thought historical laws—act anarchically against one another, oppose and neutralise one another, or do they rather follow a highest principle of order, whether this is called God or nature? Do the innumerable laws or forces in nature and spirit wage a war of extermination against one another, or do they rather follow a highest unity of law?

This unity of law the energists strive for as much as the materialists. Only, they regard the naturalistic central idea of mass, in view of the theory of electrons and the prevailing electro-magnetic view of the world of to-day, as not befitting the majesty of a world-emperor, just as they ascribe to the concept of energy the capacity of uniting in itself all those majestic attributes which suit the highest principle of order, the unity of law, in ruling the universe according to principles of unity. Energy possesses the special advantage that spiritual phenomena also lead back to energies and that their regular reciprocal relationship, as it appears, for instance, in the laws of association, can be explained by the universal law of conservation of energy.

Materialism as a world-philosophy was wrecked logically on the problem of consciousness; especially, the creation of matter as pure representation out of consciousness was thought conceivable but not conversely, the creation of consciousness, already the simplest experience, out of matter. Here energism shows its whole logical importance. It makes full use of the unity of law in nature and spirit inasmuch as it succeeds in bringing extension and thought, body and soul, nature and spirit under a common denominator, namely, energy. In the concept of energy, consciousness is readily

incorporated as in its superior principle. For consciousness indicates no substance, no mass, no spatial extension, but force, tension, energy. To speak of the energy of consciousness does not involve any *contradictio in adjecto*. Consciousness, according to Ostwald, is only a special form of nerve-energy which is manifested in the central organ. The phenomenon of consciousness itself is of an energistic nature and consequently obeys in its associational regularity the universal law of Conservation of Energy. For no spiritual phenomenon is perfected without a suitable application of energy. In "attention" nerve-energy is collected, in "exhaustion" it is destroyed. Thus in spiritual phenomena the question is of the origin and transformation of a special type of energy which Ostwald provisionally calls "spiritual energy." The form of energy working in the whole nervous apparatus Ostwald calls "nerve-energy."

The energistic view of the world is characterised by two phases. The first is directly related to the Helmholtzian principle of the Conservation of Force which is now taken as the law of Conservation of Energy and which, when first conceived, ran thus: The sum of the existing active force and elasticity is constant, while the later formula that is current to-day runs: The sum of potential and kinetic energy is constant. Helmholtz, Thomson, Clausius and the oldest (mechanical) school of physicists believed, before the discovery of the new rays by Hittorff, Lenard and Röntgen, that the law of energy was naturally connected with molecular mechanics. And so there arose that mechanistic energism which to-day is built into pure energism by Helm and Ostwald by adhering again to Robert Mayer. Mechanistic energism had not yet placed the phenomena of consciousness under the law of Conservation, but it was the Ostwaldian doctrine of nerve-energy which regarded even the phenomena of consciousness as forms of energy that could apply itself seriously to energism and raise energy to the rank of a common

denominator of all phenomena, including the spiritual. If formerly, body and spirit, mass and motion had been opposed to each other, so were now representations, feelings and will-acts in their energistic value, and only movement remained as the central concept to which body and spirit or mass and sensations, as fundamental properties or attributes had to be subordinated. As Spinoza degraded both the substances of his master, Descartes, extension and thought, into attributes of a neutral third (*deus sive natura*), so Ostwald and with him the energistic nature-philosophers of our days regard body and consciousness or mass and sensation as parallel forms of phenomena of a neutral third, a monistic central notion, namely, energy.

From the time of Poncelet the notion of energy has come near the principle of work (*principe de la transmission de travail*). Energism now means the principle of the transformation, transmission and continuation of work. Energism, therefore, gives the clearest expression to the relativistic thought which has become the prevailing one from the time of Leibniz—its formula runs: Being means standing under relations. When changes appear, says Helm (*Energetik* p. 20), there still subsists among them this mathematical relation—this is the formula of energism and this is certainly also the only formula in the domain of the knowledge of nature. Consequently, everything must be transformed or resolved into energy or work. For Ostwald matter as the primary concept no more exists, it emerges “as secondary phenomenon through the constant aggregate of certain energies.” Energy itself, however, is defined by Ostwald as work or everything which arises from work and is transformed into work. The totality of nature appears, therefore, to Ostwald as a part of changing energies in space and time of which we become aware in proportion as these energies impinge upon our body and especially, upon the sense-organs designed to receive them. And thus Ostwald arrives at the following conception which is most

important for energism (*Naturphilosophie*, p. 152): "Energy alone exists in all known natural phenomena without any exception or, in other words, all natural phenomena can be regulated by the concept of energy. All that we know of the outer world we can represent in the form of statements regarding existing energies and thus the concept of energy shows itself on all sides as the most general concept that science has ever formed. It embraces not only the problem of Substance but also that of Causality". In his small epitome of "nature-philosophy" (in the collection entitled "*Systematische Philosophie. Kultur der Gegenwart* I, 6, 1907 p. 162) Ostwald distinguishes several kinds of energy. Consequently, there are several kinds of mechanical energy (to which work belongs) such as heat-energy, electrical and magnetic energy, emissive and chemical energy. To these forms of energy there corresponds on the inner side, viewed from the standpoint of consciousness, nerve-energy. For we obtain all our knowledge of the outer world, so Ostwald continues, through our sense-apparatus; the necessary and sufficient condition, however, that the sense-apparatus may be brought into operation, is that between it and the outer world there is an exchange of energy. This exchange consists in the majority of cases in this, that energy flows over from the outer world to the sense-apparatus; still there are particular cases in which the reverse movement of energy takes place. What we therefore perceive is always only the differences in the conditions of energy with reference to our sense-apparatus.

Against this energistic view of the world which completely substantialises energy.—"Energy may therefore be regarded as substance in the proper sense of the word" says Ostwald "it is for this reason substance that it is present in time and space" (*Naturphilosophie* p. 146 f, 278)—weighty considerations have been advanced from philosophical and scientific quarters. Thus, Alois Riehl (*Philosophie der Gegenwart* (Philosophy of to-day), 2nd Edition, p. 158) thinks it wrong

to speak of energy as the only quantity by the side of space and time, as every form of energy rather shows itself as a product of two quantities, a capacity-factor and an intensity-factor, which are both real quantities. If matter, so runs Riehl's objection to the Ostwaldian principle, is always an abstraction, it is yet no thing of thought, it is no thing at all, but the manner in which things are represented through the external senses. Also energy is an abstraction ; but the forms of energy are concrete, so far as they can be known through sensuous perception restricted to spatial things. Energism does not receive much better treatment at the hands of Eduard v. Hartmann, although in many respects he comes near it and gives it—as against mechanistic energism—logical preeminence. But Hartmann also finds (*Moderne Naturphilosophie*, Preuss. Jahrbuch 1902 p. 14) that “energy, in exactly the same sense as matter, is an objective, real phenomenon.”

Also the logical subsumption of the concept of force under the concept of energy is not allowed to pass unchallenged in scientific circles. Thus Alfred Dippe (*Naturphilosophie*, 1907 p. 76) says that it is not possible to substitute for the concept of force that of energy, because energy according to its definition, relates only to that which is mutually transformable, to equivalent work, while the work of the mass does not fall under it. Consequently, energy falls as a subordinate notion under the concept of force. The concepts energy, work and effect must, after the manner of Obermayer, be strictly logically separated from one another. For Dippe Lavoisier's doctrine of Conservation of Matter contains in it the Conservation of Force as well as the Conservation of Energy. Ostwald indeed puts both force and energy under the higher concept work. He distinguishes energy of position or restful (potential) energy from the energy of motion or active (actual, also kinetic) energy. For him the total energy of the world is constant, as in all natural

phenomena without any exception energy is present. Energy, however, as opposed to force, is a more simple and more original thing, because our senses react well upon energies and not upon forces. Energy itself, however, is, as we already know, "work or everything which arises from work and can be transformed into work." And just as Marx resolved all economical values into work-values and these again into the time taken up by work, so Ostwald introduces work as the central concept under which he subsumes mass, force and energy.

That this prepares the way for "empirical" metaphysics Ostwald will not be able to deny. For, whether he gives his assumptions the title *protoltheses*, instead of *hypotheses* matters little, owing to the fact that his concept of Substance, of "simple energy", is as metaphysical as any other concept, such as, ego, will, logos or monad. For the essential characteristic of nature-philosophy seems to him to be "the most universal statements of the character of natural laws." For this reason Wundt also, and with perfect justice, counts him among the dialectical metaphysicians. And J. Wiesner (*Naturwissenschaft und Naturphilosophie*, Oesterr. Rundschau Vol. XV, No. 4, 15th May, 1908) raises his warning voice against the too bold hypotheses of modern nature-philosophy. Yet Ostwald speaks of his "simple energy" as the most universal substance or as "substance in the proper sense of the word." Ostwald is therefore urged from many sides, especially forcibly by Wilhelm von Schnehen, who inclines to the standpoint of v. Hartmann, to profess metaphysics openly and unreservedly. Lastly, Ostwald will not be able to pass over the sharp polemic of Alois Höfler, as sketched in the work *Zur Gegenwärtigen Naturphilosophie* (On the nature-philosophy of to-day). His position: The concept of force and equally with it, that of work are categorical concepts—strikes logically so powerfully at the root of energism as a world-philosophy, that energism must boldly defend itself if it

is to attain the end aimed at, namely, to replace the materialistic by energistic monism, especially, as Lipps has recently called the concepts "force", "energy", "law", scientific "mythology".

In the struggle for a world-philosophy, energism has to fight with two forces. As it itself seeks to follow the true mean between materialism and idealism, it cannot help crossing swords with both the opponents. Hitherto energism confined itself by preference to settling with the mechanico-materialistic opponent whom it wanted to crush. The principal work, however, still remained to be done. Even when the materialistic opponent was defeated, there remained the fight with idealism.

It is not without some meaning that energism aims at an inductive metaphysics in close touch with the particular results of all the sciences dealing with reality, such as has been in vogue from the time of Fechner, Lotze, v. Hartmann, Wundt, Eucken, Bergmann, Külpe, Erhardt and several others. The metaphysical necessity of human nature postulated by Kant is an indispensable necessity. The sworn enemies of metaphysics of the type of Avenarius and Mach are living proofs of the proposition that we can consciously fight against all metaphysics, in order, finally, unconsciously or unwillingly, to fall into it. The critics of phenomenalism, Hönigswald and Hell (*Ernst Mach's Philosophie*, Stuttgart 1908), have convincingly proved that finally Mach also landed in "a metaphysics of being".

There is no escape from the psychological circle. The process of human duplication cannot be avoided. We cannot help putting our own qualities into the All. A coarser or finer anthropomorphism is the spiritual fate of the human race. It matters little whether one calls this ascription of the characteristics of the human species or the qualities of the human race to the necessary principle of unity of the world, anthropomorphism with the Greeks, "idola tribus" with

Francis Bacon, "introjection" with Avenarius, "Einlegen" with Petzoldt, or, lastly, "Einfühlen" with Lipps. Whether we call this highest centre of unity or order, nature or God, it still remains only a projected doubling of our own unity of self. In this respect the critiques of Locke, Berkeley and Hume do not differ. If the body is doubled by projection, there arises materialism; if the soul is introjected into the world, idealism is the result; if particular sensations or experiences are "deposited," there arises phenomenalism; if lastly, muscular strength, force or will is "felt" in the world-whole, there arises that view of the world which Wundt calls with Schopenhauer voluntarism, and Ostwald calls with Robert Mayer and Leibniz energism. The great strength of energism as a world-philosophy lies therefore in this, that we live in an age of technique of which the central idea is work. Dishonoured by the Greeks, work is honoured by us. The change in our attitude towards work disposes us favourably towards the energistic view of the world. To the Greeks work was too bad for a citizen, whereas in our eyes, work is good enough for the totality of the world or God. As in the scale of values of our culture-system work occupies the highest rung, one can easily understand how a world-philosophy like that of energism is endeavouring to subsume, as we saw above, all forms of transformation of existence under the central concept of work.

The new "movement of nature-philosophy" which is connected with the names of Wilhelm Ostwald, one of the founders of physical chemistry, and the botanist, J. Reinke, differs from the nature-philosophy of the old type, especially, from that of the Schellingians (as for example, Oken, Steffens) essentially and principally in this, that it proceeds inductively, and not like these deductively, that it proceeds from experience, and not like these, from a metaphysical, logically arranged and ordered world-formula, that it finally weaves into the new system of nature-philosophy the whole

circle of the exact sciences, as its model Spencer has done, and builds it organically on the lines of a synthetic construction into the energistic world-philosophy, That 'movement of nature-philosophy'; however, of which Theodor Lipps is the spokesman, still represents an altogether different form of 'nature-philosophy' from that of Clifford and Stallo, Mach and Ostwald, Reinke and Driesch. And if the academic philosophers look upon the physicists, chemists, botanists and zoologists, who venture as "unscientific dilettantes" to make incursions into, and border disturbances in the sacrosanct territory of professional philosophers, with scorn and disdain, one will have to remind them that caste-pride and class-pride are nowhere less in place than in philosophy. One can pronounce the peevish and morose diatribes of the bitter "privatdozent" Schopenhauer, absurdities and dialectical perversities, and yet remember that all the great philosophers before the appearance of Kant were anything except academic professors of philosophy. In a science which exhibits the anomaly that its greatest men were no State-recognised and academically-stamped professional representatives but "laymen", one should be a little more careful in the use of the term of reproach "dilettantism". Descartes was an officer and scientist, Malebranche and Gassendi were clergymen, Bacon, jurist and Lord Chancellor, Hobbes and Locke were travelling companions by profession and politicians by love. Berkeley was a travelling companion and clergyman, Hume and the younger Mill were officials, Spinoza was an artisan (lens-grinder), Leibniz was a librarian, Spencer, a railway engineer; Nietzsche was, it is true, professor, yet not of philosophy but of classical philology. Had the Germans had no Melanchthon to show, who was "at the same time" a professor, then they would have had to be content with such esteemed men as Christian Thomasius, Joachim Jungius and Christian Wolff before Kant showed once for all that a professor of philosophy could also

be a philosopher of the highest order. Consequently, it seems to me impossible for one to turn up one's nose and sneer at the "movement of nature-philosophy" of our days such as has proceeded from Mach, Boltzmann, Ostwald, Reinke because the above-named persons are not philosophers "by profession". With this contempt of academic philosophers for the "dilettantist" nature-philosophers, the attitude of Karl Stumpf should be contrasted,—“I should look upon it as extremely important that the philosopher should have learnt and practised some craft, that is to say, should have himself worked in some concrete province, whether it be of the mental or natural sciences. He ought to be familiar in his own life with the joys and sorrows of research in some particular line, he must through positive work win the right to speak and he must have a command of the language of the sciences which he intends to master”. Stumpf no doubt warns us in his cautious way against the hasty generalisations of our “nature-philosophers”. But even the exaggerations, hastiness—nay, even occasional slips in their own province—as Chwolson and Ernst Haeckel have shown, should not diminish our pleasure in finding that great scientists, who in their special provinces have done something striking, partly, even pioneer work, have overcome the former horror for all philosophy. To rebuke these from the pulpit instead of gladly accepting their comradeship, is something more than foolishness—it is arrogance. To cast in the teeth of grave specialists who have proved their worth in their own provinces a few logical or philosophico-historical “blunders” is extremely childish. How Chwolson has reproached Hegel with scientific absurdities ! Does not Hegel remain in spite of all this a divine philosopher, yes, the greatest philosophical genius among the Germans by the side of Leibniz and Kant ?

It is extremely foolish and unjust that “scholastic” nature-philosophy should take up arms against “scientific” nature-philosophy and should in extreme self-complacency keep always

ready the academic anathema of "dilettantism" I can agree in great part with Arthur Drews in what he says about the article "Naturphilosophie" of Theodor Lipps ("Die Philosophie zu Beginn des 20 Jahrhunderts". (Philosophy in the beginning of the twentieth century), Karl Winter's publication, 2nd edition of the Festschrift in honour of Kuno Fischer, Heidelberg, 1907). Lipps plainly came, as we have already shown, close to that neo-Fichteanism which prevails among the neo-idealists whom we have already described. That "absolute ethical idealism" of Lipps, the monism of consciousness of which expresses that the individual ego knows itself as a part of the universal ego and as the 'in itself' of the appearances, which fall to its lot, of even this universal ego—is just such a neo-Fichteanism as is represented by the world-view of Rud. Eucken, Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert (Hugo Münsterberg on the other hand, as we have shown, has slowly and imperceptibly moved from Fichte to Hegel). To this monism of consciousness which is energetically opposed by Arthur Drews in his work "The Ego as the fundamental problem of metaphysics," 1897, and in his criticism of Rickert (Preussische Jahrbücher Vol. 167 No. 2, 1907), Drews replies in his article "Lipps als Naturphilosoph" ("Die Propyläen" Vol. V, No. 32-33 for the 6th and 13th May, 1908 p. 518) in the weighty words: So long as the monism of consciousness has not made it intelligible how under the assumption of an absolute form of consciousness—even if it be only the crude appearance of such consciousness—the manifoldness of individual consciousness is possible, it cannot claim to be regarded as the only true and scientific monism.

In full and conscious opposition to the speculative "nature-philosophy" of the logicians which tends towards Fichte, of which we have treated under the heading "Neo-idealists" stands the psychological or phenomenalist "nature-philosophy" of Wilhelm Ostwald who has recently given a

popular exposition of this nature-philosophy. In his *Grundriss der Naturphilosophie* (Elements of Nature-philosophy), Leipzig, 1908 (The preface bears the date Spring, 1908), Ostwald positively takes his stand upon that "modern" nature-philosophy, namely, the energistic nature-philosophy, which resolutely keeps aloof from the older Fichte-Hegelian phase of the nature-philosophy of the University philosophers, whilst Ostwald clearly approaches the relativistic line of phenomenologists of the school of Avenarius and Mach and the pragmatic movement of the American James and the Englishman Schiller which has its origin in Protagoras and Hume. For him, as for Bacon and James, philosophy exists not for its "own end," as it does for Socrates and Spinoza, but ultimately for "human ends." With Comte whose classification of sciences Ostwald unconditionally accepts, he sees in all philosophy a perfect systematic knowledge according to the formula: *Voir pour prévoir*. "Predictions" or "anticipations of the future" constitute for Ostwald, as for Mach, Comte and Hume, the meaning of all science. Even natural laws cannot decree what shall happen, but they can only inform us of what has happened and what generally happens. The conclusions are drawn according to the scheme: Up to now things have stood thus, therefore we expect that they will also stand thus in the future. Even the causal law reduces, according to Ostwald, as according to Mach, to functional relations. Accepting the Spencerian idea of adaptation and selection where Spencer has extended biologically and perfected the Humean view of the problem of causality, Ostwald remarks "If one likes to call such a relation *a priori*, one is perfectly free to do so." But the empirico-inductive method, as Ostwald accepts it with Mill, is the only fruitful method and deduction is only inverse induction which has a heuristic value as controlling induction, as an abbreviation, as a memorandum for helping the memory. The

syllogistic form of induction should, however, run thus: Because it has been so up to the present moment, therefore I expect that it will also be so in the future. Indeed, Ostwald thinks that in order that science may to-day open up new paths it is necessary that the deductive sciences should give up one by one all their claims to absoluteness (p, 47). On this point, surely, Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* (Logical Inquiries)—this standard work—could have taught him differently. It is, however, characteristic of Ostwald that his book *Grundriss der Naturphilosophie* (Elements of Nature-philosophy) opens with two chapters—"General theory of knowledge" and "Logic, the doctrine of plurality and Mathematics"—before it proceeds to nature-philosophy proper, to the "physical and biological sciences." Ostwald here shows himself thoroughly an epistemological representative of Mach's world-philosophy. And so stand here again in irreconcilable opposition to one another, logicians and psychologists, relativists and absolutists, positivists and idealists, genetic method and critical method. As in metaphysics the question of the day is, Spinoza or Leibniz? so in the theory of knowledge the question is, Hume or Kant? The nature-philosophers who are metaphysically inclined and of a logical turn of mind gather round the critical method of Kant, just as the "modern nature-philosophers" under the lead of Mach and Ostwald group themselves round the genetico-psychological standard of Protagoras and Hume. As energetic metaphysicians, the modern nature-philosophers prefer Aristotle to Plato, Leibniz to Spinoza, and as epistemological philosophers and as logicians they swear allegiance to Hume as against Kant.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEO-ROMANTIC MOVEMENT

Classicism and romanticism succeed one another rhythmically for ever. As all movement in nature according to Spencer and Duhring, proceeds strictly rhythmically, so the culture-movements of all ages have oscillated between the rational-philosophical and the emotional-artistic views of the world, between rationalism and mysticism, between classicism and romanticism. Of course, we have here in mind only the spiritual principles of these literary tendencies and not the purely scholastic classifications of the historian of literature. They ebb and flow with strict periodicity in the phenomena of spiritual history as waves do on the sea-beach. If a powerful wave of rationalism flows over a whole race in the midst of a leading culture-system, it diminishes in force after reaching its maximum intensity and makes room for an overwhelming wave of feeling.

The opposites, classic and romantic, receive at the hands of Schiller the formalistic antithetical names, naïve and sentimental; at the hands of Goethe, the names healthy and diseased; at those of Friedrich Schlegel, the names, objective and interesting, and lastly, at those of Nietzsche, the names, Apollonian and Dionysian. We might formulate the ancient opposition thus: It is the contradictory relationship of rest and motion or of being and becoming (Eleaticism and Heracliteanism). One misunderstands completely the romantic movement when one simply identifies it with "storm and stress", or treats it contemptuously according to the prevailing fashion as "one-sided exaltation of the life of feeling, especially, of fancy" or

even as an overexcited "chase of phantoms". Romanticism is certainly not an outlet for the personal caprice of this or that romanticist or the leisurely sport of a dialectic happy hour, but the necessary expression of a deep tone of life. To fight romanticism, thus, does not mean undervaluing it but analysing it, tracing it to its hidden psychological motives.

The bookseller friend and supporter of romanticism, Eugen Diderichs in Jena, has done everything to clear the path of that neo-romanticism, the fundamental principles of which have been laid down by Ludwig Coellen (*Neu-romantik*, Jena, Diderichs 1906) in a collection of his previous essays. My fundamental disagreement does not prevent me from paying proper attention to the neo-romantic movement of the present day and tracing its most important products, but rather makes it extremely necessary for me to do so.

Refusal to accept the romantic tendency in philosophy does not at all mean condemning the romantic spirit *in toto* and thus treating with contempt those motives of feeling and impulses of thought, which in the rhythm shown above always tend towards the romantic tone of life. One can only successfully check the unceasing emotional ebullitions of romanticism when one follows it up to its deepest spiritual ramifications. For the romanticist, all poetry is from the beginning only a philosophy of the heart, as all philosophy is only a poetry of the head.

For the romanticist the individual personality is everything, the beginning and the end of all thought, in one word, as Friedrich Schlegel says, the centre. Consequently, the centre-doctrine of Friedrich Schlegel, as Marie Joachimi has shown in her book *Die Weltanschauung der Romantiker* (The world-view of the romanticists), (Jena, published by Eugen Diderichs), is the point to which all romantic philosophising returns. The cult of genius, the "blue flower", the all-transcending and all-eclipsing ego, flows into that centre-doctrine of Friedrich Schlegel, the true philosopher of

romanticism, whose aesthetic-optimistic universalism goes back to no less a person than Kepler. The Kepler society of to-day represents the scientific side of neo-romanticism.

Classicists and romanticists, however, not only succeed one another in historical rhythm, as we have shown, but the two spirits very often exist in one and the same person. The rational side pushes towards the repose of classicism, while the feeling or heart-half tends towards romanticism. Now, the beast order triumphs, now the "rebel"; now man feels himself in his inalienable doubleness as race, and so he thinks classically; now, he feels as an individual, and so he feels romantically.

If one carries this unceasing struggle in the human breast from the individual personality to whole generations or prevailing religious and philosophical tendencies, one is confronted with the same picture of doubleness and division: after action comes regular reaction; after revolution, counter-revolution; after reformation, restoration. What is true in the individual is tendency in the political or religious movement. Nothing is more false, says Wilhelm Dilthey (*Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung* (Experience and Poetry), 2nd Edition 1907 p. 271), than the belief that in romanticism one has to do with a particular tendency. Romanticism rather is the tendency of a whole generation which emerged clearly in the last decade of the eighteenth century and for which the years 1790 to 1800 correspond to that important period of a man's life which lies between his twentieth and his thirtieth year. The elements of intellectual culture which existed then out of the store of the previous generation were principally the poetry of Goethe and Schiller, the philosophical revolution in which Kant, Jacobi, Fichte and Schiller figured and the powerful movement and ferment in the natural sciences. However diverse the starting points of Fr. Schlegel, Hardenberg, Tieck, A. W. Schlegel might have been, they still formed an "offensive and defensive alliance,"

a school. How could, so asks Dilthey further, the poetry of Goethe and Schiller be followed by this rapid decline, this heterogeneous development, this unbounded sway of subjectivity, of fancy, of surrender to nature, nay, even of unrestrained arbitrariness? We reply: Refinement and passion, rest and movement, classicism and romanticism succeed one another periodically, as history teaches.

The infernal-Dionysian element in human nature rebels, with the irresistible force of instinct against the Apollonian element that has become quiet. Not the laurel as the prize of victory but fighting for its own sake, is its watchword. The end, peace, has no charm for the romanticist but the means, fight. The surging, fomenting, chaotic element, the unrest in the struggle of everybody with everybody, in short, the mobile equilibrium in society brings it unexpected raptures, that "heroic enthusiasm" which Giordano Bruno has described to us so vividly. Romanticists play with feelings and live with tones. All romanticism is fragmentary, says Karl Joël, because it is the impulse of the infinite, and that means spiritual passion. The infinite cannot be expressed but only pointed out, and the fragmentary character belongs therefore precisely as a symbol to the form of romanticism. The romanticists are born aristocrats of imagination who haughtily put their self-centred ego, the holy genius, the superhuman genius against the plain matter-of-fact-man, against the "imaginative Philistine," as long before Nietzsche Tieck jeeringly said. And so Joël sees in romanticism a type of all men, a powerful, ever-recurring spiritual force, the necessary germ of everything great in a good as well as in a bad sense. Romanticism which yesterday was as gloomy as the bat in the midst of sleeping ruins, appears to Joël a bright bird which buzzes round us with a youthful flapping of wings. What we want now is to tame this noble bird. It will be seen in course of time, so concludes Joël his book *Nietzsche und die Romantik* (Nietzsche and Romanticism),

that romanticism is not simply the opposite of classicism but its presupposition, that romanticism is the intoxication of youth above which classicism shows itself as maturity, and it will be seen in course of time that we must live through romanticism in order that we may attain maturity.

Foolish coquetting with the superhuman makes as little a romanticist as the mere wearing of a hat makes a gentleman or the fastening of a garter makes a true knight. Joël adds pertinently (p. 356): The mere presence of feeling or will does not constitute a romanticist, or every wild impulsive man would be a romanticist. Only the feeling that has become reflective, only intellectualised passion, a tearing asunder of the soul through the mixture of its functions, is romantic. Thus the emergence of reason is necessary and it alone perfects romanticism. Quite similarly Marie Joachimi regards the problem of romanticism. Romanticism wanted the Germans "to see more deeply, to think more profoundly and to feel more truly. Consequently, it tried to immerse all life in poetry." For knowledge, Marie Joachimi thinks, never reaches life. Consequently romanticists from the time of Schelling start with a preference for the idea of organism, just as formerly their starting-point was with Fichte the ego. The *all* symbolises for the romanticists the person, whence arises that organico-vitalistic romanticism of Friedrich Schlegel which Chamberlain in his *Kant* and Count Hermann Keyserling in *Gefüge der Welt* (Structure of the world) have placed anew in the fore-ground of philosophical interest. But even the mysticism of the romanticist, especially of its philosophical spokesman, Friedrich Schlegel, is not fantastic ecstasy of feeling, but as Marie Joachimi says, there is, according to Friedrich Schlegel, nothing in it that is without logic even in its secrets, even in its mysticism. As one sees, the most important works on the world-philosophy of the romanticists, who have called into being the neo-romantic movement, agree in this, that romanticism also has

its immanent logic, as Ricarda Huch has successfully maintained, and with the help of Joël, Ewald, Joachimi and Walzel defended against the unrivalled exposition of Haym.

There are logically ordered natures which only feel at home in the world of proof and there are mystically turned natures which do not like to be convinced but persuaded, not taught but improved, in one word, which do not like to know but to believe. And so with whole generations. Classical knowledge has to do with the universal, the permanent, the persisting, the necessary, in short, with the race, the romantic art with the individual. Its universal historical conflict is the crux of all philosophy—the problem of universals, that is, of the insoluble tragic relation of unity and plurality, of the individual and the collective, of anarchism and absolutism, of species and genus.

And therefore the struggles between classicism and romanticism produce those eternal tortures of Tantalus in artistic and literary agitations and movements which are so similar in nature and which have appeared in naturalism, symbolism and pre-Raphaelitism, in the constellation of the three poets, Ibsen, Tolstoi and Nietzsche, in the philosophy of a Maeterlinck and the art of a Liebermann and Rodin, in the æsthetic decadence of Burne Jones, Stephan George and Hugo v. Hofmannsthal. Romanticism is at the present moment again in evidence, just as a century ago, after Schiller and Goethe, Kant and Herder, the romanticism of Schlegel and Stolberg, Novalis and Hölderlin, Wackenroder and Tieck, Arnim and Brentano, Chamisso and Fouqué, Werner and Goerres, Hofmann and Hauff was. At that time the romanticists led the fashion in literature, as did a generation earlier, the romanticist of will, Fichte, the romanticist of fancy, Schelling, and the romanticist of thought, Hegel, before he sent his letter of resignation to romanticism in his *Phänomenologie des Geistes*.

This perpetual rhythm of classicism and romanticism has been especially portrayed by Ludwig Coellen in his *Neu-romantik* (Neo-romanticism). For him classical art is "an art of peace, of quiet possession". "No more in roving longing and in the struggle with the realities of life does the artist seek for the manifestation of the Absolute. Everything chaotic is chained to the fixed dialectical forms which it satisfies with the rhythmically arranged pulse of life". In the re-awakening of mysticism, whose "philosopher" is Maeterlinck, Coellen sees the surprisingly close affinity of the neo-romantic literary and artistic movement of the present day with German romanticism as it was a hundred years ago. "The blue flower" of former times now means: dreamy mysticism, passively exciting æstheticism and wanderings foreign to life. All these new appearances are, however, "no atavisms, but they are to be regarded as periodic phenomena which appear from inner necessity, at the time of a culture-change". This periodicity Coellen sees even in the attitude of particular generations towards the Absolute. There appear therefore detached periods which have arisen from and are characterised by a marked change in the relation of the Absolute to the forms of appearances. Mysticism and logicism are the two poles in the spiritual domain. Naturally, the romanticists have also a full need of unity and an insatiable thirst for universalism" (Joachimi) but they satisfy this need by mystic perception, by subtle immersion in the depth or shallowness of one's ownself. With Fichte, Fr. Schlegel finds in his second period "in the subject, in the spiritual ego, the great manifestation of the world-unity." From here one step further leads to the centre-doctrine of Schlegel which had its origin in Schelling's nature-philosophy, as Marie Joachimi has rightly observed. For from Schelling Schlegel borrows that thought of organism which governs romanticism, to which the Fichtean ego has become in the macrocosmic way a spiritually active world-ego.

Mechanism, the mathematical order of quantity and number, is abandoned; the consideration of ends comes to the foreground. The line of thought of the romanticists does not go direct through Spinoza to Parmenides but it moves in a zigzag way through Leibniz's "monas monadum" and Giordano Bruno's "De triplice Minimo", through the Stoic λόγος σπερματικός and Aristotle's μετέωρος to Plato's doctrine of ideas. If, according to Friedrich Schlegel, the philosopher of romanticism in the strict sense—and Marie Joachimi has conclusively proved him to be such—everything must be explained from a common centre, which centre is, however, conceived as a germ, as an organic living being, then the logico-mathematical path is definitely abandoned and the teleologico-biological occupies its place. If with this there is, moreover, associated in Friedrich Schlegel the "primeval love", the Platonic *eros* and if this central point is raised to the rank of the "highest", of "fulness," of "God," the romantic attributes of whom are endless spirit, beauty, feeling, enthusiasm, love, then the romantic view of the world is completed. The conception of God as "absolute fulness," as the primeval fire or love that feels, brings the "old romantic tendency towards mysticism" to perfection. Pythagoras and Heraclitus have thus entered into the neo-romantic philosophy, just as they did in Giordano Bruno, the original type of philosophical neo-romanticism.

That romanticists, owing to their asthetico-organic view of the world, show a tendency towards optimism, is self-evident. Romanticism, says Marie Joachimi, is one of the strongest conceivable assertions of life, for out of a living centre it creates love and understanding and participation in everything living, visible and clear, and simultaneously with these, deep regard for the unfathomed, the mystical, the emotional. This *emotional*, however, it comprehends by means of "a purely metaphysical perception" (Coellen) which reminds one of the *ratio intuitiva* and *amor Dei* of Spinoza

and Leibniz. For with Spinoza, the neo-romanticist Coellen thinks that the instrument of mysticism and its metaphysical comprehension is intuition, that kind of knowledge which carries with it a sure guarantee of truth. Not the mystic sensation, Coellen continues, but knowledge through reason is dark. The latter is always imperfect and it only conceives. Being by way of approximation in a veiled form. The mystic comprehension, on the other hand, is the immediate revelation of being. Only when knowledge through reason is carried through the intuition of mysticism, does man arrive at a harmonious view of being. This harmonious comprehension, again, makes the neo-romanticists conscious of that "forward-pushing optimism" which teaches us to "make out of every occurrence a deliverance into the higher form of life." Similarly, Marie Joachimi says: The romanticists are optimists and believers, so far as the eternal progress of the human spirit is concerned.

However tempting and attractive this optimistic conclusion of the romanticist may be to the representatives of "social optimism," we must nevertheless fundamentally reject this romantic optimism because we cannot accept its premises. Also we see two great tendencies cross each other in the development in the realm of the history of culture of the human race, now meeting and blending, now checking and resisting each other. These are feeling, with its organ, religion, and reason, with its organ, philosophy. In a later phase of the evolution of the human race there stands on one side, understanding with its organ, knowledge which proceeds mathematico-logically, abstracts from the contents and only keeps before its eyes the formal identity of A and B, that is, traces the plurality of appearances to numerically expressible order-series. For science, for statistics, for example, A and B, a Bismarck and a cretin are interchangeable and convertible. In the statistics of birth and death Bismarck and the cretin are only empty, dead, convertible numbers. To the purely

formal laws of number, contents are absolutely immaterial. 4×4 is always sixteen, whether one has to do with trees, men, plants or gods. The method of logico-mathematical science is thus a strictly regular, necessary one, because the human spirit through the recognition of this logico-mathematical order only affirms (identifies) its own being, and therefore remains in that domain where incontestable sovereign rights belong to it. On the other side stands art with its psychological root, fancy. Here it is not the typical, the recurring, the interchangeable, in short, the racial, that is the decisive factor, but rather the opposite of these, the individual, the unique, the non-recurring, the uninterchangeably personal. And thus it is quite natural that reason and understanding produce order in philosophy and science, whilst feeling and imagination with their organs, religion and art, have for their contents the intimately personal, and thus the unclassifiable, because there can be no substitute for it. Science and philosophy require therefore inquirers and thinkers in whom there dwells the mathematico-logically trained intellect; religion and art, on the other hand, point to prophets, saviours, saints, heroes and geniuses, in whom feeling, will and imagination constitute the decisive spiritual force of life. By the former the future—solar and lunar eclipses perhaps—is *calculated*, by the latter, only *prophesied*. The former treat of that which is characteristic of the race, what is constant through all changes, consequently, the type, the latter, especially, the artist, the unique, the personal, which is never again met with in the same composition in a second species. The former proceed therefore naturally calmly, relevantly, dispassionately, impersonally, in short, classically; the latter on the contrary, proceed passionately, impressionistically, enthusiastically, eminently personally, in a word, romantically. Euclid there, Isaiah here. The former give logico-mathematical truths, the opposite of which is unthinkable, because it is full of inner logical contradictions. The former give thus “eternal truths”

in the Leibnizian sense, the latter, on the other hand, publish forebodings and interpretations of the future, divinations of people's fate, in short, admonitions and edifications. The predictions of the former have therefore absolute certainty, whereas the prophecies of the latter have only a conditional, that is, subjective certainty. If the question is of scientific truths which can be attained through quantity and number, there are doubtless thinkers and inquirers, who proceed mathematico-logically, who can say the last word. If the question, again, is of beauty, conscience, feeling, the irreducibly personal, where we shall never attain anything with compasses and rulers, with titration and dyeing methods, with the microscope and the scalpel, the first place should be given to founders of religion and to artists.

Houston Stewart Chamberlain has in his work on Kant very well indicated the opposition that has just been brought into prominence. The spirit which thinks mathematico-mechanically, that is, which takes the standpoint of the law-giver, emerges in the incomprehensible world armed with its tables of laws and forces its scheme upon it, whereas the advocate of direct knowledge teaches the whole-hearted surrender to intuition, the "wholly proper method of inquiry", or, as Goethe calls it, "the question addressed to Nature". With Schiller and Kant, Chamberlain conceives the essence of religion as well as that of art much more deeply than is customary with the ordinary academic philosophers. As soon as man, says Chamberlain, shapes nature, he creates science and as he does this, he himself emerges from the chaos and is personality, for he proves himself a free being. From being a slave of nature so long as he only senses it, man becomes its lawgiver, as soon as he thinks it.

For the "thinking view of things", however, as people have defined philosophy several times, the romantic method of intuitive apprehension is the most wrong way imaginable. The romantic philosophers of the school of Friedrich Schlegel,

as also the neo-romanticists of our days, conceive, as it were, the epic of the universe with the help of their constructive imagination; they fancy the world-connexion, instead of examining it in terms of quantity and number, so far as our technical aids reach. It is not discursive thinking which rather is proscribed, that bears the palm but "mystical perception", to which undoubtedly thinkers of the first order have made powerful concessions. Spinoza's *ratio intuitiva* and *amor Dei*, Hume's placing of that faculty of imagination in the front rank for which the whole world evaporates into a pure belief, Kant's view of the essence of religion as "bringing forth the idea of God out of the depths of the heart" (Chamberlain), not to mention the romantic triad, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, have all in their weak moments first drunk the waters of Lethe, in order afterwards to be intoxicated with the romanticist's nectar, with the stupefying juice of the "blue flower". Even Socrates offered his cock to the gods. We understand, above all, the hidden psychological motives of the old as well as of the new romanticism, but just because we understand them, we are doubly on our guard. The path of reason is straight; it leads to "eternal truths" but by reason of its straightness it appears to emotional natures, who are attracted by bright charming things, somewhat monotonous and uninteresting, whilst the epic of the universe, as the imaginative among the poets and thinkers dream, captivates our imagination. This dialectical incense, however, has its dangers. From the time of Schlegel and Stolberg to that of Brunetière and Maeterlinck, this feeling-philosophy has led to Rome. In his book *Goethe und die Romantik*, Oscar F. Walzel has brought out the irresistible Catholicising force of all romanticism which has suddenly revived all mediæval romanticism and Christian mythology. The rebels and revolutionaries of thought, the fault-finders and critics of the permanent, the sworn enemies of the fanatics of order and lovers of construction, end in the cloister in

which the spiritual revolt, finally calmed, is choked in the firm embrace of a dogma. Poets of eternal inspiration, like Ibsen and Tolstoi, maintain no doubt their ground but neurotics like Maeterlinck, Huysmans and Strindberg follow the path of the romanticists and the roads of the romanticists lead through many zigzag paths to Rome. The God-seeker and social revolutionist of former times is for ever caught in the polyp-like stretching claws of ceremonials and rituals. The romanticist has changed and become a classicist. But only a religious classicist, for Catholicism with its immutable holy truths is the type of religious classicism, as Protestantism which has thriven at the breast of German mysticism—Luther adored above all men Master Eckhart—with its placing of “sentiment,” “personality,” in the front rank, in contrast with the all-levelling Catholic sanctimoniousness, is religious romanticism. If our modern romanticists of all shades don’t fare better than their spiritual ancestors and cousins, the French and German romanticists, I can see in the neo-romantic movement of our days, which I conceive psychologically and value very highly, nothing more and nothing less than a difficult spiritual crisis, a deep spiritual tone of our entire circle of culture. Neo-romanticism is the expression of the ennui of culture on its negative, and of the need of emancipation on the positive side.

Romanticism breaks out in all provinces of intellectual life, in science, no less than in æsthetic literature and art. So academic art which sets up strict norms and binding laws of drawing, painting, poetry, chiselling or building, is classic, whereas the naturalistic or even impressionistic art which is opposed to universal rules, which observes the right of personality and recognises the “as I see it”-principle as the highest, if not the only criterion of artistic power, is romantic. Every move towards the universal is a tendency towards the repose of classicism, as every counter-placing or placing of the individual in the foreground at the cost of the universal

arises from the presence of the personal element and contains within it a tendency towards the cult of the ego, towards strong originality, towards ego-centric self-deification, in short, towards romanticism.

The Church expression for classicism is Orthodoxy, in politics it is Conservatism. In social life this adherence to what is customary and traditional expresses itself as convulsive clinging to the outer form, whether in physical deportment or in spiritual habit. Manners and customs, family or class traditions supply a canon of behaviour. Ceremonials and etiquettes are the buttresses which support the edifice of a tradition. Therefore they show the greatest steadiness, a steadiness verging almost upon numbness. Their grotesque form is pedantry. To pedantry in social conduct, to the scrupulous care in the observance of conformity dictated by tact and sanctified by tradition, corresponds in Church matters, strict orthodoxy; in politics, the party discipline of unquestioning obedience; in art, the blind slavery of rules, whether they are the rules of a text-book, of a school or of a master. Renunciation of one's own judgment and absolute subordination of personality to the whole, as perhaps the Jesuits in the extreme right and the freemasons in the extreme left wing of our culture-system taught, are the pre-suppositions, if not even the pre-conditions of that rest and uniformity which are essential to a stable equilibrium of human forms of relation and modes of conduct. At the extreme end of classicism there is the danger of ossification, whilst the logically conducted romanticism is threatened with the danger of complete derailment. There, the flood retires and leaves a stagnant pool from which arise obnoxious emanations and decompositions; here swells it into wild torrents which burst all dams of historical tradition and sweep away all embankments of convention and legality, of rules and regulations, of rights and morals, of religion and morality, of traditions and constitutions, in order to bury all historical past in the ruins.

The inevitable struggle between person and race, between preservation of self and preservation of the species, between human institutions and the natural order of the world is the eternal theme of the history of the world. To-day this universal historical struggle within human nature is reflected even in the two extreme ends of our political party-division, in anarchism and socialism. Anarchism is political romanticism, just as socialism which defends the interests of the race, at first of the working-classes, against the arbitrariness of personality, represents political classicism—however strange this description may at first sight seem to be.

Two views of the world have for centuries been striving for supremacy; one extols rest, the other, movement. In religion this struggle shows itself in the form of the Brahmanic-Buddhistic religion which places absolute rest, nirvana, at the sacred beginning as well as at the sacred end of the world-process. To this there stands in opposition from pre-historic times the Iranian-Persian type of religion as it has poured itself into Christianity and Muhammadanism through Judaism with its idea of salvation through Messiah. Here it is not rest but motion, development, ascent, the forward, that is extolled. Those place the holy in the world backwards, in the remote past, these place it forwards, in the most distant future (Eschatology). For the quiet type of religion paradise is forever lost; for the movement-type of religion, the “third kingdom,” the “coming world”, the “eternal peace” in the millenium, the absolute state of equilibrium in nature and history, lies yet before us. There, a descent from the perfect condition of rest, here on the contrary, an eternal ascent from the imperfect to the perfect. There, Neo Platonic emanationism, here, Spencerian evolutionism. Tired, decayed, withered cultures project their flabby ideal of inactivity into the world-consciousness, into substance or God, and thus arises the ideal of *nirvana*.

Fresh, energetic, haughty and arrogant culture-systems, on the other hand, which represent no end but only a beginning, do not extol eternal rest but eternal movement, not death, but life, not the wintry peace of the graveyard but the awakening of spring. To the religious evolution of the human race the philosophical runs parallel. In the Greek age classicism and romanticism stand as much in sharp and irreconcilable opposition, as perhaps the neo-idealists and the neo-positivists do at the beginning of the twentieth century. The standstill-thinkers or the Eleatics are on one-side, the forwardmoving-thinkers or the Heracliteans are on the other. There the party of restful being, to whom all movement, all plurality sinks to the level of pure appearance; here, the spokesmen of unceasing Becoming, to whom, on the contrary, the benumbed being coagulates into a chimera, into a fetish of words (*flatus vocis*), into a conceptual idol. The ontologists are the classicists, the evolutionists the romanticists in philosophy. The Eleatics of to-day are those logicians who through conceptual thought alone can represent connectedly and express adequately the picture of the world, whilst the Heracliteans of to-day are those psychologists and neo-positivists who raise sensuous perception to the rank of an indispensable starting-point of every scientifically satisfactory picture of the world. As in the Middle Ages, realists and nominalists, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, rationalists and empiricists were opposed to each other, so there stand in mutual opposition to-day logicians and psychologists—these being the classicists and romanticists in philosophy.

The relation of the particular to the universal, of unity to plurality, of movement to rest, of species to genus, of the individual to the race, in short, the decried or detested problem of the universal which controlled, if not completely, yet greatly, the thought of the Middle Ages, is more than a whim or caprice of scholastic over-subtlety. It is nothing more and nothing less than the fundamental problem of philosophy and

the cardinal question of religion. Classicism and romanticism are those two possible replies which the problem of the universal admits of consistently. Either the universal is the highest reality, and then classicism is right, or the particular is the starting-point as well as the centre of the conception of the world, in which case romanticism has the last word. Like the two opposites, the Emperor and the Pope, or Guelphs and Ghibellines, there stand in the Middle Ages the realists or universalists with Thomas Aquinas at their head (with the formula: *universalia ante rem*) and the nominalists with Duns Scotus and William Occam at their head (with the formula: *universalia post rem*). And the German positivist Ernst Laas announces happily that these opposite concepts have had already in ancient times their highest expression: on one side stands Plato with his claim that the universal, the concept, the race, the idea, constitutes the being of things, on the other, the sophist Protagoras with his homo mensura doctrine that man is the measure of all things. The line of Plato Heinrich von Stein has drawn in his *Seven books on the history of Platonism* while the line of Protagoras has still to wait for a comprehensive compiler (Petzoldt has made a modest beginning). Both types of thought lead right to the heart of to day; the Platonic is represented by the strict logicism of the Marburgian School (Cohen-Natorp) and the Protagorean is represented by the so-called empirio-criticism (Mach-Avenarius) and the neo-positivists or pragmatists (James, Schiller).

The romanticists see in restless Becoming, the classicists in self-contained Being, the meaning of their own existence as well as of the whole existence of the world. The classical type of thought sees "all at one and the same time" (*πάντα ὁμὸν νῦν ὅστις*, simul) the romanticist, "all, one after another" (*πάντα περὶ*). Regularity lies for the one in spatial co-existence, for the other, in temporal succession. The favourite symbol of the one is the "still mountain," that of the other, "eternal flow."

The geometrical method (*mos gemotricus*) is as much characteristic of the classical type of thought of the followers of Spinoza, as the biological is characteristic of those of Leibniz. In geometry we have to do with figures in space, the mathematical relations of which are governed by immutable laws of eternal truth (*vérité éternelle*), whereas in the theory of the phenomena of life (biology) we have to do less with a "being" than with a "doing," a process, a function. There co-existence, here, succession is the decisive factor of explanation. There, the question is of the spatial series, here, of the temporal, of rhythm and periodicity. Conformity to law consists there in unchangeableness of mathematical relations—the Pythagorean theorem does not change and does not move from its place in a hundred thousand years—whereas here it expresses itself in variation, alteration, change. There, we have to do with the laws of "being," here, with the laws of "happening" or of "development." For the spatial type of thought near which classicism stands, ontologism, the legitimacy of being, is therefore as natural as for the temporal type of thought, which is related to romanticism, the doctrine of the legitimacy of evolution or evolutionism represents the most suitable type of thought.

The subject we are discussing here may be called *Psychology of system-building*. It will not suffice for us to establish with the strict accuracy of the chronicler *what* a thinker has thought, but we want to know *why* he has thought thus and not otherwise. Our method with regard to the history of philosophy is not simply descriptive or narrative but over and above this, explicative and genetic. We try to give the historical information that in our culture-system from the beginning of authentic history the romantic movement has always succeeded the classical. Thus the Orphicists were the romanticists among the Greeks. Karl Joel who has clearly stated Nietzsche's relation to romanticism,* has in a separate work critically examined the romantic

tendencies among the Greek nature-philosophers and has discovered in Heraclitus the prototype of the romanticist. We see in every revolt of feeling against reason or the individual against the race a tendency towards romanticism.

For us the Neo-Pythagoreans and the Neo-Platonists among the Greeks are as good romanticists as the Nazarites, Essenes, and Therapeutae among the Jews, the Gnostics within the dogmatic Christian fold, the mystics of all shades, such as appeared among the Arabs in Ghazzali and the Sufis, among the Jews in the "Sefer Jezira" and the "Sohar" or the "Kabbala" and finally in the Roman-Christian Middle Ages in the school of the Victorinians. The masters, Eckhard and Tauler, who greatly influenced Luther, Suso and Ruysbroek, the "brothers of common life" and Jacob Bohme are in our eyes nothing but romanticists who oppose the thought that was thoroughly mastered in scholasticism and which became classic in Albertus Magnus and his successor Thomas Aquinas. Pascal and Rousseau later represent the height of romanticism.

The Scholastics *think universally* and consequently, classically, the mystics of all nations and times *feel individually*, and consequently, romantically. All mysticism, when regarded from the standpoint of the theory of knowledge, is more or less conscious nominalism with the formula: Not man as the species of a genus, but *the* man, the intuitive individual, the praying ego, the ascetic and world-renouncing personality is the centre of action. Only intuitive knowledge is with the mystics true knowledge and is consequently in its full significance reserved for God. To the mystic God reveals himself through deep, pondering, reflecting meditation wholly personally, wholly ego-centrally. To him no general revelation at Horeb or Sinai, at Bethlehem or Mecca suffices, but he extorts through fasting and praying, penance and abstinence a personal revelation, a raising of self to God. Neither the revelation in the three testaments, as the three

monotheistic religions taught, nor—and this even much less than the former—the general revelation in nature, as the pantheists of all classes proclaim, suffices for the mystic. He will not think God with the Scholastics only logically, but he will feel and “see” Him directly, wholly personally. Through a “sacred” change of life he will compel God to reveal himself to him alone. In the Church, romanticism is in several ways the “holy” instead of the “hero,” in art it is “genius”—In all these cases the “great individual” is either directly opposed to the broad mediocrity, the mean, the all-too-many, or at least departs markedly from them. The problem of romanticism is now the individual. This is also the unconscious protest of feeling against the universalistic tendency that absorbs everything personal, which is exhibited by the Scholastics who try to produce a lasting harmony between revelation and human reason, between natural and supernatural light. The most perfect representative of this harmonising tendency is Thomas Aquinas whose doctrine is looked upon by the Catholic Churches of to-day as truly classic, that is, as ideal, unquestionable, unalterable. Classicism is nothing else than a definite form of expression of the belief in authority. The classicist is he who has asserted something exemplary, ideal, normal, final, unrivalled.

By *scriptor classicus* one understands a perfect writer. Thus the golden age of Latin literature from Cicero to Augustus is called classic. *Classici* were in ancient Rome the most highly taxed class, whereas the proletarii occupied the lowest of the six grades of taxation in the time of Servius Tullius. And the classicus or classicism became gradually by metaphorical change from money-values to spiritual-values, the highest grade in the scale of human values. In literature classicism is assigned a high a rank perhaps similar to that of the *poeta laureatus* of the Renaissance, the sainting or canonisation in the Church or elevation to peerage in the State. A classic period, as for Humanism and Renaissance

the whole of antiquity became, does not mean a *noli me tangere*, a secularising feeling of respect, an unattackable literary centre of authority. As we see in individual classicists something which leads the fashion or acts as a model which can be imitated but not attained, so we see in the classical ages of literature, such as all leading cultures have, something finished, complete, final, to which we look up wonderingly with trembling awe but perhaps with that tone of resignation of feeling with which the dogmatists of the Church view the "lost Paradise." Thus the humanists, for example, looked upon antiquity as a lost paradise which they sought to recover by the discovery of old texts.

The Renaissance which discovers, or, more correctly, rediscovers the right of personality against the obligation of the people of the Middle Ages, is a romantic opposition to the culture regulated by synods and councils, just as Humanism signifies rebellion against the scholasticism which attained the rank of classicism or, as will be said in Church language, was canonised, and as Reformation represents the romantic protest of the feeling of the individual conscience against the universal Catholic dogma and its outward show of piety. The humanists fight against ossified thinking, the Renaissance-artists against frozen feeling, the Reformers, lastly, against crystallised beliefs.

Indeed, plethora causes disease as much as anæmia. All hygienists are at one in this, that overfeeding is as fatal as under-feeding. Therefore it is necessary to seek the golden mean between orthodox conservatism and radical drifting, between classicism and romanticism. For nothing kills a movement more rapidly and more surely than its running into excess. The example of history teaches us in a hundred ways that the best grounded and the most laudable efforts turn out to be their own destroyers. *Discite moniti*. The reading of the signs of history is the cardinal problem of

every serious thinker who follows intelligently the activities and efforts of his contemporaries.

All indications in art and æsthetic literature, in philosophy and sciences point at this moment unmistakably to the fact that in the eternal to-and-fro-movement from classicism to romanticism we are once more tending towards the latter. The once strictly forbidden, proscribed and rejected romanticism has been from the time of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Huysmans and Maeterlinck, Coleridge, Carlyle, Emerson, Ruskin, Morris, Wilde and Whitman again in the ascendant. The cult of reason is to-day manifestly retiring and that of feeling is advancing. Plotinus and Pico, Suso and Ruysbroeck appear now to have more influence than ever. If one looks at the enormous productivity of the neo-Romanticists with whom Jacob Minor in the "Deutsche Literaturzeitung" has made us disgusted (No. 49 December 7, 1907) one feels almost tempted to speak of an "industry of feeling" a happily coined word which Helene Böhlau has opportunely dropped in her latest novel *Das Haus zur Flamme* (*The house on fire*). If one goes deep into this neo-romantic movement of our days, to which the budding nature-philosophy and the neo-vitalism which is gaining ground in scientific circles correspond, the dangerous elements of the movements are removed. We have to do here with a constantly recurring tendency of passionate thinkers who grow up in opposing the rules and laws, the order and proportion, the spiritual quiet and logical peace of the rationalistic thinker.

The romanticists are of a semi-dark disposition. Where the logical thinker or rationalist wants light and air for the satisfaction of the demands of hygiene, there the feeling-thinker or irrationalist longs for semi-darkness, twilight, the redness of the evening or the morning. Whilst the romanticists put the whole into their ego, the classicists allow the proper ego to be merged in the whole. Spinoza completely extinguishes his ego, Friedrich Schlegel sees in

his ego the "centre." Both perfect thereby subjective duplications, whilst they project their ego outwards and put it into the world-connexion. Only, the romanticists advance psychological microcosm, the rationalists, logical macrocosm. For the former, the individual ego, the personality, is everything, the race being by its side only a fetish of words, a false conception (Berkeley), an airy nothing, or—as Fritz Mauthner says—an empty for word chimera. Not so the classicists. For them the race, mankind, Godhead, unity of law, in a word, the universe, is everything; the individual personality, the proper ego, is only a faint reflexion, an extremely volatile emanation of the all=comprehending world-breath. As the point is to the line, the waves to the ocean, the atom to the cosmos, so is the individual, according to the rationalists, to the universe.

The struggle in the realm of world-history between religion and philosophy is due, in the ultimate and deepest psychological analysis, to the perennial conflict between reason and feeling in the human breast. These two spirits which indeed live in the same breast, God and Satan, angel and devil, good and bad spirit, geniuses and demons, patron saints and evil spirits—so the poets symbolise and so the priests mythologise—lead to that inevitable rhythm of motion which, according to Duhring and Spencer, characterises all the phenomena of nature. Our pulse shows, so long as the circulation of blood goes on properly, that strict rhythm which we are in the habit of comparing with the ticking of the watch. The physicists know the opposition between stable and unstable equilibrium, between statics and dynamics, between rest and motion. Already, the types of gods upon which men throw the reflexion of these two sides of their nature show that doubleness which belongs hereditarily to human nature. In the Aristotelian picture of the world, especially, God, the primitive picture of majestic rest and inaccessibility, transforms Himself into a principle of motion,

into that "prime mover" which has bestowed upon the inert, passive matter—here rest is dethroned and degraded into passivity of matter—the first shock of motion. Only this concession does Aristotle make to the ideal of rest, that God, the prime mover, is not Himself in motion. And this view of God, according to which the machine, world, has received its first shock of motion, from demiurges, or world-machine-architects, Isaac Newton also shared in great part.

Let classicists and romanticists, or rationalists and irrationalists fight to the bitter end on the great stage of the market-place or public life. We peep behind the curtain of this world-theatre. We penetrate to the motives of thought that lie in the background and which always cause this unavoidable struggle in the human breast as well as in its reflexion in the spiritual tournament. In the article *Gefühlsanarchie* which appeared first in the "Deutsche Revue" and then in my book *An die Wende des Jahrhunderts* (At the parting of the centuries), Mohr 1899 p. 300 sq., I have noticed and tried to interpret philosophically the signs of the dawning of a neo-romantic movement on the horizon of literature. There I have pointed out the spiritual doubleness of man which is only a phenomenon that is in keeping with the anatomical division into two halves. One function, the rational, which is the logical part in us, strives unceasingly upwards for light, the other, feeling, equally unceasingly downwards for semi-darkness. Reason lives in the world of logico-mathematical proof, feeling is at home only in the dreamy twilight of glimmering foreboding and pregnant riddles. In connection with this view of the opposition between classicism and romanticism, a sentence of Oscar Wilde which he wrote to the editor of the "St. James Gazette" may be in place; "Good men are artistically uninteresting. Bad men, on the other hand, are, from the standpoint of art, interesting subjects of study." Good men call up reason, bad men, fancy. The American, Brooke Adams, in *The Law of*

Civilisation and Decay with an essay by Theodor Roosevelt has exhibited this primeval opposition in human nature in the region of economics. Brooks Adams knows two types of the human spirit, the imaginative or emotional type which is credulous, full of martial spirit, but also artistically competent, and the rationally ordered economical type which aims at industry and commerce, at accumulation of capital and possession of wealth. Though we do not accept the far-reaching conclusions of Brooks Adams who sees in this struggle between the intellectual and the emotional the theme of world-history, the chain of thought developed here underlies his view of history. In individual psychology we distinguish the visual from the auditive type; in social psychology, on the other hand, the opposition between the purely rational and purely emotional is fundamental. The watch-word of the cult of reason based upon mathematics and logic has been from the time of Descartes clear and distinct knowledge (*clare et distincte percipere*); the motto of the cult of feeling that has given birth to religion and art is the word of Goethe: Feeling is everything. Or, as Spencer in his latest work *Facts and Comments* has expressed this primacy of feeling over reason, feeling is the lord and reason is its servant.

The romantic protest of feeling on behalf of personality against all attempts at unifying and levelling the individual through race—whether the rules for this are called laws and regulations, norms and canons, rules of art, principles of investigation or religious imperatives—always makes itself evident when art begins to be crystallised into empty formulas, religion into infallible dogmas, morals into dissolving universalisations, laws into oppressive bonds, and lastly, philosophy into pure logical schemes or highest abstractions. The romantic flow of blood rejuvenates, animates, freshens when the state of equilibrium indicates the inertia of old age. The romanticists are, like the “good”, the salt of the earth.

Consequently, it is well that from time to time a romantic counter-movement appears which bravely checks hard dogmatism.

The interpretation of romanticism here attempted will be nothing else than a psychological analysis of romantic thought. If true knowledge, according to Bacon, be knowledge of causes, we shall surely master the romantic movement of our days, which may cause us to make a fatal step "backwards" and lead us to the consequences of the age of enlightenment, if we peep into the deep spiritual motives which always work in favour of romanticism. As soon as the logically and mathematically moving culture of reason, of which the philosophical expression is rationalism, has said its last word, as soon as the sphinx has finally solved the riddle, romanticism periodically appears. Against the finality of the solution the questioning individual always sets himself. The rationalists or classicists are the great repliers and peace-makers; the irrationalists, mystics and romanticists, on the other hand, are the great questioners and eternal peace-breakers of the human race. As soon as the intellectual conscience seems satisfied and lulled to dogmatic sleep, the romanticist awakens it. For him conclusiveness is a counter-argument against the truth of a thing. For the romanticist there are no conclusive answers but only eternally unsettled questions.

As the best type of the neo-romantic movement of the present day we have the philosopher, Houston Stewart Chamberlain. The *Grundlagen des 19 Jahrhunderts* (Foundations of the 19th Century) in which Chamberlain undertook to describe from a purely external view of the close of the old and beginning of the new century and which; according to his own statement, he owes to the "initiative of the publisher, Herr Hugo Bruckmann" (Preface to the 1st Edition) tries, if not according to its intention, still in its effects, to kindle the movement described by us. Immediately after the

appearance of Chamberlain's *Grundlagen* dreadful confusion arose on all sides. After fanatic despisers came enthusiastic admirers. The publisher, Bruckmann, published, out of the immense mass of press notices for and against the *Grundlagen*, a useful collection in the year 1902. There the adverse criticisms stand peacefully by the side of the appreciative ones. The whole scale of positive and negative values from *pianissimo* to *fortissimo* lies there in excellent gradations. Serious scholars like Bulle, Helmont, Lezius, Hueppe, Max Koch, Karl Krumbacher, even eminent expert philosophers like Drews and Joël have pronounced in favour of Chamberlain. The Basel professor Karl Joël, one of the best authorities on philosophical romanticism, as we already know, who has written as the address to the University of Basel the book *Der Ursprung der Naturphilosophie aus dem Geiste der Mystik* (The origin of nature-philosophy from the spirit of mysticism) and has published an original, thoughtful book *Nietzsche und die Romantik* (Nietzsche and Romanticism) (Jena, Diedrichs) speaks thus of the *Grundlagen*, "It is the most interesting book of the last decade". And Joël adds : "This book lives : it is so glowing with passions, so sparkling with humour, so hating and repelling, so animated and animating, so splendidly bold, so courageously self-revealing, so fresh, soft, gay, free, so full of contradictions, that it can only be a man and no book."

The waves begin to retire. The exciting passions begin to grow calm. Time probably does not heal all wounds, but it is an unrivalled taskmaster for securing the distance-feeling which Nietzsche extolled with perfect justice—the pathos of distance. If one points out to Chamberlain his errors, omissions and contradictions, he replies laughingly, "Why else should I be a dilettante? And indeed I am not a dilettante through weakness or ignorance, but a dilettante by profession, by love and principle. I am like Rousseau a *conscious* dilettante, and as I clearly say in the preface to

the fourth edition of my *Grundlagen* (Munich, Bruckmann 1903) a "trained greenhorn". Dilettante is he who pursues a subject from love and passion and not from self-interest. You others use a thick book so that you may hurl dilettantism at me as an insult, as a literary sansculottism. I ward off the blow; I shall transform the term of reproach *dilettantism* which once belonged to the Sansculottes and Gueux, and convert it into a title of honour. The *conscious* dilettante—and I am one—is no opponent of the specialist but rather his servant, "he is however, a completely independent servant who for his special problems must also have his own special ways. And he receives his materials for the most part from the *savants* and he can also with new efforts oblige them in several ways". And what do you want? Has not my work been successful to me? A trustworthy witness, Karl Joël, in whom surely there is no trace of the universal German prejudice, writes about my *Grundlagen*: "The principal thing in this book that is in keeping with the spirit of the age is the conscious rising of dilettantism against science which divides itself into special studies and collections of studies." It naturally looks all the more funny when Chamberlain in his work on Kant (p.341) which has yet to be discussed, reproaches Haeckel or Ostwald occasionally with "bloody dilettantism".

One cannot dismiss a writer of the type of Chamberlain by exposing contradictions which the person assailed not only jeeringly admits but even claims as the lawful property of conscious dilettantism, as its title of honour. To refute Chamberlain is to explain him psychologically. What has brought Chamberlain into contact with the tendencies of the age and has enabled him to give the boldest, and we say unhesitatingly, the most brilliant expression to his thoughts in his neo-romantic race-imperialism, is feeling working underground. Everybody knows, however, that one cannot refute feelings but at most can analyse them, reduce them to their component

factors, in order to make them ineffective through the discovery of their constituent elements. Pronounced polemic works, as for example, those of Friedrich Hertz which proceed according to the maxim, "the biter must be bit", are, as psychological counter-effects, as humanly conceivable and consequently, as pardonable, as every resistance, every reaction, every echo in the forest is, which gives back the sounds exactly as they originally came. But I cannot regard any such polemical or party books as effective, as simple or even as convincing; the followers of the party in question do not use them, the opponents they do not convince. *Cui bono?* The chief and great men among them cannot be deluded by passionate polemical or party-writings but only excited and driven to greater contradictions. And the crippled, shrivelled, infirm Cantonalists in dialectical circles are led by the nose by *one* party, only to be similarly held in leash to-morrow by the *other* party. Of very little importance are these upholders of a principle, these weathercocks of thought, on whose spiritual physiognomy the marks of the author whom they have last read are discernible. Pure Sisyphean labour. However firmly we may be hooked on to the eyelets of their thought-processes, to-morrow a difficulty comes in and becomes everyday greater and greater. What concerns us is not the herd but the bell-wether, it is not the crowd of willing followers who always follow the law of the greatest quantity of force, namely, the force of the lungs, that satisfies our scientific desire, but the leaders themselves are the objects of our dialectical wishes. As one can never observe a feeling in feeling, so one should never judge a book which strains every nerve to its breaking point, in this frame of mind. Through exercise of self-control one should obtain the requisite feeling of distance in order to be able to do justice to one's most bitter opponent and should try not to sneer at him and condemn him unheard, but, as Spinoza, who has been ridiculed by Chamberlain as an ideal Rabbinit, prescribes,

only to conceive him. The unquestionably greatest Jew of all ages, Jesus Christ, whose Teutonic origin was advocated by the All-German party at the instance of Chamberlain before Chamberlain disposed completely of the story that he had called Christ a German in Harden's "Zukunft" for the 23rd January 1904, went much further than the meek Jew Spinoza. For Christ demands that one should show the right cheek to the man who struck one on the left. This excess of self-resignation we can never by any effort produce in us; we are all extremely infirm and weak sinners. But we can always accede to Spinoza's requirement that the human passions should be treated calmly and critically as if we had to do with lines, planes and figures. And so we shall here make the attempt *cum studio sed sine ira* to place ourselves at the standpoint of Chamberlain's neo-romanticism, at first indeed, only the most important part of his romanticism, namely, the romanticism of race, and to trace it to its psychological *motif*.

If the problem of race, as Chamberlain repeatedly says, is in reality so developed that it does not admit of a single solution and thus does not allow any necessary conclusions or absolutely valid inferences, that is, apodictic judgments—dogmas are, it is remarked in passing, only religious paraphrases of the logical conception of apodictic judgment—then every system based on a race-theory necessarily has an ethereal foundation. If, however, all examination of a fully "perfected system" is impossible, there is no strict knowledge of the conclusions derived from an hypothetical race-theory, but only a weak conjecture, no objectively valid truth, but only a subjectively valuable faith, no principle, but a maxim, no law, but at most only a rule, and thus no categorical command but only an hypothetical advice. Chamberlain is a relativist. All inquiry into the origin of things is to be looked upon, according to him, as metaphysical contraband. The relative is the only absolute that we know, so runs a finely pointed French oxymoron.

“Subjective certainty” as the only anchorage of objective truth is a relativistico-phenomenalistic criterion of truth which we meet with in a hundred different forms from the time of Protagoras in the mystics and aesthetes, in the sophists and sceptics, in the agnostics and positivists, as I need hardly point out to the learned dilettante Chamberlain, who does not boast a little of his *docta ignorantia*. The appeal to one’s own “intuition,” to the inner “tune,” to “feeling in one’s own breast” (Chamberlain), to “higher inspiration,” to “divine revelation” in the religious domain or to intuitive knowledge in the domain of logic, is as old as the romanticists, sceptics, positivists or mystics. Chamberlain starts now from such a purely subjective criterion of truth. “Immediately convincing, as nothing else is, is the possession of race in our own consciousness. Whoever belongs to a markedly pure race is aware of it everyday (*Grundlagen* Vol. 1, p. 271 and also in other places). For this proposition Chamberlain is severely censured by his fellow-combatant in the race-theory, Ludwig Wilser, vide *Rassentheorien*, 1908, p. 22. Very well does Chamberlain remind one of Socratic *daimonion*. More powerful still is the Heraclitean-Anaxagorean principle: The inner demon in man in his personal law. The Schopenhauerian *Operari sequitur esse*, “action follows from being,” whence arises the absolute immutability of the intelligent character, lies in the same line of personal predestination, just as the anti-metaphysician Chamberlain has bestowed upon the arch-metaphysician Schopenhauer the wreath of glory, in order later in his work on Kant (p. 91), to place a crown of thorns upon his head. Rudolf Lehmann and Johannes Volkelt have given the happy information that Schopenhauer was a thorough-going romanticist. We will here think of Chamberlain as a neo-romanticist in the sense in which we understand the psychology of the romanticists.

The old formula of relativism which was prescribed by Goethe, the formula, namely, that man is the measure of all

things, Chamberlain interprets thoroughly subjectively like the extreme later Sophists, that is, as meaning that not *man* but *the* man is the measure of all things. Chamberlain, the philosopher of history, who struggles for a view of the world, seeks a sociological measure of values which ought to become the universal measuring-rod for the scale of human values and he finds such a fundamental measure in himself, in his own bosom, as he has repeatedly assured us, and this general measuring-rod with which he seeks to determine the values of individual men, social groups and whole nations is for him—race. How does Chamberlain know that there is a measuring-rod called “race”? Who guarantees him the correctness of this fundamental measure? The reply to this is: Race is a fact. Well, how do we create this fact? Out of ourselves! The “own consciousness,” “the feeling in one’s own bosom” guarantees for Chamberlain the correctness of his norm for the history of philosophy. How does it fare, however, when this “own consciousness” changes in the course of time, transforms itself through reading, through new discoveries or new knowledge? Does the anti-papist Chamberlain believe in the dogma of infallibility, especially, in that of his own infallibility? Are we not in a hundred ways compelled to give up truths which were once dear and sacred to us because they could not be maintained on account of a deeper insight into the working of nature and culture? I do not speak at all of chameleonic natures like Nietzsche who was throughout a firm believer in the race-theory, so long as he lived in the same spiritual atmosphere as Chamberlain—namely, in that of Richard Wagner—but who later left us as a legacy the sentence, “Maxim: Not to associate with any person who has taken part in the fraudulent race-scheme.” Can Chamberlain seriously guarantee that he will always hear out of his own consciousness this fundamental tone “race”? My logical and sociological objections to the Chamberlainian, Gobineauan, Woltmannian and Wilserian

concepts of race, I have set down in the Chapter "The beginnings of race-formation" (*Die Anfänge der menschlichen Kultur*. Teubner's collection, *Aus Natur und Geist* No. 93, 1906 pp. 42-68). I naturally do not enter here into the objections raised there. Here the question is only of Chamberlain's neo-romanticism. Even granting that Chamberlain is a steady character, that he will remain unswervingly true to his present ideals during his life-time, what does it matter to us? What value as truth will a concept have for us which can show no other evidence of its legitimacy than that it originates in the consciousness of Chamberlain?

Now under one condition the creed of Chamberlain has meaning for other people, the condition, namely, that behind this creed there is hidden a great artist. Of a thinker we require objective validity of his conclusions, of an artist, only subjective consistency. And here lies the key to the psychological understanding of Chamberlain and the neo-romantic movement that has sprung from him and that affects a vast circle.

Chamberlain is a thoroughly artistic personality, like the romanticist Rousseau of whom he reminds us throughout, in spite of the great difference between the zealous race-aristocrat and the equally earnest democrat. The "creed of a Savoyean vicar" is perhaps scientifically as unassailable as the best that Houston Stewart Chamberlain has to offer. But the inner creed of an artistically important personality is logically unassailable. Feelings, moods, instincts, inner experiences cannot be contradicted. Against the "inner disposition" of a great nature the weapons of logic prove blunt and ineffective. Irrationalism cannot be hit by rationalism. Otto Pözl in Vienna has, in my opinion, of all critics of Chamberlain, said the most significant word. "Chamberlain's Germans" are a purely intuitive artistic concept. And his "race" is again a concept which is purely

intuitive and which is a property of his personality.....Race creates its own ideas ; these, however, and their rules give the best evidence of it. There is a circle in definition, *intuition escapes definition*.

The "intuitive perception" is the heirloom of all artistic philosophers from Plato and Plotinus down to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. And even in the framework of the great rationalistic systems of Descartes and Spinoza the *ratio intuitiva* has a prominent place. The mystics, especially, recognise no higher moment of truth than the intuitive knowledge of one's own self. And thus Chamberlain also thinks that the deepest ground of all religion is that all-holy "secret" of which Plato's *Phædrus* speaks and which Jesus indicates by the words, "The kingdom of God dwells in you." "Step by step" it is said in the *Grundlagen* (Vol. I 3rd edition pp. 392 and 199) "we follow wonders; the greatest wonder is we ourselves." The vivid perception of a great world-mystery, the sentiment that the natural is supernatural, is common to all. Goethe's word, "Only the extravagant makes greatness" is precisely the fundamental idea of Chamberlain's neo-romanticism. In the case of the artist we accept this word of Goethe which Chamberlain transcribes and gives us back in a hundred variations, especially, in his book on Kant, as unconditionally as we reject it for thinkers and scholars. An artist may very well treat with supreme contempt all requirements of the logical doctrine of method, and indeed, of discursive thought, and express himself thus : "Without troubling myself about a definition, I have shown race in one's own bosom, in the great acts of genius, in the glowing pages of human history" (Vol. I 3rd Edition p. 290). A scholar, however, who sees in the concept of race the universal key to the philosophy of history which would open to him all castles and gates, nay, all subterranean paths of world-history, cannot, like Chamberlain, say that the mystical concept "pure race" in and for itself is an airy nothing, which instead of helping, only hinders (pp. 282,

291). That the chapter "Sanctity of pure race" (p. 310) cannot be reconciled with the strict nominalistic theory of an "airy nothing of thought" can surely lower the value of a scientific account but not that of an artistic temperament. The scholar in Chamberlain therefore often sets himself greatly in opposition to the artist in him—and hence the numerous contradictions which Friedrich Hertz and many others have discovered. That dualism of which Fr. H. Jakobi gave the celebrated account—In my head I am a Spinozist, in my heart, however, a true Christian—is the inevitable fate of most romanticists. And so also is Chamberlain in his *ratio*, the logical part of his being, a strict nominalist, so far as every universal concept, even his central concept "race," is an "airy product of thought" but in his heart, in the illogical part of his being, in the subterranean region of instinct, he is a firm believer in the reality of concepts. The airy thought-product "race" transforms itself with one stroke into a "holy law of human becoming" (Vol. I 3rd Edition p. 310). Surely, race is a collective concept, as animal-breeders show us, for a series of individual creatures. So speaks the logician Chamberlain, the strict nominalist, to whom this scientific nominalism "seems to adhere as an intellectual race-mark," especially, that nominalism which has run through the blood of English philosophers, as we have already shown, from the thirteenth century. Against this nominalism, however, Chamberlain's race-instinct strongly asserts itself. The irrationalist, the philosopher of feeling, the mystic, romanticist and artist in Chamberlain are stronger than the logician and the scholar; the heart triumphs over the head, and thus arises a neo-romantic philosophy of history. One does not believe one's eyes when one finds immediately after this rigorous nominalistic confession (of the head) at p. 310 an equally rigorous realistic confession (of the heart) in the very next sentence: "Race" is "no arbitrary concept, no product of thought, but these individuals are linked with an invisible, but at the same time real power

resting upon material facts. Surely race consists of individuals; still the individual itself can only under fixed conditions, which are summed up in the word *race* reach the fullest and noblest development of its faculties." The "airy thought-product" transforms itself thus all of a sudden into a constitutive factor of human occurrences, determines the destiny of the individual, becomes its fate and assigns to it its unchanging place in the scale of values.

This inversion of value of the airy thought-product "pure race" and its transformation into a social *kismet* we can enjoy always as an artistic conception, if it comes to us in the garb of a harmless hypothesis, but we cannot allow it to pass unchallenged if it appears with the dogmatic claim of an explanation of the History of Philosophy. Such explanations and deductions of human history from a single principle as Chamberlain offers us in the airy thought-product "pure race," which he himself describes as mystical, are not new to us. We know rather from Paracelsus and Helmont's "Archeus" the architect of all things, of several forms of such a determining factor from the earliest times. Buckle called it climate and properties of the soil, Taine the "milieu", Marx the struggle of classes, Gumpłowicz, the struggle of races. This is excessive realism of concept which condenses an abstraction into a highest formula and makes this formula a party-cry and thus the "riddle of the sphinx," the "world riddle", nay, even the "social question" is sought to be solved. The method is very well-known: People conceive a certain conceptual scarecrow and imagine for it an idol or word-fetish. People then invest concept and word with all the paraphernalia of sovereignty, give them a crown and a sceptre, place them on the throne, kneel down supplicatingly before them, keep the gaze fixed on the floor and dare not look the self-constituted sovereign boldly in the face. Afterwards one is surprised at the powerful effect which, thanks to the

formation of language, is produced by this conceptual sovereign, but forgets that between the ermine and the purple robe there is placed a phonograph which automatically repeats what we have already put into it.

A linguistic upstart, a classificatory expression which is current among animal-breeders, which from the very beginning signified a variety, at most a subspecies, but never the highest genus or species, is saved from wreck for the sake of a neo-romantic Philosophy of History and raised to a *deus ex machina*, to a machine-God of human history. The old gods fall from their pedestals. Divine providence is dethroned. The good Pan is mediatised. On account of a logical anarchy of conceptual formation and a methodological *coup de main* which proclaims the conceptual proletariat *race* at night as the god of history, we have ceased to understand ourselves scientifically. The ruling ideas of history are inverted. The pure arbitrary rule of a theory threatens to seize the vacant throne of historical providence with the old cry of the usurper, "Ote-toi de là que je m'y mette".

This neo-romantic Philosophy of History we must oppose. The distortions of Gobineau nobody has criticised more severely than Chamberlain. Whoever calls him a disciple, interpreter or successor of Gobineau does injustice to both. "Gobineau's doctrine is the grave of every practical treatment of the race-question"—so it is said in the Preface to the fourth edition (p. 18). Chamberlain does not want to be called either a disciple or an apostle of Gobineau, either a copier of Gobineau or a retailer of Gobineau's articles. Wherein, however, does Chamberlain's race-concept differ from that of Gobineau? Or, has Chamberlain any race-theory of his own? Underlying the race-imperialism and race-romanticism which Chamberlain puts into the Teutonic culture-concept, is there no proper world-view, no artistic conception? As we now think of examining Chamberlain's neo-romantic philosophy of history critically we shall introduce into

the field against him an authority whose claim to speak Chamberlain can never dispute namely, Chamberlain himself.

The "blue flower" of the philosopher of history, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, means the German race. Already the German romanticists whom Rudolf Haym in his *Romantic School* with great delicacy and fineness of feeling followed critically to the most hidden corners of their soul, showed a marked predilection for everything German. The German song of heroes, the minnesong, above all, the ancient German popular song were carefully collected, romantically trimmed and pronounced the essence of all true poetry. Chamberlain himself does not think very highly of these romanticists whom he characterises as "degenerate and vague" (*Grundlagen* Vol. I 3rd Edition p. 136). He speaks disparagingly of German romanticism which once "threw its shadow on all sides so that it became the fashion to "explain mystically" anything and everything (p.194). And Chamberlain will rightly maintain against us that the old romanticists, the Schlegels and Stolbergs, especially, the Catholising ones, would have let their German character come to nothing on the altar of the universalistic, only soul-saving Church, whereas he is a German protestant to the finger-nails and a pronounced antipapist. The Germans are to him (Vol.II 3rd Edition p.103), the builders of all modern culture-values. Against the old *ex oriente lux* Chamberlain haughtily and conceitedly places his own *ex septentrione lux*. All culture is fundamentally northern. The collective name "German" is used in the sense which Tacitus originally gave it. Only Chamberlain uses it now in a narrower, now in a wider sense than Tacitus. The elasticity of the collective concept "German" Chamberlain admits unhesitatingly, "There has never been a nation which has called itself "German" Only through the true establishment of a new conception of *German* does the consideration of the appearance of the German become of practical value" (Vol. I p. 469). The new conception of

Germans formed by Chamberlain which he puts in opposition to that of the Jews we may call race-romanticism and conceive as the last word of that romantic philosophy of history which begins with Adam Müller, Treitschke, Lagarde and Dutchmen of the School of Rembrandt but is powerfully influenced by Schopenhauer and Wagner. It is Chamberlain who first finds the charming formula for German race-romanticism.

That Chamberlain has a low opinion of German romanticists is no reason why we should separate him as a philosopher of history from this spiritual tendency. Neither Schopenhauer nor Nietzsche has ever thought of calling himself a romanticist. And still from the time of Lehmann and Volkelt it has become a scientific commonplace to call Schopenhauer a "romanticist of German philosophy". Falckenberg even called him a romanticist of the thing-in-itself. And Richard M. Meyer sees in Schopenhauer the most "proper philosopher of romanticism". The same thing happened to Nietzsche. Karl Joel in Basel says in his book *Nietzsche und die Romantik* (p. 6), "I am sure even Nietzsche would have been roused to indignation at such a classification. Nietzsche speaks (in the 15th volume) very often of romanticism. But where he names it he opposes it". And yet Karl Joël has succeeded in conceiving Nietzsche as the true king of philosophical romanticism.

Surely, we shall have to recast the current conception of romanticism if we are to include in it Nietzsche and Chamberlain as our bounden scientific duty requires us to do. Romanticism can no longer be regarded as the wild caprice of an exuberant age, as the strange whim of a headstrong society, but romanticism must be conceived as the deep and, consequently, justifiable longing of the tormented human breast. Our understanding creates logic, our feeling gives birth to mysticism. One half of the human being, the superficial or the logical transforms itself into technics and science, into laws

of quantity and number, whilst the other half, the subterranean, the uncontrollably active, gives rise, in imagination, to art, in feeling, to religion, in the will, to law and the State. If we live in a purely rational period of the prevailing culture-system, the *mos geometricus* is the predominant factor. This represents the harmony founded on strict numerical relations, the state of equilibrium in all the phenomena of life. Order, law rhythm, proportion, uniformity, rest, agreement, strict organisation and unification are the expressions of the logico-mathematical view of the world. Its danger lies in its being frozen into absolute authority. Temperaments, passion, personality, self-consciousness, emotional excess, enthusiasm, ecstacy, intoxication, infatuation—in short, emotions—constitute the fundamental essence of all romanticism. Its danger lies in the unsteadiness of the subject. To the solemn earnestness and sober symmetry of classicism, romanticism opposes the satiric play of caprice, in its extreme forms even the frantic capers of wild whims, at the highest, Bacchanalia and irony. These two antipodes of every culture-system are consequently the direct expression of opposite temperaments. In the historical religions, revelation, the three testaments, councils, synods, in short, dogmas represent classicism; sectarianism, mysteriousness, religious secret organisation, kabbalism and mysticism represent romanticism. Wherever strict conformity to law sets the standard, whether it be the standard of art or the standard of life, classicism gets the upper hand. Where, on the other hand, personality is its own lawgiver and rebels against everything permanent, everything sanctioned by custom or fixed by convention, the “blue flower” of romanticism begins to blossom. When use or custom, law or morality has become stiffened into mummified uniformity then the revolt of romanticism sets in to give life to the dead bones. Thus, the humanists were the romanticists in ancient language and culture; the quattrocentists, the romanticists in art, the heroes of the Reformation the romanticists in religion;

the revolutionaries are the romanticists in politics and to-day the race-theorists are the romanticists of blood.

If the laws of art, religion and morals establish themselves as monotonous identities, so that all personality becomes flat and sinks into a mere outlet of the universally valid, then the powerful individual, the "great man," whether it is the holy man or the hero, the eccentric or the genius, appears as opposed to this spiritual levelling. In poetry these rebels are called *Stürmer* and *Dränger*, in religion, heretics, in art people call them secessionists, in politics, reformers. Between naturalism, religious reform, pre-Raphaelitism, symbolism and socialism, there exists therefore a secret connection which works underground. It is the general struggle against everything hardened into a dogma, against everything prevailing in the form of a tradition, against everything stiffened into a convention. If anywhere, there has been a resurrection in history, as Joël exquisitely remarks. "The old romanticists were recovered from the dust of libraries, a wealth of learned and commonplace literature has already taken charge of them and neo-romanticism calls itself not without reason the most modern literature and art" (p. 2). "Fragmentary is all romanticism because it is the impulse of the infinite, and that means spiritual passion" (p. 118).

Of the romanticist nothing is more characteristic than the genius-cult. Out of feeling arise all values, especially, the religious ones. But the perfection of all values is the holy "genius." The artist alone is the true man, according to romanticism. Tieck speaks smilingly of "the over-intellectual," Friedrich Schlegel most earnestly of "the over-holy"; Fichte's being is "over-power", as he is the discoverer of the "over-real" (Joël p. 130). "Man is the pedestal upon which the artist stands as representing his nature"—so runs the motto of romanticism. A new aristocracy springs into life, an intellectual, aesthetic, genius-aristocracy, the historical model of

which is the old Stoic "wise man." Schopenhauer and Wagner revel in working out the conception of aristocracy. And in this school Nietzsche as well as Chamberlain has been trained. Georg Brandes, the "discoverer" of Nietzsche, has called this view of the world "aristocratic radicalism" and Nietzsche gladly accepts this characterisation—nay, he looks upon this expression of Georg Brandes as the most comprehensive thing which has ever been written about him. The last remnant of this romantic genius-cult is, for the individual, Nietzsche's over-man, and for the race, Chamberlain's "Germans." If we carry, for instance, Nietzsche's "over-man" from the singular to the plural, from the individual to the collective, there arises the neo-romantic philosophy of history, that is, the new idea of the German race as formulated by Chamberlain. In Chamberlain all tendencies of the romantic genius cult are thus combined; they all flow into the universal "German" bed. What Nietzsche has attributed to the "over-man" who is to be produced, Chamberlain has projected into his German race which is to be reared. Upon his "Germans," all tendencies of the romantic genius-cult are unmistakably and indelibly stamped. This spiritual physiognomy of the race-concept "German," formed by Chamberlain is as a collective name what Nietzsche's overman is as an individual—Chamberlain's "German" is the "racial over-man."

Now people will be able to understand the expressions here introduced, "race-romanticism" and "neo-romantic philosophy of history." If we henceforth regard Chamberlain as a race-romanticist, one will not, according to what we have put forward here as the definition of a romanticist, see in the expression used any intention to underrate or wilfully under-estimate him. We wish rather to explain Chamberlain's "neo-romantic philosophy of history" psychologically, deduce it logically and classify it philosophico-historically. A *homo sui generis* we historians of philosophy do not know within the strict domain of our

enquiry. Every thinker, even the greatest and the most original, has to fall into a fixed groove in the framework of our philosophico-historical scheme; we unite and co-ordinate the particular appearances, according to the needs of classification and survey, with fixed types of thought. And thus the artistic personality of Chamberlain has compelled me to place for the sake of classification what is his highest and what is most peculiarly his own, his discovery of a German "race," by the side of those philosophico-historical methods of explanation which seek to deduce the whole course of human history from a universal principle discovered by them. So the philosophy of history of the Church had once for its formula *ex ius dei*, later *cujus regio illius religio*, monarchical absolutism had for its own, *coluntas regis* or "l'état c'est moi" of Louis XIV, and political liberalism, "laissez faire, laissez passer." The formula of Marx's socialism founded upon the economic view of history is "class-struggle" and that of aristocratic radicalism, finally, is, so far the individual is concerned, over-man (with Nietzsche), and so far as the race is concerned, over-race. We have in vain searched for traces of Adam Müller, the romantic philosopher of history, in Chamberlain. Chamberlain seems hardly to know the name of this spiritual ancestor of his, in spite of extensive reading which is bound to command one's respect although one may call it haphazard and desultory. Adam Müller's *Elemente der Staatskunst* (Elements of Statecraft), to-day a forgotten and obsolete book, first struck those minor notes which resound Catholicised in Görres and Protestantised in Ludwig V. Haller. These are repeated in Treitschke, Lagarde and Dutchmen of the Rembrandt school in the major key, in order to fade away in Chamberlain's neo-romantic philosophy of history.

Now is there a formula, is there a single formula which can charm away completely all riddles of human history, explain without ambiguity all changes of people's fortunes? And even if there be such a formula of the history of

philosophy, does Chamberlain's race-romanticism, his categorisation of events according to mixture of blood, contain that greatly longed-for masterkey which enables us to open all secrets of universal history? Here appear my notes of interrogation. Race and mixture of blood seem to be as unimportant characteristics in the elucidation of historical connections, as perhaps the "race-struggle" of the Marxians is. Here, as there, the question is rather of a one-sided construction of an in-itself-justified heuristic principle. Instead of proving that 'race' or "class-struggle" is logically permissible as a principle of classification in history or even as the only permissible factor for explanation, these are accepted as self-evident postulates, developed unconditionally and announced without proof. In my article, *Die Anfänge der menschlichen Kultur* (The beginnings of human culture), *Aus Natur und Geist*, Leipzig, Teubner 1906 p. 42 sq., I have set forth in detail my logico-methodological reflections upon the current race-theories of Gobineau, of his German apostle Schemann, of de Leusse and Le Bon, Lapouge and Ammon, and lastly of Ploetz, Reibmayer, Wilser and Woltmann. There the *logical* insufficiency of the race-concept as a principle of historical classification is shown. Here we consider more especially the highest type of the *philosopher of history*, Chamberlain, because with him the question is surely not of a biological play, but of a world-view based on the history of philosophy which one cannot dismiss as scientifically worthless. Here, if anywhere, could an *argumentum a silentio* have place. Consequently, a dialectical passage of arms should decide the issue, according to all rules of true fencing.

The first logical error of the race-romanticism of Chamberlain we see in this, that he ascribes to the concept of race, which according to his own assertion is artistically formed, nothing but those attributes which we others are wont to ascribe to the concept "culture-system" favoured by Dilthey. I undervalue in no way, be it well understood, the

magical effect of blood. In many respects I even respect the sanctity of blood which bursts forth everywhere in Chamberlain. We owe greatly to our blood our instincts, the race-memory (Hering) or "mneme" (Semon). These instincts, again, themselves represent the stored-up race-experience of our immediately preceding series of ancestors. The observation made by the old doctrine of transmigration and the Church doctrine of traducianism is correct, that by virtue of the dispositions lying in our blood we find our personal destiny in great measure pre-ordained. Through mystical cords which are as invisible as they are indestructible, we are bound up with the race-history of our ancestors. As in our anatomical structure—phylogenetically—we represent an abbreviated history of our ancestors, so we recapitulate in our spiritual organism the experiences of our forefathers condensed into instincts and automatic acts. Every man carries the demon in himself, so say Heraclitus, Democritus, Socrates and Cardanus. Every man brings into the world his unchangeable intellectual character, so says Schopenhauer. Here, again, a fate? A kind of predestination through blood?

A sociological determinism through blood will only then result when one ascribes with Chamberlain to blood or to the instincts which blood carries with it, a compelling, uncontrollable, undeniably binding influence upon men, especially, upon civilized people. Here I part company with Chamberlain's romanticism. Instincts as collective experiences may perhaps work in a fatalistic and deterministic manner upon people in a natural state, as these cannot oppose intellectual motives to the illogical part, the subterraneously working instincts. In the natural state the environment governs men, in the civilized state men govern the environment. In civilized people, consequently, the regulator of whose lives is the motive of reason, the instincts are controlled, curbed, restrained, held in check, in short, regulated or even completely counterbalanced by rational grounds. What to us civilised people the

inherited instincts leave is only inclinations, dispositions, tendencies for the performance or avoidance of a certain group of actions. But the life of instinct no longer has any compelling force upon us to the extent it still has upon people in a natural state. "The type of arbitrary states of consciousness is characteristic of civilized people, the type of compulsory states of consciousness is characteristic of people in a natural state" (Vierkandt).

Here begins the logical error of neo-romanticism. Chamberlain huddles together in confusion groups of people of different epochs and grades of culture. He makes use of the form of classification according to race which is derived from the breeder class as a universal historical principle of classification and exposition; he transforms, however, with it, without noticing the logical error, a passing state of temporary duration into an unchanging permanent type; he confounds a subordinate property with a fundamental one, a tendency with a law, a heuristic or regulative principle with a constitutive one, in short, a mode of the historical substance with that substance itself.

The neo-romanticism of Chamberlain revives the old Cain and Abel myths. Everything high-minded or radiant, everything straight or high-toned, in short, all light and glow, is showered upon the one race, the German race, whereas everything crooked and fragile, everything spiritually crippled and twisted, all spiritual blindness and spiritual deafness are ascribed to the Semitic races, especially, the Jews. There God, here Satan. There, the race of Ormuzd, here, the race of Ahriman. From the beginning romanticism drew its chief strength from the so-called "higher myths" whose essence Wilhelm Wundt has lately investigated in "Archiv für Religionswissenschaft," Vol. XI July, 1908. Wundt sees in stories, sayings and legends forms of evolution of the myth. We are to-day in the midst of a neo-romantic race-mythology, not indeed of one that has been handed down

from past generations, or one surrounded by the halo of tradition, but one of conscious formation of legends, of intentional backward projection of our desires and longings into the remote past. We have, like the philosophers of history of the Restoration epoch, a great desire for galleries of ancestors. The romanticists of the philosophy of history of former times went back, while tracing the origin of our culture-system, to the Middle Ages and up to the time of Ludwig v. Haller and Stahl they remained there. This gallery of ancestors does not please the radical neo-romanticists. If Rousseau goes back to the natural state, Schopenhauer to the Buddhistic *nirvana*, Tolstoi to ancient Christianity and Nietzsche constructs out of "the fair beasts of the primeval forest" the coming over-man, the imagination of Chamberlain in the region of the philosophy of history reveals itself in the painting of an over-people, an over-nation, an over-race, the German.

"German" is, as Chamberlain sees (Vol. I. p. 467), a Celtic word which he employs only for simplicity's sake. "Somewhat elastic and so far perhaps inadmissible," this idea appears to Chamberlain himself "to be the same whether it is conceived narrowly or broadly, and especially because the consciousness of what is specifically "German" is a late acquisition, at least to us Germans" (p. 464). And thus Chamberlain also understands by *Germans* something fundamentally different from what "the genial, but highly imaginative" Count Gobineau does: Gobineau and Buckle are to him rather "two poles of an equally false method" (Vol. II. p. 708). Chamberlain sees clearly that "German" is a concept the exact meaning of which can only be brought out by a historical description; the 'ancient German' and the 'Aryan' are hypothetical concepts (Introduction to the 4th Edition p.17). German and Semitic are collective concepts, *collectiva*, subordinate species of the higher concept mankind which Chamberlain (Vol. I p. 708) throughout

regards as a linguistic expedient. Only, I do not understand why only such collective concepts as "mankind" are linguistic expedients, and thus pure abstractions, while the collective concepts "race" or "German" are to be represented as conceivable concreta. Whether a collective concept embraces 1500 million or only 200 million people cannot possibly make any difference so far as the logical validity is concerned. What is the relation between unity and plurality, between a soldier and an army, between the individual and the family, between the social atom and the race, between the citizen and the people, between the individual rate-payer and the nation, between the individual personality and the "race"? This is in plain language the logico-sociological problem of "race". Chamberlain replies: The individual is a necessary product of its mixture of blood, of its race-character. So far as the individual is connected with the highest race-concept "mankind", its characteristic, its personality, is confused, dimmed, reduced in value. So far, however, as it belongs to the subordinate species "race", its relation to this collective concept is vivid, perceptible, plastic. Germanic race is in the eyes of Chamberlain a "concrete fact" (Vol. 11 p. 709). If one belongs to the Germanic race one has "creative power", "sincerity", "thoughtlessness", "toleration", "sense of duty", "organising capacity", "naïveté", "love", "freedom", "power of expansion", "art", "science", "technique", "discoveries", "industry", "freedom", "civilization", and "culture"—not to speak of physiological characteristics, such as skull-formation, colour of the hair, height, carriage and blue eyes. If one, however, is born in a Semitic cradle, one brings with him as the fatality of his blood, as predestination for sins (for a register of these, according to Chamberlain, see above under "German" and "Semitic") the following bundle of qualities into the world: "egoism", "a minimum of religion", an "abnormally developed will", "materialism", "poorness of imagination", a "peculiar legal sense", "tendency towards

mysticism", "lack of State-organising capacity", "oscillation between despotism and anarchy"—not to speak of the colour of the eyes or the hair, of the structure of the skull or the nose. We see also that the higher race-concept "mankind" is, according to Chamberlain, completely empty, lifeless and colourless, while the concept of the subordinate species "race" shows a collective bundle of attributes indicative of life and colour. Open air is what constitutes the artistic collective concept "German," obscure light what constitutes the equally artistic collective idea "Semitic". Makartean feast of colour there, Ruysdaelian shade here. All light in those, all darkness in these. In the cradle of the Germans lie the Graces, in that of the Semitic people lie the Parcae. An image of the Blessed Virgin, to whom the human race in fervent devotion makes a pilgrimage, is placed on the right side with the conceptual symbol "German"; a scarecrow, a masquerade, a "veritable Gottseibeiuns (devil)" is placed on the left side and to it is attached the conceptual symbol "Semitic". As in the comedies of Raupach, Iffland or Birch-Pfeiffer only two types are placed in opposition to each other, a paragon of virtue and a contemptible fellow, because the soul-painting poets have no other colours in their palette, so this great "universal tragi-comedy"—called the history of the human race—is made up of two races constituting world-history. With the chaos of nations and with the Jews the old culture fell to pieces, but with the appearance of the German race on the stage of history a new world is created. The Germans are the creators of a new culture!

In the structure of this race-romantic exposition Chamberlain composes his drama of history. First act, exposition: Greece-Rome-Judaea. Second act, cutting of the knot: The appearance of Christ. Third act, culminating point of the crisis: The Roman Empire falls to pieces owing to the chaos of nations, mixture of the races; the Jews appear in the history of the Western countries; the irreconcilable discord,

the religious race-instincts, the Guelphs and the Ghibellines, the two swords, universalism and nationalism, appear in the universal historical struggle in which the chaos of nations triumphs. Fourth act: The Germanic nations emancipate the benumbed universalism, namely, Catholicism which represents only a religious Roman Empire. In discoveries, in technique, in science and industry, in domestic economy and law, in politics and religious institutions, in philosophy, religion and art, the Germans create a new culture.

Whoever falls under the hypnotic influence of this mesmerist in penmanship, this thought-reader of history, will feel how difficult it is to get rid of the glamour of this wonderful dream of a historical spirit-seer. Admiring the architectonic skill, the magnificence of the conception and lastly, the glamour and lofty style of expression, I can regard the neo-romantic view of history of Chamberlain only as the flow of an artistic temperament and cannot welcome it as that redeeming and emancipating word to which we have long been looking forward. Race-imperialism and race-romanticism can at best exhibit the unnamable woe of the men of to-day, their inner tattered condition, their spiritual disruption, their uncertain oscillation between flattery and free-thinking, but cannot diminish the crisis or in any way finally remove our doubts. The *Grundlagen* is a historical poem which affords us great aesthetic pleasure, and that is no small service. For our tastes are unfortunately so spoilt that only great artistic power can stir us. Nietzsche and Chamberlain, the former, a romanticist of individuality, the latter, a romanticist of race, are the shrill notes which pierce us deeply and irresistibly cut a hole through us. This our age requires, this our age understands—and hence the great influence of Chamberlain's race-imperialism, the distant echo of his neo-romanticism.

A romanticist in the current sense, or even according to the rubric of the scheme of literary history, Chamberlain

certainly is not. He rather finds himself in good society, the best according to his taste, namely, in the society of Schopenhauer, Wagner and Nietzsche. The romanticist of the thing-in-itself stands in the same relation to the romanticist of the rhythmic world as the racial over-man theory of Chamberlain does to the personal over-man theory of Nietzsche. The rationalistic encroachment on the romantic province of Chamberlain is not a small one. In an introductory essay "The race-question" in the Vienna paper "Waage" for July 7th, 1900, Chamberlain speaks thus : The difficulty of the race-problem lies in this, that it is not possible to give clear-cut definitions of the different races, because there are found transitional forms or lurking forms, above all, because science will never succeed in tracing the races to their origin and clearly distinguishing them. "*The point in which it is manifestly lacking is clear regulative ideas*". Here shows itself clearly in Chamberlain the logical comprehension of the race problem. Race is, in fact, to use the expression of Kant, a regulative idea, perhaps also only a heuristic principle, but surely no constitutive factor of history. Here room must be made for scientific comprehension. We shall both agree in this, that race is not the highest generic concept like mankind, but a subordinate specific concept. According to Chamberlain, race is a permanent type ; as I look upon it, race is only a subordinate species, the collecting, sifting and classification of which may have a heuristic value. No, says Chamberlain, it has a regulative value. Race is a type of permanent characteristics which can act as our guide in the labyrinth of history. Chamberlain is an excessive admirer of "value-estimating" history but he recognises only one value—race.

How does Chamberlain, however, obtain this race concept of his, to which he attributes a form lasting over centuries, embracing nations and ages ? Race is, somewhat like blue or green, a fact, so runs his sociological *ceterum censeo*. A pure

fact, however, is not yet a cause, a pure event is still no history; an individual experience has yet no universal validity. This Chamberlain should know, I should think, as well as I do. And how does Chamberlain succeed in discovering the truth which is for him unimpeachable, that race exists? Race—in the sense in which the breeder uses the word—indicates either more or less, is a relative concept; it is a thoroughly plastic substance which under favourable circumstances can arise very rapidly and under unfavourable circumstances more rapidly disappear. Whether a horse has “race” an expert perceives at once, also what degree of race it possesses he perceives very soon; yet it cannot be defined even with the aid of the experience of crossing, in-breeding, feeding and training. It is therefore only important to know the fact, the fact of race. (Introduction to the 4th Edition p. 20). Every text-book of logic will teach Chamberlain this, that one can never deduce from particular facts, or pure relational concepts, objectively valid truths, especially, absolute measures of value. Chamberlain can neither see in race with Voltaire different species, nor with Kant only a name for variety, but with Darwin he joins the ranks of practical men, of breeders of animals and cultivators of plants. Race is for him then “that raising of definite essential characteristics and universal capacity for work, that elevation of the whole being which is obtained under absolutely fixed conditions of selection, crossing, in-breeding—but only under these absolutely determinate conditions, and then without any exception, that is, with the certainty of a law of nature.” (Ibid p. 16).

We can very well deny ourselves the cheap triumph of Wilser (*Rassen-theorien*, 1908, p. 22) in casting in the teeth of Chamberlain “vague observations.” But I ask the thinker Chamberlain, the logician in him, the rational part of his romantic temperament. How does race, a fact observed by breeders, suddenly transform itself from a pure principle of

division into a binding, historical law? How can a characteristic of such questionable permanence as race transform itself all of a sudden from a classificatory name into a law? How, lastly, does it come about that a purely heuristic principle of classification is raised not only to the rank of a regulator of history, but also to that of a constitutive principle, to a law of nature which is universally valid? On the analogy between animal breeding and human propagation which is lame not of one leg alone, like all comparisons, but of both, even a problematic judgment can hardly be founded, far less a categorical one. What does Chamberlain think of the ancient German "dwarfs"? Chamberlain should think of Windthorst who has made a great piece of German history, of Ranke who has described it in a masterly manner, of Menzel, who has made a sketch of it of eternal beauty, of Lichtenberg, who embodied the choicest spirits of the "Germans" in his Lilliputian figures. If one says with these four German pygmies that they helped to build the German "culture-system" we shall unhesitatingly agree; if, however, one thinks them to be representatives of the German "race," this only makes things bizarre.

I am afraid the old anthropomorphism which is firmly rooted in men plays the race-romanticism of Chamberlain a bad trick. Bismarck as the type of race—so seems to us the sociological anthropomorphism of Chamberlain. Chamberlain's collective concept "German" is the idealised Bismarck embracing Celts and Slavs, placed beyond history and stamped as the ideal picture of the Germanic group of nations. Race-romanticism is the fondling of a pet idea, the playing with a metaphor, the universalisation of one fact or a few facts, in order imperceptibly to generalise them and raise them to the rank of decisive factors of history. The same one-sidedness which Marxism exhibits in the *economic* sphere in the exclusive stress laid on class struggle as the only factor of history, Chamberlain shows in his race-theory in the biological sphere.

One thing above all : A fact may be psychologically true, but it need not at all on that account be logically true. The psychologically real lies in the subjectively valid evidence of the senses, the logically true lies in the objectively, that is, universally and necessarily valid expressions of reason. "Race" may be in the epistemological sense subjectively true. That the sun rises every day is true so far as our eyes are concerned, but it is not true so far as reason is concerned ; that a certain colour is called "black" may be psychologically true, like green and blue, according to Chamberlain, but physically there is no such thing as black. Will Chamberlain be of such a type of sensationalist that only that is for him logically acceptable which sensuous experience—"the fact"—shows with certainty. Will he maintain with Anaxagoras and Epicurus the validity of sensuous experience so strongly as to say with them that the sun is as great as Peloponnesus and the crescent no greater than it appears to us, because that only is to be regarded as true which the senses show us?

One need only raise this question in order to reply without hesitation in the negative even if the question is understood in Chamberlain's sense. Chamberlain is neither a sensationalist nor a sceptic—he is only a romanticist. He revels with an exuberance praised by Goethe in the delineation of a noble race to which he has given the characteristics, physical as well as spiritual, of Bismarck in a way which has escaped notice. What, however, is hereditary, is entirely included in the instincts, the race-experiences, and this produces an inclination, a tendency, but no spiritual fatality, no "certainty of the law of nature." It is impossible therefore to draw from race-characteristics any logically binding universal conclusions regarding individual men, still less, regarding great groups or whole nations. Such conclusions are always problematic, never categorical. The race-romanticist passes lightly with the infallibility of the somnambulist over the logical hedges and ditches, the

crevices and precipices of thought. This is artistic conception but certainly not science. To explain history on the basis of a neo-romantic race-construction is to make use of astrology, to cast a horoscope, to raise the study of physiognomy to the rank of a science, to pronounce graphology the highest wisdom.

And yet there is in this deep abyss of the *Grundlagen* a valuable scientific expedient. If we replace the catch-word "race" of the animal breeders and plant cultivators by the scientific concept for classification, introduced by Dilthey, namely, "culture-system", we can understand the efforts of Chamberlain. Blood produces only the inclination and is, moreover, uncontrollable and uncheckable. The "culture-system," on the other hand, expresses the collective will of vast circles for the general formation of their mode of life, their laws, their morals, their professions and their social organisation. Far, far behind these great forces of history that shape life which we collectively call the culture-system, there appear with civilized people the inherited instincts. One is born, it is true, with one's blood, but one may control one's stored-up race-experiences or instincts, through one's will, ennoble them through feeling and govern them through reason. What, however, is changeable exhibits itself as a heuristic characteristic of a concept, not as a regulative, still less, as a constitutive principle. Into a culture-system one enters. Such touches of race-romanticism as Chamberlain—without intending it—developed into a system, the Renaissance knew in Campanella and Cardanus, who with Plato advise us, exactly like Chamberlain, to build a new society by way of bringing up a race. The same thing Chamberlain demands of us for the collective concept "German", and Nietzsche for the individual "over-man". Blood, however, only goes backwards; the culture-system, on the other hand, goes forwards. This "forward", however, underlies as much the race-romanticism of Chamberlain, as the "overman" of Nietzsche or

the "coming kingdom" of Tolstoi and Ibsen. We have to-day a forward-marching and no backward-projecting imagination. And Chamberlain is, in striking contrast to Gobineau, a teleological optimist in history. If one, however, projects one's ideals, as we optimists all do, forwards, in front of the human-race, and not behind it, then race as a constitutive factor is as useless as the culture system is indispensable. We civilized people use ideals as a substitute for those instincts which regulate the mode of life of the natural man. Without ideals there is no life worth living for individual men and still less, for whole peoples or nations. The more enthusiastically, therefore, we go in for ideals, the less does the artistic race-concept seem to me to be the ferment of a national formation of an ideal which embraces all sects and classes and is self-contained.

"Blood" or "race" which may have played a certain rôle in a lower past stage of our historical existence cannot at all be any longer regulators of the history of the nations that have come of age. Instead of "blood" and "race" we have only to-day "nationality" and "culture-system" as regulative ideals of history. Not animal motives, brutal instincts of the bird of prey, which know only an 'I' and no 'thou'—whether this 'I' is an individual 'I', like Nietzsche's over-man, or a collective 'I' like Chamberlain's Germanic racial overman—but conscious purposes and an organic growth of the *volontés de tous* into a *volonté générale*, as Rousseau required for the State, govern to-day the common life and the common work of civilised men. In short, conscious-spiritual factors make history to-day and no infernal race-instincts, as among wild and barbarous people. This view apparent ebbs, atavistic falls do not make us hesitate to accept.

With this neo-romantic philosophy of history I have tried so thoroughly to come to an understanding, because I see in Chamberlain in spite of himself, the most notable type of neo-romanticist. Chamberlain's peculiar work on Kant

(Munich, Bruckmann 1905) confirms me only in this, that in him we have the most eloquent representative of the neo-romantic movement. Like Fichte Chamberlain says: The philosophy of a man is born with him; it is to be regarded as the necessary product of his nature. The term *Weltanschauen* (p. 17) I look upon as a happy idea. The "appearance" is for Chamberlain the most important thing. The mystics of all ages have quite charmed him. The romanticist Novalis is praised because he is the author of the words: The world is a universal metaphor of the spirit, a symbolic picture of it. Even for him, a thorough-going dualist of the Cartesian type, this romantic doctrine of absolute identity is "perfectly untenable". Out of love for a miserable logical duplicity, complains Chamberlain (p.371), this doctrine destroys form, personality, analytic science. That such things appear among us and delude dull heads he considers a most regrettable thing. "In religion we cannot do without mysticism, for through it myth first becomes living experience; for philosophy it is a poison". The dualist Chamberlain goes so far as to maintain the monstrous doctrine: "We people have a perverse tendency towards monistic conceptions" (p. 547). If I then, notwithstanding his disparaging remarks about romanticists, not only count Chamberlain as a romanticist, but also see in him the philosophical mouthpiece of the neo-romantic movement of our days, this is principally because Chamberlain has considered more deeply, characterised more sharply and worked out with greater elasticity the leading thoughts of all romanticism than any of his predecessors or successors. His *Grundlagen* as well as his work on Kant constitutes a formless arsenal of that argument which in the final analysis always leads back to romanticism. What the German romanticists with Friedrich Schlegel at their head have dimly felt, receives at the hands of Chamberlain intelligible form. Therefore it happens that the principal philosophical thoughts of German romanticism, as they have been

formulated in the works of Hayn, Huch, Joachimi, Walzel, Joël, Coellen and Ewald, appear in a perfectly intelligible form in the writings of Chamberlain and his follower Count Keyserling. What remained with many unuttered, only half-conscious, and was on the tip of the tongue, seeking an opportunity for expression, has been raised to the clearness of formulas, and thus the neo-romantic movement of our days has been made to speak.

Mysticism, says Chamberlain in his work on Kant (p. 79), is, as a mental temperament, as a presentiment of transcendent, unfathomable worlds, an estimable spiritual event ; several times it has shown the way for release from the chains of dogma ; still, as a rational disposition, it is to be avoided ; the most brilliant intellect becomes childish if it follows this wrong path. For this reason, however, only the theological "perception" is rejected, but not at all the illogical, irrational, anti-mathematical one. The "bewitching eye," the "idea in its totality" of which Goethe represents the type, is rather what Chamberlain loves most. The great philosophers Goethe, Leonardo da Vinci, Descartes, Bruno, Plato, Kant) have always a special "nature to show." This perception is developed most perfectly in Goethe, who said, "My nature which consists in considering and handling the objects of nature, moves from the whole to the individual, from the total impression to the observation of the parts," "The world of the eye" is the world of Goethe. For through analogy, this "guardian angel," as Goethe once calls it, the presentiment of a distant ideal, is inferred from the "world of the eye" (p. 117). Science, says Chamberlain, is "systematic anthropomorphism": we feel our thought-forms in "nature." But there are two kinds of perception, an analytic one, aiming at a mathematical dissection of movements, and an intuitive one, directed towards a construction of nature through imagination (p. 159). The *ratio intuitiva* of the Scholastics and Spinoza, the highest form of our scientific

insight, receives here a significance which gives a deeper foundation to romanticism and establishes it more firmly than any of the leading romanticists has hitherto succeeded in doing.

If "perception" is an essential requirement of all romanticists and mystics, the "myth," the "primeval myth," especially, is an element in the life of romanticism. And here also the neo-romantic movement led by Chamberlain shows a more solid foundation than any of its predecessors. We know how Schelling with Bruno, and later, with Jacob Boehme, fell into myths and lost himself in complete mysticism. Not so Chamberlain. And here the rationalistic covering which he gives to "ancient myth" is unmistakable. With vague ebullitions of feeling Chamberlain is always as little in sympathy as Keyserling. According to Chamberlain, dream and myth are rather inwardly related (pp. 282, 286, 307, 342, 353 ; so says also Count Hermann Keyserling : *Unsterblichkeit* Munich, Bruckmann 1907 pp. 26, 58, 67). Myth, says Chamberlain, this always conscious dream, has, exactly like the dream of the sleeper, always a double root : on the one hand, it grows out of the perception of nature, on the other hand, it arises from the reflexion of man upon his own self. As Tylor and Herbert Spencer trace the animistic form of religion, so Chamberlain traces myth to dream-life.

By the side of "perception" and "myth" there occurs usually the "organic view of the world" as the third ingredient of all romanticism. The organic and teleological view of the world is not only common to all the old German romanticists but it has also been the watchword of all the organic schools of law that have sprung from romanticism from the time of Savigny to that of Bluntschli. Life is the central problem of the romanticist. Chamberlain only represents "the organic theory" in a scientific form, which brings him close to Hans Driesch whom recently Count Hermann Keyserling has also followed. The organic unity which Keyserling with Driesch

traces to the Aristotelian "entelechy" Chamberlain refers to Kant's unity of apperception, "that incomprehensible inner something through which all intuitions and thoughts can be brought to a single focus." With Fichte Chamberlain therefore, like Keyserling, calls this unity, 'I ! And the old dispute between mechanism and organicism which I have treated of in my *Mechanical and Organic Conception* (*Der soziale Optimismus* (Social Optimism) Jena 1905 pp. 180-218), Chamberlain formulates thus : Is organism for this philosopher a machine, or is machine for him an organism ? He sees two great ancient myths of thought, namely, monism and pluralism, and two great ancient myths of perception, atomism and organicism. Yes, he sees in the natural science of to-day the greatest consumer of myths that there has ever been.

Chamberlain, on the other hand, says, in opposition to this, that one smells in his organism something of mysticism (p. 495). Organic are with him those definitely formed appearances in which form is the cause and not the effect. Form and purpose rule the organic method of thinking. Life is form (pp. 470, 480, 495). The idea of conformity to an end is for him the perception of the form of life carried over to the conceptual region. "Form as the law of life is the thought of an end as it is represented to perception."

The neo-romantic movement, the typical representative of which is not Maeterlinck, as Coellen thinks, but Chamberlain, works with all the tools of old German romanticism—"intuition", "primeval myth", "genius", "organism", "teleology"—but the great creative power of Chamberlain has followed all these problems of the first importance of the old romanticists to their roots. It is not in vain that Chamberlain has started from botany. Its methods he has employed in philosophy, as his Vienna friend Wiesner and the Kiel botanist-philosopher J. Reinke have done. It is therefore conceivable that Chamberlain has created a school, has disciples among thinkers

as well as inquirers and has found an echo in the widest circles of educated people whose neo-romantic temperament of life meets half-way this most brilliant dialectician of romanticism. An independent advocate of this doctrine is his younger friend Count Hermann Keyserling.

People's minds are in a state of ferment. That peaceful self-sufficiency, as it characterised a generation ago all the sciences, especially, natural science, we have lost. Where the previous class of inquirers who were greatly captivated by the dogma of mechanical causality and infallibility of the Darwin-Spencerian doctrine, gave definite answers in which the *blasé* motive for knowledge finally came to a rest, there we people of to-day see only signs of interrogation. The sacrosanct atom-theory has lost its scientific credit. The cathode rays of Leonard, the X-rays of Röntgen, the N-rays of Blondlot and Charpentier, the discovery of helium and radium have produced cracks in the artistic edifice of the mechanico-materialistic view of the world. The ion theory and electron theory, J. J. Thomson's corpuscular theory and Ostwald's energism strive with one another for supremacy, for setting up and piecing together, in place of an exploded view of the world, a scientifically more tenable view and one that is more in accordance with the results of recent research—the electromagnetic view of the world. The brickwork is not yet complete. People quarrel about pillars and cross-beams. The place is full of din and confusion. We experience in the neo-romanticism of our days a philosophical *Sturm und Drang*.

Under the bold title, *The Structure of the World*, a philosophical neo-romanticist, Hermann Keyserling, has produced a work (published by T. Bruckmann, Munich, 1906). The sub-title *Attempt at a critical philosophy* and the dedication to Houston Stewart Chamberlain whose work on Kant is dedicated to the author, a man between twenty-five and thirty years of age, show the direction in which the lines of

thought of Count Keyserling move—a Kantianism founded by Chamberlain.

In five chapters (The unity of the universe, continuity and discontinuity; *Harmonices mundi*; the problem of the spirit, freedom in universal connection) and an epilogue (What is truth?) Keyserling sets forth before us his philosophy. He is only half-conscious of his dependence upon Kant and Goethe; of his indebtedness to Chamberlain's work on Kant, on the other hand, he is fully conscious. It appears no doubt more in the dedication and preface than in the style and method, more in the habit of thought and artistic temperament than in its philosophical convictions and its epistemological basis. On the other hand, Keyserling is not at all conscious of what he owes to Spinoza and Fichte. Thus, he takes from the first nothing more than the motto for the second chapter of the book and for his work *Immortality* (1907); of the second, he says hardly anything more than what is given by a cursory mention of names. And still on close critical examination what Keyserling calls his "new philosophy" appears to be a neo-romanticism based on the scientific views and the state of scientific knowledge in the beginning of the twentieth century, just as Fichte's philosophy was a revival of romanticism based on the results of Kantian criticism carried over to the region of society, politics and history in the beginning of the nineteenth century. Kant has treated Spinoza with neglect—a thing which pleases Chamberlain, the arch anti-Spinozist. Through the Jacobi-Mendelssohn dispute over the supposed Spinozism of Lessing the study of Spinoza has come to the foreground of philosophical interest. And so Fichte was influenced by Spinoza, whose doctrine exercised great influence over the students of Leipzig, till Kant's doctrine of freedom released young Fichte from the clutches of Spinoza. Fichte recovered with the help of Kant, but he never forgot his obligations to Spinoza. His synthesis ran—Kant and Spinoza.

The unity of the universe as a "closed, self-contained whole" is that assumption which Keyserling shares with the great monistic thinkers of past ages, although he equally takes up arms against materialistic and spiritualistic monism. Where does this meaning of the unity of the universe lie? In the concept: world, cosmos, universe, this meaning of unity is already implicitly contained. While we form this highest generic concept *world*, we have already got rid of, eliminated the milliard forms of manifoldness within it and have arrived at a point of unity embracing all this manifoldness. This logical elimination which belongs to every subsumption we call abstracting from difference (to draw out=abstract). That thus the universe is one—the doctrine with which Keyserling starts—can be pronounced a formal, identical, existential judgment. As we have previously extracted (logically abstracted) unity out of plurality and have called this unity the universe, it is self-evident that we must find in such a concept—exactly as in a locked-up money box—what we have previously put there. The unity which we have substantialised in the universe—whether it is the Lavoisierian unity of the conservation of matter or the Meyer-Helmholtzian unity of the conservation of energy—is just that unity which we have woven round us as life-preserving threads out of the confused and misleading plurality of events. In such a unity, says Keyserling, has man always believed? Always? And what of fetishism? And polytheism? And the pluralism of the later Greek nature-philosophers (atoms, elements, homoeomere)? And the dualism of Aristotle, Descartes and Chamberlain?

To this unity of the world-conception we have been gradually led with the development of the power of abstraction. And indeed to this meaning of unity, to this forcing upwards of our intellect to this highest capacity for abstraction, the religious system through the unifying concept of God and the philosophical system through the unifying concept

of substance have gradually led us. To the convinced polytheist our interpretation of unity is wicked idolatry.

Why, however, is it that just the advanced portion of the human race has come to such an interpretation of unity? Where lies the compelling psychological motive which has obliged most thinkers gradually to pass from many gods to one God, as well as from the pluralism of substances to monism? Why does this monism, to the great chagrin of Chamberlain, lie unmistakably in the blood of our culture-system? I believe I have given a sufficient explanation of this motive of thought which contains within it an ineradicable anthropomorphism. The unity of the universe is, in my eyes, only a duplicate of that unity of self which every man has observed in himself and which one is consequently inclined to generalise, transfer to the outer world and bestow upon cosmos. Whoever forms the concept "world" has perfectly conceived his own unity of the self which, according to Mach, has object-necessity, and according to Cohen, thought-necessity, through self-duplication, through carrying his own unity over to all the 'not-I' s'. This psychological necessity of carrying one's own identity over to the world-whole gives rise to monotheism in religion and monism and pantheism in philosophy.

If the interpretation of unity is confined to the stuff of the world, there arises materialism; if it refers to the spirit in which this alleged stuff of the world itself exists as a representation, there arises idealism or spiritualism. If one regards, however, matter and spiritual power as only forms of exteriorisation of a common fundamental principle, hylozoism is the result, whether it is in the most primitive form, as among the pre-Socratic philosophers, or in the aesthetic-organic pantheism of Schelling or the pan-psychism of Gustav Theodor Fechner.

Matter, force and life are therefore the three unities to which the immanent necessity for unity of the most advanced civilised nations can be referred. If the first of these occurs,

that is, if the highest unity which we are spiritually obliged to construct is called matter (atom, mass or corpuscle), then force and life must be conceived in this matter and there arises the philosophy of mechanical causality—strict materialism. If the second occurs, that is, if force is conceived as the highest unity, then, on the contrary, everything mechanical will be resolved into the dynamical; all rest will then be regarded as infinitely small motion (Leibniz) and all matter will be transformed into a product of forces, that is, of mass and velocity. This philosophy leads in its ultimate conclusions to that energism which is to-day found in the school of Ostwald and Helm. Matter and life must then, according to energistic monism, be transformed into energies and thus we get, in fact, according to Ostwald, form-energy, volume-energy, as also nerve-energy and energy of consciousness. Only thus can energistic monism set itself against materialistic monism and maintain its ground successfully.

Both these methods of interpretation Keyserling summarily rejects. Force and matter cannot be converted into one another without leading to an absurdity. For force—and that is the interesting novel thing in Keyserling—represents the principle of continuity, matter that of discontinuity. The synthesis of these two factors of the world between which there is an irreconcilable contradiction—matter and force—is represented therefore first by the third factor, life. And here begins neo-romanticism. In the process of life, matter and force are made one. For life is a permanent unity in coexistence as well as in succession. If now the world were an organism, as the hylozoists in ancient times and the Schellingians of all shades, and lastly, Fechner's all-soul-theory in modern times maintained, we could easily solve the riddle of existence. Life would then be substance and force and matter its attributes. To regard the cosmos itself as animated is, thinks Keyserling, a delusion (p. 41). Thus, not force and matter *in* life, as in organism, but force, matter *and* life must

according to Keyserling, be the factors of which the highest unity of the world-whole consists. One is reminded here of Chamberlain's placing life in the front rank. These three factors he calls categories, whereas we call them the three attributes of the "highest unity of the world-whole".

In the course of our exposition it will be seen why this third attribute, life, must be added. All life signifies in itself a "suitable reaction against the outer world," as Keyserling (p. 368), exactly in the sense of Spencer, concludes. As Spinoza could not allow life to rank as a phenomenon *sui generis* and thus as a special third attribute, as Keyserling has done, without abandoning his strict determinism which rejects all purposive evolution, so life must, according to Spinoza, be conceived mechanically and built out of the two attributes, extension and thought. The consistent mechanists in German biology who have arisen out of the school of Du Bois-Reymond—their chief representative is Bütschli in Heidelberg—oppose the teleologico-vitalistic explanation of the phenomena of life as much as does the great Benedictus de Spinoza who has taught us the mechanico-naturalistic pantheism, notwithstanding the mystic touch of his *amor dei intellectualis*.

Not so Keyserling. For him Leibniz and Schelling have not lived in vain, nor have the neo-vitalists under the lead of Driesch, especially J. V. Uexküll, written in vain. For the younger generation of German biologists, the problem of life does not go without a remainder in physics and chemistry. There remains an irreducible residuum. It will not therefore do—with Spinoza and the naturalists—to explain life purely mechanically. Teleology cannot, as Descartes and Spinoza desired, be placed under a ban and banished altogether from scientific inquiry and exact philosophy. It makes its appearance always again and again, as Eduard von Hartmann said a generation ago and triumphantly repeated in his book *Das Problem des Lebens*.

All ingredients of the scientific knowledge of to-day—the higher analysis, projective geometry, Viktor Goldschmidt's theories of crystallography, the hypotheses of the English astronomer Sir Norman Lockyer, finally and especially, the modern physical theories, the biological works of Gustav Wolff, Neumeister, J. V. Uexküll, Driesch, Reinke, Breuer, Frédéric Houssay and other authors—Count Keyserling has made use of in building his “structure of the world.”

The geometric garb of Keyserling goes back to the primitive type of pantheism, as far as Xenophanes and Parmenides. For Keyserling (p. 53 and other places) the world=whole is a self-contained whole, comparable to a sphere. We seem to be listening to Parmenides when Diels (*Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*) (Fragments of the pre-Socratic philosophers) says: “As a final boundary exists, the being is enclosed on all sides *like the mass of a perfect sphere* and is equally strong from the centre to all the sides.” The unity of the universe is neither a physical unity, as the materialists will have it, nor a purely conceptual one, as the spiritualists believe, but a purely formal unity—a unity of law. This is the alpha and omega of Keyserling's metaphysics. That he comes in this way very near Pythagoreanism and Platonism he feels very well. On the contrary, he is completely unconscious how near he is to Cohen's “Logic.” Cohen, as is well-known, raises the cry: Pythagoras finally triumphs. The essence of things, says Cohen, is number, or, as it runs in the milder conception of Pythagoras, it is regulated by number. The formal unity of law, the forms of manifestations of which in the world of appearance proceed according to strict numerical proportion, is that absolute, unconditioned, unrelated, which Plato calls idea, Kant, thing-in-itself, Spencer, the Unknowable, Spinoza causa sui.

Number has, as the mathematician Kronecker has said in an essay (dedicated to Zeller), its own life, independent of the human spirit. Similarly Cournot and Cantor have expressed

themselves. The laws of mathematics are to Kronecker at once functions and mirrors of the laws of the universe. Mathematics treats not only of these derivative functions of the highest world-equation, but it is at the same time one of these functions, and consequently, we are in a position to express the other functions through it. In this sentence (p. 96) he remembers vaguely Spinoza but he drops at once the threads of memory, because, like his master Chamberlain, he wants to be a thorough dualist, especially, "to throw every monistic analogy into the bottomless deep." But this pretended dualism of Keyserling which he bases upon intuition and thought and according to which there corresponds to intuition continuity (geometry) and to thought, discontinuity (arithmetic), does not last long. Already Kant had admitted the possibility that his dual principles, sense and understanding, to which, according to Keyserling, the opposition between continuity and discontinuity, between geometry and arithmetic, between intuition and thought, and lastly, between being and becoming corresponds, might in their ultimate roots be identical. Reinhold found this point of coincidence in consciousness, Keyserling seeks this point of coincidence, this limiting concept of the human spirit, in world-mathematics. For he conceives the universe (p. 135) as a mathematical structure, the formal principle of which agrees essentially with the formal principle of mathematics. The unity of law of the universe is a mathematico-objective one, as Spinoza will have it, and not a logico-subjective one, as Kant takes it to be. This world-mathematics expresses itself in two attributes, as Spinoza calls them, or categories, as they are called by Keyserling. Spinoza calls them extension and thought, Keyserling, matter and force. Here he has built Kant into Spinoza and has brought the Kantian dualism of sense and understanding, of the phenomenal and intellectual world, into contact with the dualism of the two attributes in Spinoza. This he does through the tendency of his thought

to place matter with its discontinuity, by the side of arithmetic, and force with its continuity, by the side of geometry. We obtain thus the following view of the world *more geometrico*: The world-mathematics is geometry, when we have force in mind, it is arithmetic, when we limit our view to matter.

What, however, holds matter and force together? What is the bond of union between those attributes, of which one, matter, represents being, and the other, force, represents becoming? There, substantiality, here, causality; there, the statical laws of persistence, here,—according to the parallelism doctrine of Spinoza—the dynamical laws of happening or becoming. Why do the laws of persistence agree with those of happening? Whence arises the similar course of the laws of statics and dynamics? Whence finally, the eternal parallelism of bodies and souls, of matter and form, of extension and thought? The dogmatic Spinoza maintains: The two attributes must from eternity to eternity run parallel, because they are identical in the Absolute (*Deus sive natura*). Here the ways of Keyserling and Spinoza part. The latter conceived the world only *more geometrico*, not however, *more critico* or *more biologico*. Leibniz and Kant Spinoza has not been able to anticipate. Keyserling, however, is with Kant a critical, and with Leibniz a biological philosopher. Of the three critiques of Kant, the one that has charmed him most is the last, the critique of Judgment. And here we have the problem of life as well as that of teleology which grows with it—the problem which is the bridge that leads as much to Leibniz, as it does to Spinoza's purely geometrical view of the world. Here Keyserling inclines to the neo-romantic way of thinking.

Life is the great synthesis of Keyserling. If to matter (being) belongs the category of substantiality, to force, (becoming), the category of causality, then life—according to the scheme of triadic rhythm originated by Kant—represents the

category of reciprocity. Thus we come to Schlegel. World-mathematics requires a third attribute (category, as Keyserling says), in order to combine uniformly the continuity of matter with the continuity of force, and thus life represents the mutual action between matter and force, whence results their parallelism. Not upon the unity of God's nature does the parallelism of matter and force, of extension and thought rest, but upon the central category of the romanticists, life. According to Spinoza the phenomenon of life is absorbed completely in the two attributes of extension and thought (in the laws of mechanics and association psychology). Spinoza has extinguished the self, and has merged all individuality in the indivisible substance. Not so Keyserling who has passed through the critical school of Kant, the school of modern biology, and above all, that of Chamberlain. Life is not only a phenomenon *sui generis* but a principle regulating matter and force. The world-mathematics—Spinoza's *causa sui*—requires this third attribute, life, in order to make the synthesis of matter and force. Life creates the mean between these two heterogeneous factors and combines both into a higher unity. Clearly expressed: Ether is the imaginary quantity which dissolves the discontinuity of matter in the continuity of force (p. 139). This placing of life in the front rank stamps Keyserling as a neo-romanticist.

Life itself shows, in fact, strict rhythm, according to Goethe's saying: Although nothing happens *through* number yet everything happens *in* number. Owing to Keyserling's acquaintance with the results of the exact sciences, it is not difficult for him to make the analogies between the natural and spiritual sciences, as once the nature-philosophers of the school of Schelling did (Oken, Steffens, K.E. v. Baër). And recently the nature-philosophers of the school of Ostwald have tried to prove the unity of law of nature and spirit, of inorganic and living, organic nature, inasmuch as they lay great stress on the connections through laws, or, more correctly, on the

imperceptible transitions between the three kingdoms. As thus the pure forms of happening, according to Keyserling, proceed in accordance with mathematical laws, as they evidently do in a substance which can be called "world-mathematics," human thought can be, when looked at from the cosmic standpoint, only a special case of the unity of law found in everything that happens in the world. Rhythmical laws govern the attribute of extension (substance) as much as that of thought. The real ground of the rhythmical constitution of things is always an empirical one; the formal ground, on the other hand, is a mathematical one. It is not only in the beating of the heart and motion, in sleep and awaking, in dance, music and poetry, it is not in human "work" only, as Karl Bücher has shown, that there is rhythm, but any motion whatever exhibits it, as Eugen Dühring and Herbert Spencer have shown (Reference should here be made to p. 211 of Keyserling's book). This rhythm in nature, for example, between colours and tones, physicists and musicians have long noticed. So also have Zeising and Fechner discovered the rhythm between the masterpieces of the plastic and the poetic art. It was reserved for a Heidelberg crystallographer, Viktor Goldschmidt, to show the identity of the laws of formation of crystals and tones. This discovery of Goldschmidt which no doubt receives at the hands of different experts different receptions, was extremely important for the completion of Keyserling's neo-romantic world-conception. If he formerly only maintained that mathematics *reflects* whatever happens in the world, he now says ecstatically that mathematics *is* whatever happens in the world. The more strict Pythagoreanism triumphs. The universe is not only regulated by number, but the true, final and deepest essence of world-mathematics is number. Nay, even more. The Pythagorean numbers are in great measure identical with those which Goldschmidt, Wyneken, etc. have brought to light. The picture of the world is now revealed (p. 224). The world-mechanics is mathematics!

One law rules the world. Whether one gives it the title God, Nature or mathematics is more a question of the taste of the age than a really important distinction. From the crystal to music, that is, from the lowest depths of nature to its highest revelations, the same strict law of number rules everywhere. Cusaner and Giordano Bruno live again. And as music expresses for Keyserling, who stands near the Wagner circle and is related to Chamberlain's neo-romanticism, the most inward essence of man, one need not be surprised if he feels he can hear in physics, chemistry and biology of which he discovers the harmonious numerical proportions, the Pythagorean harmony of the spheres.

To the "structure of the world" belongs now, however, also the 'I', the human consciousness. A philosophy would not be complete if it did not assign to this 'I' a place in the house of the universe. However much Spinoza might resolve, as, later, Hume did, the 'I' into a bundle of representations, self-consciousness caused him great difficulty, because he could not point out in the attribute of extension a correlate of it. Here appears now in Chamberlain the Fichtean romanticism, the placing of the ego in the foreground. As he allows the Leibnizian teleology to appear at the cost of the Spinozistic mechanism, in the spirit of the Kantian "Critique of Judgment" inasmuch as he raises life to a special category, so he opposes—like Fichte—the spontaneity (freedom) of the 'I' to the dumb, fatalistic determinism of Spinoza. Teleology and freedom are the two points which separate Chamberlain and Keyserling from naturalism. These were, however, precisely the points that distinguished Fichte as early as his student days from Spinoza and led him forcibly to Kant.

The 'I' is for Keyserling no simple bundle of representations but a teleological unity (Artistotle). The entire reference of consciousness is to one thing—it is the 'I'. This 'I' is the formal law of the human spirit, like the mathematical order which governs and determines all relations of the spirit *a priori*

(Kant). The "transcendental unity of apperception" in Kant is with Keyserling a piece of the "world-mathematics," a reflection of the world-formula, and as such, at the same time, the biological law of the body. The soul as the entelechy (perception) of the body is that old Aristotelian formula which has charmed Leibniz and recently appears in an essentially modified form--'I' as teleological unity--in Mach (*Erkenntnis und Irrtum* (Knowledge and Error), 1905). One framework now holds both man and nature. His 'I' itself belongs to the ideal-formal connection which he must create outside of him in order to understand the world. The unity of the universe is an ideal in exactly the same sense as the unity of the ego. The living personality thus becomes a mathematical law. This anthropomorphism is unavoidable and the psychological circle is a fundamental one. Man projects first his highest values into the world-concept, then he makes this reflection of his own picture serve as a model for the conduct of life. First, God is humanised, then man is deified.

The Fichtean touch shows itself also in his conception and interpretation of life as "a free act". When Fichte finished reading Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, he exclaimed, "Now I first see that this earth is not the land of enjoyment but of work". His energistic ideal of the world and life is therefore the free act, as an end in itself, acting for the sake of acting. In the same sense the philosophical botanist J. Reinke conceives "the world as an act". Here Keyserling has learned directly from Chamberlain and indirectly from Fichte. The genius-cult, the tragical heroism, the centralisation of the ego, as they ring in Kant and resound fully in Fichte and the romanticists, have in the contents of their ideas and their tone, entered into Keyserling's "structure of the world". His doctrine of freedom is perhaps the Kantian one, the strict autonomy which only imposes laws upon itself because it is itself already a (mathematical) law, but to conceive life as a "free act" is pure Fichteanism. Spontaneity rests upon this, that

man as subject exists. The cosmic connection reflects itself in laws; the world-centre is reflected back from the ego. Mathematical laws govern the universe as well as man. The formal unity of the universe, Kant has already taught, is a correlate of the unity of the ego. All these are propositions which are valid with Keyserling as well as they could be with Fichte, and especially with the proper philosopher of romanticism, Friedrich Schlegel. Marie Joachimi has clearly worked out these fundamental principles of romantic philosophising.

Still more accentuated is that tendency, which Chamberlain has stamped upon the neo-romantic movement of thought in the latest work of Keyserling, *Unsterblichkeit* (Immortality. A critique of the relations between natural occurrences and the world of human representations), Munich, Bruckmann 1907. However much he may diverge in important points from Chamberlain, both the works of Count Keyserling are inspired by the spirit of Chamberlain. Admitting fully the originality of that which Keyserling has to offer as a thinker, we must say that he ought to admit his close relationship to Chamberlain in our philosophico-historical arrangements, even if he does not approve of it.

Chamberlain and Keyserling equally oppose all one-sided intellectualism and strict rationalism. Thereby they strike the romantic note. The illogical, the irrational, the "secret" is the element of life of the old romanticists no less than that of the neo-romanticists. And so Keyserling also sees [*Unsterblichkeit* (Immortality, p. 26)] in every process of intellectualisation a process of resolution. In the rational man, he complains, the deepest and fullest fountains of life are dried up; he knows no more of creative belief, of self-ennobling imagination, of instincts which are illogical and yet so certain. This adoration of instincts and of the unaffected, unreflecting, natural understanding of man at the cost of all abstract knowledge through reason, is a common

tendency of our neo-romantically feeling age. Maeterlinck here appears. From the time of Nietzsche, especially, instincts whose adorer was the arch-romanticist Rousseau, have been the catchword of the age. Widely divergent modes of thinking—such as those of Hering and Semon in their return to race-memory or “mneme,” the empirical criticism of Avenarius and Mach in the emphasis laid on “pure experience” and “the natural view of the world,” and lastly and principally, the pragmatic method of James and Schiller in its glorification of the “oldest truths” and of “healthy commonsense”—all vie with one other in the emphasis they lay on the instinctive as opposed to the rational factor. As Rousseau once exhibited sociologically against the refinements of the town people the instincts of the natural man, according to the old Cynic-Stoic doctrine, so we experience in the neo-romanticism of our day a glorification of instinct at the cost of logical categories which are to be resolved in their turn wherever possible, into instincts of thought.

What is characteristic of the romantic tendency in thought, especially, in the feeling of Chamberlain and Keyserling, is its predilection for symbolism, ancient myth and refined mysticism. “Myth,” says Keyserling (p. 58), “appears as mysticism in all its magnificence.” One should never, according to Keyserling, forget that every myth as a symbol represents originally the final explanation which cannot be further criticised. All mythologies, so far as they do not relate to historical occurrences, are therefore for Keyserling “relics of concrete stages of thought.” In this way we return to those ideas which Lobeck once expounded in his *Aglaophamus* (1829). Lobeck has found in Keyserling his true friend from whose tongue the following words slipped (p. 67): “More than the Hellenic myth deepest critical philosophy cannot reveal.” One should compare with this the rationalistic explanation of myth given by Wundt in his *Völkerpsychologie* (Folkpsychology) and his important as well as illuminating historical

deduction of myth in an essay which has already been mentioned (*Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, Vol. XI, July 1908, p. 200). Wundt represents here as against Jakob Grimm the view that stories, proverbs and legends are not relics and transformations of myths but more or less original forms of these.

To neo-romanticism belongs naturally as an inseparable ingredient the primacy of belief over knowledge. For the relativist and positivist Hume, belief, especially, belief in an external world, began just after mathematics, that is, after the analytical truths. According to Kant, who saw in geometry only a synthetic science, belief begins first in the rear of mathematics and physics which both fall in the domain of knowledge, while physics, according to Hume, belongs to the province of belief. Still more radically in favour of life do the neo-romanticists proceed. To them the geometrical and logical axioms are also, exactly as they were once to Bernardino Telesio, only things of faith, not of knowledge. Belief and existence, says Keyserling (p. 121), are absolute correlates, exactly like subject and object. And with Schleiermacher and James the province of all belief is sought in feeling. Feeling thereby becomes the criterion of values of reality as well as of truth. "I feel myself as an entelechy," says Keyserling with Driesch (Aristotle, Leibniz). "I feel continuity, boundlessness." And with this feeling is the belief in immortality in its most universal, schematic form already given and on this it is founded (p. 130). While the rationalist Descartes concludes: I think, therefore I am, the neo-romanticist of all grades and shades conclude: I feel, therefore I am. This preponderance of the feeling-element is also the thread which binds together the evolutionism of Spencer and pragmatism of the type of that of James with the neo-romantic tendencies of our age. Hume and Smith have here cleared the path.

Reason, consciousness, our logical conception are lowered by the neo-romanticists to the rank of things of secondary importance. With Schopenhauer they are of secondary importance, as compared with will; with Ed. v. Hartmann, as compared with the unconscious; with Nietzsche, as compared with instinct and his "will to power;" with Chamberlain and Keyserling, finally, as compared with the primeval myth or instinct. Coarsely Keyserling expresses this primacy of instincts (p. 174): One can almost say that consciousness signifies a *faute de mieux*, a round-about way of gaining time. Instinct works faster than reflexion. The highest philosophy, so concludes Keyserling his book on Immortality, ends in resignation to the inscrutable, in the awfulness of a mystery.

Two kinds of neo-romanticists in these days strive for supremacy: romanticists of the will and romanticists of feeling. My personal attitude towards the neo-romantic movement I have repeatedly shown in the essay "Gefühlsanarchie" (Anarchy of feeling) (in my *Wende des Jahrhunderts* At the Parting of the centuries, 1899 Tübingen, Mohr) and in the essay *Rückwärtster und Vorwärtster* (Backward-movers and forward-movers), occurring in my *Sinn des Daseins* (Meaning of Existence), (1904 Same publisher). The neo-romantic movement, the reawakening of which I to some extent (in the "Deutsche Revue") predicted ten years ago, has in the meantime created waves which go far beyond the mark indicated there. Above all, there have arisen in Chamberlain and Keyserling esteemed leaders and pioneers whose significance is to be sought in this, that they rationalise romanticism. All motives of thought of the French romanticists from Rousseau to Chateaubriand, Bonald, de Maistre and the German romanticists we find working in Chamberlain and Keyserling. But everything markedly mystical, nebulous, vague, abstruse is rejected by them. A neo-romantic mode of thinking is offered us by both which is scientifically deep and logically illuminating. Here we must take sides early and must

examine the strong position of romanticism with regard to its logical capacity from the standpoint of that strict rationalism which is most clearly represented by Ebbinghaus. The older, more energistic view of neo-romanticism which by preference lay stress on the side of will, is in Rousseau, Smith, Hume, the English popular philosophers and the German romanticist, less delusive than the recent neo-romantic phase which emphasises to-day the side of feeling. For it receives support to-day from the school of Ribot in France, of Spencer in England, of James in America, and lastly, from Horwicz, Ziegler and Heinrich Gomperz in Germany. The neo-romantic movement is no negligible quantity, especially, in that form which Chamberlain has given it. The struggle in the history of the world between rationalism and irrationalism must rather be brought to a termination in the twentieth century in the framework of our views and knowledge, in order that the awakened individual roused from his dogmatic slumber—whether it is the materialistic slumber or the slumber of the Church or dogma—may enjoy rest, may be brought to a logical equilibrium. Neo-romanticism has once more disturbed that dogmatic rationalism to which Spinoza once gave a final form. The belief in the autocracy of the logical consciousness is shaken by the neo-romanticists. Only a great system-builder and comprehensive thinker will trust his power to take up the cudgels in order to show their proper position to the irrationalists, mystics and neo-romanticists of these days. The ground prepared by Nietzsche is fatally favourable to the neo-romantic development of thought in these days. One should reflect how once Rousseau's alluring cry of romanticism found a thousand echoes in France and Germany. Instincts and feelings, myth and symbol, "mystery" and "belief" have again had a chance. It is necessary now through self-reflection and a bold union of all rationalists and intellectualists to check the spread of the neo-romantic movement before it can spell destruction.

CHAPTER V

THE NEO-VITALISTIC MOVEMENT

"In activity lies the riddle of life", so runs the neo-vitalistic motto which the Basel physiologist G. von Bunge has openly and frankly thrown into the debating ground of the nature-philosophy of the present day. If our philosophers (Cohen), cosmologists and astrophysicists of to-day go back in several ways to Pythagoras, as we have last seen them do in Keyserling, so far as they refer the undeniably present "mathematics of nature" to the rhythm of events, to strict numerical proportions in the process of nature and the process of history, the biology of to-day, so far as it gives up the sole governorship of mechanism and accepts the joint governorship, if not the chief governorship of vitalism, is supported on the shoulders of Aristotle. What the leader of neo-vitalists, von Bunge, declares with emphasis, namely, that "every organism is a wonderful structure, a microcosm, a world in itself," because its movements do not occur purely passively, according to the laws of hydrostatics and hydrodynamics, but contain in themselves along with, and over and above these, a principle of automobility, Aristotle declared in ancient times against strict mechanism.

The conflict between mechanism and vitalism which has again been revived with vehemence and has been carried on with passion, is to us, historians of philosophy, no new thing, for it has made its appearance in eternal historical rhythm from the time of Democritus and Aristotle: now as atom, now as entelechy, now as "King Chaos who deposes Jupiter", now as the purposive and significant end of the world, which has for its base conformity to the laws of nature and for its top Divine conformity to universal law, now as mechanical causality,

now as finality. Ever since the origin of the aesthetico-organic view of the world which Giordano Bruno in the last phase of his thought (in his writings "De triplice minimo" and "De monade") has given us, this opposition has in several ways been so reconciled that in the Divine substance which produces the world through artistic creative power, the cause and the end of the world coincide. From here the path leads to Leibniz and Schelling.

The essential opposition of the teleologist incarnate, Aristotle, to the first full-blooded mechanist, Democritus, does not prevent him, however, from regarding Democritus as a man "who seems to have reflected more than any other person". Thus, for example, "on growth and change no one before Democritus reflected in any way except most superficially". What Aristotle has to reproach the fathers of the mechanical view of the world, Leukipp and Democritus, with is their mistake in "light-heartedly undertaking to seek the origin of movement". On the eternal riddle of mankind about the *why* (cause) and *where* (end) of natural events, the mechanists have only to offer the dogmatically hardened, purely empirical, mechanico-causal explanation: It is or happens always so, for "it so happened also before." Democritus may have always called man what von Bunge with Bruno and Leibniz has called every organism, namely, a "world in miniature" (cf. Zeller, "Philosophie der Griechen" Vol. I. p. 806) but he was not willing to grant life a special teleological principle. "Nothing happens in this world by chance, but everything occurs necessarily according to fixed principles"—so runs the fundamental proposition of the mechanical view of the world from the time of Democritus. What one calls chance (in relation to purposiveness) is for the naturalist Democritus only a name for excusing one's own incompetence, for Spinoza an *asylum ignorantiae*.

Surely, the naturalists of all ages could not be blind to the fact observed, that order and connection must rule in the

world-whole, that otherwise it cannot be conceived how the individual parts of an organism are so wonderfully interconnected that it seems that a conscious intelligence has harmonised them with one another. For this reason the teleologically-inclined thinkers conclude: As everything is made *with* intelligence, it can only proceed *from* a conscious intelligence. This very alleged intelligence, this intentional and purposive element, the mechanists of all ages have refused to accept because it is an illusory appearance. The inner connexion of the parts with the whole one explains from the days of Anaximander and Empedocles, with whom Democritus is closely allied, as much through the principle of "survival of the fittest," as later Darwin and Spencer do. Just because nature, according to the naturalists of all types, forms a unity in which nothing occurs without a reason but everything occurs with absolute (mechanico-causal) necessity, the inner connexion of the parts which belong together to the same whole is conceivable. All necessity, in other words, is either a physico-chemical or a logical necessity but under no circumstances a teleological one. Nature "wills" or "intends" nothing, but is as it is—this has been the belief, raised to the level of an axiom, of all materialists and naturalists from the time of Democritus.

"Nothing in nature occurs without a purpose"—so it has been echoed from the teleological side for two thousand years, the authoritative mouthpiece of which is Aristotle. Every cause, every reason, or every change of motion, as also everything mechanico-causal must in its deepest root fit in with the final causes or final ends of nature. The efficient causes must be subordinated to the final ones, so says Giordano Bruno himself. Every living organism is a living protest against the mechanisation of nature. The working together and hanging together of numerous lower organs or parts of organs for common action without a principle of end is an impossible idea. Of themselves and without a purpose, the separate constituents

of an organ could not have found themselves working together for common objects. Moreover, the wonderful structure of particular sense-organs, as, for example, the camera obscura of the eye, can never be conceived without the help of teleological principles of explanation. The riddle of creation can, however, well be solved if one regards all events of the world as representations of ideas or laws (Plato) working in a timeless manner, as forms or types in a substance (Aristotle). Then arises everything passive or mechanically necessary out of substance, out of space (according to Plato) or out of passive matter (according to Aristotle). Everything active, on the other hand, arises from idea, form, concept, and lastly, life. For all life consists, according to Aristotle (*De Anima* Vol. I. p. 10), "in the power of self-movement, in the capacity of a being to bring about himself a change in himself". Consequently, the soul is the first entelechy of a natural organic body (*Ibid* Vol. II p. 1). The passive matter opposes a form working with a purpose and hence the abortions and other sins against the purposes of nature. "Nature as a totality is a gradual conquest of matter through form, is always a more perfect development of life The purposiveness of nature takes place through a gradual progress, a slow evolution" (Zeller). Thus the powers of plants are limited to nutrition and reproduction, while in animals, through the sense of touch, a sensing soul appears. In man, finally, there is added to the plant or animal soul, reason as the highest power of the soul. This continuity of progress in nature which Aristotle teaches, leads everywhere from the imperfect to the perfect, from the lifeless to the living, from obscure sensation to clear reason. Inorganic nature, the elements, the chemico physical phenomena exist, according to Aristotle, only that they may build up organic forms. It is one and the same life, the active principle of auto-movement (automaton) which manifests itself in gradually self-realising purposiveness, as well as in the highest revelations

of the human intellect. Thus, the inorganic is itself conceived as a lower species of natural life. Yes, all movement represents a lower stage, an inferior type of life.

Aristotle is, above all, the primitive type of the vitalists, although he makes use of the word first used by Xenophon, *μηχανικός* (heuristic), and even builds it up into a special science, namely, mechanics. Aristotle's mechanics is undoubtedly counted among his unauthentic writings. Rudolf Eucken (*Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart*) (Fundamental conceptions of the present day, 1878) has even reminded us that regarding a proper opposition between the mechanical and the organic no passage can be found in Aristotle himself. For the expression *organism* is used by Aristotle in its original sense of 'tool' and the Byzantines have given the collective name *organon* to the logical works of Aristotle only because they see with Aristotle in formal logic a propaedeutic science of principles, that is, an "instrument of thought".

The fundamental opposition between the mechanical and the vital occurs, then, so far as things and not so far as philosophical terminology is concerned, from the time of Democritus and Aristotle. It was Robert Boyle, the founder of chemistry as a science, who first made a serious use of the term *mechanism*. He even avoids the concept *nature* and replaces it by *cosmic mechanism*. In a separate work Boyle treats of "the excellence and grounds of the mechanical philosophy". Surely, mechanism here means as little as it does in Newton, whose "world-mechanics" requires the Aristotelian "prime mover" to inform it of the laws of mechanics, a complete rupture with, or a severe opposition to finality. The efficient causes in no way here exclude the "final causes", mechanism in no way excludes here comprehensive teleology. For the efficient causes represent only the outer form of events, while the final causes constitute the reason of events. The opposite theory of Spinoza, namely, *mechanica divina vel supranaturalis ars*, is yet

for this reason foreign to Boyle and Newton that Boyle considers it necessary to make a special investigation "into the final causes of things." Boyle thought "that a strict, thorough-going mechanical theory of end required a counter-theory to make the direction of movement towards the existing forms and of a rational order of the world intelligible; the more inwardness and essential connection were taken away from natural occurrences, the more necessary seemed the consummation through a transcendent." (Eucken). And so stand in Boyle, as in Giordano Bruno and later in Leibniz, "cosmic ends," by the side of "cosmic mechanism." The sharp opposition between mechanism and finality or transcendental teleology leads back, therefore, so far as the thing is concerned, to Spinoza, and so far as the philosophical terminology is concerned, to Kant in his youthful days. By mechanism we understand, as Sigwart does (*Logic* Vol. II. p. 633), the relation to one another of a closed plurality of unchangeable substances which change their relations with one another according to unchangeable laws.

This "conformity of relations to law" is precisely the problem which has ever been the subject of discussion between mechanists and neo-vitalists. The homunculus is as decidedly placed *ad acta* as the *perpetuum mobile*. The "Newton of Grashalm" must again be born. No one wants any longer to give up mechanical explanations so long as they are within their region of validity. But this region of validity has been hotly disputed. Philosophers, like Richl, see in all mechanism only a symbol for the universal law-abiding character of events and Ernst Mach regards the idea that all physical events are to be explained mechanically as due to a bias or prejudice. Therefore we confine ourselves first to those positive-minded thinkers who are not willing to quit the strict province of science, especially, of natural science, for all the world. The "firm" mechanists who demand with Spinoza the total exclusion of all vitalistic or teleological views

can appeal less to Helmholtz who required the resolution of all natural science into mechanics as an ideal, than to Du Bois-Reymond, the iron pillar of mechanism. Even recently with an old, shaking hand, the passionate, spiritually advanced Hercules of mechanism, moving unerringly through life, dealt a final powerful blow at the hydra of vitalism (especially, at the neo-vitalism of von Bunge). The postulate of Helmholtz transforms itself in Du Bois-Reymond into a strict iron dictum of science: "There is for us no knowledge other than mechanical knowledge, and only *one* truly scientific form of thought—however miserable a substitute for true knowledge this one may be—namely, the physico-mathematical form." "Commit to the flames all that is not mathematics or cannot be traced to mathematics"—decreed the Englishman Hume before him.

Against this the neo-vitalism of the present day rises in revolt. The "hydra" always grows new heads. The energists (Ostwald, Helm, Clifford, Stallo, Kleinpeter), as we have already seen, entirely oppose this dogmatic mechanism and materialism. The epistemologists, especially, ranging from the pragmatists and positivists, the phenomenologists of the Protagorean-Humean type (Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt, Cornelius) to the immanence-philosophers (Schuppe and Rehmke) and the neo-Kantian, neo-Platonic, Pythagorean idealists of the school of Hermann Cohen, will have absolutely nothing to do with the materialistico-mechanical dogma. They declare with Nietzsche that mechanics as a doctrine of motion is already a translation into the sensuous language of man: The dogma of mechanism resolves itself into a picture or symbol of universal conformity to law. Of pure "organicists" of the school of Schelling and Karl Ernst von Baer—the latter has vigorously set himself against all "telephobia" and has revived the old Aristotelian entelechy in his doctrine of "striving for an end"—as well as of the romanticists of the present day who flock to the standard of their philosophical hero, Fr. Schlegel,

I shall make absolutely no mention. Here the subordination of the mechanical to the organic is obvious. For they all think hylozoistically, like the primitive philosophers. Life is for them not something secondary, but primary; everything inorganic, therefore, is either inert, dead or former life, or an unconscious, instinctive, dawning, gradually awakening life, an "embryonic life of nature." If these pure organicists or romanticists of feeling (Schelling, Schlegel), romanticists of will (J. G. Fichte) and romanticists of concept (the followers of Hegel) were right, there would either be no place reserved for mechanism, or only a silent place graciously assigned to it in the corner of time, in the Court-room of metaphysics. John Tyndall's witty saying would therefore hold good: "If matter appears before the world as a beggar this happens because the Jacobs of theology have robbed it of its birthright".

A wholesale renunciation of mechanism as a methodical view of the world, as the happiest method which human wit and intelligence have ever conceived for doing away with the great abundance of problems which beset us, is surely not attempted in the neo-vitalism of to-day. Even Leibniz, the reviver of the vitalistico-teleological view, is so far from renouncing the mechanical view that he rather thoroughly assumes it; in fact, Leibniz demands the validity of mechanical principles not only for the non-living occurrences of nature but also for everything living. Even the soul is for him, as it is for Spinoza and Descartes, a "spiritual automaton" (*automaton spirituale*). But the problems of mechanics themselves, the old Aristotelian question: Whence arises motion? and the present day variant of this question, Whence arise natural laws in general, and the laws of motion which lie at the base of all mechanics, in particular?, do not find a final solution in pure mechanism. With mechanism our philosophical questions do not end but they rather here properly begin. Mechanism itself becomes a problem which cannot be solved by physics but first by metaphysics.

For even Wundt who makes with Clausius and Boltzmann great concessions to mechanism, has to admit that the mechanism of nature is only a portion of universal connection of spiritual causality, and therefore the Leibnizian enunciation of the problem is correct: *omnia in corporibus fieri mechanice, ipsa vero principia mechanismi generalia ex altiore fonte profluere.*

The phenomena of life and further, all organic forms refuse absolutely to be joined to a purely mechanical view. The more thoroughly, the more many-sidedly and deeply we seek to investigate the phenomena of life, says von Bunge, the more we arrive at the view that events which we believed could be explained physically and chemically, are of a more complicated nature and defy all mechanical explanations. For the simplest cell, the formless, structureless, microscopic protoplasm drop already shows all essential functions of life—nutrition, growth, reproduction, movement, sensation. And Engelmann's researches on the *arcella*—(unicellular being) lead to the result that already in the protoplasm psychical processes are at work. Therefore we return to that definition which Kant has given of organised matter. An organic product of nature is that in which everything is end and at the same time also means. By *end* Kant understands surely only "the represented effect, the representation of which is at the same time the principle of intelligent efficient causes determining its production". Consequently, all consideration of end is only regulative or heuristic for man, but never constitutive for nature itself. *Extra mentem* the consideration of end can only have a symbolic value, and though the phenomenon of life may be for Kant a concept of limit and for Du Bois-Reymond one of the insoluble world-riddles, still Kant has in his *Critique of Judgment* made an exception in the case of organised beings which places him close to Leibniz and Aristotle. From the consideration of organised being, says Kant (Works, Vol. V, p. 391),

one is necessarily led to the idea of the whole nature as a system organised according to the rule of ends, to which idea all mechanism of nature according to the principles of reason must be subordinated.

The "problem of life" forms as a rule the boundary between the mechanical and the teleologico-vitalistic view of the world. The Aristotelian definition of life as "auto-motion" (automaton) is at the base even of the Kantian. "All life", says Kant (*Works*, Vol. VII, p. 15), "rests upon the power of arbitrary self-determination" and in another place he says, "Life is the power of a being to act according to the laws of the faculty of desire". A continuous adaptation of inner to outer relations is, according to Herbert Spencer, the phenomenon of all life. In this external adaptation of the living plasm to its environment, the Aristotelian entelechy, auto-motion and spontaneity are as much implicitly contained as in the Kantian faculty of self-determination of life. As strongly as the youthful Kant in his pre-critical period (especially, in *Geschichte und Theorie des Himmels* (History and theory of the heavens) 1755) inclined to a purely mechanical interpretation of all phenomena of the world, so strongly did the old Kant (especially, in his *Judgment*) incline to the Leibnizian view. And even Herbert Spencer whom the dogmatic mechanists gladly claim as their own, stood nearer the organic view of the phenomena of the world, especially, the interpretation of life and society in the organic sense, and consequently, nearer anthropomorphism than mechanism. We further know from his autobiography that Coleridge's work *Idea of Life*, as we shall show later, imparted to him Schelling's fundamental thoughts on the philosophy of nature. To these add Wilhelm Wundt as the third in the alliance whom the "mechanists" would readily claim back as one of them. As strongly as Wundt maintains that whenever mechanical interpretation is permissible, one should rely upon it, so little does he deny that its region of validity

is extremely limited. The tendency towards life is then, according to Wundt, already contained in the inorganic, whereby the Aristotelian-Leibnizian view of life preponderates over the purely mechanical.

The scientific balance of to-day again manifestly inclines on the side of vitalism, as a generation ago it inclined on the side of mechanism. One will not, however, on that account fall into the old error of the "vitalists". For the "life-spirits" of the Stoa and Descartes, the "arcanum" of Paracelsus, the "archeus influus", or the "vis plastica" of van Helmont, the "plastic nature" of Ralph Cudworth, the "anima inscia" of G.E. Stahl, the "formative impulse" of Blumenbach, the "impetus faciens" of Boerhave, the "force hypermécannique" of the school of medicine of Montpellier, the "vital principle" of Bachez or "influence vitale" of Claude Bernard—for all these the neo-vitalists of to-day have, as v. Hartmann says, only a contemptuous laughter. They see in those *qualitates occultae* of the former vitalists an old position that has now been abandoned, its own alchemy as it were. And the vitalists of to-day stand in the same relation to the former representatives of life-force as those who hold the localisation-theory of the brain—Munk and Flechsig—stand to the founders of phrenology, Gall and Spurzheim, to whom, for example, Auguste Comte whole-heartedly and Spencer with a certain reservation attached himself.

"The life-force" in its old, antiquated form whose death-knell was sounded at the Göttingen Scientific Conference in the year 1854 is dead. The funeral oration of Lotze in Rud. Wagner's pocket dictionary of physiology is a sample of dialectical embalment. And it is not in vain that everything which the physiologists of the school of Ludwig have since stated as a counter-argument is echoed. Helmholtz and Du Bois-Reymond, Schleiden and Hyrtl have not lived in vain. But the younger generation of biologists has not forgotten that Johannes Müller, the founder of that German school

of physiology from which all the great thinkers who have taken life for a machine have sprung, did not hesitate at all to speak of an unconsciously working purposive activity, of an organic, force such as is seen at work in instinct. And even Justus v. Liebig had no hesitation in claiming for organic life a formative principle along with the chemical and physical principles. In the phenomena of life there is added to mechanism and chemism an "enigmatical plus" (O. Liebmann).

With this "enigmatical plus" which appears in all the phenomena of life, the so-called neo-vitalists are concerned. The first attack on the purely mechanical interpretation of life favoured by Kölliker, Fick and Nägeli was made by E. Rindfleisch in his book "Aerztliche Philosophie" 1888 (Rectorial address at Würzburg). In a separate treatise entitled *Neo-vitalismus* (1895) he attacks the dogma that life is composed of no other elements than dead nature. On the Italian side he was supported by Fano, on the Swiss side by G. v. Bunge in Basel whose programmatic treatise *Mechanismus und Vitalismus* now forms under the title *Idealismus und Mechanismus* the second volume of his *Lehrbuch der Physiologie des Menschen* (Text book of Human Physiology) (Leibzig, Vogel, 1901). With him joined Hamann (*Entwicklungslehre und Darwinismus*) (The Theory of Evolution and Darwinism Jena 1892). Of course all these neo-vitalists deny "life-force" in the sense in which the thinkers of the Renaissance period understood it. The *qualitates occultae* of the Scholastics of which Galileo made a final refutation rot also for the neo-vitalists in the grave in which lie the errors of the human race that have been corrected. The sharp saying of Kant, "Reason is hushed on the cushion of dark qualities" is true also of the neo-vitalists in these days. They reproach, on the other hand, the mechanists, who have overcome all scruples and have lulled to sleep the slumbering scientific conscience with a dogma-ridden explanation,

the explanation, namely, that life-process is only a complicated state of motion which is solely governed by the forces of inanimate nature, with having in their possession this soft cushion. The neo-vitalists have collected a strong material of facts built on a methodically strict basis out of life-functions which seem to defy absolutely all reference to mechanics. The old guardians of mechanism, R. Heidenhain and A. Mosso of Turin, have under the lead of their chief Emil du Bois Reymond (Report of the sitting of the Prussian Academy 1899) stirred themselves against the neo-vitalistic Fronde, especially, powerfully against v. Bunge. But even among the younger generation of biologists the universal inquirer, M. Verworn, has in his *Allgemeine Physiologie* (Universal Physiology) boldly waved the flag of mechanism against all neo-vitalistic tendencies. The veterans of mechanism, Weismann and Bütschli, defend themselves bravely against the advancing enemy who is conquering one position after another. O. Bütschli, in particular, has in his *Mechanismus und Vitalismus* (Mechanism and Vitalism) 1901, collected all the arms which are at the disposal of the representatives of strict mechanism. Bütschli has also succeeded, as H. Driesch admits, in resolving certain biological phenomena into inorganic ones. But even Bütschli makes such great concessions to teleology in an excellent essay (Ostwald's "Annalen der Naturphilosophie," Vol. III, 1904) that the leader of the neo-vitalists, H. Driesch, in his work *Naturbegriffe und Natururteile* (Concepts and judgments of nature), 1904, p.212, explains that on the logical basis of Bütschli he does not consider an understanding with neo-vitalism impossible.

Hans Driesch himself only in his last days went over completely and openly to the side of the "vitalists". In his writings before 1896 he still allowed the casual an equal value with the teleological view. The "empirical teleology" of Paul Nikolaus Cossmann and the "fitness-theory" of Gustav

Wolff (*Beiträge zur Kritik der Darwinschen Lehre* 1898, *Mechanismus und Vitalismus* 1902, a polemical work directed against Bütschli's book of the same name) are in the eyes of Driesch, as it were, only skirmishers of neo-vitalism. As true predecessors Driesch only reckons, among philosophers, F. Erhardt (*Mechanismus und Teleologie*, Leipzig 1890), William Stern ("Zeitschrift für Philosophie", 1903), Busse (*Leib und Seele*) and lastly and principally, Eduard v. Hartmann, whose *Kategorienlehre* (Theory of the categories) he values most highly (v. Hartmann's *Problem des Lebens* (Problem of Life) appeared first in 1906). At the end of his work *Die Seele als elementarer Naturfaktor* (The Soul as an elementary factor of nature), Leipzig 1903, Driesch expresses his relation to Eduard v. Hartmann as follows: "To those who are conversant with these things, the similarity of my views with the results of the inquiry of Eduard v. Hartmann will be obvious. They are similarities in the results and not in the methods." This speaks well for the truth of these results. I say emphatically that I first became acquainted with the conceptions of v. Hartmann here in question after I had finished the chief theme of this work. With regard to v. Hartmann the same thing which happened to Driesch happened to Johannes Reinke and Gustav Ratzenhofer: they only became acquainted with his views after they had established their own. Ernst Mach narrates in the preface to his *Analyse der Empfindungen* (Analysis of Sensations) that the same thing has happened to him with regard to the system of Richard Avenarius. Certain thoughts are in the air. Thus, Max Verworn in *Naturwissenschaft und Weltanschauung* (Science and Philosophy), 1904, says that he conceived his "psycho-monism" before he was acquainted with the systems of Mach, Avenarius and Ziehen.

Among scientists who come near the neo-vitalism of the type of that of Driesch, there occur to one, on the English

side principally, the name of E. Montgomery ("To be alive, what is it?" *The Monist*, 1895, "The Substantiality of Life", *Mind*, 1881) and then that of T. H. Morgan (*Regeneration*, New York, 1901). Among Germans the prominent figures are : K. C. Schneider (*Vitalismus*, 1903, *Lehrbuch der vergleichenden Histologie der Tiere*) (Textbook of Comparative Histology of animals), 1902 and Neumeister (*Betrachtungen über das Wesen der Lebenserscheinungen*) (Remarks on the essence of the phenomena of life), 1903. The recent vitalistic dispute between the Jesuit priest Wasmann, whose scientific views are to be considered seriously, and Ernst Haeckel has, moreover, led in no small degree to the popularisation of the problem with which we are concerned. Among the typical representatives of the neo-vitalism of to-day stand prominently Hans Driesch and Johannes Reinke by the side of Eduard v. Hartmann, the father of this mode of thinking, whose vitalistic doctrines we shall discuss at great length.

H. Driesch avowedly goes back to the Aristotelian doctrine of entelechy (*ἐν τέλει ἔχειν*). His work "on soul" concludes with an express reference to Aristotle whose *De Anima* he has repeatedly mentioned in terms of praise. The writings of Driesch which bear upon this point are : *Die Lokalisation morphogenetischer Vorgänge* (The localisation of morphogenetic states), 1901 ; *Die Seele als elementarer Naturfaktor* (The Soul as an elementary factor of nature) ; 1903 ; *Naturbegriffe und Natururteile* (Concepts and judgments of nature), 1904. The whole material Hans Driesch has skilfully collected and exquisitely classified in the work *Der Vitalismus als Geschichte und als Lehre* (Vitalism as history and as doctrine), 1905 (Vol.III of the Library of Nature and Culture-philosophy). Very recently Driesch collected his ideas in two essays which he published in Ostwald's "Annalen der Naturphilosophie" in July 1908. The "hidden forces" Driesch rejects absolutely. But to assume everywhere a machine or molecular motion seems to him as

absurd as it is to speak of the thoughtfulness of the bee or the magnanimity of the wolf. The theory of "chain-reflexes" according to which instincts, like those of chewing and swallowing, are nothing else than a strict chain of reflexes that has become mechanical through practice and custom, has been greatly affected by Driesch's biological thoughts. Kassowitz in his "*Allegemeine Biologie*" Vol. IV, 1906 and Richard Wahle in his *Ueber den Mechanismus des Bewusstseins* (On the mechanism of consciousness), 1906, undoubtedly make use of Loeb's theory of chain-reflexes as the most important argument against vitalism. Kassowitz and Wahle represent, the latter biologically, the former psychologically, the rear-guard of the retreating mechanism. All narrow attempts at a mechanical explanation of life are wrecked, according to Driesch, on the rock of the following facts. The freely combined reactions of movements of cerebrumless vertebrate animals cannot be conceived as occurring in a mechanical manner, but require the admission of an autonomous mode of occurrence. *In actions, especially, something fundamentally new obviously appears.* The autonomy of the phenomena of life is perfectly apparent; it only requires to be enriched and strengthened by being placed by the side of the old phenomena. Of this "bio-autonomy," proofs as well as instances have been given. Driesch gives (p. 112 ff) five independent proofs of the autonomy of the phenomena of life. Consequently, in the preface to his *Naturbegriffe und Natururteile* (Concepts and Judgments of nature) he has characterised his nature-philosophy clearly as a system of Aristotelian and Newtonian maxims. That which in actions finally reacts Driesch calls with Aristotle an "entelechy." The entelechies are with him constants; on the other hand, Driesch rejects absolutely the hypothesis of a "living substance" as also of a "qualitas occulta" in the sense in which it was used by the old vitalists. Even the "potents" of the form-building system are with him, as with Aristotle, entelechies. "The entelechies

'exist' in the sense of extended reality, just as other constants 'exist' as elementary world-factors." There are even constants of different grades: physical, chemical, biological (entelechies). "From this, that entelechies represent a higher grade as compared with inorganic manifoldness it follows at once that my autonomy-theory does not oppose the living as a special phenomena to the inorganic but that it distinguishes grades in the manifoldness of the given and thus arranges the distinct parts one after another. *The organic is a member of this classification.*" (*Naturbegriffe und Natururteile*) (Concepts and Judgments of Nature 1904 p. 123). And this remarkable polemic work in defence of vitalism concludes with the words, "Autonomy and entelechy would exist without an organic order but then there would be no system of entelechies in the deeper sense."

If in Cohen's Logic (1902) Pythagoras is revived, then Aristotle is revived in Driesch's biology. His 'entelechy' has acquired in Leibniz's monad and Hartmann's unconsciously and purposively working substance metaphysically, and in Driesch's *Versuch einer Analyse der elementaren Bedeutung der Entelechie* (Attempt at an analysis of the 'elementary' meaning of entelechy) biologically a new meaning. What, moreover, the Aristotelian *entelechia* is for Driesch, I maintain that the Stoic *ἡγεμονικόν* (higher portion of the soul) is for Johannes Reinke's dominant-theory. His dominant-theory J. Reinke propounded in *Welt als Tat* (4th Edition, 1905) and in his *Einleitung in die theoretische Biologie* (Introduction to Theoretical Biology), Berlin 1901 and defended in his *Philosophie der Botanik* (Philosophy of Botany), *Natur und wir* (Nature and ourselves) 1907, and a series of shorter essays. The dominant-theory J. Reinke puts in clear opposition to the mechanical theory of life. The dominants are with him "over-energetic forces" of an intelligent character. They are "the directing impulsive forces" in plants and animals. In *World as Act* they produce a sort of spiritualisation of the

material substance. With Eduard v. Hartmann, with whose *Kategorienlehre* (Doctrine of Categories) and *Moderne Psychologie* (Modern Psychology) he first became acquainted when his *Theoretische Biologie* was in the press, he accepts unconscious purposiveness. Dominants as products of organisation, it is said at p. 625, work unconsciously, they know as little of that which they do as the machinery of a chronometer or a lens which throws the image into the dark chamber of the photographer does. Chemical energy only directs mechanical work ; the organism, however, acts. Even these symptoms—activity, the opening of a personal series of events in virtue of an inner causality—are, for Reinke as for Bunge and Driesch, a most important fact against mechanism which can only explain backwards through causes but not forwards through ends. Reinke sees, like Driesch, in the simplest cell something fundamentally different from the states of the lifeless matter of our earth. Consequently, he explains the vital phenomenon (the “vital action” of Driesch) as a special phenomenon without thereby admitting the presence of a special life-force in the sense in which ancient vitalism conceived it. Reinke feels himself at one with Claude Bernard who propounds the doctrine : “L’élément ultime du phénomène est physique, l’arrangement est vital.” (The ultimate element of the phenomenon is physical but the arrangement is vital). Even this arrangement which determines the direction of motion, Driesch traced back to the entelechies of Aristotle, Reinke, however, to the *ἡγεμονιχόν* (= dominants) of the Stoics. For dominants are for him nothing but “direction-giving forces” or “system-forces.” Reinke distinguishes between dominants of work and dominants of form. The Stoic doctrine of the impulse of self-preservation (*ἐπὶ τοῦ τηρεῖν ἑαυτοῦ*) is intimately connected with the Stoic doctrine of *ἡγεμονιχόν* (Latin : dominans). In the same line lies the theory of conation (endeavour) of Hobbes, of impetus and *sumum esse conservare* of Spinoza, of *tendance* of Leibniz and

lastly, of *esse se velle* of the Scholastics and Schopenhauer. Very skilfully has Rud. Goldscheid in Vienna handled the questions of the "concept of direction and its significance for philosophy" in Ostwald's "Annalen der Naturphilosophie" Vol. VI No. 1, Leipzig 1903. The "concept of direction" as Goldscheid informs us, now begins to reveal its whole philosophical and sociological productivity. Rud. Goldscheid has also recently in his academic essay "Entwicklungstheorie, Entwicklungsökonomie, Menschheitsökonomie" (Theory of Evolution, Economy of Evolution, Economy of Mankind), Leipzig 1908, discovered the scientific realm of the concept of direction. Every living being has its direction-giving force, its formative impulse (momentum), its "will to live," as Schopenhauer sums up this proposition metaphysically. Consequently, even the neo-vitalists view Schopenhauer with special favour.

As little as Aristotle gained a final victory over Democritus, so little will the neo-vitalists of to-day give us a final judgment. Only people in many ways show a leaning, thanks to the deeper insight into the essence of biology as a science, towards vitalism, especially, in its new form (Driesch, Reinke). *Adhuc sub judice lis est*. It is not our duty to settle the universal historical dispute here, but to illustrate the separate phases of this process and bring clearly into view the material of action. But we shall not simply give a chronologically faithful *report*; we will also *explain*.

Every theory is explained through the statement of its historical development. As there has been an unceasing struggle between classicism and romanticism for more than two thousand years, so also there has been a struggle between the primeval opposites, mechanism and vitalism, in the explanation of the phenomena of life. Neo-vitalism is a kind of romanticism of Science. The mechanical view of the world characterises the age in which thought reaches its finality in "atom", while energism and vitalism represent a re-action against

materialism in which the apparently settled problems are again brought up for discussion. The neo-vitalistic romanticists group round the flag of Lamarckianism which they oppose to the mechanical view of strict Darwinism. A. Pauly's *Darwinismus und Lamarckianismus* and R. H. Francé's *Die Weiterentwicklung des Darwinismus* (Further development of Darwinism), 1904, are the polemic works which have given rise to this movement. The mentor of this new direction in biology is the *Zeitschrift für den Ausbau der Entwicklungslehre* (Journal for the construction of the theory of evolution) the moving spirit of which is R. H. Francé, and which since the beginning of 1907 has been published by the publishing house *Kosmos, Gesellschaft der Naturfreunde* in Stuttgart. From the same publishing house has also appeared the bold book of defence of Dr. Adolf Wagner, Privatdozent of Innsbruck, named *Der neue Kurs in der Biologie. Allgemeine Erörterungen zur prinzipiellen Rechtfertigung der Lamarckschen Entwicklungslehre* (The new current in biology. General discussions for the special justification of the Lamarckean theory of evolution). Schopenhauer, Eduard v. Hartmann and Th. Fechner are the philosophers to whom this "new current in biology" refers by preference.

Academic philosophers stand as much aloof from the neo-vitalistic movement and receive it as coldly as they do the neo-romantic line of thought and energism. Thus Münsterberg (*Philosophie der Werte* (Philosophy of Values), 1908 p. 307) says, "Vitalism is untenable and logically without a principle". It is for him "only a collective name for the unsolved problems of to-day". Even such an impartial thinker as Kurd Lasswitz rejects neo-vitalism in the chapter on *The principles of biology* in his latest book *Seelen und Ziele* (Souls and Ends). Leipzig 1908 p. 115, and that for the following reasons: All the manifold forms which vitalism takes have still this in common, that one believes one must claim for the organic world a special

new form of legal connection, a specific life-force regarding which the most divers characterisations have been given and the most divergent views formed. Among these, Lasswitz continues, there are some systems the representatives of which regard themselves as vitalists through an epistemological mistake, because they undervalue even the significance of the process of thought in the concept of reciprocity. Expressions, like entelechy, constants of individuality, biological constants, agent, potent, formative dominants and so forth, are perhaps only paraphrases of that synthetic unity which from the epistemological standpoint was characterised as a system (or structure). What is important here is whether the new terms introduced should signify a constitutive law or a regulative one, that is, a determination regarding "is" or regarding "ought," a categorical or a teleological proposition or anything psychological at all. The teleological and the psychological theories are as vitalism to be rejected epistemologically, whereas it is a mistake to use the name *vitalism*, where the concept of entelechy as an efficient force is not joined to the idea of purposiveness or spiritualisation. I try to approach the opposition between mechanism and vitalism from the side of the history of philosophy (*Sinn des Daseins*. Tübingen, Mohr, 1904 p. 42 sq.). For neo-vitalism has a symptomatic significance. I see in it a natural reaction against the dogmatic all-still thinkers, against the materialistic view of the world whose last representative is Ernst Haeckel. As our thirst for facts is appeased, there appears a hunger for causes. "Measure and number" alone do not satisfy us any longer; we want to know "meaning and ends." So long as we lived in a mathematically-governed and physically-interested age we confined ourselves to what could be measured. To-day, however, biological inquiry is in the ascendant and struggles with the mathematico-physical for supremacy. As the sum, world, however, does not go without a remainder in the mechanics of atoms, nay, as the

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atom itself, ever since the days of the ion and electron theories, has become open to question, the teleological view of the world again claims its right which was encroached upon and trampled by the 'telephobia' of the mechanical view of the world. Democritus and Spinoza satisfy that naturalism which meets the causal need of human nature, but Aristotle and Leibniz protect the ancient right of that teleological conception of the world which is suited to the biological view, as the mechanico-causal conception suits the mathematical view. Therefore, Aristotle and Leibniz stand on the foreground of "nature-philosophy" in general and the neo-vitalistic movements of to-day in particular.